Germans and ‘Blake’ by the British–aimed to make the Abwehr’s night reporting system as accurate as their day reporting, increasing the danger to British and Allied shipping in the area.5 It was perhaps no coincidence that two months later, the Germany Navy made plans to drive the British Fleet ‘out of the whole of the Mediterranean’, eventually redeploying the bulk of their U-boats from the Atlantic.6 In a move to counter this new German threat, in January 1942, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Britain’s clandestine sabotage agency, used two antiFranco locally-recruited agents, in an operation codenamed ‘Falaise’, to blow up a German observation station in Tangier. Although the raid demolished the building, the long-term benefits were arguable as the Germans simply moved the post to another location and other reporting stations continued to make visual sightings of Allied shipping. Sir Samuel Hoare, HM Ambassador in Madrid, had at the last moment withdrawn his permission for the operation to go ahead, but it was too late. Indeed, reports soon reached the Admiralty that British ships were being observed by the new ‘Bodden’ equipment. Rear-Admiral John Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, nevertheless remained keen to pursue the sabotage option.7 He told Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC), that ‘the only counter-measure possible is action by S.O.E. from Gibraltar and from Tangier simultaneously’ to carry out a ‘demolition’ of these stations.8 It was a course of action that met a fairly robust response. After consultation with the Foreign Office, Cavendish-Bentinck replied that the ‘position of our Consulate General at Tangier is likely to become untenable if there is another bomb incident in that neighbourhood and it is doubtful whether in the present state of affairs our relations with Spain will stand more strain’.9 Colonel (later Major-General Sir) Stewart Menzies, the Chief of SIS, was also brought into the discussion. Equally nervous, he feared the arrest of his representative in Tangier and a demand for the withdrawal of the British Consulate, the result being that his ‘Intelligence organisation which is producing much information on North Africa from Tangier, would disappear’. In Spain itself, Menzies feared ‘violent repercussions on the British intelligence system’ which he argued was ‘a vital centre for operations against the Axis’.10 Godfrey was not to be deterred, arguing for ‘vigorous intervention’ by Commandos and ‘special troops’ from SOE before U-boats ‘very quickly render these waters impassable in either direction’.11 His efforts ultimately ended in failure after
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