that even he foresaw German reunification as a pretty long- or medium-term process. What was his mindset at the time, and what exactly happened to change it?
Peter Hartmann Does Mr Genscher want to address that one? The 10 points were a response to Mr Modrow from the GDR, who talked about this treaty community. In order to avoid destabilisation in the GDR, the idea was that we should have a new institutional framework for cooperation, and that was the beginning of this 10-point programme. Indeed, I was interested to read that Christopher Mallaby thought it was rather unambitious and he did not focus on it much, and yet it became quite a big thing later on, with hindsight. We can discuss the substance, but it was not really that far-reaching. At the same time, it did give a signal that the Federal Government was keen to react to events, but it was just an internal German concern. It was not even about German unity. There was always this sentence that came back about self-determination, but it never actually said German unity or reunification. It was to do with a community under one treaty, and he wanted to send a signal to the citizens of the GDR and to Mr Modrow that you just cannot sit back and let things happen.
Sir Brian Crowe Mr Genscher, can I add a supplementary question so that you can respond to it as well? Firstly, Valentin Falin, just before that period, came to Bonn (this is perhaps also a question to Dr Hartmann) and he brought with him the proposal for a confederation. What kind of role did that play in your considerations, because Gorbachev himself seemed to be taken by surprise by that suggestion? Secondly, Mr Genscher, when did you hear about the 10-point plan? Dr Hartmann, when did George Bush hear about the 10 points, because Helmut Kohl says in his memoirs, ‘I informed President Bush beforehand’? Mr Teltschik says that was the case, and the document was forwarded, although rather late and in German.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher The speech was not an argument made by the government. It was a CDU document. The Federal Chancellor’s speech was not given as Bundeskanzler, but as party leader, because it had not actually been agreed within the government. It was a very serious proposal, but we did not make anything of it. My party chair, Graf Lambsdorff asked me immediately afterwards, ‘Did you know anything about this?’ I said no, but I would advise that we do not comment on it, because we are in a historic situation, and nothing would be worse for the interests of Germany than for us to seek to intervene on a party basis in a matter on the future of Germany. Certainly, the speech was given as party chairman of the CDU, not as Federal Chancellor. It is a document that has been superseded by events, because the unification from below had gained considerable momentum. It was certainly done at the political initiative in response to the increasingly dramatic events in East Germany, in recognition also that unification was to be a central campaign issue in the forthcoming Bundestag elections. The speech was drafted by Kohl’s close advisers and delivered without consulting or even informing his own foreign minister, his Western allies or the Soviet Union.
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