concerns about the security redistribution and many other things. And, of course, we found ourselves dealing with a flood of high-level visitors as I am sure all subsequent Heads of Mission and Deputy Heads of Mission did. Some of those were tremendous, like the State Visit of The Queen; it was completely chaotic but wonderfully good-natured and I think it achieved a huge amount. John Major’s visit, as Prime Minister, did too, though we wished he hadn’t made his misjudged comments about the High Commissioner’s residence. Some of the visits, however, had little to do with benefits to bilateral relations or the UK taxpayers. I remember that at the time of the successful outcome of the elections, there was a tremendous sense of excitement elsewhere in the Mission. A quotation, or a misquotation, that Thabo Mbeki made at that very time: ‘Bliss was it in that dawn, to be alive; but to be there was very Heaven.’ He was right, or almost right. Even then, however, we as a mission were careful to voice cautionary words to London about the future, in particular on managing expectations; the expectations were so high. I think one has to recall that the constitutional negotiators were increasingly desperate to avoid the very real prospect of civil war and of economic meltdown and, arguably, left too much to future good will – in particular, on this critical issue of the redistribution of resources. I was reading a book recently by Hlumelo Biko115 on this subject; one understands where he is coming from in his deep criticisms of the actual negotiating process, but there was a limit to what could be achieved in those pivotal years when we could, easily, have found ourselves embarking on a further period of bloodshed rather than of peace. Really, much of the onus for taking up the reins and ensuring that there was a successful, subsequent redistribution of resources lay with the successors to those negotiators. So, being in the Embassy from 1992-96 was a real rollercoaster of a ride. I do believe that we laid a good foundation for the subsequent growth of UK interest and our successor representatives, but they will, doubtless, let us know. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you very much indeed. We have until quarter to three for questions and comments, so the floor is now open, and I might take one or two at a time. So: Saul, Keith and Sir Peter. PROFESSOR SAUL DUBOW: Thank you very much for clarifying the matter of Mrs Thatcher referring to Mandela as a ‘terrorist’. I nevertheless think it is true that there were people around her in her circle who believed that the ANC was entirely dominated by communists and this may explain some of the context of ‘terrorist’ accusations. One of the reasons the ANC so disliked Mrs Thatcher was not just her position on sanctions but, in particular, her support – and this seems to be a personal support – of Chief Buthelezi, whom Dr Carter has mentioned. So, I wonder whether you might say something about the British Embassy’s position with regard to Inkatha and how that might have changed over time. Another person whom you did not mention, although you did mention Mrs Suzman, is opposition figure Frederick van Zyl Slabbert.116 He was very, very active as an internal broker himself, and I wonder whether you had any particular contact with him? KEITH SOMERVILLE: Lord Renwick, I wondered what your view was, or is, on the effects that PW Botha’s infamous Rubicon speech117 had on Margaret Thatcher’s thinking? I have read various accounts that said she was so angry, as was the American government, at the way British and American willingness to offer certain levels of support in return for gradual change suddenly changed. Also that she was willing to take a harder line when it was 115
Hlumelo Biko, The Great African Society: A Plan for a Nation Gone Astray (2013). Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert (1940-2010), leader of the Progressive Federal Party, 1979-86. 117 See chronology (Aug 1985). 116
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