The next generation BMD system designated “Nudol,” or A-235, will likely use HTK interceptors. (The Nudol interceptor could also perform in an ASAT role.) But while the United States has ruled out a nuclear-armed BMD interceptor, Russia is not as firmly committed to this decision as is the United States.62 Some in Russia believe that using a nuclear warhead would give higher confidence in their BMD by relaxing the demanding accuracy required by conventional HTK technology.63 Such a Russian nuclear BMD would introduce an additional uncertainty wrinkle in the dynamics of a multipolar BMD world if Russia either retained its older A-135 nuclear BMD interceptors or developed a modified nuclear-capable version of the A-235. The Russian S-400 air defense system has a certain level of defense capability against theater-range ballistic missiles, though no capability against ICBMs, whose higher speeds are too fast for the S-400 system to handle. The S-500 is a more advanced longer-range system than the S-400. Roughly comparable to the U.S. THAAD system, it is under development and may have some capability against ICBMs, though this capability is uncertain. The system remains under development as of mid-2017.64 Russia is actively involved in BMD development work and clearly has interest in exporting its shorter-range tactical ballistic missile defenses and air defense capabilities. However, Russia does not seem to have a clearly articulated strategy for its missile defense at the national strategic level. Other than limited protection for Moscow’s command and control, it is difficult to identify a scenario in which deployment of a missile defense system would contribute to Russia’s security or would make a difference in its ability to manage a conflict. Also, as mentioned in a previous section, Russian analysts many years ago assessed that a nationwide missile defense system is too technically difficult and expensive. Russia’s strategic BMD capability would be limited by the lack of a network of sensors, especially satellites and forward-deployed radars, which would be essential elements of an effective missile defense system. As a result, the current program is unlikely to produce a system that would affect the existing balance between Russia and the United States or between Russia and China.65 In mid-June 2017, the United States and Russia agreed in principle to resume strategic stability talks. While many strategic stability issues are clamoring for attention on the strategic stability agenda, strategic BMD may well be one of the issues that will be discussed.66
62 63 64 65 66
Podvig, April 2017, op. cit. Giles, op. cit. See Giles, op. cit., and references therein. Podvig, April 2017, op. cit. Steven Pifer, “Taking the Edge off U.S. Russia Strategic Relations,” Blog, Brookings.edu, June 19, 2017.
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