This section provides review coverage of recent contributions to research into various aspects of ‘extremism and democracy’. We include shorter book notes (150-300 words) and as well as more substantial reviews (600-900 words) of books that are of particular interest to group members. In addition to providing a broad range of reviews the team also welcome suggestions for future book reviews (including your own) or ideas for review symposia. If you would like to review one of the currently available titles (below) please contact one of the reviews editors: Matthew Goodwin (University of Manchester) E-mail: matthew.goodwin@manchester.ac.uk Sarah de Lange (University of Amsterdam) E-mail: s.l.delange@uva.nl ------------------------------------------------
CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW
*Jason Brownlee (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge University Press) *Christopher M. Hutton (2005) Race and the Third Reich: Linguistics, Racial Anthropology and Genetics in the Dialectic of Volk (Polity) *Leigh A. Payne (2008) Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence (Duke University Press) *Darius Rejali (2007) Torture and Democracy (Princeton University Press)
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BOOK REVIEWS
Roger Griffin, Modern and Fascism: the Sense of a New Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2007). ISBN 978-1-403908784-6. Reviewed by Roger Eatwell (University of Bath)
Roger Griffin’s The Nature of Fascism (1991) is one of the most important books ever written on ‘generic fascism’. Influenced especially by the earlier writings of Emilio Gentile and George Mosse, it took fascist ideology seriously. However, their work was published at a time when structuralism dominated academic research, and fascist ‘ideology’ was largely seen as a mask for the interests of the middle and/or capitalist class. Griffin, on the other hand, published his magnum opus at a time when there was a burgeoning academic Zeitgeist concerned with the power of ‘discourse’. Griffin subsequently sought to bolster the explanatory power of his approach by aligning with those who argued that fascism was a manifestation of a fanatical ‘political religion’. According to this approach, fascism arose against a background of a ‘sense-making crisis’, which led the masses to seek transcendence by adopting a new identity. Griffin’s latest work argues that fascism ‘represents an alternative modernism rather than a rejection of it’ (p.2), and seeks to identify the roots of this quest for a ‘new beginning’ within a deep cultural malaise which afflicted parts of Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The book is a remarkable piece of scholarship, but in methodological terms it marks a notable step backwards from his magnum opus. This was based on a remarkably diverse set of approaches, whereas Modernism and Fascism is largely an exercise in the history of ideas and a study of ‘intellectuals’. For example, concern with ‘decadence’ and the ‘quest for a new beginning’ is largely studied through a number of ‘texts’. Like much ‘cultural turn’ writing, it assumes a relatively simple cause and effect relationship of such discourse. However, the empirical evidence suggests that during both the movement and regime phases of fascism, supporters were attracted for a broad variety of reasons. Whilst fascism was undoubtedly seen by some as a form of new religion, it also appealed on economic and other grounds (such as land promised to the peasants in pre-1922 Italy, and cheap holidays organised by the KDF in post-1933 Germany). Fascism in Germany and Italy was not so much a cultural movement as a highly organized political movement. The ensuing regimes exercised control through forms of coercion and group conformity more than through inspiring new belief systems. The post-structural turn in fascist studies has brought many insights, but it is now in danger of believing its own myths!
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Neil J. Smelser, The Faces of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). ISBN: 0691133085. Review by Michael J. Boyle (University of St. Andrews)
In this important and helpful new volume, Neil J. Smelser, a distinguished professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, provides a comprehensive and multidisciplinary account of the problem of terrorism. Drawing on his previous research work on sociology and on his recent work as a member of the Committee on Science and Technology to Counter Terrorism for the National Research Council in the U.S., Smelser offers a sophisticated review of the some of the key issues in the study of terrorism, as well as a thoughtful analysis of how counter-terrorism might sensibly be done in a post 9/11 environment. Throughout the book, Smelser develops the theme of entrapment; i.e., that in some cases the problem of terrorism creates situations in which there are hard, if not tragic, tradeoffs, which must be managed. For example, an act of terrorism forces responders to make harder future choices between security and civil liberties; similarly, efforts to restrict terrorist access to the media tend to leave the media more open to accusations to bias and partisanship. Each of these sections is very helpful and allows us to think more precisely about the dilemmas governments face in responding to terrorism. Similarly, Smelser’s careful analysis of the dilemmas associated with different counter-terror approaches (like target hardening and the restriction of financing to terrorist groups) is well-informed and politically feasible. His conclusion is ultimately that it is impossible to completely prevent terrorism, but that a careful management of expectations, benefits and costs of terrorism can go a long way towards discouraging it. Smelser also provides a sophisticated and multi-level analysis of causes, tracing the incidence of terrorism from root causes to more proximate psychological and ideological factors. This is particularly helpful, as this book avoids the common mistake of assuming a single, coherent causal relationship between one factor – for example, poverty – and the incidence of terrorism. On the contrary, Smelser acknowledges that many causes vary at the level of generality and have different causal significance in different contexts. This suggests that at no point will scholars uncover a single causal chain of independent variables that produce a single dependent variable (terrorism). Rather, Smelser conceives of terrorism as a funnelling process, where a complex set of factors push and pull an individual into making a strategic choice for terrorism.
This is a more sophisticated account of causation than appears in most works on terrorism and should be required reading for anyone working in the field. Further, Smelser provides a careful and subtle reading of how publics might respond to a terrorist attack, especially as they search for meaning of the event and an immediate reduction of uncertainty. This is an overlooked aspect of the problem of terrorism and deserves further study, especially in light of the fact that immoderate responses to terrorism carry the risk of generating more terrorism over the long run. In short, this is a strong contribution to the existing literature on terrorism and provides a wealth of insights (especially from sociology and psychology) which would profit those working on terrorism from within political science. It can come highly recommended to all ECPR members.
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Tamir Bar-On, Where Have All the Fascists Gone? (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). ISBN 978-0-7546-75154-1. Reviewed by Andreas Umland (National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv)
This book represents a major contribution to the study of the post-war West European extreme right-wing intellectual movement that has become known as the “European New Right” (ENR). Apart from providing an in-depth analysis of the ideas of the francophone nouvelle droite and Italian nuova destra, the book discusses: (a) what the defining characteristics of the ENR are, (b) how various scholars have interpreted the ENR, and (c) the ENR’s impact on, and interrelations with, extremely right-wing parties and the political mainstream, especially in France. Bar-On distinguishes the ENR from the neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon New Right and identifies the metapolitical strategy of the ENR as well as its anti-egalitarianism and insistence on the “right to difference” as core characteristics of this particular variety of right-wing politics. Bar-On makes a useful distinction between those scholars who regard the ENR as a form of neo-fascism, and those who do not. Among others, the prominent British theorist of fascism Roger Griffin has insisted that the various mutations within the discourse of the ENR since its clearly fascist phase in the 1960s have not touched the core of the ENR which has remained a veiled, yet full-scale permutation of palingenetic ultra-nationalism (Griffin’s conceptualization of fascism).
Bar-On, however, does not only introduce Griffin, but also a number of other scholars who have made similar arguments, and warned in one way or another against the ENR’s inroads into mainstream political discourse. Bar-On’s extensive treatment of this particular position is in so far laudable as he does not seem to support it fully, but rather acknowledges the argument of other scholars who have seen the ENR ideology as either a synthesis of old right-wing and New Left ideas, or as a genuinely novel political ideology transcending the borders of traditional right and left.
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Antonio Costa Pinto, Roger Eatwell and Stein Ugelvik Larsen (eds), Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe (London: Routledge, 2007). ISBN 978-0-415-41983-3. Reviewed by David Baker (University of Sheffield)
As Roger Eatwell notes in his Introduction, it has become conventional wisdom to distinguish the conservative/authoritarian movements and regimes in inter-war Europe, from more radicalised fascist/totalitarian ones. He suggests, however, that there were significant differences both between and within these categories, and that ‘fascism’ should therefore be understood within ‘a matrix of possible syntheses’, centered on a range of essentially nationalist responses to the rise of the politicized under-classes of Europe and associated left-wing elites. Thus, inspired by the first manifestations of fascism in Italy, fascists developed new forms of nationalist political leadership, involving varieties of charismatic politics associated with forms of secularized personal magnetism and force of will, rather than any claimed wider religious mission. The central focus of this volume is the analysis and debate of such issues both theoretically and empirically/historically. The book is subdivided into two sections. The first entitled ‘Approaching Charisma’ offers a theoretical/methodological discussion of the concept/s of charisma, while the second and larger section contains several case studies of individual fascist and authoritarian leaders between the 20th century wars. It concludes with an analytical reconfiguration of the concept of charisma and its place in analyzing classical fascism. In the important opening theoretical chapter Roger Eatwell accepts that modern conceptions of ‘charisma’ derive from Max Weber’s definition of a form of exceptional rule during period of crisis, where populist leaders inspire mass-support for tough political solutions, but argues that this ignores important dimensions of the leader/support relationship within fascist movements. Instead, he refines the concept into ‘coterie charisma’, the leader’s appeal to his elite core; ‘centripetal charisma’, the leader’s ability to become the personification of politics and the state, creating and
maintaining a mass support base; and ‘cultic charisma’, the creation of a quasi-religious cult centered on an ‘inspired’ national leader. Michael Dobray’s second theory chapter investigates the roots of charismatic authority in Weber’s model and uses this to critique Ian Kershaw’s stress on Hitler’s domination through personal charismatic authority, suggesting that in the process Kershaw has transformed the Weberian Ideal Typology, in a model of historically-defined essences. In a very important qualification, Rainer Lepsius’s study of National Socialism opens the case studies section with an interesting sociological analysis of Weber’s model, suggesting that the traditional analytical dichotomies between ‘monocratic’ and ‘polycratic’ conceptualizations of Nazism in power should not be treated as mutually exclusive characterizations of the dictatorship. Stanley Payne offers a sound analysis of the central significance of Franco’s Civil War stance as the savior of all Spain from a perceived immanent and overwhelming communist threat, also linked to the elimination of his chief fascist flange rival, which cleared the way for the Spanish dictator to foster a quasi-fascist-style charismatic mythology in power. Antonio Costa Pinto presents a similar picture in Portugal, as Salazar, another conventional authoritarian dictator of the period, cloaked himself in quasi-fascist leader-cult, having also eliminated his main fascist rival. Marc-Oliver Baruch discovers the essence of Petain’s (non-fascist) propaganda in Weber’s model of the revered individual of accepted heroic virtue, who embodies true merit. But he also demonstrates that in Vichy France the ideologies of the state and the dictator were never successfully merged, leading to a relatively fragile and short lived charismatisation. The chapters on Croatia and Norway (by Goldstein and Larson) highlight differences that occurred where fascist took power by collaboration, or occupation. Larson’s fascinating study of Vidkun Quisling demonstrates that the charismatic authority of this essentially withdrawn individual came from below, based upon the personal loyalty of his immediate followers. While, in the case of Croatia, Goldstein suggests that the charismatic aspect of Ante Pavelic’s rule was characterised by his successful personal embodiment of widely-held longings for the realisation of Croatian national sovereignty. Stephen Fischer-Galati’s study of the Romanian Iron Guard leader Corneliu Codreanu depicts a archetypical charismatic individual who based his appeal on cults of religion and violence, combined with a strong attraction for disaffected youth. In the final chapter, Emilio Gentile links the concept of charisma exclusively to the regime period of Italian Fascism, during which, he argues, the Duce was privileged with ‘invested charisma’ from the fascist movement, at least until he succumbed to his own charismatic myths, after which they too doubted him. In their joint conclusion Costa Pinto and Larsen employ the knowledge gained to break from the traditional Weberian model of authority, invested by a combination of traditional, legal and charismatic means, adding an ideological dimension, by developing a working triangular model of charismatic and dictatorial leadership around ‘charisma from above’, ‘charisma from below’ and ‘the charismatic event’. The historical case studies generally reinforce the theoretical points made by Eatwell, Dobray, Costa Pinto and Larsen, that fascist charisma was invested in the various
leaders, both by their relationship with their political movements/regimes and the wider relationship of each ‘leader’ with their charismatised masses, rather than simply through their self-sufficient charismatic authority – a process best summed up in Eatwell’s ‘matrix of possibilities’. Several of the historical studies also demonstrate the significance of a ‘charismatic event’ underlying this process. It is clear from this volume that to understand role of charisma in relation to fascism, it is necessary to adopt a highly nuanced reinterpretation and enrichment/refinement of Weber’s original concepts. Above all, this volume reaffirms the belief that ‘charisma’ and ‘fascism’ are properly linked, are useful analytical/conceptual terms, and offer a much needed scholarly re-examination of the important linkages between them while suggesting fruitful avenues for future research. As such, students and researchers in the field of comparative fascist studies, political ideologies and modern historical studies will all welcome and make use of this volume.
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D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell (eds) Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). ISBN:9780230013490 Reviewed by Andrej Zaslove (Wilfred Laurier)
Political parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, and Forza Italia have prompted scholars of European politics to seriously engage with populism. A healthy debate has ensued over how to define populism, over why there has been a sudden increase in populist parties since the 1990s, and over the political and the policy implications of populism. The contributors to Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy present compelling answers to these pertinent questions. In the Introduction Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell develop a concise definition of populism. The authors define populism as a political ideology that juxtaposes the “virtuous and the homogenous people” with “political elites and dangerous others.” This dichotomy assumes that elites and outsiders have robbed the people of their culture, rights, and sovereignty. The “inherently good and sovereign people” are mobilized by charismatic and populist leaders who present themselves as the defenders of the culture and the way of life of their people (pp. 3-4). The “Introduction,” quite rightly, separates populism from the current tendency to automatically link populism with the radical and the extreme right. Moreover, it lays the
groundwork for the book’s central research questions: Why are there currently such a high number of populist parties in Europe? And why is populism successful in some countries and not in others? In Part One of the book Gianfranco Pasquino and Alfio Mastropaolo set the stage for the subsequent case studies. They examine the structural conditions that facilitate the rise of populist movements, and, most importantly, the reasons behind the current populist surge. Pasquino and Mastropaolo, each in their own manner, emphasize that the central causes behind populism are political. They argue that the decline of political parties and intermediating institutions within civil society create a space for populist parties. As Mastropaolo points out, Fordism and the construction of the welfare state in the post-war era was accompanied by “organized democracy.” Political parties, unions, and civil society organizations mobilized and protected their members; they were perceived by their supporters as their legitimate representatives (pp. 36-9). The emergence of the cartel party, the de-linking of the party from civil society, and the declining ability to set the political agenda, due in part to the growing power of private media outlets, means that citizens no longer perceive their political parties as actors who can adequately address the pressing political issues (pp. 39-44). As Gianpietro Mazzoleni points out in his chapter on the media and populism, the restructuring of print, radio, and television, and the general mediatization of politics, is particularly conducive to the rise of populism (p. 52).The reader might be left wondering how this analysis explains the success and the failure of populism. As Pasquino notes, the decline in the “structures of political intermediation,” the personalization of political power, and the more prominent role played by the media are prevalent across most Liberal Democracies. However, according to Pasquino, success and failure depends on structure and agency. Populism is more successful where these transformations are more profound (pp. 26-9). And success depends on agency and political mobilization; it depends on the “presence of a leader willing and able to exploit existing social conditions of anxiety and availability (pp. 26-7).” These opening chapters set the stage for the second part of the book, the case studies. The question is: why has populism been particularly successful in Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and France, while it has failed in Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and Ireland? Reinhard Heinisch’s chapter on Austria highlights that growing disillusionment with consociational democracy, the neo-corporatist welfare state, value shifts, demographic changes and new ideological cleavages created opportunity structures for the Freedom Party (pp. 67-74). Marco Tarchi demonstrates that the decline of the post war Italian party system, due to the demise of communism and secularization, along with an economic crisis which followed the end of the golden age, and the significant increase in immigration, also created the opportunity structures for the emergence of both the Lega Nord and Forza Italia (pp. 87-88). Daniele Albertazzi’s chapter demonstrates that Switzerland, one of the wealthiest Liberal Democracies, is not immune to populism. Important economic transformations and migration, and the media allowed new actors such as the Lega dei Ticinesi and the Swiss People’s Party to exploit the tools of direct democracy to attack Swiss consociational democracy (pp. 107-115). In a similar manner, Paul Lucardie argues that the demise of the Dutch pillar
system, due to secularization, economic stagnation and new issues such as immigration and law and order created the opportunity structures for populist mobilization (pp.1517). The French case diverges somewhat from these examples since it does not fit the model of consociational democracy and since France did not experience the same degree of partitocrazia as in Italy during the so-called first republic (1946-1992). However, Jens Rydgren demonstrates that in France electoral dealignment, declining party membership, and party convergence (real or perceived) have also created opportunities for the French National Front to exploit (pp. 174-175). The question is whether structures alone can explain why populism has been successful in these countries, while it has been less successful in Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and Ireland. The answer is both yes and no. For example, those countries that so far have proven to be rather immune to populism have also experienced a decline in the presence of political parties and institutions of intermediation, while there has also been a trend towards the personalization of leadership. However, at the same time specific country structures do decrease the likelihood that populist parties will occur. Rydgren emphasizes that class voting has not diminished to the same degree in Sweden (p. 142). Decker highlights that the Nazi legacy has increased the institutional and the cultural threshold for populism to penetrate the German political system (p. 1334). And Stefano Fella argues that in Great Britain the use of populism by Margaret Thatcher (and Tony Blair), along with the first past the post voting system, has made it more difficult for populist movements to emerge. Despite this emphasis on opportunity structures, a common theme throughout the book is that the success and the failure of populism is often due to agency. Successful populist leaders possess the personality, the organizational skills, the resources, and the ideological tools to exploit anxieties, frustrations, and anti-political sentiments. On the other hand, Decker argues that populism has largely failed in Germany, especially right-wing populism, since no populist leader has been able to create a national populist movement (pp. 128 and 133-4). Rydgren points out that division within New Democracy were partly responsible for the failure of populism in Sweden (p. 138). And McDonnell argues that similar opportunity structures that could facilitate the rise of populism are present in Ireland; failure might be due to the simple fact that a populist leader has not emerged (pp. 214-5). The chapters in this collection are of high quality. Albertazzi and McDonnell articulate a clear and concise definition of populism that is subsequently applied and further clarified in the cases studies. Moreover, the common emphasis on the tension between structure and agency illuminates the success and the failures of populist movements. However, despite my high praise for the book, I am less convinced by the general application of the term populism for movements as diverse asForza Italia, the German Party of Democratic Socialism, and the French National Front. I do agree that the parties under consideration are populist. However, in my opinion the reader is left wondering if all forms of populism can be placed under one roof without further compartmentalization.
Cas Mudde, in his recent bookPopulist Radical Right Parties in Europe, has identified three forms of populism; the populist radical right, populist neo-liberalism, and social populism (pp. 29-31). The assumption here is that these forms of populism, especially the populist radical right, have a specific ideology. In other words, it is not enough to label these diverse parties as populist parties. Rather, it is equally important to emphasize that these populist movements often have distinct ideologies, identities, and political platforms – all of which influence their electoral success and the reasons why voters support them on a continued and on going basis.