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WHY SYRI A M A TTERS M ORE THA N YOU THI NK While Russia focuses more on naval expansion and market access, Iran is mainly focused on its regional flexibility. The Political Science Quarterly explains the theory behind this in their Spring 2019 volume. They go on how due to Iran's "Strategic isolation," permanently being barricaded by all of its rivals (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, etc.), they are more inclined to exert a show of force in their foreign policy rather than deal with a strong foundation for their domestic politics. Such desperate tactics come with considerable risk, and what better pay off could a victory in Syria be. Let's say, Iran won the jackpot and additional chips in the poker game that is JCPOA negotiations. Here are the reasons why. Chip one, arm trading networks. As part of its foreign policy doctrine, Iran utilizes various terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas to exert influence abroad. However, when it comes to giving arms and weaponry to said groups, the task becomes a little more complicated. Due to the US' previous presence in Syria, our forces would block off groups such as Hezbollah from receiving Iranian arms within the region; as a result, they would often have to go through more strenuous routes, where the margin of error was highest. Nevertheless, now that the US has pulled out of the region, these routes are now open for business because Syria has reclaimed autonomy and couldn't care less what Iran does, so long as the people don't revolt against Assad. Which leads to the second chip, local political control. Sounds weird, but ironically it's Iran's ace as of now. During the height of the Syrian Civil War, Iran assisted Assad by providing him militias to operate within local provinces and exert both physical and political control. These groups, separate from Hezbollah and Hamas, are directly apart of the Iranian State. They are known as, The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC for short. According to the Institute for the Study of War, "Iran is also assisting pro-government shabiha militias, partly to hedge against Assad's fall or the contraction of the regime into Damascus and a coastal Alawite enclave. These militias will become even more dependent on Tehran in such a scenario, allowing Iran to maintain some ability to operate in and project force from Syria.?As a result of Syria's dependency on the IRGC to project influence, the US pullout of Syria allows Iran ample opportunity to seize more significant sums of power. Even potentially, let's say, forming political coalitions and lobbies within Syria. While the initial impact of such action would provoke regional tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the more immediate and fatal effects would be an increase of leverage for Iran. Why is this bad? Well, for starters, the US is already losing significant amounts of pull with Iran as a result of our recent pullout from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA). Moreover, with increased hostilities within the Gaza Strip, a prominent trading and geostrategic area, the US and Iran are closing in on each other. Thus, the US needs to regain face and get