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Impact of Culture on Integration: Conference Proceedings


The proceedings of the conference are financed by the Integration and Migration Foundation Our People and the Ministry of Culture of Estonia, with the co-financing from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals

European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals

Editors: Eva-Maria Asari, Tanel Mätlik Translation: A&A Lingua LLC Publisher: Gravitas Consult LLC Address: 6-1 Väike-Tähe Street, Tartu 51010 Estonia info@gravitas.ee www.gravitas.ee

Copyright ©2012 Integration and Migration Foundation Our People The responsibility for ideas or opinion expressed in this publication lies with the authors of the articles. Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. Gravitas LLC, Integration and Migration Foundation Our People, Ministry of Culture and the European Commission accept no responsibility or liability whatsoever with regard to the use made of the information contained in this publication.

ISBN 978-9949-30-851-4 2


Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 4 Opening Remarks – Impact of Culture on Integration ................................................................................... 5 Laine Randjärv Policy-Making for Cultural Integration Role of Culture in Minority and Migrant Integration in the EU ................................................................ 8 Eva-Maria Asari Integration Policies for Europe in the 21st Century ................................................................................ 17 Robert Palmer Integration in Estonia: Different Ways ................................................................................................... 22 Triin Vihalemm Multiculturalism - Introduction to a Problem......................................................................................... 29 Frederik Stjernfelt The Significance of Democracy and Cultural Exchenge for Young People as Diversity increases ........... 41 Adam Newman Turner The Making of Italians ............................................................................................................................ 47 Susanna Tamimi Preparation Process of renewing the Estonian Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity .......................... 50 Marianna Drozdova Estonian Policy towards Ethnic Minorities and Russification of Ethnic Minorities: Success or Failure? . 54 Aleksandr Aidarov Russian Nation-Building, Cultural Diversity and Language Policy ........................................................... 58 Konstantin Zamyatin Cultural Issues of the Integration Policy in France ................................................................................. 62 Marie-José Bernardot Best Practices Introduction to Practical Examples of Cultural Integration .................................................................... 66 Tanel Mätlik Television - Travel without Travelling ..................................................................................................... 68 Priit Kuusk Music as a Tool for Integration............................................................................................................... 70 Leelo Lehtla Dance as a Tool for Integration .............................................................................................................. 72 Zemfira Lampmann, Jevgeni Mironov Cultural Integration at the Warsaw Multicultural Centre....................................................................... 74 Witek Hebanowski Integratia - the Integration Comic .......................................................................................................... 76 Franz Wolf-Maier Finnish Association of Russian-speaking Organizations (FARO) ............................................................. 77 Petr Potchinchtchikov, Polina Kopylova Film as a tool for Integration .................................................................................................................. 78 Marc Nigita

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Acknowledgements This collection of articles is based on the presentations and topics discussed at the international conference on “Impact of Culture on Integration� held in Tallinn September 20-21 2012. Culture provides an environment for dialogue between different ethnic groups and, thus, plays an important role in fostering the integration process and promoting the inclusion of ethnic minorities. Currently, a key question that prevails throughout Europe is how to use culture more effectively in creating cohesive societies, without putting at risk the preservation of cultural identities of the members of different ethnic groups. The role of culture in integration however, poses a number of questions. For instance, does the unification of a society on the basis of common citizenship and common language also suppose the acquisition of a common culture (or at least some of its elements)? And, if so, how does it differ from assimilation? When tackling these questions, both the Estonian and the European Union context were considered at the conference. The aim of the conference was to exchange the information, experiences and best practices between the EU Member States with regard to the role of culture in the integration of third country nationals, as well as generating new ideas for future activity and policy. The outcome of the conference is to support policy makers and practitioners active in the field of integration to use culture more effectively in integration activities. The first section gives an overview of the theoretical debates about the importance of cultural identity in minority rights. The rest of the book is divided into two broad sections, first focusing on the cultural policies and programmes that Member States implement towards ethnic minorities and thirdcountry nationals while the second part presents a selection of best practices how culture has been used to foster integration of third-country nationals. We would like to thank the Integration and Migration Foundation Our People and the Ministry of Culture of Estonia for initiating the conference on such a topical issue and also all of those who attended the conference, giving their feedback, ideas, thoughts and reflections on the issues raised and thereby enhancing our understandings. We are delighted that the European Commission has co-financed the conference and its proceedings from the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. Finally, we would like to thank our contributors who have been generous and gracious with their time to write engaging and insightful papers that make up this book.

Tanel Mätlik, Gravitas Consult LLC Eva-Maria Asari, Gravitas Consult LLC The Editors

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Opening Remarks – Impact of Culture on Integration Laine Rändjärv, First Vice-President of the Riigikogu (Parliament) Mahatma Gandhi, whose philosophy of non-violent disobedience has over the course of time influenced peaceful national and international movements, wrote: “I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible.” I believe that most people present in this hall today would agree with this philosophy. Esteemed colleagues and dear friends, It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this conference, the title of which is ‘The Impact of Culture on Integration’. I firmly believe that being like-minded people, we wish to lead the world towards greater understanding, tolerance and respect between nations. In terms of its geographical location, Estonia is situated at the crossroads of many different cultures and over the centuries, culture has been the fundamental way of achieving mutual understanding between different nations. The intertwining of cultures is reflected in language, art, architecture and elsewhere. A positive example is the University of Tartu, which is famous all over the world for its different research schools. Throughout its history, professors from different countries have worked and shared their intellectual insights. Their knowledge and research results have also been integrated into the Estonian landscape of research culture. Culture has a special meaning for Estonian state. By culture we mean both cultural traditions and our native language, as well as being able to read, learn, conduct research or sing in the same. Thanks to its literary language, the state has been able to weather the storms of the past. Estonian people have always cherished their language and culture, but at the same time they have also held the traditions of other people in high regard – in addition to their own language, they have also studied Russian, German, French and English. It is very important for the people and cultural traditions of a small country that they do not exist isolation from the outside world. A decade or so ago, essayist Enn Soosaar wrote in his article entitled Mononational Estonia as a Daydream that Estonia was not linguistically and culturally homogenous region already prior to the 18th century. During last eight centuries, several languages, cultures, attitudes and mentalities have co-existed here and influenced one another to a greater or lesser extent. (Eesti Päevaleht, 21 September 2000) People in Estonia are different not only in terms of their native language and national culture, but also with regard to their moral values, life philosophy, world-view and ideas of citizenship. We need a more differentiated and elaborated actions in our integration process that would take into account the needs and characteristics of each group. The main purpose of Estonia’s integration policy is to ensure that every resident of this country feels part of the Estonian state; that they speak Estonian and understand Estonian culture; and are proud of their own ethnic identity and the culture of their ethnic homeland. It is essential that cultural heritage traditions are passed on to our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Because one can be tolerant and love can only if one loves and understands his or her own culture. Our children acquire their basic knowledge on cultural diversity already in school and it seems to me that the younger generation does not have any specific issues when exposed to novel cultural phenomena. 5


Today, there are representatives of more than 190 ethnic groups living in Estonia (in 2000, this number was just 142). There are large and strong communities as well as small ethnic groups, who set up national cultural societies or work in Sunday (Weekend) schools. One of the most important instruments of integration policy in the Republic of Estonia is undoubtedly culture. This is eloquently demonstrated by the decision that in our country the Ministry of Culture is responsible for integration policy issues. Despite the fact that the integration process has been on-going for many years, we can neither today nor tomorrow report on its completion. Some activities in this field have been successful and function well, others require a new approach. Failure is unknown only to those who do nothing. However, inaction is not a solution either. It is essential that the society as a whole actively learns about the world that surrounds it and its processes. I am confident that the experiences from working in the field of integration, the theoretical concepts and the practices shared during the course of this conference will enhance our knowledge, benefitting us all in our future work. I wish all attendees a pleasant conference atmosphere and many thought provoking presentations and constructive discussions. I do hope that you will also make new friends and encounter many like-minded people! Many great experiences in Tallinn – a City by the sea, which has for many centuries been enriched by the symbiosis of the cultures of different nations.

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Policy-Making for Cultural Integration

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Role of Culture in Minority and Migrant Integration in the EU Issues Paper for the International Conference on “Impact of Culture on Integration” Eva-Maria Asari, Gravitas Consult LLC

Introduction We live in a world of remarkable ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, and one of the most difficult challenges faced by modern societies is to find the ways how to adequately respond to the competing demands that arise from these different groups in their attempts to protect their cultures and identities. Contemporary conception of minority rights comprises a whole set of political, social, economic and cultural rights. This paper will focus on the latter and explore the role of culture in ethnic minority and immigrant integration in the European Union building on the theories of minority rights and the conceptual frameworks developed in international law. There is a general trend in the international law towards value of pluralism and recognition towards the need to preserve identities of all groups in society, since the unity of identities which the nation-state model has pursued has not be able to protect the rights of some individuals, but more importantly has not been successful in avoiding the tensions and conflicts around the world which the international community has sought to prevent. Culture is a complex concept, with no concise definition in international law or academia. In the widest sense culture refers to universal human capacity: it includes the totality of the knowledge and practices, distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It may also include tangible products such as cultural property (e.g. art treasures), archaeological heritage, literature, broadcast media, musical and artistic works etc., but also modes of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs1, cuisine and dress, household practices and industrial techniques. As an expression of way of life culture is important to both majority as well as minorities. As with culture, it goes without saying that defining “minority” has also proved to be difficult. In the XX century ‘minority’ has come to refer mainly to a particular kind of community, and especially to a national or similar community which differs by language, ethnicity or religion from the predominant group in the state2. Minorities can be distinguished by different cultural and other markers of identity (such as language, race and ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or life style) or by their historical relation to the larger political community (indigenous groups, ethno-national minorities or immigrant communities3. For the purposes of this paper and conference we adopt wide definition of cultural minority that includes ethnicity, language and religion and this is also reflected in the presentations. We will also look at different ways the culture can be manifested – dance, film, food, music, media and television etc. Culture and Inclusion in Multicultural society One of the fundamental principles of liberal society is that its members have equal chance to get what they want out of life that is no one is forced to act in the ways that contradict their values. However it 1

UNESCO, Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies 1982 “Study on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities”, United Nations, New York, 1991, E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (sales No. F.91.XIV.2), para. 564. 3 Kymlicka, W. (1995: 18). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford; Parekh, B. (2000: 3-4). Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press/Palgrave 2

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poses an important question what does this equality of opportunity entail in multicultural society. Does this mean that people should or should not be made subject to legal or other requirements that could or would force them to violate their cultural and/or religious commitments? There are two broad responses to this question. First response is classical liberal Barryan 4 approach that opportunities have to be assessed independently of the dispositions of cultural groups to taking advantage of them. Opportunities in general are an objective state of affairs. Cultural belonging is treated as an “expensive taste” or costly way of life that is voluntarily chosen, and therefore all the cost (both material and emotional) must be borne by the minority community. Moreover as a matter of justice the state does not bear responsibility to provide minorities with cultural rights. The state is treated as ethnoculturally neutral. This approach is challenged by arguments of cultural embeddedness of human nature. People do not exist as atomistic individuals abstracted from society but rather as socialised individuals embedded within well-defined social and political order. Functioning of individuals in the society is dependent on their cultural values. Cultural membership is a primary good that provides us with capacity of providing meaningful options to act upon and aids our ability to judge ourselves the value of our lifeplans5. Culture is a way of relating to other in any interaction – a way of following or challenging social rules and so a dimension of any social relation from a cultural slur in the work place to the relations among nations6. Culture is considered an intrinsic part of individual well-being7.This also means that persons’ self-respect is bound up with the esteem of his or her esteem ethnic group. If a culture is not generally respected, is discriminated against, belittled or scoffed at, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened 8. Members of these groups will find it difficult to integrate into another (e.g. dominant) culture. Since culture forms an important part of individual’s ability to function on society, acquiring cultural capital9 becomes essential aspect of the socialisation process. Cultural capital takes the form of strategic tools that in turn transform into socialised tendencies or dispositions to act think or feel in a certain way. Therefore parents, for instance, can endow their children with linguistic and cultural competences that will give them a greater likelihood of success at school and university 10. This creates the link between cultural capital with the ability to acquire economic capital. This has raised the question of so called cultural citizenship11, whether accommodation and naturalisation into the receiving society’s nationality should also entail cultural rights for ethnic minorities and immigrants. In a secular society, especially where social inequality is intensified by economic rationalism and deepening cultural diversity, shared citizenship functions as a major foundation of social solidarity. 12 Citizenship includes (legal) rights and obligations that, translate into formal entitlements to scarce resources in society. These include economic resources such as social security and healthcare 4

Barry, B. (2002). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Harvard University Press Kymlicka, W. (1991:166), Liberalism, Community and Culture, Oxford University Press 6 Tully, J.(1995:15) Strange Multiplicity, Cambridge University Press 7 Malloy, T. and Gazzola, M. (2006:30) Evaluation of the impact of inclusion policies under the Open Method of Co-ordination: Assessing the Cultural Policies of Six Member States of the European Union, ECMI 8 Taylor,Ch. (1992). Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”. Princeton: Princeton University Press.; Tamir, Y. (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton University Press 9 As referred to by Bourdieu (1990) – Cultural capital refers to the symbols, ideas, tastes and preferences that can be strategically used as resources in social action. 10 Malloy, T. and Gazzola, M. (2006:30) Evaluation of the impact of inclusion policies under the Open Method of Co-ordination: Assessing the Cultural Policies of Six Member States of the European Union, ECMI 11 Delanty. G. (2007) Citizenship as a learning process: Disciplinary citizenship versus cultural citizenship. Eurozine. 12 Isin, E. and Turner, B. (2002). Citizenship Studies. In E. F. Isin and B. S. Turner (eds.) Handbook of Citizenship Studies (pp. 1-11). London: Sage; Miller, D. (2000) Differentiated Citizenship. In Laius, A., Pros, I. and Petal, I. (Eds.) Estonia's Integration Landscape: from Apathy to Harmony (pp. 56-64). Tallinn: Jaan Tõnisson Institute. 5

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entitlements, as well as, within a liberal framework, access to culturally desirable resources or goods such as the right to speak one’s own language in the public arena, or rights relating to religious freedom. This has therefore raised the question whether minority rights are dependent on person’s citizenship in the country of residence and what cultural rights, if any are to be guaranteed to third-country nationals and immigrant communities?13 Are immigrants expected to gradually absorb the values and norms which predominate in their host society, especially on an inter‐generational basis; or are social values and norms enduring and deep‐rooted within each nation, shaped by collective histories, common languages, and religious traditions, so that migrant populations are unlikely to abandon their cultural roots when they settle in another country 14? Hence, the nature of cultural (and linguistic) rights of minorities in the XXI century is changing and need to be reconsidered as the distinction between national minorities and immigrants is becoming more blurred. This is why Frederik Stjernfelt 15 has proposed the adoption of "soft" multiculturalism in liberal democracies as a possible solution. He argues that there should be maximum freedom for cultural variation possible, allowing citizens to develop their cultures however they desire - as long as they respect basic principles of democracy. The only limitation being no compromise between liberalism and culturalism, basic democratic and liberal principals overrule cultural preferences and new-comers have to adopt their way of life accordingly. The categorising minorities into national minorities and immigrants has an important normative value and holds significant consequences on the political level because they are attributed different moral value. National minorities are accorded with more or less the full complement of rights vis-à-vis immigrants, who are rendered a limited set of rights. The system of minority rights is based on the notion of compensation for the (historical) disadvantage. National minorities that have had to struggle to maintain their culture and way of life in the face of attempts of (sometimes forcible) assimilation, have been deprived of public status and of the politically allocated resources necessary for their culture to be preserved. Immigrants, however, are regarded as having relinquished their right to protect their societal culture by leaving it behind. They can be granted cultural rights that intend to assist them in expressing their cultural particularity and pride, but without it hindering the success of the economic and political institutions of the dominant society. The distinction between national minorities and immigrants is temporal: old immigrants become national minorities and new migrant communities arrive. This in turn raises the question degree of indigenousness needed for an immigrant community to become national minority. In Hungary, for example, for a community to gain national minority status, it has to have a history of at least one century of living in Hungary 16. One could of course argue whether a hundred years is too long or too short, but is a fixed numerical criterion. Another way to distinguish between national minorities and immigrants is to name them in the relevant Government regulation as Estonia 17 and Sweden18 have done. Here gaining the status is more dependent on the lobby activities of particular groups to push through legislative amendments to be included in the list.

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Article 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not exclude non-citizens from its realm and Article 2 promotes respect for the ICCPR rights for all persons within a state’s territory or jurisdiction. This implies that having satisfied all other requirements of minority, a group will not be excluded on the basis of their nationality and that aliens can constitute a minority group 14 Norris and Inglehart (2009) Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. New York: Cambridge University Press 15 For more details see his article „Multiculturalism - Introduction to a Problem“ in this volume 16 Article 1, Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 17 Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities, 1993 18 Government Bill National Minorities in Sweden (1998/99:143)

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Cultural rights are also closely intertwined with the everlasting individual vs. collective rights debate in the liberal minority rights theory. It is reflected in the move from matter of justice that cultural minorities need recognition to matters of social cohesion or whether group rights undermine the sources of solidarity among citizens in democratic societies. The most developed international instruments usually refer in their phraseology to persons belonging to minorities. E.g. ICCPR19 Article 27 is phrased as an individual rights, however it includes group component: In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion or to use their own language.

While political rights, for instance, can relatively easily be ascribed on individual bases, then rights related to culture – like language, religion, education etc. are mostly of collective nature and cannot be meaningfully realised individually. There is a variety of policy responses that have been employed by European societies. Robert Palmer in his article “Integration Policies for Europe in the 21st Century” explores different models of integration that have been adopted in the EU to respond to growing pressures of migration. The conference also explored different policy solutions that are offered to national minorities and third-country nationals in Estonia, but also in other Member States (e.g. in Italy20, France21, the UK22 and Russian Federation 23) and the impact they have had on the identity of these minority groups. At the same time culture and ethnicity are only one aspect of person’s identity. There are people who are neutral to their ethnic belonging and do not want to be treated as members of a linguistic or cultural (or any other kind of) minority, as compared to people who turn their cultural distinction into a collective resource and claim special treatment in education, media policy and elsewhere where it becomes the question of public culture. Triin Vihalemm24 gives an overview of the importance of ethnic and cultural identity for Russian-speakers in Estonia, based on the results of the Integration Monitoring 2011 25 In the European nation-state system the public cultures are usually centred around dominant (ethnic) groups26. Different Member States follow diverse models and expect different level of contribution and participation on the part of minorities. Also what constitutes public or societal culture 27 varies from state to state, but in general public sphere is considered to comprise of legal and political institutions, economy and partially education, family, morality and religion while the private domain is made up of the languages of ethnic minorities, ethnic traditions, kinship, network of associations and a system of religious organisation etc.28. Multiculturalism is taken to involve on the one hand the acceptance of common culture governing the public domain and promoting a variety of folk cultures in the private domestic and

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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights For more details please see Susanna Tamimi „The Making of Italians: A study into Italian models of integration and sociopolitical participation“ in this volume 21 For more details please see Marie-José Bernardot „Cultural Issues of the Integration Policy in France“ in this volume 22 For more details please see Adam Newman Turner „The Significance of Democracy and Cultural Exchange for Young People as Diversity increases“ in this volume 23 For more details please see Konstantin Zamyatin “ Russian Nation-Building, Cultural Diversity and Language Policy“ in this volume 24 Please see her article „Integration in Estonia: Different Ways“ in this volume 25 For more details on the results of the monitoring please see the Summary of the results in English http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Integratsiooni_monitooring_2011_ENG_lyhiversioon.pdf 26 Kaufmann, E. (2004). Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities. Routledge 27 Kymlicka, W. (1995: 67). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford; 28 Rex, J. (2001) “The concept of a multicultural society“ in Guibernau, Montserrat and Rex, John (eds.): The Ethnicity reader, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp. 205-220 20

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communal domains29. On the other hand, the problem of this two domain theses is that some very important institutions as the education and religion lie in the border of the two spheres and creates tensions between minority communities and the dominant society on whose premises and rules these organisations should be administered. The public sphere is common and shared by all members of the society and therefore minority communities should ideally have a say and possibility to shape the institutions the public domain is made of30 i.e. public culture in societies of immigration has to be transformative and reflect and respond to the composition of the society. Estonian model of multiculturalism is based on Estonian cultural prevalence, which forms the commonsocietal core. The subject of the model is an individual who joins and shapes the common core in the public sphere. There are no provisions for (collective) recognition of the minority cultures. Estonian culture and language form the basis of public culture in Estonia – Estonian is the working language political institutions and in addition it includes also Estonian citizenship, democratic values, common social institutions and common education system. Practice and development of minority cultures is reserved to the private sphere, although there are several public policy instruments for funding activities of cultural associations and hobby schools. Aleksandr Aidarov31 analyses what impact have these policy instruments had on integration of smaller ethnic minority groups in Estonia, while Marianna Drozdova 32 gives an overview how ethnic minority communities were consulted when preparing the new programme document for Estonian Cultural policy and Cultural Diversity. Minority Rights in the EU Context The notion of diversity is one of the key goals of the European Union. However, there are different kinds of diversity within the Union: (i) EU’s legal framework focusing only on protecting what is ‘European’; (ii) focusing on issues that are important to the national identities of member states or (iii) is it also interested in engaging with the more complex forms of sub-national minority identities. The current consensus in academia and within civil society is that EU law favours the former two types of diversity over the latter33, therefore leaving minority issues out of the direct scope of the Union. Unlike the United Nations or European Court of Human Rights, and the Council of Europe, the European Union has no competence to set standards on minority protection. In the EU law binding standards only exist in the field of equal treatment and antidiscrimination and are the firmest in the field of employment. The provisions of the EU treaties do not explicitly refer to minority rights. Their effect on minority rights is indirect, e.g. principles of internal market (like free movement of goods and services) allow minorities to enter and receive their goods in other member states. Binding standards within EU law concern only a small section of minority rights, but the EU does have competence to promote diversity and facilitate redistribution of resources across the EU and through that to influence minority protection in Europe.

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Rex, J. (2001:210) “The concept of a multicultural society“ in Guibernau, Montserrat and Rex, John (eds.): The Ethnicity reader, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, pp. 205-220 30 Bauböck, R. (2001). Public culture in societies of immigration. IWE Working Paper Series. 31 For more details see his article „Estonian Policy towards Ethnic Minorities and Russification of Ethnic Minorities: Success or Failure?“ in this volume 32 For more details see her article „Preparation Process of renewing the Estonian Cultural policy and Cultural Diversity” in this volume 33 Ahmed, T. (2011: 13). The Impact of EU law on Minority Rights, Hart.

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Main rights aimed at protecting and preserving the cultures of minority groups and encompass the rights to preserve elements of the minority way of life (including arts, literary and scientific pursuits)34, a right of minorities to carry out traditional economic and social activities within their communities (e.g. hunting, fishing), access minority education35, preserve languages36, maintain a correct transliteration of their names37. While cultural and linguistic rights play central role in minority rights, the EU’s commitment to rights-based approach to culture and language is minimal. There are however, many activities to promote cultures and languages focusing mainly on enhancing the flowering of cultures of Member States 38. The EU legislation cannot offer minorities with legal entitlements to develop their cultures or use their languages, there is possibility to interpret EU legal provisions as supportive of diversity in certain cases as article 151EC imposes a duty on the Union to take culture into account across all EU policies, learning of languages that are not official EU languages is promoted under article 149 EC on education. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 39 also calls for respecting cultural diversity, but does not provide for specific cultural rights. The 2011 Commission Staff Working Paper on EU initiatives supporting the integration of third-country nationals40 has a separate section on culture, which tackles the role of culture in integration as does “European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals,”41 which also mentions the importance of migrants’ cultural participation. In addition to education, employment, and citizenship, the basic principles for strengthening the common framework for integration of third country nationals call attention to the following:  “Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, intercultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.”  “The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.” EU competence in the area of culture is more of an enabling one and does not include the right to adopt binding harmonising legislation in the area of culture. The implication of this being that EU cannot provide formal legal constraints on national constructions of culture or on national protection on cultural diversity. Ensuing from the phrasing is also that area of EU cultural policy is focused on Member States and it does not state whether it also applies to minority cultures within Member States. However it does include protections of cultural traditions attached to certain regional territories, but this in turn excludes minority groups that do not dominate their geographical region. The lack of territorial attachment is a challenge for minority rights in general, because low concentrations of minority group makes it more difficult to argue for (collective) establishments relating to education, language and media, for example. 34

Article 27 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 15 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Articles 4, 5, 6 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 35 Articles 12 and 13 of Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 36 Articles 9,10 and 14 of Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages generally 37 Article 11 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 38 Article 3 (q) EC Treaty 39 Article 22 40 COM(2011)957 final 41 COM(2011)455 final

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Religious Rights and the EU Freedom of religion (i.e. freedom to hold a belief and the freedom to manifest a belief) is usually treated as a separate human right from cultural rights, but the two are closely interlinked. Today religion constitutes the heart of many minority rights debates in Europe, but also elsewhere, ranging from security issues and terrorism activities to right to wear hijab in public places. One of the spheres where cultural, but also religion diversity comes up work place. Management of religious and cultural diversity in employment can be manifested in the question of working hours, days of public holidays and alike. While the state and religion have long been separated in mostly secular Europe, European societies still have strong Christian roots and this may pose problems for non-Christian communities in observing the requirements. In general the question of working hours in the EU, which would be relevant in cases Jews not being able to comply unconditionally to work commitments on Saturdays or Muslim communities of Fridays, is in the competence of the Member States. The Working Time Directive42 obliges the employer to provide the worker 24 hours’ uninterrupted rest in each seven-day period. Therefore practical solutions in this area greatly depend on specific employer and on the proportional impact it has on economic performance. Employment Directive43 prohibits religious discrimination in employment, but sets only minimum standards for equal treatment, by allowing Member States 44 to take further measures of substantive equality, but there is no legal obligation under EU law to accommodate different working hours for religious or ethnic minorities for days of observance. Wearing religious dress at work place concerns in addition to the right to freedom of religion the right of individuals to private life. According to the European Commission on Human Rights, the right to freedom of expression may include the right for a person to express his or her ideas through the way he or she dresses45. European Convention system accepts that the wearing of the Islamic headscarf is a manifestation of Islamic religion46. However the right to wear religious attire in the public sphere is limited under international law and can be denied in public employment and education institutions in order to protect the rights of others to secularism and to protect public order from religious fundamentalism47. This though does not refer to non-employment situations, e.g. receivers of services and education etc. which has been recently highlighted in the United Kingdom and France. Prohibition may be justified where there is a legitimate aim that is met proportionately, but does not refer to matters in the private sphere. Another area where questions of religious diversity outside workplace arise is animal welfare. According to the Protocol on the Protection and Welfare of Animal48 the Community and the Member States will pay full regard to animal welfare in formulating and implementing the Community’s agriculture transport, internal market and research policies, while respecting the legislative or administrative provision and customs of the Member State relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and religious heritage. Directive on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing 49requires that animals 42

2003/88/EC Concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, Article 5. 2000/78/EC Establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 44 Article 4. 45 Clayton and Pitt (1997:183) “Dress Codes and Freedom of Expression“, European Human Rights Law Review 54. 46 Vakulenko (2007), „Islamic Headscarves’ and the European Convention on Human Rights“, Social and Legal Studies 16(2). 47 Lucia Dahlab v Switzerland 2001-v 447, Leyla Sahin v Turkey (2007) 44 EHRR 5, Belgin Dogru v France (App no 27058/05) judgement of Decembre 4 2007 48 Article 13 LTFEU 49 93/119/EC 43

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are spared any avoidable excitement, pain or suffering during slaughter or killing and related operations, both inside and outside slaughterhouses. It required the stunning of animals, which may run into contradiction with some practices of religious slaughter. The Protocol allows Member States to maintain slaughtering religious practices (e.g. for Jewish and Muslim communities for making meat “halal” and “kosher”), but does not oblige them to do so. Estonia has decided not to implement the religious exemption on the grounds of animal protection. Language Rights and the EU In international human rights law, there is no absolute right on the part of minority to claim the state to use minority language in the public sphere, e.g. there is no obligation to provide services in non-official languages50. The use of any language in private is protected from state interference as a general human right of free expression and as a specific minority right 51. However there is growing acceptance 52 for states to fulfil this as far as possible in using minority-specific instruments where appropriate, for example in the number and geographical concentration of a minority group is high and the authority has the financial means53. Estonian Constitution54 allows for localities where at least half of the permanent residents belong to an ethnic minority, everyone engage with the state and local government authorities and their officials in the language of the minority, but it has never been implemented. At the EU level there are 23 official languages that are used as working languages in the EU institutions. This does not extend to minority languages except to the extent than an official language of one Member State is a minority language in another Member State. Language is not stated as an independent ground for nondiscrimination in EU law55. Education forms an important part in the linguistic debate. It allows language to be passed through generations and is the base for reproduction of minority intelligentsia. Specific international law on minority rights in education covers providing opportunities for minorities to learn their mother tongue56, teaching others about minority language57, and setting up minority educational institutions58. Directive concerning education of migrant children59 is the only legal act under EU law that provide the right to learn minority languages in educational establishments. Directive promotes the learning of the mother tongue on cultural and identity grounds and requires Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that children of migrants from other EU member states receive tuition in the official language (or one of the official languages) of the host state and, in addition, to promote the opportunities for education of the mother tongue and culture of the country of origin. Establishing minority educational institutions and holding classes in minority language is an important way to teach and raise awareness of its language. This, however, is not univocal right in international law and depends on number of members

50

De Varennes, (2001:18) The Linguistic Rights of Minorities in Europe, in Trifunovska (ed) Minority Rights in Europe: European Minorities and Languages pp. 3-31. 51 Article 7 ECRML and Article 10 FCNM 52 Article 10 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 53 De Varennes, (2001:19 ) The Linguistic Rights of Minorities in Europe, in Trifunovska (ed) Minority Rights in Europe: European Minorities and Languages pp. 3-31. 54 Article 51 55 Articles 12-13 EC 56 Article 14 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 57 Article 12 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 58 Article 13 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 59 77/486/EEC On the education of the children of migrant workers

15


of the minority group, length of their presence in the state and whether they are confined to a particular locality. Conclusion International law in general recognises that the cultural diversity of the many groups within a nation should be protected, but the wording can be regarded as weak, as the requirement is to promote minority cultural rights alongside and within the framework of the national culture. This means the constant search of balance between integration and assimilation. Also despite the growing positive rhetoric in the EU institutions on the value of diversity, minority rights have remained symbolic within the EU legislation. Although the EU is increasingly engaging with its minority population through numerous binding and non-binding measures it is yet to provide a coherent body of material to be called EU notion of minority and minority rights. One of the reasons why issues of cultural rights are sensitive is that they are treated as the first step for claims for more autonomy, i.e. the fear of escalation of cultural demands in to political ones. However this need not be the case, since by guaranteeing cultural security of its inhabitants the state would be less inclined to put forward claims for political self-government.

16


Integration Policies for Europe in the 21st Century Robert Palmer, former Director of Democratic Governance, Culture and Diversity, Council of Europe/ Independent Expert The movement of people, including immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, is one of the greatest challenges to stability in European societies in the 21st Century. Cohesion is not only being tested by the debt crisis and austerity measures, but by a much less publicized tension concerning European borders, and the movement of people across them. There is a growing discourse relating to European ‘diversity’. In 2011 and 2012 many tens of thousands of people have fled the instability of North Africa to seek shelter, mostly in southern European countries. Putting aside unlawful migration, in 2011 the EU experienced a 59 per cent increase in applicants for entry. In the same way that the fiscal crisis is pitting parts of Northern and Central Europe against Southern Europe, the refugee challenge is creating similar tensions. Profound changes are not only affecting Europe’s banks and financial institutions, but also Europe’s borders. Europe has always been a land of migration. Throughout the centuries, Europe has attracted migrants, and has been built on the experience of migrant populations. Now almost all European States are net immigration countries. Most have experienced high levels of immigration since the 1990’s. Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the Nordic countries are all examples of this trend. A second category of countries became net receiving countries even earlier in the 1980’s, in large part because of growing economic prosperity, such as in Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland. Figures from Eurostat indicate that in 2010, there were 47.3 million foreign-born residents, representing about 9.4 per cent of the European population. Approximately 6.5 per cent of the EU population was foreign nationals. 63.4 per cent of EU residents who were born abroad came from highly developed countries. However, unlike the self-proclaimed countries of immigration of the New World, such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, certain countries in Europe have found it difficult to come to terms with the fact of immigration. Many sections of European societies have been reluctant to welcome and incorporate immigrants, especially coming from non-OECD countries that are perceived as having significantly different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. This hostility is counter-intuitive given the extent to which European countries have benefited from immigration in the past decades. The large-scale mainly low-skilled immigration of the 1950’s and 1960’s was a crucial component of post-war economic reconstruction in Western Europe. Today, labour migration fills critical gaps in the IT sector, in engineering, construction, agriculture and food-processing, healthcare, teaching, catering, tourism and domestic services in many countries. The economic case for labour migration will become even more urgent in the coming decades when there will be predictable shortages in particular economic sectors, partly due to a reduction of the workforce through ageing and other factors. The pattern of European migration has changed. In terms of countries of origin, the composition of European migration flows have altered. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, most of the foreign population in Western Europe consisted of migrants from Southern Europe – Italians, Greeks, and Spanish. Then after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, migration in the 1990’s was largely east to west. Now, the citizenship of foreigners residing in the EU overall are dominated by people of Turkish, Moroccan, Albanian, Chinese, Ukrainian, Russian, Algerian and Indian origin. Different countries have experienced slightly different 17


patterns; for example, Iraqis and Afghans in Denmark and Sweden, Russians in Estonia and Finland, Turks in Germany, Romanians in Hungary, Albanians in Italy, Angolans in Portugal, and Indians and Pakistanis in the UK. In Estonia, the number of immigrants is small. In terms of minorities, the largest is Russian, and in terms of recent immigration, the most important countries of origin are Russia and Finland. Different factors have influenced patterns of migration, which have been a combination of economic, social and economic considerations, but also national policies of migration control. These have often been shaped not only by labour market conditions and needs, but also by national concerns and popular anxieties. Many European citizens are anxious about the ghettoization of ethnic minorities, and there is evidence in certain countries of increased inter-ethnic tensions and violence. The popular media has certainly played a part, with featured stories often focused unfavourably and in a highly biased manner on ‘foreigners who are taking our jobs’ and migrant criminality and anti-social behaviour. Most European foreign-born citizens in Europe are concentrated in cities. In certain cities, such as Rotterdam, Geneva, Luxembourg, London and Marseilles, half or more of the resident population is foreign born, with some neighbourhoods reaching up to two-thirds. For many cities, the change has been rapid. For example, 20 years ago, Oslo had less than 2 per cent foreign-born residents, whereas today it has 27 per cent. In Barcelona, the number has risen from 2 per cent to 15 per cent in only seven years. Although cities and city authorities that need specific enlightened policies and strategies to deal with the increase of migrants, the impact of migration has been most significantly influenced by state authorities and national governments, in terms of broad policies related to labour migration, migration control, asylum and protective systems, and most certainly integration. All these policies are affected by a combination of economic, political and legal factors. Members of the Council of Europe are bound by the European Convention of Human Rights, which sets out standards for the international protection and extension of rights to non-nationals. Judgments by the European Court of Human Rights against the actions of certain governments have been controversial, and sometimes not in line with national popular opinion. The management of public attitudes to diversity is very complex, and political debates and xenophobic discourse that inflame public opinion are difficult to control. One can recall the debate in France about the wearing of the burkha in public, or the violence in Germany between extreme right-wing and extreme Islamist groups (Salafists). One still remembers the caricatures that led to a crisis between Denmark and the Islamic world in 2005. More recently, there was the trial of Anders Breivik in Oslo, who shot 85 young people in a youth gathering in Norway in 2011. In some European States, a dominant issue is the integration of Muslim residents, where certain Islamic beliefs and practices have been viewed as being incompatible with liberal democratic and human rights standards, resulting in the populist targeting of Muslim communities. No country is immune to racist incidents. In Estonia, the Bronze Night in Tallinn in 2007 and ensuing disturbances relating to the relocation of the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn were provocative. According to the results of a special Eurobarometer survey in 2009, 41 per cent of Estonian respondents believed that ethnic discrimination is widespread in Estonia. Several national authorities have recognized a profound need to review their approaches to integration. Very strong and sometimes divisive debates about integration are currently taking place in countries such as the UK, Germany and France. Although integration efforts in the past have been based on a premise of human rights and welfare support to migrants, there is now rather divided public opinion about how

18


much effort should be made to help those in need, and anti-immigrant opinion-leaders increasingly portray economic refugees as a burden on the state, and often as a cultural threat as well. In the discourse on immigration, there have been different approaches to integration policy and issues connected with diversity, which logically are influenced by differing national and local histories and contexts. The main policy approaches can be summarized as follows: 1. Non-policy: where migrants have been regarded as irrelevant or a transient phenomenon with no lasting impact, or they have been considered unwelcome, and therefore there has been no need to formulate a specific policy. 2. Guest Worker Policy: where migrants are regarded as a temporary labour force whose members will eventually return to their countries of origin, and so policy is seen as short-term and designed to minimize the impact of migrants on the rest of the population. 3. Assimilationist Policy: where migrants are accepted as permanent, but where it is assumed that they will be absorbed as quickly as possible into the general population. Differences from generally accepted cultural norms are not encouraged, and may even be discouraged or suppressed if they are considered a threat to the integrity of the state. 4. Multicultural Policy: where migrants are accepted as permanent and their differences from the cultural norms of the host community are encouraged and protected in law, with an acceptance of that fact that in some circumstances this may lead to certain separate or segregated development. 5. Intercultural Policy: where migrants can be accepted as permanent, and while their rights to have differences are recognized in law and institutions, there is an emphasis and encouragement of policies, institutions and activities which create common ground, mutual understanding, empathy and shared aspirations, and which communicate strongly the importance and value of diversity to society. The policy approaches identified above place different emphases on the relative importance of economic rights, social and civic rights and cultural rights. However, the protection of all such rights are important to an effective intercultural approach, which also places stress on community building and cohesion that goes beyond anti-discrimination and principles of equality. The focus is on the ways and means that all people in a community can ‘live together,’ not only ‘side by side’. These typologies are simplified and some may overlap in part; they certainly do not represent all policy models for integration. Also, it should be recognized that states may adopt different policy approaches towards new and traditional migrants. For example, there may be historic and legal recognition of the rights of traditional migrant or minority groups to retain their distinct language, culture and schools, while the expectation of new migrants arriving might be that they assimilate quickly and totally. In Estonia, legislation does not use a definition of ‘a migrant’ or ‘a migrant worker’ as such. There exists the concept of a ‘third country national,‘ and in most cases no difference is made towards the reasons of immigration. There is also a distinction between two groups: the so-called ‘old immigrants’ who arrived during the Soviet period or earlier and recent immigrants who arrived in Estonia after 1991, and who are a rather heterogeneous group. Particular issues may affect more ‘visible’ immigrants from Africa and Asia who, although small in number, may have significant problems with integration and employment that are different to recent Russian migrants. A new paradigm for integration should balance rights-based approaches and the fight against discrimination with a solid discourse around the ‘advantage of diversity’. This means shifting away from 19


depicting migrants as vulnerable groups in need of protection and support to viewing migrants as a key to the positive development and prosperity of the entire community. This shift in policy and attitude will be increasingly important bearing in mind Europe’s aging societies and the significant inflow of young migrants. In a globally integrated economy, European economic growth will depend on its demography and on attracting talent from abroad. Analyses demonstrate that the recruitment of labour from third countries will be essential to the survival of the European economy in the future. Research evidence shows that diversity contributes to prosperity, creativity and growth, and that productivity and wages are higher in regions with more diverse populations. More evidence needs to be gathered to prove conclusively the link between immigration and economic growth and innovation. One pilot project now jointly funded by the Council of Europe and the European Union focuses on cities as laboratories to demonstrate the impact of intercultural policies as described above. Cities often suffer from an ‘integration deficit’ and are an appropriate scale to change current policy paradigms and introduce a coherent intercultural based approach. The project is called ‘Intercultural Cities’ www.coe.int/interculturalcities, and currently has 21 cities as members, in addition to a further 40 associated cities that are using similar approaches and methodologies. The cities exchange good practice and develop common strategies, tools and models that promote the advantage of diversity, while taking into account the individual context and particular issues and differences of each member city. In addition, four national networks of intercultural cities have been established in Italy, Spain, Norway and the Ukraine, placing emphasis on different national priorities. Among the many practical tools developed by the Intercultural Cities project is an Index that can measure progress, monitor the impact of changes, facilitate the review of policies, enable ‘bench learning’ and provide an evidence base for policy-making. The Index now offers comparative data for over 45 cities. The Index also provides city-by-city reports to enable political leaders, civic manages and researchers to monitor the effectiveness of city integration policies and strategies. There is a growing demand across Europe and beyond to join the Intercultural Cities learning community, and cities in North America, Central and Latin America and Asia have asked to be involved so that they can benefit from the European expertise and use similar approaches and tools to promote intercultural integration. These are cities that are attempting to combat discrimination by adapting their policies to actively endorse diversity, and that have developed proactive strategies to deal with cultural conflict and provide incentives for cross-cultural mixing and entrepreneurship. The outcomes of the Intercultural Cities project have been inspiring, but the results reflect only one-stage of a longer term process leading to better ways of strengthening community cohesion and improving the social, economic and cultural well-being of all Europeans, wherever they were born. When examining integration strategies of EU countries, it appears that many are more focused more on socio-economic and legal-political issues, and sometimes on language promotion, but less on broader cultural integration concerns. More attention needs to be paid to the cultural components of integration policy, as this relates to values, norms, preferences and competencies that are essential to promote interaction and cohesion. This issue goes beyond language use, which is important, but is not the only factor in achieving genuine cultural integration’

20


Clearly, there is no single ‘national model’ across Europe that can be replicated in all countries. However, there are number of actions and orientations that can be proposed. Here are a few of these. -

-

-

-

-

Promote a significant shift in the perception that diversity is a threat, to diversity as an asset to be recognized and valued, by placing an emphasis on direct actions and measures that will help avoid segregation and foster mixing in the public realm, and that underline common values and encourage working towards common goals across all sections of the community, regardless of nationality, origin, language or religion. Ensure a strong approach to the inclusion of migrants in the core institutions of society, rather than special policies directed towards any particular group. This should include equipping migrants will the tools to participate in the main institutions (including language training, scientific and technical knowledge to access the labour market). Special cultural programmes and organisations developed solely for migrants as a target group have proven to be of less importance in terms of successful cultural integration compared to the participation of migrants and their children in general institutions open to all. Develop measures that ensure that institutions become more sensitive towards the needs of the migrant population through, for example, the intercultural training of personnel. Special focus should be placed on the integration of children of migrants, with a review of current educational practices, including the role of parents in schools. Major attention should be given to the responsibility of local authorities in fostering integration through implementing proactive policies and strategies that are applied across all services (housing, planning, social services, transport, policing, public space, education, social services, and culture). The media should be involved and understand their role in promoting equality, tolerance and the value of diversity. Consideration should be given to specific issues that arise in communities where there are growing Muslim populations due to immigration. Islam should be given a place, parallel to that given to Christian churches and Jewish communities. Exchange of experience and good practice models between national, regional and local bodies in relation to cultural integration should be actively encouraged. There are many examples of new integration approaches at both national and local levels in Europe. The results and impacts should be shared to determine the next actions to be taken.

Diversity is Europe’s destiny. Most of those who have come to Europe in recent decades and their descendants are here to stay; many remain partly attached to the cultural heritage of their countries of origin. So long as they obey the law, people who come to live in a new country should not be expected to leave their faith, culture or identity behind, but everyone should view these as distinct assets. Indeed, it is this diversity that can contribute to the creativity that Europe now needs.

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Integration in Estonia: Different Ways Triin Vihalemm, Tartu University Estonia, together with Latvia, has been a sort of social experiment in the integration of ethnic minorities in the European economic and political context that can be informative for policy-makers all over EU. Due to the large proportion, the relatively homogeneous primary socialization patterns and wide variation in education and social stratification characteristics of the Russian population 60 in Estonia, the different patterns of their integration are well traceable. This paper will explore the different ways in which people of migrant backgrounds can be socially, politically and culturally embedded in the same type of state and adapt to market interventions. The paper will also discuss the role of social and cultural capitals in these processes. There are many ways to measure the integration of immigrants in Europe that are used in academic and applied research (e.g. Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003; Niessen & Schibel 2004). The division between structural and subjective/individual level indicators is quite common, as is division according to such societal subsystems as legal-political, economic and cultural integration. The current Estonian integration program uses the divisions between legal and political, socio-economic, and educational and cultural integration (Estonian Integration Strategy…). However the need for more socially sensitive ways to diagnose problems and define the target groups of the policies was acknowledged when Integration Monitoring was planned61. Thus a cluster analysis that enables to group respondents on the basis of their answering patterns, was compiled on the basis of three sets of aggregated variables that describe 1) political self-determination, 2) Estonian language skills and linguistic practices and 3) participation in the public sphere and civic involvement (Lauristin 2011). Each set of aggregated variables involves variables that describe structural levels of integration (e.g. citizenship or NGO membership) and variables reflecting the respondents’ personal perceptions and practices (e.g. what country is regarded as the homeland or what language is spoken with ethnic Estonians) (op cit). The novel variable, not used in the other integration measurements, is the last one. It consists of the several single variables such as the participation in the informal political activities apart from elections (e.g. public meetings, sign calls, protests, petitions, debates in the Internet, demonstrations and pickets) and participation in the public cultural and sports events, because these events create certain common symbolic space and temporal feeling of belonging. It includes also the self-assessment about how well one feels informed about what is happening in Estonia? The other constituent variables were NGO membership and trust towards state institutions as an aggregated variable consisting of many single variables. From the combinations described above three sets of aggregated variables and five clusters were formed to describe five different patterns of embedding of Russian population into the Estonian society. The general characterization of the clusters is drawn on the graph 1. The follow-up analysis below is done on

60

In the following analysis the term “Russian population” refers to people who identify themselves ethnically (partly) as Russians or identify the Russian language as their mother tongue. According to the Census 2011, 321,198 persons identified their ethnicity as Russian, whereas 383,062 identified their mother tongue as Russian. The census data split by ethnicity and mother tongue is not available yet but, according to approximate calculations, about 60-70% of people who reported their ethnicity as being other than Estonian or Russian or did not report their ethnicity at all should have reported Russian as their mother tongue. Source: http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/I_Databas/Population_census/PHC2011/PHC2011.asp Accessed in 10.09.2012. 61 The monitoring was commissioned by the Ministry of Culture of Estonia and the fieldwork survey was carried out at the end of 2011. The research project consisted of focus groups and survey. The author was an academic team leader of the research group.

22


the larger sample of Russians and other people of non-titular ethnic origin and/or mother tongue62. The larger sample enables to have statistically relevant evidence about the inter-group differentiation and characteristics of the subgroups vis a vis to the total Russian population in Estonia. Below the five clusters will be characterized according to the variables that show statistically significant connection (p≤,001) with the belonging to the relevant cluster. Graph 1. Characterization of Clusters According to Main Constituent Variables The graph indicates relative differences of the means. The zero level on the graph marks a mean score of relevant variable in the total sample, the vertical columns mark differences of mean scores of the same variable in cluster subsamples compared to the average mean. 2,5 2 1,5 1 0,5

cluster III

cluster IV

trust towards institutions

selfassesment about being informed

cluster II

NGO membership

participation in public events

-1,5

informal political activity

-1

Estonian language

-0,5

citizenship, homeland and political involvement

0

-2 -2,5

cluster I

cluster V

The first cluster represents a group of people (about one fourth of all adult Russian population) who have acquired necessary state-specific capitals: most of them have very good Estonian language skills and Estonian citizenship (see Appendix 1). Their everyday practices favour relatively strong involvement in the Estonian-mediated public sphere. For example, 90 % of the people in this group follow at least one Estonian-language media channel and 37 % of them have participated in least one big public cultural and sports event. Thus, they do feel high “informational security�: 90% of them consider that they are (very) well informed about what is happening in Estonia. Their lifestyle is also characterized by frequent interpersonal contacts with ethnic Estonians: 70% of them have many Estonian friends and every second lives in the areas with large concentrations of ethnic Estonians (Appendix 1). Many of the people belonging to this cluster are born in Estonia (Appendix 1) and significant share are third generation settlers - 40 per cent have grandparents who were born in Estonia. Thus the impact of structural provisions (geographical area and history of residence) is high in formation of this pattern of integration. This group is an embodiment of the pattern of individual coping with the political and economic 62

The initial clustering was done on the smaller sample base weighted to be ethnically proportional (958 ethnic Estonians, 451 other ethnicities). The follow-up analysis was done on the total sample base of other ethnicities that consisted of 787 interviews with respondents who claimed their ethnicity and/or mother tongue to be other than Estonian.

23


requirements set by the state or market forces. At the beginning of the 90s, David Laitin regarded this pattern as one of the most likely patterns and called it the “competitive assimilation cascade”: “if all Russian-speakers feel that all others will remain monolingual in Russian, they will see little need to learn Estonian. But if they fear that many others are already adjusting to the new language regime by learning Estonian, they will feel pressure to join the cascade” (Laitin 1989: 25). This pattern is followed approximately by one-fourth of the Estonian Russian population, more frequently by young and educated people who have rather frequently holding higher social status (see Appendix 1). This pattern is set as an ideal in the different versions of the Estonian State Integration Programs because it is based on the individual rights and choices of social agents. A comparison with other clusters reveals that the first cluster is most assimilationist vis a vis ethnic issues. The people in this group hold more sceptical opinions on the need for a special Russian-language television programme in public service broadcasting (42 per cent were against the idea) and positive assessment of possibilities for high-quality education for Russian youth (72% of positive evaluations). Metaphorically speaking, these people have invested their personal resources in meeting demands in order to try to reach the higher strata in society and they do not want to be treated as linguistic or cultural minority members. However a part of this group may need some public encouragement, „normalization“ of ethnic self-expression, linguistic, mnemotic and other cultural practices other than Estonian. The second cluster represents another novel pattern that is common among the younger generation (see Appendix 1). The cluster is centred on linguistic integration, whereas their political integration is weak in terms of citizenship and attitudes related to the acquisition of citizenship (see Graph 1). Indeed, majority of the group members know Estonian language reasonably well but 40% does not have Estonian citizenship. The weak involvement at the nation state level is also expressing itself in the low trust towards state institutions (40% does not trust). Although 93% of people belonging to this cluster Estonianlanguage mass media, they do not consider themselves well-informed about what is happening in Estonia (only 32% think so). Table 1. Political Participation Practices Outside Elections in Five Clusters. Share of people in the group who have... ...participated in public meetings ... signed some call, protest, petition ... participated in the political debate on the Internet (written article, posted comments ... joined a political protest or support campaign on Facebook or other social network ...taken part in a demonstration, picket

I 5 8 4,5

II 74 69 67

III 7 13 8

IV 2,5 5,5 4,5

V 2 1 5

2,5

49

7

2,5

3

1,5

49

5

3

2

People in the II cluster that covered 13% of the sample, are characterized by a critical stance towards Estonian state politics, but a stronger-than-average practice of alternative political participation (see Table 1). The active and large usage of social media by 87% of the people in this group supports these practices. Besides the virtual and temporary participation this group can be characterized also by high civic involvement – every second member of this group is a member in one or several NGO-s. Contrary to the first cluster, the members of the second cluster hold critical opinion about educational perspectives of Russian youth in Estonia – 77% of them consider that high-quality education is not obtainable. Approximately every second member of the group feels to belong to several ethnic groups, thus being 24


carrier of multiple ethnic identities. However, ethnic categories are not significant in their selfdetermination nor in how they interpret social relations (see Graph 2). Their social solidarities are fluid and temporal, which contrasts sharply with their high virtual and physical participation in various actions that take place in the public sphere. Although they are educated in Estonian schools and most of them have the necessary linguistic capital to get ahead in Estonian society, many of them think about leaving Estonia and approximately every fourth person has done some kind of preparations for that. This new generation, frequently residing in the block house areas in the Eastern part of Tallinn, has much in common with the youth of migrant background residing in other European cities. The problem of the “third generation”, who are more critical than their (grand)parents, has been raised (e.g. Haddad & Baltz 2006, On integrating…2006) but, in general, European societies lack a “recipe” for how to communicate with the young people of migrant family backgrounds who are critical or even arrogant towards official policy initiatives and who are able to mobilize flexibly and temporarily in social media networks in order to protest, and to express their likes and dislikes. The political power structures in Europe generally have badly adapted to such spontaneous, bottom-up participation as massive gatherings of e-signatures etc., nor are the existing integration policy models designed for the “new generation”. Research on the youth culture and network society might help to develop more adequate models. The Estonian experience reveals the importance of the global popular and consumer culture as a socializing environment for Russian youngsters (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2010). Instead of large identity narratives, they use small narratives and signs of global consumer and popular culture to build up a positive self-distinction (Vihalemm & Keller 2011). As sophisticated consumers, they have a new type of cultural capital that enables them to manoeuvre in social (power) relations and makes them immune to large narratives and ideologies. One way to achieve some level of dialogue with them may be via new forms of public-private partnership. Although the mass media usage practices of this cluster are multifarious, qualitative studies show that they still lack the skills necessary to discern manipulation and poor journalistic quality. The development of media literacy in schools is an attempt which could help with this group, but has proved to be unsystematic; Russian-medium schools, in particular, presently lack both material and immaterial resources for this type of education. Graph 2. Agreement with the statement: "Today, it is absolutely necessary that a person would feel their ethnicity membership" in the clusters 60,0% 50,0% 40,0% 30,0% 20,0% 10,0% 0,0% I

II

III

IV

V

25


The third cluster who is labelled “Russian-speaking Estonian patriots” (Lauristin 2012) consists from Estonian citizens who have modest Estonian language skills - 63 per cent know Estonian mainly passively. This cluster embraced 15 per cent of the respondents in the sample. They display high political interest, participation in the elections and territorial loyalty (67% of them regards Estonia as the only homeland) but because of modest Estonian language skills their opportunities for participation in the public sphere and civic associations are limited. They have limited possibilities for interethnic contacts already due to the spatial isolation – 42% of the people in this group resides in industrial cities in the North-East Estonia where other ethnicities outnumber ethnic Estonians. Thus the role of Russian-language mass media in mediating the current issues and opinions of ethnic Estonians is crucial. Indeed, this group expects the media to carry more active role in the integration processes. “Russian-speaking Estonian patriots” feel strong civic solidarity but also a strong bound with their religious and ethnic heritage (Graph 2) and seek for positive distinction on the ethnic basis – e.g. 72% admit to feel proud or pleased when the Russian athletes, musicians, scientists are recognized in Estonian media. The average age of this group is much older than the two previous clusters (see Appendix 1). Thus, the vast majority of the group members grew up in the Soviet society and likely transferred the civic allegiances and practices of the past into the present-day Estonian state (Vihalemm 2002). This group represents the integration pattern that would most benefit from the policies guided by the ideas of multiculturalism: structural level or collective solutions would increase their participation in Estonian society. The fourth cluster is an outcome of the process of ethnization during the post-Soviet transition. Approximately every fourth person among Russian minority follows this pattern. They show the strongest bond with ethnicity (Graph 2) and define their Russianness on the basis of a wide range of cultural attributes (e.g. celebration of Russian folk holidays and national holidays of Russian Federation). The group largely includes older people with Russian citizenship, or undetermined citizenship, who lack the Estonian language skills to operate in Estonian society (Appendix 1). Because of the prevalence of Russian citizenship and almost exclusive following of Russian television broadcasts in this group, one may want to call this diasporic pattern with an external centre of political and cultural allegiances. However, studies show a great deal in common with the ethnic-identity-building pattern common among ethnic Estonians (Vihalemm 2007). Thus, it would be misleading to say that the formation of this pattern is solely the result of the diaspora politics of the Russian Federation – there are many factors that have shaped the ethnization process. However, the impact of Russia in intervening in the local politics is considerable here. This group is the one most ready to turn their cultural distinction into a collective resource and to claim special treatment in education, media policy and elsewhere. Due to the lack of citizenship, their political participation is limited to the local level, but the opportunities offered here are taken advantage of rather actively. The strong opposition between the state and city power elite in Tallinn, Narva and some other places partly derives from the ethnic arguments that are utilized in the political self-establishment of both the state and city elites. Culture is the most promising “language” of communication on one side, but at the same time is it rather sensitive and constraining because of diaspora politics of the Russian Federation. The fifth cluster that involves about one fifth part of Russian minority in Estonia, represents a group with minimal ambitions and resources for participation in politics, civil society and the public sphere. They are satisfied with “social citizenship” and the opportunities available at the local level of participation. Unlike the IV cluster they express arrogance vis a vis the questions concerning the mass media, education and cultural perspectives of Russian minority.

26


Thus, the same type of state and market interventions have brought about different ways in which people of migrant backgrounds can be socially, politically and culturally embedded. As explained above, the culture can play rather different roles in regard to each pattern – from hindering assimilation to fostering civic allegiances towards Estonia.

References - Entzinger, H., and Biezeveld, R. (2003). Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration. Report written for the European Commission. Rotterdam. - Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013. Internet: http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/mitmekesisus/Estonian_Integration_Strategy_20082013_ENG_VV_11.06.09_nr_236.pdf - Haddad, Y. Y. & Balz, M. (2006) “The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration - Policy or the Empire Strikes Back?”, International Migration, 44, 2. - Laitin, D. (1989). Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. - Lauristin, M. (2011). Lõimumisprotsessi tulemuslikkus ja sihtrühmad: klasteranalüüs. (The performance of integration in the different target groups: cluster analysis). Estonian Integration Monitoring 2011. Compiled by AS Emor, Praxis Center for Policy Studies, The University of Tartu. Contracting entity Ministry of Culture. Authors Marju Lauristin, Esta Kaal, Laura Kirss, Tanja Kriger, Anu Masso, Kirsti Nurmela, Külliki Seppel, Tiit Tammaru, Maiu Uus, Peeter Vihalemm, Triin Vihalemm. Unpublished electronic manuscript. http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Intmon_2011_pt_7.pdf - Niessen, J., and Schibel, Y. (2004) Handbook on integration for policymakers and practitioners. Brussels: European Communities. - “On Integrating Immigrants in Germany” (2006) Population & Development Review, 32, 3. - Vihalemm, T., Keller, M (2011). Looking Russian or Estonian: Young consumers constructing the ethnic “self” and “other”. Consumption, Markets and Culture, 14(3), 293 – 309. - Vihalemm, T., Kalmus, V.(2010). Cultural Differentiation of the Russian Minority, in: Lauristin, M.; Vihalemm, P. (eds.), Estonia's Transition to the EU: Twenty Years On. Routledge Taylor & Francis Ltd, London and New York, 92 - 115. - Vihalemm, T. (2007). Crystallizing and Emancipating Identities in Post-Communist Estonia . Nationalities Papers, 35, 3. - Vihalemm, T. (2002). On the Perspectives of Identity Formation among Estonian Russians. In: Lauristin, M., Heidmets, M. (eds.) The Challenge of the Russian Minority: Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia, Tartu University Press, Tartu. 219-223.

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Appendix 1. Socio-demographic profile and state-specific capitals of the five clusters formed in the Estonian Integration Monitoring Survey 2011. The percentages in the columns are calculated per sub-sample in a particular cluster, not per total sample. The total sample is formed by the respondents who defined their ethnicity as Russian or identified Russian as their mother tongue (N=736) Number of the cluster I Age 15-24 yrs. 16 25-34 yrs. 26 35-49 yrs. 30 50-64 yrs. 22 65-74 yrs. 5 Education primary 10 secondary 60 higher 30 Social status manager, entrepreneur 15 specialist 25 worker 20 retired 15 student 14 unemployed 6 other 6 Citizenship Estonian 82 Russian 7 other country 2 undetermined 9 Do you know the Estonian language well enough to newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts? Yes, I understand everything 65 I understand most of what is written/said 25 I partly understand what is written/said 9 I do not understand 0 Estonian/Foreign born Born in Estonia 75 Foreign-born 25 Area of residence in Estonia Tallinn: Lasnam채e and Maardu area 14 Tallinn: other areas 28 North-east Estonia (industrial cities) 11 Other parts of Estonia 47

II

III

IV

V

23 26 32 18 1

13 12 20 39 16

11 14 24 34 16

14 14 24 31 18

13 66 20

9 62 29

14 78 8

27 61 12

7 34 21 3 13 15 8

6 19 25 28 5 8 9

7 10 27 30 3 15 8

8 12 26 29 10 11 4

59 96 17 29 10 2 41 27 10 2 6 23 2 41 39 understand Estonian-language 31 43 19 7

13 27 46 15

7 13 40 40

14 22 30 34

53 47

71 29

50 50

50 50

50 19 9 21

16 29 42 12

14 20 55 11

13 36 27 24

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Multiculturalism - Introduction to a Problem Frederik Stjernfelt, Center for Semiotics, University of Aarhus During the year of 2010, heads of state of the three largest European countries distanced themselves from multiculturalism. Angela Merkel, David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy indicated, each in their way that the multiculturalist policies which had been attempted in Germany, Great Britain, and France, had failed. Thereby, however, nothing has been said about which policy should be adopted instead, regarding the whole complex of multiethnicity, immigration, freedom of speech and religion, etc. Should it be a national "Leitkultur" (leading culture), One-Nation conservatism, or should it rather be French "laĂŻcitĂŠ" secularism, or some other variant of universalism, be it liberal, social democrat or socialist? But even worse - to distance oneself from "multiculturalism" is not, in itself, a very clear statement because the notion does not refer to anything very unambiguous. The distancing from multiculturalism is understandable, in so far as group rights, special treatment, support to religious parallel societies, etc. seem to make problems worse rather than solving them. But this still does not make clear by means of which principles you should address the existence of a manifold of religions and cultures in modern European societies.

What is "multiculturalism"? This paper intends to make clear some of the background to the complications regarded "multiculturalism" - with the basis in Jens-Martin Eriksens and my book "The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism" (New York 2012). A decisive problem lies already in the very word. Does "multiculturalism" refer to a state of things or to a policy? If it is taken to refer to a state, most seem to agree about the fact that European societies have long since become multiculturalist - to the extent that there is a plurality, in most Western democracies, of citizens with different backgrounds. On that basis, many perform the rhetorical trick of arguing that as we live in multicultural societies, we should also adopt a multiculturalist policy. But this jump from the recognition of a state of things to the adoption of a policy is far from automatic. For "multiculturalism", taken as referring to a policy regarding the multicultural state, is a normative choice. And normative multiculturalism, in itself, may come in many very different variants. You can claim. e.g., that the single citizens in a democratic society should have to live according to whichever culture they may wish, as long as they do it within the confines of existing legislation - and, especially, the fundamental parts of existing law pertaining to rule of law, democracy and civic rights. This basis provides the possibility for a rich cultural variation - but, at the same time, there is a series of things which cultural groups cannot claim. They cannot claim special rights for their members which differ from the rights of other citizens, they cannot claim special, direct access to political influence besides democratic processes, they cannot claim the right to have their own legislations and court systems, they cannot form their own militias, police forces, or standing armies, they cannot enforce religious rules or clan rules which go against normal legislation of the country. You buy your cultural freedom by relinquishing such ambitions - but in doing so you do not differ from other groups, organizations, clubs, religions, etc. in civil society which have exactly the same liberties - and which are, in the same way, prevented from claiming such special rights. Liberal, democratic societies thus provides for what could, in practice, be called a "soft" multiculturalism. To many, such soft multiculturalism does not seem sufficient. To be recognized as a citizen in a democratic society with the duties, rights and considerable liberties it entails, appear to some not to suffice - because there are things, as just mentioned, which are not within the political reach of cultural groups. This goes all the way from rather small issues - can you make special demands on the serving of 29


food in public institutions, the organization of public baths, or the right to exemption from wearing helmets while riding a bike - and to very wide demands like the introduction of special legislation, apostasy bans, special courts and police forces from certain cultural or religious groups. So "multiculturalism" as a normative policy exists in a wide variety of different degrees of strength, ranging from "soft" freedom to organize cultural activities in assemblies of free citizens - and to "hard" development of autonomous parallel societies. If you speak for normative "multiculturalism", then, you should be obliged to make specific where on this scale your "multiculturalism" belongs. This complexity regarding the concept of multiculturalism, however, is not the only piece of confusion of ideas. An even more profound confusion lies in the very concept of "culture" which is, very often, taken to be basic for various variants of multiculturalism. This may be illustrated by pointing to the fact that the use of the concept of "culture" has vastly increased in Western societies during the recent decades. Readers who are old enough to remember debates in the 1960s and 1970s will recall how differences in the way of living of large human groups were addressed in terms of society, economics, policies, division of powers, production types, history, geography, resources, modernity ... and much more. If "culture" appeared at all in such explanations, it was some distance down the hit list of factors influencing the differences between groups of human beings. Since then, the strange thing has happened that "culture", as it were, has eaten up all the other different types of differences between groups, societies, and states. Many, if not most, now seem to assume, without further notice, that it is the "culture" of people which determines how they produce, which states they organize, which policies they prefer, how they live, interact, trade, split up in social groups and subcultures ... and so on. It is assumed, often without thinking closer about it, that all these things are but surface results of deep cultural "values" which are taken to form the fundamental basis of a society - just like "debates over values" are taken to be something very profound. In a certain sense, such ideas are galloping idealism - the assumption that everything in a society springs from ideas. Maybe this stance has spread as a result of the bankruptcy of Marxism - which claimed, as is well known, that ideas and values are but surface icings and the really formative forces were the material interests of different groups or classes which just camouflaged these interests as if they stemmed from ideas. This was obviously simplistic and wrong - but with the claim about "culture" as the only issue determining societies, went to the opposite extreme. And that extreme turned out to be extremely conservative - no matter whether "culture" was now supported by the left wing or the right wing. The emphasis of culture - in the shape of "hard" multiculturalism of the left wing or hard nationalism of the right with - invariably supports the forces in a given society which intends to preserve ways of life as they are - maybe even as they are merely imagined to have been once in an authentic state, before the processes of modernization came along and dissolved everything. This is why culturalism - the idea that individuals are determined through and through by culture - is reactionary, in the shape of hard multiculturalism as well as the shape of national culturalism. Many things then are now simply classified as "culture" which was earlier characterized as political, religious, economical, scientific, social, etc. If you take a society, in which clan structures take care of basic economic and social security of the individual - in return for an unshakeable loyalty to the clan, then such a structure will frontally clash with the demands of modern, democratic societies of a spreading of loyalties from family over friends, workplaces, society, and state. And if you come from a religion which demands to have direct influence on society and politics in ways outside democratic procedures - they you will, in the same way, clash with the central notion of modern democracies of secularism: politics should not be governed by theology. These are normal social and political tensions. But being rebaptized to "culture", a strange ennobling and immunization takes place of such social, economic and political 30


habits. All of a sudden, they become respectable, worthy of protection, even inviolable and noble in a way which was not the case when such practices were not yet called "cultural". Where does this strange notion of culture stem from?

"Culturalism" This counter-wave against Marx could find support in Max Weber - whose famous book about protestantism and the capitalistic work ethic turned Marx upside down and proposed that it was Calvinism and its doctrine about predestination (and not protestantism as such) which increased work ethics and made capitalism possible in Western Europe. But the actual culturalists from the 1980s and onwards were not only Weberians. They did not seek to explain the process of modernization - they rather sought to make cultures immune against change. This is why they introduced other theories, developed, inter alia, by 20th century anthropology. Such theories claimed that the individual is determined by his culture by a process of "enculturation". The fact that any child may be socialized into the practices of any society was taken as a proof that culture may write anything on the blank, receptive slate of the individual. The more obvious theory that this is possible because human beings are biologically rather similar and have the same basic needs which all cultures must address, was rejected in favour of the theory that cultures are infinitely variable and they, forcefully and without resistance, inscribe themselves into the individual. When first culture is thus inscribed, however, its writing may no longer be changed. This theory - which could be called "culturalism" - lies as an unspoken premise in many variants of "hard" multiculturalism: when special rights of all sorts are called for, then it is because cultural individuals are not free, autonomous persons equipped with their own reason - they are irreversibly shaped by their culture and have, for that reason, a need for special political status and protection. In "The Democratic Contradiction of Culturalism", Eriksen and myself chart how this special concept of culture was first articulated in the first generation of American anthropology in the 1920s and 1930s. Then, the main subject of anthropology was "primitive" peoples, most often living in small groups, territorially separated from one another, with each their set of cultural special features. Each tribe seemed to possess its own world view, and it might easily seem as if all the members of a tribe shared that view and understood everything through it - also because of the fact that many tribes were so small that only little - or no - social stratification had developed. That is why this concept of culture - in. e.g. Ruth Benedict ("Patterns of Culture", 1934) - implied the idea that cultures were completely homogeneous internally. Externally, by contrast, the opposite reigned - radical difference between cultures so that an individual from one culture would be completely unable to understand another culture. At the same time, everything inside one culture was taken to be connected intimately: cosmology, politics, warfare, agriculture, clothing, gastronomy, decoration, etc. - the tiniest cultural feature had its place in an all-encompassing, unshakeable system of values. This concept of culture was then, by anthropologists, projected onto much more comprehensive and complex societies like the old high cultures of Eurasia and Mesoamerica, or modern societies and empires. Also they were seen as "cultures" - but only at the cost of an enormous simplification. For is "the West" a culture in the same sense as the Kwakiutl of Western Canada were? Are China or Islam "cultures" in the same sense as the Trobriands of the Pacific? Enormous societies with many millions of members and large degrees of internal diversity over millennia - are they "cultures" in this compact sense of the word? This concept of culture made possible a certain lop-sidedness in the conception of human beings and their groupings which bothers the notion of multiculturalism to this day. For if once you have decided that a culture is an organically connected system holding for one and every single member of it, they you make yourself blind 31


to internal tensions in that culture: power struggles between different elites, clans, or subcultures, the subjection of one class by the other, the attempts of individuals to go against or escape culture, etc. - and then the step is easy to support the most reactionary version of "culture" which is most often marketed by some of the power holders of the group who wish to get the means to restrict individuals which are tempted by modernization, new, ideas, cultural hybridization etc. And, on the other hand, if once you have decided that cultures are radically different, it is very easy to become blind to the many similarities which may hold between cultural groups which are all obliged to solve the same basic problems of power and organization, based, in turn, on the biological similarities of the needs of human beings across cultures. To what extent the problems of multiculturalism were already visible in anthropological culturalism became obvious already in 1947 when the recently founded UN undertook, led by Eleanor Roosevelt and with the participation of representatives of many different countries, the sketching of the UN declaration of human rights which was finally adopted the next year. When the Association of American Anthropology learned about this initiative, it reacted by filing a complaint. No concept of universal rights should be recognized because an individual may only realize himself within the confines of the culture, to which he "inextricably belongs". Even a concept like the "freedom" of the individual must be avoided, so the anthropologist, because different cultures would have radically different and incomparable notions of freedom. Already here, in 1947, it was clear how culturalism and relativism went directly against Enlightenment and its universal ideals of rule of law, democracy and civic rights for all. The anthropologists, as you will know, proved unable to stop the drafting of the UN resolution which was adopted in 1948. But the case opened an internal strife in anthropology which has been raging ever since. Culturalism in its pure version is far from as dominant in the anthropology of our time as it was back then when the AAA leadership could, without further notice, make their political protest on behalf of anthropology as such. But in return, anthropological culturalism has spread outside the confines of academia. Books like those of Benedict, her friend Margaret Mead and others became bestsellers for a broader audience and contributed to the spreading of culturalism as a spontaneous ideology among the educated middle classes in the West. For a first glance, it might seem as if the important notion of Enlightenment tolerance regarding other individuals and other points of view was now extended to cover other cultures and societies as such - as the organic entities culturalism claimed they were. With the 1968 revolt, a healthy interest in other cultures and societies than the west became widespread - but often, it allied itself with culturalism in a belief that all cultures are, a priori, of equal value and that there can be no standards with which to compare different cultures (as if type of government, level of education, individual liberties, income, GNP, rate of criminality, health and much more did not provide such standards which are constantly considered in modern international politics). And even if the anthropologists did not succeed in influencing the 1948 UN declaration, culturalism proved to be able to penetrate the UN through other channels. Two seminal papers by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss thus became decisive for the basic ideology of the UNESCO, beginning already in the early 1950s the former, "Race and history" to an extent that it has become known as the baptism certificate of the UNESCO. Here, Lévi-Strauss claimed that international collaboration, like the UN, must have as its precondition the difference between participating cultures, so that the levelling of those differences will diminish cultural evolution. Collaboration must hence take care to preserve differences - even if LéviStrauss sensed that exactly an organization like the UN would inevitably increase the disappearance of differences. This problem became the focus for a later UNESCO paper from 1971, "Race and culture" where Lévi-Strauss drew the radical conclusion that cultures must isolate themselves at a distance from 32


each other, as the only cure against on-going globalization. The fact that the same paper simultaneously advocated a partial return to the biological concept of race gave rise to scandal - which made the audience overlook the true disaster: that the implication of culturalism could go directly against the universalist ideals of collaboration as the basis of the UN. LĂŠvi-Strauss' idea - that the single cultures ought to isolate geographically in order to preserve themselves - is otherwise found only in extreme rightist variants of multiculturalism such as the "ethnopluralism" of the European right wing. Such consequences of culturalism could never been openly drawn, of course, in a UN organization, but the papers by LĂŠviStrauss illustrate very well how the UN came to vacillate between to completely opposed ways of thinking: the universalist idea of the equal right of all human beings and the culturalist doctrine of the equal right of all cultures - without having any clear idea of how to mediate between the two or how to negotiate clashes between them. This becomes a problem, of course, when dealing with cultures which do not support the idea of the equal rights of all human beings, or even decidedly claims to ascribe very different privileges and political rights to whites and blacks, men and women, believers and infidels, etc.

From Culturalism to Multiculturalism These tensions around culturalism all had an unspoken precondition - namely that "cultures" in the same way as "peoples", "nations", and "countries" were localized each on their local territory. All the discussions around multiculturalism spring from the movements of migration which, in the decades after the war, introduced substantial minorities of immigrants with different cultural backgrounds in most western countries. In contrast to traditional minorities which had most often a territorial affiliation, such new minorities were rarely territorially defined but settled among the local population of bigger cities. This entailed an acute political problem of how to tackle this cultural difference. USA, as the prototypical western country of immigration, a state created by immigrants, had developed its ideal myth of the "melting pot" - over the course of a couple of generations, cultural differences would melt and merge into general American culture. But after WWII, such assimilation did not appear as an attractive option for many immigrants from the Third World. And multiculturalism developed, both as a reality and as different political programs. Especially in former British colonies like USA, Canada, Australia, Malaysia and elsewhere adopted multiculturalist ideas, sometimes on the basis on common law and power distributions used by the British Empire. In contrast to the American "melting pot", new metaphors were launched, like "mosaic" and "salad bowl" - the idea being that the apparent unity of the immigration country consisted, for a closer gaze, of small units which remained unchanged and closely connected to their countries of origin from before emigration. A metaphor, of course, explains just what is highlighted in the image it makes, and how the "salad bowl" should be realized as a politically functioning entity, which role the bowl and the dressing should play, remained an open question 63. Malaysia provides an especially striking example for consideration of such issues, because none of the groups implied are Western. A small majority of the country is constituted by Muslim Malays (considering themselves the original people despite the existence of small aboriginal tribes antedating their arrival) while a large and a smaller minority are constituted by Chinese and Indians, mainly migrated there as merchants and workers during British colonial rule. After independence, Malaysia has developed a still more radical type of multiculturalism - besides a normal court system on the basis of British law, there is 63

Multiculturalism, in its different versions, addresses various kinds of groups. One is that of immigrants with a cultural identity considerably different than that of the majority of the host country; another is that of indigenous minorities with a long presence in the state, and typically based on certain sub-territories of the state. As Will Kymlicka argues, the latter have a more entrenched demand for e.g. special parliamentary representation and self-government than the former. Thus, "soft" multiculturalism would not necessarily entail the dissolution of such traditional political rights of territorial minorities, but it would argue against further, culturally motivated rights to such groups

33


now a sharia legal system complete with religious courts and police forces - which are only relevant for the Muslim part of the population. Thus, different laws hold for different groups, regarding not only family law, but also to some extent penal code and trade legislation. Real estate, for example, have different prices depending upon the religion of the buyer, as the Malays are favoured by state-supported lower prices. An affirmative action system regulates the leaderships of private companies, and all issues regarding intergroup relationship are considered awkward and are dealt with extreme care or not at all by the press which is government controlled. Conversion between groups is permitted - except conversation away from Islam, no matter whether to Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Atheism, etc. The famous case of Lina Joy illustrates this: a Muslim woman who converted to Christianity in 1998 but who could not have the legal recognition of her conversion. Civil courts kept referring her case to the sharia courts which invariably rejected her claim as "apostasy" which is considered a criminal offense in sharia law and which is punishable by imprisonment. After a ruling of the superior court of the civil part of the legal system definitively referred her to the religious courts in 2007, Joy must emigrate to evade punishment. Malaysia thus illustrates some of the possible consequences of "hard" multiculturalism with parallel court structures: the curtailment of political liberties, the restriction of freedom of speech, the preferential treatment of certain groups over others, etc. It is, of course, an open question, to what extent such consequences follow with necessity from "hard" multiculturalism. The elaborated Canadian discussion of multiculturalism in political philosophy tends to draw a more positive picture. The communitarian philosopher Charles Taylor and his doctrine about a "politics of recognition", for examples, seeks a policy in which all cultures are granted recognition. Taylor perfectly realizes the problems of such an idea: what if a certain culture has not achieved anything praiseworthy - which form of recognition would it deserve? Taylor tackles this issue by maintaining that it must be assumed that all cultures have made at least some positive contribution deserving recognition or, in the very least, that we can not a priori assume the opposite. But another problem is: what does it mean that a culture be "recognized" in a multicultural society? Should it have a certain amount of special rights - and if so, how many? What if the special rights of several cultures conflict - whose right should then prevail? Who is to perform the recognition of a culture - public representatives or ordinary people whose actions may be difficult to govern? In what should recognition consist - if not special rights? Symbolic ceremonies, rituals, speeches, or what? Canada has passed a series of multiculturalist laws of which several more have the character of nice declarations of intent than real politics. But the thoroughgoing idea is that immigrant cultures should be able to continue unchanged and even develop without disturbance - at the same time as the immigrants are supposed to develop a Canadian identity on a higher level. The goal, then, would be a double identity, comprising the original, cultural identity on the one hand supplied with an addition, Canadian, multiculturalist, political, meta-identity on the other. But no extensive reflection has developed addressing how potential tensions and oppositions between those two levels should be dealt with. If an immigrant culture, e.g., is theocratic and claims the power of god in politics, it will of course go against democratic norms of the Canadian meta-culture which cannot let state government rule on the basis of hypothesis of the existence or intentions of gods. Such possible tensions are discussed more openly by the leading Canadian multiculturalist philosopher, Will Kymlicka, who has launched the idea of "liberal multiculturalism", taking the demand for freedom for cultures as a generalization and extension of the liberal civic rights pertaining to individuals. He does so by taking freedom as a menu of options provided by the culture to which the individual belongs: it is culture which offers the possibilities of choice which are meaningful for the individual. It may appear strange that he does not see that in a globalized world, people become more and more aware of options stemming 34


from other cultures than one's own, options which may attract peoples' attention and which they may wish to import to their own culture or even migrate to embrace. In return, Kymlicka wants to delimit the liberty of action available for cultures in politics, based on liberal principles. He wants thus to put a limit to group rights so that group rights claimed as part of one group's fight against another are not legitimate, just like special rights which allow for a cultural elite to enforce its policies on group members by internal control, should not be considered legitimate. Only those group rights which serve to "protect" a cultural group against the surrounding majority society, have legitimacy. These principles constitute an attempt at a basically liberal containment of multiculturalism - they remain problematical, however, because no clear means to distinguish between the protection of a group and the suppression of a group member is developed. What is the legitimacy of policies, e.g., which do both of these things at the same time? It becomes a problem because a large number of concrete cases have this double character. Here, Kymlicka tends to make things a bit too easy for himself by focusing discussion on very mild examples of group rights - such as freedom from work on common holidays, bathing curtains in public swimming pools, and the like. But how do his principles fare regarding more serious issues like the ban against apostasy which many Muslim groups regard as very fundamental? Some groups go as far as to claim death penalty for apostasy, some recommend prison sentences with re-education, other groups less formally practice various forms of social expulsion of converts. Such measures evidently have the character of protection of the group against the surrounding society - it maintains the group that no-one is able to leave it to join other groups or currents which are easily available in multicultural societies. But at the same time, such measures constitute a very severe curtailing of individual freedom of religion, constitutionally granted in most Western societies. What should prevail here - group protection or individual protection? You cannot have both Having read Kymlicka you are in no doubt that individual liberty would weigh heavily here - he would probably not sanction apostasy bans in democratic states - but the principal problem is that he does not develop a theoretical set of criteria clarifying when which of the two principles should trump the other. Apostasy ban is protective of groups (ergo good) and suppressive of individuals (ergo bad) at one and the same time. The same duplicity recurs in his philosophy at the more general level where the conceptualization of human liberty is at stake. Kymlicka will maintain, just like a Kantian as John Rawls, that the individual possesses the decisive property of liberty which makes it possible for him to step back from his own culture and make it (or parts of it) the object of critical reflection. Thus, the individual is not determined by his culture through and through. On the other hand, Kymlicka maintains that a "societal culture" is complete in the sense that it provides all necessary institutions for its individuals and constitutes the source of all the possibilities of choice which constitute human freedom and make the life of the individual meaningful. This tension - is the individual able to rise above his culture or is he deprived from seeking options outside of his culture - Kymlicka seems unable to solve, and his compromise of "liberal multiculturalism" time and time again encounters problems which can only be solved by choosing one of the two sides of the compromise. Like the British historian of ideas Jonathan Israel recently expressed it in an interview: what if a young girl runs away because of being threatened by a forced marriage? Whose side should the state support? Here no compromise or relativism is possible - should the state support the parents to force the girl to come back and accept her destiny, or should it protect the girl against the coercion of her parents? Kymlicka's greatest problem - stemming from the same untenable compromise is that of "targeted multiculturalism" - multiculturalist policies aimed to solve the special problems of the particular cultural group. He would much like to set up general criteria for which group demands should be eligible for special rights - and even have such principles articulated as basic principles for the UN. But he admits he has not yet been able to formulate such principles. You easily get the suspicion that the 35


reason is that it is simply not possible: there could be no general principles for targeted multiculturalism, exactly because each single culture is claimed to have its unique demands criteria which are said to be incompatible to those of other cultures. So even if Kymlicka's project of a "liberal multiculturalism" does sound tempting and sympathetic indeed, it ends up as conceptually unintegrated. As soon as it faces a problem, it separates into its two constituent parts, like oil and water, and you must make the choice whether you, in that particular case, goes with the liberalist or the culturalist solution. As a tendency, Kymlicka seems to prefer liberalism, anytime his theory faces serious problems. But that implies that very easily, no real multiculturalism risks to remain in it, and he goes all the way back to the soft multiculturalism which it was his aim to transcend.

Leftist and rightist Multiculturalisms - versus "soft" multiculturalism The special conception of groups of human beings as "cultures" which lies behind multiculturalism can surprisingly be found on both political wings. Actually, this idea has historically been strongest on the right wing. For nationalism which has for most of the 20 th century up till the present day been a right wing political current, is based on a culturalism which is similar to the culturalism of "hard" multiculturalists on most points. Both claim the individual is a mere product of its culture which he owes everything and which is the only place the individual may realize his dreams, shaped as they are by the same culture. Nationalism claims the place of culture, of course, to be the nation - with the addition than the nation politically should develop into a self-sustaining political entity so that culture, nation, and state mirror each other. "Hard" multiculturalism claims that the place of culture is the cultural group and that this group should develop into a self-sustaining political entity, within the framework of a state making it possible for several such groups to coexist on the same territory. So the only point where nationalism and multiculturalism agree, is regarding territory - they agree in the right of culture to prevail over the individual. This has given rise, recently, to many strange clashes, because the disagreement over the role of culture to territory makes nationalism and multiculturalism oppose each other, no matter their agreement on most other issues. Nationalism may wish to put limits on immigration, multiculturalism to augment immigration. The political focus upon immigration, integration, etc. makes opponents of the two - and this opposition may make so much noise so as to cover much of the political spectrum. This implies that anti-culturalist points of view easily become less visible - it is implicitly taken for granted that if you are not multiculturalist you must be nationalist and vice versa. But this tends to make invisible positions opposed to culturalism as such and its claim that all human is cultural. It appears as a puzzle how a conservative, culturalist ideology like "hard" multiculturalism has been able to gain much support on the political left wing. The left, as a tendency, was historically universalist in its demand for equal rights to all - why on earth has it developed into accepting a doctrine, closely related to nationalism, claiming human beings are not equal and the state even should protect the differences between groups with privileges and special rights? Multiculturalism claims a foundational role for culture and thereby goes directly against classical Marxism claiming, quite on the contrary, that economy and production formed the basis of society while culture was relegated to a variable surface level. It is so much more strange as there does not seem to have been any large discussion pro and con multiculturalism on the Western left during the spread of multiculti in the recent decades. Maybe there's a connection to the vanishing of Marxism on the left in the period after the fall of the wall. The left seems to have given up the central idea of state ownership of the industry and, correlatively, the idea about the working class as the subject of history. What the left has maintained, then, may be the sympathetic idea of protecting the weak against stronger powers. If this was earlier the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, the roles now seem to be played by minorities versus majority culture. But with this shift, the left opens 36


up for the idea that minorities should not only enjoy equal rights on a par with the majority - but also enjoy recognition of all sorts of cultural special rights. Why can we not be exempted from the law claiming bikers should wear helmets, now that our religion demands us to wear turbans? The example stems from Great Britain - where Sikhs actually enjoy such an exemption - and keeps recurring in the discussion of multiculturalism. But it also nicely illustrates the kernel of the problem of targeting multiculturalism: if Sikhs may enjoy exemption form helmet legislation, why not Jews with their kepis, Muslims with kufi caps, hooligans with soccer club flat caps, etc.? The left seems not to have found any principle for why some groups should enjoy special rights but not others. Such a criterion would require that different cultures should be compared so the equivalent to the Sikh turban in other groups could be decided. But such a comparison is exactly what culturalism claims impossible.

Religion as a problem An argument often heard is that in the comparison of groups, religious principles and emotions should enjoy a special status, they should have special protection, give rise to special rights. Many culturalists assume that religion is a special, noble or profound part of culture, root of identity, calling for special considerations. Also this idea has a counterpart in anthropology and religious studies where an idea is widespread that religion somehow constitutes the core of a culture. Believers often add the idea that religion constitutes the core of their personal identity. This cannot be refuted. But seen from the point of view of a modern society, it is difficult to see why the assumption that powerful, invisible beings exist should give a religious group more political influence than a scientific group, a political group, a striptease club or an association of stamp collectors. It is indeed a strange argument for a left wing which was used to cherish the Marxist assumption of religion as merely the opium of the people. Regarding religion especially it may be added that exactly the secularism of liberalism and Enlightenment qualifies as the best way of organizing societies with the aim of maximum freedom of religion. Secularism does not mean - some believers fail to realize this - that religious belief should be confined to the private sphere only. Quite on the contrary, it means that religion should enjoy no privileged political influence. Different modern democracies have realized this in various ways by separating state and church like in France, the USA, and Sweden - or by making a state church kept at a distance form political power, like in Denmark, England, or - a Muslim variant - Kemalist Turkey. The decisive effect of secularism is that it gives many different religions access to a broad range of public activities: they may organize political parties, publish newspapers, magazines and books, they may organize public meetings and demonstrations, proselytize, participate in public discussions, etc. - just as may all other organizations of civil society. Here it is too often forgotten how things are in societies without secularism: here, typically, one religion dominates which is deeply entrenched with political power, exploiting its special position to marginalize or even prohibit and persecute believers of other faiths. If, in contrast to culturalism, you claim that basic human needs are roughly invariant across human cultures, then the idea of culturalism about radical differences between cultures evaporate. And, again in contrast to culturalism, you claim that reason, imagination and logic are common faculties to man (and other potential thinking beings) then the idea of culturalism that cultures provide unchangeable frames for individuals also must be given up. Then the individual is free to use reason and imagination to change his "culture", to learn from other individuals, groups, societies - and the individual no longer needs "special rights" to protection of cultural practices which - as everything else - vanish if not used. "Cultures" themselves hereafter no longer appear as paradoxically closed systems which at the same time determines everything and are in need of protection against offense and defection - they appear, rather, 37


as groupings of people which also are in a constant process of internal strife, alliances, developments, breakthroughs, inspiration from other "cultures", cultural hybrids, subcultures - etc. It is for that reason that the contrast to "hard" multiculturalism is not its close cousin nationalism - which is, in some sense, nothing but multiculturalism on a large scale. Its contrast is rather a "soft" multiculturalism on a liberal, democratic, enlightened basis which realizes that cultures are but plastic, temporary organizations which evolve, reflect, mix, split, sometimes of political reasons, sometimes economical, sometimes social, sometimes scientific, sometimes technological reasons. Such constant cultural developments need no special rights to preserve atavistic features suppressing individuals - features only able to survive in the open air museums of special rights - but they are in dire need of a solid framework in the shape of rule of law, democracy and individual liberties 64.i The "soft" multiculturalism of liberal democracies contain the maximum freedom for cultural variation possible, allowing citizens to develop their cultures however they fancy - as long as they respect basic principles of democracy. This is no "liberal multiculturalism" in the sense of a compromise between liberalism and culturalism - it is the liberty for that manifold of cultures, religions, expressions, individuals which is made possible by the wide framework of liberal democracies.

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A question often addressed is whether liberal democracy can function without some measure of "social cohesion" in addition to wealth and the political rights of the individual - such as the cohesion provided in many states by nationalism. That is the question whether a Habermasian "Verfassungspatriotismus" - constitutional patriotism - is sufficient. It seems like a strong argument that some further social cohesion is beneficial - but there are very different accounts for the possible character of such cohesion. Communitarianists will argue such cohesion demands the shared agreement upon a body of pre-political lived value connecting individuals. To me, this demand remains too cultural and will, in effect, complicate integration of individuals not sharing such values. Another criticism of naked liberalism is that of republicanism. Here, the very political process of a democracy continually develops and adjusts values and principles springing out of the common government of the state as a res publica by the citizens. The core of democratic culture, in this optics, is actually doing politics together. Thus, shared language forms an important such a principle - not because of a culturalist assumption of unmentionable national values inherited in language, but because of deliberative democracy necessitating a public sphere supported by a common political means of communication. The longer period a democracy functions, the more of a shared political tradition it develops, uniting citizens in their shared knowledge of and commitment to that republican tradition.

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References and suggested further reading                                  

Baber, H.E. 2007Multicultural Mystique. The Liberal Case Against Diversity, N.Y.: Prometheus Books Barry, Brian 2001 Culture and Equality, Cambridge: Polity Press Benedict, R. 1934 Patterns of Culture, Boston and N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Company Benhabib, Seyla 1999 „The Liberal Imagination and the Four Dogmas of Multiculturalism“, in The Yale Journal of Criticism, 12.2, 401-13 Benhabib, Seyla 2005 Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 31, no. 7, 753-71 Brown, Donald E. 1991 Human Universals, McGraw-Hill Bruckner, Pascal „Enlightenment fundamentalism or racism of the anti-racists“, onlinemagasinet Perlentaucher, 24/1 2007 Canadian Multiculturalism Act http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/sgunew/MCMULTI.HTM Eriksen, Jens-Martin og Frederik Stjernfelt Hadets anatomi, Kbh. 2003 -Krigens scenografi, Kbh. 2004 -„Et undertrykt folk har altid ret“, Information 24/2 2006 Adskillelsens politik. Multikulturalisme - ideal og virkelighed, Kbh. 2008 The Democratic Contradiction of Multiculturalism, New York 2012 Eriksen,T.Hylland 2001„Between universalism and relativism:A critique of the UNESCO concepts of culture“, in Jane Cowan,Maire-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard Wilson, eds. Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, 127-48, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press The Executive Board American Anthropological Association 1947 „Statement on Human Rights“, American Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 49, no. 4, 539-543 (primaryauthor:Melville Herskovits) Finkielkraut, Alain 1987 Le defaite de la pensée Paris: Harrison, Lawrence and Samuel Huntington (red.) 2000 Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, N.Y. 2000 Israel, Jonathan, 2001 Radical Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford UP -Joppke, Christian 2001„Multicultural Citizenship: A Critique“, in Arch. Europ. Sociol., vol. XLII, no. 2, 431-47 469 Kukathas, Chandran 1998 „Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference“, in Political Theory Oct. 1998, 686-699 Kymlicka,Will 1995 Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights,Oxford: Oxford UP -2007Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford: Oxford UP -2007a „Disentangling the Debate“, in Stein 2007, 137-56 Lévi-Strauss, C. 1972 „Race et histoire“ (1952), in Anthropologie structurale deux, Paris: Plon -1979 „Race et culture“ (1971), in Bellour, R. og Clement C. (eds.) Claude LeviStrauss, Paris: Gallimard Lægaard,Sune 2005 „On the Prospects for a Liberal Theory of Recognition“,Res Publica 11, 325-48 2007 „The cartoon controversy as a case of multicultural recognition“, Contemporary Politics, 13:2, 147 – 164 Mayer, Ann Elizabeth 2007 Islam and Human Rights, Oxford:Westview 39


            

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McDonald, Leighton 1996 „Regrouping in Defence of Minority Rights: Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship“, in Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 34, no. 2, 292-319 Okin, Susan Moller (ed.) 1999 Is Multiculturalism Bad forWomen? Princeton Phillips, Anne 2007Multiculturalism Without Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press Renteln, A.D. 1988 „Relativism and the Search for Human Rights“, American Anthropologist, vol. 90, no. 1, 56-72 Schmidt, P.F. 1955 „Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism“, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 52, no. 25, 780-791 Schuster,A. 2006 „Does Liberalism need Multiculturalism? A Critique of Liberal Multiculturalism“, in Essays in Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2006 Sen, Amartya 2006 Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny, London: Allen Lane Stein, Janice Gross et al. 2007 Uneasy Partners.Multiculturalism and Rights in Canada, Ontario:Wilfried Laurier University Press Steward, J. 1948„Comments on the Statement of Human Rights“ in American Anthropologist vol. 50 no. 2, 351-352 Stjernfelt, Frederik 2007 Diagrammatology. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, Ontology, and Semiotics, Dordrecht: Springer Taylor, Charles 1994 „The Politics of Recognition“, in Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, Ewing NJ: Princeton UP Vermeulen, Hans og Boris Slijper 2000 „Multiculturalism and Culturalism“, paper at the conference Democracy Beyond the Nation-State, www2.fmg.uva.nl/imes/books/vermeulenslijper2000.pdf Walker, Brian 1997 „Contested Territories: A Critique of Kymlicka“, in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. 30, no. 2, 211-34 Washburn,W.E. 1987 „Cultural Relativism, Human Rights, and the AAA“, American Anthropologist, vol. 89, no. 4, 939-943

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The Significance of Democracy and Cultural Exchange for Young People as Diversity increases Adam Newman Turner, BA, MA, NPQH, Principal Associate, Institute of Community Cohesion, Coventry University, UK Director, Real Outcome Learning UK. CULTURE: ‘Ways in which groups of humans repeatedly represent and communicate their experiences and act creatively’ In this paper I will reflect on the relevance of cultural programmes to the integration of minority ethnic groups into European host societies and, in the Appendix, suggest some models and theories which should underpin and inform this work. I will take a wide definition of European ‘culture’ to include fundamental values of community organisation and democratic government as well as its narrower meaning referring to ethnic heritage, language, food, arts, sports and customs. The word ‘culture’ comes originally from cultivation65 meaning improvement. This implies change and development and reminds us that culture is not a static phenomenon. I will focus on our need to ‘cultivate’ and educate the younger generations, whether migrant or indigenous, as it is they who will build the integrated and diverse communities required in the future. I will argue that our education systems need to be far more energetic in promoting active youth-led projects which explore different interpretations of culture and give all young people experiences of democratic decision-making and an understanding that democratic values are required for peaceful co-existence. These must form a part of national inter-cultural strategy as it is these kinds of educational experience that will lay the necessary foundations for inter-community dialogue and cohesion. How can State-Sponsored Cultural Programmes help to Promote Community Cohesion? 1. Developing Self-Confidence of Minority Groups Enabling minority groups to celebrate and present elements of their culture, to feel accepted and gain recognition from members of the host community. 2. Building Inter-Community Appreciation Dialogue and interaction between cultural elements of different ethnic groups. These can assist in reducing inter-communal ignorance and mistrust, establish dialogue and also promote awareness of the cultural contributions made by immigrant communities. 3. Sustaining Heritage and Language Sustaining and celebrating the cultural heritages and identities of minority communities. Assisting transmission of culture to subsequent generations (e.g. support for mother-tongue language and cultural learning, sponsorship of traditional community festivals, community media, provision for religious observance, …). In some cases, direct links with countries of origin, such as school to school linking. 4. Creating Opportunities for Cultural Exploration Educating young people for critical analysis and evaluation of cultures and traditions. Encouraging the blending and fusion of cultures to stimulate new creative work, bringing groups together and providing spaces and performance opportunities.

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Latin: colo = to till (the soil)

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5. Addressing Sensitive Issues Creative work which stimulates debate, raises public awareness of sensitive intercultural issues and offers creative forums as alternatives to personal, social and political conflicts. 6. Developing Understanding of Democracy Widening participation in democracy is an essential value underpinning European culture. All young people, whether indigenous or newly arrived migrant, need to understand the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a pluralist democracy. This becomes a more urgent imperative when there are increasing numbers of young people whose background does not include a strong belief in democratic traditions.. The Urgent Need for Sustained Government Action The perennial debate about controlling certain types of immigration is intensified by economic strife and has also led to Islamophobic newspaper headlines and far-right political demonstrations targeting Muslim communities. Set against this there has been a growth in the wearing of some distinctive cultural markers of minority ethnic identity (such as the Niqab face-covering for women). These are often seen by their wearers as symbols of group solidarity in the face of threats from hostile host communities, but they also indicate a degree of active ‘self-exclusion’ from mainstream culture. The lack of trust and understanding between different communities living parallel but separate lives in neighbouring streets was identified as a significant factor leading to the widespread inter-group violence in a number of northern cities in England in 2001.66 This was addressed subsequently through several national policies over the next decade designed to promote community cohesion across the UK 67. Young People and Cultural Evolution Discussions of integration of immigrants often make assumptions about ethno-national identity which fail to recognise constant historical change and internal regional differences. When exploring how social policy can result in better integration, it is necessary to recognise that as each migrant community settles and becomes established it will display unique patterns of association with host communities which will change over time. Within a single minority community, origins and migration patterns are not uniform and interpretations of culture and tradition will differ. Intercultural policy therefore needs to recognise the constant changing and blending of each community’s representations of their own cultural identity and, in particular, the variations between generations and the need to support young people in developing their own understanding of cultures. Young people from minority cultural groups may navigate, on a daily basis, the disjunctions between family, school, national media and street cultures. But they may also be eager to explore and create their own interpretations of all of these. Education and youth provision needs to respond to and facilitate this kind of exploration and equip young people with the intellectual and creative skills and vocabularies with which to make sense of their own inter-cultural experiences and also better understand the cultural life of the people around them from different backgrounds. Why Democracy Important? In this discussion I wish to define culture in a wider sense than simply referring to arts and creative activities. A consideration of role of democratic practices is also highly relevant to the relationships 66

Cantle, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the independent Review Team. UK Home Office For example: The duty upon all schools to promote community cohesion (Education + Inspection Act 2006), The Equality Act 2010. 67

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between migrant communities and mainstream hosting societies in European countries. For the sake of this discussion I will assert that one of the fundamental principles underpinning European cultures is an aspiration to evolve and operate effective participatory, pluralist and openly scrutinised democracy as a means of distributing and organising power and mediating between interest groups. Whilst this may be a controversial statement, there is no space in this paper to justify it or explore the concept more fully. If this is accepted, then integration of migrant and indigenous communities must involve some degree of assimilation into the democratic rights and responsibilities associated with representational democracy. For any democratic system to function, all the significant groups within a community must have access to representation. A European concept of democracy may be quite different from the understanding of power, leadership and authority in some countries from which migrants may have come. Indeed it may be directly opposed by some interpretations of religious teachings. Equally, a young person from a marginalised indigenous family whose members are completely disengaged from any kind of democratic participation may need reassurance that participation can be fruitful. These differences require shared exploration, particularly in the minds of young people who may be absorbing contradictory teachings from different sources: for example from their Islamic madrassas, from their home backgrounds and from their state schooling. The existence of significant groupings within our communities who do not subscribe to basic democratic values clearly poses a threat to cohesion and social order across our cities. This is a strong argument for a renewed emphasis on education about the importance of democratic values. In the UK some schools have recognised that preparing young people for democratic participation requires a carefully structured education programme that includes practical experiences of leadership and decisionmaking through active student-led projects. This is a completely different approach to passive learning about constitutional structures and legal systems which is sometimes thought to be citizenship education. The legal introduction of citizenship education to the English National Curriculum (since 2002) required all children to learn about human rights and democratic processes and to be involved in projects of ‘active citizenship’ to benefit their local communities (at least twice in their school careers). This was a highly significant improvement to the National Curriculum, but may be at risk as the current national government appears to be reverting to a narrower, more traditional and less practical curriculum. Supplementary/ Complementary Schooling Many minority communities in the UK have established community-based education programmes which operate in addition to normal schooling for their children. It is estimated that there are 5000 such ‘supplementary schools’68. Some are for instruction in religion, language and heritage whilst others emphasise academic study to supplement mainstream schooling. The study of mother-tongue languages is now recognised as enhancing rather than impeding overall academic progress, if done appropriately 69. National and local government programmes have been established to engage with these supplementary schools to offer a quality framework and encourage their links to state education. Participation in such schemes is, however, voluntary and there are strong arguments to require all supplementary schools to come under proper regulation. A specific resource package has been developed for Islamic schools to help them to incorporate better understanding of European-style citizenship70. Unacceptable Traditions and Sensitive Issues

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www.supplementaryeducation.org.uk For example: Cummins, J. (2000). Language, power, and pedagogy. Bilingual children in the crossfire. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters. 70 For example: ‘Islam & Citizenship Project’: http://www.theiceproject.sdsa.net/index.php 69

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Many migrants have a natural desire to maintain links with their homeland and sustain traditional cultural practices. In some cases oppressive and unacceptable behaviours such as forced marriage, genital mutilation and violent religious exorcism can form part of an extreme adherence to traditional cultural values and these must, of course, be conspicuously and clearly excluded from any recognition of acceptable cultural diversity. Such abuses are more likely to be detected, however, if there is an open dialogue about cultural practices. Victims are often young people who may feel that they do not have opportunities to talk about abusive situations unless open discussions of cultural practices form a part of their education. Creating adult programmes and spaces for cultural exchange and celebration can also provide opportunities for sensitive issues and potential conflicts to be explored before they lead to intercommunity strife. Conclusions Governments cannot instruct people to become friendly with their neighbours and share information about their customs, heritage and sense of identity, but strategic facilitation of programmes which bring communities together is now a necessary part of national policy for any country facing increasing diversity. To do otherwise is to risk serious social hazards in the near future. Well-planned artistic and creative cultural activities are proven to be effective in engaging and motivating people to contribute to their communities and in bringing different groups together. State education must also adapt the curriculum to ensure that future generations have a critical awareness of their own cultural heritage, can contribute to the regeneration of the dominant culture in the communities where they live and have the skills to relate constructively with people from different backgrounds to their own. These types of learning form an essential part of being equipped to be economically and socially successful in increasingly diverse communities. This learning must include creative cultural exploration as well as youth-led community activism, to help develop understanding of local and national democratic processes in a diverse context. Given the potential dangers of inter-community conflict as diversity increases, there are strong arguments for governments to make significant investments into such strategies in order to secure the social harmony and economic wellbeing of their countries. It is self-evident, however, that these ideas can only form part of a much wider strategy that must also address the deep structural causes of inequality and social exclusion which impact disproportionately on minority communities.

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APPENDIX: SOME THEORY AND SOME PRACTICE TO TRANSFORM EDUCATION WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE REDUCTION OF PREJUDICE? Practical projects designed to meet the objectives set out in this paper need to be underpinned by principles which maximise the probability of increasing inter-community trust and reducing prejudice. International research on education and group behaviour offers some models worthy of detailed consideration before programmes are planned. Some are outlined below; it will be apparent that they relate closely to the objectives set out at the start of this paper: CONTACT THEORY Originated by Gordon Allport71, this suggests specific conditions which help to reduce inter-group prejudice when two or more groups meet and work together. An understanding of these principles is important as some encounters between groups can increase prejudice. The ‘optimal’ conditions include ensuring that neither group can claim a higher status during the meeting and that planned activities between groups are not highly competitive. SUPPORTING SELF-ESTEEM Individuals and groups with low self-esteem are more defensive and less able to explore other cultures for fear of losing their own identity. The following three conditions are understood to be pre-requisites for self-esteem in an educational setting. They can be applied to individuals or groups: a) A belief that you have worthwhile skills b)

Recognition of these skills from others

c)

Spaces within a social group to take responsibility and use your skills to contribute

‘JOHARI’ THEORY OF BUILDING TRUST AND COHESION This social psychological interpersonal model (devised by Luft and Ingham72) suggests that two on-going processes are required if individuals or groups are to build mutual trust: 1) Disclosing / sharing / presenting information about yourself 2) Receiving feedback about yourself from the other person or group These two processes can be seen to take place in most informal social situations as people get to know each other. They can also be carefully organised in group activities to build mutual trust in nonthreatening ways. A CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH TO EDUCATION This approach offers learners control over their learning as they work with the guidance of teachers to construct knowledge through reviewing, reflecting upon, sharing with others and analysing their experiences and structured research tasks. This approach can be deployed alongside traditional didactic teaching, but is far more appropriate and effective for the types of learning set out above in which learners need to explore their own and others cultures and gain deep understanding of how and why democracy works in practice. Educational projects demonstrating success in the reduction of prejudice commonly use a constructivist approach whilst those using purely cognitive and didactic methods usually result in failure to change attitudes. 71 72

Allport, G.W. (1954) The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, Mass. Addison Wesley Luft, J. (1984) Group Process: An Introduction to Group Dynamics, Mayfield

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A model for Inter. Group Cultural Encounters Based on practical projects with youth groups in the City of Leicester UK, the following model provides a useful structure for joint cultural exploration: 1) ENCOUNTER Meeting points managed to minimise stress and discomfort 2) ENGAGE Opportunities to absorb ideas from each other 3) EXPLORE Experimentation through comparing, distilling and blending ideas from each culture 4) EXPRESS Combining ideas to find and show new joint realities 5) ENACT Presenting work in progress to an audience 6) EMPOWER Reflecting on experiences, strengthening learning and building proposals for the future

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The Making of Italians A study into Italian models of integration and socio-political participation Susanna Tamimi “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians”73. These are the words Massimo D'Azeglio pronounced at the eve of the unification of Italy in 1861. With only one person out of forty being able to speak Italian at that time, the unification was followed by what we would call today a cultural integration process. Local languages, customs and traditions were gradually pushed at the margin, leaving space only for the “Italian culture” to emerge. One hundred and fifty one years later, the making of Italians still remains at the centre of national and international concerns. With 4.570.317 foreigners residing today in the country (7.5% of the total population) and more than 21 languages used across the Peninsula74, the following questions need to be posed: How could third-country nationals become Italian? And what does it mean to be Italian? Bearing these queries in mind, this paper focuses on examining Italian models of integration, by investigating two levels of decision and policy-making: national and local. My argument is that, while at a national level, the integration model is assimilationist in character, at a local level, third-country nationals are organizing themselves into civil society organizations that are starting to play a crucial role in the local decision-making and cultural fabric. Cooperation between third-country nationals' civil society organizations and local institutions are indeed significantly increasing, showing a new interactive model for the making of Italians. In this regard, the example of Milan, home today to 207.412 third-country nationals, will here be used as a case study. When my father arrived in Milan from the Palestinian Territories in 1970, one of the first words he had to learn was the one of meridionale (southerner). Looking for a place to stay in the Northern-Italian industrial city, he came across numerous letting advertisements stating Non si affitta a meridionali (We do not rent to southerners). Despite more than a century having passed since the unification of Italy in 1861, the making of Italians was still very much an on-going process and hostility between the North and the South of Italy was and to a certain extent still is- significantly widespread. Up to 1970, Italy was a country mainly characterized by internal immigration and external emigration and the limited number of foreign citizens in the country for many years did not constitute a serious cause of concern. Since the late 1970s, however, Italy has witnessed a sudden transformation from an emigration to an immigration country, with foreign citizens with regular residence increasing tenfold. Despite only 143.838 immigrants legally resided in the country in 197075 (mainly from other European countries), Italy is today home to 4.570.317 foreigners (7.5% of the total population) from more than 191 countries. In light of this rapid transformation, the Italian legal and political framework governing immigration in Italy has also been subject to changes. While before 1986 an Italian immigration policy as such did not exist, the past 26 years have seen a continuous introduction of corrective measures and of new laws (in 1990, 1998, in 2002 and finally in 2011). Despite the fact that these laws have outlined a legislative integration framework, which recognizes for instance the importance of preserving immigrants’ cultures and languages, Italian governments have throughout the years been not less efficient in defining and allocating specific funding for these purposes, leaving local charities and institutions taking all the burden of preserving others’ cultures and languages. As a result, these fundamental rights have remained dead letters while immigration has increasingly become perceived as an issue related to social and economic order. Moreover, with the introduction of the Agreement of Integration 94/2009, the Italian State is currently re73

Gilmour, D. (2011),The Pursuit of Italy: A History of a Land, its Regions and their Peoples. Istat (2011), from: http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39726 75 A.A.V.V., (2005), Stranieri in Italia, from: www.stranieriinitalia.it/news/anticipa2005.doc 74

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defining its own model of integration. This new model, adopted by other EU states, conditions granting a legal status to an applicant on his/her passing a series of tests that would make him/her integrated in society. The Agreement works on a point principle and the points can be gained or lost: you win points when you pass the Italian language and civic culture test or when you accomplish a series of activities such as being enrolled in an Italian school or volunteering; you lose points when you are convicted of a crime. Despite the term 'agreement' implying a bilateral interaction, the integration model advanced by this law de facto implies a hegemonic power relation between the host country and the immigrant, with the latter being obliged to adapt to the former. It is also Interesting to note that the agreement was introduced as part of the Italian Security Act of 2009, and not as part of immigration law, as if not learning Italian might be considered a security threat for the entire society. Joining most European countries in a wave of neo-nationalistic narrative, the Italian current model of integration is clearly assimilationist in character or, better still, as described by Renzo Guolo, it is a model of 'dutiful assimilation'76, where assimilation becomes a condition for remaining in the country. In front of this assimilationist model, however, a different scenario is appearing at a local level. Many different cases could be quoted as examples; this paper will focus on two: the increasing engagement of foreigners' civil society organizations in the decision-making of the city and the emergence of second-generation groups demanding political rights and further inclusion in the society. Between December 2010 and December 2011, I conducted a research project for Codici (an Italian think-tank) on the development of migrant-led civil society organizations. Throughout the 12 months of my research, I was able to map over 50 third-country nationals’ civil society organizations operating in the city. Despite these organizations being mainly focused on offering support to their fellow citizens, their participation in many of the local decision-making institutions was remarkable and has risen in the past couple of years. A large number of these organizations, for instance, are working on the promotion of their cultures and languages. Schools are in this context fertile grounds for the development of social experiments, where members of different communities, together with Italian parents, collaborate and overcome cultural and linguistic obstacles by advancing an exchange and interactive model. Numerous migrants-led civil society organizations collaborate in fact with schools for the teaching of other languages (Arabic, Chinese, Spanish and so on and so forth) as well as for the organization of cultural events. In an elementary school, located in the heart of Milan, Scuola RussoPimmentel, foreign parents help the school to translate all the official and informative documents in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish and Albanian to help those parents with a poor level of Italian to access information and participate in the activities promoted by the school. Morning classes for parents are also offered and run by voluntary organizations and civil society organizations within the school. Moreover, in May 2011 a new city council was elected in Milan, revealing from the start its intention to adopt a new positive attitude toward third-country nationals residing in the city. With Expo 2015 looming, the new municipality realized the necessity of making Milan better equipped to hosting different cultures and languages. While some might feel reluctant to believe this interest will last after the end of Expo, the reality is that this event has offered new opportunities for third-country nationals to emerge and acquire a role in the political and cultural fabric of the city. So much so that in December 2011, the Municipality of Milan launched the Forum of the world city's cultures, a permanent forum that aims at creating a framework for the active participation of foreign communities and a venue for sharing ideas, projects and proposals for the development of cultural and economic policies. One-hundred and twenty-two foreign communities have joined the Forum, meeting on a regular basis. Since December 2011, the Forum has organized a multi-ethnic festival on food and nutrition, MiFood, and has participated in the planning of the Centre for World Cultures, which opened in June 2012. In addition to the increasing engagement of these civil society organizations, Milan – as the rest of Italy- is 76

Guolo, R. in interview with Sara Hejazi. from: http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000021112

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witnessing a rapid emergence of second-generation groups. Second-generation immigrants, mainly raised and educated in Italy, can take advantages of their in-depth knowledge of Italian society to play a role in local decision-making and cultural fabric. Among the different second generation organizations present in Milan (Associna, Yalla Italia!, GMI and so on and so forth), Rete G2 is amongst the more politically active ones. In February 2012, Rete G2, together with other 19 organizations, launched the Italy is also me campaign demanding that the State should confer Italian citizenship on children born in Italy from legal migrants and grant local voting rights to legal workers residing in Italy for more than five years. The campaign has appeared on local and national media throughout the entire Peninsula. Rete G2 has also been able to acquire a dedicated editorial space in the most popular Italian newspaper, il Corriere della Sera, where they publish articles about the positive aspects of multi-ethnicity and of the presence of third-country nationals in the country. Both cases clearly reveal that, while an assimilationist model is advanced at a national level, the local sphere shows a different way of conceiving cultural integration not as an hegemonic power relation between the host society and the others but rather as an interactive process, where third-country nationals are regarded as active players, capable of contributing to the decision-making and the cultural fabric of the city. The making of italians is still an on-going process and will always be. The terms “culture” and “integration” are both fluid, varying according to the changes of the society they describe. The Italian society encountered by my father over 40 years ago is not the one in which I grew up. Despite much still needing to be achieved, one cannot ignore the fact that the distrust between North and South of Italy is no longer the same as 40 years ago, and the gap between men and women is also no longer as wide as before. All these changes have occurred as a result of the introduction of new rights and new opportunities for interaction. The immigration phenomenon has created profound radical changes in the Italian society, affecting several aspects of its social, economic and political life. While at a national level, policies continue to be driven by the desire of preserving an Italian hegemonic culture, at a local level real integration is already taking place, reflecting the definition of the Council of the European Union and the Representative of the Governments of the Member States that defines integration as a dynamic, two way process of mutual accommodation (..)77.

77

EU Common Basic Principles (2004)

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Preparation Process of renewing the Estonian Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity Marianna Drozdova, Tallinn University / Estonian Ministry of Culture Presented is a description of inclusion process conducted as part of preparation for renewal of Estonian Cultural policy fundamentals. The abovementioned policy-making process is yet in progress, which has to be considered when viewing presented project. Background information Previous cultural policy fundamentals were formulated in 1998, and have been in action since. The process of review and renewal of fundamentals of Estonian Cultural Policy until 2020 was initiated by the Estonian Parliament, whose agenda for 2011 – 2015 includes this task. Estonian Ministry of Culture is responsible for preparation of this process and conducting related research and inclusion process. Current presentation is designed to present the process of involvement of various target groups in the process of preparation of current policy document. In order to provide maximum transparency of the process, it was decided to involve the organizations active in the various fields of culture, to gain maximum input both on the current state of affairs, main principles of cultural policy, relation of culture policy with other policies, from the point of view of various cultural fields, problems that need to be addressed, main targets and principles specific to each cultural field involved in the process. Design of the process The general outline of the process of preparation of Fundamental of Estonian Cultural Policy included first design of the structure of the document by the workgroup of the Estonian Ministry of Culture, and defining of the thematic workgroups in which the task of gathering input and formulating theme-specific guiding principles to be included in the final document of foundations of Estonian Cultural policy, would be implemented. The following culture fields were defined, to be addressed separately: • Cinematography

• Design

• Music

• Museums and archives

• Performance art

• Protection of ancient heritage

• Literature and publishing

• Libraries

• Architecture

• Folk culture

• Visual arts

• Cultural diversity

Current presentation is directly related to the preparation work done within the workgroup related to the topic of Cultural diversity, during January – June 2012. As a result of this process, suggestions regarding the field of Cultural diversity were to be formulated by June 2012, in order to be later integrated together with inputs from other cultural fields into a wholesome draft of fundamentals of Estonian Cultural Policy. As a next step, in October-November 2012 this document version is to be discussed again within the involved cultural fields and related workgroups, to finalize the document of Estonian Cultural Policy fundamentals and present it to the Parliament in January 2013.

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Inclusion activities In order to gain a throughout understanding of the situation regarding the cultural Diversity in Estonia and its relation to the new fundamentals of Estonian Cultural policy, as well as provide maximum inclusion of various organisations working in the field of retaining and development of cultural heritage of minority cultures – following inclusion activities took place during the 6 months of preparation process:  January-March: Round tables with experts and researchers in related fields, analysis of previous research on the topic and related legislation, definition of questions to be addressed during the following inclusion process  February: presentation and call for participation at the Round table of the Council of minority cultures  April: two online surveys – one involving 77 organisations working with support, protection and development of minority cultures including 13 umbrella organisations; second survey involving 140 respondents not directly related to work of cultural organisations.  April: Three round tables in Tallinn, Tartu and Jõhvi, total number of participants over 70 representatives of cultural organisations, local government officials, researchers.  May: analysis of gathered data and input, formulating proposal draft of cultural policy foundations input from field of Cultural Diversity  June: Presentation of the draft to the Round table of the Council of minority cultures, final roundtable with comments regarding the current version of the Draft  September-November (planned): review of integrated Cultural Policy foundations document version that includes input from all culture divisions and fields, feedback and comments from representatives of minority cultures organisations Results The discussions, surveys and interviews with experts produced a very wide input wide input, that included information about existing problems and proposed solutions, conceptual ideas and theoretical analysis, as well as very practical ideas and examples of actions that may be taken and implementation of which would be welcomed by the organisations and institutions working in the field of cultural diversity. The analysis conducted on the basis of this input, following main points regarding the expectations for the foundations of Cultural Policy within Cultural Diversity subgroup were formulated: Main goal of Estonian Cultural policy regarding cultural diversity: Guarantee stable development of cultural diversity in Estonia, paying extra attention at preservation, protection and development of national minority cultures, viewing cultural diversity as a recourse enriching information and cultural environment of Estonia. The proposals to be included in the input for the fundamentals of the Estonian Cultural policy from the part of Cultural Diversity workgroup can be formulated within 10 main points, as follows: 1. Increasing cultural cohesion in Estonian society – focus on bringing closer together the majority and minority communities that are currently divided – not only by language, but also by different perception of identity and insufficient cooperation on daily basis, and use culture as a means for that goal. 2. Common media sphere – focus on achieving stronger awareness of cultural differences and cultural sensitivity in media coverage, in order to support creation of common cohesive discussion

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

platform, rather than fuelling misunderstanding, or increasing perception of division and discrimination. Roles of central and local government bodies – focus on taking regional diversity – density of minority population, cultural diversity, and socio-economic factors – into consideration in the process of supporting preservation of cultural diversity. Clarify definitions and legal framework – pertaining to the definitions related to cultural minorities and cultural diversity used in the public discourse, and the legal documents, on basis of which the status of cultural and national minorities is to be defined. Cultural diversity in education system – related to cooperation with the Ministry of Education in relation to both providing necessary methodological and scientific support for the implementation of pedagogical programs within bicultural and bilingual context. Scientific research – importance of supporting creation of the body of knowledge and research into the questions of efficient methods and policies designed to creating a cohesive and integrated society. Minority inclusion in realization of cultural policy – related to the role of minority groups representatives and minority cultural organizations in the process of implementing the designed policy framework – design of actual implementation programs, partnership in their realization. Contacts with homeland – related to the importance of contact with home- country of origin of the cultural minority groups, in order to provide informational, relational and other kind of support needed for effective retaining of related cultural groups in Estonian society. Increase competence of cultural organizations – focus on cultural organizations and umbrella organizations being currently the main partners in implementing activities targeted on minority representatives in the society – the goal is to increase the capability of the organizations to: a) Increase administrative competence b) More efficiently involve minority representatives into the active work of the organization – both as participants / visitors of open events, and as active members and contributors – organizers. c) Attract additional funds necessary for implementation of organization’s daily work, special events and cooperation activities d) Present results of their work via various media channels, to be more visible to the society. e) Other administrative and managerial issues targeted at increase in productivity and efficiency both of existing structures and the ones being created. Cooperation with civil society – focus on stimulating cooperation of cultural organizations of Estonian and minority cultures, as well as cooperation of cultural organisations with a wider network of civil society – youth organisations, other NGO-s, in order to increase their impact and strengthen their.

The process of formulating the foundations of Estonian cultural policy is currently continued in the workgroup of the Ministry of culture, where these principles are integrated with the results of other workgroups.

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Conclusion The process described in this presentation is an example of inclusion process in the process of development of an important framework policy document that is going to define and steer the development in Estonian cultural policy for the years to come. The overall outcome of the inclusion process is yet to be determined, since the process of preparing the foundations of Estonian Cultural policy until 2020 is still under way. What may currently be said, is that this was a valuable experience of designing and implementing inclusion process, and allowed to collect valuable input and information that can be used not only for the process of preparing foundations of Estonian Cultural policy that the inclusion process was designed for, but also other related processes and activities – starting from daily work of the Cultural diversity department of the Estonian ministry of Culture, and up to the preparation of design of new Integration program for 2014 - 2020, the preparation for design of which is scheduled to start in 2013. As was mentioned above, it is important to consider that current policy-making process is still in progress, and it is yet to be determined how and in what form the results will find reflection in the designed policy, considering results from other fields of

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Estonian Policy towards Ethnic Minorities and Russification of Ethnic Minorities: Success or Failure? Aleksandr Aidarov, Tallinn Technical University This presentation is based on the article by A. Aidarov as a part of his doctoral thesis: Aleksandr Aidarov and Wolfgang Drechsler. “Estonian Russification of Non-Russian Ethnic Minorities in Estonia? A policy analysis.” To be published in Journal of Baltic Studies.

1.

Non-Russians and their Assimilation in Estonia since 1991

31% of Estonian population are non-Estonians. Ethnic Russians are the largest ethnic minority who make up almost 26% of the population. Other ethnicities make up 4,6 %. For the purposes of analysis I call the latter non-Russians. Non-Russians are Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars and et al, who came to Estonia during the times of Soviet Union. They are people who are called “Russian speaking population”, “Russian speakers” or even “Russians”. It sounds logical. Language plays a very important role in defining national identity in Estonia. This is why Estonians define the identity on the basis of the language. But from the point of view of the ethnic identity, not all persons who speak Russian are Russians, even if they speak Russian as their mother tongue or as a second language. For instance Russian speaking Udmurt is not Russian, but according to his or her self-determination, Udmurt. Question of ethnic assimilation became important to Estonians and Russians as a result of establishing nation-state and other concurring processes, also the stereotype of the Russians as “national enemy” who threatens Estonian language and culture. In these circumstances assimilation of other ethnic groups was less important. According to the research on linguistic vitality and language proficiency among Estonian ethnic minorities actual assimilation in Estonia has been into Russian language and culture. In other words, ethnic minorities tend to Russify in Estonia.

2.

State Support for Preserving and Developing Non-Russian Languages

In this paper Russification is defined as a process of homogenization of the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities into the Russian cultural and linguistic sphere in Estonia since 1991. Russification is unintentional consequence of ethnic-minority policy by the Estonian Government and the support provided for preserving cultures and languages. From the “idealistic” perspective Russification is not in Estonia’s interest a) as a liberal-democratic state Estonia supports ethnic minorities according international conventions and/or b) from the “cynical” perspective, which is manifested in the “rule and divide” principle towards the large, post-Soviet, Russian-speaking community in order to find good representatives with whom the state could work together and who would offer an alternative to nationalist leaders. According to sub-goal no 6 of the Estonian Integration Strategy 2008–2013 state support is aimed at creating opportunities for ethnic minorities to learn their mother tongue, to preserve and develop their cultures and languages. To achieve that, various policy instruments have been created. Lets’ concentrate on the six key policy instruments in the area of cultural and educational integration: 1) optional language and culture classes in public secondary schools, 2) hobby (or weekend) schools, 3) private schools, 4) cultural societies, 5) national cultural autonomy, and 6) publicly financed media. The former three instruments belong to education policy (responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Research) and the latter to cultural policy (responsibility of Ministry of Culture and Estonian National Broadcasting). When speaking of links between the targets and the support mechanisms, it is important to pay attention to 54


whether the chosen instruments assist achieving the goals (non-Russian preserve and develop their language and culture) or not (ethnic minorities become Russified). The implementation of these instruments will be analysed from the Government and ethnic minorities’ perspective with stress on how minorities use these instruments for themselves. Data used for the analysis is often not publicly collected. Information was gathered from the responsible institutions mentioned above, who in turn obtained it from ethnic minority NGOs, schools etc. Therefore the data should be treated with caution.

3.

Support Mechanisms for Non-Russian Languages and Cultures

3.1. Education Policy: Additional language and cultural studies in basic schools, hobby schools, and private schools In general, public schools in Estonia have either Estonian or Russian as their language of instruction. According to the Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act the parents have a right to require the secondary school to organize the teaching of a language and culture to students who speak a language (either as their mother tongue or a second language spoken at home) which differs from the language of instruction. The law stipulates that a separate class can be launched if at least ten parents of such students submit an application to the principal of the school. Since 1992, a total of six such classes have been opened. Based on the date on 2003-2010 there are not enough children at the schools to open such classes. If the classes are opened, they do not function long. The only class that has been working continuously since 2004 is at the Kannuka School in Sillamäe, where children learn Ukrainian language and culture. As of 2012 there are classes for language and cultural studies for Ukrainians (opened in 2004), Belarusians (opened in 2010), Azerbaijanis (opened in 2011). During the past five years the number of hobby schools (or weekend schools) has risen. When in 1999 there were 9 hobby schools, then in 2012 there were already 2010. However only 17 hobby schools are supported by the state and have pupils. Number of pupils at hobby schools varies greatly – from 6 to 40 pupils. In general the number of children is small, only 0,5% of non-Russian population. Since 1991 nonRussians have not established separate private schools with mother tongue as language of instruction, although it is allowed under the Private Schools Act. 1998-2009 Estonian, Russian and Finnish has been used as the language of instruction. Implementation of hobby schools and optional classes has raised the discussion why ethnic minorities do not make use of these opportunities. According the Government the additional classes are not popular: parents lack initiative, the number of pupils is not enough and they are scattered over different schools. The work of hobby is believed to depend on the initiative on the part of ethnic minorities and on the strength of the community. From the point of view of the ethnic minorities, however, the hobby schools are underfunded and are financed on project-basis which impedes long-term planning and the work at hobby schools is done by volunteers. Hobby Schools Act, that regulates the work of hobby schools does not take into account the needs and problems of ethnic minority hobby schools. For example, if an ordinary hobby school offers leisure time activities for children, then ethnic minority hobby schools focus on teaching mother tongue and culture. And, private schools are not regarded as strong alternatives to public schools, because they are expensive. Learning in public schools is free of charge. Non-Estonians are generally less wealth than Estonians they are a greater risk of becoming unemployed etc. This can explain why non-Russians have not set up their own private schools – public schools are free and the parents are not wealthy enough.

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3.2.

Cultural Policy: Cultural Societies, Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities and Radio

Broadcasts There are 333 registered cultural societies in Estonia that focus on ethnic minority cultures. 33% of them belong to non-Russians. Non-profit activeness of ethnic minorities in Estonia is generally low. The same applies to non-Russian cultural activities. For example in 2008 0,7% of Belarusians, 5,4% of Ukrainians and 6% of Tatars belonged to cultural societies. The number of members could be even lower. For example, of 495 Chuvashs living in Estonia 106 belonged to the cultural societies. However, the number of active members is smaller, some 20 people (who write projects, sing, dance). In other words there are activists in the societies (their number is small) and passive if not “virtual� members. Taking into account the problems that Ingerian Finns, Swedes and Russians have encountered when establishing own National Cultural Autonomies (NCA) and the declarative nature of the law of NCA, Ukrainians and Belarusians who have numeric potential to create NCA according to the law, deem it unreasonable and not worth the effort. They rather expect to use the current funding possibilities. Radio 4 of National Broadcasting offers broadcasting opportunities for ethnic minorities to introduce their culture. Radio programmes are produced on project-basis. At the end of each year it is on certain which ethnic minorities will continue their programs. Programmes vary in length from 20 to 40 people and are aired once a month or once a week. In 2012 Belarusians, Tatars and Ukrainians do that in their mother tongues and Chuvash on Russian, Armenians and Azerbaijanis both in Russian and in their mother tongue. Since 60% of Belarusians, 52% of Tatars and 59% of Ukrainians do not speak their ethnic language, the audience is probably even smaller. Russian speaking programmes are better in terms of transmitting information. All others interested can listen to them as well. This however, does not help to preserve the language, while it can support cultural identity. Similarly to education policy, cultural policy has raised the debate why ethnic minorities do not use offered opportunities. According to the Government the system functions well and it exploitation depends on ethnic minorities. Several reasons of why ethnic minorities do not use them actively are known: cultural societies cannot find new members and leaders, generations of ethnic minorities born in Estonia are not interested in culture, societies cannot or do not write good projects and reports, which in turn diminishes their financial stability, leaders of one ethnic group do not cooperate due to mutual disagreements, societies are not effective and there are many fictive organizations who misuse the status of cultural society to attain resources from the state without contributing to culture. From the point of view of ethnic minorities the funding system is the biggest shortfall: support of fictitious organisations, decentralised system (in order to find resources one has to submit the project to different organisations), inability to organise long-term activities, funding is given for one year, system of project application and reporting is too bureaucratic and should be simplified. This critique concerns Estonian non-profit sector and not only cultural societies of non-Russians. However, it is not politically important topic because in politics there is call for increased funding, but not for improving the funding system.

4. Failure of the Policy Through Education and Cultural Policy Mechanisms Six policy instruments function on project basis. Without intent this cannot diminish or impede assimilation of non-Russians into Russian language and culture – the process that Estonia has inherited from the Soviet times. If Estonian Government regards the preservation and protection of languages and cultures of ethnic minorities as important goal and there are instruments created that do not support achieving these goals then this policy, by definition of policy failure, has failed. The Government can criticise ethnic minorities that they are not able to use existing opportunities for various reasons. However, the instruments created should help the Government to achieve the goal. If the policy has failed because of the instruments, then this is not the fault of ethnic minorities. The question is how to improve existing instruments and/or develop new ones to achieve the goal. Otherwise the Government has a risk to continue supporting ethnic minorities just to support them without meeting the goal. This is what is called performative policy. For the future, it would be interesting to find out why the Government, 56


despite being aware of the current situation, still continues to use the project-based funding system. There could be two reasons: a) neoliberal ideology and new public management that require ethnic minorities to be independent, autonomous, take initiative and b) project-centred culture that has developed as a result of international financial support to the Estonian public sector after 1991. This support is project-based so that its’ logics has been used to support ethnic minorities.

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Russian Nation-Building, Cultural Diversity and Language Policy Konstantin Zamyatin, University of Helsinki The paper explores the developments in the course of nation-building in post-Soviet Russia and its influence on cultural and linguistic diversity. The exploration is based on the analysis of official policydefining documents. Despite the proclamation of equal-in-right status of all peoples of the Russian Federation and their languages, designation of Russian and titular languages of Russia’s republics as the state languages marks their actual hierarchy. In fact, the analysis demonstrates that in recent years the federal authorities aim at valorisation of the Russian language at the expense of other languages. Arguably, this latter development could be better understood in the context of Russian nation-building agenda.

Nation-Building The problem of social and cultural integration was set on the political agenda of the newly created Russian Federation in the early 1990s. In looking for the basis of integration, it was in fashion to look for a Russian national idea. It was a matter of discussion, which nation(s) should be constructed, civic or ethnic. On the one hand, Russian authorities inherited some late Soviet legacies, including the formula of ‘the multinational people’, postulates of equality of the peoples and their languages, on the other hand, they introduced some new principally new political institutions, e.g. Russian as the state language (see Constitution of the Russian Federation of 12 December 1993; Concept of the State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 15 June 1996). Since the last years of Yeltsin’s presidency, authorities decided not to invent the wheel and to follow the way of other former Soviet republics: the concept of nation-state came into political discourse as the basis for integration. The course of Russian nation-building became the mainstream of debates on the visions of Russia’s future. At the time of Putin’s Presidency the idea of the Russian nation as a civic and even political nation sharing common values became the state policy with the approval of the Concept of the State National Educational Policy (Order of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation of 3 August 2006) that stated among its aims “spiritual consolidation of the multinational people of the Russian Federation into a single political nation”. However, in the current year, the policy experienced transformations. It seems, Russian policy-makers in their efforts of nation-building tended to ignore the findings of classic studies on nationalism arguing that creation of a civic nation is possible only in conditions of liberating civil society, which arguably is not the case for the current situation in Russia. In response to recent raise of Russian ethnic nationalism, which among other things includes the demand for recognition of the ethnic Russians as ‘the founding nation of the state’ (‘gosudarstvoobrazuiushchii narod’), the official nation-building project was a matter to modifications (see Zamyatin 2012). Lately, the attributes ‘civic’ and ‘political’ were dropped from the public discourse. The Draft Strategy of Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation Up To the Year 2025 was published on 27 September 2012. This Draft again contains a compromise: it aims, on the one hand, at ‘strengthening the civic unity of the multinational people of the Russian Federation (Russian nation)’ (‘rossiiskoi natsii’) and, on the other hand, ‘at maintenance of ethno-cultural diversity of the peoples of Russia’. A novelty is that the document addresses the problem of inter-nationality conflicts that emerge, i.e., out of immigration: the Draft also aims at ‘harmonisation of inter-nationality relations’ and at ensuring 58


‘adaptation and integration immigrants in Russian society’ (p. 21). However, as a contraposition to immigrants, the Draft for the first time ever officially uses and even defines the terms ‘autochthonous peoples of the Russian Federation’ (‘korennye narody Rossiiskoi Federatsii’) (p. 5). Further, in strife to overtake the rhetoric of ethnic Russian nationalism, the paper speaks about ‘uniting role of the Russian people’ (‘obiediniaiushchuiu rol russkogo naroda’) and emphasizes that Russia was created as a ‘union of peoples, as the State that historically had the Russian people (‘russkii narod’) as its system-forming core’ (p. 8).

Cultural Diversity The implementation of the nation-state project in Russia is complicated, i.e., by the plenitude of its languages, cultures and religions. On the wave of the processes of sovereignisation and democratization in the conditions of the USSR disintegration at the early 1990s a substantial basis was created in Russia for diversity maintenance that included, i.e., incorporation of non-Russian national-state and nationalterritorial units in the state structure, guarantees for development of national education and national cultures, promotion of linguistic diversity and other measures (see Perepelkin, Razlogov and Razmustova 2012). Indeed, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity could be a challenge for the unification of nation. The selection of a nation-building scenario could be influenced by the need for diversity management). In these circumstances it is not a wonder that the axiom of “United Russia” having “united legal, economic, informational, educational and cultural space” is presented as the ultimate value. In the sphere of culture, no definition of ‘culture’ was given in the 1990s (Law of the Russian Federation Foundations of Legislation of the Russian Federation on Culture of 9 October 1992). Using this gap, the substitution by a narrower understanding of culture was suggested to open the way for a later ‘folklorisation’ (Federal Law On National-Cultural Autonomy of 5 July 1996). The Draft Federal Law on Culture in the Russian Federation of 26 October 2011 suggests as a task of cultural policy “creation of conditions for ensuring a united cultural space on the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of recognition of a special role of the Russian culture (russkoi kultury) as the basis for consolidation of equal cultures of the peoples of Russia”. Current trajectory of developments not only in cultural policy, but also in regional and federalism policies, nationalities and language policies reveal the authorities’ intention to undermine or remove cultural and other differences in their strife for homogenization (see, e.g., Prina 2011).

Language policy The ambiguity of nation-building is especially visible in the field of language politics. The Preamble of the Russia’s Language Law (Law of the Russian SFSR On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian SFSR of 25 October 1991) states that ‘the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation are the national wealth of the Russian State’. Its contradictory provisions on languages’ equality and hierarchy of their statuses, state support for language revival and antidiscrimination clauses did not change the dominant position of the Russian language and low legal and actual status of other languages (see Tishkov et al. 2009). Furthermore, nowadays the late Soviet formula ‘Russian as the language of internationality communication’ (Law of the USSR On the Languages of the Peoples of the USSR of 24 April 1990) is an object of criticism. It is argued that Russian is not only under decline internationally, but also that nonRussians are disadvantaged because of poor knowledge of Russian exactly due to the role of Russian only as a tool of communication and its teaching to non-Russian for the narrow purpose of communication and for the purpose of perfect knowledge as (Khrushchev’s the second?) native language. Recently a new slogan was proposed to substitute the old one which argues that ‘Russian became the national wealth (natsionalnoe dostoianie) not only of the Russian people, but also of the peoples of Russia 59


(Guboglo 2007). The line of argument challenges the widespread (in particular, among national elites of bigger peoples) idea that the Russian language was a tool of Russification, and insists that it was (also?) a tool of the cultures maintenance through their translation to Russian and via its mediation to the world. The criterion to measure if Russian has already become the national wealth of a people is a simple one: if Russian is recognized as the native language by more than half representatives of a people (e.g. Karelians) than it has become its wealth. This idea is backed by the statistics that practically all Russian citizens nowadays know Russian. In connection with this idea is a newly proposed ideology regarding the role of the Russian language in society as the all-civic language of solidarity (Guboglo 2007) corresponds to the civic vision of nation. However, for the first time on the top level the emphasis was laid in the recent paper for the session of the Russia’s State Council, an advisory body to the Russian head of state, held in Ufa in February 2011 and devoted to the nationalities policy, on ‘Russian as the language of the Russian nation’ (see Russia’s State Council Report 2011). Finally, along the inland transformations, authorities intensify their support for the Russian language abroad, i.e., through activities of the Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Fedorova and Kochelyaeva 2012).

Conclusion So far, by the current absence of the formally adopted policy-defining document, it is still an open question, which scenario in building the Russian nation will prevail out of a few possible variants: civic or ethnic Russian, Eastern Slavic or even Russophone. They could still coexist for some time in status quo of purposeful ambiguity serving various political ends, resulting in a wide range of the inconsistent state policies (see Shevel 2011). However, if the model of the ethno-political pendulum applied to description of Russian politics (Pain 2003) is accurate, then the course of the nation-building that, drifted towards ‘civic’ nation during the 1990s and at the early 2000s, could be expected to turn back towards mixed ‘civic-ethnic’ or even ‘ethnic’ nation in the 2010s. It is symptomatic that the term ‘(cultural) integration’ is applied in diversity management only in the context of immigrants and the “Near Abroad”. In the context of traditional groups the unification agenda would result in the further shift of the policy vector towards assimilation across domestic policy areas.

References  Fedorova, Tatyana and Kochelyaeva Nina (2012). Country Profile: Russia. Last update: December 2011. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. Council of Europe/ERICarts, Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 13th edition.  Guboglo, Mikhail (2007). Ot iazyka mezhnatsionalnogo obshcheniia k obshchegrazhdanskomu iazyku solidarnosti. Etnologicheskie ocherki. Informatsionnyi biulluten. Available at http://www.mdn.ru/cntnt/blocksleft/menu_left/nacionalny/publikacii2/knigi1/mn_guboglo. html  Pain, Emil (2003). Mezhdu imperiei i natsiei: Modernistskii proiekt i iego traditsionalistskaia alternativa v natsionalnoi politike Rossii. Moscow: Liberalnaia missiia.  Perepelkin, Lev, Razlogov, Kirill and Razmustova, Tatyana (2012). Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity in Modern Time Russia. National Report on the Russian Federation. The Council of Europe Transversal Study Project. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 60


 Prina, Federica (2011). Homogenisation and the ‘New Russian Citizen’: A Road to Stability or Ethnic Tension? Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 10 (1): 59-93.  ‘Report of the State Council of the Russian Federation on Measures of Strengthening the Inter-Nationality Concord in Russian Society’. Ministry of Regional Development, March 29, 2011. Available at http://www.minregion.ru/activities/interethnic_relations/national_policy/505/.  Shevel, Oxana (2011). Russian Nation-building from Yel'tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic or Purposefully Ambiguous? Europe-Asia Studies 63 (2): 179-202.  Tishkov, Valery, Stepanov, Valery, Funk, Dmitry and Artemenko, Olga (2009). Status of and support for linguistic diversity in the Russian Federation, Expert Report. Moscow, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russia's Academy of Sciences.  Zamyatin, Konstantin (2012). Nationalities Policy in Russia. In Russian Federation 2012: Short-term Prognosis, ed. Karmo Tüür, 62-66. Tartu: Tartu University Press.

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Cultural Issues of the Integration Policy in France Marie-José Bernardot, Ministry of Interior

Introduction: historical context France is a land of immigration: it is the European country with the oldest tradition of immigration (1 million foreigners in 1911 and 3 million in 1931). In 1914, the percentage of non-nationals in the population was even greater than today. Today a quarter of the French population has a parent or grand-parent of foreign origin; two-thirds of immigrants come from French-speaking countries (former colonies). In 2010, there were 5.1 million migrants in France, including 3.1 million foreigners (regular). Each year, 180,000 foreigners from third country nations are accorded the right to live in France. The French State practices a generous and long-standing policy of naturalization (100,000 people are naturalized every year, with some fluctuations depending on policy changes at governmental level).

I General characteristics of integration policy The tradition of integration in France is based on the founding principles of the Republic: France is a nation which remains open to the world, as French citizenship is accessible to foreigners who wish to integrate provided that they respect Republican values such as democratic right, equality, secularism (the principle that implies respect for all religions and designates a clear separation between public and private spheres). Although the goal of “assimilating” foreigners in the “French Crucible” necessarily entails use of the French language, it is not compatible with “multiculturalism”, defined as the coexistence of diverse cultures which endure over time and remain “self-segregated” as enclaves in the host country. .... however some of these principles are not so easily implemented, for multiple reasons that include, among others, the arrival of new migrants from non-francophone countries (China, India, Turkey...) and “ethnic” concentrations in certain districts (typically suburbs or old and run-down city-centre localities). The evolution of French society itself since the 1980s – with rising unemployment, and, since 1974, the new trend of “family-based” immigration, with new requirements – has necessitated on-going changes to integration policy.

II political integration and cultural issues The integration policy of the Department of Integration and Citizenship (Ministry in Charge of Integration – DAIC in French) at national level, together with intermediaries at local level (“région” and “départements”, French administrative districts) aims to provide answers to these new issues and challenges. 1 / The acquisition of the host country’s language as well as an understanding of the values, practices and “codes” of the society are considered prerequisites to the process of integration (“cultural” environment). Learning the French language is one of the major priorities across multiple programmes.

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Other example : an innovative system has been in place since 2008 to enable immigrant parents to more closely follow the education of their children (“Open the school to parents”). This programme, run in conjunction with the French Ministry of National Education, is today present in three-quarters of French “departments” and in all major cities. A clear understanding of the values and traditions of the host society by recently arrived foreigners is considered necessary in order to promote the notion of “living together” in French society: there are many projects and training schemes that promote this theme. 2 / The policy of integration includes cultural actions “stricto sensu” because they use the “tools” of culture, and are supported at national, and local levels (region, cities), to help to change attitudes. These actions relate to culture, memory and the history of immigration. They cater first and foremost to foreigners and immigrants, but also to all French citizens, since successful integration depends not only on the willingness of the migrant to integrate, but also on the openness and acceptance of society as a whole. At national level The DAIC provides financial support to designated national initiatives of groups that implement projects in the field of culture, memory and the history of immigration (every year interested groups are invited to apply for grants directly to DAIC). In 2012, some 20 associations were selected for grants totalling more than €500 000. These projects typically deal with memory and transmission of the history of immigration, but also focus on children and youth in schools, the acquisition of civic values and tolerance, as well as training sessions on interculturality, seminars, public cultural and artistic events. At local level, in state administrative districts and local communities: Many local initiatives are taken, especially by the cities themselves, often with the support of other local communities, in the field of culture and the memory of immigration: exhibitions, conferences on the history of the regional immigration, festivals of cinema, street parties, etc. Associations and social centres are also very important actors in this field: their initiatives are helped financially by the DAIC and its regional partners but also by local communities. In fifteen regional districts, the various associations involved in the history and the memory of immigration have formed regional networks in order to pool their resources and better promote their initiatives (these networks are supported by public authorities). Civil society initiatives are also numerous and very important for social cohesion and the integration of foreigners on a daily basis.

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III the National City of the History of Immigration (CNHI in French): an original structure, a public operator, under the tutelage of the DAIC and the Ministries of Culture, Education and Research. The CNHI is a museum and a network whose mission was originally fulfilled by many associations involved in the history of immigration in France. The opening of the CHNI took place in October 2007 in an increasingly strict political climate relating to immigration (this was the period of the controversial creation of a National Ministry of Immigration and National Identity). One of the essential missions of the CNHI (which functions as a traditional museum but also as a “network” extending beyond the physical structure of the museum) is to contribute to promoting the history of immigration, in all its multiple manifestations, as an integral part of the history of France, thereby helping to confront and change negative stereotypes and preconceptions of immigration and immigrants. The CNHI is an innovative concept and brings many facets to bear in the promotion of its mission: it functions both as a museum of the history of immigration and an exhibition hall; it organises events and conferences that are open to the public, and also serves as an educational and scientific centre at the heart of a vibrant network of public and private regional and European stakeholders working in the field of immigration. Among recent exhibitions organized by the CNHI, special mention might be made of a few particularly successful events: “Polish immigration in France”, “Generations: a century of North African immigration”; and “Football and immigration”. The next temporary exhibition will be devoted to the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the French-Algerian War and will focus on the experience of Algerian immigrants in France during the war period. The exhibition is being organized under the scientific leadership of Benjamin Stora, an eminent historian of the period, and will open on October 9, 2012.

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Best Practices

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Introduction to Practical Examples of Cultural Integration Tanel Mätlik, Gravitas Consult LLC Practical work in the field of cultural integration may take many forms depending on the objective, target group, participants, area of culture, format and other aspects. The practices presented in the current conference proceedings cover a wide variety of areas of culture: comics 78, music79, film80, national cuisine81, national clothes, dance, art, and graffiti 82. The activities take such forms as exhibitions, festivals, workshops83, TV and radio broadcasts, Internet websites and games, publications. Therefore, culture, it can be argued, is a fruitful environment for integration activities - the concrete forms of these activities depend on the creativity and imagination of involved artists, painters, film-makers and other actors in the field. In this variety of practices, there is one important aspect that needs special attention – the objective of cultural activities for integration. Film-making and painting is the result of creative process, while support for integration is rather a by-product of this process. However, by having a closer look at the cultural activities, one can notice a difference between value-oriented and contact-oriented cultural activities in cultural integration. Value-oriented cultural activities have clearly-defined goal to introduce the democracy, liberal values such as freedom of speech and cultural diversity and tolerance towards immigrants and members of host society. Culture is used as a medium to deliver these messages to the audience because culture is very closely related to values and social norms in the country concerned. At the same time, the aspect of values and norms also plays a crucial role in integration policies at large. The EU’s conceptual document on integration84 stresses the importance of respect for the basic values of the European Union and national values. The importance of common values is emphasised in the current publication by Robert Palmer, who has described the concept of intercultural policy where both the recognition of cultural rights is accompanied with the creation of common ground, mutual understanding, empathy and shared aspirations. Thus, the promotion of these values can be done very often consciously via cultural activities targeted both at the immigrants and the host society members. It can be sometimes difficult to participate for some groups in such cultural activities if their social values and norms do not comply with the proposed normative framework. However, such cultural activities may open the meaning of values and social norms for people in a more natural way than special introduction courses for newcomers in the country. The main aim of contact oriented cultural activities is to establish contacts between immigrants and the host society members via culture by introducing the cultural diversity to each other. Culture is used as a cause and environment for increasing awareness about various cultural groups and if possible, for joint activities between immigrants and the host society members. The transfer of knowledge about the European values may occur during these cultural events but is not compulsory – the main reason is the wish to enjoy jointly diverse cultural achievements, or going together through the process of cultural 78

Please see article „Integratia - the Integration Comic“ by Franz Wolf-Maier in this volume Please see article „Music as a Tool for Integration“ by Leelo Lehtla in this volume 80 Please see article „Film as a tool for Integration by Marc Nigita in this volume 81 Please see article „Television - Travel without Travelling“ by Priit Kuusk in this volume 82 Please see article „Dance as a Tool for Integration“ by Zemfira Lampmann and Jevgeni Mironov in this volume 83 Please see article „Cultural Integration at the Warsaw Multicultural Centre“ by Witek Hebanowski in this volume 84 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions - A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union (COM/2005/0389). 79

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creation. The common cultural experience unites people, creates common and positive memories for people who might not know each other otherwise. The assumption is that an integrated cohesive society depends largely on the frequent contacts between people from different economic, social and cultural groups. The other expectation is that the active communication between culturally different persons will change their attitudes towards cultural differences in a positive direction. People will be more open and will better understand the particular ethno-cultural traditions or lifestyles. Both approaches to activities of cultural integration are equally important. Sometimes it is more relevant to pay attention to mediation of values and social norms. In other cases, it might be more effective to avoid direct presentation of values because of complicated cultural context, and as a first step, the awareness raising and the creation of contacts between persons from very different cultural communities will provide better results. The examples presented below will hopefully give inspiration for new and original cultural activities that would emerge in different contexts and towards different target groups in European countries and elsewhere.

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Television - Travel without Travelling Priit Kuusk, ERR (Estonian National Broadcasting) When I initially decided to introduce a new and different cooking series on Estonian TV, I had never thought of combining together, at first sight so different topics such as cooking and integration. After a few years of thought and search for funding, the cooking series “Kitchen Citizens” was born in cooperation with Integration and Migration Foundation Our People. The first goal of the series was to introduce a variety of national cuisines that exist here to Estonian viewers. At the same time everyone working in the kitchen play an important role in expanding horizons of Estonians and inhabitants of Estonia, also enrich our culinary traditions with their ethnic, cultural and religious traditions. Travel without Travelling Travel without travelling has been one of our mottos, since here, in our hometown Tallinn, there are representatives from all parts of the world then we have many opportunities to travel. Integration is a two-way process. The main emphasis of the series, however, is on widening the horizons of Estonian speaking viewers and their values. It seems that the first season met the target very well. Each episode had on average 100 000 viewers. At the same time, it seems to me that all those people who were in front of our cameras and played the leading roles, appreciated highly that their work is sincerely valued by people who live here and that they care about it. Reasons for coming to Estonia Why Estonia? Was my question to everyone who was not born here. The two most common reasons were – Love and Work! You come here, fall in love and stay. All these stories share one thing in common – it usually happens to men (e.g. from Pakistan, Azerbaijan) and they begin to speak the language of their future wives. That is Russian or Estonian, respectively. Work brings people here for different reasons. Professional chefs are often invited to work here, but people come also because they are good at it and an opportunity arises. The latter is common to Georgian women for instance. Third reason is war and refugees. Kitchen is one of the easiest and fastest ways to find a job. Attitudes towards Estonia and the Locals In general the attitudes are positive, but there are also very negative examples. In most cases they are not willing to speak about this in public. Mass media, including television, has therefore responsibility to promote tolerance among local people towards people of different national background, who have, for different reasons chosen Estonia to bet their new homeland. Based on the feedback from the viewer’s we can confirm that new information on how people of different ethnic backgrounds “invisibly” enrich Estonian food culture was impressive and brought about positive reactions among the audience. At the same time, one has to admit, when talking to citizens who have been refugees, it is amazing how indifferent the state and the relevant authorities are towards refugees. There are no measures to support accommodation to life in Estonia, people have to find their place in Estonia on their own, without having knowledge of Estonian way of life and language. This explains high level of unskilled workers among 68


refugees (some also manage to become qualified chefs) in restaurant kitchens. The job is difficult, the demands of workers are low and employers are eager to take advantage of this. Assessing the goal of our TV-project – to widen the information field of the viewers through introducing the ethnic cuisines and the ways they are organised – then I believe that this approach, where the main aim – to promote tolerance, understanding, even if it is hidden behind cooking, will give positive results.

Links to the project   

http://etv.err.ee/index.php?0562955 Recipes presented in the project http://etv.err.ee/index.php?0562955 The episodes of the series can be watched in the digital archive of Estonian Public Broadcasting http://etv.err.ee/arhiiv.php?otsing=K%C3%B6%C3%B6gikodanikud

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Music as a Tool for Integration Leelo Lehtla, Pille Lill Music Fund PLMF in a non-governmental non-profit organization launched in 2003 with the aim to support the development of talented professional musicians by organizing master classes, opportunities to perform and by introducing them internationally. In 2005 PLMF started organizing the chamber music series “Master School” all over Estonia including Narva, the third largest city in Estonia, located at the eastern extreme point by the Russian border. Narva has a population of over 60 000 inhabitants of whom over 93% are Russian speaking and almost 34000 of them we identify as European Third-country Nationals (36% are Russian citizens and 16% have undefined citizenship - a term applied to those migrants from former Soviet republics and their children, who did not pursue any country's citizenship after the collapse of the Soviet Union). The series of concerts introduced Estonian top-artists to an audience who was quite cut off from all “Estonian national” trends due to the fact that a lot of the people only followed media channels of the Russian Federation and not a lot of the top level arts projects travelled to Narva. Already in 2006 we took the series to Sillamäe as well (another Eastern city with around 65% European Third-country Nationals). The series' were very popular in both cities and with the work in Narva and Sillamäe we realized how music performed at a very high professional level could be one tool to raise interest towards “Estonian national” culture and life in general. In 2008, when the recession hit, the local governments were not able to continue co-funding the series and therefore PLMF had to stop organizing concerts monthly. But, as the saying goes - When God closes one door, he opens another”, and that is exactly what happened. In 2009 PLMF got funding for their first specifically targeted integration project from the Tallinn City Government. The project took a series of concerts that introduced Estonian musicians and music to children in 10 Russian (language) schools in Tallinn, over 100 children at each event. Work in schools continued with two projects in the Sillamäe region introducing performing arts at a high level but also a number of other activities with a hands-on approach (the projects were titles “Heart to Heart” and funded by the European Integration Fund, EIF, and the Estonian Cultural Ministry, ECM). The four hour days for around 150 children each time were a great success. Most of the children had never seen live ballet dancers or opera singers or touches music instruments and as the program was not amateur (as many other projects are) they were very impressed! Thanks to this we are positive that a large number of the participating students are interested in what is going on for example in the Estonian National Opera (also supporting initiatives of the National Opera to bring children from rural areas to performances). This is a huge step for a child whose parents have no interest to participate in the “Estonian national” life and the only information they are given is through school books. Luckily we have managed to continue small scale activities in most of the schools who took part in these projects so we can keep the ball rolling. The next project PLMF undertook with the support of EIF and ECM was staging a production at the Russian Culture Centre (RCC) in Tallinn on the famous theme of „Fiddler on the Roof” (2010). In the cast there were professional musicians and dancers, professional and young singers, and amateur chorus. A mixture of Russian and Estonian speakers and of course a high percentage of EU Third-country Nationals. The 5 performances at the RCC were very well attended by children from over 20 schools, unemployed people and others by invitation only, all together around 2500 people. In addition 5 shorter versions of 70


the musical were performed in schools around Tallinn. The project was very challenging but another great success. The story of repression performed together by people with both Russian and Estonian roots to people from both background in all ages was very moving and we believe made a strong statement for forgetting the past and going on hand-in-hand or at least with understanding for each other. As all PLMF’s projects the artistic level was high and therefore we are once again positive that this experience will bring EU Third-country Nationals one step closer to participating in “Estonian national” cultural life. In 2010, once again with the support of EIF and ECM, the “Choir of Nations” was born. Choral singing is one of Estonia’s most prized traditions but there are only a few choirs in Estonia amongst the Russian speaking community, after school. In the PLMF choir project around 40 mostly Russian speaking ladies gathered twice a week for rehearsals and had one individual vocal lesson each week. The choir conductor and voice coach are native Estonian and try to speak to the mostly in Estonian. In addition there is of course a lot of Estonian repertoire. As this work with the ladies is constant the “integrational” results have been really great – many of them attended their first National Song Festival (Estonia’s prized event which is also linked to our independence) and felt for the first time they understand Estonians, most of them are intrigued and take part in many other cultural events, and their Estonian got much-much better. Thankfully after the first year ECM took in on themselves to continue funding the choir and therefore it is now into its’ third season. The most recent PLMF project funded by EIF and ECM took place in the spring of this year. It was an extensive project for 8 professional and amateur dance and music groups (incl. the Narva City Orchestra) from Tallinn (3) and Eastern Estonia (5) named “Bridges of Music”. Three two day “sessions” for around 150 participants each time took place at the Russian Culture Centre in Tallinn and the Narva and Kohtla-Järve cultural centres. The days were filled with master classes (dance, voice or instrumental), social activities and concluded with a joint gala concert in the end of the second day. The project was once again challenging for a small organisation like PLMF but well worth it. Working with adults with the hope of bringing them closer to “Estonian national” life takes much more time then working with children but after this project we can say that these two-day intense projects give a big impulse. All the participants remember them with warm memories and are surely one step closer to “bridging” with Native Estonians. PLMFs numerous projects to support the integration process between our Russian speaking and native Estonian communities through high level professional music and also through joint musical activities have effected well over a 1000 active participants and many times more have taken part in the audiences, all this in just a few years. We believe strongly that music on a high professional level has the power to take down the barriers people surround themselves with and gives the possibility to talk to them on a human level, allowing for dialogue. Music and other arts are our common language and acknowledging this helps us realize that we are not so different after all.

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Dance as a Tool for Integration Zemfira Lampmann , Jevgeni Mironov , Project Youth Street Culture Festival “Street Life” In 2009 and 2010 with the support of Integration and Migration Foundation Our People (MISA), European Fund for Integration of Third Country Nationals and Estonian Ministry of Culture we organised Youth Street Culture Festival “Street Life”. In 2009 it was organised by NGO “From the Backyard” and in 2010 NGO PSYART Our goal was to encourage contacts through joint activities among youth with Estonian citizenship, Third country nationals and young people with undetermined citizenship, and at the same decreasing prejudice towards each other and developing tolerance. The target group of the project were young EU nationals, including Estonian citizens, young third country nationals, including citizens of other country and young people with undetermined citizenship living in Estonia. With the project we were set to motivate young people of different nationalities and mother tongues for creative collaboration, at the same time creating a realistic and effective opportunities to get to know each other. If there is a common space (City of Tallinn) and shared cultural space (youth street culture), then there is a real opportunity to find a common language. Also there is a possibility to assess potential differences in development, as well as mutual exchange of experiences, skills and knowledge. In the project we aimed to promote healthy lifestyle and ethical norms in street culture, i.e. the form of graffitiart that is accepted by the society – spray can art, and to introduce the ethical principles of street art that has been developed elsewhere in Europe: 

Do not paint on architectural monuments and memorials;

Do not point on residential houses – do not impose your worldviews on others;

Do not damage work and property of others;

Develop your talent before you expose it to others etc.

In 2009 80 young people with different mother tongues and citizenship took part in preparing and executing the project, in 2010 already 182 young people with different linguistic background and citizenship aged 7-26 (including 63 TCN) took part in the project. Project activities took place in different part of Tallinn – North Tallinn, Mustamäe, Rottermann quarter in the centre. About the Festival … First STREET LIFE festival took place in Estonia in 2009. On July 18th in Kopli area we tried to show that graffiti is not vandalism – graffiti is art. The theme of graffiti drawing contest was “Me and the streets of my city”. Prestigious jury made of renowned graffiti masters from the US and France chose the best works. Local graffiti artists and guests from Latvia and Finland competed in the mastery of street art, while MC Battle (competition for rappers) and street dance competition took place where everyone could participate. Best artist, dancers and rappers were awarded. The atmosphere at the event was creative and friendly, that it created a fantastic sense of belonging between participants and also spectators, which was not inhibited by their ethnicity or age, nor preference in difference elements of street culture (rapping, dance, graffiti) nor the spirit of competition. The common wish of organisers and participants was to break the prejudice and stereotypes that have emerged in the society relating to street culture, especially towards graffiti and to show the hip-hop 72


culture as a unifying element of the young. We think that were successful in showing that graffiti is not vandalism and that one can dance to very different music and that when rapping one can use vivid, but correct language, not immodest slang. With the help of supporters were organised the second street life festival „STREET LIFE“ on July 23 rd -25th 2010. We did not change the course, and we still aimed at manifesting different types of street culture – street dance, music, rap and spray-art during the festival. The theme of the festival in 2010 was “URBAN*UNITY*LOVE”. Festival was international and multinational. We were set to support the creativity of young people and encourage the fulfilment of their creative ambitions and combine them in joint activities between young people of different ethnic background and citizenship. During the festival there were a photo exhibition, which displayed Works chosen by the jury on the theme of “URBAN*UNITY*LOVE”. Great musical experience was offered by the best DJs in Estonia. At the end of the festival there were workshops that discussed whether graffiti is art or vandalism, street dance and the art of turning discs. No linguistic problems came up during the project. The languages of communication were Estonian, Russian and English. If mother tongue was not enough to express one’s ideas, they freely switched to English – level of English proficiency among the youth is good. When preparing and implementing the project we realized that young people of different nationalities have many more values in common than differences. The circle of co-thinkers and likeminded people became larger. New contacts and joint plans were born between young people with different citizenship. Project implementers are contented with the results of the project. EU (Estonian, Latvian, Dutch) nationals, TCN (Russia) and young people with undetermined citizens took part in the project. The young people were in harmony during the events, the setting was based on perceptions of the world, talent, skill and competitiveness of young people that crossed the borders. The precondition for the success of the project was excellent cooperation and involvement of all participants. This refers to the spectators as well, who to a larger degree were participants and competitors. Links to project activates  Estonian Street Life Festival 2010 trailer - Day 1: Graffiti day http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWmPPE_xEd0&list=UUS3b1lXJUvb6sYOclYjkkPw&index=198&f eature=plpp_video  Street Life Festival 2010 trailer - Day 2: Dancing Competitions http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mp1H_v0PZF8&list=UUS3b1lXJUvb6sYOclYjkkPw&index=197&fe ature=plpp_video

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Cultural Integration at the Warsaw Multicultural Centre Witek Hebanowski, Cultural Integration at the Warsaw Multicultural Centre About the Centre Warsaw Multicultural Center has been designed to promote cooperation between various municipal offices and institutions and NGO’s in Warsaw – both those which carry out projects for benefits for foreigners and organisations set up by immigrants themselves. The Centre has developed plans to address the following areas: 

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Information - this module is addressed both to foreigners (who seek information about governmental and non-governmental programs for them and about functioning of the offices or the cultural offer) and to Warsaw residents and tourists who want to get some information about the multiculturalism of the capital. Empowerment - empowerment of foreigners to encourage them to actively participate in Warsaw cultural and social life; support for immigrant communities in realization of their own projects. Education – this module envisages support for educational activities in the area of multiculturalism, integration and education in a multicultural environment, learning of the Polish language, as well as education about multicultural heritage and today’s face of Warsaw. Research - the main challenge in this area is to conduct regular and comprehensive research on migration to/from Warsaw. Culture –the priority is to support cultural activities carried out by the representatives of various immigration communities and international cultural projects; and to prepare an interactive display about the multicultural heritage of Warsaw.

Integration through culture As part of the integration through cultural component, the Continent of Warsaw portal – Warsaw of Many Cultures, the Other Space Foundation programme runs a series of events People from the Continent and Warsaw Multicultural Plein-Air art workshops. People from the Continent is an event that takes place regularly since 2007, and since 2009 as part of the WCW (Warsaw Multicultural Centre) Pilotage. Every event is dedicated to presenting the work of artists from different culture. In addition to love for the art the thing they have in common is the fact that they live and create in Warsaw. In October 2009 during African Warsaw the following works were presented: paintings of artists from Ethiopia and Mali, Senegalese-Polish poetry as well as a book of an author who came to Warsaw form Nigeria. Moreover, it was possible to take part in drum workshops and the discussion panel concerning African art and its influence on the work of the Europeans. More information at http://kontynent.waw.pl/ludziezkontynentu/afrykanska/ Another event (April 2010) consisted of Tibetan Warsaw. This time Tibetans living in Warsaw were invited for this special occasion as guests to present their art. It was possible to see an exhibition of thankgas – painted or embroidered scrolls of religious significance and take part in creating a sand mandala – the symbol of harmony. Finally, dance and vocal performances by Tibetan monks and Śnieżne Lwy (Snow Lions) group took place. More information at http://kontynent.waw.pl/ludziezkontynentu/tybetanska/ Japanese Warsaw (November 2010) was an opportunity for Warsaw artists from the land of the rising sun to present their art. This event allowed the residents of the capital to familiarize, among other things, 74


with the art of writing Haiku, making Origami, play Japanese games and take part in the Tea Ceremony, while children could listen to Japanese stories. During the whole event the inhabitants had opportunity to watch slide shows, sculptures and movies. More information at http://kontynent.waw.pl/ludziezkontynentu/japonska/ Another event from People from the Continent series was Caucasian Warsaw which took place in June 2011. Vernissage of an exhibition, Caucasian film workshops, concerts of Azerbaijani and Armenian bands (Gamid Group, Musa-ler), Georgian cuisine and wine workshops, presentation of photos from the region, promotion of books on the Caucasus, presentation of Chechen dresses and many others took place as part of the meeting. More information at http://kontynent.waw.pl/ludziezkontynentu/kaukaska/ Event presenting the Mexican face of the capital – Mexican Warsaw took place in December 2011 and is the last to date edition of People from the Continent. More details on http://www.kontynent.waw.pl/ludziezkontynentu/meksykanska First edition of the earlier mentioned Warsaw Multicultural Plein-Air took place in December 2009. Artists of different cultures and countries were asked to cope with the topic of Warsaw. In their projects they could bring up any aspect of life of the capital: beginning from the city’s architecture, people and relations between them, smells, sounds, emotions, to hearsays and urban legends. Artists (dealing with different visual arts) came from very different corners of the world – Russia, Ukraine, Mexico, Togo, Ethiopia, French Martinique, Vietnam, India, and more. Their attempt to artistically deal with the reality of Warsaw was a fascinating experience because their works reflected both individual experience and the life of respective foreign artists in Warsaw as well as the history and cultural treasure that determines their origin. More information on http://kontynent.waw.pl/plener/ The Continent of Warsaw portal also created a multicultural computer game http://apps.facebook.com/grakontynentwarszawa/ and works on a new documentary series about multicultural Warsaw. More information on www.kontynent.waw.pl

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Integratia - the Integration Comic Franz Wolf-Maier, Austrian Integration Fund Since 1960, the Austrian Integration Fund strives for the linguistic, professional, and social integration of migrants and beneficiaries of asylum or subsidiary protection based on their responsibilities and rights in Austria. At the same time, the Austrian Integration Fund informs the majority society about facts and background on the issue, because integration can only work with a joint effort. At a large number of sites throughout Austria, the Austrian Integration Fund provides information and counselling, organises integration projects, and supports the implementation of the National Action Plan for Integration. In the field of cultural integration, the Austrian Integration Fund has developed an integration comic with Integratia acting as the "superhero" of integration. The goal is to help the people to understand what “integration” means, through illustrated cases in the form of comic. The comic is targeted both at migrants and Austrian larger society. In ten different stories Integratia shows young and old what really matters in integration. She teaches children and adolescents about attitudes and values important for living together successfully, what makes living together with different cultures easier. Their attitudes and values determine how well integration will work in different areas of life. The themes include, inter alia, learning German, equality between men and women, access to labour market and the importance of education. The comic Integratia has received extensive media coverage in Austria. It has given inspiration for additional activities like the competition for schools - „draw your own story“ with the superhero Integratia. The comic has been translated to English and Turkish language in order to promote the perception of the content among various groups of population. For further reading, please visit http://www.integrationsfonds.at/en/integratia_is_here/integratia_comic/

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Finnish Association of Russian-speaking Organizations (FARO) Petr Potchinchtchikov, Polina Kopylova, FARO

The Association has 42 member-societies and it was founded in 2000 being one of the first of the kind in Europe. The main purpose of FARO is to represent Russian-speakers in Finland through the membersocieties. The working languages of the Association are Russian and Finnish. The main goals and activities of FARO are: 

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to support and promote the Russian language in Finland as language of historical minority referring to the international norms concerning the questions on language and cultural minorities and the treaties between Finland and Russian Federation concerning the support of Finno-Ugrian minorities in Russian Federation and the Russian-speaking minority in Finland to develop the projects and initiatives which serve the Russian-speakers in Finland under the framework of Integration law of Finland and the Law against discrimination to participate in the activities of the regional/state/international level, representing the membersocieties and their particular members to provide consultation for the Russian-speakers’ civic society organizations in Finland to exchange and disseminate information concerning Russian-speakers in Finland

The Russian-speakers’ societies and organizations are mainly working in the fields of art and culture, consulting and social guiding for immigrants, children and family activities, sports.

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Film as a tool for Integration Marc Nigita, „Images de la diversité“ The public funding program Images of diversity was created in early 2007 in response for the important suburbs riots of 2005 and the impact of Rachid Bouchareb’s movie Days of Glory (Indigenes in French, meaning “Native-born”), which success led the French Parliament to revise the law fixing the compensations due to veteran from French army85 . This potential of social and political mobilisation led the movie to be the first beneficiary of Images of diversity’s grants dedicated to the promotion of ethno-cultural diversity in French cinema, multimedia and television. But those national policies weren’t really new as different programs were created these last fifty years with the FAS 86 (Social action fund for immigrate workers and their families, created in 1958) which became FASILD in 2001 (Fund for integration and discrimination struggle) and ACSÉ (Agency for social cohesion and treatment equality) since 2006. Supporting integration by developing audio-visual tools to greet immigrants and give them the most necessary cultural knowledge to help their integration, led progressively to sustaining social cohesion and discriminations fighting as movies like La Haine (The Hate) from Matthieu Kassovitz or Yamina Benguigui’s first movies (today’s Minister for Francophonie) were supported. In accordance with those roots and the proposal of Kim Pham (actually audio-visual counsellor for the French Minister of culture), the CNC (French National Center for Cinema, Audio-visual and Multimedia) joined the ACSÉ in a brand new commission named Images of diversity. The purpose was to combine the social expertise from ACSÉ and the knowledge of the cinema, television and multimedia industry of the CNC and to increase the financial power of this program. Besides, in this new co-managed board, CNC permitted to open this program to every component of film, audio-visual and multimedia industries with new financial supports as screenwriting, development and distributing or video editing (both DVD and VOD). To be selected, projects may contribute to a better representation of French ethno-cultural diversity, not specifically in their casting but mostly in regards of artistic treatment and subject. According to the constituting decree, this contribution may concern suburbs realities and their residents, immigrant or overseas population and descendants and their integration, culture or history. The great diversity of the board composition (representatives of authors, production companies, broadcast TV channels, distributors, multimedia, associative organisations and union officers) permitted an important variety of awarded projects till then ; from pedagogic tools to a Palm d’or (in 2008 with Entre les murs from Laurent Cantet) without forgetting numerous committed documentaries and fictions. Since 2007 Images of diversity awarded approximately 20 000 000 € to 676 projects (Acse and CNC combined). Among the awarded movies during these five years, some have led to new law modification discussions in Parliament like Welcome from Philippe Lioret (about the interdiction and possible penalty for helping illegal immigrants) or Djamel Ouahab’s Gerboise bleue (for "blue jerboa", the name of the first French nuclear test in the middle of Algerian Sahara desert and the lack of compensation for those). Others became critical acclaimed in festivals and many have proven the certain commercial interest

85

Since July 3rd, 1962 those pensions were fixed differently according on the origins of the military and could vary from 1 to 10 if he was from metropolis or from the former colonies (each colony being subject to different rates). 86 The FAS was firstly dedicated to the “French Muslim from Algeria workers”, which kids stayed in Algeria and couldn’t benefit from the due social allocations

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shown by the public for movies reflecting the diversity of the country, both in theatres and on French television. But despite of the public interest, there is still a lot of work to do for those movies to get more often to primetime schedule, especially on the main broadcast channels, as shown in our last reports. The causes and solutions are difficult to define as every component of the industries (authors, production companies, casting agencies and broadcast TV or distributors), seem to censor himself as they face the challenge of cultural diversity.

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Impact of Culture on Integration:Conference Proceedings