The Role of the State in Large-Scale Hydropower Development
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Impact Assessment, commissioned by COCASINCLAIR, does recognize the need for an ecological flow, but does not quote a specific number. According to CONELEC officials, the unofficial number will likely be approximately 28m3/s, but, without official estimates, it is not possible either to confirm or question this figure. Numerous civil society organizations, including local tourist agencies who host rafting tours on these same rivers, argue that without updated studies on actual water flows, this number is arbitrary and potentially deadly for the river. Agencies like International Rivers point to the experience of the Agoyán Project (156MW), built in 1987 200km south of CCS. The plant on the Pastaza River has effectively dried up the Agoyán Waterfall, further downstream. What worries these critics is that, in recent years, global warming has had impacts on rainfall patterns, a fact that cast doubts on the reliability of the water measurements used for CCS. Some organizations believe the average flow is closer to 80-100 m3/s; the plant will operate considerably below capacity and that the need for electricity will force operators to go below even the minimum of 28m3/s. (Caselli, 2011) CCS is an exceptional project, and not just in terms of its scale. It illustrates how the state can effectively overrule principles and processes, or re-draw them for objectives like sovereignty or security of supply. It is reasonable to expect governments to balance competing goals in their development paths. However, the moment Correa’s administration designated CCS as a priority project, it ruled out a consideration of alternatives. As part of an overriding geopolitical strategy that involves south-south cooperation with governments such as China and Brazil, the government must mediate between a set of multi-scalar interests, i.e., it must simultaneously broker and negotiate with partners, while also providing oversight for their activities. In the absence of safeguards vis-à-vis south-south ventures, it must also mediate between partner governments and local communities and authorities. The project reveals clear contradictions in territorial governance. The state found compelling political reasons to ignore some of the environmental laws it itself drafted in the Constitution, revealing one way to solve potential conflicts around contested energy project: a top-down, executive setting of priorities and ad-hoc procedures. !
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