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REDD Wrong Path : Pathetic Ecobusiness Penyusun Tim Mann, Muhammad Teguh Surya Editor Rully Syumanda Desain dan tata letak Do2 Cetakan Pertama, Mei 2009 REDD Wrong Path Pathetic Ecobusiness Cet I - Jakarta WALHI, 2009 210 x 148 mm No. ISBN: 978-979-8071-74-4 Diterbitkan oleh: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia Berkat kerjasama Nature and Poverty Alliance

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DAFTAR ISI

Keprihatinan Terhadap Skema Pasar

Pendahuluan

Dalam dua tahun terakhir, dunia menaruh perhatian yang sangat besar

terhadap Indonesia terkait posisinya sebagai negara penghasil emisi ketiga terbesar di dunia setelah Amerika Serikat dan Cina. _________ 1

Penilaian Uang REDD

Salah satu alasan mengapa pembicaraan yang berkaitan dengan REDD berjalan pada kecepatan yang begitu cepat adalah jumlah uang yang dibicarakan. Angka-angkanya cenderung berubah-ubah dan sangat tergantung pada metodologi yang digunakan. _ _________________ 5

Mekanisme Pendanaan Yang Diajukan

Sebagian besar perdebatan REDD adalah tentang bagaimana skema REDD dapat didanai. Ada perbedaan yang sangat signifikan terhadap bentuk REDD dan cara pembiayaan yang paling diinginkan oleh setiap negara. ______________________________________________________ 7

Sepertinya ada konsensus bahwa hubungan perdagangan karbon dengan REDD tak terelakkan, meskipun belum tentu demikian(FOEI 2008: 18). _______________________________________________ 19

Definisi hutan

alah satu kelemahan dalam kebijakan REDD yang harus diperhatikan adalah definisi hutan yang digunakan oleh UNFCCC. ____________ 22

REDD Tidak Akan Menanggulangi Akar Penyebab Deforestasi

Penting sekali bagi kita untuk menempatkan perdebatan REDD di konteks global dan mempertimbangkan akar penyebabdeforestasi di negara berkembang. ______________________________________ 25

Masyarakat Adat dan Masyarakat Yang Bergantung Pada Hutan

Dari 230 juta penduduk Indonesia, diperkirakan 40 juta antaranya masyarakat adat yang tergantung pada hutan dan barang dan jasa sumber daya alam (CIFOR,2003). _ _____________________________ 28 


Kekurangan di Peraturan Undang-undang dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia

Ada beberapa kekurangan yang mencolok dalam kebijakan Indonesia yang mendiskriminasikan dan membahayakan hak masyarakat adat Indonesia. Yang paling menggelisahkan adalah definisi hutan adat yang dipakai. ____________________________________________________ 35

Ketidaktegasan Pemerintah Indonesia

Tujuan Pemerintah Indonesia mengenai perlindungan hutan yang diumumkan sebenarnya jauh berbeda dari kebijakan pemerintah secara resmi._ ______________________________________________________ 40

Moralitas yang Diragukan

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Model-model ekonomi memperkirakan bahwa kalau REDD diterapkan pada skala nasional, penduduk urban (kota) di Jawa dan Bali akan menderita ketika harga bahan kayu meningkat, sementara penduduk rural (pedesaan) di Kalimantan dan Sumatra menerima keuntungan dari pembagian dana REDD (Resosudarmo, belum diterbitkan 2008) _ _ 44

Kesulitan Tekhnis dengan Pelaksanaan REDD

Kesulitan besar dengan pelaksanaan REDD adalah bagaimana menyelesaikan masalah Leakage. Leakage bermakna pemindahan kegiatan deforestasi dari kawasan yang ikut skema REDD ke kawasan atau daerah yang tidak terlibat..________________________________ 45

Proyek Ujicoba REDD di Indonesia

Pada saat ini sebanyak dua puluh insiatif REDD sedang dikembangkan di Indonesia. Masih agak sulit untuk mencari informasi yang akurat mengenai proyek-proyek tersebut _____________________________ 58

Studi Kasus:

Sebagai proyek rintisan REDD sukarela yang tengah dikembangkan di Indonesia pada saat ini, Proyek Ulu Masen merupakan studi kasus yang cukup menarik terkait masalah REDD. Penting sekali pengembangan proyek ini dilihat dengan seksama karena pasti akan berimplikasi bagi proyek REDD lain di Indonesia_ ________________________________ 67

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REDD dan 1 Indonesia

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1 Dokumen ini merupakan ringkasan laporan tentang REDD terhadap masyarakat yang tinggal di dan sekitar hutan dan masyarakat lainnya yang rentan akibat perubahan iklim

Dalam dua tahun terakhir, dunia menaruh perhatian yang sangat besar terhadap Indonesia terkait posisinya sebagai negara penghasil emisi ketiga terbesar di dunia setelah Amerika Serikat dan Cina. Deforestasi (penebangan hutan untuk perkebunan), kebakaran hutan dan pengeringan lahan gambut menjadi penyebab utama emisi Indonesia (Dilworth et al 2008: 20). Demikian halnya dengan laju deforestasi yang mencapai 2 juta hektar, yang sekaligus menempatkan Indonesia sebagai urutan pertama sebagai negara dengan laju deforestasi tertinggi di dunia. (Gellert 2005: 1356).




Deforestasi dan alih fungsi lahan di negara berkembang selama ini berkontribusi terhadap 18-20% emisi gas rumah kaca (IPCC 2007). Di Indonesia sendiri, penggunaan tanah dan alih fungsi lahan melepaskan 2-3 milyar ton CO2 setiap tahun (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 3). Sampai disini, menjadi penting untuk dilihat kembali fungsi hutan sebagai salah satu komponen kunci yang mengatur peredaran karbon dunia dan memiliki keterkaitan erat dengan upaya-upaya penanggulangan perubahan iklim. Untuk itu, Indonesia akan menjadi pemain kunci dalam perundingan yang akan datang mengenai masalah perubahan iklim. Pada pertemuan Conference of the Parties ketigabelas (COP13) - Konferensi Internasional Perserikatan Bangsa Bangsa tentang Perubahan Iklim (UNFCCC) di Bali pada bulan Desember 2007, pengurangan emisi dari deforestasi dan degradasi hutan di negaranegara berkembang (REDD) muncul sebagai komponen kunci dalam usaha mitigasi perubahan iklim. Diharapkan, REDD dapat menstabilkan konsentrasi CO2 di atmosfir pada tingkat serendah mungkin melalui skema pembayaran bagi negara yang mampu mengurangi atau menghentikan laju deforestasi. Karena adanya kemungknan REDD dimasukkan dalam kesepakatan paska-Protokol Kyoto, banyak negara kemudian mengembangkan proyek REDD secara terburu-buru sebelum berlangsungnya COP-15 di Copenhagen, Desember 2009.

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Paper ini ditujukan untuk memberi gambaran dari pokok-pokok pikiran WALHI terkait REDD. Pada tingkat substansi, WALHI menilai konsep REDD dianggap cacat, karena memberi kemungkinan yang sangat besar untuk dimanfaatkan oleh negara maju untuk mengelak dari tanggung jawabnya atas pengurangan emisi di negara mereka sendiri. Sementara beberapa persoalan teknis di lapangan diperkirakan akan semakin meminggirkan masyarakat yang bergantung pada hutan. Muncul pula kekhawatiran bahwa “perubahan Iklim�, yang merupakan permasalahan sosial dan lingkungan akan dijadikan usaha bisnis yang memberikan peluang untuk memperoleh hak milik tanah baru, aset (aktiva) dan memberikan ruang untuk penimbunan modal� (TauliCorpuz dan Tamang 2007).

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Penilaian Uang REDD Salah satu alasan mengapa pembicaraan yang berkaitan dengan REDD berjalan pada kecepatan yang begitu cepat adalah jumlah uang yang dibicarakan. Angka-angkanya cenderung berubah-ubah dan sangat tergantung pada metodologi yang digunakan.

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The Stern Review memperkirakan dibutuhkan US$5 milyar untuk mengurangi 50% deforestasi selama sepuluh tahun, sementara Bank Dunia memberikan perkiraan yang jauh lebih tinggi yaitu US$2-20 milyar per tahun untuk mengurangi 10-20% deforestasi (FOEI 2008).

Dalam laporannya kepada UNFCC, Blaser menghitung biaya yang dibutuhkan untuk menghentikan deforestasi pada tahun 2030 dengan memperbandingkan penyebab deforestasi dibeberapa region

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Tinjauan Blaser, yang diserahkan pada UNFCCC, menghitung harga untuk menghentikan deforestasi sebelum 2030 dengan membandingkan katalis deforestasi di beberapa wilayah. Mengingat perkiraan Blaser tidak termasuk uang yang diperlukan untuk mengganti rugi “petani subsisten�, laporan tersebut menyatakan diperlukan US$ 12.2 milyar setiap tahunnya.

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Sebuah laporan lain ke UNFCCC oleh Trines memperkirakan harga pencegahan kehilangan 148 juta hektar hutan alam (primary forest) di 40 negara-kunci antara $28 sampai $185 milyar per tahun (Trines, 2007: 43). Disini terlihat jelas ketidak-konsekwenan antara perkiraan yang tersedia. Walaupun demikian, pembicaraan REDD terus bertambah semangat. Dan sebagaimana banyak perdebatan mengenai harga pelaksanaan program REDD, cara yang paling layak untuk membiayai skema-skema REDD juga paling sering dibicarakan.

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Mekanisme Pendanaan yang Diajukan Sebagian besar perdebatan REDD adalah tentang bagaimana skema REDD dapat didanai. Ada perbedaan yang sangat signifikan terhadap bentuk REDD dan cara pembiayaan yang paling diinginkan oleh setiap negara. Brasil misalnya, yang sangat kritis mengenai hubungan REDD dengan pasokan karbon, menyatakan dengan tegas bahwa Brazil tidak akan mengizinkan hutannya untuk dijadikan offset emisi negara Annex-12 (FOEI 2008: 33). Tuvalu juga menentang mekanisme pasar dan mengusulkan pendirian dana REDD internasional untuk membiayai proyek hutan kerakyatan tanpa mekanisme offset (Griffiths 2008). Di pihak lain, Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) mengajukan mekanisme yang sedikit lunak yang termasuk didalamnya pasar karbon, dana bantuan pembangunan resmi (official development assistance funds) dan pajak atas minyak bumi atau emisi (CAN 2007). India dan Cina minta dikompensasi atas penjagaan stok karbon dan menginginkan

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Negara Annex I merupakan negaranegara yang diidentifikasikan sebagai penghasil emisi skala besar

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memasukkan hutan lindung ke dalam REDD (CAN 2007). Kedua negara tersebut juga mengungkapkan kekhawatirannya terkait dana yang disalurkan lewat Bank Dunia (FOEI 2008: 34). Republik Demokratis Kongo dan beberapa negara lainnya menyarankan adanya insentif pasar dan dana bantuan untuk pelestarian wilayah hutan skala besar yang dalam sejarahnya tidak mengalami laju deforestasi secara cepat (CAN 2007). Meksiko dan beberapa negara yang lain mengusulkan pendirian � Avoided Deforestation Carbon Fund � di dalam UNFCCC. Untuk mendapatkan dana ini, Meksiko mengusulkan diadakannya pajak atas emisi yang disebabkan oleh kegiatan yang ditentukan di Protokol Kyoto, mirip dengan pajak atas emisi di bawah skema CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) (Fry 2008). Sampai saat ini Indonesia agak bungkam di panggung internasional mengenai skema yang paling disukai dan, seperti biasa, tertarik akan aneka macam mekanisme pembiayaan. Usulan Indonesia kepada UNFCCC memfokuskan pada isu baseline, dan bagaimana mengukur deforestasi (Republik Indonesia 2008). Usulan tersebut menyatakan bahwa skema REDD harus memasukkan peningkatan stok karbon dan pengelolaan hutan secara berkelanjutan dan cenderung menggunakan pendekatan nasional (Angelsen 2008).

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Menteri Kehutanan dalam hal ini akan memiliki kuasa penuh untuk memberikan hak bagi kegiatan REDD. Penting diingat bahwa Pemerintah Indonesia mengungkapkan dukungannya terhadap pemasukan total kredit REDD ke dalam pasar karbon yang sudah ada (Angelsen 2008: 49). Cara yang paling layak untuk membagikan dan mengelola dana REDD menjadi perdebatan yang paling ramai di UNFCCC pada masa ini. Kelompok negara berkembang G77 dan Cina mengatakan dengan tegas bahwa mekanisme pembiayaan multilateral harus di bawah kuasa UNFCCC. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) adalah badan pembiayaan resmi yang diakui UNFCCC. GEF menjadi target kritik karena peran yang cukup besar yang dimainkan oleh Bank Dunia. Padahal Bank Dunia hanya salah satu aparat pelaksanaan GEF (yang lain adalah UNDP dan UNEP), ia punya pengaruh yang kental mengenai pembagian dana GEF (FOEI 2008: 28). Sebuah keluhan lain yang pernah dilancarkan ke GEF adalah prosedur pemilihan yang menguntungkan negara donor besar di atas yang lain. Catatan (credentials) sosial GEF juga kurang baik dan GEF pernah dituduh memajukan proyek konservasi besar yang esklusif di Asia dan Africa (Griffiths 2008). Oleh karena kekhawatiran ini, status GEF di UNFCCC sedang dipertanyakan dan lagipula GEF sedang melakukan tinjauan internal kebijakannya terhadap masyarakat adat.

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Selama perundingan di UNFCCC, Bank Dunia muncul sebagai badan pembiayaan terkemuka untuk suatu skema REDD multilateral, dan pada saat ini mengatur lebih dari 10 badan pembiayaan terkait dengan perubahan iklim. Di tengah kontroversi tersebut, pada akhir tahun 2007 di pertemuan COP-13 di Bali, Bank Dunia mengajukan Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Tujuan FCPF adalah “sebagai ‘katalis’ untuk merangsang penanaman modal (secara publik dan swasta) di REDD dan mendukung demonstration pilot projects (proyek uji coba) bagi pengembangan dan pelaksanaan strategi REDD secara nasional” (Dooley et al 2008: 6).

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Argentina, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroon, DRC, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Nepal, PNG, Vanuatu, Vietnam (Dooley et al 2008)

Suatu negara boleh ikut FCPF sesudah menyerahkan concept note yang menjelaskan rencana persiapan untuk REDD, dan concept note tersebut disetujui oleh FCPF. Pada saat ini 23 negara telah terlibat dalam program FCPF dan diharapkan akan mencapai 30 negara ketika berjalan lengkap3. Sampai sekarang, FCPF telah dijanjikan US$165 juta oleh sepuluh negara donor dan The Nature Conservacy (TNC) (FOEI 2008: 30). Dana ini akan digunakan untuk membantu negara-negara ini untuk turut dalam program REDD jika diterapkan. Sepertinya FCPF sangat cenderung menggunakan pendekatan pasar karbon dalam pendanaan REDD. Bukti awal menunjukkan bahwa banyak concept notes tidak

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memperhatikan hak milik tanah (land tenure) dan hak adat (Dooley et al 2008). Sebagai jawaban terhadap kecaman mengenai kegagalan FCPF untuk berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat hutan, Bank Dunia membangun dana partisipasi bagi masyarakat adat dan komunitas yang bergantung pada hutan pada Bulan Oktober 2008 (Griffiths 2008: 10). Pada awalnya Indonesia tertarik untuk gabung dengan FCPF, tetapi Indonesia memutuskan untuk bekerja dengan UN-REDD supaya bisa menghindari pemenuhan persyaratan sosial dan lingkungan Bank Dunia yang ketat (Griffiths 2008: 44). Bagaimanapun keterlibatan Indonesia, sangat penting untuk dapat mengetahui cara yang dikembangkan FCPF karena pasti akan berimplikasi bagi strategi REDD dan kebijakan penggunaan tanah di negara lain. Pada bulan Mei 2008, Bank Dunia mengesahkan sebuah dana investasi iklim lain yang dinamai Forest Investment Program (FIP Program Investasi Hutan) yang akan dikeluarkan pada awal tahun ini. FIP diharapkan dapat meraup US$1 sampai US$2 milyar untuk ”mengurangi deforestasi dan degradasi hutan dan memajukan pengelolaan hutan berkelanjutan yang lebih baik, menghasilkan pengurangan emisi dan perlindungan simpanan karbon” (FOEI 2008: 31).

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Sementara FCPF dan UN-REDD mendukung kegiatan persiapan (readiness activities) dan mekanisme pembayaran pilot, FIP bertujuan untuk memberikan dana untuk pelaksanaan reformasi dan penanaman yang dibutuhkan di lapangan. FIP tidak hanya akan menggunakan dana publik untuk membiayai kegiatannya, namun juga diharapkan akan memfasilitasi pendirian pasar karbon (Griffiths 2008: 43). Beberapa tulisan menyebutkan kecemasan tentang tujuan Bank untuk mendukung pengelolaan hutan berkelanjutan dan afforestasi melalui FIP. Kalau pendekatan berdasarkan hak asasi manusia (rights based) dan ‘berpusat manusia’ (people centred) tidak diterapkan, dana FIP mungkin akan digunakan untuk menebang hutan dan mengembangkan perkebunan skala besar (Griffiths 2008: 11). Organisasi masyarakat sipil mengkhawatirkan kemampuan Bank Dunia dalam mengelola dana perubahan iklim dengan baik. Dalam bentuk yang ada sekarang, dana Bank Dunia ini dimaksudkan untuk memberikan dana bantuan (grant) dan pinjaman (loan). Ada kemungkinan kita akan menghadapi situasi yang semakin tidak menentu bila negara-negara berkembang meningkatkan utangnya untuk menanggulangi masalah yang disebabkan oleh negara utara. Sekalipun dana ini tidak dipakai dalam skema loan, namun hal ini dapat menempatkan negara yang menerima dana dalam hubungan

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donor-recipient (donor-penerima) yang tidak mencerminkan kewajiban negara utara kepada negara berkembang (Down to Earth 76-77 2008). Penting melihat bukti bahwa Bank Dunia memiliki kecenderungan melakukan pendekatan berdasarkan pasar. Padahal ini tidak disebutkan secara jelas di dokumentasi FCPF, ini merupakan tujuan kunci FCPF juga (Dooley et al 2008). Bank Dunia sudah bertahun-tahun membiayai investasi minyak bumi yang menghancurkan di Indonesia, maka kita harus meragukan kelayakannya untuk mendorong atau mengurus REDD di Indonesia. Badan sektor swasta Bank Dunia, International Finance Corporation (IFC), menyebabkan peningkatan emisi, lewat dukungannya terhadap sektor minyak bumi, tambang dan perkebunan industri (FOEI 2008: 29). Pada Juli 2008, PBB melahirkan UN-REDD (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). Program tersebut akan dipimpin oleh UNDP, FAO dan UNEP dan mengarahkan ‘kegiatan persiapan’ (readiness activities) untuk REDD. UN-REDD akan meliputi peningkatan kapasitas (capacity building), pengembangan strategi, menguji sistem keuangan dan pengaturan institusi untuk pengawasan dan verifikasi (FOEI 2008:32). Pemerintah

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Norwegia dan Bolivia berkomiment untuk membantu pendanaan program ini sebesar US$35 juta. Sementara itu, Republik Demokratis Kongo, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tanzania, Vietnam dan Zambia sudah diterima sebagai negara partisipan.

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Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) dapat diartikan menjadi, hak masyarakat untuk mendapatkan informasi sebelum sebuah program atau proyek pembangunan dilaksanakan dalam wilayah mereka dan berdasarkan informasi tersebut, mereka secara bebas tanpa tekanan menyatakan setuju atau menolak, atau dengan kata lain sebuah hak masyarakat untuk memutuskan jenis kegiatan pembangunan macam apa yang mereka perbolehkan untuk berlangsung dalam tanah mereka (UN 2005)

Program UN-REDD mendukung ketersangkutan REDD dengan pasar karbon dan akan memadukan inisiatif internasional lain seperti FCPF, FIP dan GEF (Griffiths 2008). Program UN-REDD berkomitmen melakukan pendekatan berdasarkan hak asasi manusia (rights based) dan dalam dokumentasinya menyebutkan Free, Prior and Informed Consent4 dan memperhatikan hak masyarakat adat (UN-REDD 2008). Program ini masih dalam tahapan persiapan dan belum ada proyek yang disahkan. Suatu persoalan besar dengan UN-REDD adalah bahwa program ini akan menggunakan definisi hutan FAO yang termasuk perkebunan (lihat diskusi dibawah). Risiko lain yang harus diperhatikan adalah bahwa aparat PBB yang akan melaksanakan programnya memiliki kebijakan yang lemah mengenai masyarakat adat, dan belum ada rencana yang jelas untuk menghadapi resiko sosial berkaitan dengan pelaksanaan REDD (Griffiths 2008). Penting juga dibicarakan skema bilateral yang muncul pada tahuntahun belakangan ini. Australia menjadi pendukung besar terhadap REDD dan upaya menanggulangi perubahan iklim di Indonesia dan

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baru-baru ini mengeluarkan kebijakan ‘Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership” yang meliputi ‘Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership’ (Kemitraan Hutan dan Iklim Kalimantan) yang bernilai US$30 juta dan berorientasi pasar. Australia juga menjanjikan US$10 juta bagi pengembangan sistem akuntansi karbon nasional dan kerangka kebijakan nasional bagi REDD (Griffiths 2008: 15). Dukungan utama Australia adalah terhadap pengembangan proyek uji coba REDD di hutan gambut di Kalimantan Tengah. Namun Australia juga tertarik untuk mengembangkan proyek REDD di Propinsi Papua. UK juga tertarik untuk mendukung upaya-upaya menanggulangi perubahan iklim di Indonesia. Melalui DFID, UK bertujuan mendorong pengembangan kebijakan terkait dengan REDD dan juga merupakan pendukung besar Indonesia Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) dan FCPF. Demikian halnya dengan Jerman yang juga memberikan dukungan kepada IFCA dan sedang mengembangkan proyek REDD di Kalimantan Barat. Norwegia juga pendukung berat REDD, dan berniat untuk menjadi salah satu pendukung dalam perjanjian paska-2012. Seperti disebutkan diatas, Norwegia memberikan dana ke Program UN-REDD dan juga menyumbangkan dana yang cukup besar ke FCPF dan FIP. Selain dari keterlibatannya dengan badan multilateral ini, Norwegia juga punya

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kesepakatan bilateral dengan Brasilia dan Tanzania dengan tujuan pokok untuk mengurangi deforestasi (Griffiths 2008: 14). WALHI mengkritisi dukungan bilateral inisiatif REDD di Indonesia, khususnya peranan besar yang dimainkan oleh Australia. Harus dipertanyakan apakan dukungan ini sekaligu sebagai strategi untuk memfasilitasi operasi perusahan ekstraktif yang dimiliki Australia di Kalimantan dan Papua. Di tengah perundingan mengenai skema bilateral atau multilateral yang paling cocok, dana dari sektor swasta melalui pasar karbon sukarela dikembangkan dengan pesat. Sebagai jawaban terhadap dana yang cukup besar yang dibutuhkan untuk membiayai skema REDD, banyak pihak mengusulkan bahwa REDD dikaitkan dengan pasar karbon. Pendukung pendekatan pasar mengatakan bahwa kalau pihak bisnis tidak dilibatkan, hutan selalu akan dikalahkan kekuatan perusahaan ekstraksi dan investasi. Padahal kritik terhadap skema karbon meragukan angka ini, pasar karbon disebutkan mampu ’membangkitkan’ $30 milyar setiap tahun dan diperkirakan akan mencapai ratusan milyar atau lebih (Schwartzman et al, 2007).

perjanjiannya untuk memberikan uang bantuan secara sukarela untuk mengurangi deforestasi di negara berkembang (FOEI 2008: 18). Pendekatan sukarela yang menghubungkan REDD dengan pasar karbon muncul sebagai mekanisme pembiayaan terkemuka di Indonesia, meskipun preferensi pemerintah Indonesia adalah pendekatan nasional. Sekarang ini, terdapat dua puluh proyek dalam proses pengembangannya (Jakarta Post 2009). Proyek Ulu Masen merupakan skema paling awal dikembangkan dan akan ditinjau secara terinci dibawah.

Beberapa negara berkembang berminat pada REDD semata-mata berdasarkan pasar, dengan alasan negara industri sering mengingkari

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memasukkan REDD kedalam pasar karbon tidak saja menjadi mahal namun juga menjadi skema sia2

Keprihatinan Terhadap Skema Pasar

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Sepertinya ada konsensus bahwa hubungan perdagangan karbon dengan REDD tak terelakkan, meskipun belum tentu demikian(FOEI 2008: 18). Ada bahaya yang melekat bila kita mendekatkan diri dengan skema pasar. Dengan membolehkan negara utara menggunakan REDD berdasarkan mekanisme pasar, negara-negara tersebut dapat menghindarkan tanggung jawab untuk mengurangi emisi di negara mereka sendiri. Persoalan ini harus dilihat sebagai cacat utama dengan memperbolehkan kredit REDD untuk masuk kedalam pasokan karbon. Akar penyebab perubahan iklim tidak akan ditanggulangi kalau negara Annex-1 diizinkan menggunakan hutan untuk offset komitmen pengurangan emisi domestik. Ketika REDD dihubungkan dengan pasar ada kemungkinan akan menciptakan skema yang mahal tetapi pada pokoknya tidak berarti. Persoalan lain dengan mengikatkan REDD ke pasar karbon adalah masalah kedaulatan atas sumberdaya alam. Baik di tingkat nasional

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maupun internasional, ada kemungkinan Indonesia akan menyaksikan kehilangan kedaulatan atas sumberdaya alam, sementara pihak ketiga semakin mempengaruhi penetapan terhadap sumber daya alam. Berkemungkinan besar nantinya para pembeli di negara utaralah yang akan menentukan kriteria mengenai pengelolaan lahan dan konservasi (FOEI 2008). Apalagi, konsep mata pencaharian berdasarkan uang yang digunakan oleh negara utara kerap tidak layak bagi masyarakat setempat (Fry 2008; Griffiths 2008). Insentif keuangan tidak akan pernah cukup untuk menggantikan kehilangan ketahanan pangan dan keutuhan budaya (Griffiths 2008: 21) Sudah terbukti bahwa pasar karbon bukan saja rumit, tetapi tergantung pada perubahan (volatility). Bila mana nilai karbon jatuh, dapat dibayangkan bahwa pembayaran kepada masyarakat adat dan masyarakat yang bergantung pada hutan akan turun hingga mengancam kehidupan, dan mendorong mereka untuk meneruskan kegiatan yang menghancurkan sumberdaya alam itu sendiri (FOEI 2008: 18).

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memasukkan perkebunan didalamnya. Kekeliruan ini pada akhirnya akan memperbolehkan penggunaan dana REDD untuk membiayai peluasan perkebunan kayu. Selain dari dampak yang ditimbulkannya yang dapat menghancurkan masyarakat lokal dan keanekaragaman hayati (biodiversity), kebun kayu monokultur diketahui juga hanya menyimpan 20% karbon bila dibandingkan hutan alam (FOEI 2008: 23). Belum lagi bila dilihat sejarah perkebunan kayu monokultur itu sendiri yang di Indonesia justru menghabiskan hutan alam terlebih dahulu sebelum menjadi kebun kayu.

Definisi ‘Hutan’ Salah satu kelemahan dalam kebijakan REDD yang harus diperhatikan adalah definisi hutan yang digunakan oleh UNFCCC. Definisi hutan FAO5, yang juga digunakan oleh Clean Development Mechanism

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Brazil telah berusaha memanfaatkan kekacauan ini dengan mengusulkan insentif bagi negara yang mampu mengurangi deforestasi Namun, bila dilihat lebih jeli, Brazil akan memperoleh keuntungan dari penebangan hutan, dan pada saat bersamaan memperluas sektor perkebunan dan menerima dana REDD sekaligus (FOEI 2008: 23). Masih harus dilihat kalau Indonesia ingin memanfaatkan jalan keluar ini. Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia resmi, sejauh dinyatakan dalam Undang Undang No. 41 Tahun 1999 dan diulangi di Draft Peraturan REDD yang dikeluarkan oleh Menteri Kehutanan, mendefinisikan hutan sebagai “suatu kesatuan ekosistem berupa hamparan lahan berisi sumber daya alam hayati yang didominasi pepohonan dalam persekutuan alam lingkungannya, yang satu dengan lainnya tidak dapat

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“Hutan” adalah areal lahan berukuran sedikitnya 0,05-1,0 hektare dengan penutupan tajuk pepohonan (atau tingkatan stok yang setara) antara 10-30 persen dan pepohonan pada lahan itu berpotensi untuk tumbuh mencapai ketinggian antara 2 - 5 meter. Hutan dapat terdiri dari formasi hutan tertutup yang ditumbuhi pepohonan dengan berbagai cabang dan semak-semak menutupi sebagian besar tanah atau hutan terbuka. Tanaman tegakan alam muda dan semua perkebunan yang belum mencapai kepadatan tajuk 10-30 persen atau tinggi pohon 2-5 meter termasuk dalam hutan, begitu juga dengan areal yang biasanya membentuk bagian dari areal hutan yang secara temporer berkurang stoknya karena intervensi manusia seperti pemanenan atau karena alam yang diperkirakan dapat dipulihkan (FAO 2000).

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dipisahkan� (Republik Indonesia 2008). Maka, meskipun sekiranya definisi pemerintah Indonesia kurang tepat, namun jelas perkebunan tidak masuk dalam definisi hutan. Walaupun demikian, bila Indonesia menggunakan definisi FAO maka akan ada resiko dimana dana REDD akan dialihgunakan untuk mendanai perluasan perkebunan kayu. Meskipun itu bertabrakan dengan Draft peraturan REDD yang dikeluarkan Menteri Kehutanan itu sendiri. Seperti disebutkan diatas, Menteri Kehutanan menentukan dirinya sebagai aparat koordinasi utama untuk skema REDD di Indonesia. Otomatis, Menteri Kehutanan memiliki keterkaitan erat dengan kepentingan di sektor pulp and paper dan perkebunan di Indonesia. Draft Kebijakan REDD menyatakan bahwa siapa saja yang memegang izin dari Menteri Kehutanan (termasuk pemegang Izin Usaha Pemanfaatan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Alam (IUPHHK-HA) dan pemegang Izin Usaha Pemanfataan Hasil Hutan Kayu pada Hutan Tanaman (IUPHHK-HT)) dapat mengembangkan proyek REDD dan menyerahkan usulannya ke Menteri Kehutanan (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 6). Memang tandatanda yang sangat membahayakan.

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REDD Tidak Akan Menanggulangi Akar Penyebab Deforestasi

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Penting sekali bagi kita untuk menempatkan perdebatan REDD di konteks global dan mempertimbangkan akar penyebabdeforestasi di negara berkembang. Persoalan deforestasi di negara berkembang tidak dapat dipisahkan dari masalah perdagangan internasional dan pola konsumsi di negara utara. Tanpa harus memenuhi permintaan negara industri terhadap kayu, bubur kayu (pulp) dan barang pertanian produksi negara selatan, REDD akan terus menjadi konsep yang cacat (REDD Flags 2007). Permintaan kayu dari Amerika, Jepang dan Cina sangatlah luar biasa. Pada tahun 2003, Cina sendiri mengimpor 42 juta meter kubik bahan kayu dan 52 juta meter kubik kertas dan bubur kertas (pulp and paper), dan Indonesia merupakan salah satu eksportir terbesar (Fry 2008). Kalau masalah permintaan diabaikan, kemungkinan besar REDD juga akan menyebabkan peningkatan harga kayu hingga otomatis insentif untuk menebang hutan juga meningkat (FOEI 2008: 24).

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Apakah deforestasi ini terjadi secara tidak sah di negara yang ikut skema REDD atau hanya beralih ke negara yang tidak ikut REDD tergantung pada jenis proyek REDD yang dilaksanakan. Hal ini terungkap tuntas di diskusi ‘leakage’ di bawah. Ada juga bahaya yang cukup besar dengan menerapkan kebijakan REDD secara global ketika penyebab yang melatarbelakangi deforestasi berbeda-beda. Pertanian misalnya, termasuk peternakan sapi skala besar adalah fakta penting di Amerika Latin dan Afrika Utara, sedangkan ekstraksi kayu dan produksi biofuel merupakan penyebab utama di Asia Tenggara. Beberapa tulisan mengungkapkan kekhawatirannya mengenai pernyataan tertulis yang diserahkan ke FCPF dan UNFCCC yang menyatakan “pembukaan hutan dengan cara tebas, imas dan bakar” dan pencarian “bahan bakar kayu” adalah penyebab utama deforestasi (FOEI 2008; Griffiths 2008: 25; Angelsen 2008: 126). Juga sama memprihatinkan bahwa beragam pertanian subsisten seperti peladang gilir balik, pemanfaatan hasil hutan non kayu (NTFPs), dan kehutanan berkelanjutan digabung dan disebut sama dampaknya terhadap alih fungsi lahan (deforestasi). Meskipun terbukti selama ini bahwa pertanian gilir balikdan sistem agroforestry sebenarnya

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penyimpanan karbonnya netral, bahkan positif (Dooley et al 2008). Penggabungan beragam pertanian seperti ini berpotensi menyalahkan pihak yang justru memajukan pelestarian hutan, hingga masyarakat adat disalahkan dengan tidak adil dan ditiadakan aksesnya terhadap hutan.

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Masyarakat Adat dan Masyarakat Yang Bergantung Pada Hutan Dari 230 juta penduduk Indonesia, diperkirakan 40 juta antaranya masyarakat adat yang tergantung pada hutan dan barang dan jasa sumber daya alam (CIFOR,2003). Otomatis, masyarakat adat Indonesialah yang paling berpotensi menerima dampak yang buruk dalam pembicaraan REDD - karena perencanaan atau pelaksanaan yang tidak sempurna. Mayoritas tanah yang disisihkan untuk REDD dianggap sebagai hutan negara. Karena REDD akan meningkatkan nilai hutan, pemerintah berkemungkinan untuk tidak mengakui hak-hak masyarakat adat terhadap tanah mereka (Angelsen 2008: 115). Uang yang beredar dalam REDD memungkinkan pejabat kehutanan dan pihak-pihak yang terlibat didalam bisnis ini menafikan penyelesaian konflik mengenai hak milik atas tanah yang sedang berlangsung (Griffiths 2008).

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Karena kebanyakan masyarakat adat tidak punya hak milik atas tanah yang resmi, REDD berisiko menimbulkan praktek land grabbing (pengambilalihan tanah) ketika negara dan pihak komersil mengambil keuntungan dari pembagian dana REDD. Kalau REDD meningkatkan nilai hutan, ada kemungkinan masyarakat adat Indonesia akan digeser dari tanah mereka dan dilarang masuk hutan, yang merupakan basis budaya dan kehidupan mereka. Konflik disektor kehutanan pada dasarnya telah mencirikan hal tersebut dimana 36 persen akar penyebab konflik dengan masyarakat disebabkan oleh ketidak jelasan mengenai tatabatas (WALHI, 2007). Ada bahaya yang cukup besar bahwa pola yang sama akan diulangi dengan penerapan REDD. Seringkali masyarakat adat tidak memiliki pengetahuan birokratis atau hukum yang dibutuhkan untuk ikut bernegosiasi REDD. Kalau REDD dilaksanakan pada tingkat proyek, masyarakat adat akan tersangkut dengan penanam modal yang ‘ganas’ atau LSM konservasi yang tidak memiliki kewajiban moral terhadap masyarakat setempat. Belum lagi seluruh document yang terkait dengan hal tersebut hampir 90 persen diantaranya berbahasa inggris yang tidak memungkinkan bagi masyaralat lokal untuk memahaminya.

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Pengalaman dengan LSM konservasi pada masa lalu menyebabkan masyarakat adat Indonesia ‘mewaspadai’ janji tentang “mempromosikan cara kehidupan berkelanjutan alternatif did an sekitar kawasan lindung” (Fry 2008: 177). Ada kekhawatiran besar mengenai partisipasi masyarakat adat dalam perencanaan program REDD. Usulan REDD tetap dikembangkan dalam cara top-down (atas ke bawah) dari pemerintah, organisasi internasional dan perusahan perdagangan karbon, dan masyarakat di tingkat lokal sering tidak mendapatkan cukup informasi (FPP 2009: 7). Konsultasi dengan masyarakat lokal sering hanya sejauh sosialisasi sesudah konsep dan objek sudah diputuskan. Free Prior and Informed Consent hampir tidak pernah disebutkan dalam kebanyakan usulan

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REDD dan hal ini pun telah terungkap dalam draft Peraturan REDD Menteri Kehutanan. Di sektor kehutanan, kita seringkali menyaksikan bagaimana perusahaan meng-ko-optasi agen lokal dan pejabat pemerintah local untuk menekan masyarakat sehingga menyerahkan tanahnya (WALHI, 2007). Dalam cara yang sama skema REDD dapat ditandatangani oleh elite politik tanpa sepengetahuan konstituennya. Kerumitan pasar karbon sudah diakui secara luas - dan pasti akan menjadi sulit untuk memastikan masyarakat memahami baik-buruknya suatu skema REDD (Griffiths 2008). Banyak bupati tidak memahami prosesnya dengan baik, apalagi masyarakat setempat. (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 14). Masyarakat adat dan komunitas setempat mungkin tidak akan diberitahu bahwa perusahaan perdagangan karbon asing akan ambil keuntungan, atau melalui keterlibatannya dengan

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REDD secara tidak langsung mereka akan memperbolehkan emisi terus menerus di negara utara (Griffiths 2008: 23). Bahasa resmi yang digunakan juga berpotensi menjadi hambatan bagi masyarakat adat juga. Oleh karena itu, organisasi masyarakat sipil mengusulkan proses peningkatan kapasitas harus dilakukan sebelum konsultasi publik resmi dilakukan untuk memastikan masyarakat adat benar-benar mengetahui duduk keadaan sebenarnya (FPP 2009: 7). Meskipun ada usulan bahwa dana REDD akan dibagikan secara adil, namun belum ada satupun usulan yang jelas tentang bagaimana melakukan hal ini. Besar kemungkinan juga elit setempat dan para pemilik tanah akan menangkap keuntungan ini dengan mengorbankan rumah tangga miskin dan rentan. Patut dipertanyakan, apakah keluarga yang tidak memiliki hak milik tanah resmi masih bisa menerima keuntungan? Apakah anggota komunitas yang tidak terlibat dalam penebangan hutan yang merusak (destructive logging) dapat menerima keuntungan? Penciptaan ketidak merataan mengenai pembagian keuntungan pada akhirnya akan membawa risiko munculnya konflik horizontal. Pengalaman dari berbagai sector kehutanan menunjukkan bahwa pembayaran dapat diambil alih oleh para elite dan sering kali menyebabkan sengketa.

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Penciptaan ketidak merataan mengenai pembagian keuntungan pada akhirnya akan membawa risiko munculnya konflik horizontal. Pengalaman dari berbagai sector kehutanan menunjukkan bahwa pembayaran dapat diambil alih oleh para elite dan sering kali menyebabkan sengketa.

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Penting dilihat aspek gender dan pelanggaran HAM yang mungkin akan terjadi dalam pelaksanaan REDD. Sementara banyak masyarakat adat tidak mempunyai hak milik atas tanah mereka, kalau punya, seringkali laki-lakilah yang memegang izinnya. Akibatnya, kaum perempuan pasti ditinggalkan dari negosiasi-negosiasi tanah dalam konteks REDD (Lovera 2007). Ketidakterlibatan perempuan dalam pembicaraan masalah ekonomi ini akan memperparah keadaan. Norma-norma budaya yang menentukan peranan perempuan di Indonesia untuk menyumbang ke ekonomi rumah tangga dan pemeliharaan anak, mengakibatkan pengangguran resmi yang cukup tinggi. Di komunitas yang tergantung pada hutan, kaum perempuan sering kali bertanggung jawab untuk mengambil air minum, kayu dan hasil hutan non kayu (NTFPs). Seperti disebutkan di atas, REDD dapat membatasi akses masyarakat adat ke hutan, sumber air dan NTFPs. Maka, kaum perempuan merupakan kelompok yang sangat rentan di skema REDD (Lovera 2007).

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Kekurangan di Peraturan Perundang-undangan dan Kebijakan Pemerintah Indonesia

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Ada beberapa kekurangan yang mencolok dalam kebijakan Indonesia yang mendiskriminasikan dan membahayakan hak masyarakat adat Indonesia. Yang paling menggelisahkan adalah definisi hutan adat yang dipakai. Draft Peraturan REDD Menteri Kehutanan, yang dibuat dengan konsultasi umum yang minim, menggunakan definisi hutan yang mengacu pada Undang Undang No. 41 Tahun 1999 menyatakan “Hutan adat adalah hutan negara yang berada dalam wilayah masyarakat hukum adat�.

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Hutan negara diberikan definisi sebagai berikut ”hutan negara adalah hutan yang berada pada tanah yang tidak dibebani hak atas tanah”. Kalau dilihat secara rinci Pasal 5, butir 3 menyatakan ”Pemerintah menetapkan status hutan.... dan hutan adat ditetapkan sepanjang menurut kenyataan masyarakat hukum adat yang bersangkutan masih ada dan diakui keberadaannya” (Republik Indonesia 1999).

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Dengan ini, negara berhak untuk mempertanyakan atau meragukan keberadaan masyarakat adat Indonesia. Dengan ini, hak adat masyarakat adat diturunkan ke posisi di mana hak tersebut terbuka untuk diinterpretasikan dan gampang disangkal atas nama ”kepentingan negara”. Presiden Indonesia SBY pun mengakui hak masyarakat adat pernah dikorbankan demi pembangunan nasional (Jakarta Post 2006). Sangat mengkhawatirkan bahwa skema REDD akan mengulangi pola ini saja. Ancaman REDD terhadap hak masyarakat Indonesia menjadi perhatian beberapa LSM nasional maupun internasional. Pada Februari ini, sembilan LSM Indonesia (termasuk WALHI) dan satu LSM internasional meminta UNCERD (UN Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) mempertimbangkan kembali keadaan masyarakat Indonesia di bawah prosedur early warning and urgent action (peringatan awal dan tindakan urgen) lewat pengiriman surat yang mengungkapkan

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kecemasan mengenai kegiatan persiapan REDD Indonesia yang gagal memenuhi kewajibannya di bawah UNDRIP (UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples)6. Draft Peraturan REDD seperti yang diacu diatas juga memberikan tata pedoman bagi keterlibatan masyarakat hukum adat dalam suatu skema REDD. Seperti dinyatakan di dokumennya, persyaratan untuk hutan adat adalah: a. Memiliki Surat Keputusan Menteri sebagai pengelola hutan adat 6

Submisi tersebut juga menunjukkan prosedur untuk pengakuan hak ulayat yang diterapkan oleh Badan Pertanahan Nasional melalui Peraturan No. 5 tahun 1999. Peraturan mengandung beberapa kekurangan mengenai pengakuan hak masyarakat adat terhadap tanahnya. Untuk informasi lebih lanjut, pembaca didorong untuk membaca submisi FPP, AMAN, dan Sawit Watch

Peraturan yang ada tidak memberikan ruang bagi masyarakat adat untuk menikmati haknya secara penuh.

b. Memperoleh rekomendasi untuk pelaksanaan REDD dari Pemerintah Daerah c. Memenuhi kriteria dan indikator lokasi untuk pelaksanaan REDD d. Memiliki rencana pelaksanaan REDD Peraturan ini dengan jelas menempatkan penguasaan REDD di tangan Menteri Kehutanan. Memandang sikap Menteri terhadap masyarakat adat Indonesia sejauh ini, ada ancaman berat bahwa masyarakat adat akan tetap

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dipinggirkan oleh program REDD. Peraturan yang ada tidak memberikan ruang bagi masyarakat adat untuk menikmati haknya secara penuh. Kalau keprihatinan ini tidak diselesaikan sebelum pelaksanaan REDD, maka hal ini hanya akan membuahkan malapetaka kepada masyarakat adat.

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Ketidaktegasan Pemerintah Indonesia Tujuan Pemerintah Indonesia mengenai perlindungan hutan yang diumumkan sebenarnya jauh berbeda dari kebijakan pemerintah secara resmi. Sementara Pemerintah Indonesia mengatakan akan mengurangi kerusakan hutan, namun kenyataannya, dalam dua belas bulan terakhir, pemerintah Indonesia mengeluarkan peraturan dan kebijakan yang justru menuju ke arah sebaliknya. Pada tanggal 4 Februari 2008 pemerintah Indonesia mengeluarkan Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) No. 2 tahun 2008 tentang “Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak Yang Berasal Dari Penggunaan Kawasan Hutan Untuk Pembangunan Diluar Kegiatan Kehutanan�. Peraturan ini semakin memberikan hak kepada perusahan tambang dan membenarkan pembukaan kawasan lindung dan hutan produksi. Kemungkinan besar peraturan ini akan dimanfaatkan oleh perusahaan tambang untuk menggunakan kawasan lindung dan hutan produksi untuk kegiatan pertambangan. Perusahaan tambang tinggal membayar Rp 300 per

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meter persegi pertahun untuk mengembangkan operasi tambang di hutan lindung (WALHI 2007). Pada awal April 2009, menteri Kehutanan mengeluarkan Rencana Kerja Tahunan bagi 4 perusahaan HTI-Pulp yang konsesinya berada pada kawasan hutan alam dengan vegetasi yang rapat. Dua tahun sebelumnya 14 konsesi (termasuk diatas) ditetapkan sebagai pelanggar hokum oleh Kepolisian Riau namun Menteri Kehutanan bersikukuh bahwa tidak ada pelanggaran pidana disitu dan meminta Kapolri untuk mengganti Kapolda Riau. Pada awal 2009, Kapolda Riau yang baru mengeluarkan Surat Penghentian Penyidikan atas 14 perusahaan tersebut. Kasus ini kemudian dinyatakan banding namun toh Menteri Kehutanan tetap

Komitmen pemerintah terhadap pengurangan deforestasi harus kembali dipertanyakan ketika ketidak konsistenan yang terjadi semakin menjadi-jadi. Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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mengeluarkan Rencan Kerja Tahunan tersebut, meski Kepala Dinas Kehutanan Propinsi Riau tidak mau menandatanganinya. Keputusan yang dikeluarkan menjelang Pemilihan Umum ini di diduga berkaitan erat dengan ongkos politik yang harus dikeluarkan partai darimana menteri tersebut berasal. Pada bulan Febrruari 2009, Menteri Pertanian mengeluarkan surat keputusan yang mengizinkan perusahaan untuk membuka jutaan hektar lahan gambut untuk menjadi perkebunan kelapa sawit. Pembukaan lahan gambut ini akan mengeluarkan jumlah CO2 yang sangat banyak. Surat keputusan ini disetujui secara bersyarat oleh Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan akan diterapkan kelak tahun ini. Keputusan tersebut bertentangan dengan posisi Menteri Pertanian sebelumnya - pada tahun 2007 Menteri mengirimkan surat kepada gubenur-gubenur Indonesia yang meminta penghentian konversi lahan gambut untuk jadi perkebunan sawit. Kontradiksi tersebut menyebabkan tuntutan bahwa pemerintah ingin memuaskan kepentingan perusahan besar sebelum pemilihan umum di kemudian hari (Jakarta Post 2009). Komitmen pemerintah terhadap pengurangan deforestasi harus kembali dipertanyakan ketika ketidakkonsekwenan yang terjadi semakin menjadi-jadi.

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Moralitas yang Diragukan? Model-model ekonomi memperkirakan bahwa kalau REDD diterapkan pada skala nasional, penduduk urban (kota) di Jawa dan Bali akan menderita ketika harga bahan kayu meningkat, sementara penduduk rural (pedesaan) di Kalimantan dan Sumatra menerima keuntungan dari pembagian dana REDD (Resosudarmo, belum diterbitkan 2008). Pada tingkat internasional ada keprihatinan yang sama bahwa selama REDD memberikan penghargaan terhadap pencemar , ada kemungkinan akan menyebabkan “kehilangan niat bagi negara dengan laju deforestasi nol atau rendah untuk menanggapi ancaman deforestasi yang akan datang� (Griffiths 2008: 11). Negara yang memiliki laju deforestasi sejarah yang rendah mungkin akan dilarang mengakses dana REDD. Akibatnya, penetapan garis dasar untuk mengukur deforestasi menjadi topik yang cukup panas dalam perundingan REDD.

Kesulitan Teknis Dengan Pelaksanaan REDD

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Leakage Kesulitan besar dengan pelaksanaan REDD adalah bagaimana menyelesaikan masalah Leakage. Leakage bermakna pemindahan kegiatan deforestasi dari kawasan yang ikut skema REDD ke kawasan atau daerah yang tidak terlibat. Ini keprihatinan kunci dengan adanya program REDD yang berbasis proyek, hal yang disukai penanam modal karbon. Kajian sudah menunjukkan bahwa leakage pada tingkat proyek mendekati 100 persen di mana deforestasi disebabkan oleh permintaan kayu atau kebutuhan peternakan (Daviet et al 2007: 3). Leakage berpotensi untuk meruntuhkan skema REDD. Coba bayangkan sebuah senario dimana kredit REDD diperdagangkan untuk menggantikan emisi di tempat lain, tetapi leakage terjadi, dan deforestasi atau degradasi hutan tetap terjadi. Akibatnya, penderitaan

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dihadapi atmosfir jauh lebih banyak (Fry 2008: 173). Leakage adalah salah satu kekhawatiran terbesar dengan REDD, dan akan tetap menjadi masalah, khususnya kalau penyebab akar deforestasi tidak ditangani. Pengakuan terhadap risiko ini menyebabkan beberapa pihak mengusulkan agar REDD diterapkan secara nasional. Pendekatan nasional diyakini akan mengurangi risiko leakage dan mampu memfasilitasi penanganan secara terpadu terhadap penyebab deforestasi sekaligus (FOEI 2008: 21, Angelsen 2008: 114). Oleh karenanya, Indonesia cenderung mendukung pendekatan ditingkat nasional. Walaupun demikian, jikalau REDD dilaksanakan pada skala nasional, tidak akan mungkin mencegah deforestasi di tingkat internasional. Kegiatan deforestasi akan beralih dari negara partisipan REDD ke negara yang tidak turut REDD. Menyarankan agar bahwa REDD diadopsi pada skala nasional adalah solusi yang terlalu sederhana, dan tidak mungkin terjadi (Fry 2008: 175).

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Beberapa pihak mengusulkan untuk menyusun batasan pada negara impor agar dapat dipastikan bahan baku yang diperolehnya berasal dari hutan yang dikelola secara berkelanjutan dan bukan karena deforestasi atau degradasi hutan (Fry 2008: 175). Ini dianggap perlu mengingat hampir 25% kayu bundar dan 30% kayu lapis yang didagangkan berasal dari sumber-sumber yang mencurigakan (Fry 2008: 175). Pembicaraan tentang cara paling cocok untuk menanggulangi masalah leakage pastinya akan tetap menjadi pokok pembicaraan REDD di masa depan.

25% kayu bundar dan 30% kayu lapis yang didagangkan berasal dari sumbersumber yang mencurigakan

Penguasaan (Governance) dan Korupsi Perjuangan Indonesia untuk mengatasi kesukaran-kesukaran dengan lemahnya tata pemerintahan, korupsi dan perlakuan yang tidak adil terhadap masyarakat yang bergantung pada hutan didokumentasikan7 dengan baik. Hal ini harus ditangani secara serius bila ingin REDD dikatakan berhasil. Tata pemerintahan yang lemah dan korupsi di sektor kehutanan sangat akut. Pembalakan liar di Indonesia ditaksirkan mengakibatkan kerugian pemerintah sebesar Rp 30 trilyun setiap tahun (Sinar Harapan 2004). Pembalakan liar dianggap menjadi penyebab 43 sampai 58

7 Lihat juga, Boedhihartono A et al 2007; Gellert 2005; Down to Earth 76-77 2008; WALHI 2008

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“kalau mereka tidak bisa menegakkan hukum mengenai kerusakan hutan, bagaimana mereka akan menegakkan hukum agar tidak terjadi kerusakan hutan?�

Karena REDD akan melibatkan jumlah dana yang begitu banyak, kemungkinan besar hal ini akan menjadi kesempatan baru untuk melakukan tindak pidana korupsi. Selama pola pembagian keuntungan ke masyarakat kurang jelas, ada bahaya yang cukup besar bahwa dana ini dapat disalahgunakan oleh pejabat negara dan elite setempat.

persen deforestasi di Indonesia pada tahun 2006 (WALHI 2007). REDD pasti juga akan meningkatkan harga kayu, dan secara bersamaan akan meningkatkan tekanan untuk melakukan pembalakan liar. Maka, akan sangat penting untuk mempertanyakan mengapa REDD akan dapat berhasil di Indonesia, ketika pemerintah Indonesia tidak mampu memberantas pembalakan liar yang sudah ada - “kalau mereka tidak bisa menegakkan hukum mengenai kerusakan hutan, bagaimana mereka akan menegakkan hukum agar tidak terjadi kerusakan hutan?� (Fry 2008: 175).

Kalau REDD mau diterapkan di Indonesia, pemerintah benar-benar harus lebih giat menyelesaikan permasalahan tata pemerintahan di sektor hutan dan melibatkan upaya-upaya terpadu untuk mengatasi pembalakan liar - termasuk upaya untuk mengurangi permintaan kayu itu sendiri.

WALHI dan beberapa organisasi Indonesia lain juga mencatat banyaknya kasus korupsi di sektor kehutanan, khususnya dalam alih fungsi lahan dan pemberian izin untuk memfasilitasi peluasan perkebunan (WALHI 2007). Terdapat 15 karakteristik korupsi pada pemegang IUPHHK hutan alam dan 8 karakteristik korupsi pada pemegang IUPHHK Hutan Tanaman Industri (Greenomic & ICW, 2004).

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Penentuan Baseline (Nilai Awal) Yang Tepat Masalah penentuan baseline yang tepat yang dapat digunakan untuk menghitung deforestasi juga menjadi sumber perdebatan. Perdebatan ini dapat dibenarkan karena baseline akan mempengaruhi efektivitas lingkungan, efisiensi ekonomi dan pembagian pembayaran REDD antara negara (Angelsen 2008: 55). Kalau menciptakan baseline berdasarkan laju sejarah deforestasi, hal ini akan menguntungkan negara yang memiliki catatan deforestasi yang buruk, sedangkan negara yang melindungi hutannya tidak menerima keuntungan. Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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Lagi pula, baseline menurut sejarah tidak mungkin menjadi perkiraan yang akurat bagi deforestasi di masa depan, karena laju deforestasi akan melambat sesuai dengan ketersediaan hutan yang tersisa untuk ditebang (Angelsen 2008: 55). Indonesia mungkin mau mempergunakan laju historisnya yang cepat, karena Indonesia pernah mengatakan ingin menggunakan baseline yang menggunakan kecenderungan sejarah untuk menaksirkan laju di masa depan. Soal ketepatan juga sangat penting - kalau menciptakan baseline yang terlalu tinggi, ada risiko system REDD yang dibangun tidak akan menghasilkan pengurangan deforestasi (FOEI 2008). Isu-isu teknis terkait dengan pengukuran baseline juga penting. Ada perbedaan yang cukup besar berdasarkan metologi yang digunakan. Modeling sering berdasarkan rekaan dan tergantung pada fakta seperti laju deforestasi historis dan laju deforestasi yang diperkirakan akan terjadi, ketepatan peta yang tersedia, tanah kosong dan seterusnya (Harris et al 2007)6. Model-model ini seringkali mengandalkan data hutan yang diterbitkan oleh FAO. Patut dipertanyakan apa nilai data ini kalau perkebunan masih dimasukkan ke data FAO (FOEI 2008). 8

Lihat Angelsen A 2008 untuk deskripsi modeling terperinci.

Beberapa tulisan menyoroti kenyataan bahwa hutan tidaklah permanen, dan REDD tidak akan memperhatikan kerusakan hutan yang terjadi secara alami misalnya karena kebakaran atau kematian alami

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(Fry 2008, FOEI 2008) sehingga ada potensi bagi hasil yang salah atau menyesatkan. Memang, kesulitan dalam memastikan pengurangan deforestasi permanen adalah salah satu kekhawatiran terbesar sebagaimana yang dituturkan oleh pendukung pasar karbon (Fry 2008). Akhirnya, penting dipikirkan bahwa modeling ini hanya tertarik akan nilai karbon yang dikandung dalam hutan dan mengabaikan fungsifungsi hutan lain seperti nilainya terhadap budaya yang tidak bisa dihitung dengan uang, nilai spesies yang terancam, indikator kemiskinan dan fungsi watershed (Harris et al 2007). Ini kembali mengungkapkan satu kesalahan ideologis lainnya dengan REDD. Bagaimana mengukur nilai-nilai seperti ini, dan apakah nilai tersebut akan tetap diabaikan dalam pelaksanaan REDD?

Pengawasan Bahkan ketika baseline sudah disetujui, isu pengawasan adalah isu yang paling meragukan. Beberapa negara mengungkapkan kekhawatirannya terkait penggunaan gambar berkualitas tinggi yang dibutuhkan untuk pengawasan melalui satelit. Harga teknologi

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rentan, masyarakat adat/masyarakat yang bergantung hutan yang miskin sebagai korban(Griffiths 2008: 22). Banyak sekali proyek REDD didukung oleh organisasi konservasi besar yang cenderung memiliki catatan buruk mengenai respek terhadap masyarakat adat setempat. Bukti yang cukup mengkhawatirkan sudah muncul dari beberapa proyek uji coba FFI mengenai kebijakan perlindungan yang keterlaluan (FFI 2008). tersebut mungkin akan menjadi hambatan besar di kawasan hutan terpencil, dimana akses internet pun juga jarang (Dooley et al 2008). Walaupun akhir-akhir ini kita menyaksikan kemajuan yang cukup pesat mengenai aspek teknis akutansi karbon, prasarana teknis dan kapasitas untuk melakukan analisa dan mengelola data tetap jadi kekhawatiran (Angelsen 2008: 96). Kalau degradasi hutan dimasukkan ke skema REDD, pengawasan satelit saja tidak mungkin cukup. Lagi pula, pasti sangat mahal untuk memperoleh nilai-nilai degradasi dan kemungkinan besar nilai-nilai tersebut tidak akan akurat (Fry 2008: 171).

Akhirnya, penting sekali bahwa pengawasan tidak hanya memfokuskan pada data ilmu yang berhubungan dengan stok karbon saja. Harus ada sistem yang kuat untuk mengawasi hak asasi manusia, kekhawatiran tentang tata kelola (governance) dan pembagian dana yang adil. Pengawasan untuk munculnya konflik dan prosedur pemecahan konflik juga sangat penting. Mengherankan, dokumentasi REDD yang tersedia jarang menyebutkan aspek pengawasan ini.

Masalah pengawasan mengungkap satu isu lagi yang sangat menggelisahkan. Upaya-upaya untuk mencegah degradasi hutan mungkin akan mengakibatkan pendekatan “manusia versus hutan� yang kuno dan eksklusif terhadap konservasi hutan. Bukti menunjukkan bahwa kebijakan perlindungan hutan seringkali menjadikan kelompok

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Penutup REDD dalam bentuk yang penuh dengan bahaya. Ada risiko akan semakin meminggirkan masyarakat adat dan komunitas yang bergantung pada hutan, dan memfasilitasi kehancuran hutan. Sementara ada beberapa cacat susbtansi dengan REDD, adanya beberapa persoalan teknis berarti berkemungkinan memiliki nilai kegagalan yang sangat tinggi. Kecepatan negosiasi REDD berarti program REDD mungkin akan disahkan sebelum persoalan tersebut dapat ditanggulangi. Kerumitan mekanisme pendanaan yang diajukan dan keberagaman para pihak juga mempersulitkan soal REDD.

REDD dalam bentuk yang penuh dengan bahaya. Ada risiko akan semakin meminggirkan masyarakat adat dan komunitas yang bergantung pada hutan, dan memfasilitasi kehancuran hutan 54 I Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI

Sepertinya, masuknya REDD dalam pasar karbon tidak dapat dielakkan. Tetapi WALHI mutlak menolak REDD selama hal itu dihubungkan dengan pasar karbon serta menjadikan hilangnya akses dan kontrol komunitas lokal dari sumber-sumber kehidupannya. Keterkaitan REDD dengan pasar karbon akan membawa risiko negara Annex-1 dapat menghindari kewajibannya untuk mengurangi emisi di negara mereka sendiri dan berkemungkinan untuk meningkatkan emisi CO2. Carbon offsetting dan masuknya kredit REDD ke pasar karbon tidak akan menyelesaikan penyebab perubahan iklim. Yang paling penting adalah negara utara

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harus berkomitmen untuk melakukan pengurangan emisi yang efektif dan nyata di negara mereka sendiri. Terkait dengan masalah ini, diperlukan sebuah upaya untuk menanggulangi penyebab deforestasi pada sisi permintaan (demand). Sementara penyebab langsung di Indonesia adalah peluasan perkebunan dan ekstraksi kayu, masalah ini tidak dapat dipisahkan dari pola konsumsi di negara utara. Kalau kita tidak menyelesaikan masalah permintaan negara industri untuk produk kayu, kertas dan bubur kertas, kemungkinan besar kita akan menciptakan skema yang leaky dan pada pokoknya tidak berarti. Penolakan WALHI terhadap skema REDD bukan berarti WALHI tidak sadar pengurangan deforestasi adalah hal yang penting. WALHI mengajukan moratorium logging dan konversi hutan pada tahun 2001 dan mengulangi tuntutan ini pada tahun 2007. Untuk menanggulangi laju deforestasi, penting dimulai dari proses perbaikan tata kelola pemerintah dan penegakan hukum di sektor kehutanan. Pelaksanaan moratorium logging dan konversi hutan akan memberikan ruang untuk melakukan reformasi yang penting ini. Kalau REDD diterapkan sebelum masalah ini diselesaikan, kita semua akan menghadapi bencana.

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Pengurangan deforestasi tidak tergantung pada masalah pemerintahan sendiri. Perlu pendekatan terpadu yang menangani masalah governance sejalan dengan penanganan masalah kemiskinan dan hak milik atas tanah. Pengelolaan hutan berkelanjutan berdasarkan masyarakat, dengan pengakuan hak milik atas tanah dan hak masyarakat adat akan mencegah deforestasi dan mempromosikan konservasi hutan yang efektif pada jangka panjang. Land tenure yang terjamin berulang kali terbukti mampu mengurangi tekanan atas deforestasi dan memajukan pengunaan sumberdaya hutan secara berkelanjutan dan menyumbang kepada penghidupan lokal sekaligus. REDD dalam bentuk ini mungkin akan menjadi bencana yang luar biasa. Ada kemungkinan kita akan melihat tata pemerintahan yang tak baik, korupsi dan hak masyarakat diabaikan sementara kepentingan pemerintah dan swasta menjadi tergesa-gesa memanfaatkan kesempatan baru untuk mendapatkan keuntungan yang diberikan oleh REDD.

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12

Proyek Ujicoba REDD di Indonesia

SUMATRA: Ulu Masen: Lihat diskusi lengkap dibawah

Pada saat ini sebanyak dua puluh insiatif REDD sedang dikembangkan di Indonesia. Masih agak sulit untuk mencari informasi yang akurat mengenai proyek-proyek tersebut. Kebanyakan inisiatif bertujuan untuk menjual kredit yang dihasilkan proyek ke pasar karbon sukarela tetapi juga mengharapkan REDD akan diterima sebagai bagian kesepakatan pasca-2012. Padahal inisiatif sukarela tengah dikembangkan, Tachrir Fathoni, kepala Research and Development Menteri Kehutanan mengatakan “pemerintah pusat tidak akan memberikan izin sebelum adanya regulasi� (Jakarta Post 2009). Bagian ini akan menguraikan beberapa proyek besar yang diajukan di Indonesia.

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Leuser Ecosystem: Perjanjian telah ditandatangani antara Pemerintah Aceh dan Sustainable Forest Management Southeast Asia (SFM SE Asia Ltd) yang mengharapkan mendirikan inisiatif konservasi di kawasan Leuser Ecosystem. Kesepakatan ini akan mengizinkan PT-Devco and perusahaan anaknya untuk melakukan kegiatan bisnis seperti agribusiness-agroforestry, perkebunan kayu, ecotourism,

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energi renewable dan perdagangan karbon di kawasan Leuser Ecosystem (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

Riau: Perkebunan kayu Riau Andalan Pulp dan Paper (RAPP) mengajukan usulan untuk mengelola semenanjung Kampar di Sumatera Tengah sebagai hutan lindung. Usulan tersebut akan membangun kawasan lindung inti yang dikelilingi oleh 200,000 ha perkebunan kayu. RAPP diketahui memiliki catatan sosial dan lingkungan yang buruk di Riau dan bertahun-tahun terlibat dalam konflik dengan masyarakat setempat. Proyek RAPP akan menggunakan sistem bending dan saluran yang sangat kompleks, dan beberapa pihak meragukan kemampuan proyek ini untuk menghasilkan pengurangan emisi (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

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KALIMANTAN: Sungai Putri dan Kapuas Hulu: Flora and Fauna International (FFI) tengah mengembangkan usulan untuk proyek ujicoba REDD di Sungai Putri and Kapuas Hulu di Kalimantan Barat. Proyek ini bertujuan untuk melindungi hutan gambut dari konversi untuk menjadi perkebunan sawit dan akan melibatkan perubahan fungsi tanah dari hutan produksi menjadi hutan lindung. MoU sudah ditandatangani oleh pemerintah daerah, namun bagaimana model bisnisnya masih dibicarakan. Baseline karbon sudah ditetapkan di Sungai Putri dan masih dalam proses untuk proyek Kapuas Hulu. FFI berharap mampu mendirikan ‘kolam karbon masyrakat’ (community carbon pool) yang akan membantu melindungi hutan adat yang terancam konversi. Proyek ini dikatakan akan memastikan bahwa keuntungan disampaikan ke masyarakat adat (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008). Walaupun ada janji seperti ini, namun masih ada kekhawatiran terkait pendekatan yang ekslusif. Konsultasi dengan masyarakat hanya dimulai sesudah MoU ditandatangani dan perencanaan sudah dilakukan. Yang paling mencemaskan, FFI mempresentasikan adanya penjaga hutan yang bersenjata (FFI 2008; FFI 2009).

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Malinau:

Kalimantan Tengah: Sejuta hektar hutan gambut terdegradasi di situs mega-proyek beras di Kalimantan Tengah diusulkan sebagai proyek ujicoba REDD. Skema ini didukung oleh Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership Pemerintah Australia yang bernilai AU$30 juta. Tahapan pertama akan melibatkan rehabilitasi 100,000 hektar yang berdampingan dengan hutan gambut (Gubenur Kalimantan Tengah 2009). Pengukuran karbon telah dilakukan tetapi rencana induk belum dikeluarkan. Beberapa tulisan menyebutkan JP Morgan Stanley tertarik untuk memberikan dukungan finansial (Griffiths 2008; Down to Earth 2008). Kritik terhadap proyek ini menuturkan bahwa proyek REDD ini bertentangan dengan rencana pemerintah Kalimantan Tengah untuk terkait lahan sejuta hutan gambut di kawasan Kalteng lainnya yang diperuntukkan untuk dijadikan perkebunan sawit (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

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Pada akhir 2008, MoU ditandatangani oleh perusahaan Swiss Global Eco Rescue (GER) dan perusahaan hutan milik pemerintah PT Inhutani II. Proyek ini akan melaksanakan proyek REDD di Kabupaten Malinau di Kalimantan Timur. Proyek akan akan dilaksanakan di 225,000 hektar konsesi milik PT Inhutani, dan diharapkan akan menghasilkan sejuta kredit karbon per tahun yang akan dijual ke pasar karbon sukarela. Proyek ini jug menjanjikan akan mengurangi praktek illegal logging dan pembukaan lahan untuk peternakan di konsesi PT Inhutani, penerapan cara penebangan hutan yang berdampak ringan, dan pengembangan jasa ekosistem lain (GER 2009).

Berau: Kabupaten Berau mengadakan penyelidikan awal untuk pengembangan REDD di daerah tersebut. Padahal perjanjian resmi belum ditandatangani, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) disebut sebagai pemberi dukungan teknis yang akan membantu dengan dana persiapan.

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PAPUA:

Timika and Mamberamo:

Pemerintah Papua mengungkapkan keinginannya untuk mengurangi deforestasi dan degradasi hutan di propinsinya dan berencana untuk menata ulang sektor kehutan. Dalam rencananya, Papua akan mengurangi jumlah izin diatas hutan produksi, melakukan pengukuran stok karbon, mengatur industri kayu, dan memajukan pengelolaan hutan berbasis masyarakat. Beberapa proyek ujicoba REDD sudah dikembangkan tetapi pelaksanaannya masih terhambat oleh pemerintah pusat (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

Perusahaan keuangan Australia, New Forests bekerjasama dengan Emerald Planet tengah mengembangkan proyek ujicoba REDD di daerah Mimika, Memberamo dan Merauke. Pembayaran akan dihasilkan melalui pasar karbon sukarela. Proyek tersebut sedang melakukan pengukuran karbon dan juga menunggu persetujuan dari pemerintah pusat sebelum dilaksanakan (Down to Earth 2008; Griffiths 2008).

Mamberamo: Pegunungan Cyclops: FFI bersama Pemerintah Propinsi Papua tengah mengembangkan usulan skema REDD di Pegunungan Cyclops dekat Jayapura. MoU sudah ditandatangani oleh Pemerintah Papua dan FFI, tetapi proyek masih menanti persetujuan dari pemerintah pusat.

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Suatu skema REDD juga tengah dikembangkan di daerah Mamberamo. Conservation International mengembangkan proyek ujicoba dengan PT Mamberamo Alasmandiri, dan akan didukung oleh Carbon Conservation dan perusahaan Jakarta Forest Carbon. Conservation International menyebutkan kerjasamanya dengan PT Mamberamo Alasmandiri bertujuan mengurangi risiko leakage yang disebabkan oleh illegal logging. Conservation International pernah menuturkan bahwa keanekaragaman hayati lah prioritas utamanya (Kemp 2009). Penting sekali bahwa dampak terhadap masyarakat juga diperhatikan dengan dengan baik. Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek (Project Design Document) masih dikembangkan dan model konsultasi dengan masyarakat juga belum terlalu jelas. Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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STUDI KASUS: Proyek Ulu Masen:

13

Sebagai proyek rintisan REDD sukarela yang tengah dikembangkan di Indonesia pada saat ini, Proyek Ulu Masen merupakan studi kasus yang cukup menarik terkait masalah REDD. Penting sekali pengembangan proyek ini dilihat dengan seksama karena pasti akan berimplikasi bagi proyek REDD lain di Indonesia. Pada bulan Juli 2008, Carbon Conservation, sebuah perusahaan perdagangan karbon dari Australia, menandatangani perjanjian dengan pemerintah Aceh untuk melindungi 750,000 ha hutan di ekosistem Ulu Masen di Aceh Utara. Skema ini didukung oleh organisasi konservasi Flora and Fauna International (FFI), dan akan menerima dukungan finansial sebanyak US$9 juta dari Bank Amerika Serikat Merrill Lynch9. Dokumen proyek menyatakan bahwa proyek ini akan mengurangi deforestasi sebesar 85% dan menjual kredit ke pasar karbon sukarela, dengan harapan akan meraup US$432 juta selama 30 tahun ke depan (Down to Earth 2008)

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9

Merrill Lynch didukung oleh Bank of America

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Carbon Conservation sendiri pernah menjalankan proyek pembatasan deforestasi di New South Wales di Australia. Seperti disebutkan di Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek, proyek tersebut akan melibatkan perdagangan karbon sekitar satu juta ton CO2, terutama ke Rio Tinto Aluminium. Kita mesti mempertanyakan kepantasan Carbon Conservation untuk mejalankan skema REDD di Indonesia mengingat Rio Tinto pernah beroperasi di Indonesia dan memiliki catatan buruk terkait kerusakan lingkungan dan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia10. Kira-kira 130,000 jiwa mendiami kawasan proyek Ulu masen dan sekitarnya, dan sekitar 61 mukim akan dipengaruhi oleh proyek. Proyek ini disebutkan akan menyumbang langsung terhadap pembangunan ekonomi dan sosial yang berkelanjutan dan konservasi keanekaragaman hayati melalui perencanaan penggunaan dan klasifikasi tanah, peningkatan pengawasan dan penegakan hukum, reforestasi, pemulihan dan penebangan hutan secara berkelanjutan berbasis masyarakat. 10 Lihat laporan WALHI tahun 2003: “Undermining Indonesia� untuk diskusi lengkap mengenai catatan social dan lingkungan Rio Tinto di Indonesia.

Pemerintah Aceh berharap akan menata ulang hukum dan kegiatan di daerah tersebut sekaligus melibatkan masyarakat setempat dalam pengambilan keputusan. Proyek ini juga bertujuan untuk membuka partisipasi secara penuh terkait perubahan fungsi lahan dan akan membuat tatabatas lahan dan sistem penggunaan tanah yang diputuskan secara bersama-sama. Proyek juga akan menerapkan sistem

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pengelolaan multi-stakeholder. Alih fungsi tanah akan melibatkan perubahan klasifikasi tanah yang dimaksudkan untuk logging dan untuk menjadi kawasan hutan lindung atau kawasan logging yang berdampak ringan (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 13). Padahal masalah ini agak rumit dan penting untuk melihat rincian perjanjian antara Carbon Conservation dengan Pemerintah Aceh. Menurut Sales and Marketing Agreement (Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran) yang ditandatangani pada Juli 2008 itu, 30% kredit yang dihasilkan dari proyek akan disimpan dalam bentuk Risk Management Buffer (Penyangga Risiko Manajemen) (kemungkinan untuk mempertanggungjawabkan kecemasan tentang permanence) dan 70% sisanya akan dijual. Hasil penjualan akan dikelola oleh Agen Pengumpul yang akan dipilih oleh Carbon Conservation dan Pemerintah Aceh secara bersama-sama. Sesudah Agen Pengumpul mengambil upahnya (jumlah tidak disebutkan), sisanya dibagikan 15% ke Carbon Conservation dan 85% ke Rekening Proyek. Rekening Proyek akan dibagikan ke masyarakat setempat. Proyek Ulu Masen diklaim dibangun melalui proses yang transparan dan dengan keikutsertaan masyarakat yang akan memastikan “keuntungan dibagikan antara stakeholders (pemegang taruhan) secara adil, termasuk masyarakat yang bergantung pada hutan dan masyarakat

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yang memiliki hak adat atas tanah� (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 2). Proyek Ulu Masen menyatakan FFI menyelenggarakan konsultasi secara extensif dengan masyarakat sebelum penandatanganan perjanjian. Meskipun demikian, dari dokumentasi yang tersedia, cakupan luasnya konsultasi tersebut kurang jelas. Apakah masyarakat setempat mengetahui apa yang ditandatangani atas nama mereka, dan apakah mereka mengerti cara pembagian keuntungan? Kalau Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran diselidiki secara rinci, ada beberapa kekhawatiran lagi mengenai pembagian dana. Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek menyatakan bahwa “masyarakat hukum adat, masyarakat setempat dan organisasi masyarakat sipil akan didorong dan didukung untuk diikutsertakan secara penuh dan aktif dalam membangun mekanisme pembagian untuk dana Pembatasan Deforestasi , melalui dialog stakeholder yang kolaboratif� (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 55). Informasi awal yang tersedia di Dokumen Rancang Proyek cukup lengkap mengenai stakeholders di proyek tersebut. Stakeholders yang diidentifikasikan oleh proyek termasuk

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aktor swasta, wakil dari mukim dan organisasi adat lain, kelompok yang rentan dan kurang diwakili (misalnya organisasi perempuan), aparat pemerintah, organisasi masyarakat sipil, termasuk yang kritis terhadap proyek, dan beberapa kelompok nasional dan internasional (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 56). Walaupun demikian, MoU (nota kesepahaman) yang ditandatangani Bulan Juli kemarin menyatakan bahwa Dana Rekening Proyek akan diawasi oleh Steering Committee (Komite Pengawas) yang terdiri dari Gubenur Aceh (yang akan menjadi ketua komite tersebut), 1 anggota yang ditunjuk Carbon Conservation, 1 anggota yang ditunjuk oleh FFI, 1 anggota yang ditunjuk oleh Oxfam, 1 anggota yang ditunjuk oleh Gubenur Aceh dan 1 anggota yang dicalonkan oleh Gubenur Aceh sebagai perwakilan dari masyarakat dan secara bersama-sama ditunjuk oleh para anggota. Bila dilihat dalam skema ini, perwakilan masyarakat setempat dalam proses ini tidak memadai. Dari 61 mukim yang akan dipengaruhi oleh proyek Ulu Masen, masyarakat-masyarakat lokal punya satu perwakilan yang sesungguhnya. Potensi konflik sangat besar kalau masyarakat diperlakukan sebagai satu kelompok homogen seperti ini. Apalagi, satu-satunya anggota Komite Pengawas yang mewakili masyarakat secara langsung akan dicalonkan oleh Gubenur (dan pasti akan berkaitan erat dengan Gubenur). Terlihat sangat sinis, tetapi kemungkinan korupsi oleh elit setempat sangat tinggi. Lembar Fakta Hutan dan Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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Kekhawatiran lainnya adalah masalah perwakilan dalam penyelesaian sengketa. Perjanjian menyatakan bahwa sengketa akan dirujuk ke arbitrase dalam bahasa Inggris di bawah peraturan Singapore International Arbitration Centre (Pusat Arbitrase Internasional Singapura). Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran menyatakan dengan jelas bahwa Pemerintah Aceh bertanggungjawab untuk semua biaya berhubungan dengan penasihat hukum atau finansial Ulu Masen Sales and Marketing Agreement 2008: 25). Pihak yang terlibat dalam sengketa juga bertanggungjawab atas semua biaya arbitrase - termasuk ongkos perjalanan ke Singapura. Kecemasan mengenai bahasa resmi yang digunakan sudah diungkapkan dalam konteks REDD dan masyarakat adat. Masalah biaya mungkin akan menjadi isu yang lebih penting lagi. Kalau sengketa terjadi, akan menjadi sulit untuk memastikan bahwa masyarakat adat diwakili dengan adil ketika biaya yang sangat besar dibutuhkan. Satu masalah lainnya adalah berkaitan dengan penggunaan Rekening Proyek terkait pengawasan dan perlindungan hutan. Sebagian besar biaya proyek akan dihabiskan untuk pengawasan. Proyek Ulu Masen yang akan menggunakan gambar radar, pesawat, gambaran foto dan pengawasan di lapangan untuk me-monitor degradasi hutan (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 35). Perjanjian Penjualan dan Pemasaran juga

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menyatakan bahwa Carbon Conservation bertanggungjawab terhadap biaya yang berkaitan dengan kegiatan validasi, pengawasan dan verifikasi, sementara Rekening Proyek yang dikelola pemerintah Aceh bertanggungjawab “membiayai operasi untuk pelestarian hutan tropis”. Maka kurang jelas berapa banyak akan disumbang oleh Rekening Proyek untuk perlindungan hutan. Meskipun demikian, ini bukan satu-satunya masalah dengan pentingnya yang diberikan kepada pengawasan. Meski Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek menyebutkan ‘penjaga hutan’ tidak akan pegang senjata, Dorjee Sun, CEO Carbon Conservation, pernah menuturkan bahwa “hutan akan dijaga oleh 1000 mantan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) yang bersenjata” (ABC 2008). Diharapkan rencana pengawasan akan dikeluarkan pada bulan Desember 2008. Mudah-mudahan dengan pengeluaran rencana ini, keprihatinan ini akan ditanggulangi. Sama seperti semua proyek REDD, kemungkinan besar Proyek Ulu Masen akan menimbulkan sengketa terkait pembagian keuntungan. Walaupun mayoritas kawasan proyek digolongkan sebagai hutan negara, Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek pun mengakui bahwa kebanyakan mukim di kawasan proyek menganggap hutan tersebut sebagai hutan adat. Proyek Ulu Masen dikembangkan terlalu cepat dan mengabaikan sengketa yang sudah ada mengenai hak atas tanah.

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Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek juga mengakui bahwa sengketa mungkin akan terjadi, meskipun tidak jelas disebutkan bagaimana masalah ini ditangani. Pembicaraan sengketa yang utaman juga berkaitan dengan migrasi ke dalam proyek yang mungkin akan terjadi ketika masyarakat tetangga berusaha mencari keuntungan dari pembagian dana Proyek (in-migration). Namun lagi, konflik orisontal dalam komunitas yang menerima keuntungan dari Proyek Ulu Masen pasti akan menjadi masalah. Ada kemungkinan bahwa hanya komunitas adat lah yang akan menerima keuntungan. Sangat penting agar Proyek Ulu Masen memiliki system yang kuta dalam penyelesaian sengketa. Sementara Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek juga menyebutkan pernyataan yang meragukan ini :�norma-norma sosial di daerah dan kohesi sosial yang berada di kampung cukup kuat untuk mencegah migrasi dari luar kawasan proyek� (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 49), namun potensi munculnya konflik akibat pembagian keuntungan tidak dibicarakan.

kegiatan negara tidak mungkin terjadi di dalam propinsi Aceh. Tetapi, moratorium tersebut tidak akan mempengaruhi penebangan hutan di Propinsi Sumatera Utara atau pembalakan liar di luar kawasan proyek. Proyek Ulu Masen menyebutkan bahwa hampir mustahil untuk mengukur leakage yang diperkirakan secara tepat, proyek mengharapkan leakage tidak akan lebih dari 10%. Seperti disebutkan diatas leakage di tingkat proyek mendekati 100% bila deforestasi disebabkan oleh permintaan kayu (salah satu penyebab utama di Indonesia). Proyek berjanji akan melakukan pengawasan di luar kawasan proyek untuk menangani keprihatinan mengenai leakage dan menggunakan Penyangga Risiko Manajemen untuk menangani leakage yang ditemukan. Tetapi yang tidak disebutkan adalah luasnya daerah hutan yang akan dijaga. Rekomendasi mengusulkan daerah yang 5-7 kali lipat daerah kawasan proyek harus dijaga untuk menanggulangi leakage (Angelsen 2008: 72).

Dokumen Ulu Masen juga mengakui leakage adalah masalah utama dalam Proyek ini. Dokumen Perencanaan Proyek juga menyebutkan adanya pengembangan pengelolaan hutan secara lestari dan menyeluruh, termasuk produksi kayu akan memadai untuk mencegah leakage. Moratorium logging (penebangan hutan) yang disahkan oleh Pemerintah Aceh mengartikan bahwa leakage yang disebabkan oleh

Meskipun Proyek Ulu Masen menggunakan retorika yang cukup kuat mengenai kehidupan masyarakat yang berkelanjutan, namun ada beberapa isu yang meragukan. Hal-hal transparansi dan perwakilan masyarakat setempat merupakan keprihatinan utama. Penting sekali bahwa proyek ini diperhatikan dengan baik, karena pasti akan mempengaruhi kehidupan masyarakat adat baik di kawasan proyek maupun seluruh Indonesia. 75


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Dilworth A, Baird N & Kirby (Eds.) (2008) Losing Ground, Friends of the Earth, Life Mosaic and Sawit Watch, [online]: www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/losingground.pdf

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Dooley K, Griffiths T, Leake H, Ozinga S (2008) Cutting Corners, FERN/Forest Peoples Programme, [online]: www.fern.org/media/documents/document_4312_4313.pdf

Gellert PK (2005) “The shifting natures of “development”: Growth, crisis and recovery in Indonesia’s forests”, World Development 33 (8): 1345-1364

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Jakarta Post (2009) “Biofuel euphoria ends in vain”, 5th Feb, 2009

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Jakarta Post (2009) “Government delays awarding permits for REDD projects”, 7th Feb, 2009, [online]: http:// www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/07/government-delays-awarding-permits-reddprojects.html Jakarta Post (2009), “Peatland conversions conditionally approved”, 19th February 2009, [online]: http:// www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/19/peatland-conversions-conditionally-approved. html 79


Jakarta Post (2007) “Indonesia could net US$2 billion from forest conservation”, 30th November 2007, [online]: http://old.thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20071130.L01&irec=0 Jakarta Post (2006) “President Admits Indigenous People Mistreated”, 10 August 2006 Kalimantan Tengah Regional Government (2009) “REDD dalam perspective daerah”, presented by Governor of Kalimantan Tengah, presented at National Workshop: Membangun Kesiapan Indonesia Melaksanakan REDD, 25th Feb 2009 Kemp N (2009) “Tahapan Pengembangan Proyek Karbon di Mamberamo”, conference proceedings, presented at National Workshop: Membangun Kesiapan Indonesia Melaksanakan REDD, 25th Feb 2009 Lovera S (2007) “The impacts of market-based biodiversity conservation on indigenous peoples, local communities and women”, presented at 5th Trondheim Conference on Biodiversity, [online]: www.globalforestcoalition.org/img/userpics/File/publications/Trondheimpaper.pdf

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Republic of Indonesia (2008) Peratruran Menteri Kehutanan, Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi dan Degradasi Hutan (REDD), 14th July draft, [online]: www.dephut.go.id/ INFORMASI/LITBANG/IFCA/Draft_Permenhut_REDD.pdf “Request for Consideration of the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Kalimantan, Indonesia, under the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures” (2007), submitted by Perkumpulan Sawit Watch, AMAN, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Kalimantan Barat, ELSAM, WALHI, HuMA, Yayasan Padi Indonesia, Lembaga Bela Banua Talino, Lembaga Gemawan, Institut Dayakologi, Forest Peoples Programme, 6th July 2007, [online]: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/urgent_action. pdf “RE: Request for Consideration of the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Kalimantan, Indonesia, under the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures” (2009), submitted by Forest Peoples Programme, Sawit Watch, and AMAN, February 2009, [online]: http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/asia_pacific/ indonesia_cerd_follow_up_feb09_eng.pdf

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Tauli-Corpuz V & Tamang P (2007) Oil Palm and Other Commercial Tree Plantations, Monocropping: Impacts on Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure and Resource Management Systems and Livelihoods, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, [online]: www.un.org/ esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/6session_crp6.doc Trines (2007) Investment flows and finance schemes in the forestry sector with particular references to developing countries, a report to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, 24th July 2007, [online]: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/ trines.pdf Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Design Note (2007) “Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh, Indonesia”, [online]: www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/ Ulu_Masen_CCBA_Project_Design_Nov1.pdf

WALHI (2008) “Hak Atas Lingkungan Masih di Langit”, WALHI National Executive, Jakarta WALHI (2003) “Undermining Indonesia: Adverse social and environmental impacts of Rio Tinto’s mining operations in Indonesia”, WALHI, Jakarta [online]: http://www.eng.walhi.or.id:8001/ attachment/d016df19778a7c563cd1c99afe29c43a/369d35e1b61f17415c68f4fd230f17e6/ Undermining%20Indonesia.pdf WWF (2008), WWF Discussion Paper: Policy approaches and positive incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), [online]: www.panda.org/news_facts/ publications/?145123

Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Sales and Marketing Agreement (2008), Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project Sales and Marketing Agreement, The Provincial Government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Carbon Conservation Pty Ltd, Blake Dawson, Canberra UN (2005) UN Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent: An Overview of the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples in International and Domestic Law and Practices, Presented by Tamang P, January 2005, [online]: www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/ workshop_FPIC_tamang.doc UN-REDD (2008) “UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries”, FAO, UNDP, UNEP, [online]: www.undp.org/mdtf/unredd/docs/Annex-A-Framework-Document.pdf

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Untuk bisa menjawab tantangan mengurangi kemiskinan dan menjagai sumber daya alam secara bersamaan, Sembilan organisasi, yaitu: Sahabat Alam Malaysia [SAM], Consumers Association Penang [CAP], Walhi, Sawit Watch, the Center for Environmental Law and Community Rights [CELCOR], WWF Indonesia, the World Conservation Union Union [IUCN], NTFP Exchange Program dan Partners with Melanesians sepakat untuk menjadi bagian dari jaringan organisasi yang bergerak dalam isu yang berhubungan dengan hutan, perkebunan, dan pengurangan kemiskinan To meet the challenges of reducing poverty and safeguarding natural resources simultaneously, nine organizations: Sahabat Alam Malaysia [SAM], Consumers Association Penang [CAP], Walhi, Sawit Watch, the Center for Environmental Law and Community Rights [CELCOR], WWF Indonesia, the World Conservation Union Union [IUCN], NTFP Exchange Program and Partners with Melanesians agreed to be part of a network organizations to work on similar issues and problems related to forest, plantation and poverty alleviation.

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Friends of Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I the Earth International




REDD Wrong Path : Pathetic Ecobusiness Writer : Tim Mann, Muhammad Teguh Surya Edited by Rully Syumanda Design and layout Do2 Cetakan Pertama, Mei 2009 REDD Wrong Path Pathetic Ecobusiness Cet I - Jakarta WALHI, 2009 210 x 148 mm No. ISBN: 978-979-8071-74-4 Publish by: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia Support by Nature and Poverty Alliance

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CONTENT

Executif Summary

Concerns with a Market-Based Approach

Indonesia and REDD_____________________________________________ vii

Introduction

Indonesia has been the focus of much international attention over recent years due to it’s increasingly prominent role in creating greenhouse gas emissions. It has emerged the third highest carbon dioxide emitting country in the world after the United States and China.__________________________________ 1

Defining ‘Forests’

Potential Cost of REDD

One of the major reasons that REDD discussions are progressing at such a rapid pace is the large sums of money being discussed. Figures tend to vary greatly and are highly dependent on the methodology used. ________________ 5

Funding Mechanisms Proposed

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A substantial portion of the debate over REDD has focused on how any future scheme might be funded. Recent years have seen a blossoming of multilateral funds dedicated to addressing climate change mitigation. _____________ 7

Although there seems to be a growing consensus that carbon trading will inevitably be used to fund REDD, this has yet to be confirmed (FOEI 2008: 18). There lies an inherent danger in allowing market based REDD. By allowing northern countries to use market based REDD they will be able to evade responsibility for reducing emissions in their own countries. ___________ 19

One of the fundamental flaws that must be addressed prior to any future REDD deal is the FAO definition of forests currently utilised in UN documentation. FAO’s definition of forests5, which has also been adopted by the Clean Development Mechanism, allows for the inclusion of plantations.___________________ 22

REDD does not Address the Causes of Deforestation

It is essential to place the REDD debate in it’s wider global context and reflect on the underlying causes of deforestation in tropical countries. The problem of deforestation in developing countries cannot be divorced from discussions on international trade and Northern patterns of consumption.____________ 24




Indigenous and Forest Dependent Communities

Technical Challenges with REDD Implementation

Leakage

A major technical challenge associated with REDD is how to resolve ‘leakage’ concerns. Leakage refers to the transfer of deforestation activities from the project area to a non-participating area.____________________________ 43

Of Indonesia’s 216 million people it is estimated that 100 million, of which 40 million are indigenous peoples, depend mainly on forests and natural resource goods and services (Request for Consideration… 2007: _______________ 26

Deficiencies in Indonesian Law and Policy

There are a number of striking deficiencies in current Indonesian law and policy that seriously discriminate against and endanger the rights of Indonesia’s indigenous forest dependent peoples._____________________________ 33

Current REDD Projects in Indonesia

Further Government Inconsistencies

There is significant inconsistency between stated government aims regarding forest protection and official government policy. While the government publicly declares it’s intentions to effectively tackle climate change and reduce forest destruction, it just the last 12 months it has established a number of damaging regulations which seek to do just the opposite.______________________ 37

Misleading Outcomes?

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Several papers have questioned the dubious morality of REDD funds rewarding the most obvious polluters (those with a history of forest destruction), while failing to reward indigenous and local forest dependent people who have managed the forest sustainably (Griffiths 2008: 2). _ __________________ 40

There are currently up to twenty REDD related initiatives at varying stages of development in Indonesia. It remains quite difficult to obtain accurate information on all of them. Most initiatives intend to sell credit’s generated on existing voluntary carbon markets, and are banking on REDD’s inclusion in any post-2012 agreement. __________________________________________ 56

CASE STUDY:

Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project:

As the most advanced voluntary initiative currently operating in Indonesia, The Ulu Masen Ecosystem project provides a useful case study in the examination of REDD. It will be vital to closely monitor the development of this project as it is likely to have significant implications for other future REDD projects in Indonesia._ ___________________________________________________ 65

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Executive Summary

Indonesia and 1 REDD

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1 This document is intended as a summary report on REDD for people who live near and within the forest and all the fragile communities caused by

Deforestation and forest degradation accounts for a staggering 1820% of total global greenhouse gas emissions. Increasing recognition of the vital role played by forests in the global carbon cycle has seen Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) emerge as one of the key strategies in future climate change mitigation efforts. Reducing deforestation is seen as a relatively cheap way of mitigating climate change and is thus favoured by many industrialised countries who are daunted by the task of restructuring industry in their own countries. As REDD is likely to be included in any post-Kyoto deal, REDD discussions are currently progressing at a rapid pace, as countries seek to develop REDD programmes prior to the UNFCCC-COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. In order to achieve the kinds of emissions reductions promised by REDD, immense sums of money will be required. Consequently much of the current debate on REDD seems to revolve around the most

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appropriate funding scheme. In order to provide the large sums of money required, many parties have advocated linking REDD to carbon markets. If this were to occur, however, serious consequences may result. Incorporating REDD credit’s in carbon markets runs the risk of flooding existing markets, reducing national sovereignty over natural resource management decisions and most fundamentally, allowing Northern countries to eschew responsibility from taking meaningful steps towards reducing emissions in their own countries. A major defect with REDD is the definition of ‘forests’ currently employed in UNFCCC documentation. If this definition is formally accepted into UNFCCC REDD policy, we may actually see countries utilising REDD funds to finance ongoing plantation expansion. Not only would this be incredibly harmful for local communities and biodiversity, plantations are acknowledged as only storing 20% of the carbon that intact natural forests are capable of retaining. Serious flaws in Indonesian draft REDD policy and current forestry law mean that Indonesia’s indigenous and forest dependent communities are particularly vulnerable in the context of REDD. The vast majority of Indonesia’s indigenous and forest dependent peoples lack secure land tenure agreements. As REDD will undoubtedly result in the value of forests being increased, there is a major risk that Indonesia’s indigenous



and forest dependent peoples will find themselves denied access to the forests that form the basis of their culture and livelihoods. Several significant methodological problems also remain unresolved. These include the ‘leakage’ of deforestation to areas not participating in REDD, concerns over establishment and measurement of baseline levels of deforestation, and the appropriate degree of monitoring required. While WALHI rejects REDD in it’s current guise, this does not mean that WALHI does not recognise the importance of reducing deforestation. WALHI has repeatedly made calls for a moratorium on logging in order to allow important governance and law enforcement reform in Indonesia’s troubled forestry sector to be undertaken. Addressing land tenure concerns and promoting community based sustainable forest management has been shown to significantly reduce the pressure for deforestation. It is vital that greater recognition of indigenous and forest dependent communities’ land tenure and improving forest governance form central components of future REDD negotiations.

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01 Introduction Indonesia has been the focus of much international attention over recent years due to it’s increasingly prominent role in creating greenhouse gas emissions. It has emerged the third highest carbon dioxide emitting country in the world after the United States and China. Deforestation, large scale forest fires and drying out of tropical peatlands are said to be the main contributors to Indonesia’s emissions (Dilworth et al 2008: 20). Indonesia’s deforestation rate since 1996 has been the highest in the world, estimated at approximately 2 million hectares per year (Gellert 2005: 1356).

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It is now recognised that deforestation and land use change, particularly in developing countries such as Indonesia, are responsible for between 18-20% of global greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2007). In Indonesia alone, land use and land use change results in the release of 2-3 billion tonnes of CO2 annually (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 3). Forests are thus an essential component of world carbon cycles and will undoubtedly be included in any future measures to combat climate change. Accordingly, Indonesia will be a key player among these discussions. During the meeting of the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP-13) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bali in 2007, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing countries (REDD) emerged as a prominent component of any future efforts to mitigate climate change. REDD aims to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of CO2 at as low a level as possible through a system of financial reward for halting or slowing rates of deforestation. As REDD is likely to be included in any post-Kyoto deal, there is currently much haste to develop REDD programmes prior to the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009.

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This paper is intended to outline some of the major concerns associated with the implementation of REDD. At a base ideological level the concept of REDD is flawed, as there is a distinct possibility it will be exploited by industrialised countries to eschew responsibility for reducing emissions in their own countries. Numerous technical issues must be also resolved. In it’s current guise, REDD risks marginalizing Indonesia’s forest dependent people and even being responsible for increased deforestation. There remain serious concerns that “global warming which is a social and environmental problem has become a business endeavour which offers opportunities to gain new property rights, assets and openings for capital accumulation” (Tauli-Corpuz & Tamang 2007).

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Potential Cost of REDD One of the major reasons that REDD discussions are progressing at such a rapid pace is the large sums of money being discussed. Figures tend to vary greatly and are highly dependent on the methodology used.

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The Stern Review provides an estimate of US$5 billion to reduce deforestation by 50% over a decade, while the World Bank provides a substantially higher estimate of between US$2-20 billion annually to reduce deforestation by 10-20% (FOEI 2008).

Blaser’s report to the UNFCCC calculated the cost of stopping deforestation by 2030 by comparing the drivers of deforestation in various regions

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Blaser’s report to the UNFCCC calculated the cost of stopping deforestation by 2030 by comparing the drivers of deforestation in various regions. While Blaser’s estimates failed to include costs required to compensate subsistence farmers, the report provided an annual figure of US$12.2 billion (FOEI 2008). Another report to the UNFCCC estimated that the cost of stopping the loss of 148 million hectares of primary forest in 40 key countries would be between a staggering US$28 to 185 billion per year (Trines, 2007: 43). Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I




There is thus significant inconsistency between the various estimates utilised. Despite this variability however, REDD discussions continue to gain considerable momentum. And just as there has been much debate on the possible cost of instituting an REDD programme, discussions continue on the most appropriate way to fund any future REDD scheme.

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Funding Mechanisms Proposed A substantial portion of the debate over REDD has focused on how any future scheme might be funded. Recent years have seen a blossoming of multilateral funds dedicated to addressing climate change mitigation. Significant differences exist between countries over the form of REDD and the type of funding mechanism favoured. Brazil for example has been highly critical of linking REDD forests credit’s to carbon markets, explicitly stating that it will not allow it’s forests to be used to offset emissions in Annex-12 countries (FOEI 2008: 33). Tuvalu is also opposed to market based mechanisms and has proposed establishing an international REDD fund to finance community based forest projects without an offset mechanism (Griffiths 2008). Conversely, the countries of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations have advocated a flexible or ‘basket’ mechanism that includes carbon market crediting, official development assistance funds, and taxes on industrialised countries emissions or fossil fuels (CAN 2007). India and

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Annex 1 countries are industrialized countries recognized as being responsible for large scale emissions

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The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the official financing body under the UNFCCC

China want to be compensated for maintaining carbon stocks and are pressing for the inclusion of protected forests in REDD (CAN 2007). They have also expressed deep concern about any funding channelled through the World Bank (FOEI 2008: 34). The Democratic Republic of Congo and others have suggested market incentives and aid for conserving large areas of forest that have not had historically high rates of deforestation (CAN 2007). Meanwhile, Mexico has suggested the establishment of an ‘Avoided Deforestation Carbon Fund’ within the UNFCCC. To source money for this fund, Mexico suggests that a levy be placed on emissions generated by activities defined under the Kyoto Protocol, similar to the levy placed on emissions under the Clean Development Mechanism (Fry 2008). To this point Indonesia has been rather quiet internationally regarding it’s preferred funding scheme and seems keen to engage with a variety of REDD funding mechanisms. Indonesia’s submission to the UNFCCC seems mainly concerned over baseline issues and how deforestation might be measured (Republic of Indonesia 2008). It states that a REDD scheme should include carbon stock enhancement and sustainable forest management and favours a national approach to REDD, with the Forestry Ministry having ultimate control over granting or withholding licences for REDD activities (Angelsen 2008).

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Significantly, Indonesia has expressed it’s support for the full inclusion of REDD credit’s within existing carbon markets (Angelsen 2008: 49). There is currently considerable debate within the UNFCCC regarding the most appropriate way to distribute and manage climate change funds. The G77 group of developing nations and China have firmly stated that a multilateral financing mechanism must be under the UNFCCC’s control. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the official financing body under the UNFCCC. The GEF has been the target of significant criticism partly due to the sizeable role played by the World Bank. While the Bank is only one of the GEF’s three implementing agencies (the other two are the UNDP and UNEP), it has substantial influence over the distribution of GEF funds (FOEI 2008: 28). There are further concerns that voting procedures within the GEF give undue weight to the large donor countries. The GEF’s social credentials are also rather poor and it has been accused of promoting large exclusionary conservation projects in Asia and Africa (Griffiths 2008). Due to these significant concerns the status of the GEF within the UNFCCC is currently being questioned, and it is in the process of undertaking a review of it’s policies towards local indigenous communities. As discussions continue within the UNFCCC, the World Bank Group has emerged as the prominent funding body for any future multilateral

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REDD programme, and currently manages at least 10 funding bodies associated with climate change (Griffiths 2008). In the midst of some controversy, at the COP-13 meeting in Bali, it launched the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). The stated aim of the Facility is “to act as a ‘catalyst’ to promote public and private investment in REDD and to support demonstration pilot projects for developing and implementing national REDD strategies” (Dooley et al 2008: 6). A country may become involved in the programme after they have submitted a concept note of their preparation plans for REDD, and the concept note is approved by the FCPF. The programme currently has twenty-three participant countries, and is expected to include up to 30 when fully operational3. 3 Current participant countries include: Argentina, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Madagascar, Cameroon, DRC, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Nepal, PNG, Vanuatu, Vietnam (Dooley et al 2008)

It has received US$165 million in pledges from ten donor countries and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) (FOEI 2008: 30) and aims to use these funds to assist the selected countries participate in any future REDD schemes. The FCPF seems to be strongly geared towards promoting carbon markets in the financing of REDD. Early evidence has suggested that many of the initial concept notes submitted by participating countries pay scant attention to recognition of land tenure and ownership rights (Dooley et al 2008). In response to growing criticism over the

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Facility’s failure to adequately consult with forest peoples, the Bank set up a participation fund for indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities in October 2008 (Griffiths 2008: 10). Indonesia initially expressed some interest in engaging with the FCPF, but has reportedly opted to work with the UN-REDD program in order to avoid having to comply with the World Bank’s more stringent social and environmental safeguards (Griffiths 2008: 44). Regardless of Indonesia’s involvement, it will crucial to closely monitor the way that FCPF develops as it is likely to have significant implications for REDD strategies and land use policies in other countries. In May 2008 the Bank also authorised a second Climate Investment Fund, the Forest Investment Program (FIP), which is due to be released early in 2009. The FIP aims to attract between US$1 and US$2 billion in funds to “reduce deforestation and forest degradation and to promote improved sustainable forest management, leading to emission reductions and protection of carbon reservoirs” (FOEI 2008: 31). While the FCPF and UN-REDD programs support readiness activities and pilot REDD payment mechanisms, the FIP aims to provide finance for implementing reforms and investments needed on the ground. The FIP will use predominantly public funds rather than markets to fund these activities, although is still expected to facilitate the establishment Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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of carbon markets (Griffiths 2008: 43). Some authors have expressed concerns over the Banks stated aims to support sustainable forest management and afforestation through the FIP. The concern is that unless a strong rights-based and people-centred approach is adopted, FIP funds may be used to further promote large scale plantation and logging operations (Griffiths 2008: 11). Several major concerns exist among civil society groups about the World Bank’s ability to adequately manage climate change funds. In their current formulation these funds are designed to provide loans as well as grants. We could thus be confronted with the absurd situation whereby developing countries increase their debt burden in order to deal with a problem caused by Northern countries. Even if they are not used to provide loans, these funds will place recipient countries in a donor-recipient relationship rather than truly reflecting developed countries ecological debt to the South (Down to Earth 76-77 2008). One must also consider the Banks inclination towards a market-based approach has been well demonstrated in the past. While language is slightly vaguer in FCPF documents, this is also a key goal of the FCPF (Dooley et al 2008). Finally, it is important to seriously question the

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appropriateness of the World Bank in driving any REDD project in Indonesia considering it’s history of financing destructive fossil fuel based investments. The private sector arm of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has actively promoted increased emissions through it’s support of fossil fuel, mining and industrial plantation sectors in Indonesia (FOEI 2008: 29). In July 2008, the UN launched UN-REDD (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries). The programme will be led by the UNDP, FAO and UNEP and is geared towards “readiness activities” for REDD. It will support capacity building, strategy development, testing financial approaches and institutional arrangements for monitoring and verification (FOEI 2008: 32). The project has already received a US$35 million commitment from the Government of Norway and participating countries so far include Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia. The UN-REDD programme strongly advocates linking REDD to carbon markets (Griffiths 2008) and is expected to coordinate with

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other international initiatives including the World Bank’s FCPF and FIP and the GEF. The programme is committed to a rights-based approach, and language on Free, Prior and Informed Consent4 is strong (UN-REDD 2008). The program is still in preparatory mode and no projects have been officially approved. A major problem with the UN-REDD program is that it will utilise the FAO definition of forests that includes plantations (see discussion below). Further risks identified are that the UN agencies lack or possess only weakly binding policies with regards to indigenous peoples and current plans do not possess clear measures to address social risks associated with the implementation of REDD (Griffiths 2008). 4 The concept of free, prior and informed consent recognizes indigenous peoples’ inherent and prior rights to their lands and resources and respects their legitimate authority to require that third parties enter into an equal and respectful relationship with them, based on the principle of informed consent (UN 2005)

It is important to briefly touch on the number of bilateral schemes that have emerged over recent years. Australia has become a major supporter of REDD and climate change efforts In Indonesia, recently promoting the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership’ that encompasses the $30 million market-oriented ‘Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership’. It has promised a further $10 million dedicated mainly to the development of national carbon accounting systems and a national policy framework for REDD (Griffiths 2008: 15). Australia’s primary support is for the development of a REDD pilot project in degraded peat swamp in Central Kalimantan, although it has shown a keen interest in developing REDD projects in Papua province.

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The UK has also shown a strong interest in supporting climate change efforts in Indonesia. The UK’s development agency DFID aims to support policy development in relation to REDD and has also been a keen supporter of both the Indonesia Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA) and the FCPF. Germany has also shown support for the IFCA, and is currently working on developing REDD projects in Central Kalimantan. Norway is another clear supporter of REDD, and is strongly pushing for it’s inclusion in any post-2012 agreement. As discussed, it provides key finance to the UN-REDD Programme and has also made significant contributions to the FCPF and FIP. In addition to it’s engagement with these multilateral bodies, Norway has entered into bilateral agreements with Brazil and Tanzania with the stated aim of reducing deforestation (Griffiths 2008: 14). WALHI expresses a certain degree of cynicism with regards to bilateral support for REDD initiatives in Indonesia, particularly in the case of Australia. One questions whether this support is partly strategic in nature, in order to facilitate the ongoing operation of destructive Australian owned extractive industries in Kalimantan and Papua.

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In the midst of discussions on the most appropriate bilateral or multilateral funding scheme, private sector funding through the voluntary carbon market is rapidly being developed. The voluntary approach linking REDD pilot programs to existing markets has emerged as probably the most dominant funding scheme in Indonesia, despite Indonesia’s preference for a national approach. There are currently close to twenty initiatives at varying stages of development (Jakarta Post 2009). The initiatives tend to involve agreements between local district governments and northern carbon finance companies, often acting in conjunction with large conservation NGOs. By far the most advanced of these voluntary initiatives is the Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project, discussed in detail below.

Critics of market based approaches tend to question these figures, but the carbon market is said to be currently generating $30 billion annually and is expected to reach hundreds of billions or more (Schwartzman et al, 2007). Some developing countries have advocated a solely market based REDD, citing the fact that industrialised countries have reneged on previous commitments to provide voluntary financial assistance for reducing deforestation in developing countries (FOEI 2008: 18). This may be the case, but there remain several serious concerns with a market based approach to REDD.

While it has yet to be confirmed, many of these preparatory projects are banking on REDD credit’s eventually being included in carbon markets. In response to the large sums of money required to finance any future REDD scheme, many parties have advocated linking REDD to carbon markets. Proponents of a market based approach claim that unless business is involved, forests are always going to lose to the power of predatory investment and extractive companies.

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Linking REDD to markets risks creating a very expensive but essentially meaningless scheme

Concerns with a Market-Based Approach

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Although there seems to be a growing consensus that carbon trading will inevitably be used to fund REDD, this has yet to be confirmed (FOEI 2008: 18). There lies an inherent danger in allowing market based REDD. By allowing northern countries to use market based REDD they will be able to evade responsibility for reducing emissions in their own countries. This must be recognised as a serious and fundamental flaw with allowing REDD credit’s to be included in carbon markets. Allowing Annex-1 countries to use forests to offset their domestic emissions reductions commitments will not address the underlying causes of climate change. Linking REDD to markets risks creating a very expensive but essentially meaningless scheme. Another concern with linking REDD to markets relates to the issue of national sovereignty over natural resources. Both at the national and community levels we may see a loss of autonomy over natural resources as third parties gain increasing influence over natural resource decisions

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(FOEI 2008). There remains the very real chance that northern buyers could impose their own land management and conservation criteria on local communities (Fry 2008; Griffiths 2008). Furthermore, their utilisation of money based concepts of local livelihoods may not always be appropriate for the communities with which they interact. Financial incentives are unlikely to ever truly be able to compensate for the loss of food security, involvement in the subsistence economy and cultural integrity (Griffiths 2008: 21). Carbon markets have already proven to be not only complex, but also subject to significant volatility. If the price of carbon were to collapse, payments to local forest dependent communities could quite conceivably plunge below subsistence levels. If this occurred the livelihoods of local communities would be placed under serious threat, resulting in increased pressure to resume destructive forest activities. (FOEI 2008: 18). A further concern over linking REDD to carbon markets is that REDD credit’s could flood existing carbon markets, significantly reducing their value (Fry 2008). This would have the additional outcome of reducing the incentive for emission reductions, as reduction targets could be cheaply met by purchasing REDD credit’s (WWF 2008: 10).

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05 5 FAO Forest Definition: Forests are lands of more than 0.5 hectares, with a tree canopy cover of more than 10 percent, which are not primarily under agricultural or urban land use. Forests are determined both by the presence of trees and the absence of other predominant land uses. The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters in situ. Areas under reforestation which have yet to reach a crown density of 10 percent or tree height of 5 m

Defining ‘Forests’ One of the fundamental flaws that must be addressed prior to any future REDD deal is the FAO definition of forests currently utilised in UN documentation. FAO’s definition of forests5, which has also been adopted by the Clean Development Mechanism, allows for the inclusion of plantations. If this definition is formally accepted into UNFCCC REDD policy, this serious defect could actually see countries utilising REDD funds to finance ongoing plantation expansion. Aside from the obvious devastating impacts upon local communities and biodiversity, plantations are acknowledged as only storing 20% of the carbon that intact natural forests are capable of retaining (FOEI 2008: 23). Brazil has already sought to take advantage of this haziness by promoting incentives for reductions in ‘net’ deforestation. Were a situation like this to eventuate, it would essentially allow Brazil to continue to obtain revenues from logging it’s forest, while expanding it’s plantations and also benefiting from REDD funds (FOEI 2008: 23). It remains to be seen whether Indonesia also aims to take advantage of this significant loophole. Formal Indonesian government policy,

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as outlined in Government Law 41 of 1999, and reiterated in Forestry Ministry draft REDD policy, defines forest as “a unit of ecosystem in the form of land containing biological resources, dominated by trees in their natural forms and environment which cannot be separated from each other” (Republic of Indonesia 1999). While this definition is a little hazy, it does not appear to include plantations. There is obviously a grave concern that if Indonesia was to employ the FAO definition, REDD funds could be manipulated to fund ongoing plantation expansion. The Forestry Department has positioned it’self as the main coordinating agency for REDD in Indonesia and is strongly aligned with commercial interests in the paper, pulp and plantation sectors. Current draft REDD policy states that any forestry permit holder (including logging and industrial pulp wood permit holders) can develop a REDD policy and submit it to the Ministry for approval (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 6). Clear danger signs are certainly present.

are included, as are temporarily unstocked areas, resulting from human intervention or natural causes, that are expected to regenerate. The term specifically includes: forest nurseries and seed orchards that constitute an integral part of the forest; forest roads, firebreaks and other small open areas; forest in national parks, nature reserves and other protected areas such as those of specific scientific, historical, cultural or spiritual interest; windbreaks and shelterbelts of trees with an area of more than 0.5 ha and width of more than 20 m; plantations primarily used for forestry purposes, including rubberwood plantations and cork oak stands. The term specifically excludes trees planted primarily for agricultural production, for example in fruit plantations and agroforestry systems. (FAO 2000)

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06

REDD does not Address the Causes of Deforestation It is essential to place the REDD debate in it’s wider global context and reflect on the underlying causes of deforestation in tropical countries. The problem of deforestation in developing countries cannot be divorced from discussions on international trade and Northern patterns of consumption. Without addressing industrialised countries’ demand for timber, pulp and agricultural products produced in the South, REDD will always remain a flawed concept (Daviet et al 2007). Demand for timber from the USA, Japan and China is staggering. In 2003, China alone imported 42 million cubic metres of timber products and 52 million cubic metres of pulp and paper, with Indonesia being one of it’s largest suppliers (Fry 2008). If demand concerns are ignored, it is highly likely that REDD will lead to an increase in timber prices, and thus increase the incentive for deforestation (FOEI 2008). Whether this deforestation occurs illegally in participating countries or simply shifts to non-participating countries may simply depend on the type of REDD project implemented (see discussion on leakage below).

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There is also considerable danger in implementing a global REDD policy when the underlying drivers of deforestation vary so greatly between countries. While agriculture, including for large scale cattle farming, is a major cause of deforestation in Latin America and Northern Africa, commercial timber extraction and biofuel production dominate in Southeast Asia (FOEI 2008: 24). Several authors have expressed concern over submissions to the FCFP and UNFCCC stating that ‘slash and burn agriculture’ and collection of fuel wood are the main drivers of deforestation (Griffiths 2008; FOEI 2008: 25; Angelsen 2008: 126). There is further concern over the bundling together of various types of subsistence farming such as shifting cultivation, collection of nontimber forest products, and traditional sustainable types of forestry as all being equally responsible for ongoing deforestation. Rotational or swidden farming and agro-forestry systems have been proven to be carbon neutral or even positive (Dooley et al 2008). Significant blame may thus be assigned to parties that are actually promoting forest protection. Indigenous peoples may be unjustly demonised and denied access to the forest.

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07

Indigenous and Forest Dependent Communities Of Indonesia’s 216 million people it is estimated that 100 million, of which 40 million are indigenous peoples, depend mainly on forests and natural resource goods and services (Request for Consideration… 2007: 7). Indonesia’s indigenous and forest dependent peoples are central to any discussion on REDD as poor design or implementation of REDD has the potential to seriously impact upon their rights and livelihoods. The majority of the land currently earmarked for REDD is classified as state forest. As REDD increases the value of forests, governments may be discouraged from conceding customary land rights to Indonesia’s indigenous forest dependent peoples (Angelsen 2008: 115). REDD payments may actually work as a disincentive for forest and conservation authorities from resolving existing disputes over land tenure (Griffiths 2008). As most indigenous forest dependent people lack secure land tenure arrangements, REDD runs the risk of inciting land grabbing as

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commercial and state interests seek to benefit from the distribution of REDD funds. As REDD increases the value of forests, Indonesia’s indigenous forest dependent peoples may be forcefully evicted from their land and denied access to the forests that form the basis of their culture and livelihoods. Conflict in forestry sector has shown where 36% related land conflict (WALHI, 2007). There is a considerable danger that a similar pattern may be replicated with the implementation of REDD.

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In many cases local indigenous communities do not possess the bureaucratic or legal knowledge required for negotiations over REDD deals. If REDD were implemented on a project-basis we may see communities engaged with large predatory investors or conservation NGOs with no particular moral obligation towards local communities. Previous experience with exclusionary conservation organisations has left indigenous peoples very wary of promises of “identifying and promoting alternative sustainable livelihoods near protected areas” (Fry 2008: 177). Significant concerns remain over adequate participation of local communities in the formulation of REDD programs. REDD proposals continue to be developed in a top-down manner from governments, international agencies and carbon finance companies, and communities at the local level are often poorly informed (FPP 2009: 7). Consultation with local communities tends to be limited to ‘socialisation’ activities after basic concepts and objectives have already been determined. Language on Free, Prior and Informed Consent is currently lacking from most REDD documentation and examination of Indonesian draft REDD policy reveals some grave concerns. In the context of oil palm development, companies strategically co-opt local agents and local government officials to encourage communities to transfer their lands (Colchester et al 2006: 171). In much the same way

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local government elites may sign on to REDD schemes without full knowledge of their constituents. The complexity of carbon markets is widely acknowledged – it will be difficult to ensure that local communities adequately understand the benefit’s and drawbacks of any REDD scheme (Griffiths 2008). Many heads of districts don’t understand the process, let alone local communities (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 14). Indigenous peoples and local communities are unlikely to be aware that the carbon trading company will be taking a profit or that through engaging with REDD they are indirectly encouraging ongoing emissions in Northern countries (Griffiths 2008: 23). The official languages used may become a further stumbling block for some forest dependent communities. These concerns have led to a suggestion that a process of training and capacity building work should be carried out prior to official public consultations to ensure indigenous participation is truly informed (FPP 2009: 7). Despite promises of equitable distribution of REDD funds to indigenous and local forest dependent communities, current REDD proposals are rather ambiguous on how exactly this might occur. There is a distinct possibility that local elites and wealthy land holders would

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capture benefit’s at the expense of poorer and vulnerable households. Several other glaring questions remain around the process of fund distribution. Will those without formal land title receive benefit’s? Would community members not engaged in destructive deforestation activities also receive benefit’s? The production of new inequities with regards to benefit distribution carries a major risk of inciting horizontal conflicts. Experience from the plantation sector indicates that compensation payments are highly liable to capture by local elites and are a frequent cause of conflict (Colchester et al 2006). Significantly, there is a gendered nature to the potential rights abuses that may occur in the implementation of REDD. While many forest dependent communities do not have formal title over their land, when

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they do, it is often the men that possess the land title. Subsequently, women are likely to be excluded from any negotiations over land that may occur in the context of REDD (Lovera 2007). Lack of involvement in the formal economy could further compound this situation. Cultural norms dictate that Indonesian women have an obligation to contribute to household economies and childcare, leading to high rates of formal unemployment. In forest dependent communities, women are often responsible for collection of drinking water, fuel wood and other nontimber forest products (Lovera 2007). REDD could see indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities being denied access to forests, resulting in reduced community access to water and NTFPs. Indigenous forest dependent women thus represent a particularly vulnerable subset of Indonesian society in any exclusionary REDD programme.

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Deficiencies in Indonesian Law and Policy

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There are a number of striking deficiencies in current Indonesian law and policy that seriously discriminate against and endanger the rights of Indonesia’s indigenous forest dependent peoples. Most disturbing remains the government’s definition of customary or indigenous forest. The Draft Ministry of Forestry Regulation on REDD, which was developed with minimal consultation, utilises the definition of customary forest stated in Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry, states that “indigenous or customary forest is state forest situated in indigenous law community area”. State forest is then further defined as being “forest on land not charged with land title”. Examining the law in greater detail still, Article 5 (3) states that the “Government shall stipulate the status of forest and indigenous forest shall be stipulated if any and it’s existence acknowledged” (Republic of Indonesia 1999).

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6 The submission also points to a procedure for the recognition of customary land rights which was adopted by the National Land Board through Regulation No. 5 of 1999. This regulation has a number of additional deficiencies with regards to recognition of indigenous rights to their lands and territories. For further detail the reader is referred to the FPP, AMAN, Sawit Watch submission.

The state thus reserves the right to challenge the very existence of Indonesia’s indigenous peoples. Indigenous people’s customary land rights are hereby relegated to a tenuous position whereby they are highly open to interpretation, and easily refuted in the name of ‘national interest’. The Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has even acknowledged that indigenous people’s rights have been sacrificed for the sake of national development in the past (Jakarta Post 2006). There are grave concerns that REDD will simply replicate this pattern.

a. Decree on the right to manage customary forest

The threat REDD poses towards the rights of Indonesia’s indigenous peoples has recently been recognised by a number of international and local NGOs. In February 2009, a group of nine Indonesian and one International organisation requested that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reconsider the situation of Indonesia’s indigenous peoples under it’s early warning and urgent action procedures. The communication, which was a follow up to a previous communication, submitted in 2007, expresses deep concern about Indonesia’s preparatory REDD activities failing to meet it’s obligations under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples6.

This regulation clearly places ultimate control of REDD in the hands of the Forestry Ministry. When one considers the attitude the Ministry has displayed towards Indonesia’s indigenous peoples in the past there is a serious threat that they will continue to be marginalised by any future REDD initiative. Current regulations surrounding REDD thus leave little space for Indonesia’s indigenous communities to fully exercise their rights. If these concerns are not addressed prior to the implementation of REDD, disastrous consequences for Indonesia’s Indigenous and forest dependent peoples could potentially result.

b. Recommendation for REDD implementation from local government c. Fulfilment of the location criteria and indicators for REDD implementation d. REDD implementation plan (Republic of Indonesia 2008)

When one considers the attitude the Ministry has displayed towards Indonesia’s indigenous peoples in the past there is a serious threat that they will continue to be marginalised by any future REDD initiative.

The draft REDD policy referred to above also provides guidelines for the involvement of customary forest communities in any future REDD Scheme. As stated in the document, the REDD requirements for customary forests are:

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Further Government Inconsistencies There is a significant chance this regulation could be exploited by mining companies to use protected and plantation forest for mining activities. Mining companies need only pay Rp 300,000/ m2 per year for the right to establish mining operations in protected forest 36 I Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI

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There is significant inconsistency between stated government aims regarding forest protection and official government policy. While the government publicly declares it’s intentions to effectively tackle climate change and reduce forest destruction, it just the last 12 months it has established a number of damaging regulations which seek to do just the opposite. On the 4th of February 2008, the government released Government Regulation No. 2 (2008) or PP2, regarding “Non-Tax Revenues Resulting from Forest Use for Development Activities other than Forestry Activities�. The policy has given increased rights to mining companies and justified the opening up of protected areas and production forest. There is a significant chance this regulation could be exploited by mining companies to use protected and plantation forest for mining activities. Mining companies need only pay Rp 300,000/m2 per year for the right to establish mining operations in protected forest (WALHI 2007).

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Still in the mining sector, on the 16th of December 2008, the government approved the Minerba (Coal and Mineral) bill. Inherent in this law is a serious weakness in the degree of participation given to local communities in determining the type and degree of natural resource exploitation occurring on their land. The law establishes highly repressive regulations with regards to the rights of local communities whenever they are considered to be obstructing mining efforts. Furthermore, the regulation does not contain any assurances for the protection of community living spaces and protected areas. Despite stating that mining activities are forbidden from community living spaces, important livelihood sources and protected areas, based on this policy mining activities may still be allowed to go ahead in these regions (WALHI 2007). Finally, in February 2009, the Agriculture Ministry issued a decree allowing businesses to convert millions of hectares of peatlands into oil palm plantations. Opening up these peatland areas risks releasing huge amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. The decree has been conditionally approved by the Environment Minister and is expected to go into force later this year.

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The law establishes highly repressive regulations with regards to the rights of local communities whenever they are considered to be obstructing mining efforts. Furthermore, the regulation does not contain any assurances for the protection of community living spaces and protected areas. The decision is strangely at odds with the Agriculture Ministry’s previous position - in 2007 it released a letter asking governors to stop the conversion peatlands into oil palm plantations. This stark contradiction has led to claims that the government is attempting to satisfy powerful business interests in the lead up to the general election later this year (Jakarta Post 2009). The Indonesian government’s commitment to real and meaningful reductions in deforestation must be seriously questioned when such glaring inconsistencies abound. Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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10

Misleading Outcomes? Several papers have questioned the dubious morality of REDD funds rewarding the most obvious polluters (those with a history of forest destruction), while failing to reward indigenous and local forest dependent people who have managed the forest sustainably (Griffiths 2008: 2). A similar potential for distortion exists at the community level. One wonders whether local community members who had not been involved in active deforestation will still be entitled to benefit from REDD funds. Several authors have questioned this inversion of the ‘polluter pays’ principle (Griffiths 2008). As discussed, this distorted reward system risks creating new inequities and generating conflicts between local communities. Significantly there is a further risk that inequities may emerge between provinces. Economic modelling has suggested that were REDD to be implemented on a national scale, urban populations in Java and Bali will suffer as the price of timber products rises while rural populations in Kalimantan and Sumatra may benefit from REDD fund distribution (Resosudarmo, unpublished 2008).

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On the international level there lies a similar concern that as REDD rewards the polluters, it could actually be a “disincentive for those countries with zero or low forest loss to tackle future deforestation threats” (Griffiths 2008: 11). Countries with low historical rates of deforestation could see themselves being denied access to REDD funds. Consequently the issue of creating an accurate baseline has become the source of much debate.

“disincentive for those countries with zero or low forest loss to tackle future deforestation threats”

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Technical Challenges with REDD Implementation

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Leakage A major technical challenge associated with REDD is how to resolve ‘leakage’ concerns. Leakage refers to the transfer of deforestation activities from the project area to a non-participating area. This is a key concern with project-based REDD programmes, as favoured by carbon finance investors. Studies have demonstrated that project level leakage may approach 100 percent when deforestation is driven by demand for timber or growing agricultural needs (Daviet et al 2007: 3). Leakage has the potential to completely undermine REDD. Consider a scenario whereby REDD credit’s are traded to compensate for emissions elsewhere, but leakage occurs, and deforestation or forest degradation results anyway. The atmosphere will subsequently be much

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Implementing REDD on a national scale would not prevent deforestation on an international level however

worse off (Fry 2008: 173). Leakage will always be a critical concern with REDD if the underlying imperative to deforest is not being tackled. Recognition of this risk has led many parties to promote a national level approach to REDD. A national level approach would significantly reduce the risk of leakage and concurrently facilitate a more structured assault on the underlying causes of deforestation (FOEI 2008: 21, Angelsen 2008: 114). Indeed this is one of the reasons Indonesia claims to support a national approach to REDD. Implementing REDD on a national scale would not prevent deforestation on an international level however. Deforestation may simply shift from participating to nonparticipating countries. Suggesting that REDD is adopted on a universal scale is too simplistic a solution and unlikely to occur (Fry 2008: 175). Some have proposed demand side measures that place restrictions on importing countries to ensure that imported forest products are derived from sustainably managed forests and not as a result of deforestation or forest degradation (Fry 2008: 175). This will be no small task considering that current records show that almost 25% of hardwood lumber and 30% of hardwood plywood traded globally is of suspicious origin. Discussions on the most appropriate way to tackle leakage continue, and will undoubtedly continue to be a major concern with REDD in the future, especially if measures are not taken to address Northern pulp and paper consumption patterns.

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Governance and Corruption Indonesia’s struggles with poor governance and corruption and unjust treatment and exploitation of it’s forest dependent communities are well documented7. It is widely recognised that these issues must be addressed if any future REDD scheme is to be successful. Weak governance and corruption in the forestry sector is particularly acute. Illegal logging in Indonesia is estimated to cost the state up to Rp 30 trillion annually (Sinar Harapan 2004) and is stated as being responsible for between 73-88% of Indonesia’s deforestation in 2006 (FOEI 2008). As REDD is highly likely to result in a substantial increase in timber prices, any REDD scheme is only likely to increase the pressure for illegal logging. It is essential to seriously question why a REDD scheme would work in Indonesia, when it currently has so much trouble controlling illegal logging already - “if they can’t police logging, why should they be able to police not logging?” (Fry 2008: 175). WALHI and several other Indonesian organisations have recorded numerous cases of corruption in the forestry sector surrounding land use change and in the granting of licences to facilitate plantation expansion (WALHI 2007; Down to Earth 76-77 2008).

Evidence suggests that forest protection policies tend to target vulnerable and poorer indigenous and forest dependent communities

7 See for example, Boedhihartono A et al 2007; Gellert 2005; Down to Earth 76-77 2008; WALHI 2008

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Establishing an Accurate Baseline

As REDD involves such enormous sums of money it could simply become a new avenue for corruption. So long as patterns of distribution to local communities are not clearly defined, there is a profound danger these funds could be liable to capture from government officials and local elites. Any REDD scheme in Indonesia would need to be serious about tackling governance concerns in the forestry sector and involve a concerted effort to address illegal logging - including measures to reduce demand.

The issue of establishing an accurate baseline on which to measure deforestation has again been a source of significant debate, perhaps rightly so, as baselines will impact upon environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and REDD fund distribution between countries (Angelsen 2008: 55). As discussed, there is concern that creating a baseline measured on historical rates of deforestation will perversely favour countries with a poor record of forest destruction, while those that have protected their forests fail to receive any benefit’s.

REDD will not account for natural forest loss associated with fire or forest dieback (Fry 2008, FOEI 2008)

We must consider that historical baselines are unlikely to be a precise predictor of future deforestation anyway, as rates of deforestation slow in line with reduction in available forest (Angelsen 2008: 55). Indonesia may be seeking to take advantage of it’s previously rapid deforestation rate, as it seems to favour utilising historical trends and using these to project future deforestation rates. The issue of accuracy is also an important one – if an artificially high baseline is created then one risks generating a REDD system which makes no effective reduction in deforestation (FOEI 2008). The technical issues associated with measurement are important. There is significant variability between current REDD documentation depending on the

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method used. Modelling may be highly speculative and dependent on factors such as historical and predicted future rates of deforestation, accuracy of maps available, terrain and so on (Harris et al 2007)8. Furthermore, models often rely on forestry assessment data provided by FAO. One must question the value of such data when it continues to include plantations (FOEI 2008).

8 See Angelsen A 2008 for a detailed discussion of modeling techniques.

Finally it is important to reflect on the fact that in establishing a baseline in this way, modelling tends to focus solely on the carbon value of forests, and undermines local non-monetary cultural significance, the value of endangered or threatened species, poverty indicators and watershed functions (Harris et al 2007). This exposes another core ideological fault with REDD. How does one quantify such values, and will they continue to be ignored with the implementation of REDD?

Tied into baseline concerns is the issue of permanence. Most REDD proposals highlight the fact that forests are impermanent, and REDD will not account for natural forest loss associated with fire or forest dieback (Fry 2008, FOEI 2008). There is thus significant potential for misleading or incorrect outcomes. The challenge of ensuring reductions in deforestation will be permanent is one of the major concerns proponents of carbon markets have with REDD (Fry 2008). Consequently there has been significant debate over the timing of payments or the establishment of reserve accounts to safeguard against this risk.

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Monitoring Even once a baseline has been established, the issue of monitoring emerges as a rather problematic one. Several countries have expressed concern over the high quality images required for satellite monitoring. The cost of implementing such technology is likely to be a major obstacle in remote forested areas where even internet access is lacking (Dooley et al 2008). While there has been significant progress on the technical aspects of carbon accounting, issues of technical infrastructure and capacity for data analysis and management remain concerns (Angelsen 2008: 96). If forest degradation is included in any future REDD scheme then satellite monitoring is unlikely to be sufficient and ground based monitoring will be required. Moreover, values on degradation are likely to be highly inaccurate and expensive to obtain (Fry 2008: 171). The problem of monitoring exposes another thorny issue. There is serious concern that efforts to prevent forest degradation could result in an outdated and exclusionary “people vs parks” approach to forest conservation. Evidence suggests that forest protection policies tend to target vulnerable and poorer indigenous and forest dependent communities (Griffiths 2008: 22).

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A large number of pilot REDD efforts are being driven by large conservation NGOs who tend to have a dubious record with regards to their respect for local indigenous communities. Concerning evidence has already emerged from a number of Flora and Fauna International’s pilot projects regarding overzealous protectionist policies (FFI 2008). Finally, it is essential that monitoring does not focus solely on dry scientific criteria related to forest carbon stocks. Robust systems must be in place for the monitoring of rights, governance concerns and the fair and equitable distribution of funds. Monitoring for the emergence of conflict and the presence of appropriate resolution procedures for dealing with it’s occurrence will be vital. Current REDD documentation is surprisingly light on these aspects of monitoring.

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Conclusions REDD in it’s current formulation is fraught with danger. It risks further marginalising Indonesia’s indigenous peoples and forest dependent communities and even facilitating ongoing forest destruction. While there are some serious ideological flaws with REDD, the presence of several further methodological problems means that there is a significant risk of failure. The rapid pace at which REDD negotiations are taking place means that REDD programmes may be approved prior to these serious concerns being addressed. The complexity of funding mechanisms proposed and the multiplicity of stakeholders only complicates matters. While the inclusion of REDD in carbon markets may seem like a foregone conclusion, WALHI absolutely rejects REDD so long as it remains connected to markets. The linkage of REDD to markets risks allowing Annex-1 countries to avoid responsibility for reducing emissions in their own countries and could even increase net emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere. Carbon offsetting and the inclusion of REDD credit’s in carbon markets will do nothing to address the underlying causes of climate change. Northern countries must commit to making real and effective emission reductions in their own countries that adequately reflect their ecological debt to the south.

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Tied into this concern is the need to address demand side triggers of deforestation. While the direct drivers of deforestation in Indonesia are plantation expansion and timber extraction, these concerns cannot be removed from debates on northern patterns of consumption. If nothing is done to address industrialised countries demand for wood, pulp and paper products, then it is highly likely that a leaky, and potentially meaningless REDD scheme will result. Although WALHI rejects REDD in it’s current guise, this is not to suggest that WALHI does not recognise the importance of reducing rates of deforestation. WALHI first called for a moratorium on logging in 2001, and has repeated these calls over recent years. It is vital to tackle governance reform and appropriate law enforcement in Indonesia’s beleaguered forestry sector in order to adequately address the current unsustainable rate of deforestation. Enacting a moratorium on logging

WALHI first called for a moratorium on logging in 2001, and has repeated these calls over recent years. It is vital to tackle governance reform and appropriate law enforcement in Indonesia’s beleaguered forestry sector in order to adequately address the current unsustainable rate of deforestation.

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would allow breathing space to allow these important reforms to take place. Implementing REDD prior to these concerns being confronted could potentially be disastrous. Reducing deforestation does not rest on resolving governance concerns alone. It will require a coordinated approach that addresses governance in line with poverty and customary land tenure concerns. WALHI also advocates community based sustainable forest management that formalises traditional knowledge systems and land management practices. Community based forest management, with appropriate recognition of customary land tenure and collective rights will prevent deforestation and promote effective long term forest conservation. Secure land tenure has repeatedly been shown to reduce pressure for deforestation and promote sustainable use of forest resources while concurrently contributing to local livelihoods and biodiveristy.

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It is vitally important that the current rate of REDD negotiations is slowed down to allow some of the serious concerns outlined above to be addressed. REDD as it currently exists could potentially be catastrophic. There is a significant chance that we will see governance, corruption and land tenure issues being brushed aside as powerful state and private interests scramble to exploit the new openings REDD provides for profit generation.

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12

Current REDD Projects in Indonesia There are currently up to twenty REDD related initiatives at varying stages of development in Indonesia. It remains quite difficult to obtain accurate information on all of them. Most initiatives intend to sell credit’s generated on existing voluntary carbon markets, and are banking on REDD’s inclusion in any post-2012 agreement. While voluntary initiatives seem to be being developed at a rapid pace, the Forestry Ministry’s Head of Research and Development Tachrir Fathoni, has recently stated that “the central government will not issue permit’s until we have regulations in place” (Jakarta Post 2009). The following section details some of the larger, more advanced schemes proposed.

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SUMATRA: Ulu Masen: See detailed discussion below Leuser Ecosystem: An agreement has been signed between the Government of Aceh and Sustainable Forest Management Southeast Asia (SFM SE Asia Ltd) which aims to establish conservation initiatives in the area to be supported by carbon trading. The agreement is will allow PT-Devco and related companies to conduct business activities such as agribusinessagroforestry, timber plantations, ecotourism, renewable energy and carbon trading activities in the Leuser Ecosystem (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

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Riau: The pulpwood plantation company Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper (RAPP) has put forward a proposal to manage the Kampar Peninsula in central Sumatra as a protected forest. The proposal would establish a core protected area surrounded by a ring of 200,000 hectares of pulpwood plantations. RAPP has a poor social and environmental record in Riau and has a long history of conflict with local communities. The RAPP project involves a complex system of dams and drainage canals and there are serious doubts as to whether this project would actually result in reduced emissions (Down to Earth 2008; Anderson & Kuswardono 2008).

KALIMANTAN: West Kalimantan: Flora and Fauna International (FFI) has developed proposals for REDD pilot projects in Sungai Putri and Kapuas Hulu. The project aims to protect deep peat swamp forests from conversion to palm oil plantations and will involve the reclassification of areas zoned for plantation development to

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protection forest. While an MoU has been signed with the two district governments, the business model to be used for both projects is said to still be under discussion. Baseline carbon assessments have been completed for the Sungai Putri project and are still being conducted for the Kapuas Hulu project. FFI aims to develop a ‘community carbon pool’ which would help protect customary forests at risk of conversion. The project suggests that this would ensure REDD benefit’s are delivered to local communities (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008). Despite these promises, concerns over an exclusionary approach remain. Community consultations began only after the MoUs had been signed and initial planning conducted. Concerningly, an FFI presentation shows heavily armed security personnel protecting the forest (FFI 2008; FFI 2009). Central Kalimantan: One million hectares of degraded peatland at the site of the failed rice mega-project in Central Kalimantan has been earmarked as a pilot project for REDD. This scheme is supported by the Australian Government’s AU$30 million Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership. The initial stage of the project will involve the rehabilitation of a continuous 100,000 hectares of degraded peat swamp (Governor of Central

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Kalimantan 2009). Initial carbon monitoring work has been completed, although the master plan for the project has yet to be released to the public. Several sources have stated that JP Morgan Stanley is said to be a potential investor in this scheme (Griffiths 2008; Down to Earth 2008). Critics of the project have highlighted the inconsistency between Central Kalimantan provincial and district government involvement in the REDD scheme and their publicly released plans for conversion of a further one million hectares of peat swamps (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008). Malinau: In late 2008 a MoU was signed between Swiss company Global Eco Rescue (GER) and state owned forestry company PT Inhutani II with the goal of implementing a major REDD project in the Regency of Malinau in East Kalimantan. The project will take place on 225,000 hectares of PT Inhutani’s concession, and hopes to produce one million carbon credit’s per year to be sold on the voluntary carbon market. The project will involve reducing illegal logging and agricultural encroachment into PT Inhutani II’s forest concession areas, the implementation of reduced impact logging techniques and the development of other ecosystem services (GER 2009).

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Berau: The regency of Berau in East Kalimantan has conducted preliminary investigations for the establishment of REDD schemes in the region. While it has yet to sign any formal agreements, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) has provided support for preliminary preparation activities in the regency.

PAPUA: The Papua government has expressed a strong interest in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in the provinces and has plans to significantly restructure it’s forestry sector. The plans will involve reducing the numbers of industrial logging permit’s, conducting assessments

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of forest resources (including baseline carbon measurements), restructuring the timber industry and promoting community based sustainable forestry among many other activities. While several REDD pilot projects have been developed for Papua, the national forestry department continues to delay their implementation (Down to Earth 2008; Anderson & Kuswardono 2008). Cyclops Mountains: FFI has developed a proposal with the Papuan provincial government for a REDD scheme in the Cyclops Mountains near Jayapura. An MoU has been signed between FFI and the Papua government but the project is still awaiting central government approval.

Mamberamo: A further REDD scheme is currently under development for the Mamberamo region. Conservation International has developed a pilot project with PT Mamberamo Alasmandiri, and will receive support from Carbon Conservation and Forest Carbon. Conservation International has stated that working with PT Mamberamo Alasmandiri is required to reduce the risk of illegal logging. Conservation International also publicly stated that it’s main concern is biodiversity (Kemp 2009). If this is indeed the case, it is important that the impact on local communities is not merely an afterthought. The Project Design Document is currently under development and the extent of consultations with local communities at this stage remains unclear.

Timika and Mamberamo: An Australian financial firm, New Forests, in conjunction with Emerald Planet have developed a pilot REDD program in the regions of Mimika, Memberamo and Merauke. Planned payments will be generated from the voluntary carbon market. The project is currently assessing the carbon reserves in the region and appears to be waiting for confirmation from the central government prior to implementation (Down to Earth 2008; Griffiths 2008)

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CASE STUDY: Ulu Masen Ecosystem Project:

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As the most advanced voluntary initiative currently operating in Indonesia, The Ulu Masen Ecosystem project provides a useful case study in the examination of REDD. It will be vital to closely monitor the development of this project as it is likely to have significant implications for other future REDD projects in Indonesia. In July 2008, Carbon Conservation, an Australian carbon trading company, signed an agreement with the Government of Aceh to protect up to 750,000 hectares of forest in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem in northern Aceh. The scheme is supported by the conservation NGO Flora and Fauna International, and will receive US$9 million in financial support from US Bank Merrill Lynch9. The project states that it will reduce deforestation by 85% and sell credit’s to the voluntary carbon market, hoping to generate up to US$432 million over the next 30 years (Down to Earth 2008). A formal contractual agreement is expected to be signed in June of 2009.

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9

Merrill Lynch is now supported by the Bank of America

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Carbon Conservation has previously operated an avoided deforestation project in New South Wales, Australia. As stated in the Project Design Note, the project involved trading around 1 million tons CO2e of carbon credit’s, principally to Rio Tinto Aluminum. One must question the appropriateness of Carbon Conservation operating such a REDD scheme in Indonesia when it has been so closely engaged with Rio Tinto, a company with such a poor record with regards to environmental destruction and human rights in Indonesia10. Approximately 130,000 people live in and immediately adjacent to the Ulu Masen project area, and around 61 mukims (villages) will be affected by the project. The project claims it will contribute to sustainable economic and social development and biodiversity conservation through the use of land use planning and reclassification, increased monitoring and law enforcement, reforestation, restoration and sustainable community logging.

10 See WALHI’s 2003 report “Undermining Indonesia” for a comprehensive discussion of Rio Tinto’s social and environmental record in Indonesia.

The Government of Aceh aims to restructure forestry law and practices in the region, and involve the local communities in making land use decisions. The project aims to be fully participatory in land use reform and will establish jointly agreed boundaries and land use patterns and develop a multi-stakeholder management structure. Land use change will involve the reclassification of areas zoned for logging as protection

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forests or community managed low impact limited production areas (Anderson & Kuswardono 2008: 13). While rather complex, it is important to examine the details of the agreement between Carbon Conservation and the Aceh government. According to the Sales and Marketing agreement signed in July 2008, 30% of the credit’s generated will be set aside as a “Risk Management Buffer” (presumably to account for concerns over permanence) and the remaining 70% sold. The proceeds from the sale of these credit’s will be managed by a “collection agent” to be jointly selected by Carbon Conservation and the Aceh Government. After the collection agent has taken their fee (the amount of which is not clear), the remainder is distributed 15% to Carbon Conservation as a Marketing Fee and 85% to the Project Account. The project account will be used to distribute funds to the local communities. The project claims to be built through a participatory and transparent process that will ensure “benefit’s are equitably shared among stakeholders, including forest dependent communities and those with customary rights to land” (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 2). The project further states that extensive community consultations were conducted prior to the signing of the agreement, and language on free, prior and informed consent is strong. From the documentation

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available, however, the extent of these consultations remains unclear. One questions how many of the local communities knew what was being signed on their behalf and whether they are fully aware of how the profit’s will be distributed. Examining the Sales and Marketing Agreement in further detail, there are several additional concerns over the distribution of funds. The Project Design Note states that “indigenous people, local communities and civil society organizations must be encouraged and supported to participate fully and actively in the development of distribution mechanisms for avoided deforestation finances…through a collaborative stakeholder dialogue” (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 55). Initial information provided in the Project Design Note is strong with regards to funds distribution. Stakeholders identified by the project include private sector actors, representatives from mukims and other customary organisations, under-represented and vulnerable groups (including women’s organisations), government agencies, civil society organisations, even those critical of the project, and national and international groups as appropriate (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2008: 56). However, the MoU signed in July 2008 states that the distribution of Project Account Funds will be managed by a Steering Committee consisting of the Governor of Aceh, 1 member appointed by Carbon

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Conservation, 1 member appointed by FFI, 1 member appointed by Oxfam, 1 member appointed by the Governor of Aceh, and one member nominated by the government of Aceh as being representative of the community and appointed by the members directly. The local communities are thus grossly under represented in this process. Of the 61 mukims affected by the project, the communities have just one true representative. The potential for conflict is immense when treating the local communities as a single homogenous group in this way. Furthermore, the only member of the steering committee directly representative of the community is nominated by (and thus likely to have strong ties with) the Governor. Without wishing to be too cynical, the prospect of elite capture of funds remains. Representation is a further concern in dispute resolution in relation to the project. The MoU states that any disputes will be referred to arbitration in English under the rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC). The Sales and Marketing Agreement explicitly states that the Government of Aceh is liable for any costs related to financial or legal advice (Ulu Masen Sales and Marketing Agreement 2008: 25). The parties involved in the dispute are also responsible for the costs of arbitration - including travel to and from Singapore. Concerns over language have already been discussed in relation to local communities and REDD. The issue of cost is likely to be an even more Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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significant one. It may thus prove difficult to ensure communities have adequate representation were disputes to occur with such significant outlays of capital required. Another significant concern related to the Project Account is the emphasis placed on monitoring and forest protection. A considerable proportion of the project costs will be spent on monitoring. The project aims to utilise radar imagery, light aircraft, photographic imaging and ground monitoring to measure forest degradation (Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 35). The Sales and Marketing agreement states that Carbon Conservation is liable for costs related to validation, monitoring and verification activities. Meanwhile, the Project Account to be managed by the government of Aceh is responsible for “funding operations for the preservation of rainforests”. There is thus some haziness as to how much the Project Account would be contributing to forest protection. This is not the only concern with the emphasis placed on monitoring however. While the Project Design Note mentions that forest enforcement officers will not carry weapons, Dorjee Sun, the CEO of Carbon Conservation, has publicly stated that “the forest will be guarded by 1000 heavily-armed former Free Aceh rebels” (ABC 2008). A detailed monitoring plan was expected to be released in December 2008. Perhaps these concerns will be addressed with the release of the formal monitoring plan.

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As with all REDD projects, there is a significant chance the Ulu Masen project could incite conflict over both land and in the distribution of benefit’s. The majority of the project area is classified as hutan negara or state forest. The project design note even acknowledges that despite this formal classification, most mukims consider the forest to be customary managed forest. The rapid pace at which the project is progressing is a cause for concern in this regard. In the haste to have the project operational there are significant risks that existing land tenure issues may be brushed aside. It is vital that the project sticks to it’s promises of participatory land use planning processes. The project design note acknowledges conflict may occur but is surprisingly light on detail as to how this might be addressed. The main discussion of conflict is made in reference to ‘in-migration’ as neighbouring communities may seek to benefit from fund distribution. However horizontal conflicts within communities benefiting from the project are also likely to be a problem. There are major concerns that only those communities with acknowledged customary tenure will receive direct benefit’s, and that distribution may be inequitable or skewed towards certain groups. It is imperative that the project has robust systems in place for the resolution of such conflicts. While the Project Design Note makes the rather dubious statement that “social norms in the area and the strong social cohesion that exists in villages are strong to (prevent) significant in-migration”

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(Ulu Masen Project Design Note 2007: 49) there is no discussion on the possibility for conflict arsing from the distribution of benefit’s. The documentation provided recognises that leakage is a major concern with the project. It claims that developing sustainable community forest management, including possibly timber production, would be sufficient to prevent leakage. The moratorium on logging enacted by the Aceh provincial government means that state driven leakage is unlikely to occur within the province, although this does not address concerns of increased logging in the neighbouring North Sumatra province, or illegal logging outside of the project area. The project states that while it is near impossible to accurately measure expected leakage, it does not expect leakage to be greater than 10%. As discussed above, project level leakage may approach 100% when deforestation is driven by demand for timber (one of the primary drivers in Indonesia). The project promises to conduct monitoring outside of the project area to address leakage concerns, and use the Risk Management Buffer to ‘cover’ any detected leakage. It does not however detail the area of forest that would be monitored. Current recommendations suggest that an area 5 to 7 times the size of the project area should be monitored to address leakage concerns (Angelsen 2008: 72).

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The Ulu Masen project, while strong on rhetoric regarding sustainable community livelihoods, appears to have a number of potentially problematic issues. Matters of transparency and adequate representation of local communities are the primary concerns. It is essential that this project continues to be monitored closely as it develops further, as it’s implementation will have huge implications not only for the indigenous peoples affected by the project, but for indigenous forest dependent peoples throughout Indonesia.

Fact sheet Forest and Climate vol.1 2009. WALHI I

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Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI) didirikan pada tanggal 15 Oktober 1980 sebagai reaksi dan keprihatinan atas ketidakadilan dalam pengelolaan sumberdaya alam dan sumber-sumber kehidupan, sebagai akibat dari paradigma dan proses pembangunan yang tidak memihak keberlanjutan dan keadilan.

Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI) is established on October 15th 1980 as a reaction and concernedly for the injustice in natural and livelihood resources management. WALHI exist to support the paradigm and sustainable development process that take a side on justice.

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REDD Jalan Sesat Bisnis Konservasi