The Role of the Royal Air Force in Iraq Under the British Mandate, 1920-1932 by Eamonn Gearon

THE ROLE OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN IRAQ UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE, 1920-1932.

By Eamonn Gearon

SOAS (UNIVERSITY OF LONDON) MA NEAR AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

TITLE: THE ROLE OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN IRAQ UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE, 1920-1932.

STUDENT NAME: EAMONN P.B. GEARON

STUDENT NUMBER: 220142

SUPERVISOR: DR. NELIDA FUCCARO

DATE: 6, IX, 2008

WORD COUNT: 10,180

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MA, Near and Middle Eastern Studies, of the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................................................... 6 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 7 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................ 8 CHAPTER ONE................................................................................................................................................................. 13 CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................................................................... 20 CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................................................................................... 28 CHAPTER FOUR.............................................................................................................................................................. 36 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................................... 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................................................. 46 UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL....................................................................................................................................... 46 PUBLISHED MATERIAL............................................................................................................................................. 47 NOTES................................................................................................................................................................................. 54

ABSTRACT

This paper will examine the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Iraq during the period of the British Mandate (1920-1932), specifically to what extent was the use of air power on the part of the RAF successful in maintaining order in Iraq. (Although not renamed until 1921, for the purposes of this paper, the country will herein be referred to as Iraq, excepting specific references to Mesopotamia in quoted literature.)

At the time that Britain held the Mandate for Iraq, in the wake of the First World War, the British Treasury in keeping with like financial departments of the recently combative nations, were keen to maintain order at the least possible cost to the domestic budget. In order to satisfactorily answer this question, the paper will open with an exposition of the policy of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;air policingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; itself, moving on to consider how this policy came to be implemented in Iraq and what this meant in reality for Iraq during this period.

It is the contention of this paper that, for all of its obvious faults, the policy of air policing was responsible for the survival of the RAF and also satisfied the need of the Mandatory Power to maintain order in Iraq and keep the country alive until independence.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOC

Air Officer Commanding

AIR

Air Ministry Files, Public Record Office

BHCF

Baghdad High Commission Files, New Delhi

CAB

Cabinet Office Files, Public Record Office

CAS

Chief of Air Staff

C-in-C

Commander-in-Chief

Colonial Office Files, Public Record Office

Foreign Office Files, Public Record Office

LP & S

India Office Letters, Political and Secret

PRO

Public Record Office, Kew, London

RAF

Royal Air Force

SSO

Special Service Officer

War Office, Public Record Office

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the First World War, Britain was the de facto power across that Ottoman territory roughly corresponding to what was traditionally known by the Greek nomenclature Mesopotamia1 but which was destined to be renamed Iraq.

Following a hard fought, four-year

military campaign, Allied forces, notably large numbers of troops from British India, had displaced or captured incumbent forces from the three Ottoman vilayets or provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. These had been a part of the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century3, albeit often only under “nominal and occasional control”4 on the part of Constantinople.

In keeping with other nations and empires that had been at war, the state of the British economy at the end of 1918 was, if not perilous, far from healthy.5 The Treasury was faced with the imperative of rebuilding its domestic economy while in overseas territories they were likewise faced with similar obligations of infrastructure renovation coupled with severe fiscal restraints. This was not the time when a government would relish the growth of its empire, unless any new territory was able to provide some substantial and quickly and easily realised financial benefits.

Rising to these challenges the Colonial Office decided to introduce a policy of governance under a largely untried system known as ‘air control’ or ‘air policing.’ This policy, never before implemented on such a scale as it was in Iraq, was intended to ensure the maintenance of law and order through the widespread use of aircraft in concert with the fewest number of ground troops,

thereby ensuring the most cost effective operations possible. However one cares to characterise the British role at this time, the fact remains that in considering issues of internal and external security, Iraq was dependent on the implementation by the RAF of an experimental system of ‘air policing.’ This was new territory in terms of foreign governance and also new territory for the recently formed Royal Air Force.6

Bearing in mind the novelty of air policing, it is the contention of this paper that in terms of maintaining order in the country the policy as executed by the RAF was successful in Iraq during the British Mandate. Such a conclusion takes into consideration the various obstacles that the RAF had to overcome in conducting operations in Iraq, from the commonplace difficulties that are inevitable in carrying out military operations in foreign countries to the important and brutal bureaucratic battles that raged in Whitehall for the unit’s very survival.

Before addressing the specifics of the thesis, it is important to consider the research context of the issue followed by a more targeted delineation of the precise form this paper will take by outlining the aims of each chapter. This paper brings together numerous research strands among the most important of which are theories of air policing, the practical application of the same, British ‘imperialism’ in Iraq, the Mandate system, and the extent to which Iraq was or was not able to develop a sustainable system of government during this period. The majority of records pertaining to this period, especially those related to RAF activities in Iraq, are those produced by various arms of the British administration both in Baghdad and London. While diaries, letters and memoirs from British airmen and officials are fairly commonplace those from

the Iraqi side are not. First-hand accounts from the ordinary, largely illiterate, Iraqi populace are obviously most atypical.7

In contrast to a lack of available Arabic-language material, the quantity of source material from the British side is vast, especially when considering unpublished papers and records from the numerous government offices that had a role in implementing political and military policy on behalf of the British government. While this imbalance in available material may raise questions about reaching a balanced or impartial conclusion, it ought to be borne in mind that the main thrust of this paper is RAF activity in this period, with responses to this, while important, being a secondary consideration.

Chapter One will study the theoretical development of air policing from the earliest days of powered flight in those Western nations that were considering the uses of aircraft in war. These theories were not developed in laboratory isolation, but drew upon experience gained in African and Asian settings before and during the First World War as well as in Europe during WWI. The study of this area will draw on such sources as David E. Omissi’s Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force 1919-1939 (1990) and David Killingray’s “ ‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939” in The Journal of African History (1984).

Drawing on an understanding of the theoretical development of air policing, Chapter Two will consider why this policy was thought appropriate for Iraq after WWI and how and when it came to be implemented there. Noteworthy work in this field include Phillip S. Meilinger’s

“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II” in The Journal of Military History (1996) and Timothy J. Paris’s “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools” in The Historical Journal (1998).

Chapter Three will more closely examine the specifics of RAF activity in Iraq during the Mandate period, including a review of the varied roles, military and non-military, in which they were deployed. In addition to reviewing these roles, this chapter will also deal with the opinions and controversies surrounding the deployments themselves. Among the more significant literature of this area are James Lunt’s Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (1981), Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932 (1976), and Daniel Silverfarb’s Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 1929-1941 (1986).

Chapter Four will draw upon the above strands to allow a fuller consideration of the view of Iraqi authorities, operating under what defenders of the Mandate system would refer to as ‘British guidance’ but what detractors claim was in reality closer to a neo-imperialist form of British rule. Apart from Charles Tripp’s standard A History of Iraq (2000), Abid A. AlMarayati’s A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq (1961), and Iraq Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Implementation of a Nationalist Ideology by Reeva S. Simon (1986), a consideration of material contemporaneous with the period is useful, including B.H. Bourdillon’s presentation, “The Political Situation In Iraq” in the Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs (1924).

In a final consideration of the efficacy or otherwise of air policing, the policy will be examined from the point of view of both British and Iraqi authorities. From the British side, this means an evaluation of RAF’s stated role in Iraq as enforcers of law and order while from the Iraqi standpoint this evaluation will take place through the lens of political developments in the nascent Iraqi state in relation to both RAF and diplomatic policy at this time. Works consulted regarding the results of this policy will include Philip Anthony Towle’s Pilots and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918-1988 (1989) and, for some interesting counter arguments, James S. Corum’s “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History” in Aerospace Power Journal (2000).

CHAPTER ONE

In considering the development of the theory of air policing from its beginnings, it is worth noting that the concept was neither conceived nor born in Iraq but it was there that it grew to maturity. While it has been said that, “as with many new ideas of warfare, the air weapon was first considered in works of fiction”8 theories of air policing were not limited to works of the imagination nor were they developed solely as theoretical models.

Within the framework of this paper air policing, or air control as it is also referred to, specifically denotes “the use of air power to enforce colonial authority, especially in areas that were ‘unsettled’ on the periphery of European administration.”9 The genesis of air control can be found in a number of European colonies both in Africa and as far east as India’s North-West frontier and the border with Afghanistan. From the earliest days of powered aircraft, European militaries had started to put into practice various ideas regarding the usefulness of aircraft in policing disobedient subject peoples, refining these ideas until there existed a body of knowledge regarding the expediency of air control when used against ‘uncivilised’ peoples. Indicatively, Chapter 11 of the RAF’s first doctrinal manual was entitled, “Aircraft in Warfare Against an Uncivilized Enemy.”10

Closely linked to air policing is the concept of air substitution, which refers to the use of an air force as “a substitute for the older services, [i.e. the Army and the Navy] and not additional to them”.11 Originally suggested for use in a number of Britain’s African colonies, notably

Nigeria where future Chief of Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard was stationed from 1903-191012, the intention was to free up native regiments for deployment to other of Britain’s colonies.13 At the same time it was considered a valuable tool in colonial conflicts were it was assumed it would scare ‘uncivilised’ natives. The first such use of aircraft was likely that by Italian forces in Libya in their war of 1911-12, where they used airplanes to ‘police’ the locals through aerial bombardment, rather than committing to a more costly ground offensive,14 as did the French in Morocco in 1912-14.15

In 1914, Winston Churchill while First Lord of the Admiralty “commissioned a report on the possible use of aircraft in Somaliland.”16 Before these plans were actually implemented in 1919, other opportunities arose in which theories of air policing were put to the test. The Royal Flying Corps, the RAF’s predecessor, was in action in 1916 in both Egypt’s Western Desert against the Sanusiyya fraternity and in Sudan against Ali Dinar, Sultan of Darfur.17

Although the concept of air substitution was more fully developed by the British military during the course of the First World War, it was not until the altered worldwide political reality of the post-War period that it was in any sense widely implemented. In part the result of the development of such political ideas as self-government and self-determination, promoted by America’s President Wilson among others, there was a widespread move away from the older Euro-centric model where nations controlled empires or otherwise held colonies or like entities in whatever guise international law allowed.

In this post-war reality, an uprising in the British Protectorate of Egypt in 1919 saw the utilisation of aircraft as more than just a means to deliver bombs, additionally being used to drop proclamations on the local population, delivering post, patrolling railway lines and for relieving remote garrisons.18 In May of the same year, the RAF were also in action in what is prosaically known in Britain as the Third Afghan War and which Afghani history records as the War of Independence.19

However, it was a rebellion in Somaliland in 1919 that provided the RAF with the ideal opportunity to use Churchill’s 1914 study in the most sizeable testing ground for air policing to date, the viability of which the RAF was so keen to prove. For 20 years, Sayyid Mohammad Hasan (known disparagingly as the ‘Mad Mullah’) had led a resistance movement against British rule in Somaliland, which resistance had grown as the British withdrew troops from the country after the end of World War I.20 As a result, a cost effective plan was sought by the Treasury in London to regain order at the lowest possible expense. The proposal accepted by the British Cabinet in October 1919 was created by Sir Hugh Trenchard who, when asked if he thought aircraft could be a part of any plan replied, “Why not leave the whole thing to us? This is exactly the type of operation which the RAF can tackle on its own.”21

Trenchard’s scheme required the deployment of only twelve De Havilland two-seater bombers and 200 RAF personnel, a godsend to the cash-conscious Treasury. The aircraft and men all arrived off the coast of Somaliland on 30 November and almost immediately began operations against Sayyid Hasan and his men. After just three weeks of aerial attacks, both bombardment and machine-gunning, Sayyid had fled and his forces were sufficiently dispersed

for the British to call a halt to flights and declare the effort “a striking success.”22 From the government’s point of view this was true in both a military and economic sense.23 The original, pre-RAF plan had been to send two Army divisions at an estimated cost of £6 million: the RAF’s pacification cost just £77,000.24

It was as a direct result of the success of the Somaliland campaign that air policing so rapidly gained acceptance and the number of like deployments of the Air Force in a similar role grew.

However, the Army, perhaps unsurprisingly, disputed RAF claims about their

effectiveness, suggesting for example that Sayyid’s forces were already tired and depleted by the time air operations began.25 Another Army man, Sir Henry

Rawlinson (C-in-C India), pointed

out that air operations in Somaliland had lasted only three weeks, but that it was because of the actions of British Empire ground troops, including the Somali Camel Corps, who had been engaging the enemy in a six-year campaign,26 that had really caused the “disintegration” of enemy forces.27 Whatever the voracity or otherwise of the Army’s claims, in the next decade the RAF “deployed … to Iraq, Afghanistan, India, Aden, Transjordan, Palestine, Egypt, and the Sudan”28, demonstrating how “such expeditions [had become] indispensable means of keeping the empire under control.”29

Thus, a belief in the effectiveness of air policing took hold among policy makers, who were quick to see it as a form of legitimate conduct whenever the need arose to cheaply control a native, non-Western population. Already, by 1919, the distinction had been made that while air policing in ‘civilized warfare’ remained unacceptable, if one was engaged in ‘uncivilized warfare’ it was perfectly acceptable.30 At the same time, air policing was not without its critics,

even when employed against ‘uncivilised’ peoples with reactions ranging from one understated description of bombing as ‘unsporting’31 to a more violent outburst against “this

Hunnish and

barbarous method of warfare against unarmed people.”32 A more practical criticism against air policing came from the massed ranks of British colonial administrators who felt that the policy increased the distance – literally and metaphorically – between rulers and ruled,33 and that perhaps bombing people did not “create conditions for a peaceful administration.”34 Sluglett also notes the nature of air control as a blunt instrument of control noting that there were a number of “incidents during the mandate period [which] indicate that the speed and simplicity of air attack was preferred to the more time-consuming and painstaking investigation of grievances and disputes.”35

Having been used extensively in support of ground forces in Afghanistan and Somaliland, Trenchard worried that the RAF would be seen as simply an infantry support force, which thought delighted RAF detractors,36 and as a result he was keen to highlight the unique functionality of his force. Defending the RAF, John Salmond (later Air Officer Commanding Iraq) argued that, “the actions of the ground troops were ‘invaluable’ but ‘subsidiary’ to the bombing campaign,”37 which he was not alone in seeing as a good example of the effectiveness of strategic bombing. To their credit, neither Salmond nor Trenchard ever claimed that the RAF could pursue a policy of air policing without utilising ground troops.38 For one thing, both men recognised the value of armoured-car patrols to both call in air strikes and in retrieving downed airmen.39

It was not just the British who recognised early on the value of air power as an instrument of warfare but it was Trenchard who quickly saw the possibility of using airpower not to defeat an enemy’s ability to fight but rather to destroy their will to fight.40 Others too saw in the original nature of air attacks that they could produce dramatic results by instilling fear and other damaging psychological effects. Baden-Powell, founder of the Boy Scout movement, spoke eagerly of air power being employed in “ ‘savage warfare’ because ‘the moral effect on an ignorant enemy would be great, and a few bombs would cause serious panics.’ ”41 However, it was not the case that such martial innovations engendered fear solely among ‘uncivilized’ people. As Cooper points out, German air raids on Britain during WWI “exerted a disproportionately strong moral effect simply because of their relative novelty.”42 However, any advantage enjoyed through the novelty of air attacks soon wore off and talk of, “the awe displayed by African and Asian tribesmen when confronted with the guns and bombs of aircraft”43 was usually exaggerated by those keen to defend the usefulness of air policing.

Just how quickly the fear of air attacks wore off on a civilian population can be seen in the different public reaction in London where a state of “near panic”44 in 1917 was replaced in 1940 by fear, followed by resignation and defiance.45 If British and other Westerners were no less susceptible to having bombs dropped on them than ‘uncivilised’ peoples, what marked them apart was access to technology. For Towle, “the use of air power epitomises the technology and economics of the developed nations.”46 Further, Thomas is right to point out that such terms as, “ ‘imperial policing’ and ‘counter-insurgency’ conjure up images of one-sided encounters between heavily-armed European forces and easily cowed Arab populations”,47 terms which belie the fact that noncompliant tribesmen were not always so intimidated by aircraft as European

forces would have wished. Nor were there, having moved from airships to aircraft, any significant scientific advances in air policing in the period before the Second World War. After 1918, the “aeronautical revolution” was more closely related to “production rather than of great scientific advancement.”48

So it was that in the inter-war years, following on from success in somewhat limited operations, supporters of air policing promoted it as an indispensable element in any imperial policing effort. Apart from the ability of aircraft to deploy rapidly to remote and otherwise unprotected corners of the British Empire, the RAF put themselves forward as the only cost effective wing of the military to effectively carry out these types of policing activities.

It is worth reiterating that it was the panicky reaction of the British public following German raids that led to the birth of Britain’s independent air service. Were it not for the failure of the existing Army and Navy air divisions to protect the nation from these raids, the future of air policing may have taken a quite different direction. The salient point is that the birth of air policing as a policy of the British defence establishment had nothing to do with colonial control but was the result of bureaucratic inefficiency and inter-service rivalry. Coincidentally, it is striking to note that it was this same inter-service jealousy that strove so strenuously to destroy the RAF in the first years of its existence but that it found salvation through the need for low cost colonial policing.

CHAPTER TWO

Building on the development of the theory of air policing examined in Chapter One, this chapter will examine why the policy was deemed appropriate for Iraq and how and when it was implemented there. Before beginning such an appraisal, it is important to consider how unlikely the survival of the RAF was at the end of WWI. The opinion of many towards the RAF upon its formation is well framed by Omissi when he writes, “The Royal Air Force was created, to the amusement of its many detractors, on All Fools’ Day, 1918.”49

In spite of the fact that the RAF at the end of WWI was the largest,50 most powerful air force in the world,51 and the only one existing independently of other armed forces,

it was in

grave danger of failing to survive while its parents – the British Army and the Royal Navy – were actively seeking its post-natal termination. As head of the RAF, Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Marshall Sir Hugh Trenchard, was equally keen to ensure that his charge would both survive and grow. In order to secure this outcome, Trenchard realised it was imperative to persuade the War Office (which was responsible for a decision about the RAF’s future) that his service fulfilled a role not otherwise provided for by the senior services. It was in the course of this quest to discover a niche for the RAF that Trenchard first settled on “imperial policing and … strategic bombing.”53

On landing in southern Iraq at the start of WWI British government policy was not to occupy the whole of the country but, as Fieldhouse states it, “the evolution of British control over

Mesopotamia from 1914 was primarily the accident of war.”54 With the end of the war Britain found itself in de facto possession of Iraq,55 which meant an immediate need to provide order where Anglo-Indian forces were the sole representatives of what could be thought of as a governing authority.56

In a colourful opinion offered by Mr. Bourdillon, Counsellor to Sir Percy Cox, Britain’s High Commissioner in Iraq (1920-23), the majority of the British public at this time saw Iraq, “in the light of a rather unattractive war baby of highly suspicious parentage whom they have been compelled from a sense of duty to adopt, but for whom they have no feeling of parental affection.”57

Thus, Britain had to enact a policy that was both fiscally acceptable to the Treasury but which would also guarantee security in the mandated territory and safeguard Britain’s interests in Iraq and across the region as a whole. For Britain, this meant in part remaining in situ to keep competitor nations such as France, Turkey or Russia at bay. Coupled with this was the quite understandable motivation on the part of the British to stay in Iraq in order to, “obtain some longterm benefit for the military effort it had made to conquer the country.”58

Whatever government policy was at the beginning of the war, in 1918 financial savings were central, as “a financially strapped Britain had to face up to several expensive, new colonial obligations.”59 In December 1920, the cost of maintaining the British garrison in Iraq stood at £30 million per annum, which figure included 17,000 British and 85,000 Indian troops.60 The costs involved in policing Iraq were so great that Churchill, upon his appointment as Colonial

Secretary, wrote to Cox demanding an immediate reduction in the size of the garrison, which demand Cox felt so unreasonable that he came close to resigning his post. He was only persuaded not to when reassured by Churchill that he had no intention of losing control of Iraq.61

In spite of these costs, throughout this period Sir Henry Wilson was not only trying to destroy an independent RAF but also pushing for an increase in funding for the British garrison in Iraq.62 The challenge for the Treasury to save money and the RAF to police Iraq is neatly laid out in the following Air Ministry minute for Trenchard from February 1920. The official’s contemptuous tone towards the value of Iraq is especially noteworthy:

“Secretary of State [Winston Churchill] tells me today that the General Staff profess themselves unable to garrison Mesopotamia. As you will remember the original estimates provided for £21.5 million for this purpose which is considered more than the country is worth. Secretary of State has had to cut this down very considerably with the result … that the General Staff now proposes complete evacuation of the country. He wishes to know whether you are prepared to take on Mesopotamia.”63

For Churchill to propose such a radical solution as maintaining control of the whole of Iraq through such a relatively novel method as air policing and for Trenchard to rise this challenge64 either demonstrates that the two men shared a visionary trait or simple bloody mindedness in the face of the commonly held military wisdom that the task was impossible.

Even before accepting this challenge, from the time of his appointment as CAS in 191965 relations between Trenchard and his inter-service counterparts, Field Marshall Henry Wilson and Admiral David Beatty, were “stormy bordering on the rude.”66 Wilson and Beatty made, “no secret of their desire to disband the RAF.”67 Equally, neither the Army nor the Navy during this period, or indeed during the course of World War One, showed any great desire to build up their own air services to become more effective fighting services.68

At the same time, as a result of the air raids on London and the failure of existing air defences to prevent these, there was a groundswell of opinion that led to the argument that, “ ‘aviation is a thing sui generis which cannot be efficiently controlled by soldiers or sailors.’ ”69 Such realities fed precisely into Trenchard’s view of the value of the RAF, a three-fold vision that held that, “air superiority was an essential prerequisite to military success; airpower was an inherently offensive weapon; and that although airpower’s material effects were great, its psychological effects were far greater.”70

It is worth noting that in 1919 every single senior RAF officer had gained their military experience and seniority in either the Army or the Navy,71 including Trenchard as an infantry officer,72 which may have coloured the views of many regarding the place of aircraft in the wider military framework. Any prejudice that Trenchard had earlier in his career had certainly been overcome by the time of his appointment as CAS by which time he had decided that the RAF’s future was inherently linked to that of Iraq. Writing to John Salmond, he explained that he was, “having a good deal of trouble in getting the increase to the Air Force that I want … but if you can take over in Iraq all will be well.”73

The work of the RAF in Somaliland in 1919 further convinced Churchill to press ahead and persuade the British Cabinet to support Trenchard’s plan to allow the RAF to, “assume the imperial police burden in Mesopotamia and the Middle East.”74 It was this “act of faith”

that

led Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to pointedly enquire if Churchill intended to, “govern the troublesome country with ‘Hot Air, Aeroplanes and Arabs’76, the last being a reference to the Arab Levies employed by the British in Iraq. The role of the RAF during the course of the 1920 revolt in Iraq went a long way to persuading many otherwise sceptical observers that there was a role for air control in imperial settings. In part this was because the Army working alone had failed to put down the rebellion, instead being forced on numerous occasions to rely on air support to effect victories on the ground.77

Among those who remained unconvinced by the merits of the RAF at this time were Sir Percy Cox, British High Commissioner in Baghdad and the commander of British forces in Iraq, General Sir Alymer Haldane.78 While Cox never came to have much faith in air control, preferring to maintain a large British garrison until the Iraqi Army was ready to take over, by the summer of 1921 Haldane had been persuaded of its merits. At one time Haldane even said that had he had more aircraft in 1920, he might have been able to suppress the rebellion before it spread nationwide.79 Another example of the anti-RAF campaign, which by this stage can be seen as a rearguard action, was the leading article in The Times in 192180 that said the RAF had failed to suppress the Revolt even though at the time of writing they had not even been deployed.

While Killingray is right in stating that the “future independent role of the RAF was assured by 1925,”81 this refers to the service’s future being guaranteed by the British Government, like any government often making decisions in the wake of political realities. While the political machinations may have continued in Whitehall, in practical terms the RAF’s long-term future had already been given surety. The fact that the RAF had a permanent role that was more than just plausible in theory became generally accepted as a result of their actions in Iraq and the subsequent report Trenchard presented at the Cairo Conference in 1921.82 Following the Conference, the Colonial Office assumed a greater military role in the Middle East and with that great advocate of air policing Churchill as Colonial Secretary this meant a “heavy dependence upon the RAF,”83 and a protected future for the practice of air policing.

Although this secure future is clear with the benefit of hindsight, it was immediately following the Cairo Conference that the War Office fought most bitterly to first reduce the role of the RAF in Iraq and then to have it disbanded altogether. Unfortunately for the War Office, by this time the majority of the British Cabinet fully believed in the efficacy of the RAF, either because of reports received from serving officers or as a result of tireless lobbying on the part of Churchill.84 In September 1921, obviously not realising that his ‘anti-air’ party had already been defeated, Sir Henry Wilson was still calling for the abolition of both the Air Ministry and the RAF, claiming that it was only useful as, “a means of propaganda or an instrument of terrorism.” The following month Lord Beatty concurred.85

The RAF officially received the victory they had been seeking on 1 October 1922.86 After nearly three years of battling between the War Office, the Colonial Office and the Air Ministry, a

policy of air control was implemented in Iraq and the RAF gained overall authority for all military operations in that country, under the Air Officer Commanding, John Salmond.87 It was the first time an Air Force commander had held such a position88 and from then until the end of the Mandate in October 1932, the RAF retained overall responsibility for both internal and external defence of Iraq. Although described by one critic as, “little more than a boy”,89 Salmond was actually a very competent 40-year-old officer with a great deal of field experience gained during the First World War.90 (In 1930, as Air Chief Marshall, Sir John Salmond became Trenchard’s successor as CAS.91) In October 1922, the field strength of British forces he controlled consisted of “eight squadron of aircraft, nine battalions of British and Indian infantry, besides local levies, armoured cars, pack artillery and supporting units.”92

The RAF was fortunate for their survival in a number of respects. In operational terms, Iraq was a blessing for the RAF as it provided them with no shortage of flat desert landing grounds for its still fragile planes,93 and at the end of WWI there was a surfeit of parts, with “stocks of surplus aircraft and spare parts … which could supply a much diminished RAF for many years,”94 not to mention a plentiful supply of qualified pilots. However, as Meilinger says, “[i]t seems to be a trait of democracies that after a victorious war their military forces do not simply demobilize, they disintegrate.”95 In 1918, total RAF personnel numbered 240,000 with 22,000 aircraft, figures that were slashed to 30,000 and two hundred respectively by March 1919.96

Perhaps the RAF was luckiest of all in having an unlikely hero in the form of Trenchard as CAS until 1929, 97 whose major contribution was “one of political status in the successful fight

for survival as an independent service.”98 Known to be socially awkward, he “had neither the look nor the personality of a heroic leader”.99 He was nevertheless a visionary when it came to the RAF100 and its potential in ‘policing’ overseas territories, which thoughts he was able to make, “clearly and forcefully to his subordinates.”101 He also quickly understood the need for the infant RAF to demonstrate solid organisational structure, leading to the creation of three air training schools in the first three years of his command.102 As the legendary Lawrence of Arabia wrote, having re-enlisted following the war as aircraftman Shaw: “The word Trenchard spells out confidence in the RAF.”103

CHAPTER THREE

This chapter involves an examination of RAF activities in Iraq during the Mandate. In broad terms, that activity can be divided into events surrounding the 1920 uprising, operations against non-compliant entities in Kurdistan, and manoeuvres along Iraq’s emerging borders. Also up for consideration are the less obvious, non-combat operational duties of the RAF, such as non-combat specific reconnaissance that were consistent with government business and other supporting roles. In examining these, this chapter will conclude with an assessment of this activity from both the practical standpoint of ‘was the job done successfully?’, as well as offering an economic appraisal.

If it is true that the RAF, “entered the post-war period … quite lacking in a clearly defined strategic function”,104 it is equally true that operations in Iraq provided it with that purpose. The entire period of the British Mandate in Iraq was marked by a desire on the part of the responsible authorities to see budgetary considerations at the forefront of any policy decisions. As a result, it has been argued, “British control rested on a weak military foundation because, mainly for reasons of economy, during the course of the 1920s Britain withdrew all of its ground troops from Iraq.”105 If the foundation was weak, actions in the air provided the counter-balancing strength, which started from the time that violent unrest started breaking out in Iraq,106 which was the very moment of the announcement that the country had been awarded to Britain as a class ‘A’ Mandate.

Many explanations have been forwarded to explain the roots of the 1920 Revolt in Iraq, from Kedouri’s claim for an almost exclusively Shi‘a inspired revolt107 to more commonly held arguments for a nationalist inspired uprising.108 More worrying at the time for those irresolute and uninspired British authorities on the ground was that regardless of the causes of the discontent it was manifest in cross-cultural anti-British violence. Explicitly, unrest came from all sides with both Shi‘a and Sunni religious faithful joining forces for the duration with secular nationalists against the perceived common enemy. 109

The precariousness of the situation for the British is made clear by Sluglett’s analysis that, “[t]he revolt brought almost total anarchy to the countryside … and a successful outcome for the British was by no means a certainty.”110 However, as the revolt took hold, Churchill quickly authorised the deployment of reinforcements to supplement the two RAF squadrons in country with a further two squadrons from Iran111 as well as more than 25,000 additional British and Indian troops.112 Perhaps inevitably, the “use of aircraft unequivocally shifted the balance of force … and signalled the beginning of the end of the revolt”,113 but not just in terms of the firepower. In spite of being responsible for some very heavy bombardments during the course of the revolt, notably at Rumaitha in October,114 the role of the RAF was far more varied and the success of British operations depended on their effectiveness in conducting these diverse tasks.

Haldane, commander of British troops until the RAF took that role in October 1922, was able to launch a counter offensive, “under the protection of the RAF”115 with aircraft also being used to lay siege to the mutinous cities of al-Najaf and Karbala.116 In all of these activities, the RAF benefited from the work of their own Intelligence Officers who “played an invaluable part

in briefing both the troops and the pilots.”117 The revolt of 1920 not only, “shook the very foundations of British rule,”118 but it was responsible for a sea change in British political and military policy that would ultimately lead to the RAF taking over military control of the country in 1922. According to Vinogradov, the enormous financial cost attached to achieving a favourable outcome from the British viewpoint to the revolt of 1920, “forced the hesitant British to enact a solution which for thirty-seven years was maintained by force.”119 At £40 million, the bill for the 1920 revolt considerably outweighed total expenditure for the whole of the Britishbacked Arab Revolt that took place over a period of years during the course of the First World War.

The severity (or enthusiasm from an RAF standpoint) of the British response in, for instance, the widespread use of aerial bombardments also played a part in ensuring that there was not another united, nationwide uprising against British forces or, in parenthesis, the Iraqi government during the Mandate. By March 1921, the British garrison in Iraq stood at, “thirtythree battalions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery and a large number of supporting troops.”120 In contrast, the RAF still had a relatively paltry six squadrons, later increased to eight,121 and the assistance of the Arab Levies, the presence of which allowed the withdrawal of significant numbers of British troops.

Maintaining public support for lengthy military operations is never easy but for the RAF, still surrounded by critics, this was even truer. In 1923, the RAF began a four-year on-and-off campaign against the Kurdistan-based tribal leader Sheikh Mahmud122 and his followers, the RAF’s lengthiest operation during this period. As Lunt points out, the terrain in Kurdistan is,

“rugged, mountainous, and honeycombed with caves which provided excellent protection from RAF bombers”,123 and yet it was in this arena that the RAF started operations as head of forces in Iraq when Sheikh Mahmud launched his second rebellion against the British, or the government of Iraq depending on ones reading of events.

Having been permitted to return from exile if he did not deal with Turkish authorities, Mahmud went back on his word, precipitating a guerrilla war that saw the RAF initially engaged in reconnaissance and support roles.124 When a lengthy bombing campaign against Sulaimaniya failed to defeat the guerrilla fighters, the RAF learnt to nuance their tactics launching a campaign that utilised much better coordinated ground support from local police and troops. Being relegated to a seemingly subsidiary role after what they saw as their successes in 1920 must have been galling to the RAF. The RAF were forced to fly so many missions against Sheikh Mahmud that the RAF awarded him the ironic title Director of Training.125 Perhaps it was some small consolation that even with plentiful ground forces it still took three years before Mahmud was forced into exile in Iran.126 Even then he returned to fight again in 1930.

Supporters of the RAF, no doubt still enthral to the innovative technology of the flying machines, spoke excitedly of their aggressive work in Iraq. Of RAF activity in Kurdistan for instance, Gertrude Bell wrote, “The RAF has done wonders bombing insurgent villages in extremely difficult country”.127 Such opinions from the likes of Bell may not tell us a great deal about the justification offered for bombing missions but they do offer us some insight into the positive reports being fed back to British politicians and the general public alike.

Aside from the north of Iraq, there was an upsurge in tribal raids and other violence along other of Iraq’s borders, notably in the years 1926-29.128 In the south of the country, along the 500-mile border with Saudi Arabia129 inter-tribal raids had proceeded since time immemorial. The Bedouin have a traditional saying to explain this: “Raids are our agriculture.”130 Unfortunately for the Bedouin, such traditions sat ill with the norms of modern nation states and so the RAF was called on to police the border and bomb those conducting cross border raids.131

Another of the RAF’s more notable tasks involved reconnaissance missions regarding the movement of the country’s nomadic tribes. Having gathered information about the size, location and direction of movement of these tribes, tax demands were issued by ground-borne government administrators. Although the reconnaissance role alone may sound innocuous, it did not necessarily end with the aerial collection of data. Not infrequently, tribes more used to being ignored by central government would refuse to pay any taxes demanded by Baghdad. The result of this was the issuance of warnings about the possible consequences of non-compliance. If these warnings were ignored, the RAF could be called upon to bomb the pugnacious tribes until the relevant payment was received.132

Thomas may be right to point out that, “[a]ccurate reports of Bedouin migration were essential to prevent violence over unfair taxation”133 but the policy was more widely geared towards collecting from those who were reluctant to pay rather than those who may have been paying too much. If the “Colonial Office in London considered this policy a bit heavyhanded,”134 objections to this innovative approach to tax collecting were overcome in part by the acute need for Iraqi-generated, non-British revenue to come into Baghdad’s government coffers.

Additionally, for any less caring members of parliament, the High Commissioner in Baghdad was only too willing to have the non-payment of taxes depicted as nothing less than “defiance of the British regime.”135

Other roles performed by the RAF included air transportation of both men and materiel, supplying remote locations, and force protection, which in many instances marked the difference between success and failure of an operation.136 A decrease in air policing activities towards the end of the Mandate period can partly be explained as a result of the growing strength of the Iraqi Army and Royal Iraqi Air Force, the founding of which in 1924 was supported by the British Government against Trenchard wishes.137 In spite of the fact that RAF activities lessened in the late 1920s,138 one of the most striking examples of this type of operation occurred in June 1932

139

when the RAF flew 600 British troops from Egypt in six days,140 marking the largest movement of troops conducted by the RAF during their tenure in Iraq. The necessity for such troop movements arose in part because of the withdrawal of the last British infantry battalion in November 1928.141

The crisis for the British arose when the otherwise loyal Assyrian Levies, realised that with the end of the Mandate they were going to lose not only their jobs as British-employed troops but also the protection that came with this foreign patronage. Consequently the Assyrians, whom the British regarded as a ‘martial race’,142 announced that they were going to disband and return to their traditional lands in northern Iraq, which would have led to armed clashes with nonAssyrian Iraqis who had moved there. In addition to this immediate problem for the British, note

was taken in Baghdad of the wider issue of such significant desertions on the part of the best units in the Iraqi army, becoming a rebellious force for national disunity and disruption.143

Although not ultimately forced to take offensive action against the Levies, it was only through the RAF airlift of British reinforcements at the shortest notice that such action was averted. In addition to the threat of force, British authorities agreed to safeguard the short-term future of the Levies by promising to engage them to provide security for British air bases that were to remain in post-Mandate Iraq.144 As a result, the Assyrians remained at their posts, avoiding a bloody intervention on the eve of the handover of power to an Iraqi administration.

Reacting to criticisms that air policing was indiscriminate and inhumane, defenders pointed out that bombing from the air was far less indiscriminate than were artillery strikes145 and that before most bombing raids villages were warned of impending attacks.146 The RAF additionally produced a series of reports that supposedly demonstrated that bombing missions resulted in fewer civilian deaths than non-air force missions.147 While reconnaissance flights were obviously integral to the swift gathering of information from distant locations, the RAF did not rely on these alone for information gathering. The Armoured Car Wing of the RAF proved itself to be an indispensable component in the majority of RAF operations. By 1929, the unit consisted of nearly 60 vehicles (half of which were transport lorries) including armoured cars armed with a light machine-gun and equipped with a medical kit, smoke bombs and flare guns for the purposes of signalling and such tools as might be needed to carry out aircraft repairs in the field.148 It is worth noting that many operational lessons gained by the Armoured Car Wing in

Iraq were to prove of great use in training armoured units of the British Army,149 which must have rankled with any remaining critics of the RAF in the Army.

In spite of some very obvious results the effectiveness of the air policing policy has been called into question by some. Corum obviously believes that the RAF overestimated its success when he writes that, “the RAF’s account goes, the air control doctrine worked remarkably well. … Bombing and the threat of bombing seemed to keep Iraq relatively quiet.”150 Also true is the fact that the RAF would not have been able to successfully pursue their air policing policy without the continued support of ground troops (which claim the RAF never made for themselves), especially the largely tribal Levies.151 Providing incalculable advantages over British Special Service Officers with their knowledge of local languages, terrain, tribal allegiances and squabbles, the local Levies also appealed to the Colonial Office as they were paid less than a British soldier,152 even if one were able to locate British soldiers with like skills.

CHAPTER FOUR

This chapter considers the political scene in Iraq in light of the ubiquitous British presence, highlighted through the RAF’s unique position of responsibility for internal and external security until independence in 1932. It will be necessary in dealing with this issue to reflect on the tensions that existed between the country’s British advisors and Iraqi nationalists, whether in the person of the King, members of his government or those without power and influence, who were pressing for full independence throughout this period.

Considering the victors’ attempts at map-drawing after WWI, Gelvin is right to pronounce, “[o]n paper, Iraq appeared to be a good idea.”153 Mosul was rich in oil, making the state economically viable, the middle of the country was agriculturally fecund, and Basra provided a working port into the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, “the very mandates system that had created Iraq also conspired against its full political and economic development.”154 Even before the war’s end, Britain and France had already made plans for the division of Ottoman territory.155 Additionally, in spite of lofty declarations regarding Mandatory Powers as “answerable, not to its own conscience, but to the public opinion of the world expressed through the League of Nations,”156 the Powers were more or less free to run the Mandated nations as they chose.

Any attempt to portray the Mandate as an equal partnership between British and Iraqi administrators would be as well to ignore the words of one British administrator, Sir Nigel

Davidson, who when considering the problems the British faced in Iraq remarked that, “Any form of control by a superior was bitterly resented.”157 In spite of being an army of occupation there were many in Iraq who welcomed the arrival of British forces and, according to Zubaida, “rather liked British rule and found it a great improvement on the Turks.”158 But this was not the case for the majority of the population and trouble for the British was inevitable from their first footfall in 1914. Apart from anything else, the modern administration that the British attempted to put in place, “did not appeal to many people who were used to lax government that allowed considerable local autonomy”.159 In addition to attempts to impose an alien, Indian-style administration on Iraqis, the British tried to do so with an insufficient number of qualified administrators. It has been pointed out that while Ottoman rule may not have been very efficient, “at least the Turks spoke Arabic and left the tribes largely alone.”160

It is said that Faisal was introduced to Iraq as its new king in almost indecent haste. As Dawisha says, his “loss of office was as brief as his reign in Syria.”161 The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that was signed in October 1922, with numerous amendments, annexes and subsidiary agreements, was to remain in place for the next 22 years. With regards to the copious amendments to the Treaty, one British administrator at the time suggested that it “must have seemed to Whitehall that the main feature of relations with Iraq was an almost permanent state of negotiation over treaties”.162 Regardless of the fact that through these negotiations Iraq gained “a unique position among the mandated territories”163 in terms of its freedoms (being permitted, for instance, to make treaties with other states with British approval164), it remained a mandate. As the British High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs remarked in 1926, “on matters of foreign policy and finance [British] advice was tantamount to instructions.”165 The new Treaty of 1930, which

made Iraq legally independent, allowed Britain “continued control over foreign and military affairs.”166

Once in charge, under the highly restrictive conditions laid out in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty plus amendments, Faisal grew in confidence in the knowledge that the RAF were there to support his reign against any less than loyal subjects.167 Another source of Faisal’s growing confidence was his ability to point to the development of his county’s government. Whether or not his subjects were convinced that the country really had any greater level of independence as a result of parliamentary gatherings that were inaugurated in July 1925168 is hard to gauge. Arguably, any opportunity to gain political and diplomatic experience was better than no opportunity at all.

While the British had decided to install an Arab government before the 1920 Revolt, they had not decided on the level of their military presence. After witnessing the level of violence of those events, the decision to introduce military units capable of exerting maximum force at minimum cost was made easily.169 There is little doubt that without the continued presence of the RAF in Iraq, Britain would have abandoned Iraq years earlier and, further, had they done so it would be almost impossible to envisage the survival of Faisal’s government.170 However, that should not be taken to mean that Faisal or his government were necessarily keen to have the British presence so obviously present in their affairs, rather they were resigned to the political reality of their position. Faisal in particular, having already lost one throne in Syria, was keenly aware of the possible consequences of coming into open conflict with a major power.

By 1926, the British had created the framework for the Iraqi Army,171 which when coupled with the creation of the Royal Iraqi Air Force in 1924, meant that there was in place at least the semblance of greater Iraqi control of the country’s military affairs, even though both military affairs and foreign policy were still directed by the British at this stage. The fact that the “British military presence was made less visible as the ground troops were pulled out and replaced by the RAF,” does not mean that Iraqis were not aware of the threat of force this ‘invisible’ presence represented.172 As Fuccaro makes clear, “When Britain left Iraq in 1932, the process of national integration was at a very early stage of development, and the unity of the Iraqi state was very fragile.”173

The question of when Iraq would become independent was an almost constant source of conflict during this period. Matters came to a head at the beginning of 1929 when the Iraqi Cabinet resigned en masse.174 Even though a significant occurrence in political terms, any anxiety felt among the general population had little meaningful impact outside of Baghdad’s political elite.175 (This was not the only occasion when Iraq political framework could have unravelled: between 1920 and 1932 the country had 13 governments.176) With peace prevailing, fears that the RAF would have to be deployed were unfounded, and a new Cabinet was formed after reaching an understanding with the British that they would offer unqualified support for Iraq’s claim for membership of the League of Nations, and the full independence that came with membership.177

Thus, the promise to support Iraq’s candidacy for the League of Nations made by Britain’s Labour Government in September 1929 was just a single manifestation of, “a wider

policy of retreat from an absolutist form of empire toward a more liberal or informal type of empire,”178 where “British colonial supervision” had done little more than allow for the development of those organs of state that were “consistent with British colonial and imperial interests.”179 The government of Iraq well knew the strategic importance of their country to the British, connecting as it did “the eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf and hence to India.”180

Winston Churchill, the architect behind so much of the material dealt with in this paper once wrote: “I never felt that the Arab countries had had anything from us but fair play. We created them; British money and British advisors set the pace of their advance; British arms protected them.”181 Even if one argues that people and their views are necessarily the products of their time, when one considers that the British, while officially only in Iraq in an advisory capacity, still had veto powers over all ministerial appointments and all matters of state dealing with defence, foreign affairs and fiscal policy, it can surely not be thought controversial to refer to the Iraqi government at this time as little more than a client of the British.182 The fact that Bourdillon was able to say of the British advisors that they had, “literally no executive authority whatever”183 only highlights the void between literal truth and reality.

While Faisal was apparently obedient in carrying out British directives he was also keen to help his strongly nationalist colleagues from the days of the Arab Revolt,184 which led to his being described with little affection by one British official as, “a very live factor in the Iraqi State.”185 He was in the uncomfortable position of trying to appease those Iraqis loyal to him from his time in Syria who were seeking full independence at the same time he was fully aware that his power depended on continued British backing.186 The reliance on British support

pervaded the ‘unqualified support’ for Iraqi membership of the League in ways crucial to the RAF. Provisions in the third Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, of 1930,187 not only obligated the Iraqis to buy virtually all of their arms from the British but also allowed the RAF to retain airbases in Iraq, at locations to be chosen by the RAF and maintained rent-free by the Iraqi government.188 Had the government of Iraq not been desperate for membership of the League of Nations, and tied to the terms of the Mandate imposed by the League itself, it is unlikely they would have consented to such swingeing terms. In the event, the Iraqi’s had little choice but to agree to British demands.189

As unpalatable as it may be, the RAF must to a large degree be considered responsible for the fact that there remained a country called Iraq to become independent in 1932, which point was made by Sir Henry Dobbs when he wrote in 1928 that, without the RAF “the Government of Iraq would, I believe, in a few months, either vanish altogether or remain clinging desperately to a strip of territory along the Tigris”.190 It should also be noted that independence was no guarantee of peace and that Faisal, although obviously never able to make the point publicly, may have been quite satisfied to know that the RAF presence would surely deter those elements in the country who might otherwise be pressing for independence, among them the Assyrians and the Kurds.191 The value of having such a powerful deterrent as the RAF in place, one that had already proven its worth throughout the 1920s, cannot be underestimated.

In spite of the obvious security benefits of having the RAF more or less on call, the public face of Faisal and those pro-British elements that headed his cabinet192 was necessarily directed to vocal opposition to the RAF’s continuing presence.193 Their arguments that the RAF just being in

the country was an affront to independence should not be ignored, with the populace inevitably seeing this as a continuation of British rule wearing a new face. Rather than building Anglo-Iraqi relations, the RAF airbases were seen by many as damaging that relationship.

In a final gesture of just how little the British and the Iraqi governments trusted one another, the British ensured that they followed through on their promise to the Assyrian Levies by ensuring they would provide security for the air bases, rather then members of the Iraqi Army proper, whose loyalty and effectiveness the British had cause to doubt.194 This distrust was reciprocated by the Iraqis, who were convinced that the airbases were little more than a British attempt to prolong the occupation.195

With independence gained upon Iraqâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s entry to the League of Nations on 3 October 1932,196 the RAF ostensibly ceased to have any role in assisting the government of Iraq to keep peace in the country.197 However, any groups bent on dissent likely took note of the continued presence of the British seaplane anchorage at Basra and airbases at Shuâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;aiba and Habbaniyya.198

CONCLUSION

Before presenting conclusions regarding the RAF and air control in Iraq it is worth reminding oneself of that moment in time when Iraq was created; in the wake of four years of peerless international destruction and for what was to become Iraq, more or less four hundred years of Ottoman rule during which time, “very few Iraqis had had any experience in government.”199 With this in mind, two points come to mind with regard to the post-war settlement: “The weak bargaining position of the Arab delegates to Versailles, and the duplicity of the Great Powers. … By the time the League of Nations sanctioned the decisions taken at San Remo … the boundaries of the mandates had already been agreed between Britain and France.”200

Any judgement of the actions of the RAF must also be made in the light of this knowledge of their political masters and the wider standards of imperialism prevalent in the first third of the Twentieth century. This included a slow but significant modification of imperial policy201 in the aftermath of the First World War, a symptom of a “wider policy of retreat from an absolutist form of empire toward a more liberal or informal type of empire.”202

It would not be true to say that the RAF survived solely because of political manoeuvring. Had they failed to execute their mission in Iraq they would very likely have been disbanded at some point in the early 1930s, their functions once again subsumed into air wings of the Army and Navy. As it was, they succeeded in military terms and air policing, “control without

occupation,”203 proceeded alongside the limited development of independent structures of Iraqi government and self-rule.

There are a number of conclusions to be drawn, and a number of characters and circumstances to be acknowledged. The credit for imagining air policing as other than a willowthe-wisp must go to Churchill. For its implementation and the subsequent survival of the RAF one must turn to Trenchard but for those real successes in the field, Trenchard was in no doubt that all credit was due to Salmond when he wrote without disambiguation, “I cannot emphasise too much the value your successful command in Iraq has been to us.”204

In considering success from the viewpoint of the Iraqi nation rather than the RAF, it can be said with some certainty that, “[if] air policing was the salvation of the Royal Air Force, air power was also ‘the midwife of modern Iraq’.”205 Batatu concedes this point when reflecting “the presence of the English may also have been decisive in keeping Iraq in one piece.”206 According to Bromley, the British were able to maintain power in Iraq through a “mixture of fraud and force, gold and silver for bribery and RAF bombs for coercion.”207

That said, this paper did not set out to make any claims in favour or against British rule in Iraq or to pass judgement on the morality or otherwise of RAF operations under the League of Nations Mandate. The purpose of this paper was to consider whether or not the policy of air control or air policing as pursued by the Royal Air Force in Iraq was successful in maintaining order in that country before independence in 1932. In light of the evidence presented above, there is no doubt that the success of air policing operations in Iraq contributed directly and

enormously to the survival of the RAF and that equally the survival of Iraq in the Mandatory period was to a large degree because of the RAF. The last word on this position may be given to Colonial Secretary Amery who wrote, â&#x20AC;&#x153;If the writ of King Faisal runs effectively throughout his kingdom it is entirely due to British aeroplanes. If the aeroplanes were removed tomorrow, the whole structure would inevitably fall to pieces.â&#x20AC;?208

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL India Office Library and Records (Accessed at the British Library) L/P&S/12 L/P&S/18 R/15/1 R/15/5

Correspondence of the India Office’s Political and Secret Department Memoranda of the India Office’s Political and Secret Department Bushire political residency Kuwait political agency

Public Record Office Air Ministry AIR 1 AIR 10 AIR 20 AIR 23 AIR 40

Operations in Somaliland Operations Manuals Unregistered papers of the Air Ministry Papers of overseas commands Papers of the Directorate of Intelligence

Cabinet Office CAB 16 Subcommittees of the Committee of Imperial Defence CAB 23 Conclusions of the Cabinet Colonial Office CO 730 Colonial Office papers on Iraq CO 935 Colonial Office confidential print Foreign Office FO 371 General correspondence of the Foreign Office FO 406 Foreign Office confidential print FO 624 British Embassy in Baghdad War Office WO 201

Middle East forces

PUBLISHED MATERIAL Special Report by HBMG to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq during the Period 1920-31, Colonial no.58. The Geographical Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (October, 1921): 320. Ayubi, Nazih N., Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995). Batatu, Hanna, The Old Landed Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). Bell, Gertrude, Review of the Civil Administration in Mesopotamia (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1920). Bell, Gertrude, The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London: E. Benn, 1927). Bourdillon, B.H., “The Political Situation in Iraq,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 6 (November, 1924): 273-287. Boyle, Andrew, Trenchard: Man of Vision (London: Collins, 1962). Bromley, Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994). Brown, L. Carl, Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Browne, Gilbert, The Iraq Levies, 1915-1932 (London: The Royal United Service Institution, 1932). Busch, Briton, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-21 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1971). Callwell, C. E., Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (London: Greenhill Books, 1990). Cheesman, R.E., “A History of Steamboat Navigation on the Upper Tigris,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January, 1923): 27-34. Churchill, Winston, Memoirs of the Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959). Clayton, Anthony, The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986). 47

Cohn Bernard S., An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi: Oxford University Press, India, 1991). Cohn Bernard S., Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Cooper, Malcolm, “Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July, 1987): 437-453. Corum, James S., “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter, 2000): 61-77. Dahl, Erik J., “Naval innovation: From Coal to Oil,” Joint Force Quarterly (Winter, 2000): 5056. Davies, E., Memories of State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). Davidson, Nigel, “The Termination of the Iraq Mandate,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931-1939) Vol. 12, No. 1 (January, 1933): 60-78. Dawisha, Adeed, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). Dawn, C. Ernest, “From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology,” The Modern Middle East, ed. A Hourani, P. Khoury and M.C. Wilson, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004): 375-393. De Gaury, Gerald, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1961). Divine, David, The Broken Wing: A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power (London: Hutchinson, 1966). Dodge, Toby, Inventing Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Eisenstadt, Michael and Eric Matthewson, eds., “Conclusion: Lessons for US Policymakers,” US Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003): 67-78. Eisenstadt, Michael, and Eric Matthewson, eds., US Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003). Eppel, Michael, Iraq From Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 2004). Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Peter Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural 48

Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November, 1983): 491-505. Fawcett, Louise, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Fearon, Peter, “The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918-1935,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 1974): 236-251. Fieldhouse, D.K., Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, 1918-1944 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). Fieldhouse, D.K., Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Foster, Henry, The Making of Modern Iraq (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935). Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (London: Orion Books, 1989). Fuccaro, Nelida, “Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November, 1997): 559-580. Fuccaro, Nelida, The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999). Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). Gelvin, James L., The Modern Middle East: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Ghareeb, Edmund A., Historical Dictionary of Iraq (London: Scarecrow Press, 2004). Glubb, John, War in the Desert (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1960). Glubb, John, The Empire of the Arabs (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Groves P.R.C., “The Influence of Aviation on International Relations,” Journal of the Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (May, 1927): 133-152. Heffernan, Michael, “Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1996): 504-553. Hemphill, Paul, “The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921-33” in The Integration of Modern Iraq, Abbas Kelidar, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979): 88-109. Hogarth, D.G., “Obituary: Liet.-Colonel G.E. Leachman, C.I.E., D.S.O.” The Geographical 49

Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October, 1920): 325-326. Hopkirk, Peter, Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire (New York: Kodansha America, 1994). Hourani, Albert, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1991). Jacobsen, Mark, “Only by the Sword: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (August, 1991): 323-363. Jardine, Douglas, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London: Jenkins, 1923). Kamrava, Mehran, The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). pp. 35-50. Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, (Boston: Harvard University Press 2001). Kedourie, Elie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (London: Ivan R. Dee, 1970). Keegan, John, The First World War (New York: First Vintage Books, 2000). Kelidar, Abbas, ed., The Integration of Modern Iraq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979). Kent, Marian, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy 1900-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1993). Killingray, David, “‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 19161939,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1984): 429-444. Laffin, John, Swifter Than Eagles: A Biography of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1964). Lando, Barry M. Web of Deceit: Western Complicity in Iraq from Churchill to Kennedy and Bush (New York: Other Press, 2007). Lapidus, Ira M., A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Lawrence, T.E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935). Lawrence, T.E., The Mint (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955). Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, Iraq 1900 to 1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953). 50

Lukitz, Liora, Iraq: The Search for National Unity (London: Frank Cass, 1995). Lunt, James, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Futura Publications, 1982). Marr, Phebe, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). McCarthy, Justin, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire (London: Hodder Arnold, 2001). Majd, Mohammad Gholi, Iraq in World War I: From Ottoman Rule to British Conquest (University Press of America, 2006). Al-Marayati, Abid A., A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1961). Meilinger, Phillip S., “Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April, 1996): 243-270. Meilinger, Phillip S., “The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April, 2000): 467-501. Mesopotamia Commission, Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1917). Mills, Mark Carter, “The Mandatory System,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January, 1923): 50-62. Omissi, David, Air Power and Colonial Control (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990). Ovendale, Ritchie, The Middle East Since 1914: A Companion, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1998). Owen, Roger, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004). Pape, Robert A., Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell, 1996). Paris, Michael, “Air Power and Imperial Defence, 1880-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (April 1989): 209-225. Paris, Timothy J., “British Middle East Policy-Making After the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September, 1998): 773-793.

Penrose, Edith and E.F., Iraq: International Relations and National Development (London: Ernest Benn, 1978). Polk, William R., The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm, 1979). Ryan, Michael, “The Influence of the Imperial Frontier on British Doctrines of Mechanized Warfare,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer, 1983): 123-142. Silverfarb, Daniel, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Simon, Reeva Spector, Iraq Between The Two World Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Simon, Reeva Spector and Eleanor H. Tejirian, ed., The Creation of Iraq: 1914-1921 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Sluglett, Peter, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). Smith, Malcolm, “The Royal Air Force, Air Power and British Foreign Policy, 1932-1937,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January, 1977): 153-174. Stratton, Morton B., “British Railways and Motor Roads in the Middle East, 1918-1930,” Economic Geography, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April, 1944): 116-129. Tarbush, Mohammad A., The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941 (London: Paul Kegan International, 1982). Thomas, Martin, “Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 4 (October, 2003): 539-561. Towle, Philip, Pilots and Rebels: Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918-88 (London: Elsevier, 1989). Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Vinogradov, Amal. “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2 (April, 1972.): 123-139. Wilson, Arnold, “The Middle East,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (March, 1926): 96-110. Wilson, Arnold, Mesopotamia, 1914-1917: Loyalties (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). 52

Wilson, Arnold, Mesopotamia. 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London: Oxford University Press, 1931). Wright, Qunicy, “The Mosul Dispute,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July, 1926): 453-464. Wright, Qunicy, “The Government of Iraq,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (November, 1926): 743-769. Wright, Quincy, “The Proposed Termination of the Iraq Mandate,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 3 (July, 1931): 436-446. Yaphe, Judith S., “Republic of Iraq,” in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. D.E. Long, B. Reich and M. Gasiorowski, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007): 114-152. Yapp, Malcolm, The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923 (London: Longman, 1987). Yapp, Malcolm, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995 (London: Longman, 1991). Zubaida, Sami, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.34, No.2 (May, 2002): 205-215.

NOTES

Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8. Geographical Journal (London: October, 1921), 320: “We are informed by the Colonial Office that the Secretary of State for the Colonies has concurred in the suggestion of the High Commissioner of Mesopotamia that the name Iraq shall in future be the official name of the territory hitherto known as Mesopotamia.” 3 Tripp, History of Iraq, 8. 4 Sluglett, Peter, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 1. 5 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 7. 6 Cooper, Malcolm, “Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July, 1987): 438. Meilinger, Phillip S., “The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2 (April, 2000): 480. 7 Towle, Philip, Pilots and Rebels: Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918-88 (London: Elsevier, 1989), 8. 8 Paris, Michael, “Air Power and Imperial Defence, 1880-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (April 1989): 210. 9 Killingray, David, “‘A Swift Agent of Government’: Air Power in British Colonial Africa, 1916-1939,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1984): 430. 10 “Operations,” RAF manual CD 22 (London: July, 1922), PRO, Kew. AIR 10/1197, 5. Quoted in Meilinger, Phillip S., “Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (April, 1996): 253. 11 Smith, Malcolm, “The Royal Air Force, Air Power and British Foreign Policy, 1932-1937,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January, 1977): 156. 12 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 433, n. 23. 13 Ibid., 433. 14 Ibid., 429. 15 Ibid., 429. 16 Omissi, David, Air Power and Colonial Control (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 6. 17 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 430. 18 Ibid., 430. 19 Omissi, Air Power, 9. 20 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 434. 21 Boyle, Andrew, Trenchard: Man of Vision (London: Collins, 1962). 22 ‘Operations in Somaliland against the Mullah, 1919-20’, AIR 1/23/15/1/116. 23 Omissi, Air Power, 14. 24 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 253. 25 Jardine, Douglas, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London: Jenkins, 1923), 280. 26 Omissi, Air Power, 16. 27 Ibid., 15. 28 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 253. 29 Corum, James S., “The Myth of Air Control: Reassessing the History,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter, 2000): 65. 30 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 432. 31 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 20. 32 George Lansbury, MP, quoted in Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 187. 33 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 21. 2

Corum, “Myth of Air Control”, 68. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 191. 36 Omissi, Air Power, 13-15. 37 Ibid., 15. 38 Ibid., 60. 39 Ibid., 61. 40 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 243. 41 Quoted in Omissi, Air Power, 5. 42 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 445. 43 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 431. 44 Omissi, Air Power, 7. 45 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 445. 46 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 1. 47 Thomas, Martin, “Bedouin Tribes and the Imperial Intelligence Services in Syria, Iraq and Transjordan in the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 38, No. 4 (October, 2003): 553. 48 Fearon, Peter, “The British Airframe Industry and the State, 1918-1935,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (May, 1974): 236. 49 Omissi, Air Power, 7. 50 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 438. 51 Fearon, “British Airframe Industry”, 236. 52 Paris, Michael, “Air Power and Imperial Defence, 1880-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War (April 1989): 209. 53 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 450. 54 Fieldhouse, D.K., Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, 1918-1944 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 2. 55 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 12: “Arnold Wilson’s account makes it clear that the city of Mosul was captured, on War Office instructions, some three days after the Armistice of Mudros.” 56 Lunt, James, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century (London: Futura Publications, 1982), 28. 57 Bourdillon, B.H., “The Political Situation in Iraq,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 6 (November, 1924): 273. 58 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 4. 59 Corum, “Myth of Air Control”, 6. 60 Omissi, Air Power, 24. 61 Ibid., 25. 62 Ibid., 21. 63 AIR 9/14, Minute of February 1920, quoted in Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 13. 64 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 13. 65 Omissi, Air Power, 8. 66 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 252. 67 Ibid, 252. 68 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 444. 69 Lord Hugh Cecil, quoted in Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 445. 70 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 255. 71 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 447. 72 Meilinger, “Historiography of Airpower”, 481. 73 Quoted in Omissi, Air Power, 18. 74 Killingray, “Swift Agent of Government”, 435. 75 Lunt, Imperial Sunset, 29. 76 Quoted in Killingray, “Swift Agent of Government”, 435. 35

Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 14. Ibid., 15. 79 Omissi, Air Power, 8. Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 16. 80 The Times, 15, August 1921, quoted in Omissi, Air Power, 23. 81 Killingray, “Swift Agent of Government”, 432, 435. 82 Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (London: Orion Books, 1989), 562. 83 Killingray, “Swift Agent of Government”, 435. 84 Omissi, Air Power, 26-27. 85 Ibid., 28. 86 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 16. 87 Omissi, Air Power, 31. 88 Corum, “Myth of Air Control”, 63. 89 Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, “Middle East Diary”, quoted in Philip, Pilots and Rebels, 34. 90 Laffin, John, Swifter Than Eagles: A Biography of Marshal of the RAF Sir John Salmond (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1964), 18. 91 Laffin, Swifter Than Eagles, 198. 92 Omissi, Air Power, 31. 93 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 52. 94 Fearon, “The British Airframe Industry”, 236. 95 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 251. 96 Ibid., 251. 97 Meilinger, “Historiography of Airpower”, 481. 98 Smith, “The Royal Air Force”, 155. 99 Meilinger, “The Historiography of Airpower”, 481. 100 Omissi, Air Power, 8. 101 Meilinger, “The Historiography of Airpower”, 481. 102 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 262. 103 Lawrence, T.E., The Mint (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), 95. 104 Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion”, 438. 105 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 10. 106 Al-Marayati, Abid A., A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1961), 15. 107 Kedourie, Elie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (London: Ivan R. Dee, 1970), 79. 108 Vinogradov, Amal. “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2 (April, 1972.): 123-139. Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 7. Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 34. 109 Tripp, History of Iraq, 40-44. 110 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 34. 111 Vinogradov, “Revolt in Iraq”,137. 112 Corum, “Myth of Air Control”, 63. 113 Vinogradov, “Revolt in Iraq”, 137. 114 Corum, “The Myth of Air Control”, 63. 115 Vinogradov, “Revolt in Iraq”, 138. 116 Simon, Reeva Spector, Iraq Between The Two World Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 51. 117 Lunt, James, Imperial Sunset, 36. 78

118

Omissi, Air Power, 22. Vinogradov, “Revolt in Iraq”, 123. 120 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 29. 121 Ibid., 29. 122 Lunt, Imperial Sunset, 37. 123 Ibid., 33. 124 Corum, “The Myth of Air Control”, 66. 125 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 17. 126 Ibid., 17. 127 Bell, Gertrude, The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London: E. Benn, 1927), 176. 128 Thomas, “Bedouin Tribes”, 542. 129 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 35. 130 Bedouin oral tradition. 131 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 18. 132 Ibid., 19. 133 Thomas, “Bedouin Tribes”, 559. 134 Corum, “The Myth of Air Control”, 65. 135 Ibid., 65. 136 Omissi, Air Power, 72-75. 137 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 22. 138 Ibid., 22. 139 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 39. 140 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 53. 141 Towle, Pilots and Rebels, 23. 142 Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, 64. 143 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 64. 144 Omissi, Air Power, 65. 145 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 260. 146 Killingray, “Swift Agent”, 440. 147 Meilinger, “Trenchard and Morale Bombing”, 259. 148 Omissi, Air Power, 62. 149 Ibid., 62. 150 Corum, “The Myth of Air Control”, 61. 151 Omissi, Air Power, 64. 152 Ibid., 63. 153 Gelvin, James L., The Modern Middle East: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 183. 154 Ibid., 183. 155 Ibid., 166. 156 Davidson, Nigel, “The Termination of the Iraq Mandate,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931-1939) Vol. 12, No. 1 (January, 1933), 62. 157 Davidson, “Termination of the Iraq Mandate”, 67. 158 Zubaida, Sami, “The Fragments Imagine the Nation: The Case of Iraq,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.34, No.2 (May, 2002): 206. 159 Ibid., 207. 160 Corum, “The Myth of Air Control”, 63. 161 Dawisha, Adeed, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 47. 162 De Gaury, Gerald, Three Kings in Baghdad: The Tragedy of Iraq’s Monarchy (London: I.B. Tauris, 1961), 65. 163 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 21. 119

164

Ibid., 23. Quoted in Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 22. 166 Lapidus, Ira M., A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 543. 167 De Gaury, Three Kings, 58. 168 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 32. 169 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 8. 170 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 23. 171 Corum, “Myth of Air Control”, 63. 172 Vinogradov, “Revolt in Iraq”, 139. 173 Fuccaro, Nelida, “Ethnicity, State Formation, and Conscription in Postcolonial Iraq: The Case of the Yazidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November, 1997): 561. 174 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 41. 175 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 114. 176 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 43. 177 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 11. 178 Ibid., 18. 179 Fuccaro, “Ethnicity, State Formation”, 560. 180 Bromley, Simon, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994), 77. 181 Churchill, Winston, Memoirs of the Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 1,014. 182 Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics, 79. 183 Bourdillon, “Political Situation in Iraq”, 280. 184 Yaphe, Judith S., “Republic of Iraq,” in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. D.E. Long, B. Reich and M. Gasiorowski, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007): 119. 185 Bourdillon, “Political Situation in Iraq”, 279. 186 Omissi, David, Air Power and Colonial Control (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 30. 187 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 123. 188 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 123. 189 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 22. 190 FO 406/63 E 862/6/93, letter of 4 December 1928 from Sir Henry Dobbs, Baghdad, to Mr. Amery, London. Quoted in Hanna Batatu, The Old Landed Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 25. 191 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 24. 192 For example Prime Minister Nuri al-Said and Minister of Defence Jafar al-Askari. 193 Ibid., 25. 194 Ibid., 49. 195 Ibid., 50. 196 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 42. 197 Omissi, Air Power, 37. 198 Lunt, Imperial Sunset, 47. Simon, Iraq Between The Two World Wars, 57. 199 Al-Marayati, Diplomatic History, 12. 200 Fawcett, Louise, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23, 29. 201 Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire, 17. 202 Ibid., 18. 203 Omissi, Air Power, 38. 204 Ibid., 34. 205 Ibid., 37. 165

206

Batatu, Hanna, The Old Landed Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 24. 207 Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics, 78. 208 CP 235 (25), 11 May 1925: CO 730/82/22162. Quoted in Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 64.