AFGHANISTAN |DI SPATCH E S hasty and frantic departure from Afghanistan after two decades. The ill-fated departure followed a 20-year war that was marred by unclear strategic goals after the initial successful United States invasion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
NOAA
Intelligence failure?
There has been much speculation as to the intelligence assessments that would have been provided to the American political and military leadership in Washington and Kabul. This would include the various scenarios being considered, the options and potential courses of action and assessed cascading consequences. It is unlikely that the U.S. intelligence community would not have briefed those responsible about the implications of the Afghanistan withdrawal, likely by providing daily assessments of events. Although the exact date for a Taliban takeover would have been difficult to ascertain, the monitoring of the U.S. withdrawal also saw the Afghan forces under attack. The Taliban would immediately fill the tactical vacuum left by the Afghan/ U.S. military. Intelligence assessments would be updated daily, if not hourly, as the Taliban advanced towards the capital. It is difficult to believe that senior political leaders and the bureaucracy writ large would not have been aware of the Taliban momentum as Afghans surrendered or withdrew from the field. Of note, in a cable dated July 13, two dozen American diplomats stationed in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul warned of the potential collapse of the Afghan government to the Taliban following the U.S. troop drawdown. Forwarded to the secretary of state, the strongly worded cable reportedly urged the U.S. State Department to start organizing an airlift operation to evacuate Americans and other qualified personnel. This assessment may have been supported by other U.S. and allied intelligence reporting. The scapegoating of the intelligence community has impinged on the credibility and dedication of intelligence professionals who have committed their lives to addressing and analyzing the “wilderness of mirrors” to provide the necessary guidance to their respective political, military and bureaucratic leadership. This accusation, in itself, is revealing and reflects poorly upon the Biden administration as it tries to displace its responsibility, and to ascertain who is blameworthy. NATO partners — Canada, Great Britdiplomat and international canada
ain, France and Germany — were also monitoring events in Afghanistan, and may also be responsibile for not anticipating an eventual Taliban takeover. More than 40,000 Canadian Armed Forces members served in the Afghanistan theatre of operations between 2001 and 2014. The failure to be ready and act quickly to expedite the departure of Western citizens and Afghans seeking asylum demonstrates a true lack of strategic vision by political leaders and bureaucrats.
threat of terrorist activities, presumably targeted against those nations that participated in the fight over the last two decades. The success of the Taliban will provide al-Qaida, ISIS-K (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province) and other jihadist organizations with a tremendous psychological boost. This cannot be understated as Islamists have and will draw inspiration from the U.S. and the West’s ignominious departure. A Taliban Afghanistan may again provide a territo-
Where it all began in 2001: The remains of the World Trade Centre smoulder as U.S. officials were no doubt making retaliation plans against Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida.
This is not hindsight, as those nations involved were aware, as were their intelligence organizations, of the inevitability of a Taliban takeover. Preparations should have been made, and plans and options for evacuation co-ordinated and put in place. Instead of a well-planned and orderly withdrawal, those political leaders responsible for this catastrophe were nowhere to be seen, including the Canadian ambassador, Reid Sirrs, who reportedly went on leave in July, as the Taliban were advancing. This does not bode well for the future of the U.S.’s global position or the credibility of the Western alliance. The threat picture
Following the departure from Afghanistan, the West will likely face an increased
rial operating space to facilitate recruitment, training, support and planning for terrorist violence against the West. The release of thousands of incarcerated members of the former al-Qaida, ISIS-K and Taliban from Kabul prisons poses potential problems. Al-Qaida and ISIS-K are dedicated to a regional and global jihadist campaign and the Afghan Taliban are focused on re-establishing their Afghan power base. It is unknown to what extent al-Qaida and ISIS-K have influenced the Afghan Taliban in their doctrinal outlook regarding a global jihad, or what the Taliban success will mean to jihadists globally, especially those who aspire to follow a more activist/violent path against the West and Western interests. Western police and security organizations 51
