Counter-IED Report Spring-Summer 2023

ISSN2050-6732(Print)

ISSN2050-6740(Online)

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL: ASTUDYINTOTHECOGNITIVEPROCESSESUSEDBYPRACTITIONERS ISIMPLEMENTATIONOFWESTERNC-IEDENTERPRISESSUITABLE WHENPROVIDINGDONORC-IEDASSISTANCE?

ASTRATEGICPRINCIPLESAPPROACHTOREGIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENTFROMIMPROVISEDHOMEMADETOMASSMARKET CONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

AIRBORNEMAGNETICS-AVIABLETOOLFORDETECTIONANDQUALITYCONTROL NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

UNATTENDEDPACKAGES–THESECURITYOFFICER’SDILEMMA PIRSENSORSINIEDs USINGCONSTANTPOTENTIALGENERATORS

INDIA–THEIEDCHALLENGES

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

REPORTCONTRIBUTORS MEDIAPARTNERS

Theopinionsandviewsexpressedintheeditorialcontentinthisreportare thoseoftheauthorsaloneanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofany organisationwithwhichtheymaybeassociated.Materialinadvertisements andpromotionalfeaturesmaybeconsideredtorepresenttheviewsofthe advertisersandpromoters.Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisreport donotnecessarilyexpresstheviewsofthepublisher.Whileeverycarehas beentakeninthepreparationofthereport,thepublisherisnotresponsible forsuchopinionsandviewsorforanyinaccuraciesinthearticles.

©2023.Theentirecontentsofthispublicationareprotectedbycopyright. Fulldetailsareavailablefromthepublisher.Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthis publicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystemortransmittedin anyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanicalphotocopying,recording orotherwise,withoutthepriorpermissionofthecopyrightowner.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

IFCNATOEODDEMONSTRATIONSANDTRIALS2023

5ICORTECHNOLOGY

7GARRETTMETALDETECTORS

8SAFEPROGROUPINC.

83DX-RAYLTD

9FOREWORD

ByRobHyde-Bales,ConsultingEditor,Counter-IEDReport

11TELEDYNEICM

13DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL:

ASTUDYINTOTHECOGNITIVEPROCESSESUSEDBYPRACTITIONERS

ByEdwinA.Bundy,Ph.D.inF.S.,Ph.D.inEd,CIPBI ProgramManager(GS-15),EOD/EXOSubgroup, IrregularWarfareTechnicalSupportDirectorate

23ISIMPLEMENTATIONOFWESTERNC-IEDENTERPRISESSUITABLE WHENPROVIDINGDONORC-IEDASSISTANCE?

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialist

atAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

30DEFENSE&SECURITY2023

31ASTRATEGICPRINCIPLESAPPROACHTOREGIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialist

atAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

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CONTENTS

38DEVELOPMENTFROMIMPROVISEDHOMEMADETOMASSMARKET

CONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

BySerkanKoc,Major(OF-3)TUR-A,ElectronicWarfareSpecialist,NATOC-IEDCoE

47 AIRBORNEMAGNETICS-AVIABLETOOLFORDETECTIONANDQUALITYCONTROL

ByDipl.-Ing.WolfgangSuß,ManagingDirector,SENSYS

54NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

ADVANCEDSOFTWAREALGORITHMSPOWERNEXT-GENSOLUTIONS

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58EDEX2023

59UNATTENDEDPACKAGES–THESECURITYOFFICER’SDILEMMA

ByVincentDeery,CEO,3DX-RayLtd

62IDEF2023

63PIRSENSORSINIEDs USINGCONSTANTPOTENTIALGENERATORS

ByTeledyneICM

68INDIA–THEIEDCHALLENGES

ByColonelHRNaiduGade–IndianArmyVeteran

76“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

ByLieutenantColonelJoseMRufas,ChiefofAttacktheNetworksBranch, C-IEDCentreofExcellence

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FOREWORD

Theearlypartofthisyearhasbeendominatedby thecontinuingarmedconfictinUkrainewhich startedin2014andledtothefull-scaleRussian invasioninFebruary2022.

Aswithmostarmedconficts,thewarinUkraineis leavingbehindanever-growinglegacyofunexploded landmines,operationallyfunctionalImprovised ExplosiveDevices(IEDs)andotherExplosive RemnantsofWar(ERW).Anestimated174,000 squarekilometresofUkrainianterritoryarecontaminatedbylandmines–bothanti-tankandantipersonnel1 –thelatterincontraventionoftheOttawa Treaty1997banningtheuseofanti-personnelmines. ThecontaminatedareaislargerthanEngland, NorthernIrelandandWalescombinedandrepresents amassiveclearancetaskasandwhentheoperational environmentpermitssuchclearance.

Accordingtoajointassessmentreleasedon23 March2023bytheGovernmentofUkraine,theWorld BankGroup,theEuropeanCommission,andtheUnited Nations,Ukraineneeds$37.4billiontocarryout humanitariandeminingofitslands.Thissumincludes morethan$397millionneededjustfortheyear2023.2

Intermsofglobaldeminingeffortstherearesome positivenews.AccordingtoareportbytheCambodian MineActionandVictimAssistanceAuthority(CMAA), thefrstfourmonthsofthisyearsawa65percent decreaseinnumberofvictimscomparedtothesame periodlastyear.3

InYemen,thefragiletrucebetweenwarringparties bringssomepositivedevelopmentsandhopeforthe countryaftermorethaneightyearsofwar.Yemen alongsideIraq,Afghanistan,Cambodia,Bosnia& HerzegovinaandCroatia,tonameafew,isoneofthe mostLandmineandExplosiveOrdnance(EO) contaminatedcountries,makingmanyresidential neighbourhoodsuninhabitableanddangerous.

InAfghanistan,heavyERWlandcontamination spanningfordecadesbacktotheSovietinvasion posesadditionalchallengestothefarmersandrural communitiesdevastatedbyfoodshortagesand insecurity.AccordingtotheUnitedNationsOffcefor theCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)some $18.3millionisneededyearlyforsurvey,explosive ordnancedisposal,andlandmine/ERWclearance inAfghanistan.4

1 https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/ukraine-banned-landmines-harm-civilians

2 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099184503212328877/pdf/P1801740d1177f03c0ab180057556615497.pdf

3 https://phnompenhpost.com/national/cmaa-mine-victims-down-65-cent

4 https://twitter.com/OCHAAfg/status/1630094885112934407

ByRobHyde-Bales,ConsultingEditor,Counter-IEDReport

Theviolencecausedbyimprovisedexplosive devices(IEDs)continuesaroundtheworld.Oneofthe deadliestattacksthisyeartookplaceon30January 2023whenasuicidebomberdetonatedhisvest atthePeshawarPoliceLinesmosqueinPakistan, asnumerousworshippers,includingmanylocal policemen,wereprayinginside.Atleast100people werekilledintheblastand225wereinjured.

Theuseofcarbombingsasapreferredmethod ofattacktargetinggovernmentoffcials,securityforces, lawenforcementoffcersandjournalistsisnotedin Somalia,Kenya,Nigeria,Niger,Cameroon,Burkina Faso,Mali,Iraq,Syria,India,Pakistan,Afghanistan, Cyprus,Myanmar,RussiaandRussian-occupied territoriesofUkraine.

Inamostthought-provokingarticle, Dr.EdwinA. Bundy,a SeniorProgramManagerfortheU.S. DepartmentofDefenseattheIrregularWarfare TechnicalSupportDirectorate(IWTSD), discusses decision-makingandproblem-solvinginbombdisposal anddescribesarecentstudyundertakenintothe cognitiveprocessesusedbybombdisposal practitioners.Inearly2022datawascollectedfrom currentandformerEODpractitionersin17countriesin ordertoinvestigatecognitiveapproachesusedin problem-solvinganddecision-making.Thestudyused IEDsasthecatalysttostimulatecognitiveprocessesin studyparticipants.Theparticipantshadbetween1and 35yearsofexperienceandwidelydifferingeducation levels.Forthestudy,participantshadaccesstoan onlinesitecomprising18scenarios,eachconsistingof twoorthreeimagesofapotentialIEDcircuit,checklists oflabelstoidentifycomponentsofthecircuit,potential hazardstheyconsideredassociatedwiththecircuit,and thecircuit’stype-by-function.Thescenariosrangedfrom veryeasytoverydiffcult.Participantswerealsoasked toidentifyfactorsorfeaturesregardingthecircuitsthat drovetheirdecisionmakingandfnallytoratetheir confdencelevelsineachscenariointermsofcircuit components,potentialhazards,andtype-by-function. Datafromthestudyparticipantssuggestthattheyused pattern-matchingorheuristicstoreach90%oftheir decisions.Incontrast,thestudyfoundthatlessthan 6%ofdecision-makingistheresultofamore

deliberateandanalyticalprocess.Theauthoropines thattheresultsofthisstudyhavesomeveryserious implications,nottheleastofwhichisforhowbomb techniciansaretrained.Whilemostdecisionsmade duringanaverageday,inanyoccupationoractivity, arebasedonlearned,repetitivebehaviours,or whatcognitivescientistscallheuristics,innewor criticalsituations,relyingonheuristicscanfail catastrophically.Thecommunityowesittobomb technicianstoprovidebettertoolsandtrainingin thecognitivedomain.Notonlywillthisimprove survivability,butitwillallowourpractitionersto keeppacewithadversaries,whoaremorelikelythan ever,tousenot-yet-seencomponentsandcircuitsin theirdevices.

Inhisinformativearticleonthetransitionfromhomemadetomassproduced,commercialoff-the-shelf (COTS)electroniccomponentsintheproductionof IEDs,MajorSerkanKoç oftheTurkishArmyand currentlyservingastheEWSpecialistat theNATOCounter-IEDCentreofExcellenceexamines theimpactofthistransitionbothontheproducersof IEDsandIEDDspecialists.Hepointsoutthatthemass productionofthesecomponentshasresultedintheir ever-increasingavailabilitytogetherwithfallingprices. Inparticular,theproliferationofRadioControlledIEDs (RCIEDs)haspresentedalowcost,highlyfexibleand unpredictablethreattotheC-IEDworld.Accordingto INTERPOL,internationalorganisedcrimeisamajor componentinthehighlylucrativetradeincounterfeit goods–includingcounterfeitelectroniccomponents, manyofwhicharecomponentsofRCIEDs,toinclude transformers,relays,timers,fusesandwiring accessories.Therearestronglinksbetweenthistrade andillegalnarcotics,moneylaunderingandgeneral systemicglobalcorruption.IntheCounter-IED campaignboththeAttacktheNetworksandDefeatthe Devicepillarsofthecampaignareusedextensivelyto combattheubiquitousthreatofRCIEDs.COTS electronicdevicesenablegreateruseofthecontested electromagneticenvironment–ofparticularuseinthe RCIEDfeld.Theyalsomakeitmorediffculttoidentify theelectronicsignatureofanIEDmanufacturer.There isnodoubtthattheomnipresentRCIEDstogetherwith

thevictimoperatedpressureplatesub-surfaceIEDs continuetocreatemajorchallengestoboththegeneral publicandtheCounter-IEDoperativesinbothcurrent andformerwarzonesandotherhostileenvironments.

Inhisthought-provokingarticleonthesuitabilityand effectivenessofWesternCounter-IEDenterprises whenprovidingdonorC-IEDassistance,PaulAmoroso ofAssessedMitigationOptionsexaminesthe challengesandpotentialpitfallsinherentinsuch assistance.Heusestheterm “Counter-IEDenterprise”asa collectivetermtodescribeallaspects ofC-IEDactivitiesdesignedand intendedtomatchandideally overmatchtheuseorthreateneduse ofIEDs.Heopinesthat,giventhe transnationalnatureoftheIEDthreat today,regionallycoherentC-IED responsesarerequired,basedon strategicapproaches.Heexamines theneedforregionalC-IED enterprisesastodate,insomecases theeffortsofWesternC-IEDdonor enterpriseshavebeendisjointed, lackingincoordination,and cooperationandoftenresultingin duplicationofeffort.Aspartofhis research,heidentifedC-IED strategicprinciplesforEastAfrica.He examinesregionalandglobalC-IED effortsincludingthoseoftheUNand AfricanUnion.Hefurtherhighlights responsesfromtheUS,NATO,the UKandAfghanistan.TheC-IED experienceoftheUKwashoned duringtheso-called“Troubles”in NorthernIrelandfrom1969onwards, whenthesecurityforcesinboth NorthernIrelandandmainlandUK facedthemostskilfulbombmakersin theworldatthattime.Hehighlights Afghanistanasonenationbeyond WesternC-IEDeffortsthathasa nationalC-IEDstrategy,dueinlarge

measuretothepresenceofNATOforcesfghtingthe Taliban2004-2014.Heconcludesthattodevelopan effectiveC-IEDstrategy,strategicprinciplesare requiredtoachieverequisiteimpactsandoutcomes whenprovidingC-IEDdonorassistance.

Dipl.-Ing.WolfgangSüß,istheManagingDirectorof SENSYS,aGermancompanybasedeastofBerlin, whichmanufacturesmagnetometersandtimedomain electromagnetics.Inhisinformativearticlehe

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describeshowCOTSdronescombinedwithadditional computingpowerandmagnetometersarebeingused inthefeldforUXOdetection,areaobservationand qualitycontrol.SENSYSfocusonFluxgate Magnetometers–passivesensorsthatmeasurethe Earth’smagneticfeld.Ferrousobjectssuchas landminesdistorttheEarth’smagneticfuxlinesand thisisdetectedbythemagnetometersasanomaliesin theEarth’smagneticfeld.Thedetectionsystem describedinthearticlecomprisestheSENSYS MagDroneR4Datalogger,fveSENSYSFluxgate sensors,combinedwiththeLatvianproduced SkyHubTrueTerrainFollowingsystemallmountedon aCOTSDJIM300commercialdrone.This enablesthe droneinanautonomousterrainfollowingmode,ideally ataheightbetween0.5and1meteronapreprogrammedfightpatterntocoverupto30hectaresin asingleday.Hedescribestwoprojectsusingthis system.Thefrstisonafringrangeordnanceimpact areawhichwasusedfrstbytheSovietarmedforcesin theerstwhileDDR,andsubsequentlybytheGerman Bundeswehr.Theotherprojectisthesurveyofaformer GermanWorldWarTwoairfeldconstructedbyforced labourtowardstheendofthewar.Inbothoperationsthe SENSYSdronemountedsurveillancesystemhas provedtobehighlyeffective.Ithasalsobeenused elsewhereinGermanyandinUkraine.SENSYSisnow turningitsattentiontothechallengeoflocatingnonferrousERW.

InhishighlytopicalarticleVincentDeery,CEOof 3DX-RayLtdexaminesthesecurityissuesassociated withunattendedpackages.Hebeginswithanoverview oftheglobalsecuritysituationtodayandnotesthat therewasawelcomereductioninbothdeathsand incidentsresultingfromterroristattacksfrom2021to 2022.However,ofthetoptenmostlethalattacks,six involvedIEDstodevastatingeffect,illustratingthat explosivesremainafavouredmethodofattackby terrorists.InEuropefor2021,themajorityofreported terroristattackswereclassifedasjihadistterrorism withacontinuingintenttousebothIEDsandIIDsas weaponsofattack.Hethendescribestheproblemof anorganisation’ssecurityoffcerwhenconfrontedby anunattendedpackage.Iftheoriginofthepackage

cannotbeidentifed,thenthesecurityoffcerneedsto identifythecontentsofthepackage.Ifthiscannotbe donevisually,thedilemmaisthenwhethertoescalate toafull-scalebombthreatincidentnecessitatingthe evacuationofanareaortakereasonablestepsto identifythecontentsofthepackage.Thesurest methodofsuchidentifcationisbymeansofaportable x-rayscanner.SuchascannerallowstheEOD operatortoexaminethecontentsofthepackage withouttouchingordisturbingit.3DX-Rayoffersa comprehensiverangeofportablescanningsystems. Themostsignifcanttechnicaldevelopmentinx-ray scanningsystemshasbeentheintroductionofcolour differentiatedscanswhichenabletheoperatorto accuratelyidentifythecontentsofthepackage.The 3DX-Raysuiteofscannersutilisesthreecolourscan systems,whereasmostotherscannersusejusttwo, thusreducingtheaccuracyofpackagecontents identifcation.Astheauthorpointsout,allsecurity offcersshouldconsidertheacquisitionofaportable x-rayscanner,butseeingcontentsinjustblackand whiteisnolongergoodenough. ■

RobHyde-Balesbiography

DuringhiscareerintheUKRoyal Engineers, RobHyde-Bales was responsibleforlandmineclearancein Libyaand,morelatterly,Afghanistan intherunningofthefrstUnited Nationshumanitarianlandmine clearancetrainingprogramme–OperationSalam.TheprogrammetrainedAfghanmale refugeesinlandmineclearancetechniques,andAfghan womenandchildreninmineawarenessandavoidance training.MorerecentlyhesetuptheCaribbeanSearch CentreinKingston,Jamaica.TheCentreisdesignedto trainsecurityforcesacrosstheCaribbeaninmodern searchtechniques.Afterretiringfromthearmyhejoined CranfeldUniversityatShrivenham,nearOxford,and undertookaresearchprojectonbehalfoftheUK MinistryofDefencethatexaminedwaystoimprovethe sharingofIEDthreatinformationbetweenthemilitary andcivilianorganisationsinhazardousareas.

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVING INBOMBDISPOSAL:

ASTUDYINTOTHECOGNITIVEPROCESSESUSEDBYPRACTITIONERS

ByEdwinA.Bundy,Ph.D.inF.S.,Ph.D.inEd,CIPBI ProgramManager(GS-15),EOD/EXOSubgroup,IrregularWarfareTechnicalSupportDirectorate

INTRODUCTIONTOTHESTUDY

Inearly2022,datawascollectedfromcurrentand formermilitaryandpublicsafetybombtechniciansfrom 17countries,toinvestigatecognitiveapproachesused inthiscommunityforproblem-solvinganddecision making.Thestudyusedimprovisedexplosivedevices (IEDs)asthecatalysttostimulatecognitiveprocesses instudyparticipantsrelatedtodecision-makingand problem-solving,andvariousdemographicfactors wereexaminedtodetermineifvariablescouldbe identifedthatmadesomebombtechniciansbetterat performingthesecognitivefunctionsthanothers. Studyparticipantshadfrom1to35yearsof experience,andeducationlevelsrangedfromthe equivalentofahigh-schooleducation,toseveral participantswithaPh.D.Additionally,information relatedtofactorslikelengthofinitialbombdisposal training,andanyspecializedIEDelectronicstraining, wascaptured,aswellasformalelectronicstraining (i.e.,atechnicaloracademicdegreeinelectronics), andwhetherornotastudyparticipantwasanIED electronicstrainerforotherbombtechnicians.

Afterapplyingtobeconsideredforthestudy,a processthatwasusedtoverifythatapplicantswerein factcurrentorformerbombtechnicians,participants weregivenaccesstoanonlinesiteconsistingof18 scenarios(seeFigure1),witheachscenarioconsisting oftwotothreeimagesofapotentialIEDcircuit,and

checklistsoflabelstoidentifycomponentsinthecircuit; anyhazardstheyfeltwereassociatedwiththecircuit; andthecircuit’stype-by-function.Allcomponentsforthe circuitwerevisible(i.e.,nohiddencomponents),andifa nomenclaturewasstampedinto,orsilkscreenedontoa component,atleastoneoftheimagesincludedensured thatthesemarkingswereclearlyvisible.

Forhazardsandcircuittype-by-function,participants werealsoaskedtofllinafree-textfeldidentifyingthe factorsorfeaturesregardingthecircuitthatdrovetheir decision-making.Participantscouldalsosuggest additionalcomponents,hazards,andcircuittypes-byfunctioniftheyfeltanywereinadvertentlyleftoutofthe relevantchecklists.Finally,studyparticipantswere alsoaskedtoratetheirownconfdencelevels regardingdecisionsmadeforeachcategory(i.e., components,associatedhazards,andcircuittype-byfunction).Qualitatively,thishelpedinunderstandingif thosewithmoretrainingorexperienceweremore confdentintheirdecision-makingcapabilitiesthan thosewithlesstrainingandexperience,andthe degreetowhichthatwaswarranted.

Inadditiontotheprincipalinvestigatorbeingan experiencedresearcherandaformerU.S.Army ExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal(EOD)technician, standardchecksandbalanceswereusedforthisstudy. Aswithallhumansubjectsresearch,approvalwas soughtandgrantedbyanInstitutionalReviewBoard, andoversightwasconductedbyanacademicreview committeeconsistingofDr.JohnFrucci,aformerbomb

squadcommanderandExecutiveDirectoroftheSchool ofForensicSciencesatOklahomaStateUniversity;Dr. KirkYeager,ChiefExplosivesScientistfortheU.S. FederalBureauofInvestigations;Dr.CJCowlin,a formerU.S.NavyEODtechnicianandcurrentDirectorat LargeforBombTechsWithoutBorders;andDr.Jason Beaman,ChairofPsychiatryandBehavioralSciencesat OklahomaStateUniversityCenterforHealthSciences.

Thecontentforthisstudywasvettedthroughuseof anexpertpanel.Thispanelconsistedofsubjectmatter experts(SMEs)inthefeldsofbombdisposalandIED electronics,andselectedbasedondepthandbreadth ofknowledgeandexperience.Thepanelconsistedof ChiefSuperintendent(Ret)MichaelCardash,Israel NationalPoliceBombDisposalDivision;Lt.Col,Adam Modd,NewZealandSpecialAirService;SpecialAgent BombTechnician(Ret)RobertvonLoewenfeldt,South CarolinaLawEnforcementDivision;SergeantRobert Epps,BombSquadCommander,RiversideCounty CaliforniaSheriffDepartment;Mr.JaredFrench,aU.S. DoDTacticalBombTechnician;andMr.RickHayworth, aForensicExaminerandTechnicalLeadforthe TechnicalExploitationUnitattheFBI’sTerrorist

Figure1:StudycircuitsanddegreeofdiffcultyasratedbytheExpertPanel.

ExplosiveDeviceAnalyticalCenter(TEDAC).

Mr.Hayworthwastheonlynon-bombtechnicianin thegroup,butisaninternationallyrecognizedIED electronicsexpert,andholdsanadvanceddegreein ElectronicsEngineering.

Becausethestudywasconductedusingawebbasedplatform,thestudywasnaturallylimitedto participantswhohadaccesstotheinternet,and becausethedatacollectioninstrumentwaswrittenin English,itwasalsoassumedthatparticipantshada technicalunderstandingoftheEnglishlanguage.One ofthefnalassumptionswasthatbecausethiswasa voluntarystudy,andparticipantswereself-selected, thattheywerelikelytohaveaninterestinIED electronics,andthereforetheresultsofthisstudy couldpotentiallybeskewedinthedirectionofhigher successratesforcomponentidentifcation,hazard assessment,andcircuittypes-by-functiondetermination.

FINDINGS

Itshouldbenotedbythereader,thatthesefndings shouldnotbeinterpretedeitherdirectlyorindirectly,as thisauthor,theacademicreviewcommittee,ortheexpert panel,suggestingthatbombtechniciansarenothighly capable,orprofcientatthejobstheyaretrainedtodo. Thisstudysimplyfocusesonwhattypesofcognitive reasoningapproachesbombtechniciansuseindecision making,andlooksathoweffectivetheseapproachesare usedforproblemsolvingbybombtechniciansintheIED electronicsdomain.Furtherresearchneedstobe conductedtoseeifsimilarapproachesareusedby bombtechniciansinotherdomains,suchasx-ray interpretation,andifsimilarcorrelationsexist.

Thatsaid,theresultsofthestudywererathereyeopening.Datagatheredfromstudyparticipantssuggests thatoverall,bombtechniciansusepattern-matchingfor over90%oftheirdecision-making,ratherthanusinga truehypothetico-deductivereasoningprocess.Cognitive psychologistsclassifythisasSystem1thinking,whichis anintuitivemodeofthinking,soisconductedalmost effortlessly.Thissystemisresponsibleforspontaneous orimmediatereactionstostimuli,andisoftendrivenby pre-existingbiasesoranemotionalresponse.System1 thinkingreliesalmostexclusivelyonheuristics,ormental

shortcuts,andallowsdecisionmakingtooccurwithvery littleconsciouseffortorrefection.

Conversely,System2thinkingwasusedbystudy participantslessthan6%ofthetimewhileconducting theiranalyses.System2thinkingisamoredeliberate andanalyticalprocessthatrequiresgreaterlevelsof attentionandcognitiveeffort.Thissystemisinvolvedin complexproblem-solvingtasks,andischaracterizedby deliberate,effortfulcognitiveprocessing,andcan overrideautomaticresponsesgeneratedbySystem1 thinking,whichallowstheusertoconsideralternative pathsoroptionswhileinuse.

Together,System1andSystem2thinkingarereferred toasDual-Processtheory,anditiswidelybelievedthat thesetwosystemsoperateinparallel,interactingwith eachother,butsometimescompetingforcontrolover thoughtprocesses.Inthisstudyhowever,System1 thinkingwasclearlydominant,andsuggeststhatrather thanparticipantsconductingwhatmightbethoughtofas atrueanalysisofthecircuit,theykeyedinoncertain components,presumablythosetheyhadbeentaught duringtraining,orhadencounteredatsomeotherpoint intheircareer.Theythenbasedtheremainderoftheir decisionsonlyonthepresenceofthoseveryspecifc components,andregardlessofwhatothercomponents mighthavebeenpresent,someunquestionablymore dangeroustothebombtechnicianthantheones recognized,theseunrecognizedcomponentswerenot factoredintofurtherdecisionmaking.

Anexampleisprobablywarrantedhere.Acomponentcommonlyusedinbombdisposaltraining, whetherduringinitialorsustainmenttraining,isthe555 integratedcircuit(IC).Thiscircuitiseasilyrecognized bymostbomb technicians,and iscommonlyreferredtoasa

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL

“555-timer.”Ithas aratherdistinct appearance,in thatitissmall, black,andhas8 pins/legs(see Image1).

Image1:555IC.

Thisbecomesproblematicwhenbombtechnicians starttothinkthatanysmall,black,8-pinICisa555timer,andthereforebyextension,carriesthesame

associatedhazards,andalwayscreatesaspecifc circuittype-by-function.Assuggestedbydata collectedduringthestudy,ifacomponentwithsimilar physicalcharacteristicsisusedinacircuit,even thoughavisiblenomenclatureispresent,clearly indicatingotherwise(seeImage2),manystudy participantsdefaultedtoselectingthe555IC,and indicatedthatthecircuitwasforuseasa“Time”typeby-function,aswellascarryingatimehazard.Thisis problematic,notonlybecause555ICsarecapableof beingusedforfunctionsotherthantiming,butthere arenumerousothercomponentswithsimilarphysical characteristicsthatpresentmanyothertypesof potentialhazards.

Quantitatively,thestudyfoundthataverage successratesforstudyparticipantswereonly20%for componentidentifcation,16%forassociatedhazards, and51%forcircuittype-by-function.However,study participantsratedtheirconfdenceinmakingthese decisionsratherhigh(seeFigure2).Thiswould suggestthatbombtechniciansingeneral,signifcantly overratetheaccuracyoftheirowndecisions.

Image2:PIC12microcontroller.

Figure2.Averageself-assessedconfdencelevels.

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL

Figures3–5providestudyresultsbydependent variables.Thereaderwilllikelynotethataverage successratesarehigherforcircuitsthatarecommonly taughtduringbombdisposaltraining.Thisisinline withthequalitativefndingssuggestingthatbomb techniciansperformtheircircuitanalysesusing pattern-matchingratherthandeductivereasoning,as theyarelikelytohaveseenthecomponentsusedin thesecircuits,taughtthehazards,andthenexplained thecircuittype-by-function.Whilesomeofthecircuits receivinghighersuccessratesmaynotbetaught duringinitialbombdisposaltraining,areviewofthe curriculafrom“advanced”coursessuggestthatthey aretaughtthere.

Datafromthestudyalsosuggeststhatindependent variableslikeyearsofexperience,specializedtraining, orevenlengthofinitialtraining,hadnoeffectona bombtechnicianbeingabletosuccessfullyidentify thecomponentsinacircuit,knowwhathazardsthat circuitpresents,orinmakingadeterminationasto circuittype-by-function.Figures6-11identifyaverage successratesbyindependentvariables.

IMPLICATIONS

Theresultsofthisstudyhavesomeveryserious implications,nottheleastofwhichisforhowbomb techniciansaretrained.Whilemostdecisionsmade duringanaverageday,inanyoccupationor activity,arebasedonlearned,repetitivebehaviors,or whatcognitivescientistscallheuristics,innewor criticalsituations,relyingonheuristicscanfail catastrophically.Andeventhoughitisprobablynot lostonanyoneinbombdisposal,thattousepattern matchingtotrainanewbombtechnicianeffectivelyto quicklyandaccuratelyidentifyalloftheelectronic componentsorcircuitstheymightencounterduring theircareer,theywouldhavetobeshownliterally thousandsofdifferentcomponents.Thefactremains however,thatmostbombtechniciansaretrainedto relyalmostexclusivelyonheuristics,evenafteronly beingshownwhatamountstoahand-fullof componentsduringinitialtraining,ratherthanbeing taughttousedeductivereasoningfortheirprincipal decision-makingstrategy.Therearemanyreasonsfor thisofcourse,suchaslimitedresourcesandtraining

Figure3.Averagesuccessratesforcomponentidentifcation.

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL

Figure4.Averagesuccessratesforhazardanalysis.

Figure5.Averagesuccessratesforcircuittype-by-functiondetermination.

Figure6.Componentidentifcationsuccessratesbyaffliation,lengthofinitialtraining,andyearsofexperience.

Figure7.Componentidentifcationsuccessratesbyself-assessedknowledgelevel,specializedandformaltraining, highesteducationlevel,andtrainerexperience.

DECISION-MAKINGANDPROBLEM-SOLVINGINBOMBDISPOSAL

Figure9.Hazardassessmentsuccessratesbyself-assessedknowledgelevel,specializedandformaltraining,highest educationlevel,andtrainerexperience.

Figure8.Hazardassessmentsuccessratesbyaffliation,lengthofinitialtraining,andyearsofexperience.

Figure10.Circuittype-by-Functiondeterminationsuccessratesbyaffliation,lengthofinitialtraining,andyearsof experience.

Figure11.Circuittype-by-Functiondeterminationsuccessratesbyself-assessedknowledgelevel,specializedandformal training,highesteducationlevel,andtrainerexperience.

time,aswellastryingtoinstillintraineesthe perceivedneedtoresolveanincidentandreturna scenetonormalcyasquicklyaspossible.Becauseof this,initialtraininggenerallyfocusesontool-use, ratherthancriticalthinkingandproblem-solving, whicharearguablysomeofthemostvaluable skillsabombtechnicianneedswhenfacedwith,and havingtomakedecisionsregardinganytypeof hazardousdevice.

Thisdataalsohasimplicationsforwhatwebelieve tobethetypesandvarietiesofIEDsusedglobally.If wefunctionundertheworkingpremisethatstatistics regardingdeviceuseisgatheredthroughbombdata centers,andbombdatacenterscollecttheirdatafrom reporting,whichisusuallydonebybombtechnicians, andbombtechniciansareonlyrecognizingthe componentsusedincircuits16%ofthetimeon average,orcircuittype-by-function51%ofthetime, howaccuratecoulddevicereportingpossiblybe?And byextension,howaccuratecouldinformation regardingdeviceconstructionpossiblybe,unlessit hasbeenanalyzedatanexploitationlabbyproperly trainedandqualifedforensicscientistsorexaminers?

Finally,theresultsofthisstudyhaveimplications fortheuseofbombtechniciansasexpertwitnesses. IntheU.S.,itisnotuncommonforbombtechnicians, particularlyattheStateandLocallevel,tobecalled onbyprosecutingattorneystoactasexpert witnessesregardingtheconstructionandfunctioning ofadevice,oreventhepotentialforpiecesandparts foundataresidencetobeusedtoconstructadevice. Again,thisbecomesproblematicwhenthetestimony callsforanythingbeyondrecognitionofthingsother thansimplecircuitsorcomponents.Ofcourse,thisis nottosuggestthatsomebombtechniciansarenot suffcientlyqualifedtoprovideexperttestimonyon deviceconstructionorfunctioning,butitwould behooveprosecutorstoensuretheirbombtechnician expertwitnessesdonotstraytoofarbeyondthe basicgeneralizedfunctioningofadevice,unlessof course,whattheyaretestifyingtohasbeenpeer reviewed,andconfrmedthroughvalidscientifc testing.ItisjustfartooeasyinthisageoffastfactcheckingandAIcapabilitieslikeChatGPT,toaccess

whatusedtobeconsideredarcaneknowledge,like thatofbombdisposal.

CONCLUSION

Bombtechniciansdoaseriesofnon-routinetasksthat requirementalandphysicaldexterity,complexcritical thinkingskills,andcreativeproblem-solving…and that’stheeasypartofthejob.Whilethesebravemen andwomenareexpertsintheuseoftoolstodefeat IEDs,thereseemstobealackoftrainingonthe generalcognitivereasoningskillsnecessaryto enhanceabombtechnician'sabilitytoconductactual problem-solving,whichinturncreatesdown-stream issueswithdecision-making.AsnotedbyLouis Pasteur,“Chancefavorsonlythepreparedmind,”so thecommunityowesittoourbombtechniciansto providebettertoolsandtraininginthecognitive domain.Notonlywillthisimprovesurvivability,butit willallowourpractitionerstokeeppacewith adversaries,whoaremorelikelythanever,tousenotyet-seencomponentsandcircuitsintheirdevices.■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Dr.EdwinA.Bundy isaSenior ProgramManagerfortheU.S. DepartmentofDefenseatthe IrregularWarfareTechnicalSupport Directorate(IWTSD).Heoversees advancedtechnologydevelopment effortsrelatedtoExplosive OrdnanceDisposalandExplosives Operations(EOD/EXO)andprovidestechnologybasedsolutionsforcombatingterroristandcriminal useofexplosivestooperationalpersonnelworldwide.

Dr.BundyservesasafederalliaisontotheNational BombSquadCommandersAdvisoryBoard(NBSCAB) intheU.S.,andisanadvisorforboththeInternational AssociationofBombTechniciansandInvestigators (IABTI)andU.S.BombTechnicianAssociation(USBTA).

Dr.BundyisalsoaformerU.S.ArmyExplosive OrdnanceDisposal(EOD)Technician,andCertifed InternationalPost-BlastInvestigator(CIPBI).Dr.Bundy holdsPh.Ds.inbothForensicScienceandEducation.

ISIMPLEMENTATIONOFWESTERNC-IEDENTERPRISES SUITABLEWHENPROVIDINGDONORC-IEDASSISTANCE?

INTRODUCTION

Owingtothetransnationalnatureofthenetworks whichfacilitateIEDuse,regionallycoherentC-IED responsesaredeemednecessary.Strategic approachestosuchregionalC-IEDeffortsarerequired forthemtobeeffective.TheresultingC-IEDenterprise developedandimplementedoftenrequiresC-IED donorassistance1 totheIEDaffectedstateorregion. Intheabsenceofsuchstrategiccoherententerprises, theresultingassistancecanoftenbedisjointedand lessthanoptimal.AttimesC-IEDefforts2 havebeen oversimplistic,promotingsilverbulletsolutionswhich areoftentechnologyandequipmentintensive.At othertimesproposedapproachescanbe overambitious,involvingthereinventionofthewheel andlackingtheresourcestomaketheinitiativesa reality.Inmanycases,C-IEDeffortshaveinvolved attemptstoshoehornelementsofpreviouslyused Westerntemplatesintoactionwithinaspecifc operationalenvironment.Thisarticlewillexamine aspectsofWesternC-IEDenterprisesillustratingtheir complexitiesandhowtheirrealisationismore challengingtoachievethanmightotherwisebe considered.Forthepurposeofthisandseveralrelated articles,C-IEDenterpriseisthecollectivetermto describeallinitiatives,activities,assistance, capabilitiesandcapacitiesthatcontributetotheC-IED effortsintendedtoatleastmatchbutideally

overmatch3 thethreatposedbytheuseorthreatened useofIEDsandcaninvolveanythingwhichisintended topredict,discover/detect,prevent,protectagainst, respondto/neutralise,recover/exploit,mitigate against,ordeterIEDattacks.Thearticlewillillustrate howattemptstoreplicateorimplementWesternC-IED enterpriseswhenprovidingC-IEDdonorassistanceis notthebestapproach.Wewillfrstexaminetheneed forregionallycoherentC-IEDenterprisesastodate, sucheffortshaveoftenbeendisjointed,lackingin coordination,andinsomecasescooperation.The contentofthisarticleisinformedfromresearch conductedbytheauthoraspartofaMAinstrategic studieswhichexaminedandidentifedC-IEDstrategic principlesforEastAfrica.

RegionalandGlobalC-IEDEfforts-UNandthe AfricanUnion(AU)C-IEDResponses

TheUNhasacknowledgedtheenduringandpervasive threatposedbyIEDsincontestedandfragilesecurity environments.Theyhavestatedthatsince2014,a steadyincreaseinthenumberandcomplexityof explosiveordnancethreatshasbeenrecordedagainst UNpersonnel,nationaldefenceandsecurityforces, civilianpopulations,andotheractorswithinUNmission areas.On24May2021,theUnitedNationsSecurity Councilrequestedanindependentreviewtoaddress

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialistatAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

thenatureofthisincreasingthreatandsuggestactions thattheUNSecurityCouncil,secretariat,missions, andtroop/police-contributingcountries,amongst others,cantaketoreduceandmitigatethethreat. On23November2021,thereportwasdeliveredwith recommendationswhichemphasizethatresponses neededtobeintegrated,coherentandproactive,as wellasresponsive.

LiketheUN'sfndings,theAUC-IEDstrategystated thatitisnecessarytoconfrontthischallengeinaunited effortthroughtheAfricanUnionCommission, Regional EconomicCommunities/RegionalMechanisms, Member Statesandpeacesupportoperations.Thus,awholeof continentperspectiveisneededtodevelopregionally specifcthreat-alignedapproachestoconfrontthis transnationalthreat.Suchregionalapproaches, coordinatedandsupportedbytheAfricanUnion Commission,needtoinvolveasuiteofcomplementary enablerswhichseektoprevent,counter,andrespond totheuseofIEDs.Suchregionalstrategiesmust complementwidermemberstatenationalsecurity strategiesaswellastheirnationalsecurity architecturesandstateinterests.Whileregional approachesarerequiredforeffectiveC-IED enterprisesowingtothetransnationalnatureofthe networkswhoemploythem,therearepotentiallyother beneftstoregionallycoherentC-IEDenterprises.

C-IEDstrategiesmaybeaneffectivemeanstoachieve morewithlessresources.Onacostbeneftanalysis basisthedevelopmentofregionalC-IEDstrategies canbeworthwhileendeavoursiftheyprovidetheway toachieveagreaterimpact(closertothedesiredends) fromlessmeans(resourcesneeded).

TheUSResponsetoIEDUse

AccordingtothelatestUSArmyC-IEDstrategy (February2022),aftertheIEDrosetoprominence duringtheconfictsofAfghanistanandIraqtheUSand alliedmilitariescommencedthedevelopmentofC-IED efforts.However,beforethisresponsetoIEDusein IraqandAfghanistan,otherIEDaffectedstateshad undertakeninitiativesandcollectiveeffortstocounter theirusebutdidnotusethetermC-IED.Examples includetheUK,Turkey,SriLankaandColombia.

ThesecollectivepracticesreferredtoasC-IED continuetoevolve.

Atanationallevel,theUSestablishedtheJoint ImprovisedExplosivesDeviceDefeatOrganisation (JIEDDO).Originallycreatedin2006todeviseand feldnewtechnologiestohelpidentifyroadsidebombs andotherimprovisedexplosivesthatwerequickly becomingtheweaponofchoiceofinsurgentsagainst UStroops,by2008ithadabudgetofUS$4billionper annum.NATO,theEuropeanDefenceAgencyand manyofthenationsoperatinginboththeatres,along withthosefacingIEDattacksdomestically,also contributedtothedevelopmentofC-IED;however, JIEDDOwithitsimmensebudgetalongwiththeUS’s commandingroleinboththeatresandwithinNATO wasakeyinfuencerinhowC-IEDdeveloped.By2012 withtheon-goingeffectivenessofIEDsagainstUSand coalitionforcesinAfghanistan,JIEDDOwasatthe heightofitspowerwithintheUSmilitaryestablishment. RefectingthegrowinginfuenceofJIEDDOwithinthe USmilitaryandtheglobalincreaseinIEDuse(with IEDattacksexceeding4,000in2011),on26February 2013,theWhiteHousereleasedapolicystatementon counteringIEDs.ThisPresidentialPolicyDirectiveis referredtoasPPD17.Thesubsequentproliferationof IEDuseinPakistan,acrosstheMiddleEast,North, EastandWestAfrica,tonamebutafew,aswellas sensationalistattacksintheWest,e.g.,UK,US, France,Belgium,andSpain,sawmultiplenational, regionalandinternationalC-IEDefforts.

TheUSwhichhasoneofthemostmatureand developeddefenceandsecurityarchitectureshave strategiesdedicatedtoseveralnationalsecurityand defenceissues.However,ithasnodedicatednational C-IEDstrategybuthashadseveralsupporting documentsthatseektocoordinatenationalC-IED efforts.TheUSmilitaryhaveproducedseveralC-IED strategiessuchastheUSArmyC-IEDstrategy.Two otherinfuentialUSC-IEDdocumentswerePPD17 andtheJIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlanfor2012–2016. WhilePPD17isnotanationalC-IEDstrategy,itdoes providethreepolicyobjectivesalongwitheightactions intendedtoguideUSsecurityanddefencepolicy makers.Italsoprovidesfveexamplesofsuccessfor

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

theseactions.PPD17conceptualisesaC-IEDcycle4 thatinvolvesthestepsofdiscover–prevent–protect against–respondto–recoverfrom–mitigateagainst IEDattacks.ThissixcomponentC-IEDcyclecanbe adaptedintoaneight-componentcycleasshowninthe fgurebelow,5 providingagoodframeworkto appreciatepotentialpointswithinanIEDattackcycle thatC-IEDeffortsmaybefocussedontoachieve desirableeffectstoprevent,counterorrespondtoIED attacksorthreatsthereof.

PPD17offersatoolforthosewithintheUSengaged intheC-IEDenterprise,toensuretheirC-IEDefforts remainstrategicallyalignedtotheirgovernment’s C-IEDpolicy.Itsconcludingsentenceisinsightfulin termsofwhatanationalstrategyshouldendeavourto achieve.Ittalksofawholeofgovernmentapproach integratingnational,sub-national,privatesectorand globalparticipationinC-IEDactivitiestobestposition theUStodiscoverplotstouseIEDsdomesticallyor againstitscitizensabroad,beforethosethreats becomeimminent.

TheJIEDDOC-IEDstrategicplanwasatoolto providestrategicdirectiontotheUSmilitary establishment’seffortstocounterthethreatposedby IEDs.Itwasintendedtoprovideaunifedandcoherent approachtoeffortsbytheUSdefenceestablishmentto countertheuseofIEDsagainstUSforcesbothwhenon expeditionandwhennecessary,domesticallyinsupport ofUSfederalagencies.Itsoverallgoalwastomitigate theeffectsofIEDsonthecommander’sfreedomof manoeuvreandtosetthepathfortheC-IEDeffortsin collaborationwithpartnernations,interagency,and intergovernmentalorganisationstoenablethedefeatof theIEDasaweaponofstrategicinfuence.The documentheavilyinfuencedUSmilitaryC-IEDduring thedecadeofthe2010sand,bydefault,subsequently infuencedNATOC-IED,thatofUSalliesandelements oftheUSmilitary-industrialcomplex.Whileeffortsto developnationalandregionalC-IEDstrategies,can harnesscertainelementsofthisJIEDDOstrategicplan, itfallsshortofwhatIEDaffectedstatesandregions requireforseveralreasons,whichincludeinteralia:

1.DomesticC-IEDissecondary toexpeditionaryC-IED;

2.Afghanistanwasthefocus;

3.Inconsistencyinwhat counteringIEDsmeans;6

4.Explanationofattackthe networkistoonarrowand belowparforastrategic document;

5.PrimaryresponsetoIEDsis heavilytechnologyand equipmentfocussedwiththe secondarytargetaudience beingelementsoftheUS militaryindustrialcomplex.

Forthesereasons,the JIEDDOstrategicplanfailsasa guidetoC-IEDdevelopment, investmentandimplementation.

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

Figure1.C-IEDcycle.

NATO

Mostnotably,NATOhasitsAlliedJointDoctrinefor CounteringIEDs,AJP-3.15.7 Manywesternmilitaries eitheradoptoradaptAJP-3.15asC-IEDdoctrinefor usebytheirarmedforces.Forexample,withintheIrish DefenceForcesfromcirca2007,theOrdnanceSchool ledmanyeffortstodevelopC-IEDbothatthetactical developmentlevel,throughtooperationalcapabilities andinformingstrategicperspectiveswhichincluded effortstoadaptNATOAJP-3.15C-IEDforIrish DefenceForces’use.8 Overall,theNATOAJP-3.15 publicationcouldnotbeuseddirectlybyanIED affectedstateindevelopinganationalC-IEDstrategy. Instead,itwasdesignedasmilitarydoctrineand intendedforusewithinthewiderNATOecosystemfor militariesthatareNATOconfguredandresourced accordingly.Itwasintendedformilitarystrategyand operationsratherthannationalstrategy.Thatsaid, thereismuchcontentwithintheNATOAJP-3.15 publicationthatcouldbeharnessedtoinformanIED affectedstateonwhattheymayconsiderfortheir militariesiftheirmilitaryaretobeacomponentoftheir nationalC-IEDstrategy.

WesternC-IEDApproaches

NowesternnationalC-IEDstrategieshavebeen identifedanditisnoteworthythattheUSistheonly stateidentifedashavingindependentlydevelopeda C-IEDstrategicplanandaPPDonC-IED.However, severalwesternstateshavevariousC-IEDpolicies, initiatives,strategicplans,anddoctrineswhichthey employ.IntermsofdomesticC-IED,therearevarious approachestakenbywesternstatestocounterthe threat.Inmostcases,westernnations'C-IEDis primarilyconductedundertheumbrellaofcounterterrorism(CT)oracriminaljusticeapproachandhence itisadomesticlawenforcementissue.Thisinturn meansthattypically,domesticC-IEDcomesunder nationalsecurityorcriminaljusticeorpotentiallya hybridofboth,andpredominantlyhasnomilitary involvement.Forexample,theUSJIEDDOstrategic planfortheUSmilitarywasprimarilyexpeditionary focussedand,onlyintendedtosupportUSfederal agencieswhohaveprimacydomestically.However,in

somecaseswesternmilitariescanhaveamore substantiveroleindomesticC-IED,mostnotablyinthe provisionofExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal(EOD).For example,theBelgianmilitaryprovideallnationalEOD capabilitiesasdotheDutchmilitarywithinThe NetherlandsandthesameforMalta.Thisissimilarto theprovisionofallEODcapabilitiesbytheIrish DefenceForceswithintheRepublicofIrelandtothe nationalpoliceforce,AnGardaSíochána,inanaidto thecivilpowerrole.

TheUKC-IEDEnterprise

ToexploretheprovisionofC-IEDdonorassistance,it isinformativetoexaminetheUKC-IEDenterpriseand howtheseevolvedtobeconsideredbymanyasthe leadC-IEDnationasitwasbeingdevelopedinthefrst decadeofthe2000s.Examininghowthistranspired, canassistunderstandingwhysofewWesternnations havestandaloneformalC-IEDstrategies.Thereare twoprimaryreasonswhytheUKwasconsideredthe leadingnationinthisarea.Firstly,theBritishretreat fromempiresawthemengagedinseveralsignifcant counterinsurgenciesthatexposedthemtoasymmetric threats,includingclandestineattackmethodsinthe formofboobytrapsandIEDs.UKarmedforcesand theirlocalconstabularyforceswereexposedtosuch threatsinHongKong,Aden,andCyprus.Other nations,postWWII,wereexposedtoIEDsasthey retreatedfromempire,mostnotablytheFrenchfor exampleinAlgeria.However,itistheauthor’s contentionthatitistheBritishretreatfromempireand theirexposuretoasymmetricattacksfrom‘Irish terrorism,’whichincludedIEDs,goingasfarbackas theFeniansandtheIrishRepublicanBrotherhood ‘dynamitewars’whichmarkedouttheBritish experienceasdifferent.TheLondonMetropolitan PolicealongwithotherelementsoftheUKsecurity serviceshadtocounteraclandestineorganisation undertakingterrorismusingmethodswhichincluded IEDattacks.WithinIrelandtheBritishmilitaryandother securityforceshadtocontendwithIEDattacksduring theIrishWarofIndependenceandsubsequently intermittentlyinNorthernIreland,especiallyalongthe borderupto1969,suchastheIRAbordercampaignof

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

1956–1962.From1969,Britishsecurityforcesfaced whatbecamethemostsophisticatedandpossiblythe mosteffectiveuseofIEDsuptothattime.‘The Troubles’sawtheUKmilitarydeployedtoNorthern Irelandinanaidtothecivilpowerroleinsupportof NorthernIrelandsecurityforces,inwhatcouldbe consideredanexpeditionaryoverseasdeploymentfor manyoftheBritishmilitarywhodeployed.Thename giventotheBritishArmedForces’operationsduring ‘TheTroubles’from1969to20079 wasOperation Bannerandwasconsideredaninternalsecurity operation.CoupledwiththeoperationsinNorthern Ireland,wastherelativelysteadyrateofIEDattackson theUKmainland.ThisresultedintheUKpoliceand securityservicesdirectinvolvementinC-IEDefforts. Itwastheseexperiencesduring‘TheTroubles’that exposedthemtosophisticatedIEDusethat signifcantlyinfuencedthedevelopmentoftheirC-IED enterprisewhichevolvedandsubsequentlysetthem apartfromotherIEDaffectedstates.Allthemilitary, policeandsecurityserviceexperiencesinC-IED,both domesticallyandinaquasi-overseasrole,resultedin theUKbecomingthemostreputable,experiencedand expertnationatC-IEDbytheturnofthetwentieth century.Thisleftthemastheleadnationwhenthe needforC-IEDaroseinIraqandAfghanistan; however,itisessentialtounderstandthecomplexities ofthisBritishC-IEDenterprise.

Bycirca2005,theBritishC-IEDenterprisehad developedfrom‘TheTroubles’andalsoinresponseto anemergingJihadithreat,requiringahybridapproach involvingamixtureofcounter-insurgency(COIN) practices,counter-terrorism(CT)andcriminaljustice approaches.TheUKhasnosingleC-IEDleadagency. Instead,ithasattimesinvolvedtheBritishmilitary, localpoliceforces,locallyraisedinfantryregiments, securityservices,domestic,foreignanddefence intelligence,stateandlocalforensiccapabilities, militaryandLondonmetropolitanEODandsearch teams,andCTpoliceunits.TheirEODcapabilities residewiththemilitary,exceptfortheGreater MetropolitanLondonareawheretheUKMetSO15 EODhasresponsibility.Thevariouselementsofthe Britishdefence,securityandjusticeapparatus

employedduringtheTroublesfrom1969to1991, whentheColdWarwason-going,facednomajor fundingorresourcingrestrictions.TheirC-IED intelligencecapabilitiesinvolvedpoliceforcesrelating tocriminaluseofIEDs,withUKSecurityServices (MI5)involvedwithnationalsecurityIEDissuesand theSecretIntelligenceService(MI6)potentially involvedifthereisaninternational,foreignstateor foreignnon-stateactorelementtoit.Thereisa potentialfortheinvolvementofmultiplesecurity agenciesinvolvingcivilian,policeandmilitary intelligenceelements.Foroffensiveattackthenetwork activities,theUKmilitary,canexecuteoverseas actionswithavarietyofUKpoliceandsecurityservice elementsinvolvedinthesamedomestically.Such attackthenetworkoperationscanincluderaids, interdictionsandarrests,beingexecutedundera criminaljusticeapproachoraCTframework.When doneunderaCTapproachtoC-IEDitbecomeseven morecomplexastheUKmilitaryactinsupportof policeelementsaswasthecaseforexamplewhen specialforcesoperativeswereembeddedwithLondon MetropolitanPoliceduringtheperiodofJune2017in relationtoterroristattacksinLondon.Thesame complexarrayofactorscanbeseenwithintheUK defence,securityandpolicesectorswhenitcomesto IEDexploitationwithforensicpersonnelandvarious laboratoriesofvaryingexpertiseandcapability involved.WhenprovidingC-IEDdonorassistancean appreciationoftheUKnationalC-IEDenterprise illustratesitsinterconnectedmulti-agencyandfexible approach.Itisequallyimportanttoappreciatethetime scaleandresourceinvestmentrequiredtodevelop suchdecentralisedcapabilitieswithinmatureandwellestablisheddefence,securityandjusticestructures.

Afghanistan’sNationalC-IEDStrategy

ExpandingthefocusbeyondwesternC-IEDefforts, onenationstandsoutforitsnationalC-IEDstrategy, Afghanistan.10,11 In2016,theIslamicRepublicof Afghanistan’soffceofnationalsecuritycouncil, internalaffairsdirectorateproducedthenation’s secondnationalC-IEDstrategy,withthefrstsuch nationalC-IEDstrategyproducedin2012.TheAfghan

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

InternalAffairsDirectorateweresignifcantlyassisted, supportedandadvisedbyISAFindevelopingand implementingthesestrategies.Thepartneringand outreachchiefduringthedraftingofthefrstAfghan nationalC-IEDstrategystatedthattheoutreachand partneringcelloftheISAFHQ(4Star)C-IEDbranch wasdeeplyinvolvedinthedevelopmentoftheC-IED StrategywithitsAfghangovernmentpartners; however,itwasalwaysathemeofthestrategythatit wouldbeAfghanled.Asecondkeypointisthatthese strategiesweredevelopedwithinafragilestate, counteringaviolentanddestabilisinginsurgency. Manyoftheministriesandsecurityforceswere embryonicandunderdeveloped,astheycountered IEDs.Thebackgroundtothedevelopmentofthe AfghannationalC-IEDstrategiesisanimportant considerationwhenattemptingtouseitasamodelto provideC-IEDassistance.Overall,thequestionmay beposed,whetherthewesterndominatedISAF alliance,resourcedandforcedthedevelopmentand implementationoftheirparadigmofanationalC-IED strategyforAfghanistan?

CONCLUSION

WhileregionalinitiativestocoordinateC-IEDcanbe slowpacedincomparisontonationaleffortswhichare typicallyfasterpacedtheneedforregionalapproaches tocounteringIEDuseispromotedduetothe transnationalnatureofthethreat.Thisisamonumental challengeandonethatwillbegenerationalinlength, butitcanbedoneiftheappropriateinternationally coordinatedapproachistaken,providedthereis internationalcooperationandappropriateresources allocated.Itisunrealistictothinksuchagrandstrategic endeavourwillhave193UNmemberstates’ consensus;however,evenwithmajoritybuyinfrom keyUNP5,G7andG20nations,overtheperiodofa decademassiveprogresscouldbemade.Inanysuch grandstrategicendeavour,itisnecessarytoseethat individualdevelopingnationswillnotbeabletodothis alonebutwillneedactivesupportfromacooperative internationalsecurityecosystem.Suchsupportmay involveregionalandinternationalorganisationssuch as,theUN,AU,NATO,EU,ECOWAS,INTERPOL,

WCO.Itisproposedthatowingtothematurityof Westernlawenforcement,securityanddefence architecturesandthegreaterresourcesavailableto them,coupledwiththeoften-evolutionarynatureof theirdevelopment,attemptstoreplicateorimplement suchC-IEDenterprisesintheprovisionofC-IEDdonor assistanceisnotconsideredtobebestpractice.So, howcananIEDaffectedregionanditssupporting donorsbestgoaboutdevelopingeffectiveC-IED strategy?ItisproposedthatC-IEDstrategicprinciples areneededtoachievetherequiredimpactsand outcomeswhenprovidingC-IEDdonorassistance, whichwillbethesubjectofasubsequentarticleinthe Counter-IEDReport. ■

NOTES

1.C-IEDdonorassistancereferstoC-IEDsupport providedonabilateralbasis,onajointinitiative fromtwoormoreStatesorbyaninternational organisation,e.g.,EU,LeagueofArabStates, ECOWASetcoranalliancee.g.NATO,toanIED affectedstateorregion.

2.C-IEDeffortsrefertoallinitiativesandactivities undertakenbyaState,organisationorentitytoat leastmatchbutideallyovermatchthethreatposed bytheuseorthreateneduseofIEDsandcan involveanythingwhichisintendedtopredict, discover/detect,prevent,protectagainst,respond to/neutralise,recover/exploit,mitigateagainst,or deterIEDattacks.C-IEDeffortscanincludeinter alia,training,mentoring,advising,accompanying, assisting,technologyandequipmentprovisionand intelligencesupport.

3.TheUSArmyC-IEDstrategy2022,states “developingcapabilitiestomaintainovermatchisa criticalenabler,”whenassessingIEDsasamultidomainthreatintothefuture.

4.TheC-IEDcyclepresentedhaseightsteps involvingpredict,discover/detect,prevent,protect, respond/neutralise,recover/exploit,mitigateand deter.Thesestepsintendtocollectivelyachieve thedesirableeffectsofpreventing,counteringor respondingtoIEDattacksorthethreatthereof.

Theeightstepsprovidedinthiscyclemaynot necessarilyalwaysbepresentinanygiven C-IEDeffort.

5.Theeightnamedstepsareasynthesisofvarious C-IEDcyclesreviewedaspartofthisresearch.In thedefningofC-IEDeffortswithinthisresearcha seventhandeighthstepofdeterrenceandpredict wereincludedtothoseintheUSArmyC-IEDcycle. InadditionthreeUSArmyC-IEDcyclestepswere expandedwithdiscovertoexplicitlyincludedetect, respondtoincludeneutralise(whenpossible)and recovertoincludeexploitsolessonscanbe learnedtofeedallotherpartsoftheC-IEDcycle.

6.Itsstrategicvisionspeaksofreducingthe effectivenessandlethalityofIEDswhichisrealistic andachievable;however,itsmissionstatement, referstodefeating"theIEDasaweaponsystem ofstrategicinfuence.”(p.1)ThedefeatofIEDs isnotarealisticendstatewiththestrategy acknowledgingtheIED“willremainanenduring globalthreatduetotheaccessibilityofmaterials andthepotentialstrategicimpactresultingfrom theiruse.”(p.3)Assuchtheacknowledgementin theforewordthat“wearenevergoingtostopall IEDs”(p.iii)shouldhavebeenfollowedthroughout, withathreatmitigationapproachtocountertheir useadoptedthroughoutthedocument.

7.AsofApril2022thisNATOCounter-IEDdoctrineis underreview.

8.Asof2015,aworkingdraftofthisadaptedC-IED doctrinewasdevelopedandbeingusedto informIrishDefenceForceC-IEDthinkingand approaches.

9.BritishArmy deploymentinNIwasunderthe militarynameOperationBannerwhichformally endedon01Aug2007;however,alatent,virulent butlowcapabilityIEDthreathaspersistedfrom dissidentrepublicangroupssincethe1998Good Friday Agreement.

10.Theauthorhasbeenmadeawareofthepotential existenceofaPakistaninationalC-IEDstrategy; however,despiteextensiveeffortstheexistence ofsuchastrategycouldnotbeconfrmedor denied.PotentialC-IEDsecuritysensitivitywithin

Pakistanmaycontributetochallengesin answeringthisquestion.

11.Theauthorisalsoawarethatfrom2018,the conceptofaC-IEDstrategyforKenyawas mooted.Asofmid-2022itwasrecordedthat Kenyawasintheprocessofdevelopinganational strategyinC-IED.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

PaulAmoroso isanexplosive hazardsspecialistandhas extensiveexperienceasanIED ThreatMitigationPolicyAdvisor workinginEastandWestAfrica.He servedintheIrishArmyasanIED DisposalandCBRNeoffcer,upto MNTlevel,andhasextensive tactical,operational,andstrategicexperiencein PeacekeepingOperationsinAfricaandtheMiddle East.Hehasexperienceinthedevelopmentof doctrineandpolicyandwasoneofthekeycontributors totheUnitedNationsImprovisedExplosiveDevice DisposalStandardsandtheUnitedNationsExplosive OrdnanceDisposalMilitaryUnitManual.Heworksat presentintheMENAregiononSALWcontrolaswell asinwiderAfricaadvisingonnationalandregional C-IEDstrategies.HehasaMScinExplosive OrdnanceEngineeringandanMAinStrategicStudies. Herunsaconsultancy,AssessedMitigationOptions (AMO),whichprovidesadviceandsupportinrelation toconventionalandimprovisedweaponsand explosivehazardriskmitigation.Thisarticlerefectshis ownviewsandnotnecessarilythoseofany organisationhehasworkedfororwithindeveloping theseideas.

Linkedinprofle: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulamoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE–DEVELOPINGEFFECTIVEC-IEDSTRATEGY

ASTRATEGICPRINCIPLESAPPROACH TOREGIONALC-IEDENTERPRISES

INTRODUCTION

InapreviousCounter-IEDReportarticleitwas outlinedhowowingtothetransnationalnatureofthe networksthatfacilitateIEDuse,thatstrategic approachescoupledwithregionalcoherenceare requiredtoachieveappropriateandeffectiveimpactin C-IEDdonorassistance1 providedtoIEDaffected states.Itwasalsoarguedthatowingtothematurityof Westernlawenforcement,securityanddefence architecturesandthegreaterresourcesavailableto themcoupledwiththeoften-evolutionarynatureoftheir development,attemptstoreplicateorimplementsuch C-IEDenterprisesintheprovisionofC-IEDdonor assistancearenotconsideredtobebestpractice. PursuitoftheperceivedgoldstandardofWestern C-IEDenterprisescreatesanunachievableendstate foranIEDaffectedstaterequiringC-IEDdonor assistance.Thisissuecanbeaddressedbyhaving C-IEDstrategicguidancewritteninclear,concise, accuratelanguagewhichcanbeemployedbyIED affectedstatesanddonorstoserveasabridgeto barriersaswellasdifferencesinexpectations.Asetof C-IEDstrategicprinciplescanservetoinformsuch C-IEDstrategicguidance.Thisarticlewilloutlinehow C-IEDstrategicprinciplesareneededtoachievethe requiredimpactsandoutcomeswhenprovidingC-IED donorassistance.Thecontentofthisarticleisinformed fromresearchconductedbytheauthoraspartofaMA

instrategicstudieswhichexaminedandidentifed C-IEDstrategicprinciplesforEastAfrica.

ASTRATEGICAPPROACH

AccordingtoColinS.Gray,strategymaybe consideredastheusemadeofforceandthethreatof forcefortheendsofpolicy.Itisthebridgethat connectspolicywithmilitarypower.Forourneeds,the conceptofstrategyexceedswhatmaybeconsidered classicalmilitarystrategy.ItrefectswhattheAfrican Union(AU)statesastheneedtocomplementwider securitystrategiesaswellastheirnationalsecurity architectureandstateinterests.Acomprehensive nationalstrategyinvolvesmoreelementsthanmilitary powertoeffectivelysupportC-IEDefforts.TheUS DODdefnitionofnationalsecuritystrategybetterfts ourneeds.Itexplainsthatitspurposeisfordeveloping, applying,andcoordinatingtheinstrumentsofnational powertoachieveobjectivesthatcontributetonational security.Securityinthiscontextcanbeconsideredas aconditionthatresultsfromtheestablishmentand maintenanceofprotectivemeasuresthatensurea stateofinviolabilityfromhostileactsorinfuences.In thiscaseitissecurityfromactualorthreatenedIED attacks.Thestrengthofthisdefnitionliesinabroad approachencompassingtheinstrumentsofnational power.Itisnotsimplyfocusedonthemilitaryand

ByPaulAmoroso,anexplosivehazardsspecialistatAssessedMitigationOptions(AMO)consultancy

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE – C-IEDSTRATEGICPRINCIPLES

refectstheneedforastrategicwholeofgovernment approachtoC-IED.Itisproposedthatanoptimally effectivestrategicapproachtoC-IEDrequiresall elementsofstatecraft.2 Awholeofgovernment approachtoC-IEDneedstoencompassthe instrumentsofnationalpowerinvolvingmilitary; information;diplomacy;fnance;intelligence; economics;legal;developmentalongwithlaw enforcement,regulatoryinstrumentsandcivilsociety organisations.

Lykke’sends-ways-meansstrategymodel3 provides anincompleteapproachtostrategicC-IED,asitfailsto comprehendallthenecessarydimensionsofC-IED.4 Insteaditisproposedthatstrategycanbeanyhigherlevelcoordinatingmechanismthatseeksapositionof advantageandarticulateshowthismaybeachievedby recognisingstrengthsandweaknessesinagiven operationalenvironment.Multiplenationaldocuments suchaspolicydocuments,doctrines,policystatements andactionplanscaninformnationalapproaches toC-IED.Whatgoodstrategylookslikecanbe challengingtodefne;however,thosestrategic documentsthathaveproventobeeffectivetypically communicatesuccinctlyitswhy(whatisintendedtobe done)andwhomustdowhatandbywhen.Justas goodstrategydoesnotneedtofttheLykkemodel,any publicationordocumentthatarticulatesorservesto coordinateC-IEDcanqualifyasanelementofstrategy.

AccordingtoUSPresidentialPolicyDirective17, issuedin2013undertheObamaAdministration,the greatestresponsibilityoftheStateistoprovideforthe safetyandsecurityofitscitizenswhileprovidingan economicenvironmentthatpromotesopportunityand prosperity.IftheuseorthreateneduseofIEDs underminesorimpedesthenationalinterestsofsafety, securityandprosperity,thenIEDsmaybeconsidered atactical5 issuewithstrategicimpacts.6 Forexample, IEDscandisrupteconomiclifeandfragmentcohesion withinthecommunitiesinwhichtheyareemployed. Thiswillundermineeconomicdevelopmentalongwith governancetothedetrimentofnormallyfunctioning society.Nationalsecurity,safetyandprosperityare strategicissues,whichIEDuseundermines,meaning thatC-IEDenterprisesneedtobestrategic.Itis

proposedthateffortstodatetocounterIEDusehave notbeenadequate.Thishasbeenacknowledged withintheUSArmyC-IED2022strategywhichstates, thecurrentiterationexpandstheaperturetomorefully provideacohesiveandholisticapproachtothis evolvingchallengeandmakesignifcantchangestothe linesofeffort7 traditionallyassociatedwithC-IED.This USArmyC-IEDstrategyclaimsthatsuchalineofeffort frameworkalignswithestablishedstrategicguidance whileallowingfortheadaptabilitythatC-IEDdemands.

C-IEDASSISTANCEDONOR-RECIPIENT DYNAMICS

AnEastAfricanIntergovernmentalAuthorityon Development(IGAD8)meetinginFebruary2022on regionalC-IED,notedtherehadbeensomesuccesses againstIEDuseintheregion.AccordingtotheIGAD securitysectorprogramdirector,ColMuleneh,despite thechallengesinaccuratelyestimatingthenumberof IEDevents,itappearsthatthetotalnumberrecorded in2019marksforthefrsttimeaslightdiminutionin comparisontothegradualincreasesincethe beginningoftheiruseinSomalia.Onepotentialreason forthisassessedC-IEDsuccesswithintheEast AfricanregionmaybeduetoC-IEDdonorassistance toIGADstates.ThistypicallyinvolvesanIEDaffected statereceivingdonorsupport,forexampleintheform ofassistancerelatedtointeralia,training,mentoring, advising,accompanying,assisting,technologyand equipmentprovisionandintelligencesupport.This establishesarecipient-donorrelationshipbetweenthe IEDaffectedstateandthedonorprovidingC-IED assistance.ArecipientstateneedssuchC-IED assistanceastheyhaveadefciencyintheirC-IED capabilitiesorthescaleoftheIEDthreatfacedis beyondtheircapacity9 toatleastmatchbutideallyover matchthethreat.Themotivationsofadonortoprovide C-IEDassistancecanvarybutwilltypicallybe capturedundersomeaspectoftheirforeignpolicy objectivesandbealignedtotheirnationalinterests. Regardlessofthelevelofaltruismespousedbya donor,therewillinevitablybevestedinterestswhich mayormaynotbealignedtothenationalinterestsof therecipientstate.

Thedefcienciesinatleastsomeelement(s)of C-IEDofanIEDaffectedstateandtheprovisionof C-IEDassistancefromadonorcanleadtoapower imbalanceintheresultingrelationship.Achallenge oftenfacedbyanIEDaffectedstatereceiving assistanceisthefactthatdonorsmaydrivethe decisionmakingintermsofwhatC-IEDcapabilitiesare investedinandwhattheirprioritiesare.Thereisa requirementfortheestablishmentoftheappropriate relationshipbetweendonorsandrecipientIEDaffected states,sothemosteffectiveC-IEDassistanceis provided,insupportofthenationalsecurityand developmentobjectivesoftheaffectedstate.Itiskey thatabalanceisstruckbetweentheexpectationsof thedonor(s)supportingC-IEDdevelopmentandthe stakeholderswithinanIEDaffectedstate.Thiswill oftenrequireinitialnegotiationsbetweenthedonorand thestakeholderswithintheIEDaffectedstatewhom theysupport.Therecipientstatepotentiallyendsupin asubmissivepositionrelativetothedonorunlessthe necessarychecksandbalancesareimplementedto ensuretherecipientnationremainsinlegitimate controloftheirownsecurity,safetyandstability.Atthe veryleastadonorwillwantaccountabilityand oversightofwhereandhowitsmoneyisbeing expended.Forvariousreasonsadonormaystipulate caveatsandrestrictionsontheC-IEDassistanceitwill provide.Inextremis,thedonormayrestrictwhatC-IED assistancetheyarewillingtoprovidetosuchanextent thattherecipientnationhasnosayintheassistanceit receives,howitisimplementedandevenwhocontrols itsdeployment.SuchextremisdonorcontrolsoverCIEDassistancemayevengoasfarasunderminingthe independenceandsovereigntyoftherecipientstate. Thisextremepowerimbalanceisdetrimentalto developingindigenouscapabilitiesoftherecipient nation.Suchextremepowerimbalancesarenot consideredcommonbutrepresentaworst-case scenarioinC-IEDassistanceprovision.

STRATEGICPRINCIPLES

InmanycaseswhenadonoroffersC-IEDassistance toanIEDaffectedstatetheywilleitherhavetheirown matureC-IEDexpertiseoralternativelytheywill

engageanimplementingpartnere.g.private contractor,todeliverthenecessaryC-IEDassistance. Ineithercase,thepersonneldeliveringtheassistance willcomewiththeirownparadigmofwhattheC-IED assistancetobedeliveredwillinvolve.Thefactthata recipientstatehasaC-IEDdefciency,meansthatthey maybeunawareofwhatsupporttheyrequire.This presentsthepossibilityofthosedeliveringC-IED assistancetodelivertheirparadigmofrequirements withoutconsideringtheneedsoftherecipientstate. Theserecipientneedscanincludeinteralia,wider nationalinterests,longtermneeds,indigenous capability10 development,sustainablecapacity development,culturalnuances,environmentalfactors andtheatrespecifcrealities.Inthemostextreme casestheassistancemaynotbethreataligned. Withoutsuchcontextspecifcconsiderationstherecan beamisalignmentbetweentheC-IEDassistance deliveredandthewiderneedsoftheIEDaffected state.Suchundesirablerecipientanddonordynamics involvingpowerimbalancesandmisalignment betweentheassistanceprovidedandthelongerterm needsoftheIEDaffectedstatecanbemitigated againstifrecipientnationshaveC-IEDstrategic principlestoreferto.

C-IEDstrategicprinciplesrefertofundamentalrules andguidelinesthatserveasafoundationforreasoning anddecisionmakingaboutthelonger-termdirectionin aC-IEDenterprise.Theycanhelpstatesandregional organisationsindevelopingandsustaininganeffective C-IEDenterprisewithinagivenregion.Aneffective C-IEDstrategicprincipleneedstobeaclear,concise, memorableandactionablephrasethatrepresentsa planforhowtoeffectivelyallocateresourcesto contributetoatleastmatchingbutideallyover matchingthethreatposedbyIEDs.Theyshould provideadirectivebroadenoughtopromote enterprisingbehaviour,butspecifcenoughtoalignthe C-IEDeffortsdecidedupontocomplementwider nationalsecurityordevelopmentobjectives.Arecipient stateofC-IEDassistancecanreferencesuch principleswhenconsideringhowtoengageinaC-IED enterprise,whatassistancetobeagreedtoandhowit maybemanaged.SuchempowermentofIED

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE – C-IEDSTRATEGICPRINCIPLES

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE – C-IEDSTRATEGICPRINCIPLES

affected statescanallowforoptimalindigenous capabilityinvestmentandintimecapacity developmenttoatleastmatchbutideallyovermatch theIEDthreatfaced.

IDENTIFYINGSTRATEGICPRINCIPLES

Toidentifystrategicprinciplesinsupportofa regionallycoherentC-IEDenterpriseweneedto assesswhichC-IEDeffortsshouldbepromotedand thosewhichshouldbeavoidedorminimized.Several approacheswereconsideredindevelopingan analysisframeworktofacilitatetheidentifcationof commonthemesforagivenIEDthreatunder examination.Theseincluded:

•Identifyingends,waysandmeans;

•Consideringthesituation,task,execution, authority,andsupportdemands;

•Thesevenplanningquestions;11

•Why,what,who,where,whenandhowofthe problem(5W+H).

Considerationoftheoverlapbetweeneachofthese approachesallowedforthemappingofrelationships betweenthemascapturedin Table1.

Thefrstofthesevenquestions,‘whatisthesituation andhowdoesitaffectus?’effectivelyprovidesthe problemstatementthatweareattemptingtoaddress. Inthiscase,wehavethestartingassumptionthatan IEDthreatexistsinagivenregion,stateorlocality requiringtheIEDaffectedstateornumberofstatesto engageinaC-IEDenterprise.Asthisproblem statementisknown,nosuchquestionneedstobe includedinanyanalysistoidentifyC-IEDstrategic principles.

ReferringtoTable1,weseethatweareleftwith sevenquestionsinadditiontotheproblemstatement question.Thesequestionsare:

•Whatend-stateisdesired?

•Whatactionsaretobetaken?

•Whoaretotaketheactions?

•Whereareactionstobetaken?

•Whenareactionstobetaken?

•Whatrisksneedtobemanaged?

•Whatresourcesdotheactionsrequire?

ApplyingthesesevenquestionstoagivenIED threat,allowscommonthemestoemergeintermsof whatmaybemostandleastimpactfulinsupportofa regionallycoherentC-IEDenterprise.Inconsidering thequestion‘whatendstateisdesired’thereisa requirementtoidentifydetailedrealitiesofthedesired endstateofaregionallycoherentC-IEDenterprise. Thequestionof‘whatactionsneedtobetaken’can bechallengingwhendevelopingC-IEDstrategic principles.ForagivenIEDthreat,asignifcant numberofspecifcC-IEDactionscaninvariablybe listed;however,thesewillbecontextspecifc.The temptationtolistactionsneededaspartofaC-IED strategyshouldberesisted.Instead,generic guidanceonthemostappropriateactionstobe takenisrequired.However,thekeyfundamental C-IEDenablingactionof‘understanding’boththe problemandtheC-IEDeffortsinvestedin,isdeemed essential.

Thequestionof‘whoaretotakeactions’isan examinationofwhothestakeholdersareintheC-IED enterprise.Thisstakeholderanalysishastwoelements toit,namely,whoaretherequiredmembersofthe C-IEDenterpriseandsecondlywhoistoleadthis communityofstakeholders.Whenconsidering‘where areactionstobetaken’fromastrategicratherthanan operationalortacticalperspective,thisquestion considerswherewithinastateoritsinstitutions,C-IED effortsshouldreside.Likethequestion‘whatactions aretobetaken,’thequestion‘whenactionsaretobe taken’canbechallengingtoanswerfromastrategic perspective.Thisquestionaddressesthechallengesin identifyingappropriatemanagementstructuresand practicesacrossanyC-IEDenterprise,whichcanbe multistakeholder,complex,dynamicandeven competitive.Suchstructuresandpracticesgobeyond timingandsynchronizationtowidercrosscutting considerationsacrossallaspectsofmanaginga C-IEDenterprise.

Thequestionof‘whatrisksneedtobemanaged’has twoaspectstoitnamelywhatwilloptimizethe likelihoodofsuccessofanationalC-IEDenterprise andsecondlywhatthreatsneedtobemitigated against.Somerecurrentriskstypicallyarisesuchas

interalia;lackofunderstanding;lackofcoherence, coordinationandcooperationoftenleadingto unnecessarycompetitionandwasteofresources amongststakeholders;lackofpowerofenforcementto compelstakeholderstoengageeffectivelyintheC-IED enterprise;andfnally,theriskofsomeC-IEDefforts havingnegativecounterproductiveeffectswhich overalldamagetheC-IEDenterprise.

Thefnalquestionof‘whatresourcesdowerequire’ examineshowemploymentoftechnologyand equipmentcansupportanationalC-IEDenterprise mosteffectively.Havingundertakenthisanalysisto identifywhatisconsideredasmostandleastimpactful insupportofaregionallycoherentC-IEDenterprise, distillingthesefndingsinto‘whatgoodenoughmaylook like’intermsofstrategicC-IEDprinciplesispossible.

Table1.ProcessInDevelopmentoftheSevenQuestionFrameworkforC-IEDStrategicPrinciple.

CONCLUSION

WhenprovidingC-IEDdonorassistance,the importanceofastrategicapproachhasbeenoutlined.

C-IEDassistancedonor-recipientdynamicscanbe challengingformultiplereasons.C-IEDstrategic principlescaninformC-IEDstrategicguidancethatcan inturnbeusedtooptimizesuchdynamics.

HowregionallycoherentC-IEDenterprisesare establishedisuniqueandcontextspecifc.Theydonot needtohaveaspecifcstandaloneC-IEDstrategy.In general,withtheUnitedStatesanexception,most WesternnationsdonothavededicatedC-IED strategies.Instead,theirstrategicapproachto addressingtheuseofIEDsisembeddedwithinother nationalsecuritystrategiesordealtwithasalaw enforcementissueandforthisreasonthereisnoneed tohaveastandalonenationalC-IEDstrategy.Infact anyinstrument,publicationordocumentthat articulatesorservestocoordinatenationalC-IEDcan qualifyasanelementofsuchstrategy.However,the meritofastandaloneC-IEDstrategicdocumentshould notbedismissed.InthecaseofsomeIEDaffected statesorregionsrequiringC-IEDdonorassistance,the impactofIEDusecanbesogreatandowingtoalack ofsuitablesecurityforcecapabilitiesandcapacities, thatastandalonenationalC-IEDstrategymaybe necessary.

Oneperspectiveisthatpolicydocuments,doctrines, policystatementsandactionplanswhicharticulateCIEDstrategy,shouldprimarilybefocusedtoinform donorswheretheinvestmentoftheirmoneyisbest servedtocountertheiruse.Insomecases,C-IED strategymaybedevelopedtoappeasedonorswho seekreassurancethatthemoneytheyareprovidingis beingdoneunderastrategicapproach.Such strategiesmaybe‘papertigers’andnothave foundationinwhatisneededorachievableinsupport ofreducingIEDuse.However,byapplyingC-IED strategicprinciples,theriskofsuchanoutcomecanbe minimized.

Finally,wehaveprovidedaframeworkofseven questionstobeusedwhentryingtoestablishwhat C-IEDstrategicprinciplesbestsuitagivenIED affectedregiontoachievetherequiredimpactsand

outcomesfromC-IEDdonorassistance.Toemploythis frameworkinidentifyingoptimalC-IEDstrategic principles,itisnecessarytohaveappropriatekey stakeholderengagementandotherbaseline assessmentscompletedtoinformtheunderstandingof theIEDthreatbeingcountered.Theapplicationofthis methodologywillbethesubjectofasubsequentarticle intheCounter-IEDReportbasedonresearch conductedinEastAfrica.■

NOTES

1.VariousformsofC-IEDsupportthatanIED affectedstatecanreceivefromadonorwhich canincludeinteralia,training,mentoring, advising,accompanying,assisting,technology andequipmentprovisionandintelligencesupport.

2.Statecraftmaybeconsideredas“theskillof governingacountry”(CambridgeDictionary Online)“theartofconductingstateaffairs” (MerriamWebsterDictionary)or“theskilful managementofstatesmanship”(Oxford LanguagesLanguage.oup.com).

3.AccordingtoHarryYargerinhisarticleinTowarda TheoryofStrategyin GuidetoNationalSecurity PolicyandStrategypublishedin2006,ArtLykke gavecoherentformtoatheoryofstrategywithhis articulationofthethree-leggedstoolmodelof strategywhichillustratedstrategy=ends+ways+ means,andifthesewerenotinbalance,the assumptionofgreaterrisk.IntheLykkemodel,the endsare“objectives,”thewaysarethe“concepts” foraccomplishingtheobjectives,andthemeansare the“resources”forsupportingtheconcepts.

4.TherearemanywhoderidetheLykkemodelfor strategy,forexample,JeffreyW.Meisierauthored anarticleinParametersintheWinter2016-2017 editionentitled“AreOurStrategicModelsFlawed? Ends+Ways+Means=(Bad)Strategy.”

5.Tacticalisusedhereinitsmilitarycontext,referring tocarefullyconsideredactionsintendedtoachieve aspecifcaim.

6.Strategicinthiscontextisconsideredtheeffects IEDusehasattheatre,nationalorinternational levels.

7.Linesofeffortinthecontextofplanning,usethe purpose(causeandeffect)tofocuseffortstoward establishingoperationalandstrategicconditionsby linkingmultipletasksandmissions.

8.TheIntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment (IGAD)inEastAfricawascreatedin1996to supersedetheIntergovernmentalAuthorityon DroughtandDevelopment(IGADD)whichwas foundedin1986tomitigatetheeffectsofthe recurringseveredroughtsandothernatural disastersthatresultedinwidespreadfamine, ecologicaldegradationandeconomichardshipin theregion.Djibouti,Ethiopia,Kenya,Somalia, SudanandUganda–actedthroughtheUnited Nationstoestablishtheintergovernmentalbodyfor developmentanddroughtcontrolintheirregion.

Eritreabecametheseventhmemberafterattaining independencein1993.Withthenewemerging politicalandsocio-economicchallenges,the assemblyofHeadsofStateandGovernment, meetinginAddisAbabainApril1995,resolvedto revitalizeIGADDandexpandareasofcooperation amongMemberStates.Thenewandrevitalized IGADwaslaunchedduringthe5thSummitofIGAD AssemblyofHeadsofStateandGovernmentheld on25-26November1996inDjibouti.TheSummit endorsedthedecisiontoenhanceregional cooperationinthreepriorityareasoffoodsecurity andenvironmentalprotection,economic cooperation,regionalintegrationandsocial developmentpeaceandsecurity.In2011South SudanjoinedIGADastheeighthmemberstate.

9.Capacityreferstothemeansofanindividual/ organizationtoperformassigneddutieseffectively. Thisincludeshumancapacity(individualand collectivecompetenciesandexperience),physical capacity(appropriateassets)andinstitutional capacity(systems,structuresandorganisational cultureinplace).

10.Capabilityreferstothemeansofanorganizationor entitytobeprofcientinastatedactivityfromthe collectivecontributionofassetsandcompetencyof individualsandgroupstoundertakeitsafely, effectivelyandeffciently.

11.Thisreferstoagenericsetofsevenquestions whichmaybeappliedtoanyplanningscenario whichisadaptedfromthemilitarysevenquestion estimate.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

PaulAmoroso isanexplosive hazardsspecialistandhas extensiveexperienceasanIED ThreatMitigationPolicyAdvisor workinginEastandWestAfrica.He servedintheIrishArmyasanIED DisposalandCBRNeoffcer,upto MNTlevel,andhasextensive tactical,operational,andstrategicexperiencein PeacekeepingOperationsinAfricaandtheMiddle East.Hehasexperienceinthedevelopmentof doctrineandpolicyandwasoneofthekeycontributors totheUnitedNationsImprovisedExplosiveDevice DisposalStandardsandtheUnitedNationsExplosive OrdnanceDisposalMilitaryUnitManual.Heworksat presentintheMENAregiononSALWcontrolaswell asinwiderAfricaadvisingonnationalandregional C-IEDstrategies.HehasaMScinExplosiveOrdnance EngineeringandanMAinStrategicStudies.Herunsa consultancy,AssessedMitigationOptions(AMO), whichprovidesadviceandsupportinrelationto conventionalandimprovisedweaponsandexplosive hazardriskmitigation.Thisarticlerefectshisown viewsandnotnecessarilythoseofanyorganisationhe hasworkedfororwithindevelopingtheseideas.

Linkedinprofle: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paulamoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

C-IEDDONORASSISTANCE – C-IEDSTRATEGICPRINCIPLES

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

DEVELOPMENTFROMIMPROVISEDHOMEMADE TOMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICS COMPONENTSINIEDs

INTRODUCTION

Theelectronicsindustryemergedinthe20thcentury, andsinceitsintroductionintothelivesofordinary peopleasconsumerelectronics,ithasgrownand becomeatrillion-dollarbusiness.Thepredominant characteristicoftheconsumerelectronicsmarketisthe ever-increasingavailabilityofelectronicsproducts. AccordingtoMoore’sLaw,semiconductorcomponents gaindoubleperformanceeverytwoyears.Thistrend allowedanothertendency,thatoffallingpricesinthe consumerelectronicsmarket.Generally,ithas accountedforgainsinmanufacturingeffciencyand automation,aswellasfallinglaborcostsandoverall designimprovements.

Theconsumerelectronicsindustryisvaluedatmore than$1.3trilliontodayandisexpectedtoincreaseits marketvalueinthefollowingyears.Secondly,the globalconsumerelectronicsrepairandmaintenance marketcontinuestogrow,withanestimatedincreaseto $16.52billionin2020.

TheproliferationoftheRadioControlledImprovised ExplosiveDevice(RCIED)haspresentedalowcost, highlyfexible,andunpredictablethreattoC-IED operators.Highavailabilityofconsumerelectronicsand readilyavailableelectroniccomponentsareusedby threatnetworksintheconstructionofIEDs.

OftenthecomponentsusedinIEDsareeasily obtainablecommercialgoodssuchasfertilizer,bleach (peroxide),nailpolishremover,brakefuid,herbicides, disinfectants,andcleaningsolvents.Thetrade, transportationandstorageoftheseproductsistypically subjecttoalesserdegreeofscrutinyandregulation thanthetransportationandstorageofconventional munitions.ResearchonIEDshasnotrevealeddirect transportationofcommercialgoodsfromlegal manufacturerstoarmedgroups.Rather,smalllocal tradeentities,havingobtaineddualusegoodsfrom regionaldistributioncompanies,appeartobethe weakestlinkinthechainofcustody.1

Oneofthemostimportantelectroniccomponents usedinRCIEDsisthesemiconductor.Thecentral drivingforcebehindtheconsumerelectronicsindustry isthesemiconductorindustrysector,whichbyitselfhas annualsalesnearing$500billion.

AccordingtoINTERPOL,asaglobal,multibilliondollarcrime,organizedcriminalgroupshavenot hesitatedtocashinonthetradeincounterfeitgoods.In manypartsoftheworld,international,regional,and nationallawenforcementauthoritieshaveuncovered intricatelinksbetweenthiscrimeandotherserious offencesincludingillicitdrugs,moneylaundering,and corruption.Someestimatesputthecounterfeit business

1Counteringthethreatposedbyimprovisedexplosivedevices,UNGeneralAssemblyReport,25July2016.

BySerkanKoc,Major(OF-3)TUR-A,ElectronicWarfareSpecialist,NATOC-IEDCoE

atwellinexcessof$250billionayear,andsomeportion ofthesecounterfeitgoodscanbeusedascomponents forRCIEDs.Amongthesecounterfeitgoods,thereare manyeasy-to-usecomponentssuchaspower distributioncomponents,transformers,switchgears, relays,contacts,timers,circuitbreakers,fuses, distributionboards,wiringaccessoriesandbatteries.2

BoththeAttacktheNetworksandDefeattheDevice pillarsofcounteringIEDsareusedinordertofghtthis evolvingthreat.Severalelectroniccounter-measures willbeusedinordertodetect,prevent,orneutralizethe RCIEDinanoperationalenvironment.However,these technologiesaresupportedwiththepropermeansof attackingthreatnetworksinordertoachievealongtermsolution.

RCIEDTHREAT

RCIEDsarethemostcommonIEDinitiationsystemin theworld.Thetriggermaninitiatesthedevice,sending anelectromagneticimpulsetoinitiatethefringchainor

toarmthemainswitch.Anyelectronicdeviceableto sendandreceiveasignalthroughelectromagnetic radiationcanbeusedasanIED(RCIED)trigger switch.Accordingtotheirtypesandqualifcations, theseswitcheshaveindividualadvantagesand limitations.Forexample,accordingtolatestreports3; inBahrain,RCIEDelectronickitsandvictim-operated PassiveInfra-Red(PIR)triggercomponentswereused together.Inthisscenario,theradio-controlledunits receivethearmingsignalfortheIED,whichfunctions onlywhenthePIRsensoristriggeredbythetarget.As seeninvariousIEDevents,constructionofanRCIED varies,basedontheintendedtargetandthefriendly forcecounter-measuresandTTPs.

AccordingtolatesttrendsintheuseofIEDs,terrorist organizationschoosedevicedesignprinciples accordingtotheintendedtargetandavailable materials.Whenthetargetisimportantandmustbe attackedespeciallyinconvoy,IEDsarearmedby mobileradiosbyusingapassiveinfraredsensor.For

2FocusonTheIllicitTraffckingofCounterfeitGoodsandTransnationalOrganizedCrime,UNOffceonDrugsandCrime FocusSheet.

3TheIEDThreatinBahrain,AcomparativeanalysisofcomponentsdocumentedintheGulfregion,ConfictArmament Research,2019. 4ibid.,p.38.

APIRtriggerrecoveredfromBahrainiHezbollahmilitantcellsin2017-20184

thesecurityofthedeviceandfortheprotectionofthe triggerman,asecondary,andtertiarymeansof initiationareincorporated.Regardingtherender-safe procedures,thiscomplexdesignseriouslycomplicates themitigationtaskofEODoperator.Accordingto reports,approximately36percentofallEODoperator deathsinthepasttwodecadeshaveoccurredduring clearanceofcommand-initiateddevices.

RCIEDsuseawidevarietyofcommercialand homemadetransceiverandreceiversetstosendthe wirelessinitiationsignalfromvariabledistances.There areseveraltypesofelectronicdevicesabletotransmit indifferentfrequencieswithvariedpower.Forthelast twodecadesseveralRCIEDswitchvariationssuchas; DualToneMultiFrequency(DTMF),LongRange CordlessTelephones(LRCTs),PersonalMobileRadios (PMRs),CarAlarms,RCControllersfortoys,telemetry devices,severalwirelesscommunicationdevicesand cellphoneswereusedbyterroristorganizations.The workingfrequenciesofconsumerelectronics(CE)can

varygreatlyfromregiontoregionduetodifferentlegal requirements.Thefrequencyrangesof,forexample, RCtoyswiththesameexternalconstructioninAsia differconsiderablyfromAfrica,EuropeorAmerica. SinceitcannotnecessarilybeassumedthatCEare onlypurchasedintheoperationalarea(theInternet makesitpossiblewithoutrestrictions),thetechnical exploitationandtheevaluationreportresultingfromit areofessentialimportanceforasuccessfuldefense againstthethreat.

Historically,itemsusedforanIEDbyoneterrorist organizationarealsousedbyotherterrorist organizations.Forexample,RCIEDcomponents capturedfrommilitantsinBahrainandHouthirebelsor AQAPmilitantsinYemenhaveverycommonelectronic componentswhichcanbeorderedinmassamounts. Asimplerelay,usedtoswitchonandoff,andtocontrol ahigh-powerelectronicdevice,canbeobtainedin massamountsandisusedinmosttypesofRCIEDs. Thistrendisalsoobservedinmicrocontrollers.

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

CountryName

DesignPrinciples ofTerrorist Organizationsin LatestIEDs

TypesofIEDs usedbyTerrorist Organizations UsedMaterial

NotesonindividualTerrorist Organization

Democratic Republicof theCongo

Simpledesign withmilitaryor dual-use commercial components

CommandWire

Recovered Militaryand/or Commercial Explosivesand Detonators

Nigeria

Simpledesign withmilitaryor dual-use commercial components

VictimOperated Person-Borne

Anincreaseinthetechnical capacityofarmedgroupsto diversify,designanddeploy increasinglysophisticateddevices hasbeenobserved

Somalia

Dual-use componentsand chemicals

Vehicle-Borne

Military explosives harvestedfrom explosive remnantsofwar

Al-Shabaabusinghome-made explosivesdemonstratesthat deviceconstructionmethodshave diversifed

Colombia

Complexdesign toselecttarget

Commandinitiate dimprovised explosivedevices

Diversifcationcouldindicatean increaseintechnicalcapacity amongarmedgroups

Yemen

Anti-personnel minesofan improvisednature

Improvised PressurePlates

Massproduction ofIED components

Newtacticsinthedesignand deploymentofvictim-operated devices,includingdisguising devicesasrockstohindertheir identifcationbyclearanceexperts

TheinformationtableisdevelopedbasedontheCounteringthethreatposedbyimprovisedexplosivedevices, UNGeneralAssemblyReport,17July2020.

AccordingtolatestreportsfromUN,thetechnical capacityofarmedgroupstodiversify,design,and deployincreasinglysophisticateddeviceshas improved.TheinformationonrecenttypesofIEDs, designprinciples,andmaterialsusedindifferent regionsisseeninthetableabove.

Inrecentyears,severalbrandedelectronic components–includingmicrocontrollers,power relays,andvoltageregulators–areconsistentacross RCIEDsrecoveredinBahrainandRCIEDsandUA (UnmannedAircraft)recoveredfromtheHouthisin Yemen.6

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

6AGuidetoIllicitIranianWeaponTransfers,TheBahrainFile,AtlanticCouncil,TimMichetti,December2020.

PIC16F628AMicrocontrollers.

TRENDSINCONSUMERELECTRONICSMARKET

Beforeanalysingtheeffectsoftrendsinconsumer electronicsmarketonIEDs,itisbenefcialtomakea cleardefnitionofwhatconsumerelectronicsinclude.

Intermsofdifferentapproaches,consumerelectronics areclassifedinfourdifferentways:

Inaccordancewith“ImprovisedExplosiveDevice IEDTechnicalExploitationLexicon5thEdition(2017)”:

•“ConsumerElectronics”conceptislimitedto:

◦RadioControlledToy

◦ApplianceController

◦GarageDoorOpener

◦DoorBell

•Butthisconceptwouldnotinclude:

◦Hand-HeldRadio

•PersonalMobileRadio(PMR)

•RadioTransceiver

◦Non-Hand-HeldRadio

•TaxiRadio

•TrunkMountRadio

◦CordlessPhone

•LongRangeCordlessTelephone(LRCT)

•HighPowerCordlessPhone(HPCP)

◦MobilePhone

•GlobalSystemforMobileCommunications (GSM)

•CodeDivisionMultipleAccess(CDMA) phone

◦CustomRadioControl

•WirelessCustomReceiver(WICR)

•DualtoneMultiFrequency(DTMF)MOD1-5

•Multi-hopWirelessSensorNetworksusing RadioFrequency(Multi-hopRF)

•FireworksController

◦Telemetry

•Linx(DigitalEnhancedCordlessTelecommunicationsDECT)

•Maxstream(Radiomodems)

•Others.

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

Omron,NAISandHKEBrandedPowerRelays.

STMBrandedVoltageRegulators.

DTMFReceiverBoards.

Ifconsumerelectronicsareconsideredfromapoint ofviewofthewidestpublicapproach,accordingto latestestimatestoday,theconsumerelectronics industryisvaluedatmorethan$1.3trillion,andis expectedtogrowsteadilyinthefollowingyears. Emerginganddisruptivetechnologiesandinnovations willcontinuetodrivethemarket.Inaddition, capabilitiesofnewproductsfostercustomer expectations,andconsequentlytheappetitefor spendingonnewtechnologycontinuestogrow.

Threatnetworkscontinuetousecommercialoff-theshelf(COTS)componentsinthemassproductionof IEDs.Especiallytheeasyaccessibilityofcommercial radiocontrolledtransmittersandreceiverkitsfacilitates deviceproductionofadependableandsafeIED.The programmabilityofmicrocontrollersandtheavailability ofawiderangeoffrequenciesavailabletooperate makestheRCIEDaneffectivetoolagainstfriendly forces.Withtheexpanseofthecommunication electronicsmarketandeasyavailability,RCIEDs requirelittleornomodifcation.MobileradiosorRF transmittermodulesaremorecapablethanever,are

easilyusedasthefringswitchwithinaRCIED.In general,consumerelectronicsdevicesavailableinthe marketareofhighquality,reliable,andofcheapcost duetomassproduction.Theyarealsosoftware adaptableanddesignedtooperateinacongested electromagneticenvironment.

InthepastThreatNetworkswereselectingamong specifcfrequencieswhichareavailablefortheRF deviceortransmittermoduleinthemarket.

Thehighavailabilityofthesedeviceshasstemmed fromtheoveralltrendintheconsumerelectronics market.Themiddle-classpopulationisincreasing worldwide,inthepastfewyears.Moreover,urban consumershavebeenindicatingashiftinlifestyle. Soaringinternetpenetrationandincreasingincomeare allowingconsumerstousemultipleelectronicdevices. Thiswillcontinuetofuelthemarketgrowthoverthe nextfewyears.7

Traditionallyoneofthemostimportantdesign principlesforanyterrorististooperatetheRFdevice effectivelywhiletriggeringtheIEDfromasafe distance.Becauseofthislimitation,terroriststendto

ConsumerElectronicsRevenues(USD,millions).

7ConsumerElectronicsMarketRevenuestoRakeinataCAGRof15.4%,SmartphonestoContinueDominanceover 2016-2020,PersistentMarketResearch,23December2016.

selectcommunicationchannelsthatareclearand effcientenoughtosendthesignaltothereceiver.For counter-measuredevelopment,engineersandIED expertshavefocusedmainlyonoperatingrange.The constrictionofhealthycommunicationchannelsofthe RFdevicesavailableinthepasthasledtorelatively

narrowfrequencybandsinjammers.Consideringthe abundanceofdifferentelectroniccomponentsinthe markettoday,terroristnetworkshaveawiderangeof availablefrequenciestooperateinordertotrigger theRCIED.

Counter-measuresagainstRCIEDswerefocusing onnarrowfrequenciesinthepast,buttoday’s consumerelectronicsmarketpresentsthemost effcient,effectivedevicesforverycheapprices.With commerciallyavailableRFdevicesrangingfromafew MHztomanyGHz,therangeofpossiblethreatsspans nearlytheentireRFspectrum.Thesedevicesare

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

SimplePMRsinthepast446Mhz.

ReadyWirelessRCSwitches(25Euros).

PassiveInfra-RedSensors(0.44Euros).

Today’sChineseBaofeng(20Euros)136-174,144-148,400-480,430-450Mhz.

obtainedinlargequantities.Asaresultoftheextentof potentialRCIEDoperatingfrequencies,CounterRCIEDdesignersshouldtakeintoaccountallofthe availablefrequenciesinRFdevices.Ontheother hand,anintelligentRFprofessionalcanmake modifcationstoanykindofRFdevicetoadaptit againstfriendlyforces’electroniccounter-measures.

Newtechnologieshaveenabledthreatnetworksto producetheirowndesignsinaneasierway.With additivemanufacturingor3Dprinting,threedimensionalproductscanbecreated(suchasnew designsforIEDcontainersetc.)bylayeringmaterial usingacomputerizedprocess.Reducedprocess time,costreduction,andbetterqualityand improvementsinthedesignofthefnalproductare beneftsobtainedfromthisemergingtechnology.With theadventof5G,InternetofThings(IoT),anothernew technologywillbeavailableforthreatnetworksand canbestartedtobeemployedinthenearfuture.In thiswayanecosystemofelectronicdevicesis connectedtothesamenetwork(inhere5G),andcan beaccessedremotelyandIEDattacksareexecuted fromadistancewiththeuseofsensortechnologies andconnecteddevices.

Additionally,the5Gtechnology,withitsdisruptive nature,seemstoaffectnotonlytheadversarieswho areaimingtousethistechnologyformoreeffective IEDattacks,butalsofriendlyforceswhoaretryingto developcounter-measuresagainstthistechnology.

Fromthepointofviewoffriendlyforces,the5G technologywillleadtotheemergenceofnew equipmentwithnewcapabilitiesintherealmof intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR) systems,command-and-controlapplications,manned andautonomousvehicles,anddrones.Inthisway5G willincreasethesituationalawarenessoftheIED operator.Especially,abetteruseofremoteand autonomousvehicleswithanumberofsensors connectedthroughtheInternetofThingswillincrease thestand-offdistancesoftheIEDoperatorinthe approachtotheexplosivethreat.Ontheotherhand,

theabilityforinterconnectionofdifferentequipment andsensorsenablesadversariestoplanmore complexTTPsintheoperationalarea.

However,5Gtechnologycomeswithsome restrictions,suchastherangeof5Gconnectivityis limitedbecausefrequencywavescanonlytravela shortdistance.Inordertodeliver5G,newantennas mustbeinstalled.Thisisataskwhichisboth expensiveandtime-consuming.Additionally,thereare limitationsforthreatnetworksforruralaccessto thetechnology.

ThenextthreatinNATOcountriesandAfricanareas ofoperations/crisis,isexpectedtocomefromCOTS UA(UnmannedAircraft)whicharecarryingIEDs. Advancedmanufacturingallowstheproductionoftens ofthousandsofsmall,smart,andinexpensivedrones. Itcombinesadditivemanufacturing(a.k.a3Dprinting), robots,andartifcialintelligencetomassivelyincrease thespeedandqualityofmanufacturing.Ofparticular importanceinsmalldroneproductionistherapid printingofcompositematerial.Todayacommercial3D printeris100timesfasterthanpreviousprinters.In additiontospeed,thecontinuingmassiveinvestment in3Dprintinghasimprovedbothqualityand complexityofmanufacturedproductswhilereducing prices.Priceshavedroppedtopointwhereweekend hobbyistsareprintingtheirowndrones.8

FromaC-IEDpointofview,anyplatformand technologythatcancarryexplosivestothetarget,or thatcanenablebetterTTPsforthreatnetworks,should beregardedasanareatoconsiderwhiledeveloping effectivecounter-measures.Withtheadventof emerginganddisruptivetechnologiessuchasArtifcial Intelligence,InternetofThingsandAutonomy,both friendlyforcesandthreatnetworkswillhavenewtools intheirtoolbox.

CONCLUSIONS

IntermsofDefeatingtheDevice,readilyavailable consumerelectroniccomponentsarebeingusedby threatnetworksintheconstructionofIEDs.According

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

8T.X.Hammes,TechnologyConverges;Non-StateActorsBeneft, https://www.hoover.org/research/technology-convergesnon-state-actors-beneft

tolatesttrendsintheuseofIEDs,terrorist organizationsarechoosingtheirdesignprinciples accordingtotheirtargetsandavailablematerials. Consumerelectronicsdevicesavailableinthemarket areofhighqualityandcheapduetomassproduction. Inaddition,theyaredesignedtooperateinacontested electromagneticenvironment.Non-LinearJunction DetectionandHigh-PowerElectromagneticscanbe theareastofocusoninthefuture.

IntermsoftheAttackingtheNetworkspointofview, thetrendstoahigheruseofmassmarketconsumer electronicswithoutmodifcationasRadioControlled IEDswitchesbyThreatNetworksarewidelyevidenced inAfrica,whichseemsnottobethetypicalcaseinthe restoftheworld.Itseemslikethepotentialuseofmass marketconsumerelectronicsbyThreatNetworksis mainlyaffectedby:

Leveloffnancing

Higherbudgetsseemtoberelatedtolessuseof consumerelectronics,somostlyfocusingon homemade/semi-industrialRCdevicesand/or modifedelectronicdevices.

Availabilityofexperiencedinstructors(internalor externaltothegroup)

Therelativelackofspecialistsinelectronicsand/or thelackofexperiencedIEDinstructorspositively infuencesthepredominanceofconsumerelectronics over homemade/ modifed electronicdevices.

Levelofexternalsupport

Greaterexternalsupportisrelatedtolessuseof consumerelectronics,somostlyfocusingon homemade/semi-industrialRCdevicesand/or modifedelectronicdevices.

Availabilityofimportedgoods

Alowervarietyormorediffcultaccesstoimported goodscouldleadtotheuseofavailableconsumer electronics.

Adecreaseduseofhomemade/ modifed electronicdeviceswouldreduceopportunitiesfor theidentifcationofspecifcbombmakers

signaturesrelatedtodifferentincidents.Usingmass consumerproductswouldmakeithardertoidentify specifccommonsignaturesfromelectronicexperts andmaketrackingofcomponentsmorediffcult regardingdifferentincidentsfromareasof operations. ■

Disclaimer

Thisarticledoesnotrepresenttheopinionofany nationalormultinationalorganisation;itswholecontent shouldonlybeconsideredastheopinionoftheauthor. Asalltheinformationhasbeenobtainedfromopen sources,potentialmistakescouldhavebeenmade duringtheresearchprocess.Pleasefeelfreetosend yourcomments,correctionsandinputstotheauthor, theywillbehighlyappreciated.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

MajorSerkanKoç wascommissionedintotheC-IEDCentreof ExcellenceasanElectronicWarfare SpecialistintheDefeattheDevice BranchinAugust2020,and organized5thNATOC-IED TechnologyWorkshopinSegovia/ Spainin2022.AsanElectronics EngineerOffcer,hisbackgroundhasbeenmainly basedonIEDcounter-measureactivitiesandproject management(R&Dandprocurement)asElectronic WarfareOffcerintheTurkishArmyHeadquarters.In additiontohiselectronicsengineeringeducation,he hasanM.A.degreeinTechnologyManagementfrom TurkishMinistryofDefence,DefenceScienceInstitute andSystemsEngineeringprogramdegreefromU.S. NavalPostgraduateSchool.Hecurrentlycontinueshis PhD.Program.

Email: skoc@ciedcoe.org

USEOFMASSMARKETCONSUMERELECTRONICSCOMPONENTSINIEDs

AIRBORNEMAGNETICS-AVIABLETOOLFOR DETECTIONANDQUALITYCONTROL

ByDipl.-Ing.WolfgangSüß,ManagingDirector,SENSYS

Thescopeofthisarticleistoillustratethecurrent stateofairbornemagneticsasacommercial andviablesolutionalreadyinuseworldwidefor commercial,defense,buthumanitarianapplications. Thelastdecadeoftechnologyevolutionbroughta massiveinnovationintheareaofremotelyoperated platformsonland,waterandintheair.Self-established vehicleswithopen-sourcesoftwarewerereplacedby commercialofftheshelfsolutionsintegratingavast

numberofsensorsforoperation,navigatingand obstacleavoidanceinthefeld.

Unmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs),Unmannedground vehicles(UGVs)andUnmannedsurfacevehicles (USVs)arealreadyindailyoperationformanifoldtasks likesurveillanceofproperties,industrialinspectionand monitoringofmachineriesorindustrialchimneys, agriculturalsupport,parcelservices,orthophotography and3Dmodellingofminingareasorbuildingyards.

SENSYSMagDroneR4operatedwithaDJIM300overamilitarycontaminatedarea.

Sensitivefeldslikethesearchforanddetectionof bombs,ammunition,minesandIEDsarestill underdevelopedoratleastthecommercialsolutions areunderrated.Anumberofgrantsandscientifc studiesalreadyledtoverydifferentsolutionsusing largedronestocarryground-baseddesigned equipmenttoshowcaseanewapproachtothe hazardousgroundworkofpeoplewithinminefelds. Attheend,thechallengesoffnancingatruly technology-drivensolution,turninglaborcostsand competenciesupsidedownaswellashavingdifferent technicalsolutionsforsingleusecases,made remoteoperatedsensorplatformslessattractive. Nevertheless,themarketoffersafewtechnology packagescombiningacommercialdronewith additionalcomputingpowerandmagnetometersfor simple,butprofessionaluseinthefeldofUXO detection,areaobservationandprojectqualitycontrol.

SENSYSisamanufacturerofmagnetometerand TimeDomainElectromagnetics(TDEM)solutionsfor monitoring,detectionandanalysisofareasand objects.Thecompanywasfoundedin1990andis basedinGermany,EastofthecapitalBerlin.Since then,thecompanygrewto50employees developing,producingandservicingsingleFluxgate Magnetometers,hand-helddevices,multi-sensor systemstobeoperatedbyman,carorremote platformsonland,underwaterorintheair. Commercialcompanies,thedefenseindustry,military andNGOsareusingtheequipmentinmorethan90 countriesworldwide.SENSYSproductsaredesigned forsimpleoperationinharshfeldconditions, providingexcellentdata.

ClientslikeAIRBUS,Rheinmetall,SafeLaneGlobal andmanyothersrelyonSENSYSsolutionswithin theirprojects.

ThecompanyfocusonFluxgateMagnetometers allowsSENSYStooptimizethesensortechnology andenablecustomizationfordifferentapplications. Magnetometersarepassivesensorsthatarerecording magneticintensity.Comparabletotheprincipleofa temperaturesensor,Fluxgatesmeasureatthepointof thesensoritself(notatanydistance,norhavinga certainangleofoperation).ThatwayaFluxgatesensor

isalwaysmeasuringtheEarth’sMagneticfeld.Ferrous objectsaredistortingtheEarthmagneticfuxlinesin theirproximity.Thus,whenasensorcomesclosetoa buriedobject,itdetectstheanomalyintheEarth’s magneticfeld.AssuminganambientEarth’smagnetic feldofaround60,000nT,thesensornoiseofSENSYS producedFluxgateMagnetometersisaslowas 0,006nT;therefore,SENSYSsensorscandetect changesinthemagneticfuxaslowasthe10millionth partoftheEarth’smagneticfeld.

Theillustrationoppositeshowshowfasta magneticfeldofanobject(physicallydescribedvia itsmagneticmomentinAm2)decreasesover distance.Thatmeans,thatthebestchancefor detectingofburiedobjects,isalwaysbygettingas closeaspossibletoorevenintotheground(e.g. borehole/drillingsurveys).

Thejourneytowardsairbornesolutionsstartedin 2015,whenSENSYSinvestigatedintodrone-based Magnetometersurveys.Usingaself-assembled octocopterwithanopen-sourcecontrolsoftware,frst fightswerebumpyandtobesafewemaintaineda distancetogroundofseveralmeters.Theapproachof hangingtheverysensitiveFluxgateMagnetometers awayfromthedronewasgood,butnotpracticalatall asthatresultedinunstablefightcontrolsofthedrone. Thesensorswereswingingheavilyduringfight,so thataprecisepositioningofthesensordataonthe colorcodemagneticmapwasimpossible.Also,at thistime,standardizedinterfacestothedrone(GPS, control,power)werenotavailable,sothatthedrone integrationwasahassle.

Withtwoyearsofresearch,trialsandprototyping, SENSYSfocusedonacompact2-sensorsolutionwith itsownbattery,GPSanddatastorage,calledMagDrone R3.Withonly800gweightandnoeffortstointegrateand fythedeviceitrapidlymadeitswayintoGeophysics, MiningandExploration.Everybodywhohadtooperate aCessna,twopilotsandheavyequipmentonboard couldnowcoverthesamework(andproducebetter data)withabackpackloadedwithasmallcommercial droneandtheSENSYSMagDroneR3surveykit.

Withagrowingmarketaskingformoreeffcient solutions,SENSYSreleasedthe5-sensorMagDrone

R4in2020offeringa2.5mspan/swathtobemounted onmostcommercialUAVswith2kgpayload.The systemhas5sensors,separated50cmfromeachother. TheinstalledFluxgatesaretriaxialMagnetometers, whereasallaxes(x,yandz)fromeachsensorare recordedseparately200timespersecond,generating 18,000measurementvaluesperminute.The200Hz samplingratesallowforfastfightswithoutlosingdata density.Atthesametime,thelowweightofthe MagDroneR4supportstheuseofsmalldronesand stablefightconditions.

Atthesametime,DJIreleaseditsfagshipmodel M300andtheLatviancompanySPHEngineering reachedapointinproductstabilitywiththeirUgCS SkyhubTTF(trueterrainfollowing).UsingtheM300as themainplatformandaddingtheSkyHubfor overrulingDJI’sfightcontrol,enablesustoconduct

closegroundfightswithterrainfollowingmode. Furthermore,theSkyHubcontrollercanexportthe DJIGPSinformationandforwardtotheSENSYS MagDroneR4foradirectRTKGPSbased georeferencingofallmeasurementdata.With controllableinterferencesofmountingtheMagDrone R4directlyintothelandinggear,thesetupoftheUAV magnetometersurveysystemisascompactas possible,aswellasitensuresanexcellent maneuverabilityoftheUAV.ApowerfulMagDrone DataToolcanprocessandflterthedatatocancel detectedrotornoiseoffthesurveydata,concentrating onburiedstructuresandobjectsintheground.

TheuseoftheMagDroneindozensofcustomer projectsshowsthatthisproductiswaybeyondbeing developed,ithaslongbecomeanex-stockoff-theshelfsolutionforourmarkets.

Illustrationofrapiddecreaseofmeasurementvalue(innT)overdistance(inm).

AIRBORNEMAGNETICS

TofurtherapprovethecombinationofDJIM300, SkyHubcontrollerandMagDroneR4magnetometerkit forthedetectionofferromagneticmines,theCroatian MineActionCentre–CentreforTesting,Development andTraining(HCR-CTRO)conductedafeldsurveyon theirBenkovactestsite,whichhas90ferromagnetic minesburiedatdifferentdepthsupto25cm 1 .The resultswerepresentedatthe19thInternational Symposium–MineAction2023,inVodice,Croatiaon May4thtoprovideawarenessofthecapabilitiesof suchadetectionsystem.

AnothercampaignwasexecutedbytheHeinz SielmannFoundationandtheGermanInstitutefor FederalRealEstate(BImA)onthegroundofthe foreignmilitarytrainingrangeKyritz-RuppinerHeide withtheso-calledBombodromascentraldropzone, NorthofBerlin.SincetheKyritz-RuppinerHeidehas beenintensivelyusedformilitarypurposesbythe Sovietarmedforcessince1950andlaterbythe GermanFederalArmedForces,upto1.5milliontons ofexplosiveordnancearesuspectedaroundthe formerBombodrom.

Nowadays,theHeinzSielmannFoundationis responsibleforthemaintenanceoftheheath,itis importanttodefnecontaminatedareasandtomakeit easiertoplanboththeriskandtheuseoftechnology onthesecontaminatedareas.

Arangeofdifferentammunitionwassurveyedto formulizethecapabilitiesandlimitsoftheairborne surveysystem,whichwillhelptobetterplanpre-scansof areasforriskmitigationaswellastheimplementationof qualitycontrolchecksbeforeandafterfeldwork.The resultsarepromisingaslongasthefeldconditions allowedforshallowfightintherangeof0.5to1mabove theground.Sincealotofammunitionisoflessferrous material,themagneticsignatureoftheseUXOitemsis weak.Forexample,somesmallcasesof20mm,23mm and30mmdiameterwerehardtodetect,whereasallthe grenadesof57mmdiameter,TM62tankmines,piecesof mortarshellsandsteelwireswereclearlydetected. Hence,thesurveysystemneedstooperateclosetoand bestableabovethegroundatconstantconditions(also withinthedrone)tobeabletodistinguishmagnetic noisefromUAVmovements,electronicsandrotors.

UAVdetectionsystemconsistingofDJIM300,SkyHubcontrollerandMagDroneR4.

MunitiondetectioncapabilitytestatKyritz-RuppinerHeideusingairbornemagnetics.

Resultsofairbornemagneticssurveyat1meteraltitudeabovegroundlevelatKyritz-RuppinerHeide.

Asexplainedinitially,Magnetometersdonothavean openingangle,butoperateatthepointoftheirsensor head.Becauseofthat,ascanoftheentireareais required.Theusualdistancebetweentwosensor tracksis25or50cm.AstheMagDroneR4hasa sensorframewithsensorsat50cmspacingeach,the UAVdetectionsystemneedstofyalineevery2.5m.

With30-40minutesfighttimewithhot-swappable batteriesthedailycoveragecanbeupto30 hectares.Such,thatwasdoneduringahistorical studybytheBavarianStateDepartmentof MonumentsandSitesatGanacker,Bavaria 2 .This siteisaformer“Luftwaffe”operationalairfeld.Since February1945andunderinhumaneconditions, forcedlaborerswereusedtobuildarunwayforthe MesserschmittMe-262jet-poweredfghteraircraft. Towardstheendofthewar,theairfeldwasattacked severaltimesbyAlliedairforces(low-levelattacks

andbombardments).Within4days120haofdata weregenerated,fying8hourseachday.Thetracks wereupto700meterslong,wheretheDJIM300was fyingwith5meterpersecondat1meterabove groundlevel.Downtimestochangebatterieswere around30secondseach.

Especiallyforhistoricalandinfrastructuralsurveys, thedensecoverageofanentireareaallowstoreveal thebiggerpictureofactivities,buriedinfrastructure andlinkbetweensingleanomaliesintheground.

Thebeneftsofusingaerialapproachesare obvious.Withnocontacttotheground,thesafetyof involvedoperatorsandEODtechniciansisincreased asnobodyneedstoentertheareaofinterest.Radio connectionbetweenUAVandoperator’scontrolleris severalkilometers,whichallowstoalsosurveylarge areasfromoutside.Anotheradvantageistheprecise GPSandaclick-and-tickpre-fightplanningofthe

120haofseamlessdata,generatedwith4daysofaerialmagneticssurveyatGanackersite.

surveyareaandfightlinesofthedrone.The operatorisnotsteeringtheUAVanymore,butonly actingasasupervisorandbackupincaseoffailure. Duringnormaloperation,theUAVcanfyvery straightandprecisetracks,havinganonboard obstacledetectionand(preferably)thetrueterrain followingmodecontributingtoincreaseeffciencyof datagenerationandfeldcoverage.Last,butnot leastistheadvantageofredundancy.Ononeside, thefailureofasinglesensorinamultisensor’s systemsismuchbetterdetectedandcompensated bytheothersensors.Withpre-plannedautomated fightsanddatacollection,asurveycanberepeated anytime.Thatallowsacomparisonbeforeandafter, whichopensthedoorformoreeffcientqualitycontrol mechanismswithinsensitiveprojectssuchasUXO andmine-clearance.

Insummary,theindustryreachedapointin technologyweretheuseofUAVswithinsensitive projectsonhazardousareasisviableintermsof achievementscomparedtothemoneytoinvest,as allusedproductsarecommerciallyavailable.The presentedairbornemagnetometersystemusing theDJIM300,theSkyHubcontrollerandthe MagDroneR4isalreadyinuseonanumberof formermilitarysitessuchasinGermanyorthe Ukraine.Withapre-planningofthesurveyarea,the UAVwillworkitswayautonomouslythroughthefeld atminimumheightsof0.5to1meter,5meterper secondfightspeed,entirelycoveringupto30 hectareswithinasingleday.InthecontextofEOD, suchasystemisdetectingshallowsmallferrous itemsuptodeeplyburiedlargebombs.Thisprovides agreatchancetointegrateaUAVbased magnetometersystemintolargeareainvestigations orfollowonqualitycontrols

Achallengesurelyremainswithnon-ferrous objects,suchasminesorIEDsaswellassurveying onhighlymineralizedsoils.Thisisduetothe natureofmagnetics.AtSENSYS,thischallengeis underinvestigationoptingforelectromagnetic sensorstobeintegratedorevencombinedwiththe Fluxgatesensorstomaximizethedetection capabilities. ■

REFERENCES

1 MilanBajić,MarkusSchikorra“Detectionofferromagnetic landmineswithaUAV-basedmagnetometer,demonstration, andverifcation”,MineActionSymposium2023

2AndreasStele1,RolandLinck,MarkusSchikorra“LargescaleUAVmagnetometryonaformerWorldWarIIairfeld atGanacker(LowerBavaria,Germany)”,DGG2022

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

Since2016, WolfgangSuess is oneoftheManagingDirectorsat SENSYSandresponsibleforSales, MarketingandStrategicGrowth. Before,heworkedforglobal companieslikeAIRBUSIndustries andBOMBARIDERTransportation inseveralrolesinEngineering, ProductDesignandInnovation,afterhefnishedhis studyofInformationTechnologiesin2004.

NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

ADVANCEDSOFTWAREALGORITHMSPOWERNEXT-GENSOLUTIONS

FORAUTOMATINGTHREATDETECTIONANDIDENTIFICATION

BySafeProAI(aSafeProGroupInc.Company)

AccordingtoLandmineandClusterMunition Monitor1, a signifcantportionoftheglobeiscontaminated bylandmines,asthisinfographicdemonstrates.The explosiveremainsofwarandlandminesbothpresent asignifcantandongoingthreattocivilians.These

weaponscanbefoundonroads,footpaths,farms, forests,deserts,borders,inandaroundhomesand schools,andotherplaceswherepeoplegoabouttheir dailylives.Theydenyaccesstofoodandwaterand hinderthedeliveryofhumanitarianaid.

1 http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2022/landmine-monitor-2022.aspx

Landminecontamination map2022.

NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

THENEEDFORNEXT-GENMINEDETECTION

Artifcialintelligenceanddronescanbeusefultoolsin thede-miningprocessinbothactiveconficts zonessuchasUkraineorinpost-combatareassuch asAfghanistan,Kuwait,orBosnia&Herzegovina. AccordingtorecentdatafromStatistaandthe InternationalCampaigntoBanLandmines–Cluster MunitionCoalition,thethreatofanti-personnel landmines andunexplodedordnanceispresent inover60countriesacrossAfrica,theMiddleEast, SouthAmerica,SoutheastAsia,andthroughout mainlandChinaandRussia.Theseexplosivedevices exposemillionsofcivilianstolife-threatening injuriesanddeathonadailybasis(7,000+casualties peryear).

Theglobalscopeandscaleoftheissueconfrmsthe inadequacyoftoday’smanualdeminingprocessas beingslow,labor-intensive,anddangerous.Thatis whySafeProAIbelievesthereisaclearneed forinnovativeandpracticalwaystoincreasethe effciencyandsafetyofdeminingutilizingdronesand AI/machinelearningtechnology.

SafeProAI’saward-winningartifcialintelligence (AI),machinelearning(ML)andcomputervision capabilitiesenablethe rapid,automatedprocessing ofaerialandground-based imagerymakingitan idealsolutionforanumber ofapplicationsincluding deminingandinlaw enforcementandsecurity. Thetechnologycurrentlyis beingappliedtothe identifcation,classifcation, andclearanceoflandmines. Builtwithanextensive proprietarylandmineand unexplodedordnance(UXO) dataset,SafeProAIcan rapidlydetectthreatsfrom aerialimagery,relaying preciseGPSlocationand actionablereportinginfor-

mationtodecisionmakersandgroundpersonnel,greatly increasingthescaleandeffcacyofremediationefforts. ThroughthecombinationofAI,ML,anddrone technologies,SafePro’snewdeminingsolutionsdirectly addressthelimitationsofcurrentmine/UXOclearance methodologieswhichcanbeslow,expensive,and dangerous.

SAFEPROAIDISRUPTIVEMODERNIZEDMINE DETECTION

Step1:

HighAltitudelargeareasurveywithpowerfulAI& MLfromhighresolutionaerialimageryto autonomouslylocate,label,andGPStag.

Step2:

LowaltitudedronesarmedwithGPSdatahunt minesdownandgatherhighresolution3Dlidar imagery,preciselocationtag.

Step3:

Generateanalyticalreportsfordecisionmakersto analysesafeanddangerzonesandprioritizemissions, resourcesandEODteams.

SafePro’s3StepDisruptiveAIApproach. Source:SafeProAI

NEXT-GENERATIONDEMININGWITHAIANDDRONES

APPLICATIONS

Next-genminedetection

SafeProAI’ssoftwarebringsartifcialintelligence, machinelearningandcomputervisioncapabilities thatenabletherapid,automatedprocessingofaerial andground-basedimageryinreal-timetodetect landminesandunexplodedordnance.

Infrastructureinspection

Providingdetailedvisualanalysisoffacilities,power andtelecommunicationsinfrastructureandequipment throughAIandmachinelearning-enhancedvideo processing.

Securityandincidentresponse

AI-basedprocessingofaerialimageryofcanrapidly detect,locateandidentifyobjectsofintereston

thegroundincludingweapons,contraband,or improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs).

INITIALAPPLICATION: NEXT-GENMINEDETECTION

Utilizingavarietyofoff-the-shelfconsumerand commercialdronesequippedwithanarrayofsensors includingoptical/thermalinfrared/multispectral,ourAI modelsoftwarecannowdetect50+typesofminesand UXOwithover80%accuracyincludinggrenades, projectiles,andanti-personnelmines.

SafeProAIhasdevelopedanAI-assisteddrone surveymethodthatquicklyandeasilyprovidesfeld operatorswithmapsandlocationsof80-90%ofthe presentsurface-lainlandminesandUXO,enabling themtoplansaferandmoreeffcientclearance operations.

Source:SafeProAI

Capabilitiesthatenabletherapid,automatedprocessingofaerialandground-basedimageryinreal-timethreatdetection.

ABOUTSAFEPROAI

SafeProAI (aSafeProGroupInc.company)was foundedin2020followingyearsofresearchintothe utilizationofdronesandAI(artifcialintelligence)to automatethedetectionoflandmines,unexploded ordnance(UXO)orimprovisedexplosivedevices (IEDs)andotherexplosivethreats.

SafeProAI’smachinelearningandvision-based processingcapabilitiesarebeingleveragedwithSafe ProGroup’sdroneoperationalexpertisetodelivera powerful‘Next-Gen’approachtosituationalawareness.

ARTIFICALINTELLIGENCE& MACHINELEARNINGTECHNOLOGY

SafeProAI’ssoftwarebringsartifcial intelligence,machinelearningand computervisioncapabilitiesthatenable therapid,automatedprocessingofaerial andground-basedimageryinreal-timeto detectthreatsincluding:

•Landmines,unexplodedordnance, improvisedexplosive devices(IEDs)

•Abilitytodetectitemsofinterest includingcontrabandorweapons

ExpandedAImodelcapabilitiesto detect50+typesofminesandUXOwith over80%accuracy:

•Anti-personnelandanti-tankmines

•Projectiles

•Clustermunitions

•Grenades

ExtensiveProprietaryLandmine& UXODataset:

•Compilingtheworld’slargestaerial imagerydatabaseofminesandUXO todetectanytypeofmunition

•EnablingAItodetectminesinvisual, thermal,andmultispectralimagery

Watchhowdronesandmachine learninghelptodetectlandmines: https://youtu.be/VBnNqBzUHdQ ■

ThisnewcapabilityisalsosynergisticwithotherSafe ProGroupportfoliosolutions,forexample,more effectivelyguidingandaidinggroundpersonnel equippedwithourstate-of-the-artballisticprotection productsincompletingtheirlife-savingsecurity missionsorinacceleratingthedrone-basedanalysisof criticalinfrastructure.Formoreinformation,pleasevisit: www.SafeProGroup.com and www.SafeProAi.com

Contact: info@safeprogroup.com

Drone-BasedAISolutionforthreatdetection.

Source:SafeProAI

ThermalProcessing. Source:SafeProAI

UNATTENDEDPACKAGES–THESECURITYOFFICER’s DILEMMA

AccordingtotheInstituteforEconomicsand Peace,GlobalTerrorismIndex2023‘Deathsfrom terrorismfellto6,701in2022,representinganineper centdecreasefromtheprioryear.Thefallindeaths wasmirroredbyareductioninthenumberofincidents, withattacksdecliningbyalmost28percentfrom 5,463in2021to3,955in2022.’

Thedownwardtrendisgoodnews.Butterrorismis andremainsascourgeandahugechallengeforlaw enforcementandsecurityprofessionalseverywhere.

Ofthetoptenmostlethalattacks,sixemployed improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)usedto devastatingeffect.Refectingthatexplosivesremain aprimaryweaponintheterrorist’sarsenal.

InEurope,weonlyhave EUTerrorismSituationand TrendReport(TE-SAT)1 fguresfor2021,but‘France experiencedthehighestnumberofattacks(5), followedbyGermany(3)andSweden(2).Austria, Denmark,Hungary,Belgium,andSpainreportedone attackeach.Oftheffteenattacks,fourwere completed.Mostreportedterroristattackswere categorisedasjihadistterrorism(11),ofwhichthree werecompletedattacksconductedinFrance,Spain, andGermany,andeightwerefoiledrespectivelyin France(4),Sweden(1),Hungary(1),Denmark(1)and Germany(1).Thetwofatalitiesrecordedin2021were theresultofthejihadistattacksconductedinSpain andFrance.’

‘WeaponsusedinattacksintheEUin2021included bladedweapons,vehicles(inrammingattacks)and improvisedincendiarydevices(IIDs).Disruptedplots showedtheintentandeffortstoproduceimprovised explosivedevices(IEDs).’

Thesefguresshowthatdespitethehighnumbersof successfuldisruptionsofattacksinEurope,the intentiontouseIEDsandIIDsinattackscontinuesto beaprofoundlyseriousthreat.

ItistruethatthelikelihoodofarealIEDorIIDattack remainsextremelylow,buttheveryexistenceofthe threat,nomatterhowsmall,createsotherproblems, thatofthereceiptofsuspiciouspackages,hoax bombthreatsandunattendedpackages.

Figuresforhoaxcallsandsuspiciouspackages worldwideareimpossibletofnd,sowewillhaveto relyonthe 2021UnitedStatesBombDataCenter, ExplosivesIncidentReport 2.Accordingtotheirreport therewere4,935suspicious/unattendedpackages reportedintheUSin2021and1,876reportedbomb threatincidentsinthesameyear.

Unfortunately,thereportdoesnotbreakdownwhich oftheseweresuspiciouspackagesreceivedandwhich unattendedpackages,butitissafetoassumethat mostareinthelattercategory.

Everycountrywillhaveitsownclearlydefned protocolsandproceduresformanagingabomb threatorthereceiptofsuspiciouspackages,and

ByVincentDeery,CEO,3DX-RayLtd

wecanprobablysumthemupinonesentence, ‘evacuatetheimmediateareaandcallthe emergencyservices.’

Butwhattodoaboutunattendedpackages?

Weallknowthatbyfarthevastmajorityof unattendedpackageswillbelittleJonnie’s/Jennie’s sweatysportskit,theverylatestinmen’sfacialcare productsorevenafullsuitofarmour(truestory).

Buteverysecurityoffcerineveryoffcebuilding, bank,shoppingcentre,concerthall,hospitalortheme parkwillatsometimeoranotherbefacedwiththe samedilemma.Dotheyescalatethediscoveryofan unattendedpackageintofullblownbombthreat incident,ordotheytakereasonablestepstoascertain whetheritreallyisathreatornot?

Thedisruptionandcostcausedbyabuilding evacuationisdiffculttoquantifybecausefguresare hardtocomebyandeverybuildinguseisdifferent.The costofevacuatingashoppingcentreforacoupleof hourscouldrunintothousands,butthecostof evacuatingacommercialbankinthecitycouldruninto tensofmillionsinlosttransactions.Thecostof evacuatingahospitalcouldinsteadbemeasuredin humansuffering!

Thatiswhythesedecisionsaresoimportant!

Thisiswherethepropertrainingandequippingof securitystaffiskey.

So,howshouldaprofessionallytrainedand equippedsecurityoffcerhandleanunattended packageorbag?

Firstly,theywillattempttogetavisualinspectionof theinsidethebagorpackagetocheckifthereare wires,circuitboards,batteries,tape,liquids,orputtylikesubstances.Arethereunusualodourssuchas accelerants,anythingthatwouldindicateadevice?

Butasmanytimesasnot,itwillsimplynotbe possibletosafelyseeinsidethebag.

Next,theywillcheckintheimmediateareaforthe owner.TheniftheareaiscoveredbyCCTVcallinto thecontrolroomandgetthemtocheckiftheowner canbeidentifedthatway.

Butallthatdone,andtheownernotfound,security staffcannotknowforsurewhetherthepackageorbag issafeunlesstheygetagoodlookinside.

Andtherereallyisonlyonewaytodothat.Andthat iswithaportablex-rayscanner.

Portablex-rayscannershavenowbeenaroundfor agoodmanyyears.

Generally,theyconsistofanx-raygenerator,afat detectorpanelandalaptop,andareinoperationwith militaryandlawenforcementEODteamsworldwide. Theyallowtheoperatortheopportunitytoseeinside thepackageorbagwithouttouchingordisturbingit.

Theyareprobablyoneofthemostaffordableand versatilepiecesofequipmentavailabletosecurity professionalsandshouldbeinthetoolkitofany securityteamresponsibleforanybuildingorfacilityof anysize.

Andaswithallgoodtechnology,thesesystemsare beingcontinuallydevelopedandthemostsignifcant developmentofrecentyearsistheintroductionof colourdifferentiatedscans,whichhavemadeitpossible todeterminethenatureofthematerialsbeingscanned. Thisisareallyimportantdevelopmentbecauseit meansthatinsteadofrelyingonshapetodeterminethe identityofanobject,thesesystemsarenowableto accuratelyidentifymaterialsbycolour.So,orange showsorganics,suchassomeexplosives,chemicals, anddrugs,aswellasmoreinnocentitemssuchas foodstuffs.Blueisformetals,suchasmanyguns, knives,handgrenades,metalpipebombsaswellas IEDcomponentssuchasthepowersources,switches, circuitcomponentsandmetallicfragmentation.Greenis forinorganicmaterialslikeblackpowdersand aluminumizedhomemadeexplosives.Greyscaleis usedforrecognitionofshapesandtheformofobjects.

Itisimportanttonotethatmostportablex-ray systemsonthemarketonlyusetwocolourscansand leaveoutthecolourblue,thisisbecauseofalackof understandingabouthowmaterialsimagingworks, whichcouldputoperatorsatasevereandpotentially dangerousdisadvantage.Accuratethreecolour differentiationisessential.Accuracynotonlyrelatesto thecorrectcolourisationofthespecifcobjectbutalso totheconsistentcolourisationacrosstheentire scannedarea.

3DX-Rayofferacompleterangeofportablex-ray systems.

ThreatScan®-AS1(ISC)isarobustamorphous siliconportablex-rayinspectionsystem.Itcomprises, asstandard,adetectorpanelwithanimagingareaof 430mmx347mm,anewhighpenetration150kV generator,andalaptopalongwithbatteries,chargers, theuser-friendlyThreatSpectsoftware,wireless communication,andtransportcase.

Thesystemisfullyintegrated,withaprimarydisplay, computer,communications,andpowersupplies consolidatedintoasingle,waterproofruggedcase. Asecondarydisplaytabletoffershighfexibilityin deploymenttomeetthewidevarietyofuser applicationsandthreatscenarios.

Thecombinationoftechnologiesusedin ThreatScan®-AS1(ISC)offersexceptionalX-ray imagingperformance,3DX-Ray’srenownedadvanced materialsdiscrimination,andsophisticatedimage processingsoftware.

ThreatScan®-LS1sharesthesamehighquality,high penetrationimagecharacteristicsbutwithalarger 600mmx460mmimagingarea.ThreatScan®-LS1 enablestypicalbagsandpackagestobescannedin onescan.

ThreatScan®-LS3isacompactyetpowerfulx-ray scanningsystemthatcanpenetratesteelupto40mm at120kVandupto60mmat150kV.The305mmx 256mmimagingareaenablestypicalbagsand packagestobescannedinonescan.Thecomplete systemftssecurelyintoabackpack.

3DX-RayrecentlysoldsixteenunitsofThreatScan®LS3toanundisclosedsouthernEuropeansecurity agency.

So,ifyouareresponsibleforthesecurityofyour organisation,youshouldseriouslyconsidermakinga portablex-raysystempartofyourteam’sequipment toolbox.Butremember,seeingthingsinblackand whiteisnolongergoodenough! ■

REFERENCES

1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/mainreports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trendreport-2022-te-sat

2 https://www.atf.gov/fle/166841/download

ThreatScan®-AS1(ISC)

ThreatScan®-LS1

ThreatScan®-LS3

PIRSENSORSINIEDs USINGCONSTANT POTENTIALGENERATORS

ByTeledyneICM

INTRODUCTION

ForEODteams,theuseofPIR(PassiveInfrared) sensorsinexplosivedevicescanbeamajorconcern astheyaresensitivetoX-Ray,andthencantriggera devicewhileperformingtheinspection.

TheclassicX-Raymethoduseddoesnotallowto managekVthenitbecomesverydiffculttobe undetectedbyPIR.Withthetechnologyevolving, ConstantPotentialX-Raygeneratorshaveappeared andallowtoadjustkVandmAwhilebeingabletoset thedurationofashot.Whenhavingtheparametersof

thegeneratorsettolowkVandmA,wecanremain undetectedbyPIRsensors.

Toprovethistheory,wehaveconductedastudyto determinetheoperabilityofCP(ConstantPotential) Batteryoperatedgeneratorsbelowthesensor sensitivitywhilekeepingasuffcientimagequality.

SAMPLEOFPIRSENSORS

Forthisstudy,anon-exhaustivesampleselectionof PIRsensorshasbeenused:

The4PIRsensorsappearedtohaveverysimilarresultssowewillfocusontheChacontodemonstratethefndings.

PASSIVEINFRAREDSENSORSINEXPLOSIVEDEVICES

TYPEOFGENERATORUSEDFORTHESTUDY

Features

TeledyneICMLITEX

Generatortype ConstantPotential

Beam Directional

Powersupply DewaltBattery

Outputvoltagerange 40to120kV

Tubecurrentrange 0,05to0,25mA

Tubecurrentatfulloutput 0,25mA

Weight 2,5kg/5,51lbs

Focalspot(EN12543) 0,8x0,5mm

Beamangle 50x50°

IPLevel IP54

Operatingtemperature -25to+50°C/-13to+122°F

Connections Bluetooth/Wired

MAINCHARACTERISTICS

•AdjustablekV,mAandexposuretime

•CompatibilitywithX-RayScannersandAmorphousSilicondigitaldetectors

TYPEOFDETECTORUSEDFORTHESTUDY

(optional)

SENSITIVITYTESTS

Target:identifyingtriggeringlimitversusoperatingconditionsbasedonkVandmA,distanceandduration.

a.Effectonduration

Testconditions:

•PIRSensor:Chacon

•120kV,0.25mA(Fullpower)

Conclusion:

WhileshootingatfullpoweroftheLiteXgenerator,thePIRsensortriggersimmediatelywhenx-rayed,theduration hasnoeffectevenat1second.

b.EffectofkV–mAadjustment

Conclusion:

ThekVandmAadjustmentcapabilitiesoftheLiteXCPgeneratormakeitpossibletoreducethedistance.

IMAGEQUALITY

Nowthequestionis,canwegetagoodqualityimagewhilenottriggeringthePIRsensor?

a.ImagequalityusingTactX withLiteX

b.Correctedimagequality usingTactXwithLiteX

c.Correctedimagequalityusing TactXwithLiteX–SNRValue

Parameters:

kV 80kV mA 0.1mA Distance 80cm Time 60”

d.Processedimagequalityusing TactXwithLiteX

Parameters: kV 80kV mA 0.1mA Distance 80cm Time 60”

CONCLUSION

Parameters: kV 80kV mA 0.1mA Distance 80cm Time 60”

SNRValue: 190

ConstantpotentialgeneratorscanoperatebelowPIR triggeringlimitwhilehavingagoodaveragefuxandan excellentimagequalitybecause:

•Signaliscontinuous

•Focalspotissmaller

•kVandmAareadjustable

•Timeisadjustable

So,whenPIRsystemsareused,thebestwaytonot triggerthemistodecreasekVandmAbutincrease exposuretime.Thiswillofferagreatimagequalitywhile remainingundetectable. ■

ABOUTTELEDYNEICM

Parameters: kV 80kV mA 0.1mA Distance 80cm Time 60”

TeledyneICM hasover25yearsofexpertiseindeveloping innovativeportableradiographysolutions.Itsportable generatorshaveexcellenttechnicalcapabilitiesandwhen coupledwithhigh-resolutiondetectors,providehighly accurateradiographs.Contact: icm.sales@teledyne.com

INDIA – THEIEDCHALLENGES

INTRODUCTION

AccordingtotheIndianNationalBombDataCentre, duringtheYear2021,therewerearound132reported ImprovisedExplosiveDevices(IED)blastsinIndia killing/severelyinjuring323people.Itisgenerally estimatedthatonanaverageforeveryreportedIED attempttherewereabouteightunreportedattempts, successfullyfoiledbythesecurityforcesbasedon timelyactionableintelligence.IEDshavebeenthe weaponofchoiceforinsurgents,terroristsandmilitant groupsoperatingacrossIndia’sverybroadlandscape. EventhoughtheinternalsecuritysituationinIndiahas vastlyimprovedoverthelasttwodecades,the appearanceofnewmilitantandterroristgroupsinthe arena,theinnovativetechnologiesadoptedbythese groupsinbuildingavarietyofIEDsanduseofnew mediaincludingdronesfordeliveryoftheseIEDs,pose newandvariedchallengestothesecurityforces.Is Indiafullypreparedtomeetthesechallengestokeep itspeopleandinfrastructuresecureinordertodrive development?

THREATANALYSIS

TheIEDthreatstoIndiaemanatefromtheongoing insurgencies,separatistandterroristactivitiesover somepartsofthecountry.TheUnionTerritoryof JammuandKashmir(UTJ&K)wasontheboiloverthe lastthreedecadesduetohostileactivitiesof separatists,terroristsandmilitantsinfltratingfrom

acrosstheborder.ThesituationinUTJ&Khasnow beencontrolledthroughwell-coordinatedand persistentoperationsbythesecurityforces.Theleftwingextremists’(LWE/Maoists)insurgencywhich initiallyaffected160districtsinCentralIndia–popularlyknownasthe‘RedCorridor’hasnowbeen containedandislimitedtojustabout50districts.The decadesoldseparatistinsurgenciesinNorth-East India,especiallyinthestatesofAssam,Nagaland, MizoramandManipur,havebeeneffectivelycontained throughmassivesocio–economicdevelopment, improvedroad,railandairconnectivitytotheseremote areasandstrengtheningofdemocraticinstitutions throughfairandfreeelections.Also,anumberof religiousradicalisedextremistandfundamentalist organisationshaveresortedtoterrorthroughtheuse ofIEDsinurbanandsemi-urbanareaspropounding theirmisplacedcauses.RapidlydevelopingIndiafaces bigthreatstoitsinternalsecurityfromallthese elementsthatuseIEDsasaprimarymeansof terrorisingpeople,causingdestructiontopublic propertiesanddisruptingdevelopmentalactivities. Thesehostileelementsapplygreatingenuityand intelligence,andleveragetechnologiestodesigna varietyofsophisticatedIEDsandtheirdelivery mechanisms.TheyfrequentlyadoptnewTactics TechniquesandProcedures(TTPs)thereby unbalancingthesecurityforces,andextensivelyuse

ByColonelHRNaiduGade–IndianArmyVeteran

realtimehumanintelligenceinordertothwartand frustrateanyCounter-IEDoperationsundertakenby thesecurityforces.

ThecomplexityoftheIEDSystemsisincreased sincemobilesmartphones,internetandsocialmedia

providealow-costandeasilyaccessiblemediumfor informationsharingandtheswiftadoptionofTactics, TechniquesandProcedures(TTPs),thereby facilitatingtheeffcientoperationofthesediverse systems.Suchsystemscanbeextremelyresilient,

IEDIncidents2021India. Source:BombShell,NSG,India

INDIA–THEIEDCHALLENGES

invariablyhardtotargetandare,therefore,survivable. BecausetheIEDthreatisconstantlychanging,the Counter-IEDfghtisdynamic,andmaintaining effectivenessremainsanenduringrequirementfor operationsdevelopment.TocounterthesefastchangingTTPsbyhostileelements,thesecurityforces havealsotoinnovatethroughadoptionofnew technologiesincludingArtifcialIntelligence.

NATIONALCOUNTER-IEDSTRATEGY

Presently,Indiadoesnothaveanycomprehensive NationalCounterIEDStrategyencompassingthefour pillarsofCounter-IEDoperationsi.e.,Attackthe Networks,PreparetheForce,DefeattheDeviceand ExploittheIncidence.Thestrategyshouldhaveapan governmentapproach,beacoordinatedeffortofall applicableagenciesofnationalpower,havecommon understandingofthestrategicenvironmentwith respecttoIEDchallenges,andbuildenduring capabilities.DespiteenhancedIEDsthreatslooming

large,IndiahasnotyetevolvedCounter-IEDstrategy atanylevelofsecurityestablishmentsandgovernance. TheIndianArmyenunciatedbroadstandard proceduresandprocessestoCounter-IEDthreats mostlyrelatedtoCounterInsurgencyOperations (COIN).TheCentralPoliceForceshaveoverthe decadeevolvedstandardoperatingprocedures(SOPs) forCounter-IEDoperationsapplicabletovarious terrainstheypresentlyoperatein.However,thepolice forcesofmostofthestateshaveyettoevolveany standardCounter-IEDproceduresandstilloperatein anadhocway.EvenifacomprehensiveCounter-IED strategyisfnallyenunciatedbythecentral government,theimplementationoftheabove strategiesandproceduresbecomesverydiffcultina federalstructureofgovernanceasinIndia,which requirescoordinationandsynergybetweenmultiple agenciesatvariouslevels.Nevertheless,Indiahas madegoodprogressinthisregardoverthelast twodecades.

IEDs-AGlobalProblem. Source:AOAV,UK

TheIEDChallenges. Source:InertProductsLLC

ThreatsLoomingLarge. Source:www.zeenews.india.com

COUNTER-IEDCAPACITYBUILDING

TheCounter-IEDcapacitybuildinginvolves-creating suitableorganisations;developingrequisitetraining andtraininginfrastructure;adoptinginnovativeTTPs basedonthreats;providingorganisationswithsuitable equipmentthroughleveragingoftechnology; establishingeffcientandeffectiveintelligence apparatusandbuildingaseamlessandwidenetwork forintelligencegatheringandtimelydissemination; regulatingandmonitoringsupplyofmaterialsrequired fordesigningandbuildingtheIEDs;identifyingand eliminationofsourcesofterrorfnance;creatingan adequatefrstrespondermechanism;settingup multiagencycoordinationcentresatalllevelswith effcientcommunicationnetworkslinkingthese centres;andundertakinglargescalepublicoutreach programmestoeducatethegeneralpopulationonthe Do’sandDon’tsaimedtominimisecasualtieson occurrenceofanIEDevent.Thecapacitybuildingwill havetobebasedontherealisticthreatanalysis.

INDIA’SCOUNTER-IEDCAPACITY

Organisations–TheIndianArmyhas specialcounterinsurgencyunits operatingintheUTJ&Kandthe North-East.Theseunitshave inherentCounter-IEDresourcesand capabilities.Additionally,special CounterExplosiveDevicesUnits (CEDU)arefunctionalwitheachofthe OperationalCommands.These CEDUshavebeenrestructuredand equippedforgreaterfexibilityintheir deploymentintosmallerteams.All armyfeldformationshaveintegral combatengineerunitstrainedand equippedforCounter-IEDsupport.The NationalSecurityGuard(NSG),a highlyspecialisedcontingencyforce primarilyconsistingofarmyunits–is deployedatvariousgeographicalhubs torespondtocounter-terrorand counter-hijackingthreats.TheBorder GuardingForcesallalongthe15060 kmsofinternationallandbordersfoil anycross-borderattemptsbymilitantsandterrorists. TheyhaveCounter-IEDteamslocatedattheBorder Outposts(BOPs)inthethreatenedsectorstotakecare ofanypossibleIEDincidents.TheCentralReserve PoliceForcecarryingouttheCOINoperationsinthe ‘Redcorridor’,UTJ&KandtheNorth-Easthaswell trainedsub-unitstohandleIEDs.TheCentralIndustrial SecurityForce(CISF)isdeployedalloverIndiato protectnationalstrategicassetsandcritical infrastructurefromhostileelements.TheRailway ProtectionForce(RPF)isdeployedtoprotectthe world’sthirdlargestrailwaynetworkof67,000kmsand associatedinfrastructure.AllthestatesinIndiahave dedicatedbombsquads/teamsaspartofthecrime investigationdepartmentsoftheirpoliceforces.These bombsquadsaretrainedbytheIndianArmy/NSG/ CRPFandarereasonablywellequippedforcarryingout Counter-IEDoperations.However,theseresourcesare limitedandcannotbedeployedinatimelymannerall overaparticularstate.Theirreachislimitedmostlyto

PillarsofCounter-IEDStrategy. Source:JIEDDO,USA

DronewithExplosivePayload. Source:MHA,India

urbanareas.TheCivilDefenceandHomeGuardunits ineachofthestatespossessbasicawarenessofIEDs andsupplementtheeffortsofthesecurityforceswhere required.

Training-isacontinuousprocessforhoningand updatingCounter-IEDskills.Manydecadesago,the

Indianarmyestablisheda centreofexcellence–the EDDSchoolaspartof theCollegeofMilitary Engineering.TheEDD Schooltrainshundredsof personnelbelongingto theIndianandforeign armedforcesandthe centralandstatepolice forces.TheIndianarmy’s feldformationsrunbattle schoolsatthefeld formationlevelstotrain andupdatepersonnelin Counter-IEDskillsand tasks.TheCRPFestablishedanInstituteforIED managementtotrainpersonnelfromthecentralpolice forcesandstatepolice.Likewise,theBorderForcerun similarinstitutestotrainitspersonnelonCounter-IED tasks.Inaddition,mostsecurityforcessubscribeto varioustrainingcoursesabroadforselectedpersonnel

ConfdenceBuildingTraining. Source:InertProductsLLC

EDDSchool-CollegeofMilitaryEngineering. Source:IndianArmy

MultiagencyCoordinationCentre. Source:MHA,India

inCounter-IEDtasks,proceduresandgivethem exposuretothelatesttechnologiesandprocedures availablearoundtheglobe.Eachofthesecurityforces havetheirowncaninetrainingestablishmentsforthe trainingofnewandrefresherfortheexistingcanines.

Equipment&Technology-TheIndiansecurityforces andotherspecialistCounter-IEDunitsareadoptingthe latesttechnologiesavailableglobally,whichnotonlyact asforcemultipliers,butalsoreducetherisktomanual operatorscounteringexplosivedevices.Thephilosophy andprocessof‘defeatingthedevice’hasundergonea radicalchange.High-techequipmentliketheunmanned aerialvehicles,unmannedgroundvehicles,remotely operatedvehicles,disrupters,robots,non-destructive evaluationequipment,controlleddetonationchambers/ vehicles,RCIEDjammers,GPRs,anddetectionand neutralisingequipmentarebeingdeployedonalarger scalebythesecurityforces.Requisitefundsare earmarkedtoprocurethesetechnologiesand equipmentfrombothindigenousandforeign sources.TheDefenceResearchandDevelopment Organisations(DRDO)havebeenworkingonalarge numberofprojectstodeveloptechnologiesforaerial surveillance,reconnaissance,andsafeandeffcient handlingofexplosivedevices.Theprivateindustryis beingactivelyinvolvedandpartneredtodevelopthese technologiesforthesecurityforces.Asubstantial quantityofhigh-techCounter-IEDequipmenthasbeen inductedinrecenttimesintothesecurityforces.

CONCLUSION

Asevidentfromtheabove,Indiaisslowlybutsteadily buildingcapacitiesintermsoforganisations,training, equipment,technologiesandintelligencegatheringto undertakealargenumberofCounter-IEDoperations simultaneouslyovervaryingterrainsandenvironments. However,therearestillcertaingreyareastobe addressedonapriority.Theserelatetotheaspectsof evolvingacommonnationalstrategy,closerattention totheissueof‘attackingthenetworks’,and coordinationamongstthenumeroussecurityforces. TheIndiansecurityforcesarefullygeareduptotakeup anychallengestoitsinternalsecurityarisingfromthe useofexplosives. ■

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

ColonelHRNaiduGade -IndianArmyVeteran [BE(Civil),MSc(DefenceStudies),MBA(HR)]

CommissionedintotheCorpsofCombatEngineers. ACivilEngineer,andSecurityProfessional,with47 yearsofrichexperienceinthefeldofCombat Engineering,Chemical,Biological,Radiological, NuclearandExplosives(CBRNe)Defence,Security& DisasterManagementandCounter-IEDOperations.Is aqualifedCBRNandCounter-IEDProfessional.

IsaformerMemberoftheInternationalCivilService whileworkingasChiefCWInspector1997-2004with the‘OrganisationforProhibitionofChemicalWeapons (OPCW)’,TheNetherlands,winneroftheNobelPeace Prize2013.Ledteamsofinternationalprofessionalson manyverifcationmissionstovariousmember countries,toverifytheinventoryofChemicalWeapons andmonitortheirdestruction.

Presently,ChiefConsultantwith‘CBRNeSecure India’a‘forumandaknowledgecentre’forbringing awarenessinthegeneralpublic,governmentand securityentitiesonthethreatsarisingfromtheuseof CBRNematerialandtheirdisastrousconsequences. Aprolifcwriterandspeaker,participatedinvarious internationalanddomesticconferencesonCBRN Security,DisasterManagementandCounterExplosive Issuesandwritesarticlesforprofessionaljournals worldwideonthesesubjects.

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISM INUKRAINIANLANDS

Afterthepro-RussianprotestsinDonetskand

LuhanskoblastsinMarch2014,armed separatistsdeclaredboththeDonetskandLuhansk People’sRepublics(DPRandLPR)asindependent statesfromUkraine.

FromJune2014,andinparallelwithsomeYouTube and www.mojevideo.sk publishers,acurrentlybanned channel(www.vk.com/isodal)inRussianVKontakte socialmediastartedreleasingvideosmixingproRussianseparatistforcesincombatalongwithDaesh combatantsinSyriaandNorthCaucasianfghtersin theRussianFederation.Allthosevideoshave soundtracksbasedonIslamicNasheedandTakbirs.

Almostsimultaneously,anotherVKontakteaccount (www.vk.com/isdl_jihad)createdimaginaryfags combiningthosefromDonetskandLuhanskwith jihadistsymbolism.

Atafrstglance,itlookslikethepersonsbehind thatgraphicdarkhumorinitiativearepro-separatist supporters,whoarealsocollectingmoneyfrom donationstosupporttheindependenceofDonbass:it isalldesignedindirectimitationofDaeshinfuence activitiesthroughtheworldwideweb…

From2022,theRussiangovernmenthasbeen promotinganinfuencecampaigntomitigatethe tensionsbetweenChristianandMuslimsoldiersin Russianforces,allindirectbeneftofattractingMuslim Russianstorecruitment.

Inparallel,andfromMay2022,theconfictinthe disputedDonbass(thehistoricalareawhichis currentlyunderstoodasmainlycomprisingDonetsk andLuhansk)haswitnessedsomesortoffreak propagandaandmotivationcampaignunderthe genericnameof “ImaratDonbass”

“Imaginethere'snocountries.Itisn'thardtodoNothingtokillordiefor.Andnoreligiontoo...” (JohnLennoninhissong"Imagine"frstrecordedandreleasedin1971)

Figure1:Imagesandcapturesfromvideosfrom“IslamicStateofDonbassandLugant”. (Sources–VKontakte&Youtube).

ByLieutenantColonelJoseMRufas,ChiefofAttacktheNetworksBranch, C-IEDCentreofExcellence

Theirfrstvideowasentitledas “Returnofthe RussianCaliphate” andstatingthat“alllandsbelongto Allah”,amongothermessagestryingtoshowthat RussiaisanallyofIslam.

Thevideosandmerchandisingfrom “Imarat Donbass” werewidelypromotedbytheassassinated RussianbloggerMaximFomin(AKAVladlenTatarsky), whowasevenfeaturinginsomeoftheproducedvideos.

Oneofthemainvectorsfordiffusionof “Imarat Donbass” productshasbeentheTelegramchannel “TVJIHAD” (www.t.me/tvjihad),whichposesan inconsistentcombinationofsarcasticproductions,proRussianpropaganda,andsomepiecesofrealistic jihadistcontentfromNorthCaucasussources.

ThepresenceofMuslimcombatantsfghtingforboth theRussianorUkrainianforceswascausingahuge debateabouthowtheMuslimcommunityshould considerthem.AdamShakhidov,oneadvisertothe ChechenpresidentKadyrov,statedthatthoseMuslims takingpartintheRussian“SpecialOperationin Ukraine”areMujahideenservinginthewayofAllah, andthosekilledonthispathbecomemartyrs (Shaheeds).

ButthefactthatMuslimfghtersarecontributingto bothsidesoftheconfict,thedebatecontinueswhen consideringwhoarereallyfollowingthepathofAllah, andwhoaremeredisbelievers:

•AbuHamza,AmiroftheMujahideen-Muhajirsofthe WilayatNokhchichoyofImaratKavkaz(Caucasus Emirate),commentedthatthepro-Russianfghters fromtheChechenRepublicarefghtingforVladimir PutinandnotinthepathofAllah.

•DaysaftertheRussianinvasionofUkraine,the

CrimeanTatarfghterIsaAkayev(commanderof thevolunteerbattalion“Crimea”)appealedtothe RussianMuslimsand“fellowbelievers”whoare fghtinginUkraineto“throwdowntheirweaponsor jointheUkrainianArmedForcesinthefghtagainst Russia”.

•SimilarmessageswerespreadbytheChechen volunteerfghtinggroupsontheUkrainianside (e.g.DzhokharDudayevBattalionandShaykh MansurBattalion).

•Inanswertothat,leadersofMuslimRussian religiousorganizationsappealedfortheirsupport oftheleadershipofRussia,justconsideringthe RussianspecialoperationinUkrainetoseekfor peaceasaforceddefensiveandpreventive measuretoprotectRussiaandallitscitizensfrom therealthreatofnuclearandbiologicalweapons byNATOandEurope.

“#NafrforUkraine”:Muslimreactionstothe Russo-Ukrainianconfictin2014

Thehashtag “#NafrforUkraine” wasoftenusedinTwitter inMarch2014:theoriginalmeaningof “nafr” (نفير) wasthe "calltowar",soitshouldbeunderstoodasthe calltojihadielementsforactiontotraveltothereferred countryandtakepartintheholywarinthenameof Allah:itwaspreviouslymadewithSyriaandEgypt.

InadditiontothepastextraditionfromCrimeato CentralAsiaandtheprosecutionofTatarsbyRussia, thereferendumforannexationofCrimeatothe RussianFederationin2014madeseveralregional andinternationalSalaf-jihadistorganizations(e.g. AlQaeda)totakeuptheTatarcause.

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

Figure2:Capturesfromthevideo“ReturnoftheRussianCaliphate”under“ImaratDonbass”brand. (Source–Twitter)

OneofthemostpopularTatarorganizationsis Hizb-ut-Tahrir,whichadvocatesaglobalIslamic Caliphate,andithasbeenconsideredbytheRussian Federationasaterroristorganization.

WithregardtoTatarunitsfghtingontheUkrainian sidebeforetheRussianinvasion,wecouldfnd:

•TheNomanÇelebicihanTaburuBattalion,created byLenurIslamov(ex-DeputyPrimeMinisterof Crimea)in2016andcomposedofTurkic/Crimeans alongwithotherMuslimvolunteers.

•TheDevletGirayYedekTaqimigroup,as composedofTatarsandUzbeks.

•SomeotherTatargroupsarealsosaidtobepartof the“RightSector”units.

InthecaseofChechenunits:

•ChechenRepublic’sPresidentKadyrovis supportingRussiawithpartofhisarmedforces.

•TheDeath(Смерть)battalionisfghtingalongwith DonetskPeople´sRepublic(DPR)separatists.

•TheDzhokharDudayevBattalion,ascomposed ofChechens,Azerbaijanis,Georgiansand Ingushetia’smembers.

•TheSheikhMansurbattalion,whichseemstobe morereligiouslymotivatedandradicalized.

OntheUkrainianside,manyChechenfghterswere youngfundamentalistscomingfromthe“Caucasus Emirate”,whosefghterswerecombatinginSyriaand IraqalongwithDaeshcombatants.Infact,mostofthe formermembersoftheCaucasusEmiratewerefurther

embracingtheWilayahal-Qawqaz,sotheDaesh brandinNorthCaucasus(theyissuedacallfor potentialmilitantsinRussiaandCaucasianrepublics tojointhegroupandfghtagainstRussianforces ratherthanjoiningDaeshinSyria.).

“Obportumvenies” 1,Jihadismandthe2022

RussianaggressionagainstUkraine

Foryears,Ukrainehasbeenatransitpointontheway toandfromSyria.Infact,theSecurityServiceof Ukraine(SBU)hasdisruptedseveralofthose operations.InJuly2020,itwasjudgedanAzerbaijani networkwastransportingDaeshmilitantsfromthe NorthandSouthCaucasusandCentralAsian countriesviaUkrainetoTurkey,andfromtheretoSyria andIraq.AstheintensifcationofjihadistsinSyriawas confuentwiththewarinDonbas,soUkrainepaidlittle attentiontothemilitantswhowerepassingthrough itsterritory.

Althoughmostoftheroutesforforeignfghtersgoing toSyriawereblocked,Ukraineremainsmoreorless opentothemtoday(e.g.legallyorusingfake passportsthroughanairplaneorillegallybyferry throughtheBlackSea).Ifamilitantisnotincludedin theInterpoldatabase,hecaneasilyenterUkraine inprinciple.

Themostcommonapproachfromradicaljihadism supporterstotheconfictbetweenUkrainian government,Ukrainianseparatists,andRussiawasto celebrateawarinwhichtwocrusadercountrieswere killingeachother.

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

Figure3:Picturesofmembersof“CaucasusEmirate”&“QawqazWilayah”. (Source–www.longwarjournal.org&Twitter)

1(FromLatinlanguage)Literallymeaning"comingtowardaport",itrefersto“opportunity”.

Justbasedonreligiousjustifcations,clericsin UkraineandChechnyaencouragedMuslimsto participateinthemilitarycampaignonbehalfof UkraineandRussia:

•InChechnya,themuftiSalakhMezhievasked MuslimfghterstotakepartintheRussianspecial operationinUkraineanddeclareditasa“jihad.”

•InUkraine,themuftiSaidIsmagilov(highest Muslimreligiousauthorityinthecountry)stated thatMuslimswilldefendUkrainewithmorethan justprayers,andthenissuedafatwaurging MuslimstodefendUkraine.

•AyderRustemov,themuftioftheBlackSea peninsulaofCrimea,urgedUkrainianMuslimsto

defendthehomeland,andurgedRussianMuslims nottocontributetotheRussianaggression.

•AbuHamza,Amirofthe“Mujahideen-Muhajirsof theWilayatNokhchichoyofImaratKavkaz”(so CaucasusEmirate)hasstatedthattheChechen troopsofKadyrovcannotbeconsidered“real Chechens”duetotheirsupporttoRussia.

•TheCrimeanTatarfghterIsaAkayevappealedto theRussianMuslimswhoarefghtinginUkraineto throwdowntheirweaponsorjointheUkrainian ArmedForcesinthefghtagainstRussia.

AlthoughAlQaedawasnotmakingoffcial statements,severalsourcesofpropaganda(e.g.

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

Figure4:RadicaljihadistpropagandareferredtoRusso-Ukrainianconfict. (Source–Twitter,AnNaba,WolvesofManhattan)

Figure5:InformationrecommendingDaeshfollowerstouseexplosive-ladendronesforJihad. (Source–www.archive.org)

“WolvesofManhattan” magazine)sawtheUkrainian confictasanopportunityfortheirfghterstoexploitthe Ukrainianwar,theopenborders,thepotentialtraining andcreationofcells,andtheaccesstoweapons…all ofitindirectbenefttoextendtheglobaljihadover Europeanterritory.

Ontheotherhand,Daeshcondemnedthe participationofChechenfghtersinsupporttoRussia andurgedMuslimstostayawayfromthiskindofwar madeby“crusaders”and“infdels”.

Infact,theUkrainianconfictiscallingtheattention ofDaeshfollowers,asitisevidencedbythecontinuous referencestohowthecurrentevolutionofimprovised explosivedevices’tactics,techniques,andprocedures inUkrainecouldsupporttheirobjectives.

NotonlyspecifcJihadistpropaganda,butseveral otherwebsitessuchas “Kavkazcenter” and “Checheninfo” havebeenindirectlysupportingtheideaoftheJihad againstRussiaandtherelevanceoftheUkrainianconfict initsdevelopment.

TheUkrainianconfictisstillcallingtheattentionto minoritiesandMuslimcommunitiesintheex-Soviet republicstocombatRussia:asanexample,wecould takealookatthefoundationoftheTurkicbattalion

“Turan”inUkraineinlate2022,whichcurrently comprisesAzerbaijani,Kazakh,Kyrgyz,Buryat, Dagestani,Uzbek,andAltaifghters.

LastFebruary,aCaucasianMuslimvolunteer combatunitformedin2022,MuslimCorps“Caucasus” (MKKavkaz),releasedthevideo “Musul’manskij korpus“Kavkaz”zashhishhaetUkrainuUAotorkov

rashistovvBahmute…!” (MuslimCorpsCaucasus defendsUkrainefromtheracistforcesinBakhmut) showingitsmilitantsfghtinginBakhmut,Ukraine. Russiansourcesindicatethegrouptobecomposedof Azerbaijani,Dagestani,Chechen,andTurkishfghters.

Firstindicatorsonradicalizationorjust unmaskedrealobjectives…

Duringlastmonths,theChechenShaikhMansur battalion(currentlyfghtingontheUkrainianside)has beenshowingaslightlydifferentapproachto improvisedexplosivedevices’tactics,techniquesand proceduresthroughsocialmedia,asfollows:

•PreparationanduseofvehicleborneIEDs

•UseofpersonborneIEDsasindividualtactical equipment

Thatspecifcuseofsuicidetacticsisbasedona coupleofexplosive-ladenmagazineholsters connectedtotheplatecarrier:thosedevicesare composedofTrinitrotoluene(TNT)blocks,detonating cord,andaUZGRMfuzeforahandgrenadewhichhas beenmostprobablymanipulatedthroughremovingits timedelaycomponenttoallowinstantdetonation.

Thatinitiativecouldmovetosomepotential consequences:

•Increaseinideologicalradicalizationbythe componentsofthereferredunit.

•BadimageforUkrainianforces,whichcouldbe exploitedbyRussiaasUkraineconnectionto terrorism…

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

Figure6:PersonborneIEDsusedbyShaikhMansurbattalionmembersinUkraine. (Source–Twitter&SkyNews)

SinceOctober2022,militantsfromAjnadal-Kavkaz (أجنادالقوقاز,“SoldiersoftheCaucasus”)arefghting inUkraine.ItisaChechen-ledJihadistIslamic fundamentalistrebelgroupwhichhasbeenfghtingin northernSyria.Theyareactingincoordinationwith ShaikhMansurbattalion,andtheleaderofAjnadalKavkaz(RustamAzhiev,“AbdulHakimal-Shishani”)was appointedbytheleaderoftheChechenRepublicof Ichkeria'sgovernment-in-exile,AkhmedZakayev,as deputycommanderoftheChechenforcesoperating alongsidetheArmedForcesofUkraine.

TheconfuenceofthedecisionbytheUkrainian governmentaboutfacilitatingtheintegrationof ChechenfghtersfromChechnyaandSyriawiththe changeoffocusbyseveralChechengroupsregarding UkraineasabetterwayoffghtingRussiathaninSyria couldinciteotherJihadistgroupstoarriveinUkraine.

2023transnationalvisionfromDaeshinKhurasan Wilayat

FromJanuary2022,DaeshinKhurasanWilayat(ISKP)propagandameanshavebeenevolvingfrom publicationsandmaterialsintheoriginalPashto language(alsoDariandArabicones),intotheuseof Englishintheaimofaworldwideaudience.During 2022,theapproachhasmovedtotranslationsinto Urdu(PakistanandsomezonesofIndia),Uzbek (UzbekistanandminoritiesinAfghanistan,China,and otherformerSovietrepublics),Tajik(Tajikistan, Afghanistan),Hindi(India,Nepal…),Malayalam (KeralaregioninIndia),andeveninUyghur.

OnFebruary4th,2023,the21stissueoftheEnglish languageversionof“VOICEOFKHURASAN”was showingchangesindesign,makingthemagazine morevisualandmodernized.Additionally,itincluded implicitdirectionandguidanceonattacksinrevenge for2023Quranburningsaswellasexplicitreferences topastattacksinWesternterritories.

OnFebruary19th,2023,waspublishedthe22nd issueof“VOICEOFKHURASAN”,whichisbreaking theusualmonthlyreleaseofthemagazineand publishingiteachffteendaysforfrsttime.The evolutionofthepotentialthreattoEuropeandNorth Americainsidethepublicationismainlybasedonthe inclusionofrecommendationsfortargets,tactics, techniquesandproceduresregardingtheconductof attacksinWesterncountries,alongwithmore aggressiveimagespromotingarmedactions.

Inadditiontothat,Al-AzaimFoundationcontinues publishing(andredistributing)aparallelmagazine intheArabiclanguage(صوتخراسان,“Voiceof Khurasan”),whichincludesdifferentarticlesand targetsdifferentaudiences.

Ontheotherhand,theidentifeddynamics regardingpropagandabyDaeshinKhurasanare takingplaceinparallelwithahighincreasein messagesrecommendingviolentattacksagainst Europebyothermediaagenciesandforumsrelatedto Daesh,alongwiththeproductionofnewvideos, redistributionofoldones(translatedandsubtitledinto English,Spanish,French…)dealingwithterrorist actionsinEuropeandNorthAmericainthepast,and

“DONBASSWILAYAT”ORHOWTOPLAYWITHJIHADISMINUKRAINIANLANDS

Figure7:PagesfromVOICEOFKHURASAN#21and#22. (Source:www.archive.org)

callingforreactionsagainsttheQuranburningsand otherestimatedaggressionsbyChristiancountries toIslam.

WhataboutUkraineasapotentialgatefor terrorisminEuropeanterritory?

DaeshinKhurasanWilayatiscurrentlystrengthening linksandinfuencewithothergroupsandaudiencesin theCaucasus,alongwithtakingsomesortofmore globalrolethroughincludingwiderpropagandatarget audiences,launchinginfuencemessagestothe wholeworldwidecommunity,andprovidingdirect guidanceonplanningandconductingattacksinside Europeanterritory.

Duetoforeignfghters’presenceinmilitary operationsontheUkrainiansoil,jihadistpropaganda andterroristgroupsmightexploittheUkraineconfictto conveytheirmessageandreachabroaderaudience.

Duetoitsstrategiclocation,Ukrainemightbecome a“bridge”betweenEuropeandAsia,particularlythe MiddleEast,forjihadistandterroristgroups.The vacuumofpowerregisteredonUkrainiansoildueto theconfictandKyiv’sstrategytouseforeignfghters againsttheRussiansmightpushterroristcombatants tojointheso-called“internationallegion”toacquire Westerntrainingandweapons,andmaybeusingthem againstEuropeinviolentattacks.

Consideringthatin2021theUkrainianPresident signedadecreegrantingcitizenshiptoforeigners fghtingagainstRussia,ifUkrainewouldbecomea memberoftheEuropeanUnion,theseforeignfghters couldquicklymoveonEuropeansoilandcarryout targetedattacks.

ThepresenceofAjnadal-Kavkazmilitantsraisesthe regionalgeopoliticalrisk.Itconfrmsthefearsthatthe Ukrainianterritorycouldbecomeanattractiveplacefor jihadistfghters.■

REFERENCES

•C-IEDCoE “ThreatNetworks´TacticsTechniques &ProceduresUpdateDecember2022”

•C-IEDCoE “ThreatNetworks´TacticsTechniques &ProceduresUpdateJanuary2023”

•C-IEDCoE “PropagandaonUkrainianExplosiveladenDronesinDaeshChannels”,20FEB2023

•C-IEDCoE “DaeshinKhurasan:transnational visions&threats”,24FEB2023

• www.zaborona.com

• www.ips.ac.rs

• www.nationalinterest.org

Disclaimer

Thisarticledoesnotrepresenttheopinionofany nationalormultinationalorganisation;itswholecontent shouldonlybeconsideredastheopinionoftheauthor. Asalltheinformationhasbeenobtainedfromopen sources,potentialmistakescouldhavebeenmade duringtheresearchprocess.Pleasefeelfreetosend yourcomments,correctionsandinputstotheauthor; theywillbehighlyappreciated.

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

LieutenantColonelJoseMRufas graduatedfrom theSpanishArmyMilitaryAcademyin1993.Hewas commissionedintotheC-IEDCentreofExcellenceas HeadoftheDefeattheDeviceBranchinAugust2016, andcurrentlyholdingapostofChiefofAttackthe NetworksBranch.AsaMilitaryEngineerOffcer,his backgroundhasbeenmainlybasedonExplosive OrdnanceDisposalactivitiesintheSpanishArmyand C-IEDstaffissuesatthemultinationalheadquarters.In additiontohisEODOperator/EODOffcereducation, heattendedsomeothermilitarycoursesregarding Parachuting,ArmyStaff,InformationOperations,War CollegeGeneral/JointStaff,MilitarySearch,Technical ExploitationOperations,WeaponsIntelligenceTeam, ExploitationLaboratories,HomemadeExplosivesand otherC-IEDcourses.Hisoperationalassignments includeBosniaandHerzegovina(3),Afghanistan(3), RepublicofEcuador,IraqandUganda.

E-mail: jrufas@ciedcoe.org

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