Dsa July 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

he logic of a disaster management authority, its mitigation programme, a speedy response and rehabilitation mechanism and a population aware of the risks and dangers are plain to the eye and to the commonest of senses. Disasters, natural or man-made, cause more death and destruction per calendar year than any other non-medical reason worldwide. Yet there is a sharp divide between those countries and societies that are prepared to handle the challenge of a disaster and those that are not. India, despite all its claims to high status and role, belongs to the latter category. And it is a country that is most frequently affected by disasters, more natural than man-made, but an enormous disruption and destruction in the lives of millions of people.

The lackadaisical attitude to the value of life in India is best borne out by the emergence of the National Disaster Management Authority, as part of the Union Home Ministry. The NDMA does not control assets that would be the first to respond in case of a disaster; it also does not have the authority to mandate construction standards in vulnerable zones of the country and neither does it have the power to put the whole country through disaster drills covering the entire spectrum of threats. As a rule the first to respond to a disaster are always the firemen and yet the NDMA cannot influence their reaction time and capabilities and it certainly cannot decide what equipment the fire team must carry and be driven in. Which then really sums up the crisis in this country and the inability of the leadership to institute changes that are as basic as they are logical.

The Indian subcontinent is heading rapidly into the Asian landmass forcing great stress along the fault lines of the earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s crust. The frequency of major tremors is higher in South Asia than most parts of the world. Uttarkashi, Latur, Bhuj and Muzaffarabd are simply those that happened in the last two decades. Each one of them is classified as a major trembler. Yet nothing has been done to change the construction patterns in the country, with unregulated buildings booming at rates that can only be called as mind-boggling. And all of them constructed without catering for an earthquake. Take an example from the recent earthquake off the coast of Japan. Before the tsunami struck the hapless people, the total number of those lost to the Richter 9 earthquake was about 100, from house collapses etc. An earthquake on the same scale in South Asia would certainly have casualties in the unimaginable figures.

The other frequent cause of disasters is floods, visiting every year as a matter of routine. The devastation caused in Pakistan last year was, of course, beyond the scale that has ever happened in India, but it still does question the efficacy of the response mechanism. The simplest lesson learnt from across the world and South Asia specifically, is that a de-centralised mechanism and an authority that backs it, is the most vital component of tackling disasters. A body of re-employed people sitting in Delhi is not the answer to the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s problems and threats. The answers are in the districts, where a mechanism needs to exist and practice its responses with a frequency that is reassuring to its population. Till now the country has only faced natural disasters, but should a terrorist let off a chemical or radiological weapon in a large gathering, the consequences would be beyond compare. Why the country needs to wait for that to happen before preparing for it is one of the illogical aspects of governance in India.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

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PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE!

isaster! This word itself horrifies everyone today. It may be at a personal level or it may be at a national or international level. No matter what the level of its experience, it disturbs us all. But how much and in what manner are we prepared to face it? Are we really aware and alert about such experiences?

Vo l u m e 2 I s s u e 1 0 J u l y 2 0 11 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales rajeev chathley ishani bhowmik creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution ranjeet dinesh e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

Whenever there is any disaster only then we become ‘aware’, albeit fleetingly. Usually it hardly concerns us at all. Now, the important thing in inculcating awareness in ourselves is creating a curiosity about the reasons for any disaster. There may be a natural disaster over which there can be no human control. We collectively designate these to be “an act of God”. But yet there are many man-made reasons for which only we are responsible either by collective or personal indifference, callousness or collusion. We never take the things seriously for the simple reason that we take this as not being an individual responsibility or even a collective responsibility. We presume, assume and designate it as the sole responsibility of our government and various other official agencies and think and say that it is for them to take all necessary measures to safeguard us from any such eventuality. How many of us take necessary actions immediately on being confronted by a disaster by being pro-active to secure ourselves and those around us from any disaster, man-made or natural? Following are some hazards which are strong triggers for disasters of varying magnitude: Sociological hazards • Civil disorder • Crime • Terrorism • Arson • War Technological hazards • Power outage • Fire • Hazardous materials • Radiation contamination • CBRNs • Industrial hazards • Structural collapse Transportation • Road • Rail • Aviation • Space It is the equal responsibility of each citizen to be alert and aware about the above-mentioned hazards and to contribute a bit for the collective safety and security of the people and infrastructure. I am sure that if we all start acting pro-actively then even if the situation is not under total control but, for sure, we may save some lives of our brothers and sisters in the future. So let us take a pledge in the interest of mankind to at least take control of the hazards that are created because of our self-negligence. Let us begin with children and educate them well on such hazards. We have never even given thought to inculcating the feeling of responsibility in our children right from their childhood. So we must act in this regard at the earliest. To start with we must educate our children and women first of all on this subject as they are the worst sufferers in each case of disaster. Do we regularly check our cooking gas appliances; our electrical and electronics equipment and their wirings; our main gates and old unused chemicals and paints containers? I am sure very few of us keep an eye on these supposedly innocuous gadgetry, then what to talk about bigger reasons for the man-made / created disasters such as leakage of gas or leakage of water etc. which lead to bigger disasters. In our ongoing endeavour to further the DSA mission and to add more value and stature to the magazine, we are now honoured to have Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi as our Executive Editor. We are sure with his exceptional expertise and experience in matters military and non-military Gen. Bakshi will strengthen team DSA and steer the magazine to greater heights. Jai Hind!

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

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contents DISASTER MANAGEMENT SPECIAL ISSUE July 2011

Volume 2 Issue 10 July 2011

contents

A R T I C L E S

nuclear and radiological emergencies: preparedness and response

Dr. M. C. Abani

medical preparedness

CBRN threats

biodosimetry: an effective tool

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Jetley

chemical warfare

Prof. (Dr.) M. P. Kaushik

DRDO'S CWG shield

Dr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma

reactive vs proactive

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi

food protection

Prof. Gopalji Malviya S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) J. K. Bansal

NDMA: role and function

armed forces: pivotal role

Dr. Ajey Lele

Dr. Manju Lata Gupta Savita Verma

prepare for the worst

Dr. Rakesh Datta

hazards and vulnerability

Praful Adagale

small city orientation

Dr. Harsh K. Sinha

Dr. A. S. Bawa

role of ex-servicemen

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

CBRN disasters: the aftermath

Prof. K. S. Sidhu

inculcating culture of preparedness

Brig. (Retd.) Dr. B. K. Khanna

fukushima lessons

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

challenges and opportunities for India

Dr. Rajendra Prasad

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

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CONTAINMENT

Hitherto Three Mile Island in the US and Chernobyl in Russia were the benchmarks for accidents in nuclear facilities and Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the deliberate use of nuclear weapons for mass destruction for strategic reasons. The “event” in Fukushima in Japan where the earthquake caused a chain reaction of tsunami and breakdown of emergency equipment at the plant the whole paradigm of CBRN disaster management has had to be revisited and revised. India, which has a massive programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a strategic deterrence capability, is being pressurised by civil sector activists to learn and implement the lessons from Fukushima even to the extent of demanding that new nuclear projects be held in abeyance till a comprehensive review is completed. These are legitimate fears and government must respond with transparent acts and multi-level interventions to allay these fears and ensure that everything nuclear is controllable. 6

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

round the world, nuclear energy is extensively used in the field of power generation, medicine, industry, agriculture and research and also for strategic applications. A nuclear or radiological emergency can arise during storage, transport or use of radioactive material in a nuclear facility or in public domain. Terrorist activity can also lead to such a situation. Since uncontrolled exposure to radiation can be detrimental to human health as well as to the environment, it is essential that proper plans to handle these emergencies are in place. Exposure during an emergency can be through different pathways. When large area of ground is contaminated, this will also affect both the water resources and food chain.

Dr. M. C. Abani

Emergency response centres To handle an emergency the prime requirement is to have trained manpower, proper monitoring instruments and personal protective gear. In addition support from the various agencies viz. fire services, medical, police, civil defence, NGOs etc. will be vital. Infrastructure in the form of widespread monitoring network, roads, transport arrangements, health services, shelters, food, water etc. will also be of paramount importance. As a part of this programme, an Emergency Response Centre (ERC) is to be established from where all command and control will be executed. This article describes the various likely scenarios and preparedness in the form of capacity building, so that there is an effective response in case of an emergency.

India’s nuclear programme For the last four decades India has been exploiting its nuclear energy programme for peaceful purposes and reaping its benefit to improve the quality of life for its vast population. It has a very ambitious nuclear energy programme for the future also. It is also a nuclear weapon State. Due to inherent safety culture, the best safety practices and standards followed and effective regulation by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), chance of a nuclear / radiological emergency arising in a nuclear facility in our country is very remote. However, nuclear / radiological accident leading to an emergency can still arise due to factors beyond the control of the operating agencies e.g., human error, system failure, sabotage, earthquake, cyclone, flood, tsunami, etc. Natural disasters have been recurring phenomena in India, leading to extensive loss of life, livelihood and property. Of late, it has become equally vulnerable to various man-made disasters which can also lead to similar type of losses. Nuclear or radiological emergency is one facet of the man-made emergency.

Classification of emergencies International atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) classifies the emergency scenarios under two broad categories of emergencies viz. nuclear and radiological. In both the situations resulting exposure to the personnel in the affected area is in excess of the exposure limit. It defines these as follows:

nuclear and radiological emergencies: preparedness and response A nuclear emergency refers to a situation in which there is or is presumed to be a hazard due to the release of energy along with radiation from a nuclear chain reaction (or from the decay of the products of a chain reaction). This covers accidents in nuclear reactors, “criticality” in fuel cycle facilities, nuclear explosions, etc. Examples are the accidents at TMI in USA and Chernobyl in erstwhile USSR, recent happenings at Fukushima in Japan, etc. All other emergency situations, which have the potential hazard of radiation exposure due to decay of radioisotopes are classified as radiological emergencies. Examples are the accidents that took place at Goiania in Brazil, San Salvador, Istanbul in Turkey, Panama and Mayapuri in New Delhi, etc.

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Containment strategy

4. A crash of a nuclear powered satellite.

In spite of the best safety measures employed during handling of the radioactive material, an accident may take place. In addition, there are situations where by the deliberate use of the radioactive material, an emergency situation is created in public domain. Once such an emergency occurs, comprehensive measures would need to be taken to contain it. Immediate effect of an emergency situation may manifest in

5. A mishap with a nuclear powered submarine. 6. Accidents during transportation of nuclear material. 7. Radioactive waste going into water resources. 8. High explosives in combination with radioactive material.

Disruption. Explosion of an RDD would not result in fatalities due to radiation. The fatalities, if any, would primarily be due to the associated explosion. However, it may contaminate a large area, besides its main potential of causing panic and disruption.

a nuclear power plant) where large quantity of radioactive material is handled under controlled conditions, chances of an accident are rare but not zero. Based on the gravity of the situation, emergencies in these facilities are classified as:

Improvised nuclear device

■■ In-plant emergency - confined to the plant area.

Similarly, malicious use of special nuclear material (whose accessibility is not as widespread as that of

■■ On-site emergency - spread to outside plant perimeter fence and poses

Pathways of exposure

materials and may or may not be visible.

Atmospheric releases of radionuclides in a nuclear accident may lead to high airborne activity and deposition of radioactive substances over large areas on the ground. Spread of activity in such a situation will depend on various parameters like the source term, release height, meteorological conditions, topography around the site, etc. Prompt assessment of the activity levels on the ground can

Emergency plan

In the current international situation, steps have to be taken to guard against nuclear terrorism including State sponsored one, an assault on a nuclear power plant for the purpose of causing extensive damage, theft of teletherapy or radiography sources from hospitals or industries, hijacking of radioactive materials during their transport or terrorists taking forcible control of a plant etc. Such an attack will be aimed at to release large amount of radiation in public domain.

Many of the controlled measures suggested here will be relevant even in cases of other calamities, like earthquake, famine, flood, tsunami, landslide, large scale terrorist attack, etc. Therefore Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for a nuclear emergency should be a subset of another detailed SOP which should include all the disasters. However, it will have additional provisions, typical for nuclear emergencies. It is because, this situation is not like a flood type situation where once the water recedes people can be sent back to their homes immediately. In this case sometimes the level of contamination may be so high that it may even take years before people can be sent back to their homes. Also in this case response personnel are exposed to the radiation doses which if not controlled may be detrimental to their health. Such situation is not there for other natural disasters release of radioactivity. Given below is a list of various types of situations that can cause an emergency:

9. Terrorist activities, sabotage or acts using radioactive material to jeopardise national security.

1. Accidents including criticality accidents at nuclear facilities:

10. Illicit trafficking of the radioactive sources.

■■ Nuclear reactors (power, nuclear ship and research reactors).

11. Use of improvised nuclear devices.

■■ Fuel cycle facilities viz. fuel fabrication facilities, reprocessing facilities, waste management facilities etc. ■■ Spent fuel storage facilities.

These emergencies can happen at national territory or sometimes near national borders. Above list of emergences is not exhaustive.

■■ Large irradiation facilities (e.g., industrial irradiators).

A large-scale nuclear disaster, resulting from a nuclear weapon attack (as happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki) would lead to mass casualties and destruction of large area and property. This scenario is not covered in this article.

■■ Radiopharmaceutical manufacturing.

Radiological dispersal device

■■ High strength sources used in industry, medicine etc. (e.g. used for radiography, teletherapy etc.).

In an RDD (also known as dirty bomb) the conventional explosive such as dynamite is packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. It is not a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), at the most it can be called a Weapon of Mass

■■ Radiochemical laboratories. 2. Accident at industrial facilities:

3. Accidents due to ‘orphan’ radioactive sources (a source lost, found, stolen or abandoned).

12. Nuclear attack / explosions.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

radioisotopes), when used in the form of improvised nuclear device, is yet another issue that deserves attention. Successful explosion of an IND may have catastrophic effect similar to that of a nuclear weapon. A radioactive source which is not under the regulatory control is termed as an orphan source. Such a source when found, lost, stolen or abandoned may lead to an emergency situation. There is no unique way to cope with the various emergency situations described above. Each scenario requires its own overall strategy, consisting of specific monitoring programme, interpretation of the monitored data, determining public protecting actions and controlling emergency workers’ doses and the various countermeasures that are to be taken to mitigate the situation. By taking proper counter measures in time, public at large can be saved to a great extent from the harmful effects of the radiation and overall disastrous effects can be minimised.

Disaster in nuclear plants In a standard nuclear facility (like

As per IAEA, based on the experience of the Chernobyl accident and falling of Cosmos into earth’s orbit (a nuclear powered satellite), a minimum level of threat can be assumed to exist for all countries. India has an elaborate nuclear programme and will expand it extensively in future. Therefore it has to aggressively guard its nuclear assets.

hazards to other facilities within the site boundary up to exclusion distance of 1.6 km. ■■ Off-site emergency - magnitude of emergency is such that it is likely to affect areas beyond 1.6 km exclusion distance into the public domain. Examples are accident at Chernobyl or present situation around Fukushima reactors in Japan. ■■ Trans-boundary emergency magnitude of emergency is such that the release may lead to exposure outside the international boundary of country. Accident at Chernobyl did not create emergency in the neighbouring countries, but it did contaminate to an extent a large part of the northern hemisphere. To handle any of the four types of emergencies mentioned above, a nuclear facility will have an elaborate emergency preparedness plan. For handling of an off-site or a trans-boundary emergency, active involvement of district and state authorities is envisaged.

help in planning the effective counter measures. Generally radiation exposure of the public which can be external and / or internal is envisaged through the following pathways: ■■ Immersion in plume-direct ground and above ground

A nuclear emergency plan will define role of the plant authorities, corresponding district and state authorities and the role of the community. It should ensure that role of police, paramilitary, military and other technical agencies are also clearly defined and agreed. It should be clear how responsibilities may change as the accident progresses.

Preparedness

■■ Intake through food chain and water

For an emergency situation arising due to any of the events described above, the prime concern will be the health and safety of the public. Since these types of situations can lead to radioactive contamination of the environment and can have serious consequences, a detailed emergency preparedness plan should be worked out. In case of the nuclear facilities, a proper emergency plan should be prepared which provides a reasonable assurance that when warranted, appropriate measures will be taken to prevent damage to the man, material and environment. Similar plans should be prepared by the local authorities to combat any emergency situation, which may arise directly in the public domain.

The airborne “cloud” of the material released to the environment is called plume. It may contain radioactive

The emergency preparedness plan should prepare for the following actions:

■■ Deposition of activity on walls and ground (contamination of surfaces and areas) ■■ Resuspension of particulates ■■ Inhalation of radioactive dust ■■ Intake through ingestion route ■■ Intake through cuts and wounds ■■ Intake through grass, cow, milk pathway

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■■ A quick and reliable monitoring methodology to detect the onset of an accident condition and assess its magnitude.

■■ Strengthening of regulatory and security aspects at industries, hospitals etc. is needed, particularly in the present scenario.

■■ The first responders viz. Police, NDRF, Paramilitary forces, Fire and Emergency Services, Medicos, Civil Defence, Home Guards etc. should be fully equipped with radiation monitoring instruments and safety gears and integrated into the emergency preparedness programme.

■■ Community development: Due to the fact that one cannot see, feel or smell the presence of radiation, coupled with lack of credible and authentic information on radiation and radiation emergencies, even a minor nuclear incident is invariably linked with the sad memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or with the reactor accident at Chernobyl. By carrying out proper public awareness programmes, efforts should be made to allay the fears of the community about nuclear radiation and their ownership be ensured in the emergency preparedness plans.

■■ There is a big shortage of trained doctors as well as the medical facilities to handle radiation emergency cases. Medical professionals are to be trained to work in radiation environment and to treat radiation injuries. Sufficient stock of essential medicines is to be procured on priority. ■■ Dedicated and reliable communication network with adequate diversity and redundancy with special emphasis on the last-mile connectivity during emergency be established. ■■ Development of GIS-based emergency preparedness programme is needed for effective response to any emergency. ■■ For temporary relocation of the affected population, possible places of shelters with provision of hygiene facilities in large metros and vulnerable areas are to be identified and plans for their conversion to shelters are to be kept ready. Community centres, marriage halls, schools, colleges, cinema halls etc. can be considered for the purpose. ■■ It is likely that existing stock of food and water (stored in open) in the affected area may get contaminated. Therefore alternate sources of food and water are to be identified in advance and included in the plan (to avoid use of the contaminated food and water). ■■ Network of adequate transport vehicles and good motorable roads along the evacuation routes should be planned. ■■ Monitors at entry / exit points of the country and training of the security personnel to prevent the smuggling /illegal trafficking of the radioactive materials be taken up on priority.

■■ Prior information to be provided to the members of public, likely to be affected by the accident. ■■ Identification of conditions which may lead to intervention. ■■ Intervention levels for protective action levels for withdrawal and substitution of specific supplies of food and drinking water. ■■ Civil–military co-ordination to be developed so that the services of the armed forces may be called for, to augment the coping capability of the civil administration during any major nuclear accident.

Nation-wide monitoring The most important part of emergency preparedness is to have a detailed and a reliable monitoring programme. The monitoring facilities should be equipped with portable radiation survey meters, personal dosimeters, air samplers etc. In addition, there should be laboratory facilities to carry out quick analysis of soil, water, vegetation and air samples. Important part of monitoring is an early warning system, which regularly monitors the potential points of releases at select locations around the site. Information from these places is telemetered to an Emergency Response Centre (ERC). In most countries, site specific monitoring is part of the regulatory requirement. In order to cope up with the consequences of large-scale releases

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of radiation in the environment, in addition to the site specific monitoring, many countries have established nationwide monitoring systems. Indian Environmental Radiation Monitoring Network (IERMON) established by BARC in India is an example of the nationwide monitoring programme. This programme covers major metros / cities and vulnerable areas.

Various types of surveys In case of an emergency various types of radiation surveys are to be carried out. Atmospheric releases of radionuclides in a nuclear accident may lead to deposition of radioactive substances over large areas on the ground. This can lead to radiation exposure of the public through different pathways mentioned earlier. Ground survey is routinely employed to measure the contamination levels in the area. It is carried out using fixed monitors installed at various locations and also by the portable monitoring units. Various modes of transport are used for this survey.

In addition to radiation monitoring, the components of the environment and food and water are also continuously monitored. Using this information an overall picture of radioactive contamination will be constructed at regular intervals. Models will be used to calculate the predicted dose to the population before actual results of environmental monitoring become available. It will help in deciding the countermeasures promptly. In carrying out relief measures for non-nuclear disasters like flood, earthquake, tsunami etc., there is very little detriment to the health of the personnel carrying out the relief work. However, in case of a nuclear disaster, the persons carrying out the relief work are also likely to be exposed to high doses of radiation and / or contamination, which if not controlled may affect their health and potential to carry out relief work effectively. Therefore special precautions are to be taken for the safety of the relief personnel.

Organisational structures

Aerial survey is preferred, if the area affected is large and terrain is not favourable. It is quick, flexible, leads to minimal exposure of monitoring personnel and can monitor areas unapproachable by ground survey. However, it can be carried out only in favourable weather conditions. Instrument commonly used for aerial survey is Aerial Gamma Spectrometry System (AGSS).

For the management of a nuclear emergency, well-defined organisational set-up is to be established and responsibilities are to be allocated appropriately. In Indian context, some of the important agencies that will have direct role in handling of an emergency are given below:

An AGSS, when fitted in an aircraft can scan very large area and measure low levels of contamination on the ground. During an aerial survey, an aircraft or a helicopter is normally flown at a speed of 150-200 km / hr and at an altitude of 80-150 meters. System consists of a bank of Nal (TI) detectors, a multichannel analyser system and a PC and is integrated with a GPS which provides on-line 3D positional co-ordinates namely latitude, longitude and altitude during survey. In case of an actual emergency, survey is carried out along a grid of flight lines with select line spacing. This approach helps in covering of a large area uniformly. In India, BARC has developed the AGSS. This can be fitted in an aircraft within a period of one hour and is ready for use.

■■ Department (DAE)

Crisis ■■ National Committee (NCMC) of

Management Atomic

■■ National Disaster Authority (NDMA)

Energy

Management

■■ Radiation monitoring group ■■ Decontamination centre ■■ Fire service ■■ Medical service

Emergency

■■ Security (police, paramilitary unit, army)

■■ Crisis Management Group in the nodal ministry

■■ Meteorology and environmental group

■■ Off-site emergency director Off-Site Emergency Committee

■■ Information and communication

■■ Regional / State Response Committee

■■ Site emergency director – Site emergency committee ■■ Nuclear plant authority ■■ Emergency Response Centre (ERC)

■■ Transport ■■ NGOs In India, all the important nuclear facilities have their own emergency preparedness plans and there is a

centralised agency - Crisis Management Group (CMG) at DAE Headquarters, Mumbai, which coordinates with the various units for handling of emergency in public domain. Department of Atomic Energy is the nodal agency in the country to provide expertise in the detection of nuclear / radiological emergency situation and subsequently help in the implementation of radiation protection measures and to advise on medical management.

Response teams For the management of major nuclear emergencies, the ERC will be the central place from where command and control will be executed. This Centre should be equipped with various types of monitoring instruments, protective gears and communication facility and provision to contact experts at short

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notice. It should also have close liaison with police, fire brigade, hospitals, transport services, civil defence authorities, meteorology department, NGOs and other related agencies in the area. Monitoring and response support coverage is being enhanced through 18 numbers of Emergency Response Centres (ERCs) established by BARC. For the management of nuclear emergencies, associated with each ERC, various Emergency Response Teams are to be identified. These ERTs are to be trained for the specific jobs and mock exercises should be conducted periodically. Various types of ERTs viz. Radiation Monitoring and Identification, Aerial Survey, Bioassay, Biodosimetry, Medical Support etc. are being suggested by IAEA for handling of any nuclear or radiological emergency. Most of the teams require transport vehicles, contamination monitors, high and low range gamma survey instruments, self reading dosimeters, TLDs, battery operated air samplers, thyroid blocking agents, first aid kits, protective overalls, portable radio communications systems, public address systems, radiation warning labels and signs, log books, identification badges, torch lights, spare batteries, field calibration of instruments, etc.

Intervention In case of a nuclear emergency, quick and well-founded decisions about imposition of emergency actions and countermeasures aimed at mitigating the consequences are to be taken. These interventions have to be based on national plans and recommendations, which are in general consistent with the principles set out by the international organisations, viz. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and IAEA. The proposed interventions should do more good than harm, i.e., the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction in dose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs of the intervention.

Extant infrastructure ■■ Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in our country which, ensures that while the beneficial aspects of nuclear programme and use

of ionising radiation are fully exploited, their uses do not cause undue risk to public health and the environment. It has powers, not only to license the operation of a facility but also to order partial or full shutdown of the facility that violates its guidelines. Operation of a new or existing nuclear power plant or a radiation facility is permitted only when preparedness plans are in place for the postulated emergency scenarios. All functions / operations during entire life time i. e., from siting to decommissioning of the nuclear / radiological plants under Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) are as per the AERB regulations. ■■ For all radiation facilities outside DAE, having potential of high exposure, compliance to AERB guidelines and availability of properly qualified Radiological Safety Officers (RSOs) ensure the required safety. ■■ Based on the severity of the emergencies, detailed emergency response plans are in place at all the nuclear facilities and are functional during entire lifetime of the facility. To cope with an off-site emergency at a nuclear power plant, if any, detailed response plans are put in place by the Collector of the concerned district in association with the plant authorities. Periodic mock drills / exercises involving the community are to be held to ensure the quality of the preparedness. During an actual emergency at any of the DAE facility, the Crisis Management Group (CMG) of DAE activates the emergency response and coordinates with other agencies.

Response organisation The response to nuclear / radiological emergencies has its own objectives and principles such as mitigation of accidents at source; prevention of deterministic health effects in individuals; providing first aid and treatment of injuries; reducing the probability of stochastic effects in the population; reduction of the psychological impact on the population and protection of environment and property, all within the constraints of available resources. This response has many elements in common with the response to other man-made and natural disasters, in terms of services like transport, medical, fire and emergency

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services, police, civil defence, shelter etc. However, some special features of nuclear emergency will need to be taken care of additionally. The response to an emergency should be commensurate with the level of the hazard. The national level response plan will describe the concept of operations, roles and responsibilities of all the responding organisations and their inter-relationships. The next level will comprise of plans developed by the state governments, district collectors and facility operators. This action plan should have demographic details, list of hospitals, places of shelter, alternate sources of food and drinking water etc.

relevant pathways; ■■ Determine the areas countermeasures are required;

where

■■ Predict the development of a contamination situation in time and space; ■■ Mobilise resources at short notice; ■■ Cordon off the area, if needed; ■■ Initiate countermeasures at the earliest; ■■ If required, distribute Iodine tablets without any delay (Iodine prophylaxis);

The final level will work out the SOPs for handling the emergencies.

■■ Ensure that the actions taken by the various agencies are well coordinated;

Response actions

■■ As more and more monitoring data is received, it is likely that the initial estimates of the dose levels, contamination levels and the area affected may undergo change. Based on the latest data apply mid-course correction to your plans to make them more effective.

Following are the general response actions to be taken in case of nuclear / radiological emergencies. However, no two situations are identical, therefore responders will have to use their knowledge, expertise and experience to deal with the situation as it unfolds. Depending on the type and magnitude of the emergency, some or all of these actions are to be initiated at the appropriate time. ■■ Recognise the existence of an abnormal situation and respond quickly; ■■ Identify and characterise the source and its origin;

■■ Send prior information (in respect of do’s and don’ts) to those likely to be affected by the emergency. ■■ Other important actions include: •

•

■■ Initiate a quick and reliable monitoring methodology to detect the onset of an accident / emergency condition and assess its magnitude; ■■ Depending upon the severity of the accident / emergency inform the concerned local, state and national agencies in this order;

•

Evacuation / temporary relocation of the affected population, if required; Withdrawal and substitution of supplies of food and drinking water (based on actual measurement of contamination found in food and drinking water); Animal husbandry personnel to ensure radiological protection for cattle and livestock following a nuclear emergency;

■■ Communicate the situation to other responders namely fire services, NDRF, medical services, police, civil defence, transport, etc;

■■ Initiation of the recovery phase at an appropriate time.

■■ Rapid and continuous assessment and future projections of the emergency situation as it develops;

Sometime back NDMA has released the National Guidelines on Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies. These guidelines propose a holistic and proactive approach in handling of these

■■ Estimate the radiation dose via the

NDMA guidelines

emergencies. Nuclear and radiological emergencies being man-made in nature, it assigns highest priority to prevention, mitigation and compliance to regulatory requirements, at the same time strengthening preparedness, capacity development, response etc. NDMA has raised 8 battalions of National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), which are trained to handle nuclear and radiological emergencies. A proper preparedness plan followed by capacity building in a phased manner will build disaster resilience in the society. Many of the controlled measures suggested here will be relevant even in cases of other calamities, like earthquake, famine, flood, tsunami, landslide, large scale terrorist attack, etc. Therefore Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for a nuclear emergency should be a subset of another detailed SOP which should include all the disasters. However, it will have additional provisions, typical for nuclear emergencies. It is because, this situation is not like a flood type situation where once the water recedes people can be sent back to their homes immediately. In this case sometimes the level of contamination may be so high that it may even take years before people can be sent back to their homes. Also in this case response personnel are exposed to the radiation doses which if not controlled may be detrimental to their health. Such situation is not there for other natural disasters.

To have an effective response during an actual emergency, the response plan should be exercised periodically with the participation of all the stakeholders. This will give confidence to the concerned agencies and to the members of public. The emergency preparedness plan is a dynamic programme, which is updated regularly based on the experience gained from the operation of the various facilities and the exercises conducted in public domain.

Acknowledgements My appreciation and thanks are due to Sh. B. Bhattacharjee, Hon’ble Member, NDMA for guidance and support during preparation of this article.

References 1) NBC Defence Journal, Faculty of NBC Protection, CME Pune, Vol 01, No. 01, June 2002, PP 1-15. 2) NDMA Guidelines on Management of Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies, Feb. 2009, New Delhi. The writer is former Head, Radiation Safety Systems Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and Member Secretary, BARC Safety Council. He is recipient of Dr. A. K. Ganguly Oration Award for his contributions in the field of Radiation Protection. Presently he is working as a Senior Specialist (Nuclear) at National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), New Delhi.

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disaster management

MASS CASUALTIES

For a nation that is threatened by two nuclear weaponscapable neighbours India has produced a minimum nuclear deterrence riposte; but for a nation that is also, simultaneously, the most terrorist-threatened nation in the world, India’s preparedness for a CRBN attack by an individual terrorist or group is zero. Evidence of that is seen in the absence of protection of one of the best shelters against such attacks – the Metro underground rail network – which does not have a shuttered, anaesthetic doorway.

nder the prevailing scenario there is a high possibility of Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) warfare agents falling in the hands of terrorist groups, imposing great challenge of CBRN terrorism. Terrorists may sabotage a chemical or nuclear plant. Use of CBRN agents during the war is a very remote possibility. Chemical and Nuclear agents can be used as “dirty bombs” where these agents are packaged with explosive material. On explosion a “dirty bomb” will contaminate the environment causing hazardous effects on health. Nuclear agents can be used as “suitcase nukes” having a weight of 10 kg only while it will have a yield of 10-20 kilotons, with radiation effect upto 4-5 km radius. Usually Cesium-137 or Cobalt-60 are the nuclear materials used in the dirty bomb which has got long half life causing the delayed radiation effect in the form of cancer, cataract, genetic damage, premature aging and infertility.

Mass devastation The virulence of biological agents cannot be undermined as they are cheap, easy to produce and only a small amount is required to play havoc. Bacteria like anthrax, virus like smallpox, toxin like botulisms are most commonly used as biological agents. In addition to CBRN terrorism, nuclear or chemical disaster can also occur due to accident either in nuclear reactors, chemical plants or during transportation of nuclear or chemical material. Accidental release of biological agents from a biosafety lab will cause biological disaster. CBRN disaster will cause

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) J. K. Bansal

tremendous devastation to human and other living beings, flora, fauna and environment including air, water and soil. Management of casualties in nuclear, chemical or biological scenario poses a great challenge because of the contamination.

irradiation by Beta emitters may be caused by ingestion, by inhalation or by entering through wounds. Severity of injuries depends on radiation dose. Depending on system involvement and severity of exposure various acute radiation syndromes occur.

Protection of medical teams

a. Cutaneous Syndrome

In CBRN environment a search, rescue and quick reaction medical team has to put on protective clothing, respiratory masks, boots and gloves which reduces the working efficiency. Personal protection, detection, decontamination, ridding the body of radioactive contamination (decorporation), vaccination and antidote administration are extra special requirements for management of CBRN casualties along with the usual care of heat, blast and infection effects. Nuclear agents mainly cause acute haemopoetic, gastrointestinal, cutaneous and central nervous system (CNS) syndrome while chemical agents adversely affect eyes, skin, respiratory and nervous system, of course biological agents can severely infect any part of body causing casualties in pandemic proportion. Every physician needs to be prepared to handle CBRN casualties. Brief description about nuclear, biological and chemical agents is very essential to understand the subject.

■■ Skin lesion may appear within hours of exposure.

■■ Occurs due to destruction of intestinal mucosa by acute exposure in doses of 500 to 2000 Rads.

■■ Acute doses of over 2000 Rads damage the brain severely.

Nuclear radiation

■■ Characterised by nausea, vomiting and bloody diarrhoea.

■■ Headache occurs in minutes to an hour.

■■ There is severe dehydration and high fever.

■■ There is drowsiness, severe apathy and lethargy.

■■ Death occurs in 1 to 2 weeks

■■ Loss of muscular coordination,

Radiation injuries are caused by external irradiation or by internal irradiation by Beta emitters. External irradiation may be acute or chronic, whole body or only superficial. Internal

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■■ Erythema, itching, blistering, oedema, desquamation (peeling of skin), necrosis, ulcer, hair loss and onycholysis (shedding of nails) are the main skin manifestations of radiation. b. Haemopoeitic Syndrome

(blood

related)

■■ Occurs due to bone marrow destruction caused by acute exposure in lower doses of 200-500 Rads. ■■ Characterised by marked reduction in white blood cells, platelets, RBCs. immunosupression, ■■ Petechiae, sepsis, haaemorrhage and anemia. c. Gastrointestinal Syndrome

Medical preparedness from enteritis, sepsis, toxaemia and disturbances of body fluid. d. Central Nervous System Syndrome

coma, convulsions and shock. ■■ Death is within few hours to a few days. ■■ There is no treatment possible. In case of nuclear explosion, there will be radiation contamination of environment as well as buildings and grounds. Underground metro stations could be utilised as a protected area for the shelter of victims as well as for emergency medical first aid. Provision needs to be made to cordon off both

ends of the underground metro station by a shutter fitted with CBRN filter. In case of any eventuality, the running of train would be discontinued and both ends could be closed. The provisions of safe water supply, stocking of food, drugs, medical equipment, power back-up should be planned.

Chemical agents Knowledge of the exact nature of the chemical will facilitate proper antidote administration and effective treatment for early recovery. Stocking

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disaster management

MASS CASUALTIES

Table 1: Chemical warfare agents Chemical agents

Exposure

Effects

Antidotes / Methods of Treatment

Blister Agents: Sulphur Mustard (HD), Lewisite,

Skin contact, inhalation

Pain is not immediate. Skin blisters, coughing, respiratory failure and in the eyes- itchiness, burning ,cornea damage

Decontamination, ointments to soothe blisters. Mustard has no known antidote

Nerve Agents: Tabun, Sarin, Soman & Vx

Skin contact, inhalation

Miosis, pain, blurred vision, runny nose and chest tightness, nausea and vomiting

Ventilation, Atropine, pyridostigmine and supportive therapy

Choking Agents: Chlorine , Phosgene

Inhalation

Dyspnoea, irritation of mucous membranes; coughing; tightness of chest, pulmonary oedema

No antidote, airways clearance, oxygen, Rx of pulmonary oedema

Blood Agents: Cyanogen chloride, HCN

Inhalation

Eyes irritation, convulsions, respiratory failure, sudden loss of consciousness leading to death

Antidotes: sodium thiosulfate

Biological agents

Blister caused by Mustard agent and turnover of antidotes needs to be maintained. A mobile laboratory for chemical analysis is required to be introduced so that type of toxicant can be identified at the site itself. Brief description of chemical warfare agents is given in the following table.

They cause infective diseases in a pandemic proportion. There is a need for strengthening public health system and Biosafety laboratories for the management of outbreak of infectious diseases, either occurring naturally or due to an act of biological terrorism. Health department should be equipped with state-of-the-art tools for rapid epidemiological investigation and control of suspected or confirmed acts of bio-terrorism. Genetically modified strains of micro organism used for bio-terrorism would pose difficulties in the diagnosis and treatment. Biological agents can be rapidly invading large community. Prophylactic vaccination, use of appropriate antibiotics, immuno modulators and supportive therapy are mainstay for biological disaster

nitrite

and

CBRN detection equipment

poisonous substances from body. An absorbent powder such as bentonite (“Fuller’’s Earth”) can be used for the decontamination.

management. Characteristics of most commonly used biological agents are given in the following table.

Mass casualties Proper planning and preparedness is required for medical response in case of CBRN incidence. The preparedness aspects will focus on the of CBRN detection, protection, decontamination equipment and material required for the management of the casualties at the site of incidence, during evacuation and for treatment at hospital.

CBRN training All need type other

medical and paramedical staff to be made aware about the of illness, injuries, burns and health problems caused by

Disease

Incubation Period

Duration of Illness

Lethality

Persistence of Organism

Vaccine Efficacy

Anthrax

1-6 days

3-5 days (usually fatal if untreated)

High

Very stable spores remain viable for > 40 years in soil

2 dose efficacy against up to 1,000 LD50 in monkeys

Plague

1-7 days (usually 2-3 days)

1-6 days (usually fatal)

High unless treated within 12-24 hours

For up to 1 year in soil; 270 days in live tissue

3 doses not protective against 118 LD50 in monkeys

7-17 days (average 12 days)

4 weeks

High to moderate

Very stable

Vaccine protects against large doses in primates

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first few minutes will determine the effectiveness of mitigation. Quick Response Medical Team with personal protective equipment will reach to incidence site immediately along with resuscitation, protection, detection and decontamination equipment and material. After resuscitation casualties must be decontaminated as early as possible. Decontamination is very important step for management of nuclear and chemical casualties because any extra second contact of these agents with the body is detrimental. The aim of decontamination is to rapidly and effectively remove

sodium

Table 2: Biological Warfare Agents Characteristics

Smallpox

CBRN agents and their preventive measures. Proper training and mock drill needs to be carried out about use of CBRN detection, protection equipment. Decontamination along with resuscitation measures is an essential component of medical response emergency plan. Super-specialists in the field like Hematology, Gastroenterology, Neurology, Pulmonology, Dermatology, Oncology and Ophthalmology require training for the management of effects of radiation and chemical injuries affecting different body systems.

Nuclear agents cannot be seen, have no smell, these can be only detected by certain equipment like pocket personal radiation dosimeter, team radiation survey meter and radiation survey vehicle. Biological aerosol warning system, rapid onsite biological agent detection system etc. will be required to detect biological agents. Chemical agent can be detected by chemical agents monitor, portable gas and vapor indicator etc. CBRN personal protective suit, boots, gloves, mask and charcoal underwear are very essential for quick response medical team before entering into CBRN contaminated environment.

The specialised ambulance with life support system be made available for evacuation of CBRN casualties. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) shall be laid down for attending such casualties. The casualty should be put into an evacuation bag fitted with CBRN filter before loading

into the ambulances.

CBRN casualties treatment In hospital casualty will be finally decontaminated and kept in a clean special ward. The decontamination room must be at the entry of hospital and should be sealed off from other premises and should have a separate ventilation system. Initially based on early symptoms treatment will be given. Blood is to be analysed to find out the effect of exact CBRN agents and further treatment must be modified accordingly. All supportive treatment must be given in the hospital immediately. Hospital Disaster Management plan in earmarked hospital needs special attention for management of CBRN casualties. Facilities like radiation injury treatment centre, blood bank facility, CBRN filter fitted ward, disposal system for contaminated bio-waste shall be made available. The nuclear radiation mainly causes acute heamopoietic, gastrointestinal, cutaneous and CNS syndrome which needs specific facilities and super specialists in different fields to manage radiation injuries. The facilities of bone marrow/ stem cell transfusion also require to be established. Routinely these facilities could be utilised to manage hematological diseases like leukemia, anemia and thrombocytopenia etc. For the management of biological agent microbiologist is an essential requirement. Chemical agents will mainly affect respiratory system, nervous system, eyes and skin, therefore specialists in these fields along with equipment are also to be provided.

Specialised therapy In addition to usual drugs special medical stores need to be catered for

Emergency medical response Pre-hospital care: In case of CBRN disaster, the crisis management group is to be immediately activated by triggering inbuilt mechanism for prompt Emergency medical response. The steps taken in the

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disaster management

the treatment of CBRN casualties. Amifostine significantly decreases radiation toxicity in patients receiving radiotherapy for cancer, when 200 mg/m2 given intravenously 15-30 minutes prior to each radiation fraction. Decorporation agents: Diethylene Triamine-Penta Acetate (DTPA), Prussian blue eliminates radio nuclides entered inside the body thus reducing internal contamination. The decorporation agents act as diluting, blocking, mobilising and chelating agents. The decorporation should be initiated as soon as practical. Gastric lavage, emetics, purgatives, laxatives and enemas can also be used to

eliminate radioactive material from the body. Prior administration of Potassium Iodide prevents damage to thyroid from radiation. Growth factors colony stimulating factors and other radiation recovery agents are very useful for restitution of immune system. Antidotes are required to be procured to neutralise chemical effects. Antidotes required for nerve agents are physostigmine, obidoxime, atropine and pyrido stigmine and vesicant may require dimercaprol, sodium thiosulphate, cyanide may require dicobalt editate. Biological agents require antibiotics and vaccines. Recombinant protective antigen vaccine and Anthrax immuno-globulin for Anthrax, recombinant F1-V antigen vaccine for plague, vaccines for Q fever, tularemia, botulism, viral hemorrhagic fever and smallpox need to be provided.

disaster management

MASS CASUALTIES Hygiene and sanitation The importance of effective hygiene and sanitation in a CBRN contamination environment cannot be over-emphasised. Following a CBRN attack, all food except canned or otherwise well-protected food should be thoroughly inspected to ensure that adequate protection was provided. Safe food preparation and use of purified water, protection from contamination is to be taught to the community. Close monitoring is required to observe post traumatic stress disorders or any long term health effects of CBRN agents like blindness, interstitial lung fibrosis, genetic damage, cataract and

neurological deficiencies etc., and need to be treated.

Civic networkÂ CBRN disaster management can only be possible by full involvement and total commitment of various organisations like fire services, police, communication, health services including ambulance service, hospitals. Multi-dimensional impact of CBRN disaster requires multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approach for development of trained manpower, equipment and other facilities needed for the handling of CBRN disaster. Provision of clean water supply, safe food, hygiene and sanitation, environmental health and control of vectors is to be planned to prevent any epidemic in the aftermath of CBRN disasters. Healthcare facilities are an

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PROACTIVE N HOLISTIC

essential component of emergency medical response system, but at the present, are poorly prepared for an incident. The greatest challenge may be the sudden presentation of large number of contaminated individuals. Special facilities to treat CBRN casualties are to be created in the hospitals including CBRN filter fitted ward and bio-waste disposal system. Earmarked hospitals are also to be geared up for restitution of immune system, bone marrow/stem cell transfusion, medical stores containing antidotes, vaccines, decorporation agents and antibiotics. Management

of post-traumatic stress disorders is also to be catered. Planning is to be done to deal with long term effects of radiation like cancer, cataract, genetic damage and premature ageing. Documentation, research and analysis is to be carried out in post-disaster scenario for future lessons. Â

The writer is Member, National Disaster Management Authority, Govt. of India. Prior to this he served in Army Medical Corps and Defence Research and Development Organisation. He is the pioneer of Radiation Disaster Medical Management Centre, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences, Delhi. He established NBC Mitigation Division and NBC Training Centre at Defence Research and Development Establishment, Gwalior.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Jetley

NDMA: role and function India has its fair share of natural and man-made disasters. It is just six years since the National Disaster Management Authority was created and going by the machinery and equipment it has acquired, it is capable of pre-empting some categories of disasters. Yet in a nation of the sub-continental size of India, the NDMA will need to expand the coverage of the National Disaster Response Force well beyond the ten that have been sanctioned because spreading it thin could be counter-productive.

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disaster management

PROACTIVE N HOLISTIC

ince time immemorial the Indian sub-continent has been unpropitious to be plagued by natural disasters. Earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, avalanches, floods, droughts, cyclones, forest fires, river erosions, you name it and we have experienced them all. And, as if the wrath of nature was not bad enough, we have experienced a fair share of man-made disasters as well like chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear disasters, cyber-terrorism, mine disasters and environmental disasters. One of the worst man-made disasters experienced in our country was the Bhopal gas tragedy which occurred on the night of 2/3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. It is categorised as one of the world’s worst industrial catastrophes. The threat of a disaster happening has always been around us, hanging like the proverbial sword of Damocles, yet our reactions have mostly been knee-jerk, reactive and focused on providing relief after being struck by a disaster rather than by being proactive. It was therefore high time for us as a nation to wake up to the crying need of the hour. With the creation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in 2005, a paradigm shift took place in the handling of disasters. A proactive, holistic and integrated action plan was drawn up which emphasised the importance of prevention of disasters where possible, mitigation where unavoidable and preparedness for handling the same. The aim being to conserve developmental gains, minimise the loss of life, livelihood and property.

National vision and strategy Vision: To build a safe and disaster resilient India by developing a holistic, pro-active, multi-disaster and technology-driven strategy through a culture of prevention, mitigation, preparedness and efficient response. Strategy: Basically the strategy is multi-dimensional and holistic focusing on two broad phases viz. pre-disaster phase and the post-disaster phase. In the pre-disaster phase, emphasis is laid on prevention, mitigation, preparedness, capacity building and community based disaster management (including public awareness). In the post-disaster phase emphasis is laid on prompt and quick response, speedy reconstruction and rapid rehabilitation. Post the triple tragedy of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown that struck the Japanese mainland recently, the world witnessed what was meant by a holistic and integrated approach towards disaster management.

Creation of NDMA The need for creating an organisation for handling disasters, which hit the Indian sub-continent with striking regularity, was felt for quite some time. That was why a National Centre for Disaster Management was established in 1995 in the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA) by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the then nodal ministry for disaster management in the country. This centre later became the NIDM. The responsibility for handling disasters remained with the Ministry of Agriculture till 2001. However, in August 1999, the government of India set up a High Powered Committee

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under the chairmanship of Mr. J. C. Pant. This was just prior to the devastating cyclone in Orissa. This committee recommended the setting up of a Disaster Management Ministry, but this did not fructify in the form recommended. Thereafter in February 2001, just after the Gujarat earthquake, an All Party National Committee on Disaster Management was set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. This committee recommended the creation of the NDMA under the MHA and therefore in June 2002, in deference to the recommendations of this committee, the responsibility of handling Disaster Management was transferred to the MHA and the Disaster Management Act was passed in December 2005.

NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CABINET COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL CALAMITIES PLANNING COMMISSION

By the enactment of the Disaster Management Act 2005 (DMA), government of India ordered the creation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) as opposed to creating a separate ministry recommended by the Pant committee. The importance that the government gave to this newly created body can be adjudged by the fact that the NDMA is chaired by the Prime Minister himself, with a Vice Chairman of the status of Cabinet Minister and 8 members of the status of Ministers of State. The Vice Chairman and the members are charged with the responsibility of running the day to day functions of the NDMA.

Disaster management structure The disaster management set up was structured at three levels viz. national, state and district. The NDMA was set up as the apex body at the national level, while at the state level State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMA) were set up. These were headed by the Chief Ministers. At the district level District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) were set up. These were headed by the District Collectors and co-chaired by elected representatives of the local authorities. All these authorities were charged with the responsibility of formulating holistic and integrated plans for disaster management and ensuring the implementation of these plans when required. The executive committee of the NDMA is called National Executive Committee (NEC). It coordinates the response on behalf of the NDMA. It consists of 14 Secretaries of the government of India as well as the Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. To assist the NDMA two other bodies have been created called the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) and the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF).

NEC

MHA

MITIGATION RESERVES MINISTRIES & DEPARTMENT OF STATES

SDMA & SEC's

ARMED FORCES CENTRAL PARAMILITARY FORCE

NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE FORCE

STATES

MINISTRIES & DEPARTMENTS OF GOVT. OF INDIA

STATE POLICE

DISTT’s & DDMA's

HOME GUARDS

STATE DISASTER RESPONSE FORCE

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

CIVIL DEFENCE

SCIENTIFIC ORGANISATIONS TECHNICAL INSTITUTIONS

C O M M U N I T Y

FIRE SERVICES

NCC, NSS & NYKS ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS

CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

NDMA

NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

Disaster Management Act

The salient features of the DMA were that it was a proactive, holistic and integrated approach as opposed to a reactive one. It had the legal authority to respond and take action as demanded by the situation and was backed by an institutional framework. And, last but not the least, it had what its predecessor organisations did not have viz. financial support by the creation of a Response Fund and a Mitigation Fund.

HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE

Community

PROFESSIONAL BODIES CORPORATE SECTORS NGO's

Notes: 1.

This diagram reflects interactive linkages for synergised management of disasters and not a hierarchical structure.

Backward and forward linkages, especially at the functional level, are with a view to optimise efficiency.

Participation of the community is a crucial factor.

The structure of the NDMA, evolved for disaster management at the national level, is shown diagrammatically above.

NDMA Charter

■■ To approve disaster management plans at the national level as also plans of Ministries and Departments. ■■ To coordinate enforcement and implementation of policies and plans. ■■ To create a specialised Response Force.

The NDMA is responsible for handling all natural and man-made disasters and broadly its charter is as given below:

■■ To lay down broad policy and guidelines for National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM).

a) Related to Policies and Plans

b) Related to Operational Functions

■■ To lay down policies and guidelines for ministries and states for all types of disasters.

■■ Coordinate the enforcement and implementation of the policy and plans for disaster management.

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disaster management

PROACTIVE N HOLISTIC

The recent calamity that struck Japan demonstrated to the world the correct way to handle disaster situations. It also brought out how nations should react. There was no criticism of the government by the opposition. The media did not go berserk highlighting all the gory details and doing what Indian media is getting to be best at i.e. to give their “expert opinion” on everything and to conduct "trial by media". It brought out the selfless nature and character of people who stood by each other despite having suffered humungous personal losses themselves. It brought out how efficiently post disaster reconstruction work should be done and the efforts towards rapid rehabilitation. It brought out all this and more and, we as a nation, would benefit greatly by learning from the way this calamity has been handled by the Japanese ■■ Recommend provision of funds for mitigation of disasters. ■■ Take such other measures for prevention of disasters or mitigation or for preparedness and capacity building for dealing with a threatening disaster situation or disasters as it may consider necessary.

■■ Develop educational material for disaster management including academic and professional courses.

■■ Assist in community training and preparedness.

has been taken towards Disaster Management.

■■ Liaison, reconnaissance, rehearsals and mock drills.

While no amount of effort can prevent natural disasters from happening, a lot can be done to mitigate their ill effects and, more importantly, in saving valuable lives. In so far as man-made disasters are concerned, we can do a great deal to prevent them from happening.

During Impending Disaster: Proactive deployment. During Disaster: Specialied response.

■■ General superintendence, direction and control of National Disaster Response Force (NDRF).

■■ Promote awareness among stakeholders including colleges, schools, teachers and students.

■■ Provide such support to other countries affected by major disasters as may be determined by central government.

■■ Undertake, organise and facilitate study courses, conferences, lectures, seminars within and outside the country.

■■ Urban search and rescue

■■ Undertake and provide for publication of journals, research papers and books and establish and maintain libraries.

■■ Fire rescue

National Disaster Response Force

■■ Nuclear emergencies

Despite all the “intellectual work” pertaining to policies and plans and operational functions for disaster relief by the NDMA assisted by the NIDM, disasters will continue to occur. It was therefore essential to create a force that could be pressed into service for relief work whenever the need arose for the same. With this in mind the NDRF was created. Initially, the force was to have eight battalions but sanction exists for 10 NDRF battalions. Each battalion was to have 18 teams of 45 men each. This works out to a total of 144 teams available to the NDMA for disaster relief work. Out of these four battalions (72 Teams) have been earmarked for manmade disasters / emergencies. Included in these teams are technicians, doctors, trauma specialists and dog squads. The NDRF battalions are capable of moving by land, sea and air.

■■ Chemical and biological emergencies

Role of the NDRF

■■ Medical equipment

During Peacetime

■■ NBC equipment

■■ To assist at the national level in policy formulation.

■■ Acquire and continually upgrade its training and skills.

■■ Boats for flood relief

■■ Provide assistance to training and research institutes for development of training and research programmes for stakeholders.

■■ Impart basic and operational level training to State Response Forces (Police, Civil Defence and Home Guards).

■■ Recommend guidelines for the minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by disaster. ■■ In case of disasters of severe magnitude, recommend relief in repayment of loans or for grant of fresh loans to the persons affected by disaster on such concessional terms as may be appropriate.

NIDM Genesis of NIDM: The National Institute of Disaster Management was also constituted under the Disaster Management Act 2005 like the NDMA. Its national responsibilities include human resource development, capacity building, training, research, documentation and policy advocacy in the field of disaster management.

Charter of NIDM ■■ To function within the broad polices and guidelines laid down by the NDMA. ■■ To develop training modules, undertake research and documentation and organise training programmes. ■■ To formulate and implement comprehensive HRD plan.

■■ Provide assistance to state governments and state training institutions in formulation of state level policies, strategies, disaster management framework and other assistance.

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Capabilities of the NDRF

■■ Flood / underwater rescue

■■ Medical teams

Major equipment ■■ Life detection and location equipment including laser cameras ■■ Break-in and extrication equipment (air cushions, hydraulic supports, saws, gas cutters, spreaders, rams, shoring, jacks, power tools) ■■ Power boats and diving equipment ■■ Radios, VSAT, cellular communication

■■ Search dogs With the enactment of the DMA and the subsequent creation of the NDMA, the NIDM and the NDRF a giant step

In the end it can safely be stated that we, as a nation, are now better prepared to handle disaster situations than ever before. However, there is still a long way to go. Plans at all levels are to be polished and fine tuned; drills to handle disaster situations practiced and rehearsed in the form of mock exercises; state and district response forces are to be trained and equipped and community awareness generated. We can learn a lot of lessons from other nations who have experienced disasters and learnt valuable lessons from them. The recent calamity that struck Japan demonstrated to the world the correct way to handle disaster situations. It also brought out how nations should react. There was no criticism of the government by the opposition. The media did not go berserk highlighting all the gory details and doing what Indian media is getting to be best at i.e. to give their “expert opinion” on everything and to conduct “trial by media”. It brought out the selfless nature and character of people who stood by each other despite having suffered humungous personal losses themselves. It brought out how efficiently post disaster reconstruction work should be done and the efforts towards rapid rehabilitation. It brought out all this and more and, we as a nation, would benefit greatly by learning from the way this calamity has been handled by the Japanese. The writer retired as Master General of Ordnance, Army Headquarters. A fourth generation officer, who was commissioned into the Infantry in 1965. During 40 years service in the Indian Army he has held various prestigious command and staff appointments which include command of a Brigade deployed in the highest battlefield in the world, a division in the desert and a corps in active insurgency areas. As UN Force Commander in Sierra Leone November 1999 to October 2000, he executed the highly acclaimed "Operation Khukri" which broke the back of the rebels.

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disaster management

TOXIC AGENTS

The world has come to realise that the signing of either the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Treaty by governments of all the nations of the globe will not entirely obliterate the threat of use of these weapons by “non-State” actors and, hence, the need for a system of protection, detection and elimination will need to remain continuously in place. They realise that industrial and scientific capacities have so improved that new ways of creating chemical and biological weapons in any kind of location by terrorists is possible. Hence the hallabaloo over “precursor chemicals” that boosted the attack on Iraq by the US-led coalition forces. Vigilance cannot be relaxed even with the signing of such compacts given the example of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which was supposed to contain both vertical and lateral proliferation of nuclear weapons. In many ways the NPT is in existence more in its breach than in its implementation given the examples of China, Pakistan, North Korea, Libya, South Africa, Syria and Iran that were being serviced by the Dr. A. Q. Khan clandestine nuclear network operating out of Pakistan. 24

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hemical warfare agents are always associated with sensation and that is why use or alleged use always makes headlines in the lay media. This is essentially due to the distortion of facts and exaggerated claims of their effects, which are rarely critically analysed by the readers. In chemical warfare the most important thing for an individual is to learn the proper method of protection against gases. The factors which influence protective measures are also dependent on the properties of the agents. It follows, therefore that he who expects to deal with chemical warfare, either to use it or protect against it should know how chemical agents behave. This article describes the typical chemical agents and discusses those properties which have a bearing upon their use and upon protection against them.

Prof. (Dr.) M. P. Kaushik

Rudiments of chemical warfare Knowledge of chemistry is not necessary in order to understand the few rules which govern the behaviour of these agents. Most people, when the words “chemical warfare” are mentioned, immediately think “poison gas”. As a matter of fact in the chemical warfare service, the agents are often referred to as “gases”. The term poison gas however is a misnomer. Most of the chemical combat substances are liquids and solids which are disseminated in the air by various methods. Some are contained in shells or bombs, which explode and throw the liquid or solid agent into the air in droplets or in fine particles. Some solids are vaporised by heat within a container and pass into the air as a smoke. Others, generally liquids, are carried in tanks upon airplanes and released into the air to fall to the ground as droplets or as a fine mist. A few that are volatile, that is which enter readily into the gaseous state can be released directly from the cylinders, merely by opening a valve and form a dense cloud which is carried by the wind. All the chemical agents are not poisonous. Some are toxic, some are non-toxic. A substance is said to be toxic if even at a very small dosage it is capable of producing adverse physiological conditions in living organism as a result of direct interaction with them and the intrinsic property of a substance to injure humans, animals or plants is called toxicity. A weapon that owes its destructive power entirely to the toxicity of one or more of its constituent chemicals rather than the energetic of chemical interaction between them is called a chemical weapon. The constituent chemical / chemicals that are actually responsible for inflicting casualties are known as chemical warfare agents. The deliberate use of chemicals against humans, animals or crops with the primary intention of inflicting casualties on the enemy or reducing its combat efficiency during war is what is popularly known as chemical warfare. Of the many thousands of poisonous chemicals known to the chemists, the numbers that are important as agents of chemical warfare may almost be counted on the fingers. To find a material that will combine all the requirements is practically impossible. There are few requirements which the ideal chemical agent

chemical warfare must possess. The factors which determine the behaviour of gases in the field (and hence their tactical use) are all dependent upon the physical and chemical properties of the agents. For the non-combatant the most important thing to learn is the proper method of protection against gas.

A CW system consists of a number of components. A CW carrier (e.g., on aircraft) is usually required to convey the ammunition to the target. CW ammunition which takes the form of an aerial bomb or an artillery shell contains the active chemical substance (CW agent) which with the aid of an

explosive charge is dispersed over the target.

Classification The physiological classification is the most convenient method of presenting the properties of the chemical agents

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and so they will be discussed here according to that classification. We have the following groups: ■■ Irritants ■■ Lung damaging agents ■■ Blood poisons ■■ Vesicants ■■ Nerve agents ■■ Antiplant agents ■■ Psychochemicals ■■ Lethal toxins

this compound, in spite of its proven ineffectiveness as warfare agents, is the possibility of diversion of industrial products for war. ■■ Choking agents also termed sternutators are represented by chlorine and phosgene. Both of them are widely used industrial intermediates and one has to know about these chemicals for two reasons (a) possibility of diversion for war (b) an attack by enemy or terrorists on large stocks held by the industry in every country. Chlorine was widely used in World War I by Germans directly from cylinders the effect of which was countered by the use of respirators by UK and France. This led to the introduction of phosgene.

■■ Nerve gases are the organophosphorus esters which impair the nervous transmissions by interfering with cholinesterase enzyme. The compounds were known by the turn of the century but toxicity was recognised in the 1930’s. The major thrust came from the work of G. Schrader in Germany and B. C. Saunders in UK. They include Tabun, Sarin, Sonam and Vx.

natural sources. In the scale of toxic ratings, toxins do occupy a high rating in terms of toxicity levels. There has been certain confusion whether these are included amongst the biological weapons. Botulinum and Staphylococcus enterotoxins are normally associated with food poisoning. These can easily be destroyed by boiling. Ricin is from castor plant and is associated with now well known “Umbrella murders” in Bulgaria in 1970’s. Saxitoxins is an algal toxin closely associated with some marine organisms.

Many of the insecticides which we use, belong to the same group but with much reduced mammalian toxicity

Tricothecenes which are fungal toxins were the subject of fierce controversy in the US. It was about the alleged use

complicated. The most recent instance of Mustard use in war is by Iraq against Iran according to the UN.

Threat of using biological and chemical agents against individual, localised or global scale by terrorists or enemy countries is increasing day by day, employing newer and newer materials and methods of deployment. The extent of damage is specific in each case and methods of damage control are situation specific. However, there are some common requirements in terms of sensors, systems, equipment, technologies and skills which are required to be developed / built irrespective of threat type ■■ Irritants or tear gases are normally used by civil police for law enforcement and riot control. These strictly do not fall within the purview of Geneva Protocol as these are non-toxic. These chemicals dispensed in the form of gas or aerosol cause pain in the eyes, profuse watering in nose and eyes, difficulties in keeping eyes open and some difficulty in breathing also; but the effects pass off after 20-30 minutes and do not normally leave any side effects. The first compound w-chloroacetophenone was ready for use in 1917 but was never used; but this is still used by Indian Police in riot control. ■■ Systemic agents are those which affect the blood initially. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride and carbon monoxide are some such chemicals of which hydrogen cyanide is more important. C.W. Scheele discovered this in 1872; in 1876, he died of cyanide poisoning. It is a highly volatile (10mg/m3) liquid of b. p. 26°C, with an odour of bitter almonds and highly soluble in water. It is very swift acting poison, introduced by the French into warfare. It is produced by reaction of carbon monoxide and ammonia; the importance comes out of its industrial utility. The resurgence of interest in

Chlorine was reported in 1774 by C.W. Scheele and phosgene in 1812 by J. Davy. Chlorine and phosgene are both gases at room temperature; chlorine is greenish yellow with a pungent smell and is heavier than air, keeping low. Phosgene is colourless with odour of hay. This is produced by reacting carbon monoxide and chlorine. Both irritate eyes, throat and respiratory tract; reduced function of the lungs often leads to a collapse of cardiac functioning. Direct injury is limited to the respiratory tract but secondary damages are caused by this.

brought about by altering structure.

■■ Vesicants or blistering agents cause very painful blisters on the body, which take a long time to heal. The chemicals are Sulphur Mustard, Nitrogen Mustard and Lewisite.

■■ Herbicides are used in normal agricultural practice for removal of weeds; when used in excessively large dosages, they would destroy the vegetation and crops. A few of these were used in enormously large quantity by the US in Vietnam. In our own territory, herbicides can be used in war for clearance of foliage cover, providing a line of sight, for marking targets and for keeping landing strips clear of weeds. In the enemy territory, this is used for destruction of crops as a denial of food programme.

Sulphur Mustard was produced in 1822 and its blistering actions identified in 1860. All of these are colourless liquids with a tendency to become dark on storage. Solubility of these compounds in water is quite low, so also volatility. Lewisite is different and is highly volatile. Sulphur Mustard becomes a solid at 14OC. Mustard injuries are very difficult to treat and the long term effects make it further

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■■ Psychotomimetics are chemicals which produce severe mental aberrations; LSD, Mescaline, Psilocybin, etc. were once talked about as probable agents; but the difficulty in administration at mass level and variations in effect made these lose most of the protagonists. But what came out were few synthetic compounds, all derivatives of glycollic acid. These compounds are products of imagination of a fertile brain with very little value in a combat situation.

■■ Toxins are the more recent brand in chemical warfare, especially from

require few hours to a week before the symptoms appear in the affected population and a possible attack can be suspected. These attacks require a very small amount of infectious material since most of them are living entities and are capable of self replication and cause epidemics. In nature a large number of micro-organisms cause disease to humans but all of them cannot be used as BW agent. Only a handful of agents that meet certain criteria can be used in a bio-terrorist activity. To be an effective BW agent, the micro-organism must be capable of being produced in laboratories and must be stable in harsh environmental conditions like temperature etc. Some micro-organisms make very dangerous

Clinical features: Human anthrax has three major clinical forms, based on the point of entry: cutaneous, inhalation and gastrointestinal. Cutaneous anthrax is a result of introduction of the spore through the skin; inhalation anthrax, through the respiratory tract; and gastrointestinal anthrax, by ingestion. Symptoms of inhalation anthrax are fever, dyspnea, cough, headache, vomiting, chills, weakness, abdominal pain and chest pain. ■■ Botulism Botulism is a rare but serious paralytic illness caused by a nerve toxin that is produced by the bacterium

Table 1: Agents that can be used by terrorists

Agent

Stage

Route of infection

Possible release

Anthrax Bacillus anthracis

Spores

Skin wounds, inhalation, ingestion

Spores as aerosol

Botulinum Clostridium botulinum

Toxin

Oral inhalation

Aerosolisation of preformed toxins or food contamination

Plague Yersinia pestis

Bacteria

Fleas, Aerosol

Aerosolisation or release of infected fleas

Tularaemia Francisella tularensis

Bacteria

Aerosol

Aerosolisation of the bacteria

Glanders Burkholderia mallei

Bacteria

Aerosol

Aerosolisation of the bacteria

Cholera Vibrio cholerae

Bacteria

Oral

Contamination of food and water sources

Smallpox Variola major

Virus

Aerosol

Aerosolisation of virus

Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever

Virus

Aerosol

Aerosolisation of virus

of tricothecenes in Kampuchea (now Cambodia). Nivalenol, deoxynivalenol (Vomitoxin), T-2 and HT-2 are some of the well known ones. These are absorbed through the skin also. They produce nausea, vomiting and blistering of the skin but are slow acting.

Biological agents The threat of bio-terrorism has recently received widespread concern due to the detection of anthrax spores in the mail in United States. Biological Weapons (BW) consist mainly of micro-organisms like virus, bacteria and fungi that give rise to disease and when deliberately dispersed in an area can incapacitate, reduce resistance and even cause mortality to humans, domestic animals and crops. The use of biological agents as terrorist weapons when compared with other conventional weapons differ in several unique properties, as the effect of these agents are not instantaneous and

poisons (toxins). These toxins can be produced in large amount in the laboratories and may be used in bio-terroristic activities.

The bacteria, Bacillus anthracis, causes the disease anthrax. This disease has been known since antiquity and affects humans who tend animals or come into contact with animal products. The bacterium often penetrates the body via wounds in the skin, but may also infect humans through the airways or gastrointestinal tract.

Clostridium botulinum. There are three main kinds of botulism. Food borne botulism is caused by eating foods that contain the botulinum toxin. Wound botulism is caused by toxin produced from a wound infected with Clostridium botulinum. Infant botulism is caused by consuming the spores of the botulinum bacteria, which then grow in the intestine and release toxin. All forms of botulism can be fatal and are considered medical emergencies. Food borne botulism can be especially dangerous because many people can be poisoned by eating contaminated food, which makes it a potent agent to be used in bioterrorism.

The three virulence factors of B. anthracis are oedema toxin, lethal toxin and a capsular antigen. B. anthracis is considered to be a likely agent for use in acts of biological terrorism, as the spores of this bacteria are extremely resistant to sunshine, UV radiation, heat and disinfectants.

Clinical features: A neuroparalytic illness characterised by symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis of motor and autonomic nerves, usually beginning with the cranial nerves. Symptoms usually include double vision, blurred vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech, difficulty in swallowing, dry mouth and muscle

■■ Anthrax

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weakness. If untreated, illness might progress to cause descending paralysis of respiratory muscles, arms and legs. Botulinum antitoxin can prevent progression of illness and shorten symptoms in severe botulism cases if administered early. ■■ Plague Plague is an infectious disease of animals and humans caused by a bacterium named Yersinia pestis. People usually get plague from being bitten by a rodent flea that is carrying the plague bacterium or by handling an infected animal. Millions of people in Europe died from plague in the Middle Ages, when flea-infested rats inhabited human homes and places of work. Today, modern antibiotics are effective against plague, but if an infected persons is not treated promptly, the disease is likely to cause illness or death. Wild rodents in certain areas around the world are infected with plague. Outbreaks in people still occur in rural communities or in cities. They are usually associated with infected rats and rat fleas that live in the home. In India plague foci are known to occur in the states of Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Gujarat. Globally, the World Health Organization reports 1,000 to 3,000 cases of plague every year. Incubation period: The incubation period of primary pneumonic plague is 1 to 3 days and is characterised by development of an overwhelming pneumonia with high fever, cough, bloody sputum and chills. For plague pneumonia patients, the death rate is over 50 per cent. ■■ Tularemia Tularemia, a bacterial zoonosis, has long been considered a potential biological weapon. It was one of a number of agents studied at Japanese germ warfare research units operating in Manchuria between 1932 and 1945; it was also examined for military purposes in the west. The causative agent of tularemia, Francisella tularensis, is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to cause disease, making it a potential bioterrorist weapon.

Humans become incidentally infected through diverse environmental exposures and can develop severe and sometimes fatal illness but do not transmit infection to others. Clinical features: The onset of tularemia is usually abrupt, with fever (30OC – 40OC), headache, chills and rigors, generalised body aches (often prominent in the low back), coryza and sore throat. ■■ Glanders Rare in humans. Sporadic. Few naturally acquired cases have occurred in India. Cases continue to occur in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South America. Clinical features: Primarily a disease of horses, mules and donkeys. In humans, disease can occur in four basic forms: acute localised infection, septicemic illness, acute pulmonary infection, or chronic cutaneous infection. Symptoms include fever, malaise, pleuritic chest pain, cervical adenopathy, splenomegaly and generalised popular/pustular eruptions, mortality rate is over 50 per cent despite antibiotic treatment. Systemic invasion can occur with resulting chronic abscessation. ■■ Cholera Vibrio cholerae is the toxin producing bacterium that causes cholera. The organism is mainly spread in infected water. The incubation period varies from a few hours to five days. The disease may occur as mild diarrhoea but a more acute development is more typical. Antibiotics in combination with replacement of lost liquid have a positive effect on the regression of disease. The bacterium is extremely sensitive to acidity in the stomach, which implies that the susceptibility to the cholera bacterium considerably varies between different people. Clinical features: Profuse watery diarrhoea, vomiting, circulatory collapse and shock. Many infections are milder diarrhoea or asymptomatic. ■■ Smallpox Smallpox is caused by variola virus. This virus disease is extremely infectious and is spread by e.g.,

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coughing, sneezing or fragments of skin. The infectious agent is only found in human beings. Virus particles are extremely stable both in the dry form and in water and consequently would be a suitable BW agent. Incubation period is about 12 days (range: 7 to 17 days) following exposure.

Ebola-Reston, has caused disease in non-human primates, but not in humans. Clinical features: The signs and symptoms of Ebola HF are not the same for all patients. The symptoms that occur in most Ebola patients are

early warning or post event monitoring, decontamination and contamination monitoring equipment, technological procedures, individuals and mass protective equipment for rescue and medical management teams, medical management facilities etc.

Decontamination: Development of suitable technologies and systems will be addressed for decontamination of environment, men, materials and equipment, requiring development of specialised chemicals, dry and wet decontamination technologies, mobile decontamination systems for personnel,

Early Warning: Early warning is the key element for any rescue mission; this will require development of wide spectrum of sensors and detection equipment deployable in a variety of situations. The technologies of sensor technology, data communications, realtime monitoring, data analysis and reporting will have to be worked out which are presently lacking.

equipment and terrain.

Clinical features: High fever, fatigue and head and back aches. A characteristic rash, most prominent on the face, arms and legs, follows in 2 to 3 days. The rash starts with flat red lesions that evolve at the same rate. Lesions become pus-filled and begin to crust early in the second week. Scabs develop and then separate and fall off after about 3 to 4 weeks. The majority of patients with smallpox recover, but death occurs in up to 30 per cent of cases. Importance: Smallpox, because of its high case-fatality rates and transmissibility, now represents one of the most serious bioterrorist threats to the civilian population. Over the centuries, naturally occurring smallpox, with its case - fatality rate of 30 per cent or more and its ability to spread in any climate and season, has been universally feared as the most devastating of all the infectious diseases. The United States and Russia possess the stocks of this virus. If terrorist groups get hold of it and release it would have devastating effect, as the worldwide population has no immunity against this disease. Also it’s feared that this disease will sweep the entire human population within no time as production and stockpiling of the vaccines and its administration is a time consuming affair. ■■ Ebola haemorrhagic fever: Ebola hemorrhagic fever (Ebola HF) is a severe, often-fatal disease in humans and non-human primates (monkeys and chimpanzees) that has appeared sporadically since its initial recognition in 1976. The disease is caused by infection with Ebola virus, named after a river in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) in Africa, where it was first recognised. The virus is one of two members of a family of RNA viruses called the filoviridae. Three of the four species of Ebola virus identified so far have caused disease in humans: Ebola-Zaire, Eboa-Sudan and Ebola-Ivory Coast. The fourth,

high fever, headache, muscle aches, stomach pain, fatigue and diarrhoea in the initial few days and chest pain, shock and death within one week of becoming infected with the virus. Rarely, sore throat, hiccups, rash, red and itchy eyes, vomiting blood, bloody diarrhoea, blindness and bleeding are also associated with Ebola infection.

Increase in threat Threat of using biological and chemical agents against individual, localised or global scale by terrorists or enemy countries is increasing day by day, employing newer and newer materials and methods of deployment. The extent of damage is specific in each case and methods of damage control are situation specific. However, there are some common requirements in terms of sensors, systems, equipment, technologies and skills which are required to be developed / built irrespective of threat type. Management of emergent BC scenario will demand appropriate sensors and detection equipment for

Post-event Monitoring: Postevent monitoring is essential for planning and organisation of rescue mission, this will require development of survey and reconnaissance systems. Technologies of unmanned surveillance, robotics and specialised vehicles sample collection and analysis systems. Contamination Monitoring: BC agents will contaminate the environment, men, material and equipment externally as well as internally. It will require development of technologies and procedures to monitor the extent of contamination in wide variety of situations, which are currently available.

Protective Equipment: Protective equipment are lifeline of rescue operations equipment and systems for this purpose. Medical Management: Medical management of affected people will be involved in the task depending on type and extent of emergency, requiring specialised systems, medicine, treatment procedures, casualty evacuation, diagnostics and treatment. Survivability Assessment and Enhancement: There is urgent need to develop technologies and create facilities for simulation of various BC war effects, and develop the monitoring technologies to assess the effect of these on critical defence systems and develop the techniques for enhancing survivability of systems and crew. BC War Effect Control Systems: Spread of BC agents in environment is a major health hazard to population at large, development of specialised

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technologies to control, deviate and limit the spread of hazardous BC agents will reduce the magnitude of rescue operation and affected zone significantly. Training: Training is important for coordinated rescue efforts. It is proposed to design training capsules for all elements of BC scenario management in the areas of early warning, post event monitoring, contamination monitoring, decontamination, protective equipment medical management, survivability assessment, war effect control methodologies through simulation and mock drills. Command Control Centre: Role of command and control centre will be key to success of all elements of BC rescue mission. For success of command and control centre, technologies for communications, data transmissions, emergency response centre need to be addressed.

Third age? Despite improvements already at hand, chemical warfare remains a heavy constraint and the adverse effects are still high. Only perfectly trained units can really overcome the inherent physiological and psychological difficulties. Thus, another step must still be taken before reaching a new age of chemical defence: This is no longer an excessive ambition, as the techniques required for the development of new equipment become progressively available. The great advance in the fields of chemical analysis, miniaturisation, automatic data transfer and the remarkable progress of automation, unthinkable a few years ago, will considerably increase the sensitivity, selectivity, rapidity and polyvalence of the response, all basic factors in alarm and monitoring systems. Furthermore, new knowledge on interaction between chemical agents and absorbent products will have a direct impact on the quality of protection. The constant progress of international co-operation is bearing fruit, thanks to the consolidation of similar research work and to the chance thus given to each country to take advantage of the advances made by their partners.

Prime role of detection Because of these constraints, it still implies that protection, either individual or collective, cannot remain permanent on the tactical level. Before the attack, it must be implemented as late as possible, with the help of either local or remote alarm detection system after the attack, the protection posture must be alleviated and finally deactivated as soon as possible. This is made possible by monitoring equipment, which will provide the necessary information on the attenuation and later on, at the end of the risk. Obviously, only protective measures will preserve the soldier from danger, but their implementation is fully determined by the efficacy of the detection system procedures, before as well as after the attack. The detection system will also determine the decontamination function. Before the decision to decontaminate, monitoring systems will be used to decide on the site and surface areas to be treated; afterwards, these systems will also help to verify its efficacy and decide whether the operation can go on without special protective measures. Therefore, detection, which determines the success of both protection and decontamination, is indeed the key to chemical defence. This concept must not be only theoretical; it must have a practical impact on the selection of priorities regarding the development and the implementation of new equipment.

The biological threat The current biological threat extends beyond the military theatre. Recent acts of biological terrorism have incited panic, injuries, deaths and economic disruption leading to widespread fears among the general population even if the events did not cause mass casualties. Authorities charged with the responsibility of homeland security find themselves in a difficult situation, developing and implementing effective consequence management strategies faced with the lack of immediate feedback during or shortly after a biological attack. Biological agent detection systems must be able to detect in realtime to warn potential victims before they are exposed in order to minimise the number of potential

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casualties. The approach, most widely promoted to date, involves deploying a network of remote point detectors upwind of personnel and assets to perform this task. Ideally, these detectors are stationary and capable of automatic (i.e., unmanned and unattended) operation and require little or no routine maintenance. Recently, other applications have emerged that require a solution to provide high mobility for these point detectors. These applications include vehiclemounted system. A vehicle-based system can be used as a remote point detector to survey terrain to identify problem areas and double as command post.

Detectors A significant amount of confusion currently exists in the marketplace as a result of the inappropriate use of the term “detector”. Many of the products currently promoted as detectors are in fact more properly characterised as triggers or identification devices. For the purposes of this article detection is defined as a process that determines and confirms an aerosol is a biological aerosol. Identification is a process by which a sample is analysed to specifically identify the biological agent. A number of technologies are available for consideration for viable mobile biological detection system. Optical based biological detection systems offer exciting potential due to their reduced size, portability and the ability to provide real-time operation and detection of bacteria, viruses and toxins. Optical–based laser induced fluorescent detectors are currently the most mature and the accepted standard for such applications. The goal of this article is to review the biological threat and the criticality of real-time biological detection in saving lives, to describe the requirements and advantages of mobile biological detection platforms and to assist the reader in understanding the challenges of implementing an effective mobile biological detection capability. The main characteristics of biological agents that make their use attractive as a terrorist threat is their high toxicity, the delay between the release of an agent and its perceived effects on humans and the associated deniability making it difficult to apprehend the enemy.

Quick detection critical The effects of biological agents on victims can generally be summarised in three phases: infection, symptoms and treatment. Success in dealing with the consequence of a biological attack is critically dependent on taking the correct actions promptly. In order to be effective and to minimise the number of persons exposed to potential infections and to provide timely treatment to those affected, biological detection systems must offer reliable real-time detection. Real time is here defined as a time lapse of 30 seconds or less from the moment that a potential pathogen comes into contact with the air intake of a detection system until the instant that an alarm is issued. Without this benefit, the detection of a clandestine bioterrorist attack likely will not occur until the clinical analysis of the initial outbreak patients demonstrating symptoms and early fatalities. By this time, the illness will have spread among the population and the effectiveness of medical treatments significantly reduced as compared to their effectiveness if administered immediately following exposure. Decontamination: The military needs decontamination technologies that essentially allow troops to continue in battle. Short decontamination times of several hours are sufficient for the civilian sector, but the military sector requires even faster action. Survival of troops depends on decontamination of personnel, material, clothing and equipment in the shortest possible

time to restore troops for action. A decontaminant that might not harm a rugged tank, for example, could be fatal to an aircraft, which has to operate from sea level to 40,000 feet or beyond; a ship at sea has a larger environment to deal with and also must contend with the unique problems of the sea. The materials from which these types of equipment are made also are considerably different.

cloth or simply brush or shake it away. Spray-down of equipment should begin immediately after completion of personal wipe-down. The spray-down removes or neutralises contamination on the surfaces operators must touch frequently to perform their mission. For radiological contamination, they remove contamination with whatever is at hand or flush it with water and wipe it away.

The goal is to make the decontamination equipment small and portable enough to go into the field where the contaminated equipment is. Compact, self-contained, mobile and air-transportable systems are needed that provide all the necessary components required for establishing a stand-alone Contamination Control Area (CCA). Units that decontaminate personnel, equipment, large vehicles and sensitive material (such as aircraft cockpit controls, computers and ship radars) were developed in the 1990s. Among many examples, the Decon Shelter, made in collaboration with the Australian military, consists of four 16’ x 24’ inflatable buildings and the hardware for decontaminating men, women and injured personnel at the same time.

The professional first responder needs to function effectively and with minimal stress in such a variety of industrial and terrorist created hazard environments that his protection is a premier consideration in chemical and biological agent’s threat.

Immediate decontamination is a basic soldier survival skill carried out by soldiers as soon as possible after they discover they are contaminated. Personal wipe-down should begin within 15 minutes of contamination. For radiological contamination, troops wipe off the contamination with a

It is then necessary to go back to the very basic efforts of awareness and to ceaselessly repeat that the one and only objective remains the definitive disappearance of forbidden weapons. If this happens one day, it will rest on two complementary “pillars”, obviously not only to abide by the international agreements but also to control an excellent defence tool, tactically fully developed because it is technically up-to-date.

The writer is programme Director NBC Defence Technologies. He has been visiting scientist to Utah State University, Logan, USA and has served Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) in various capacities. He has more than 120 research papers and 16 patents to his credit.

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The fact that all thoughts of a successful strike have to be abandoned because of the security bandobast can be as frustrating to a terrorist as is a successful terrorist strike for the security forces. That no terrorist strike happened during the Commonwealth Games can be interpreted as a success of deterrence created by the arrangement that was in place. However, the fact that it was event specific would leave other crowded localities in the city amenable to a CBRN event. It is, therefore, necessary both to conserve the trained manpower created for the occasion as well as to spawn an ever-widening network of trained personnel to continue the good work till all the highly-populated areas of the city are covered. This should be replicated in every city of India.

afety and security concerns are very important in today’s uncertain times. Phenomenon of terrorism is ubiquitous in India. We are surrounded by many unstable nations and have an active presence of many non-State entities from the subcontinent. Apart from war-torn countries like Iraq - India has suffered with perhaps the highest number of civilian victims of terror. The primary targets of terrorist activities include densely populated locations, crowded areas like markets, centres of religious faiths, religious congregations, mass transportation systems, shopping malls / streets, sensitive places like economic centres, tourist destinations, hotels, resorts, critical key infrastructures including industries, business houses, academia, strategic places, vital installations, heritage buildings, financial and technological hubs, hospitals, political meetings, symbols of political power, public functions and entertainment joints, clubs and mega sport events etc. There is plethora of such places all over where terrorist’s swarming actions could wreak carnage and hold the rapt attention of the whole world.

Emerging trends Terrorists, the world over, are not only getting more and more aggressive in their activities but also adopting newer modalities, techniques, technologies and strategies in their modes of operation to keep the surprise element in their operations. They are developing ideological, financial and logistical links with various

like-minded organisations. Their force multiplier includes connections (good networking amongst themselves as well as with rogue nations) and the fact that terrorist organisations are faster and more flexible. Over the years, the nature of terrorism has undergone fundamental changes. Terrorists no longer seemed bound by previous limits, when they sought attention to their cause, not deaths. By the 1990s, terrorists sought mass and indiscriminate killing and justified it by invoking higher, religious authorities. Present terror alert level is described as “less severe ... more complex and more diverse ... homegrown ...,” as stated in “Assessing the Terrorist Threat” by Bergen and Hoffman, Bipartisan Policy Center, USA. Conventional warfare armed conflicts by terrorists have become an exception rather than rule. During past decades India has not faced any overt war. In the non-conventional warfare there are three types of deterrent weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) – nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) agents. The spread of WMDs and their means of delivery and the possibility that terrorists acquire them, are the principal threats facing the world. A new dimension of unannounced covert attacks (including that in low-intensity conflicts) involving CBRN agents is another imminent menace.

Developing scenario Why would terrorists be tempted to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents?

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Dr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma

The twenty-first century has seen access to NBC technology in the hands of terrorist organisations. Even though terrorists consistently have used conventional explosives, movement adherents may also be willing to use WMD arsenal on a grand scale. Following predictions about the list of probable agents for CBRN attack (in descending order of likelihood) chronicled in the Annals of Emergency Medicine (1998) by Sharp and co-workers from CDC Science & Technology Center, are as relevant today as they were then: 1. Use of a conventional explosive 2. Release of an industrial chemical 3. Release of a military chemical agent 4. Use of a ‘dirty’ bomb 5. Release of a biological agent The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) had earlier warned that “Al Qaeda and affiliated groups continue to enhance their capabilities to conduct effective mass-casualty CBRN attacks” and that Al Qaeda possesses “at least a crude capability to use” CBRN weapons.

Four CBRN attacks There have been only four significant attacks involving use of toxic materials as unconventional weapons by terrorists during the last four decades. The first incident was in September 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror

DRDO’S CWG shield attack in the Dellas, Oregon, USA when Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (now known as Osho) cult sought to depress voter turnout in a local election by clandestinely contaminating salad bars of 10 local restaurants with Salmonella enterica Typhimurium, sickening at

least 751 people. In June 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels in the Batticaloa district, in northern Sri Lanka attacked a Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) base with non-lethal chlorine gas canisters, injuring more than 60 military

personnel and enabling the LTTE to rout the fort. On the morning of 20 March 1995, members of an apocalyptic Japanese religious sect (Aum Shinrikyo cult) deployed 11 packages containing liquid Sarin (a nerve agent) on 5 Tokyo subway lines exposing nearly 5,000

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

IMPERATIVES the world witnessed the undisturbed and trouble-free completion of the CWG 2010, the conduct of this faultless feat cannot be solely attributed to our state of intelligence (in collaboration with counterterrorism cooperation with US, UK, Germany and Israel etc.), great prevention job done by our dedicated security forces and our overall crisis management system. We need to also thank our lucky stars in this winning spree on all fronts.

At present, capacity in terms of adequate skilled manpower, material logistics and infrastructural facilities at various levels required for management and mitigation of such disasters is grossly far from being adequate … There is a need to share the good practices and lessons learnt at all levels including London Olympics 2012 and Glasgow 2014 CWG etc., for raising CBRN preparedness for response during such mega sporting events. Let us take it as a challenge to create CBRN emergency resilience in all potential terrorist targets so that the occurrence of such incidents is prevented at the first place and efficiently responded to in the unfortunate event of its happening persons (killing 12, with nearly 500 hospitalised). The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, occurred over the course of several weeks beginning on 18 September, 2001. Letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several news media offices and two Democratic US Senators, killing five people and infecting 17 others. The technical capacity of terrorist groups to produce or acquire and effectively deliver unconventional weapons varies considerably. Achieving catastrophic outcomes with unconventional weapons requires a considerable scale of operations. Only in a very few cases have groups been able to amass the skills, knowledge, material and equipment to perpetrate attacks with unconventional weapons on a scale that comes close to that of the danger posed by terrorist attacks with conventional explosives. The confluence of religiously inspired terrorism and technological diffusion “will impel terrorists to overcome technical, organisational and logistical obstacles to WMD use.” Terrorist are publicity hungry. They want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening besides sizeable number of people affected in their encounters. During sporting events, particularly those with global appeal as recently witnessed during Commonwealth Games 2010 and ICC Cricket World Cup, fans and spectators congregate by tens to hundreds of thousands at various sporting / practice venues watching eminent athletes, officials and VIPs from across the globe. The world’s elite electronic and print media are readily available to spread news at the speed of light. The terrorist organisations always lie in wait to utilise such global mega events for executing their nefarious designs.

CBRN an imperative threat After the end of the ‘Cold War’ and the emergence of the non-State threat, there is a widespread fear that the dreaded WMDs would fall into the hands of terrorists. Responding to this threat, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12656, in November 1988. Federal Agencies were tasked to develop comprehensive plans to respond to the many permutations these threats posed. (Federal Register Vol. 53. No. 228, Wednesday, November 23, 1988). It was widely believed till 1990s that terrorists would steer clear of using CBRN agents due to their perceived obsession with controlling events that they start. Terrorist were understood to harbour profound fear about dangerous toxic substances (which they knew little about) that they would harm or affect them as adversely as it would their intended target. During last two decades, the basic information about WMD resources (the spread of CBRN agents and knowledge of their means of delivery) is now easily available from open sources. The safety and security of existing CBRN materials remain tentative in many corners of the world. Knowledge of CBRN ‘resources’ and on Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) to guard against unconventional weapons agents are easily available to extremists. There are clear indications that terrorists intend to acquire them for malicious purposes. Terrorist’s capabilities have also increased due to the widespread availability of and easy access to dual-use technologies. The US National Strategy for Homeland Security had warned that the “expertise, technology and material needed to build the most deadly weapons known to mankind—including CBRN weapons—are spreading inexorably.”

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

The historical record cautions against axiomatically suggesting that the Al Qaeda movement or any other terrorist group will inevitably successfully use CBRN weapons in a catastrophic attack.

Plans to thwart CBRN attack ‘Preparedness’ implies the state of readiness to deal with a threatening disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof. Security has been a significant and highly visible presence. In addition to on-site protection, the Indian government sought and obtained information from other nations with respect to any possible terrorist risk. Preparing the nation to address the threat of CBRN terrorism is a formidable challenge because anticipating such attacks and dealing with the devastating consequences of the CBRN agents involved, are formidable tasks. It includes prevention, mitigation and capacity building both for human resource and infrastructure development. The key-point of thwarting potential CBRN attacks in the bud is the ability to prevent them from happening in the first place. Preventive measures are designed to foresee the problems that will demand interventions before the disasters. They include counter-terrorism strategies, risk and vulnerability assessment, surveillance and environmental monitoring, CBRN security and early warning system (EWS) and prevention of illegal trafficking of hazardous CBRN agents including waste. This calls for implementation of far greater police control. Basic issue is ‘Upto what levels of insanity do we have to prepare for?’ There is a global intellectual consensus that acts of terror shall not be accepted under any circumstances. It may be impossible to prevent

the fanatic from acting on impulse, but we have to have the people and resources to make it as hard as possible for evil to be carried out against sportsmen, sportswomen and spectators. Effective response plans need to be essentially developed to manage such attacks, if and when they occur.

DRDO’s contribution Ministry of Defence and DRDO play a leading role in preparing the nation and local response forces to protect, prevent, deter and respond to acts of terrorism events involving hazardous or toxic CBRN materials. Training opportunities for governmental emergency responders (military, paramilitary and civilian) were designed to prepare these teams by generating necessary awareness and imparting training on techniques, procedures, aptitude, knowledge and skills so as to raise their preparedness to confront disaster situations involving the dreaded CBRN agents. These courses were designed for someone with a basic level of knowledge and understanding of CBRN agents. The training course presented instruction that incorporated advanced competencies, technology and tactics that focus on the specific threats associated with CBRN material. Based on training need analysis, these courses provided the trainees with an overview of the international and domestic threats with a spotlight on detection of a CBRN event and identification and decontamination of CBRN hazards. The course also includes familiarisation with PPEs for operating in an all-hazards environment and preservation of incident scene evidence for forensic investigations. The five-day course provided the trainees

from the classroom teaching to hands-on experience to interactive sessions with experts. Mock exercises were conducted to allow trainees to locate and identify the toxic substance, practice coordination with other responders and emergency functionaries and reinforce their new skills and knowledge in a realistic training environment. Clarity of roles and responsibilities for each agency as well as a coordinated strategy are vital. The exercise areas were enhanced with realistic props, loud and confusing noise, alarms and theatrical smoke. Multi-agency integration and interoperability was the single largest challenge to the participants in coordinating an effective CBRN response. The trained responders took these challenges and incorporated their experiences to develop a positive heartening response. Typical feedback of a course participant was … ’I feel that I have a better awareness about the CBRN threats and how to protect the public, manage chaos, stay prepared and respond if something of this type happens’. In addition a Quick Reaction Team was raised that used to survey the stadiums daily at night to collect the CBRN baseline data. Thumb rule of success was - when planning for covert attacks involving CBRN agents, one should think more than a terrorist, while during implementation, one should think oneself as an incident victim.

Start of new era? The Games are over, but we should not let our guard down. And talk about a 2020 Olympic Games for India is still premature until questions about foolproof security of Games can be fully answered. Even though

The need to prevent, to create awareness, to be prepared, to meet situations created by CBRN emergencies – all over the world, is much more today than ever before. The emergency response agencies need to avoid complacency. Concerted efforts should be made to prepare for a wide range of potential terrorist attacks that will likely include CBRN material. At present, capacity in terms of adequate skilled manpower, material, logistics and infrastructural facilities at various levels required for management and mitigation of such disasters is grossly far from being adequate. One should not wait for any ‘Wake up’ attack / incident to prompt us to raise our CBRN preparedness for response and requirement of enhancing skills of all responders for a unified and coordinated reaction in the public domain. There is a need to share the good practices and lessons learnt at all levels including London Olympics 2012 and Glasgow 2014 CWG etc., for raising CBRN preparedness for response during such mega sporting events. Let us take it as a challenge to create CBRN emergency resilience in all potential terrorist targets so that the occurrence of such incidents is prevented at the first place and efficiently responded to in the unfortunate event of its happening. (Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the writer, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) or any other Indian government agency.) The writer is Scientist ‘G’, Additional Director and Head, Division of CBRN Defence, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS), Delhi.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

INDIAN CONTEXT

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi

No section of any society in any part of the world can keep itself aloof from disaster management both in its proactive role of preparedness, prevention and mitigation or its reactive role of rescue, relief and rehabilitation. It is good that realisation of this basic fact has begun to dawn on the Indian military establishment which has long campaigned against its Constitutional responsibility of ‘aid to civil authority’ with deleterious effect on the body politic.

he great eastern Japan tragedy caused by an almost 9.0 magnitude earthquake off the coast on 11 March 2011, has served to highlight the crucial salience of the subject of disaster management. This earthquake and the resultant tsunami wave of 29.6 m that struck the Japanese coast caused a loss of 13,013 lives

(with another 14,921 people missing) and 4,711 injured. About 1,25,000 buildings were destroyed and the economic loss has been pegged at over US$ 309 billion - making it the world’s most expensive natural disaster on record. The most worrying aspect was the Chernobyl-like meltdown of the nuclear reactors sited on the coast.

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People’s response Despite the enormity of the tragedy, the heartening aspect was the response of the Japanese people and their highly proactive approach based upon “preparedness, prevention and mitigation” as opposed to the reactive Indian approach that focuses largely

reactive vs proactive on “rescue, relief and rehabilitation”. Thus an almost 9.0 magnitude earthquake-cum-tsunami in Japan caused at worst 28,000 casualties. The Jammu and Kashmir earthquake of 2005 that measured 7.6 on the Richter scale had caused 80,000 casualties (minus the tidal wave and nuclear dimension of the Japanese earthquake-cum-tsunami).

The scale of the casualties serves to underline the basic difference in approaches to disaster management. The key life saving factor was the speed of the Japanese warning system. The initial warning was generated in just 3 minutes and the detailed warning in four minutes flat from the trigger event of the earthquake. The second

great casualty mitigating factor was the design and construction of the Japanese buildings which withstood the shock of an almost 9.0 magnitude earthquake. Hence the proactive approach correctly focuses as “preparedness, prevention and mitigation”, rather than a reactive and knee-jerk response of relief and rescue operations alone as prevalent

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disaster management in India and countries.

other

third

INDIAN CONTEXT world

Indian context India is highly prone to different types of natural hazards and has suffered several major disasters in the past. ■■ 58.6 per cent of the Indian landmass is prone to earthquakes of moderate to high intensity. ■■ Of the 7,516 km long coastline, close to 5,700 km is prone to cyclones and tsunamis. ■■ Floods are recurrent events that cause huge damage to properties and assets every year (besides loss of lives and agricultural produce). ■■ Hazards like droughts, landslides, forest fires, thunderstorms, cloudbursts, mud slides, snow avalanches and cold waves also routinely take a severe toll of life and properties.

Man-made disasters Besides there are a whole range of man-made disasters to include Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear disasters coupled with transport accidents (air/railways/ marine/road traffic). In the Indian context mass casualty terrorism like 26/11 and large scale rioting and arson also constitute major man-made disasters. This latter category is likely to become a major threat in the days ahead. The increasingly dysfunctional and failing State of Pakistan is feverishly engaged in increasing its nuclear stockpile from 30-80 to over 110 nuclear weapons. Given the radicalisation of that society, this nuclear stockpile could easily fall into the hands of jihadi terrorists / non-State actors. This could lead to the phenomenon of catastrophic terrorism using tactical nuclear devices (like the ones Pakistan is likely to mount on its Nasr tactical missiles) or crude radiological dispersal devices (RDD) that could contaminate entire population centres and lead to mass panic. We are increasing the number of our nuclear plants. Apart from tsunami induced meltdowns these could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks and sabotage. The radiological

dimension therefore will continue to loom ominously in the Indian context and demands adequate preparedness, preparation and credible steps now to ensure prevention and mitigation.

Disaster damage Disaster management in India is a serious issue. In 1975 the losses suffered by India due to disasters amounted to US$ 38 billion. By 2005 this had reached a peak of US$ 527 billion in that year alone. Between 1995 and 1999, the losses caused by natural / man-made disasters in the developed world amounted to 2.5 per cent of the GDP. However in the developing world, losses in the same period amounted to 13.4 per cent of the GDP. This scale of damage incurred clearly highlights the difference between the basal reactive approach, premised simply on “rescue, relief and rehabilitation“ in the third world countries, with highly proactive approach of the developed nations premised on “preparedness, prevention and mitigation”. The primary need in India therefore is to move beyond the reactive and relief centric approach to a far more comprehensive and proactive approach that anticipates and prepares for the crisis situation well in advance and hence greatly curtails the scale of loss in terms of lives and property.

National framework Given the horrifying scale of losses in the year 2005 (US$ 527 billion), India enacted the Disaster Management Act on 23rd December 2005. It was enacted in the concurrent list of the Constitution thereby giving both the centre and the states a meaningful role. This Act established the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that was initially led by the former Army Chief Gen. Vij. This aimed to build a safe and disaster resilient India and tried to invoke a “proactive culture” based on prevention, mitigation, preparedness and efficient response. It has tried to involve itself in the initial construction phase itself to ensure safety of buildings and structures and their resilience in the face of likely threats from the natural / man-made environments. Its response stretches to the “reconstruction and recovery” phase that aims to build back better. Nodal ministries and departments of the government have been identified

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to respond to various categories of disasters and an elaborate organisation of the NDMA has been put in place. It has tried to main-stream disaster management into the Development Plans per se in concert with the Planning Commission. A need for DM Audit has been agreed for all new and ongoing projects / programmes and a selective revisiting of completed works to ensure disaster resilience. All new projects will have disaster resilience aspects inbuilt at the conceptualisation stage itself. State Disaster Management Authorities have also been set up at the level of individual states with the Chief Minister as ex-officio chairman. These go down to District Disaster Management Authorities at the level of each district that function under the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner. It has created a National Disaster Response Force of ten paramilitary battalions (nine of which have already been raised). One of them presently specialises in response to radiological disasters. These are a miniscule force compared to the land mass and population size and the scale of threats entailed.

Military role Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister had stated 'the world over, without exception, all governments have involved the armed forces whenever a disaster strikes. They are invariably the first to respond and quickest to reach the affected area. As has increasingly been observed in recent times across the world, men in uniform have played a stellar role in mitigating and alleviating the sufferings caused by disasters”. The Indian armed forces have played a stellar role not just within the country but equally in responding to the tsunami in South East Asia and south India, the Katrina Hurricane in the USA, natural disasters in China and in Japan. Such rescue and relief operations earn tremendous goodwill for the armed forces both at home and abroad and must remain a key peacetime function.

Marginalisation Strangely, the Disaster Management Act of 2005 is surprisingly silent on the aspect of assigning well-defined role and responsibilities to the armed forces. It only makes a brief one line mention

that states inter alia that “Deployment of Naval, Military and Air Force; other Armed Forces of the Union may be required for the purpose of this Act”. Though the first Secretary NDMA was a former Army Chief, he tried his best to keep the armed forces out of this sphere. The ten paramilitary battalions instead were to be raised for this task. This was a legacy of the 1980s and 1990s when it was felt that the army was being overused in “aid to civil authority” and was being called literally at the drop of a hat – both for maintenance of law and order and natural calamities like floods etc. which were entirely predictable and could be catered for by the state authorities concerned. Military Staff Officers complained that bridging equipment deployed to replace washed away civilian bridges were invariably not returned for years on end causing functional problems. Hence over the years two views have emerged on the role of armed forces in disaster management: approach recommends ■■ One dampening our response and discourages over enthusiasm. It is deeply coloured by the experience of the 1980s. The NDMA veered towards this approach. ■■ The other approach recommends a larger, more proactive and more participative role for the armed forces in disaster management. Frankly, it feels, that as a reaction to the overuse of the 1980s era, the armed forces have swung to the opposite extreme and are increasingly getting marginalised from the national mainstream.

Goodwill quotient The insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east are now in their terminal phases. Being a heartland insurgency, the army is understandably not keen to get deeply involved in the Maoist insurgency. Post-nuclearisation of South Asia, chances of a conventional war have receded. In fact the political leadership seems to be working from a baseline assumption that war is simply not an option. So why is the nation spending US$ 36 billion annually on its armed forces? This marginalisation of the military is an unhealthy trend. Increasingly, shooting conventional wars will be a rarity and armed forces will increasingly have to deal with low intensity conflicts and military operations other than war. The so-called primary and secondary roles will have to be revisited. Existential threats to national security are much more likely to come from internal threats rather than external sources. Low intensity conflicts may well be the primary form of conflict and be on par with external wars. A prime component of these would be aid to civil authorities in times of natural or man-made disasters. These are vital functions that earn the Services a tremendous amount of goodwill. In fact in Punjab, the army’s massive flood relief operations in 1989, had served to win back the trust and goodwill of the population.

People orientation The people are the centre of gravity of all counter-insurgency operations. Massive relief and rescue operations during the earthquake and snow tsunami in Jammu and Kashmir in 2005 had equally served to win back the population. Terrorist tanzeems like the

Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-eMohammad in Pakistan have realised the goodwill potential of such relief and rescue operations and have been undertaking these extensively in PoK. In states riven by insurgencies or terrorism it is vital for the army to retain the goodwill of the population. That is a critical centre of gravity of its operations and relief, rescue and aid in times of emergencies is the easiest route to win hearts and minds of an alienated population. The military simply cannot afford to let go of any such opportunity to win public goodwill. It must therefore retain a most proactive approach to disaster management operations and remain the first respondent to reach out to the beleaguered people. A penny pinching, budget-saving approach on the part of the army (on the specious bureaucratic premise that it is no longer the army’s task but that of the National Disaster Response Force) would amount to criminal folly. The armed forces must retain their proactive approach to disaster management for its tremendous payoffs in terms of the gratitude and goodwill of the population.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of DSA.

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disaster management

BIO-SECURITY

Chernobyl and Fukushima are illustrative examples of what can happen. It is pure fiction that a nuclear accident can be managed, contained, capped or any of the words of solace that are conjured up by energy starved nations to keep public opinion at bay. Things happen and then there are chain reactions of a kind not confined to the reactor core. Meltdowns occur and human life and the environment bear the brunt of a falsely created assurance that by using the word “half-life” the consequences become reduced and, therefore, manageable. Much the same goes for chemical and biological disasters. A determined enemy will find ways of using any or all of these weapons of mass destruction. The name of the game is staying one step ahead of the terrorist. It is possible but time-consuming and requires a dedication to detail that needs to be cultivated.

food T

he term disaster derives from the Latin dis, “again” and astruvr, ”stars” and is translated as “the stars are evil”. While there are many definitions of disaster, a common feature is that the event overwhelms local resources and threatens the function and safety of the community. It may be either natural or man-made or a combination of both.

The examples are (1) natural impact events like tornado, cyclone, flood, seismic disturbances leading to earthquake, volcanic eruption and / or tsunami (2) natural progressive events like major vehicular or industrial accidents, major fires, terrorism and war including bioterrorism. The most common consequences of disaster are:

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. A. S. Bawa

protection ■■ It presents a serious threat to the health status of the community; ■■ It results in the presentation to a healthcare provider of more causalities or patients in number; ■■ The loss of services, which prevent a healthcare facility from continuing to care for its patients. The physical effects of a disaster are usually obvious. Tens or hundred or thousands of people lose their lives. The survivors suffer pain and disability. Homes, workplaces, livestock and equipment are damaged or destroyed including infrastructure failure.

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disaster management

BIO-SECURITY

Indian conditions

micro-organism or toxin that can cause disease or death in humans. Threat agents include a broad range of microorganisms (bacteria, rickettisia and viruses) and toxins of biological

India’s unique geo-climatic conditions make it vulnerable to natural disasters like flood, drought, cyclone, earthquake and epidemics / pandemics leading to sizable number of causalities. The dimensions of modernisation and industrialisation are man-made disasters such as road / rail / air accidents, fire and stampede having also mass casualty potential; new dimension being Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) disaster occurring accidentally or caused by terrorism activities.

In addition to taking steps to prevent bio-security events, food producers, processors, transporters and retailers also should have in place policies, procedures to detect and evaluate potential bio-security threats if they should occur. A protocol for contacting local authorities (law enforcement, regulatory or public health depending on the situation) in the event of a bio-security threat, the protocol should include key contact information (i.e. name, telephone number, fax number, e-mail address, 24 hour availability information) for each pertinent agency and the information should be updated on a origin. Biological weapons are easy to make, difficult to regular basis detect, very effective and highly

Disaster management requires policy, planning and pre-organised response system. It is designed to provide instant communications, short response time, training medical personnel, needed equipment and supplies, airlift capability, extraction and rescue technology, authoritative leadership and communication. Planning requires an awareness of the range of disasters which can occur, possible preventive measures, types of injuries, measures to prevent further causalities, special problems and requirements.

What needs to be done The principles of disaster management are as follows: ■■ Preventing the occurrence ■■ Minimising the number of casualties ■■ Preventing further casualties ■■ Rescue ■■ Provision of first aid ■■ Evacuating the injured ■■ Provision of definitive care ■■ Facilitating reconstruction-recovery

Radiation injuries are caused by external irradiation or by internal irradiation by β-emitters. External irradiation may be acute or chronic, whole body or only superficial. Internal irradiation by β-emitters may be caused by ingestion, by inhalation or by entering through wounds. Severity of injuries depends on radiation dose. In case of nuclear explosion, there will be radiation contamination of environment as well as buildings and grounds.

Metro as hub Underground metro stations could be utilised as a protected area for the shelter of victims as well as for emergency medical first aid. Provision needs to be made to cordon off both ends of the underground shelters by a shutter fitted with NBC filter. The provisions of safe water supply, stocking of food, drugs, medical equipment, power backup shall have to be planned. Chemical agents are often referred to as gases. Chemical warfare agents are available worldwide and include vesicants (blister agents), nerve, blood and respiratory agents. A biological threat agent is defined as an intentionally disseminated living

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

selective against humans, animals or plants. Defence against this class of weapons is difficult, particularly when biological agents can produce casualties over an area of thousands of square kilometers. Biological agents can be used with devastating effect in combination with nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons.

Food protection Generally, food is not prepared or served in an environment contaminated by NBC agents. It is important to continue operations only after ensuring adequate individual protection. Field kitchens must be moved to uncontaminated areas and decontaminated before food service can be resumed. It is important to remember that striking and loading the field kitchen is more difficult and takes longer when soldiers are wearing chemical protective clothing. The tactical situation and the priorities for decontamination will determine how long Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MRE) rations are used. In exceptional situations, it may be necessary to serve food in a contaminated environment. The decision to feed in a contaminated environment rests with the commander. Provisions must be made to partially decontaminate personnel and ensure that food does not contact contaminated terrain or material. The method of feeding troops in such an

environment depends on the type and extent of contamination and the availability of protective shelters. Troops in an area contaminated by chemical agents with no detectable vapour hazard

or in an area where they are under the constant threat of NBC attack must be fed on a rotating basis. If the troops are in a contaminated area where there is also a vapour hazard, feed them inside a shelter equipped with an overpressure system. The overpressure system fills the shelter with pressurised air that has been filtered to remove NBC contamination.

Storage Food must be protected from contamination. Procedures for subsistence must be a part of operational plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) at all levels of food service and Class I operations. Consuming contaminated food may cause illness, injury or death. Food stored outdoors should be under overhead cover as mustard or VX agents will damage or degrade most protective wraps. Some food items may be decontaminated and consumed. However, decontamination is often a difficult and time consuming process. Subsistence rations must be stored in ways to provide maximum protection in the presence of NBC contaminants. Planning for storage may mean the difference between having edible or non–edible subsistence. Foods that are packed in cans, bottles, airtight foil or film wraps as well as food packaged in sealed boxes or multilayered wrappings may be stored outdoors or in partially protected areas. Foods not packaged in this manner must have covered storage inside if possible to protect it from NBC contamination.

Nuclear contamination The two types of nuclear contaminations are induced radiation and fallout. Induced radiation is not normally a food service problem as blast or heat will normally destroy material stored in the induction zone. Food may be contaminated by fallout miles away from the blast site. Overhead cover is essential or items may become so heavily contaminated that decontamination becomes difficult if not impossible. Food that is packaged in cans or other sealed containers is not in danger of contamination by fallout as long as it remains packaged. Foods not packaged in this way, such as fresh fruits, vegetables and fresh meat can be protected from fallout by putting them in sealed containers. Insulated food containers and refrigerators are excellent protection from fallout. Containers such as sea / and or NBC protective trucks with containerised cargo areas, trucks with covered cargo beds also offer protection.

Biological contamination Two types of biological agents are pathogens and toxins. Stringent sanitation in preparing and serving food will reduce contamination by pathogens. Since pathogens may be spread by insects and rodents, insect and rodent control is especially important. Toxins are poisonous substances produced by pathogens and other microorganisms. To protect food from toxins, foods must be stored in air tight sealed containers.

Chemical contamination Chemical weapons release toxic chemicals. Food may be protected from chemical contamination by placing it in sealed airtight container. Containers must be decontaminated before the food can be consumed. Chemically contaminated food is difficult to decontaminate. Due to limits in the ability to detect contamination that is bound to other materials, the use of such food always poses a major health risk.

Food inspection Food or water that may be contaminated by nuclear fallout or

biological or chemical agents must be inspected. The Army Medical Corps has the sole responsibility for monitoring and recommending food decontamination or disposal procedures and preventive medicine. If food or water becomes contaminated, it must not be consumed unless it is first decontaminated or approved for consumption.

Detection methods It is essential that every soldier, especially if he is deployed in food services, knows how to detect NBC contamination. The Radiac meter or Geiger counter is used to monitor food, water, personnel and material for possible contamination by induced radiation or fallout. To inspect food, personnel or material for nuclear contamination, operation manual must be followed step by step. Background radiation will produce a signal even in the absence of contamination. An audible signal provides the most sensitive indication in changes in the quantity of radiation present. Food is contaminated if it produces a reading greater than two times that of the surrounding environment in an uncontaminated area. At present, there is no simple cost effective facility available to detect the presence of biological agents in food. The supporting Medical Corps are responsible for inspecting food for biological agents. The changes in food characteristics like slime, discolouration and odour to be inspected for any presence of biological agents. If food is suspected of being contaminated by biological agents, further inspection is required.

Food bio-security Food bio-security threats involve the intentional contamination of food or agricultural products with biological, chemical or radiological agents or biological toxins, as well as physical or cyber threats to food - system facilities. They could range in scope from small - scale, isolated cases to coordinated terrorist events. At first indication, some bio-security threats represent an obvious problem that warrants an immediate response. Others may appear less urgent and therefore become subject to credibility assessment and further investigation. Occurrences that may indicate a bio-security threat include:

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disaster management

BIO-SECURITY

■■ Discovery of some physical characteristic of a food item or agricultural product that suggest possible contamination with a biological or chemical agent (e.g. presence of an unidentified and unexpected powder, a bad odour, or an abnormal taste). ■■ Reports of unusual patterns or types of illness among employees or consumers, possibly related to a food or agricultural product. ■■ Observation of suspicious behaviour or activity by an employee or customer. ■■ A significant security breach in a food-system facility, storage tank or shipping vehicle. ■■ Receipt of a threat (via telephone call or piece of mail) including that an agricultural or food product has been or will be contaminated. ■■ Two or more of these events occurring simultaneously.

Tripwire detection response In addition to taking steps to prevent bio-security events, food producers, processors, transporters and retailers also should have in place policies, procedures to detect and evaluate potential bio-security threats if they should occur. Policies, procedures and protocols: ■■ Mechanism to identify and track certain illness in employees that may include product or plant contamination. ■■ A procedure for handling and recording consumer complaints so that any illness possibly associated with a food or agricultural product can be rapidly assessed and evaluated. A protocol for contacting local ■■ authorities (law enforcement, regulatory or public health depending on the situation) in the event of a bio-security threat, the protocol should include key contact information (i.e. name, telephone number, fax number, e-mail address, 24 hour availability information) for each pertinent agency and the information should be updated on a regular basis. ■■ Use of security patrols and / or video surveillance, if deemed necessary, to detect suspicious behaviour or

unusual events.

mission

■■ Mechanisms for tracking hazardous chemicals or laboratory reagents and positive controls as well as protocols to investigate missing items or other irregularities. ■■ Protocols for inspecting and tracking incoming ingredients, packaging, labels and products return to detect tampering or counterfeiting.

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms…

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

Protocols for tracking ■■ finished product in case a recall is necessary at some point.

— Chanakya

Random inspections of ■■ storage facilities, vehicles and vessels to detect potential security breaches. Protocols for internal ■■ reporting and management of potential bio-security events, by type of event.

Hazard analysis Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) is a safety management system that addresses and controls biological, chemical and physical hazards existing in the food supply chain. It is designed to identify health hazards and establish strategies to prevent, eliminate or reduce their occurrence. Food producers, processors, transporters and retailers also should consider offering food security training to all employees. Training should include recognition of potential tampering and security breaches as well as steps that employees should take if they become aware of any potential biosecurity issues. People need to be informed, conscious and well prepared for the possibility of CBRN disaster. The public health infrastructure needs strengthening at local, State and national levels with trained personnel, updated labs and improved communication links to facilitate a coordinated and effective response. The medical community, as the front line of defence, needs

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to be engaged and better trained to recognise and respond to CBRN related illness.

The writer is Director Defence Food Research Laboratory, Mysore, India. He has received many awards for his outstanding contributions to the field of food science and technology. He has more than two hundred and fifteen publications and one hundred and fifty presentations in National and International journals.

disaster management

SERVICE BEFORE SELF

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

role of ex-servicemen

Much of the reason why the armed forces personnel fall quickly and easily into place in a disaster management situation is that they have a wealth of talent and skills in dealing with adverse situations. That in fact is their metier and this article suggests that they can best be utilised as core groups in planning and executing of rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in disaster areas in their natural habitats after retirement from active service. Given the need to keep the military young, most of them are able-bodied and skilled, but have to leave just past middle age. They have a lot of potential in them and this can be gainfully utilised in disaster management of all kinds. 46

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n the aftermath of the recent tsunami in Japan, alarm bells have started ringing in India. Particularly, it is on account of nuclear reactors becoming affected by the combination of the earthquake and the tsunami deluge in Japan which could not be controlled for a long period. In fact, uncertainty still prevails in that country whether the reactors are safe and because of this fear people from likely affected areas have started migrating.

Bhopal gas spectre India is in the process of buying and installing large number of nuclear reactors costing billions of rupees. Doubts have been raised whether India will be able to manage a nuclear disaster with no experience in this field whereas Japan has had earthquake disasters almost every day and has been managing nuclear reactors for nearly half a century. It is because of this uncertainty that people ofÂ Jaitapur in particular and Maharashtra population in general are now demanding cancellation of Jaitapur nuclear reactor. Earlier, we failed as a nation in controlling and managing Bhopal gas tragedy which in itself was a miniature nuclear disaster that resulted in over twenty thousand people suffering in terms of fatal casualties and permanent disabilities.

Bad record We, in India, also suffer disasters in some shape or the other almost every day. Among the natural ones floods, flash floods, violent thunderstorms, forest fires, landslides, epidemics come to mind instantly. In the man-made category air strikes, both conventional and nuclear, sabotage of infrastructure like dams / power stations / roads / railways / bridges / water systems, poisoning of water supplies etc. are within realms ofÂ possibility. Terrorism is also a man-made and dangerous form of disaster as was made evident by 9/11 terrorist air strikes at New Yorkâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s World Trade Center and 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack.

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disaster management

SERVICE BEFORE SELF

The central government has established National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). It has a vice chairman with the status of a cabinet minister at the Centre and about ten members who enjoy the status of a minister of state. Most of the members are retired bureaucrats and have no aptitude for the job. The first vice chairman was a retired chief of the army staff who did an outstanding work in establishing the NDMA and design its policies, procedures and drills. He has now been replaced by a disgruntled MLA from Andhra Pradesh who has no clue of the subject and has been sent to NDMA only to avoid his political manoeuvring of the state. The NDMA, therefore, lacks professionalism and dedication. Conditions at state level are even more deplorable By their very nature, disasters come with suddenness that not only causes human and property loss, but overloads on administrative system that is geared primarily to routine civil operations. Just when help is most needed to save lives and property, the administration becomes handicapped because of the suddenness of the tragedy, damage to communications / infrastructure, unpreparedness to face the calamity and lack of regular training. Gujarat isÂ a clear example of this. But things were no better after the Chamoli and Uttarkashi earthquake and large scale calamity spread by Latur earthquake in Maharashtra. Armed forces had to get involved in a big way to retrieve bodies from debris, start relief work in a planned and prepared manner, establish temporary hospitals and handled thousands of injured people and carried out last rites of thousands of dead bodies. It was shocking to know that civil administration refused to take on the task of disposing the dead bodies.

Contingency planning Good contingency planning to meet the disasters is, therefore, an inescapable necessity. Whereas civil administration is keen to distribute relief grants after the disasters, it has no desire to plan and prepare to prevent a disaster or to fight it out on occurring which could avoid damages to human beings and the property. Contingency planning for disaster management requires detailed plans to cover all eventualities, necessary communication plans, necessary equipment / supplies / machinery, leadership chain and trained human resources. Most important of all, this entire system should regularly and sometimes with surprise, be exercised such that their reaction times are consistent with the demands of a calamity. I had been involved in managing floods in Sultanpur Lodhi Sub-division of Kapurthala district in Punjab, flash floods of Kupwara district in the Jammu and Kashmir and as chief of staff of our Eastern Army in controlling yearly floods in Assam and other seven states of our north eastern region. My experience is that in our present system of administration such contingency planning is unlikely. The civil administrator has found an easy recourse to hand over the crisis situation to the armed forces and only come in when the relief material and grants are to be distributed. I have also experienced that on armed forces arrival in affected areas precious time is lost establishing necessary interfaces between the civil and military. Unfortunately, the civil administrator was found invariably busy in taking care of visiting political leaders. Because of this delay, substantial avoidable damage takes place. In managing disasters, it is absolutely essential that local experts get immediately involved in managing the crisis without becoming victims of formalities.

Ex-servicemen The country is blessed with a large ex-servicemen population distributed down to the village level. Every year approximately 1,000 officers, 3,000 junior officers and 65,000 soldiers (junior ranks) retire from active service. Within this retiring force, technical, medical and management expertise exists to cater to any contingency.

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Indeed, many of the ex-servicemen would have actually assisted civil administration in combating disasters. In addition, they are trained to fight wars which themselves are akin to disaster. The solution is to involve this valuable human resource in the planning, management and execution of disaster management along with the civil administration. Among them are experts and experienced communication technicians, road construction experts, medicos in various trades, project designers and managers, administering and efficient working of airfields, experienced air pilots, civil works engineers, drivers, carpenters, masons, telephone and wireless (radio) operators, dozer-drivers, welders, blacksmiths, health and hygiene specialists, vehicle mechanics and machinist etc. It is, indeed, very experienced and valuable national resource which the government must plan to utilise. In natural disasters specially and post-disaster reconstruction activity, experts in trades and skills as mentioned above are the main necessities. In a planned manner, a proper record of all ex-servicemen must be prepared in every state and every district of a state which should also list their expertise and special knowledge and experience. They, then, should be organised into units and sub-units. At local level, I recommend a unit of 150 ex-servicemen at every district. They will be responsible to make plans, identify resources and suitably disperse manpower and assign tasks to them. They will also be responsible to conduct regular practices and refine drills / procedures to ensure an effective and quick reaction disaster management system. Their responsibility will also include to collect local data, establish contact with local people and involve them in their schemes of disaster management. We must not forget that the local men are the best material to render aid and assistance in disaster management. Proper lists of these local volunteers should be prepared and they should assemble, once a week, for the purpose of trainingÂ and information updating. Efforts should be made to have a small unit (sub-unit) of 10 to 15 volunteer ex-servicemen in every village.

At division level in every state, there should be a headquarters, comprising of 20-30 ex-servicemen. At state level, there should beÂ a director disaster management with a team of experts in various fields to advise and assist him. The director should work directly under the Chief Secretary. The disaster management units and sub-units should have means of communication, vehicles, equipment and machinery so as to enable them to be operational at the shortest possible time in an emergency. In times of necessity, machinery, equipment and manpower can be sent from one state to the other. By this, it would be possible to properly utilise the resources which reach the affected areas from various places and organisations.

NDMA Lately, the central government has established National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). It has a vice chairman with the status of a cabinet minister at the centre and about ten members who enjoy the status of a minister of state. Most of the members are retired bureaucrats and have no aptitude for the job. The first vice chairman was a retired chief of the Army staff who did an outstanding work in establishing the NDMA and design its policies, procedures and drills. He has now been replaced by a disgruntled MLA from Andhra Pradesh who has no clue of the subject and has been sent to NDMA only to avoid his political manoeuvring of the state. The NDMA, therefore, lacks professionalism and dedication. Conditions at state level are even more deplorable. They do not have an independent authority taking care of disaster management and, in an ad hoc manner, one of the bureaucrats is given an additional charge of this subject. At district and sub-divison level, no organisation for disaster management exists and district magistrates / commissioners are made responsible for it. A totally lackadaisical attitude prevails. Hence, no proper professional environment, in terms of organisation responsible for disaster management exists in the country. This must be reformed immediately. in

In the absence of professional climate civil administration to handle

this very important responsibility, armed forces are deeply involved in shouldering upon themselves this task. It is because of ever eagerness of the armed forces that the civil administration finds it convenient to palm this responsibility off to them. Consequently, at state and district level plans are prepared by the armed forces and training and rehearsals regularly organised. Even the coordination meeting, training and rehearsal events are avoided by the civil administration on some pretext or the other. It is a pathetic attitude. Involvement of ex-servicemen will bring some sense of purpose and professionalism to face the calamity of disasters.

Territorial army The government of India is planning to raise more units of territorial army (TA). I suggest that disaster management sub-units and units should be amalgamated into TA and organised into TA (disaster management). We had experimented with similar arrangement a few years ago, to protect environment in that two battalions of TA, 127 and 128, were raised. These two units have done a tremendous job in planting lakhs of trees in Mussoorie hills and along Indira Gandhi canal in the desert of Rajasthan respectively. The 127 Battalion TA (Ecological) and 128 Battalion TA (Ecological) are hundred per cent manned by ex-servicemen. We should raise TA (disaster management) and equip them with special equipment and machinery required to manage various types of disasters. When there is no disaster situation, these ex-servicemen units / sub-units can be utilised for national reconstruction and social emancipation

works - the two fields in which immense work needs to be done. Some of the areas in which ex-servicemen can be utilised are anti-corruption drives, preventing encroachments and building violations, primary education and adult literacy, primary healthcare, care of the handicapped, social forestry, prevention / containment of forest fires, adventure tourism, eco-tourism and imparting training for defence against nuclear strikes. They can also be utilised for keeping an eye on anti national elements in the society as also to counter terrorism. During the last 64 years, armed forces have rendered a yeoman service in protecting the society during natural disasters. Civil administrators are not only ignorant about nuts and bolts of managing disasters, they also lack aptitude, training and keenness for the job. It will be totally in the national interest to utilise invaluable human resource pool of ex-servicemen in disaster management in particular and when not involved in this priority task, in socio-economic development activity. We need to plan, prepare, train and rehearse to meet the challenges that disasters present before us. For this ex-servicemen, who have many years of experience in combating emergencies, can be a very powerful and strong asset. The writer has been general officer commanding in the Kashmir valley, Chief of Staff of Eastern Command, Indian Army and Vice Chancellor Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak (Haryana). He was appointed chairman Administrative Reforms Committee for Haryana and Uttarakhand by the centre in the year 2001. The committee studied and made recommendations on disaster management besides many other issues.

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disaster management

PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES

Prof. (Retd.) K. S. Sidhu

the aftermath There is no better application of the word â&#x20AC;&#x153;holisticâ&#x20AC;? than in the management of disasters by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear means. Institutions dealing with disaster management, civic zone development and environmental issues need to be intertwined organically to ensure a large modicum of prophylaxis against disasters caused by any of these sources as well as post-event management. The psychology of such a management structure is the product of a common intent of protecting the social milieu.

isasters are as old as human history but the dramatic increase and the damage caused by them in the recent past have become a cause of national and international concern. Over the past decade, the number of natural and man-made disasters has increased unavoidably.

Disaster is an unexpected unpleasant or unfortunate extreme event, which causes great damage to human beings as well as plants and animals. Disasters occur rapidly, instantaneously and indiscriminately. A disaster is a result of the combination of hazard, vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the potential chances of risk. A disaster happens when a hazard impacts on a vulnerable population and causes damage, casualties and disruption.

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PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES

Many manifestations These extreme events either natural or man-induced exceed the tolerable magnitude within or beyond certain time limits, make adjustment difficult, result in catastrophic losses of property and income and life is paralysed. The events which take place exacerbate normal environmental processes to cause disasters to human society such as sudden tectonic activities leading to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, continued dry conditions leading to prolonged droughts, floods, collision of celestial bodies and atmospheric disturbances etc. With technological

Thus the term refers to ‘bad or evil star’. The United Nations defined disasters as ‘A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic and environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected community/ society to cope using its own resources’.

Disaster components An earthquake is disastrous only when it affects people, their properties and activities. Thus, disaster occurs only when hazards and vulnerability meet. But it is also to be noted that with

use which might be at least of equal importance to their known effects.

WMDs Fully aware of the fact that the disasters unleashed by the use of weapons of mass destruction could be catastrophic, the technological advances have made access to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) an easy affair. Different types of CBRN agents have grown with the passage of time that have the lethal potency to cause serious injury to life, physiologically and psychologically. With the increasing apparent threat of CBRN terrorism, the

No long-term panacea

Risk management

Furthermore, the psycho-social effects at the emotional, psychological, social and behavioural levels have been shown to be more widespread and long-lasting than direct physical effects in terms of their impact on society and population health. The lack of a proactive public communications strategy by public authorities while media images portrayed suffering at the scene of the attack, coupled with the lack of follow-up care and support, had a significant influence on the public response to this incident. Long-term behavioural and emotional

Evidence in the disaster affairs indicates that psycho-social consequences of terrorism are a critical component of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) events, both at the clinical level and the normal behavioural and emotional levels. Planning for such psycho-social aspects should be an integral part of emergency preparedness.

effects experienced by people included fear of commuting, absenteeism from work and lack of trust in public authorities, insomnia, depression, anxiety and uncertainty about longterm health impacts. The difficulties faced by the emergency medical community during triage and treatment due to lack of training and preparedness for a CBRN terrorism event may be well documented. The apparent lack of consistency in testing and treatment regimes for groups exposed at different times also resulted in eroding trust in public health authorities. It emphasises the critical role that perceptions, attitudes and emotions play in shaping public responses to CBRN threats and events and the importance of understanding and anticipating social and psychological factors in CBRN risk management planning.

into account social, cultural, ethical, political and legal considerations. High-tech risk management frameworks are by and large comprised of the following interrelated essentials:

The objective of risk management should be to provide systematically sound, cost-effective, integrated actions that reduce or prevent risks while taking

Risk communication between decision makers and stakeholders has to be maintained at all phases of the risk management process. CBRN terrorism risk management frameworks are still in their infancy and to date have largely focused on guiding resource planning, to manage infrastructure damage and interagency coordination to manage the physical and medical consequences of the event at the time of attack and rescue. Vulnerability assessment has been one of the most important factors in the risk management framework that is a crucial modifier of disaster

Unfortunately, despite their more frequent occurrences, disasters are viewed in isolation from the processes of mainstream development and poverty alleviation planning. The institutions dealing with disaster management, development planning and environmental management etc. operate in isolation with any integrated planning between them has almost been lacking. With a greater capacity of the individual / community and environment to face the disasters, the impact of a hazard may be further reduced advancement, development initiatives resulted in the creation of a lot of infrastructure and permanent assets. Gradually, material development separated man from nature on one hand and augmented vulnerability of the human population, on the other. The progressive increase in loss of life, property and deleterious effect on environment due to disasters moved the international community to look at disaster management in a new perspective which transcends international barriers, anticipates possible threats and enables tackling of disasters from the pre-stage.

International help The international dimension of disasters was realised during the last decade that was observed as “International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction” dedicated to promoting solutions to reduce risks from natural hazards wherein a protocol was also sought to be established so that when it comes to suffering of humanity, help from the international community flows in right earnest. The term disaster owes its origin to the French word Desastre which is a combination of two words des meaning bad and astre meaning star.

greater capacity of the individual/ community and environment to face these disasters, the impact of a hazard reduces. Therefore, disaster management is dependent on three major components namely hazard, vulnerability and capacity. Disasters, obviously, can be natural, but also man-made. Natural disasters include floods, earthquakes, cyclones, famines and disease; man-made disasters would encapsulate major industrial accidents and the accidental or deliberate use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Nukes The long-drawn debate has equated WMDs with nuclear weapons, since the acronym includes biological and chemical weapons, but also radiological weapons — the so-called ‘dirty bomb.’ There is little doubt that the use of nuclear weapons can inflict incalculable destruction, instantaneously due to heat, blast and immediate radiation effects. More horrendous is the still uncharted territory of secondary radiation within weeks and tertiary radiation that could last for years after the nuclear incident. The most horrific aspect of nuclear weapons has been the largely unknown effects of their

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development of specific frameworks and tools to assist first responders and public health and emergency planners in managing CBRN threats and events is critical. Case studies of traumatic incidents/events illustrate the scope and intensity of psycho-social effects experienced by first responders, victims, families and communities. Such incidents provide valuable evidence and guidance on the types of psycho-social aspects that need to be considered in CBRN threats and attacks, the focus is primarily on detection, containment and shortterm consequence management related to the physical hazards. The psychological, social, emotional and behavioural aspects of terrorism have not been fully integrated into preparedness and planning efforts. Moreover, an evidence-based risk assessment and management framework to assist emergency planners and first responders in preparing for and responding to the psycho-social dimensions of terrorism currently does not exist. Terrorism has been defined as the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence to instill fear in populations and an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations.

■■ Issue identification, including understanding the social, cultural, ethical, political and legal context of the problem; ■■ Risk assessment that is, hazards identified, likelihood of adverse outcomes estimated, risks and benefits characterised; ■■ Identification, selection and implementation of risk management options; and ■■ Ongoing monitoring management interventions.

risk

consequences, because it helps direct interventions aiming to deal with the psycho-social impacts. The need to incorporate public perception of terrorism risks and to consider the impact of psychological and emotional factors on behaviour while developing risk management strategies can build up effective messages to lessen fear and prevent panic in the face of a CBRN threat or attack.

Structured process Within the context of CBRN readiness planning to facilitate adaptive psycho-social responses, a risk management framework helps in providing a structured process so as to identify: psycho-social hazards;

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disaster management

PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES

vulnerable groups; situational factors that may influence psychosocial outcomes; and individual and population level factors that can influence psycho-social outcomes. These factors oblige to be considered when identifying and selecting evidence based psycho-social risk management intervention options to foster resilience, a process or the attainment of positive outcome at the individual, family and community levels despite adverse situations. Adoption of a resilience perspective broadens the focus of the risk assessment process in disaster preparedness and planning from simply examining vulnerabilities, needs and impacts to one that includes community assets, resources and capacities. It has been found to be better to spend significantly more to develop early warning systems about the future happenings of earthquakes and tsunamis, asteroids that might strike the earth and other catastrophes. As some of the countries build the capacity to prevent, mitigate and manage CBRN threats and events, it is important to recognise the range of social, psychological, emotional, spiritual, behavioural and cognitive factors that may affect victims and their families, communities, children, the elderly, responders, decision makers and others at all phases, from threat to post-impact recovery. A structured process to assist CBRN emergency planners, decision makers and responders in identifying psycho-social risks, vulnerable populations, resources and interventions at various phases of a CBRN event to limit negative psycho-social impacts and promote resilience and adaptive responses is the essence of our psycho-social risk assessment and management framework.

Radiological threat There is a growing realisation that radiological weapons could become the real WMD threat since radioactive materials are widely dispersed over research laboratories, hospitals, industrial enterprises and so on, quite apart from their generation by atomic power plants. The use of such weapons in a WMD mode has not occurred yet, but there is little doubt that they could be used by terrorist organisations. In

fact the “Advances in bio-technology, molecular biology and genetic engineering and the availability of such technology in the public domain may also be used with malicious intent to cause widespread panic and breakdown of public health systems” as a part of asymmetric warfare as the terrorists have a natural interest in these unconventional weapons.

Recommended measures Various measures have been recommended from time to time to reduce the fallout effect of a CBRN attack. It is no doubt essential to evolve a well-developed planned course of action to deal with the challenges of a WMD disaster. Disaster management plans including the creation of a viable National Disaster Management Authority, based on a holistic approach to coordinate the impact of WMD disasters and to mitigate disasters of the affected area has also been suggested. Timely action, including requisite awareness among the public, essentially required to mitigate the fallout of a chemical / radiological disaster including effective coordination among various agencies such as the police, military, medical team, fire department, civil defence organisation, NGOs, media and district administration in combating a dangerous disaster will help in reducing its impact. The preparations should be undertaken by the general public to deal with CBRN emergencies and the measures to be taken to tackle mass casualties due to WMD agents. Silent warfare is an excellent channel that prepares the State system and the general population to efficiently and competently deal with a WMD disaster.

Sensors Detection mechanisms are an essential factor of any successful CBRN public protection policy, which aims at establishing the release or presence of a CBRN agent in a given area/ location. It is usually associated with prevention, before, during and after any CBRN incident to accomplish the main objectives of protection, i.e., prevention, protection, response and recovery, based on a holistic approach through co-ordinated and integrated

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efforts and policies. Before an incident occurs, allow for continuous monitoring to either prevent a CBRN incident or to allow for early warning in the event of its happening. Pre-disaster activities those, which are taken to reduce human and property losses, caused by a potential hazard. For example, carrying out awareness campaigns, strengthening the existing weak structures, preparation of the disaster management plans at household and community level, etc. Such risk reduction measures taken at this stage are termed as mitigation and preparedness activities.

reactions. Similarly, some experience reactions immediately while others can experience reactions days, weeks or even months after the event. Emotional reactions are very common and can include feeling numb, sadness, anxiety, anger, grief, irritability,

number of difficult questions about the appropriate responses to such threats, which not only have the potential to be extremely disruptive to normal, day-to-day activities, but also may provide individual terrorists and terrorist groups with a potent instrument against society, even in the absence of a

Priority should also be given to the co-ordination of detection policies with other policies because technology does not provide an exclusive answer to terrorist threats. Intelligence is crucial to understand the threat and direct the use of necessarily limited resources. Prevention policies, particularly those addressing the root causes of terrorism should also be developed.

Behavioural changes Affected by disasters people can face a wide range of psycho-social reactions. Some people may experience and express very strong reactions while others may have very mild

against

the

associated

Comprehensive palliatives It is unavoidable to start from an all-hazards approach, since no matter whether a CBRN incident is accidental or intentional, man-made or not, the response in terms of civil protection and health is likely to be similar. The CBRN policy package is therefore broadly based on an all-hazards-approach, but with a strong emphasis on countering the terrorist threat, in particular with regard to preventive actions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has categorised four potential nuclear security risks:

During the incident, detectors are required on the spot in order to allow to identify the precise nature and extent of the release and to organise the response accordingly. The initiatives taken to ensure that the needs and provisions of victims are met and suffering is minimised. Activities taken under this stage are called emergency response activities. Finally, after the incident has occurred, detectors are to confirm the results of early identification, collect evidence and confirm that the area has been decontaminated. Monitoring, warning, identifying and consequence assessment are thus all core technological functions of detection accomplished through a comprehensive multi-layered approach. There are initiatives taken in response to a disaster with a purpose to achieve early recovery and rehabilitation of affected communities, immediately after a disaster strikes. These are also called as response and recovery activities.

populations risks.

■■ Theft of an existing nuclear weapon; ■■ Radiological hazards caused by an attack on, or sabotage of, a nuclear facility or transport vehicle; ■■ Acquisition of nuclear material and preparation of a primitive or improvised nuclear weapon;

helplessness and guilt. Some people withdraw, feel restless or on edge, have trouble functioning at work or home, or simply not acting like themselves. Some have increased alcohol or drug use. Confusion and difficulties with concentration, memory and making decisions can occur. Physical reactions are also quite common - which may include fatigue or exhaustion, general aches and pains, headaches and stomach-aches. Some people may have flu-like symptoms, trouble with appetite, or trouble in sleeping. For many people these reactions to disasters are temporary and often can be resolved within days and weeks. Reactions or symptoms that persist or worsen are of increased concern.

Nuclear dimension There have also been a small number of attacks on nuclear power facilities worldwide; numerous unsubstantiated threats to trigger nuclear explosive devices. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to distinguish between a mere hoax and the real thing. This tends to raise a

real capability or willingness to carry out an actual attack. In any event, an attack using unconventional weapons would certainly cause serious economic and social disruption. There are no commonly accepted definitions of CBRN materials, threats or incidents - sometime it merely refers to CBRN incidents, without defining what these incidents could be, while other terminology related to CBRN materials refers to terrorist attacks using unconventional means - as opposed to the more conventional means of explosives and arms. In the military context, the terminology mainly refers to the use of non-conventional weapons, or WMD. An approach, which looks at all possible ways in which terrorists can use these materials, is the only one acceptable from a point of view of prevention and detection, since all possible risks concerning these materials should be covered. The threat of a terrorist group acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) materials has led governments and international organisations to adopt far-reaching regulations and programmes to defend

■■ Malicious use of radioactive sources, particularly in a so-called “dirty bomb”. Similarly, the disaster management phases may or may not occur in isolation or in any precise order. Often phases of the cycle overlap and the length of each phase greatly depends on the severity of the disaster. Management would entail: ■■ Mitigation - Minimising the effects of disaster, e.g., building codes and zoning; vulnerability analyses; public education. ■■ Preparedness - Planning how to respond, e.g., preparedness plans; emergency exercises/training; warning systems. ■■ Response - Efforts to minimise the hazards created by a disaster, e.g., search and rescue; emergency relief. Returning the ■■ Recovery community to normal, e.g., temporary housing; grants; medical care.

Vulnerability Vulnerability may be defined as

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disaster management

PSYCHO-SOCIAL ISSUES

“The extent to which a community, structure, services or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the impact of particular hazard, on account of their nature, construction and proximity to hazardous terrains or a disaster prone area.” Vulnerabilities can be categorised into physical and socio-economic vulnerability. Physical vulnerability includes notions of whom and what may be damaged or destroyed by natural hazard such as earthquakes or floods. It is based on the physical condition of people and elements at risk, such as buildings, infrastructure etc; and their proximity, location and nature of the hazard. Socioeconomic vulnerability determines the degree to which a population is affected by a hazard on the intensity of socio-economic conditions of the people.

Capacity Capacity relates with the physical and socio-economic “resources, means and strengths which exist in households and communities and which enable them to cope with, withstand, prepare for, prevent, mitigate or quickly recover from a disaster”. People’s capacity may be classified into physical and socio-economic context. Physical Capacity: People whose houses have been destroyed by the cyclone or crops have been destroyed by the flood can salvage things from their homes and from their farms. Socio-economic Capacity: In most of the disasters, people suffer their greatest losses in the physical and material realm. Rich people have the capacity to recover soon because of their wealth. In fact, they are seldom hit by disasters because they live in safe areas and their houses are built with stronger materials. However, even when everything is destroyed they have the capacity to cope up with it. Hazards becomes a disaster only when the frequency or likelihood of a hazard and the vulnerability of the community increases the risk of being severely affected. A “dirty bomb” is likely to result in some immediate deaths and serious injuries, caused by the explosion of the conventional explosive rather than by exposure to radiations. Effects on the health of those exposed to radioactivity depends upon how long

they remain in the contaminated area, the size of the particles released by the explosion and the type of radioactivity emitted. Another threat could come from a different type of terrorist attack, using a primitive or improvised nuclear weapon rather than a “dirty bomb”. Unlike “dirty bombs”, a primitive nuclear weapon, also called improvised nuclear device, would actually imply the explosion of a nuclear device fabricated with stolen or illegally acquired civil plutonium. The damage caused through such a device would be great, even if the nuclear explosion induced were relatively limited. In the event of a release of radiological material, three types of radiation-induced injury can occur: external irradiation, contamination with radioactive materials and incorporation of radioactive material into body cells, tissues, or organs.

“Orphaned” nuclear materials The events of September 11, 2001 have intensified apprehension that terrorist groups will endeavour to steal weapons-usable nuclear material in order to build a nuclear weapon. Although stocks of these exist in many countries around the world, the largest inventory is held in the Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union in addition to some of the south-west Asian States. Owing to economic and political turmoil, this material is vulnerable to theft. A close examination of open source evidence reveals numerous cases of theft or attempted theft of weapons-useable material from post-Soviet States facilities. Even in the US and Europe, it has been reported that thousands of radioactive sources have been lost or stolen. According to the IAEA, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological substances worldwide, of which a significant number involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a “dirty bomb”. Networks of illegal transfer of nuclear technology, such as the one set up by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan, the exact reach of which is still unclear, are also a serious concern. Numerous instances of profit-motivated nuclear hoaxes have been reported in the media in the past many years. Such hoaxes involved

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sellers offering weapons-usable or weapons-grade nuclear material and instead deliver some other bogus radioactive, or in some cases, nonradioactive substance. All these cases reveal the heightened call for combined detection policies with effective policies to control the spread of nuclear and radiological material and nuclear technology in order to limit the risk of terrorists accessing them. The physical security of nuclear material in all sensitive facilities, as well as the security of nuclear facilities themselves - nuclear power plants, storage sites, etc. - need to be reinforced along common lines. In all these areas, international co-operation helps improve global preparedness.

use of detection systems; and ■■ Providing responders with the necessary tools to save lives and limit damage to property in case of CBRN incidents.

Guiding principles The following principles, based on the needs assessment findings, have been put forward by experts in the field: 1. Serve as a platform for evidence-based information to assist user groups of various disciplinary backgrounds.

The effects of disasters are not limited to those affected directly by the events. Others may also suffer indirect effects from trauma-referred to as “vicarious” or “secondary” traumatisation. Those at risk include spouses and loved ones of trauma victims, people who try to help victims, such as police or firemen and healthcare professionals who treat trauma victims, such as therapists and emergency room personnel, as well as journalists. Other professionals who work in areas severely affected by disaster, including city and local professionals, are also at risk for a stress response.

■■ Deploying a risk-based approach to CBRN security, entailing the use of riskassessments to drive the prioritisation of security measures; ■■ Ensuring that CBRN materials are well-protected and the potential for their diversion is limited; ■■ Strengthening the exchange of information between States on CBRN security issues in order to react more swiftly to emerging threats; ■■ Improving the development and

5. Guide the assessment, mitigation and management of psycho-social impacts for specific communities and subgroups within a population. Subgroups will include children, adults, the elderly, first responders and decision makers. 6. Characterise the negative psycho-social effects of CBRN events most commonly experienced by victims as normal responses to abnormal situations, including behavioural, cognitive, spiritual, emotional, social and physical effects. 7. Recognise that CBRN events can result in positive psychosocial impacts in the community, including increased social-cohesion, resilience and coping behaviours.

Marshalling resources Protecting the population from terrorism and other criminal threats can be achieved by concentrating efforts and resources on minimising the likelihood of CBRN incidents occurring and limiting their consequences should they materialise. Some of the core measures to achieve these goals are:

post-event recovery and reconstruction. The time dimension and evolving phases of a CBRN threat and event are important to identify effects and interventions.

2. Build on current practices and an all-hazards approach to guide emergency planners, first responders and public officials in appropriate interventions to prevent and mitigate negative psycho-social impacts and promote compliance with CBRN counter-measures and positive psychosocial outcomes. 3. Facilitate a common understanding of CBRN psycho-social issues and enhance the translation of current research on psycho-social impacts, identification of high-risk groups and vulnerability and protective factors into practice. 4. Identify psycho-social effects and interventions across an expanded chronological timeline with an emphasis on pre-event planning and preparedness and long-term,

pre-event 8. Favour public engagement strategies and community-based interventions that foster resilience and other positive psycho-social outcomes. effective risk 9. Recognise communication as an important intervention in preventing negative psycho-social impacts and promoting compliance with protective behaviours. 10. Recognise education as an important intervention across the CBRN event timeline to increase confidence in preparedness, to dispel myths and to convey accurate information on expected psycho-social reactions and steps to contain the hazards. 11. Include professional counselling interventions as well as interventions at the organisational level to enhance inter-agency coordination and address the special needs of the first responder community.

The interventions element identifies options for various levels of psycho-social interventions as well as those which seek to protect public health by minimising exposure to CBRN hazards, preventing the spread of infectious agents and minimising morbidity and mortality through rapid treatment. Three main categories of psychosocial interventions, at the individual, organisational and community levels have been identified. Each of these categories may be further subdivided into interventions related to: (1) risk communication, (2) education, (3) social support and (4) professional counselling. The same interventions may be appropriate for a particular psycho-social effect across various subgroups at a particular phase in the CBRN timeline.

Integrated planning Unfortunately, despite their more frequent occurrences, disasters are viewed in isolation from the processes of mainstream development and poverty alleviation planning. The institutions dealing with disaster management, development planning and environmental management etc. operate in isolation with any integrated planning between them has almost been lacking. With a greater capacity of the individual / community and environment to face the disasters, the impact of a hazard may be further reduced. In an ideal world, a complete range of devices to be available for use in heavily populated areas may be incredibly expensive. But in the event of an actual CBRN attack, it is almost certain that current capabilities would be insufficient. It may not be a wise policy to publicly seek to identify what measures have already been taken, thus, by implication, drawing attention to the gaps. The writer is former Head, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies and former Registrar, Punjabi University, Patiala, India. He specialises in Indian Security and the Indian Ocean / South Asia region. He has authored five books and 45 research papers and articles.`

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After the promulgation of the Disaster Management Act in 2005, India has made considerable progress in integrating the communities into the disaster management infrastructure and training them for synergetic functioning in the event of any of the several disasters India is prone to. However, there are still wide gaps that need to be filled especially in industries. The Bhopal gas tragedy does not appear to have the chilling effect it should.

Inculcating

culture of preparedness Brig. (Retd.), Dr. B. K. Khanna

isasters have been occurring since ancient times and are not new to mankind. They have been managed to the best capability and efforts of the government in power. However, in recent times, owing to their increased frequency as well as intensity, disaster management has attracted immense public interest at the national and international level. More than half of the disasters in the world occur in Asia, making this region the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most vulnerable area.

Indian disaster quotient The Indian subcontinent accounts for 24 per cent of all disasters in Asia. Nearly 58.6 per cent of India is prone to earthquakes and 12 per cent to river floods, affecting more than 1 million people every year. About 7,200 km out of 7,516 km of Indian coastline is prone to cyclones and tsunamis and 3 per cent of landmass is vulnerable to landslides. Snow avalanches are frequent and drought occurs almost every alternate year. More than 1,00,000 people get killed in road accidents alone, India stands at number two position, after Iraq, in number of people who died due to terrorist-related activities during 2008. There is hardly any disaster, natural or manmade, which is not taking place in India. Some of the reasons for increase in the frequency of natural disasters are population explosion, rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation leading to mushrooming of not so well planned growth of cities, unplanned land use, investigative and proactive role of media, climate change and global warming. Rapid industrialisation and menace of terrorism have added new dimensions to man-made disasters. The poor and marginalised sections of the society are the worst hit. Among those affected, pregnant and lactating women, children below 5 years, aged, sick and differently abled groups suffer the most.

Global trends Appreciating increasing trend of fatalities and collateral damage to infrastructure in under-developed and developing countries as compared to the first world countries, the decade of 1990s was declared, by the United Nations, as the International Decade for

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The Fire and Emergency Services in the country are deficient of manpower upto 70 per cent of their authorised strength and the equipment they are holding is vintage. They have to be provided with state-of-the art fire fighting and emergency response equipment, like inflatable lighting towers and handheld drillers, cutters and saws Natural Disaster Reduction. A number of initiatives were taken globally, prominent among them being the Kyoto Protocol, under which the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has been ratified by 175 countries. Under this protocol, industrialised countries were to reduce the collective emissions of green-house gases by 52 per cent compared to the base year 1990. The new millennium began with the launch of International Strategy for Disaster Reduction to build up disaster resilience in vulnerable areas. The Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) was adopted by 168 governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction at Kobe, Japan in January, 2005. India is one of the signatories to these declarations.

Transition in India Government of India, in recognition of the importance of disaster management as a national priority, after the horrific experience of Latur earthquake in 1993 and the Orissa Super Cyclone in October 1999, had set up a High Powered Committee in August 1999 and a National Committee on Disaster Management after the Bhuj earthquake, for making recommendations on the preparation of DM Plans and for expediting laying down the framework for disaster mitigation and management in India. Even while the recommendations of

the HPC report were being analysed by the government, as an interim measure, the management of disaster was shifted from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Home Affairs, pending finalisation of an arrangement at the National level. Indian Ocean tsunami acted as the catalyst and the government of India took a defining step in the legislative history of the country by enacting Disaster Management Act 2005.

Disaster Management Act The Disaster Management Act (2005) formalised the institutional framework for disaster management in India, at national, state, district and at the local levels. National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was constituted as the single window, apex body for DM, at the centre, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Similar arrangements came up at the state level under the Chief Minister. This enabling system was taken down to grass-root level by having District Disaster Management Authority (DDMA) headed by the District Collector. The most notable feature is that the co-chairman of the DDMA is the elected representative of the Zila Parishad (local body). This brought in the much required public interface at the cutting edge level. The fact that these authorities are headed by the executive heads of the governments themselves indicates the national resolve to tackle the management of disasters on priority and at the highest level intervention. The Act envisages a paradigm shift, from the erstwhile response centric syndrome to a pro-active, holistic and integrated management of disasters with emphasis on prevention, preparedness and mitigation. These efforts are aimed at conserving developmental gains and also minimising loss to lives, livelihood and property. The Act also created 10,000 strong nine battalions of the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) as a specialised response (two additional ones are in the pipeline) and the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) for institutional capacity development, research, networking and documentation. The NIDM works within the broad guidelines of the NDMA. The entire DM arrangement is backed by institutional, financial and legal mechanism. These institutions are not

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parallel structures but complimentary and tread in harmony with existing organisations which ensures complete synergy at the national level. The national vision has been evolved after multi-facet discussions and confabulations at national level with concerned stakeholders. The national vision is “to build a safe and disaster resilient India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster oriented and technology driven strategy through a culture of prevention, mitigation, preparedness and response”.

National DM strategy While formulating national DM strategy, NDMA took into consideration the contemporary imperatives, the lessons learnt from the past, the commendable work in management of disasters by the Armed Forces, the motivated and selfless role of the NGOs and volunteer organisations, the innate resilience of the communities to live with disasters, the significant role of the corporate sector in providing relief, the capacity of academic and scientific institutions in providing innovative and futuristic inputs and above all to take off from the good work already done in this field. The national strategy for DM is based on seven pillars of prevention, mitigation, preparedness and capacity development, awareness generation, rapid operationalisation of National Disaster Response Force and further strengthening of the National Institute of Disaster Management. It was also decided to centre-stage the community which bears the brunt of disasters as immediate responders. Necessity of making them aware of the various types of disasters they are vulnerable to, the elementary preparedness measures and training they must undertake, to provide themselves immediate succor and to save their own and their families’ lives before specialised response is activated, are the cornerstones of national DM strategy.

Culture of preparedness NDMA is mandated by DM Act 2005, to lay down national policy and plan on DM and issue guidelines for various types of natural and man-made disasters. One of the tasks also envisages monitoring and coordinating the implementation of the

policies and plans. It is in this regard, an initiative has been taken by NDMA to conduct table top and mock exercises on various types of disasters, initially in the most vulnerable areas of the country. The aim of the initiative is to inculcate a culture of preparedness in the country. Some of the objectives for conduct of the mock exercises are, to highlight the roles and responsibilities and enhance the coordination among the stake-holders, identify gaps in the resources, communication and systems, identify areas for public-private partnership and empower the community to face disasters squarely. Mock exercises on natural and man-made disasters (except chemical industrial disasters) are conducted at district level. The chemical (industrial) disaster mock exercises are organised in most accident hazardous industries.

Mock exercises The mock exercises are conducted in four steps. In step one, during orientation-cum-coordination conference, sensitisation of the participants takes place. Need for conduct of the mock exercises, the aim, objectives and scope of the particular exercise, the exercise organising committee, the participants, the nodal officers, detailment of independent observers and media coverage are delineated during this step. In table top exercise, initially the key stake-holders, like the Collector, Superintendent of Police, District Medical Officer, District Fire Officer and Chief Inspector of Factories of the state and the

Managing Directors of the short listed MAH industries (in case of chemical industrial disasters) are requested to present their emergency response plans. In certain cases, State Disaster Management Secretary, Director General Fire and Emergency Services, State DG Police and DG Health Services also present their respective state DM plans. The worst case scenarios are thereafter painted in a bottom-up approach, from preparedness to rescue and relief and through injects, the responses of the concerned stakeholders are elicited. The roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder, in mitigating the disasters get clarified. The control and coordination of the disaster is managed through the concept of incident response system. Independent observers are detailed for each stakeholder department / organisation, to report on the gaps and deficiencies. Observers are given a detailed format to report on. Safety officer is also nominated for avoiding mishaps / accidents during actual conduct of the mock exercise. In step three, the observers are briefed on their roles. They are asked not to interfere in the functioning of the organisation being observed. Thereafter, the mock exercise is conducted by mobilising resources, according to developing situations, to derive certain lessons. Additional resources from the state / centre are released as per the demand and availability. During conduct of mock exercises on chemical disasters, both ‘on site’ and ‘off site’ plans are practised.

For ‘on site’ emergencies, the industries activate resources at operational, supervisory and management level. When the emergency becomes ‘off-site’, the Collector or a senior officer nominated by him takes over as Incident Commander. An Incident Command Post is established at district level near the incident site for command and management of the disaster. Incident Commander and Emergency Support Functionaries work in tandem and in close coordination and mutual aid. Immediate response by the community for search and rescue and how evacuation is done is practiced and the response time of the first responders is noted. Specialised response is activated for ‘off site’ emergencies if required. Emergency medical response includes rescue, training, evacuation, hospital preparedness and creating surge capacity in designated hospitals. The police response includes cordoning, law and order, traffic control, directing the first responders to their assigned tasks, conducting the VIP visits and handing over the dead bodies to the relatives, after ‘panchnama’. The fire and emergency services activate their resources for fighting fires and for emergency situations. Other ESFs play their roles according to the standard operating procedures given in the DM Plan. At the end of the mock exercise, a detailed debriefing is carried out where the observers and heads of all participating organisations take part and give their observations and share experiences. Step four involves documentation. All the mock exercises are documented

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by filming them as also recording the lessons learnt for future references and for training purposes. The gaps identified during the mock exercise and discussed during the debriefing session are evaluated at NDMA and sent to the Chief Minister / Chief Secretary / MDs of the concerned state / industries, for follow up action.

Initiative for school safety NDMA has also taken initiative for school safety programme. The aim is to ensure the safety of students and staff (teaching and non-teaching) against all types of perceived disasters. The objectives are to empower the schools to face the disasters before the specialist response is effected and to help them institutionalise DM framework in the schools, like School DM Committee, analysing risk and vulnerability assessment of the school, formulating School DM Plan, procuring DM resources, constitution of DM teams for mitigation and response and trigger mechanism. The school mock exercises are conducted in two steps. In step one, how to proceed for making DM framework and how to conduct mock exercises is delineated. In step two, the mock exercise is conducted by detailing independent observers. At the designated time, an alarm / siren is sounded simulating the disaster, say like onset of earthquake. The classes take appropriate action required during the disaster phase. Thereafter respective class teachers give instructions for evacuation of children to assembly area/s and head count is carried out there. The monitor thereafter gives the injury status of the class to the Control Room. The search and rescue and first aid teams, in the meanwhile, assemble near the Control Room, from where they are detailed to evacuate injured children from various classes, as per report given by the monitors. The injured are thereafter brought to the First Aid Area near the Assembly Area and rendered first aid by the First Aid Team. First aid is also given at site by school first aid team, if required. The school control room gets activated immediately and invariably the Principal takes over as the Incident Commander. When the rescue and first aid phase is over and the observers are satisfied, the exercise is called off. A debriefing session takes place thereafter. In the debriefing,

observers and stakeholders (including children) participate and the lessons learnt and gaps identified are intimated to the management and the principal of the school in the After Action Report, for follow up action.

Mock exercises The participants include departments and stakeholders dealing with disasters at the state and district/s level, with emphasis on community participation in large numbers. The stakeholders at state level include, Secretary Disaster Management, Secretary Health / Director General (DG) Health, Secretary Education, DG Police / IG (Law & Order), DG Fire & Emergency Services, Bomb Disposal Squad/s, Chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers and Pollution Control Board (for chemical industrial disasters), Armed Forces columns, NDRF teams and Paramilitary Forces, etc. At district level they comprise of Revenue Department led by the Collector, police force headed by Superintendent of Police, Fire & Emergency Services, led by the District Fire Officer, Medical Services, headed by the District Medical Officer, NGOs, District Supply Officer, Municipal Corporation, District Public Relations Officer, Civil Defence, Home Guards, Red Cross, National Cadet Corps, Nehru Yuva Kendra (youth organisations), Resident Welfare Associations and Panchayati Raj Institutions (local bodies). In chemical (industrial) disaster, the short-listed industries take part in full strength at operational, supervisory and management levels. In major exercises like on earthquake, cyclones, the participation ranges from 15,000 to 20,000 people and in minor disasters, like urban fires and chemical (industrial) disasters the participation ranges between 3,000 to 5,000 people. For the school mock exercises, students, teaching and non-teaching staff take part. The strength varies from 600 to 3,000 per school, depending on its size.

Types of mock exercises The mock exercises are conducted on natural and man-made disasters. The range includes earthquakes, floods, cyclones, landslides, urban fires, chemical (industrial), mass casualty management, terrorist attacks, bomb blasts, gas leaks etc. In school mock exercises, the disasters on which

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exercises are conducted include earthquake, urban fire, terrorist attacks, epidemic etc.

Lessons learnt Some of the major lessons learnt from more than 403 table top and mock exercises conducted so far, are given in succeeding paragraphs. ■■ Overwhelming response from the community, schools and first responders, including the district administration and state governments. ■■ Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) (regulator) has asked its affiliated schools to get mock exercises conducted in their schools. There are over 33,000 schools affiliated to CBSE. In addition, a number of state education boards have also responded positively. Some universities are also showing interest. ■■ At some places, where mock exercises were conducted, actual natural / man-made disasters took place coincidently thereafter; the response of the community / industry and first responders was comparatively quicker and professional and saved many lives and precious infrastructure. ■■ The roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders became clearer. They became more confident in carrying out their assigned tasks, during and after a disaster. ■■ Command, control, communication and coordination aspects got streamlined though concept of incident response system (Indianised ICS version). ■■ The concept of self reliance at individual, family, school and community level was inculcated. ■■ The specialised response of NDRF has been appreciated by the community and the district administration / state governments. They have also helped in training the community and first responders in DM response during normal times. In schools, they have held demonstrations on search and rescue and medical first response, which children appreciated. ■■ Post Mumbai terrorist attacks on 26/11, even private and public

organisations have been approaching, for conduct of mock exercises. Many a private school management has been approaching the DM officials for conduct of mock exercises in schools, all over India.

Gaps identified ■■ The decision makers, viz. politicians and senior bureaucrats have to be more sensitised to give due importance to the disaster risk mitigation and management aspects. ■■ In Chemical (Industrial) Disaster mock exercises, the top management generally have not been attending the mock exercises. They are invariably the responsible officers during actual disasters. Hence they are not sensitised and practised adequately. In school mock exercises also, the management and many a times even principals do not attend the mock exercises, which leaves them poorer in gaining first hand knowledge about the gaps in school preparedness for disasters. ■■ The Fire and Emergency Services in the country are deficient of manpower upto 70 per cent of their authorised strength and the equipment they are holding is vintage. They have to be provided with state-of-the-art fire fighting and emergency response equipment, like inflatable lighting towers and handheld drillers, cutters and saws. ■■ Police force is not fully prepared for DM tasks. There is shortage of manpower; they have vintage weapons and their vehicles do not have stretchers for immediate evacuation of casualties. The police communication network at certain places is also outdated and not reliable. At places, they even do not have luminous ropes to control the crowd. ■■ Risk and vulnerability assessment of the district / industry / schools against disasters have not been carried out professionally. ■■ First aid training has not been given to the community and school children. ■■ Hospital preparedness is mostly inadequate and creation of surge capacity is not known to even medical fraternity. There is also shortage of ambulances. Most ambulances are used

as load carriers and are not equipped with life saving emergency equipment. ■■ NGOs are not skilled in particular DM tasks. They can carry out mostly general tasks, like relief distribution, etc. ■■ Corporate sector is not as yet geared for corporate social responsibility (CSR) during mitigation phase and have so far been providing relief only after a disaster. They need to be sensitised for CSR during mitigation and preparedness phases of disaster, as well. ■■ Whereas MAH units carry out ‘on site’ drills every six months regularly, the ‘off site’ mock exercises are mostly eyewash, as the district administration rarely takes part in such drills. The industrial units also have not got the risk and vulnerability of their establishments done professionally. Many MAH units do not have wind-socks prominently displayed. The availability of personal protective equipment with the first responders is much below the required minimum. ■■ The early warning and alarm systems are required to be upgraded for timely response by the first responders and the community. ■■ DM plans of the districts and industries need to be reviewed and updated. DM plans in schools are mostly non-existent. ■■ The schools have not carried out structural audit of the school buildings, which is mandatory as per orders of the Supreme Court, dated 13th April, 2009. ■■ The community is invariably the

first responder but it is not interested in training itself. They need to be mentally and physically prepared and then trained. ■■ Traditional practices are not given the due importance they deserve. ■■ The districts / industries / schools need to conduct mock exercises at least two times in a year to know their status of preparedness. In conclusion, this initiative of the NDMA has elicited overwhelming and positive response from the states / districts / MAH industries / schools. The community has also started feeling involved. The schools are now more keen to improve their disaster preparedness. Post Mumbai attack of 26/11, there has been tremendous demand even from the private entrepreneurs for assisting them in preparedness and mitigation measures. India may, perhaps be the only country in the world, to have taken the initiative, to conduct so many mock exercises at national level, on so varied disasters from earthquake to terrorist related disasters, at so wide a level (district, MAH industries and schools) with utmost commitment, sincerity and social responsibility. Hopefully, in the next two to three years time, we may claim to be among the most prepared countries for managing all types of disasters. The writer is Senior Specialist (Training and Capacity Development) in National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), New Delhi. He did his PhD in ‘Internal Threat to India - Policy and Options’ and has been in Disaster Management field for over 37 years. He is visiting faculty in 34 universities / training institutions in India and has been decorated with Sena Medal and Vishisht Seva Medal.

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Some are toying with the idea of dropping nuclear energy as an alternate source in a “clean energy” context. With 440 nuclear reactors in operation in 30 countries it will not be easy to change gears in mid-stride but there is no doubting the necessity of the International Atomic Energy Agency raising the bar for safety of nuclear reactors to something above the Fukushima experience. “It-can’t-happen-to-us” attitude is a recipe for disaster. India, with 65 per cent of its landmass prone to earthquakes, cannot be complaisant and it would be best that it suo motu incorporate the lessons learned from Fukushima in all its nuclear projects past, present and future and move on – to thorium-based totally-enclosed install-and-relax reactors.

he Fukushima accident has revived the long-dormant issue of nuclear safety and these indelible images will no doubt accompany all future debates over nuclear energy. Hence, it is pertinent to put the consequences of this event in perspective. This was not a disaster on its own but the earthquake and tsunami which propelled it to happen were certainly natural disasters. This was not an accident but the plant experienced a natural event which was an “act of god” in insurance parlance far beyond what it was designed for. Fukushima was planned to withstand the consequences of an earthquake measuring 8.2 on the Richter scale but unfortunately, the quake which came measured 8.9. In the light of the emphasis by exponents on expanding the role of nuclear power the experts must now shift their attention to making sure the existing nuclear plants and especially the older ones, meet strict contemporary standards about which doubts have been raised. There could well be lessons to be learnt from Fukushima.

Facts on the ground A quick recall of the sequence of events would be desirable for understanding the catastrophe. At the Fukushima nuclear plant, on March 11, huge waves of water came in and, roughly an hour after the initial shock of the quake, hit the area of the nuclear power plant, knocked out external power and knocked out the emergency diesel generators onsite at the plant. The operating reactors shut down immediately upon sensing the earthquake, but radioactive fission products in the reactors’ uranium fuel continued to generate heat after the shutdown and therefore required

continuous cooling. But cooling was unavailable as the reactors lost all electric power, including from backup emergency diesel generators. Without adequate cooling, fuel temperatures rose to dangerous levels. The zirconium tubing surrounding the fuel reacted with hot steam to produce hydrogen, which mixed with air and exploded, destroying the surrounding structures.

Massive radiation leakage As the heating continued, at least part of the fuel in the reactors likely melted and released radioactive material, some of which then escaped through the breached protective structures and spread into the surrounding air. The multiple failures of safety systems in the four reactors at Fukushima went beyond any emergency scenario the Tokyo Electric Power Company had ever envisioned, forcing it to improvise solutions, including using fire pumps filled with seawater to cool the reactors. For any nuclear power plant, when it’s shut down, there is a significant amount of radioactive decay heat that has to be gotten rid of, but the cooling mechanisms cannot operate unless there is a source of electrical power to turn pumps and carry away that massive amount of heat, failing which the water surrounding the reactor core that keeps it cool will start to boil away. If the fuel rods become uncovered, then there is a risk of the fuel beginning to literally melt. Then the possibility of releasing radioactive materials to the environment can go up significantly, especially if there is a breach in the containment structure of the reactor.

Hydrogen problem There are bound to be explosions

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as were seen. Apparently, these were hydrogen explosions. What happened there was the steam from the coolant’s contact with the overheating fuel rods dissolved into its molecular components. When water dissociates, it becomes hydrogen and oxygen. Hydrogen is a flammable gas and it doesn’t take much to ignite it, especially in the presence of a lot of oxygen. The worse-case scenario could be if the massive amounts of spent nuclear fuel are stored in pools of water inside that building. If the water boils away or there’s a breach, those spent fuel rods could catch fire. If they do, there could be massive amounts of radioactive material being dispersed into the environment. That could be the truly worst-case event. Several reactor core loads worth of material are packed into these spent fuel pools --- another load of fuel rods resident in the reactors that could melt down. But then it could get even worse, because you have several additional core loads of material that are in these spent fuel pools.

Danger in the pools The storage pools for radioactive spent fuel at Fukushima have also posed a threat. They contain more dangerous radioactive products than do the reactor vessels. One drained pool allowed spent fuel to heat up; similar overheating threatened an adjoining unit and Japanese officials desperately tried using helicopters, fire pumps and even riot police water cannons to keep the spent fuel rods under water in which they finally succeeded by reconnecting a power line to one of the reactors, which could help pump much-needed cooling water.

The reason for the frantic efforts to stabilise the reactors and spent fuel pools was that if the situation were to deteriorate further, molten and vaporised fuel could release dangerous radioactive fission products such as Cesium-137. If the radioactive materials are deposited in sufficient concentrations, they could make surrounding areas essentially uninhabitable.

What went wrong? Technologically, a number of things appeared to have gone wrong. There was no backup emergency core cooling. There’s a steam suppression system in these boiling water reactors to reduce the pressure buildup so that there is no breach in the

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containment structure. But apparently these steam suppression systems just got saturated, which points to a design error as pointed out by Charles Ferguson, President, Federation of American Scientists in an interview with Toni Johnson (”Japan’s Crisis for Nuclear Power”, Council for Foreign Relations Newsletter, March 15, 2011) adds that “It seems the designers didn’t anticipate that the steam could build up that rapidly and didn’t build enough capacity in the steam suppression system.” So that’s one thing that needs investigation. He further points out another issue that “there should have been an emergency core cooling system that could pump in boron, because boron is a neutron absorber, without going to the drastic step of pumping in seawater laced with boron.”

Re-do spent fuel storage It also needs to be underlined that these reactors had fairly old designs which were about forty years old. These older boiling water reactors typically store their spent fuel in aboveground pools outside the primary containment structure but inside the secondary containment structure. There is some protection for them, but not as much as some of the more modern, pressurised-water-reactors’ spent fuel pools. Of the 13 nuclear reactors along Japan’s coast that were directly impacted by the earthquake and tsunami, it was the four oldest ones that failed completely. The more modern units sustained damage but could bear the brunt of the nature’s onslaught, even if just barely, despite facing forces far greater than what they were designed to withstand. Postmortems will likely disclose that the older plants were designed to lower standards than more recent ones and were not adequately upgraded. Such findings will raise questions about older reactors elsewhere. This is a cause of concern for all nuclear power producing countries using the same old technology.

Competitive nuclear fuel There are now 440 nuclear reactors operating in 30 countries, producing roughly 14 per cent of electricity worldwide. Apart from safety, there are other issues which also deserve attention before moving ahead. The advances in nuclear technology were

expected by the industry to bring costs down to be competitive with other power generation sources but there are conflicting views expressed. And regardless of public debate in developed countries, emerging economies have committed to substantial expansion of nuclear power over the coming decades to help supply their growing economies. The largely clean record of global nuclear operations over the past 20 years did much to reduce overt public concern about nuclear safety; and growing interest in controlling greenhouse gas emissions spurred discussion of a renewed global expansion of nuclear power.

Soul searching Failures at Fukushima will require a pause to allow public discourse in each country to catch up with the plans. For reasons of energy security or climate change, it may still be that nuclear power is the right option for some countries to pursue. But it is equally clear that the events in Japan will require an honest discussion about risks and requirements for redundancies. Nuclear power is simply a complex way to boil water to make steam to generate electricity. Some countries may decide that they will prefer to generate electricity with other technologies; some may even be willing to pay more for their electricity to avoid the risks of nuclear power. Other countries may choose to respond by reinvigorating their regulatory procedures. Regardless of individual regulatory and investment environments, events at Fukushima will complicate planning for nuclear expansion for the coming years in all countries. Fukushima simply exposed what has always and will always, persist with nuclear power—it is a technology that is perceived as dangerous and no amount of redundancy will ever be able to completely scrub the spectre of nuclear risk from discussions of energy policy.

Security angle Security issues will also have an impact on the degree to which a nuclear development occurs. In a scenario with expanded nuclear power capacity, there will be increased production, movement and storage of nuclear materials and thus a corresponding need to ensure the safety and security

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one must consider the potential consequences of a massive accompanying tsunami as a major challenge to the reactors. Since it may be difficult to ensure that the sodium systems remain intact under the worst imaginable circumstances, it may be prudent to conclude that a tsunami-prone location may not be the best place to build a sodium facility whether a nuclear power plant or something else.

of facilities, equipment and modes of transportation from sabotage, theft and terrorism. Many of the nuclear plants around the world are not proof against a 9/11-type attack, or portable antiarmour missiles already reported to be in the hands of terrorists in certain parts of the world. Environmentalists are of the view that generating electricity with steam-driven turbines powered by nuclear fission is not the answer to the global energy hunger and the problems of carbon dioxide emissions. Even if no further accidents or sabotage were to happen, we still don’t have particularly good solutions regarding what to do with the dirty waste they produce. And the world does still have alternative options, involving more efficient use of energy, reduction of unnecessary energy waste and renewable CO2-neutral ways of producing it, like wind and solar power.

N-weapons proliferation The answers to these questions revolve around addressing four major challenges to significantly expanding nuclear power capacity: cost, safety and security, waste, and proliferation. Finally, in a world of expanding nuclear power capacity there are increasing concerns over nuclear proliferation - the acquisition, production or diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes. The examples of North Korea and Iran remind everyone of the continued and enhanced vigilance required to ensure nuclear non-proliferation.

The devil we know Japan’s worsening crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant following

the March 11 earthquake and tsunami has reignited the debate about the safety of nuclear power in countries located in earthquake-prone regions to rethink pursuing nuclear power. There are going to be effects throughout the whole Japanese nuclear industry and perhaps the worldwide industry. It doesn’t seem that the backup safety systems were adequate and they put this nuclear plant right at the coast. Clearly, they were not anticipating the sort of quake that hit which they had never experienced in the last 140 or so years. But everyone knew this was an earthquake-prone region. Marginalising nuclear power would, however, be a dampener in climate-change policy. Nuclear reactors might not seem the most eco-friendly power source after the Fukushima disaster, but they’ve been crucial to plans for curbing greenhouse gas emissions.

Revisit the parameters There are bound to be apprehensions about “boiling water reactors” which boil water in their pressure vessels essentially identical to the failed Fukushima reactors. There is also a call for the “pressurised water reactors” which do not generate steam in the reactor itself, to have formidable reinforced-concrete containment domes. These reactors must accommodate seismic challenges, just as any other reactor type. While there are many such design features in common with other reactor designs, the problem is simpler for the fast reactors because of the low pressure and the fact that this type of reactor does not need elaborate water injection systems. In light of the Fukushima event,

The lesson learned is that even in a country as technologically advanced as Japan, nuclear plants are vulnerable to unforeseen, yet deadly combinations of technical failure, human error and natural disaster. This realisation has prompted at least some world leaders to take a step back and rationally reassess all previous assumptions about the risks of nuclear power. But others have concluded that the lesson of Fukushima is not that nuclear energy technology is inherently unsafe but that this was an event unique to the Japanese context.

Cooling systems The major lesson to be learned is that for any water-cooled reactor there must be an absolutely secure supply of power sufficient to operate cooling pumps. Many other lessons are likely to be learned. At this early point, it appears that design criteria for fuel storage pools may need to be revised and hydrogen control assessed. All nuclear installations will probably be required to do a complete review of the security of their access to electrical power.

Reassuring features Given the severity of the challenge faced by the operators at Fukushima and their ability to manage the situation in such a way as to preclude any significant radiation related health consequences for workers or the public, this event should be a reassurance that properly designed and regulated nuclear power does not pose a catastrophic risk to the public but overall, nuclear power remains a safe and cleaner energy source. Given the financial impact this event will have, it will be worthwhile for the designers, constructors, operators and licensing authorities to support a thorough analysis of what actually

transpired during this event. It is envisaged that the nuclear power industry will learn from this event and redesign nuclear facilities as needed to make them safer in the future.

The road ahead The Japanese disaster has precipitated a terminal crisis for the global nuclear industry. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan has made an incredible announcement – prompted by the ongoing Fukushima nuclear crisis that Japan, is dropping plans to double its nuclear power capacity and the construction of 14 new nuclear plants and will instead “start from scratch” with its energy policy, by developing wind, solar and biomass energy sources. Many other nations are downsising or reviewing nuclear power. Germany has decided to phase out nuclear power; Switzerland has suspended plans to build new nuclear reactors. China has curtailed all new projects and revised safety standards on existing ones. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, too, has ordered a review of all nuclear plants being built by Russian agencies. Even France, which gets more than three-fourths of its electricity from nuclear reactors, has upgraded the level of the Fukushima crisis on the disaster scale. The summit meeting of the Group of Eight major powers held in Deauville, France, has wound up with the adoption of a joint declaration in which the G-8 leaders committed to strengthening the safety of nuclear power generation highlighting the seriousness of the issue in point. The declaration calls for the International Atomic Energy Agency to draw up stricter safety standards for nuclear power stations in earthquake-prone areas, like those in Japan. It also asked G-8 members and other nations to comprehensively evaluate the safety of existing nuclear plants and more effectively use new safety standards. Clearly, Fukushima is now being tested over the extent to which it can contribute to enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants which is a matter of serious concern for the international community. The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

UNBRIDLED DEVELOPMENT?

Disaster-prone India has to be particularly careful of the effects of its much-needed developmental projects on the environment as well as the populace they are intended to benefit. Thus cost-benefit and risk-benefit analysis has to become the basis of all new infrastructure projects. In fact, there have been technological developments that enable retro-improvement of existing structures to minimise effects of disasters as well as proneness. After the earthquake in the National Capital Territory of Delhi some years ago structural improvements that are intended to prevent buildings from collapsing were suggested by the experts and made mandatory.

death, adding to the health, economic and social burden of an already impoverished nation.

isasters encompass the unprecedented disruption in the functioning of a community or a society involving large-scale human, material, economic or environmental losses. These outpace the capability of the affected community or society to cope with the agony and setbacks by employing its own manpower and material resources. Thus, disasters - natural or man-made - pose serious challenges to any society or nation-State, developing or developed. Therefore, in a country like India, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and its over-all impact on human well-being and economic uplift should constitute the basic tenets of human security management. Conceptually, human security has been encapsulated as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Disasters have proved to be the major sources of fear, shock and scarcity of resources by their onslaught and hamper the path of human security. Therefore, disaster management must be inter-linked with the mainstream development planning.

The Indian subcontinent is one of the world’s worst hit regions by natural as well as man-made disasters. India’s 5,700 km Indian Ocean coastline is cyclone-prone; 40 million hectares of cultivable land is flood-prone; 68 per cent net cultivated area in 116 districts is drought-prone; 55 per cent of total area is located in seismic zone III and IV; and sub-Himalayan and Western Ghats are land slide-prone. India has also experienced tsunami challenge in 2004. Going by past records, we all have seen rough seas, cyclones and high tides. But never heard about such a thing coming from our sea (Indian Ocean). It has hit the Indian states of Orissa, West Bengal, Pondicherry, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Huge death tolls could have been avoided, had there been a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean region.

Disaster probability

Warning systems

History bears ample evidences that approximately 60 per cent of the world’s natural disasters have occurred in the Asia-Pacific region. Among these, South Asia is the worst hit. Evidently India, on account of its geographical setting, extent of territory, climatic and geological composition and especially due to its peninsular position is the worst affected theatre of disasters in the South Asian region. Of all its states and union territories, 22 are disaster-prone. Drought and floods, earthquakes and cyclones inflict tremendous destruction, with grim regularity year after year. They are spiralling out of control, increasing in frequency, causing more and more injury, disability, disease and

As observed, the decline in injuries, loss of livelihoods and deaths from disasters over the past 30 years is, in part, due to the introduction, use and upgradation of early warning systems. Recent advances in science and technology in forecasting techniques and the dissemination of information are major contributors. However, the development of a more people-centred approach is clearly essential to ensure that the warnings captured by satellites, computer modelling and other technologies reach the stakeholders and are acted upon. Natural disasters are very often called as the ‘Wrath of Almighty’. In

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Rajendra Prasad

reality, they are, to a large extent, the wrath of nature. At the same time, overwhelming tampering in the name of modernisation and development has exacerbated the wrath of nature. Consequently, ‘natural’ disasters are man-made to a startling degree. In India, for instance over the years, floods and droughts have compounded repeatedly by the uncontrolled felling and cutting of forests, severe harm to mountain ecology in Himalayas and other hilly tracts, excessive use of groundwater, changing patterns of farming and unplanned land acquisition and erratic development and industrialisation. When forests are destroyed, rainwater runs off, causing floods and diminishing the recharging of groundwater. The increase of landslides in the Himalayas in recent years can be largely ascribed to the uninterrupted deforestation and network of roads that have been indiscriminately constructed in the name of development.

Infrastructure It is by now a well-documented fact that man-made structures, including canals, dams and embankments, have worsened the flood situation in the country, very often as shown by the repeated flooding of Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh and many other parts. Gigantic dams also carry potential seismic threats. Despite these potential dangers, numerous dams, vulnerable to seismic activity, are being built in the Himalayan foothills. The Tehri dam, a major hydroelectric project faced stiff opposition from environmental activists and local people because it straddles the Central Himalayan Seismic Gap, forming a

Challenges and opportunities for India huge geologic fault tract. Any major earthquake in the region could inflict severe damages in the holy cities like Haridwar, Rishikesh and other mountain towns and contiguous areas.

Additionally, the big dams can exert excessive stresses on the fragile ecosystem of the Himalayas. India has learnt no lessons from the world’s most devastating reservoir-induced earthquake on December 10, 1967,

measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, which struck Koynanagar in Maharashtra, killing 200 people and injuring 1,500. The epicentre and aftershocks all were traced to the vicinity of the 103 m-high dam or under its reservoir.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

UNBRIDLED DEVELOPMENT?

Nature-displaced refugees

Man-made disasters

Land degradation, which today affects 175 million of India’s 329 million hectares, is also increasing because of uncontrolled development-oriented human activities and interventions. Natural grasslands are vanishing because of overgrazing. Water logging, salinisation, over-fertilisation and mining are degrading large tracts of land. The deleterious effects of these on human habitat have been seen largely observed in the western parts of Orissa where deforestation, mining and the decline of traditional irrigation and agricultural systems culminated in serious land degradation on a large scale, leading to one of the worst drought conditions in the country. This in turn leads to large-scale seasonal and permanent migration from rural areas to urban slums. More than 33 million people have been displaced by ‘development projects’ in India, which is three times higher than the number of conflict-induced Internally Displaced People worldwide.

In addition, India is overwhelmingly getting vulnerable to so many man-made disasters resulting from rapid industrialisation, especially nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) industrialisation, modern transportation paraphernalia, contagious diseases, over-crowding, communal riots, trans-national terrorism, etc. Particularly, beneath the expanding arena of information and communication technology and globalisation, the disastrous onslaught can be felt everywhere. In all probability, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) disasters could be very alarming, along with their far-reaching

when terrorists would opt for these deadly weapons to cause catastrophic scenarios. Having a nuclearised South Asia and the nexus between Pakistani and foreign jehadi elements, the danger of nuclear terrorism or the use of radiological ‘dirty bombs’ looms over the horizon. After the killing of Al Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden on Pakistan’s soil and reactionary terrorist trends with suicidal tendencies, the danger has compounded. The deep-rooted seeds of separatism and cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the nexus between organised crime and transnational terrorism in India’s north-east and expanding tentacles of Naxalism

Global warming The interventionist hand of humans can be seen in what has now emerged as an indomitable challenge – global warming – which has altered weather patterns and is bound to exacerbate natural disasters, coupled with the increasing scale and frequency of their occurrences. Findings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which has been established by the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme, show that the global average surface temperature increased by 0.6ºC over the course of the 20th century. Scientists have recorded the 1990s as the hottest decade in the world ever since the Industrial Revolution occurred. As a consequence of global warming, snow extent has decreased by about 10 per cent since the 1960s, while mountain glaciers have retreated rapidly. The global average sea level rose by 10 to 20 cm during the 20th century and the amount of heat stored in the ocean has measurably increased since observations began in the 1950s. In 21st century, consistent endeavours must be made at different levels to check global warming coupled with eco-friendly development.

consequences. The given figure is self-explanatory:

Looming terrorist menace Menacing monsters of indigenous and trans-national terrorism have caused enormous material losses and human victims in the past. Rapid scientific and technical advances are creating an ever increasing array of deadly agents of chemical and biological terrorist potentialities - a probability with rising hazards. It is simply a point of time

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

in its different parts have turned the spotlight on their potency to cause death and destruction. There can be other man-made disasters being germinated in the Indian soil indigenously. According to the report of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 21 states are under the threat of Naxalism, causing one of the most serious manmade challenges of a disastrous nature.

Underlying challenges Appreciating the critical situations

and the fact-sheet of the general impact of disasters, it is notable that in the social and economic sectors, disasters accelerate existing inequality and germinate potential sources of conflicts, including violent ones at different levels. They could catalyse regional political tensions and compound social grievances and dissonance. Disasters could induce resource scarcity and reinforce environmental security concerns. They could weaken popular legitimacy of the government in power and initiate the erosion of political authority. Disasters generate new political spaces and give rise to new local, regional and national political actors. In some cases, they could expose political institutions and cause national socio-political crisis. Disasters may challenge State sovereignty and cause distortions of alarming proportions. Compound disasters could complicate older territorial issues and exacerbate inter-State conflicts. Evidently, increasing urbanisation, rapid and uncontrolled development, climate change, habitation in vulnerable areas, especially low lying coastal regions and rising inequality can cause serious national / human security risks. It can cause increased risk of humanitarian agonies, prompt mass migration and unassimilated diasporas. Intense competition for all kinds of resources may increase social disorders and political instabilities. They could intensify changing demographic patterns and exacerbate transnational, inter-communal conflicts. They could cause imbalance in national planning, programming and budgeting priorities and participation in developmental activities. It is also important to note that post-disaster recovery interventions have high potential in transforming bilateral relations between different nations. Disasters may also create opportunity to facilitate relatively better dynamics for the germination of confidence building and cooperation amongst neighbouring States that have been in conflict since long.

mitigation. Mitigation is to be linked with development. Policy, framework and systems to be inter-linked. It has to be institutionalised and sustained as an integral part of national life. We need to evolve institutional framework for partnership with all stakeholders (State, household, community, corporations, market, civil society, regional and global agencies and other organisations, etc.) as insurance to disaster risk reduction and human security management in India. Nation-States across the globe can increase and multiply their core competencies and reduce their vulnerabilities through multi-dimensional development. Development planning provides the opportunities to individual governments to draft plans for mutual economic and social development. Over the years, the concept of sustainable development has been widely identified by international agencies and by governments as the consequence of comprehensive planning that integrates essential ingredients and considerations of disaster risk reduction (decreasing hazards and vulnerability) with the modus operandi and modus vivendi designed to protect the environment from the onslaughts of global warming and climate change and to promote economic growth, levels of education, living conditions and quality of life of the entire population on this Planet Earth. India has also embarked upon the path of such endeavours. Having passed the Disaster Management Act in 1995, India has already focused on the incorporation of disaster management in its mainstream development at the national, regional and local levels.

Retarded growth Disasters can retard the efficacy and range of resource allocation for the purposes of development. The damages inflicted by a disaster can be divided into four groups:

Development catalyst

■■ Loss of resources;

human

and

material

Concentrating on future opportunities and courses, we need a paradigm shift from reactive to pro-active. Relief activities are to be aimed at preparedness, prevention and

■■ Disruption of long-term, planned developmental programmes and diversion of many crucial resources to other, immediate or shorter-term requirements;

■■ Deleterious impacts investment milieu; and/or

upon

■■ Disruption of the non-formal sector (local transactions and businesses, etc.). Disasters inflict a particularly devastative economic impact on the communities in the affected areas in which there are limited alternatives for the protection or salvage of physical assets that are devastated or partly damaged or in areas in which the resources already are at critical points. Development processes can both increase and / or retard the vulnerability of a society to various hazards.

Marginalised first victims There are profoundly established linkages between poverty, marginalisation, over-population and vulnerability. To a large extent, vulnerability derives from poverty. The poor are more likely to live in vulnerable areas (slopes prone to landslides, flood plains, marginal agricultural land), have difficulty accessing education and information, have fewer assets to invest in resources to reduce vulnerability and are more prone to become malnourished and have chronic illnesses that predispose them to injury and death. Development may be associated with the production of new hazards accepted by a society because the perceived benefits of the development project far exceed the relative risk associated with the project. Therefore, risk assessments must be part of any programme planning and evaluation. Training and education are of critical importance in preventing increased vulnerability as a result of development strategies. Development also can progress in a manner that will result in mitigation of the impacts of an event on a given society (increase absorbing capacity and / or buffering capacity, elimination of hazards or the risk of them producing a disaster). Such mitigation measures can be either structural or non-structural. There exists a wide range of options for incorporating mitigation measures in development projects. The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

It needs to be put bluntly that it is the Constitutional responsibility of the military to participate in what is described as “aid to civil power”. One needs also to be aware that there has been a constatnt attempt to erode that responsibility. At least one top General has lost the opportunity to become Chief of Army Staff in part for his position on the “aid to civil power” issue. Because war is disaster management of a different kind, the armed forces of any nation should, for the same reason of pre-eminence on the battlefield, be the best equipped to handle disaster management. That is the reason why the Indian armed forces are the best equipped and the most capable of all the statal institutions in the country and that is why too they have played a pre-eminent role in ameliorating the miseries of people affected by the many different types of disasters that afflict this nation, almost simultaneously, over the ages. Differences of opinion over employment of armed forces in what is essentially a Constitutional requirement will be as disastrous as a tsunami.

Prof. Gopalji Malviya Dr. S. U. K. Jamadhagni

armed forces: pivotal role T

he geographical location of India in one of the most sensitive geological zones of the world, makes its tryst with natural disasters rather long and arduous. The Himalayan mountain ranges are one of the youngest fold mountains in the world, meaning there would be considerable tectonic activity between the plains and the mountains. Statistics show that nearly 65 per cent of India’s land area is earthquake prone. More than 70 per cent of agricultural land is susceptible to droughts, 12 per cent to floods and eight per cent to cyclones. The vast coastline of India is vulnerable to cyclones and storm surges. The loss of human life and extensive damage to property alone make naturally-occurring phenomena a disaster.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

In the light of the enormous contribution of the armed forces in countering disasters, it is felt that they now have to fulfill a logical task of guiding and assisting any national level management structure that deals with disasters. Disaster management plans for the present must also underline their contribution “so that the procedure for deploying them is smooth and quick”. Even if and when their operational services are replaced by the NDRF they must continue to provide strategic assistance. The Indian armed forces must be given a bigger role in planning for disasters and not only managing disasters after they have occurred Predilection Disasters rather than any other concern of national importance require a dedicated response as the magnitude of destruction due to disasters and the consequent effects are increasing day by day. Unchecked population growth, unplanned urbanisation and exploding populations sharing the same resources have accentuated our vulnerabilities to these disasters. The situation is complicated by the fact that India lacked at least until recently a comprehensive nationwide plan on disaster management and mitigation. According to the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2010, India has suffered from 416 disaster events in the period of 1980-2009 which has killed 1,41,888 people and affected 15,01,211 more resulting in an economic loss of US$ 51,64,506 million. Regular budgetary provision is only made to alleviate immediate losses which would typically take the form of humanitarian relief and early recovery and is not part of a comprehensive disaster risk financing strategy. India, for example, has a Calamity Relief Fund covering emergency repairs to approved items of physical infrastructure and statutory personal compensation.

GDP loss The floods in Leh in August last, the floods in Andhra, cyclone Laila in early 2010 and many other situations have warranted the continued support from all wings of the armed forces involved in rescue, relief distribution and reconstruction. The death toll in the Orissa cyclone, Mumbai floods, tsunami that struck the eastern shores of India and Andaman and Nicobar, the earthquake in Bhuj, Jammu and Kashmir resulted in enormous loss of life and property. In 2004, 2,50,000 persons were

reported killed by disasters – mostly from the Indian Ocean tsunami in December. Disasters affected 146 million people (mainly due to floods in Bangladesh, India and China) and inflicted an estimated damage of US$ 100-145 billion. In the decade from 1994-2003, ‘natural’ and technological disasters have claimed 68,671 Indian lives and have affected 68 million people annually. It is estimated that India is already suffering a loss of nearly 13 per cent of its GDP due to disasters. The rapid growth of our cities most of which lie either along the coasts or in the seismic zones has meant large-scale violation of building and infrastructure norms related to preventing disasters or calibrating them into construction plans. The unimaginable destruction of trees especially along the coasts for short-term economic benefits has spelt doom for coastal population as they have lost the protective covering or shields against the highly destructive tsunami and other sea surges. Lack of proper emergency facilities for huge populations, including, much of our poor and severe strain on existing public resources to tide over such calamities, make the situation much worse. In spite of the importance of the subject, it hardly finds mention in India’s policy annals. In fact, the Indian Constitution has no mention of disaster management or relief in its Seventh Schedule of Section III namely the concurrent list.

Military in disaster relief At times of crisis, the most dependable, most used governmental organisation in disaster relief is the armed forces. The role of armed forces in countering disasters is evident from the weightage given in the annual reports of the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces where, a separate

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

section is dedicated for aid to civilian authorities in which relief operations take a prominent role. This is indicative of the extent of armed forces involvement in recent times to help in disaster relief not only in India but even abroad. The dependence on the armed forces while principally is due to the discipline, dedication and organisational strength of the forces, is also because of the lack of any recognisable civil defence system. While such a system was in place during the World Wars, the practice has neither continued nor extended to include natural disasters after independence. Often natural calamities like floods, cyclones, famines and earthquakes witness the complete collapse of the local administrative machinery due to the sheer size of the tragedy and the acute lack of emergency response mechanisms and adequate resources. It is more often the people’s voluntary efforts that have saved the day rather than any well-thought-out management plan. Recent years have seen some very grave natural disasters that have called for tremendous effort from agencies that handle disaster relief. The floods in Leh in August 2010 proved a challenge as the area was cut off from the rest of the Jammu and Kashmir state leaving over 170 dead and thousands homeless. Nearly 7,000 soldiers were deployed for the rescue missions. Both the army, by way of the General Reserve Engineer Force helped re-establish communication links in and around Leh and the Air Force, by dropping food, drinking water and other aid materials and also rescuing people by airlifting them, contributed to the relief efforts.

Air-land operations Cyclone Laila which hit the Andhra

coast in May 2010 caused widespread damage to crops and inundated several villages resulting in deaths too. The army sent in nearly 300 personnel to east and west Godavari and Krishna districts. The Indian air force deployed 11 aircraft including ten AN-32s and an IL-76 aircraft as well as two Chetak and two MI-8 helicopters for rescue missions and to distribute food and other supplies. A naval team of 33 men with five Gemini boats helped in relief operations in the Narsapur area in west Godavari district. Two Dornier aircraft and two Chetak helicopters of the Coast Guard conducted sorties to trace the fishing vessels still out at sea.

hygiene facilities, shelter, restoration of power, water supply and the provision of rescue facilities, including diving equipment to meet any contingencies. The medical teams also had the task of preventing the spread of epidemics and diseases. Ships were converted into hospitals and military field hospitals were air transported.

Tri-Services relief effort

Overdependence

The tsunami relief effort of 2004 was perhaps “one of the biggest peacetime operations” to be ever undertaken by the tri-Services. India’s armed forces not only spearheaded relief operations within the country but also abroad and earned well-deserved appreciation. The Indian navy was the first relief organisation to reach the port of Galle in Sri Lanka within a few hours. India probably had the largest contingent of foreign armed forces with 2,000 naval personnel and five warships with a dozen helicopters involved in the relief work there. The Indian navy simultaneously conducted five missions including those in Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, employing 32 naval ships, seven aircraft and 20 helicopters. The main tasks of the navy included assuring supplies of food and safe drinking water, medical assistance, adequate sanitation and

The issue of involvement of armed forces in tasks other than traditional defence-related areas has been in the arena of debate for a long time. While it is agreed that the army must maintain cordial relations with the civilian administration and population in general and extend assistance in times of need, experts argue that repeated involvement of fighting forces to counter insurgency and other law and order situations leave alone relief operations is not advisable for a prolonged period of time due to its effect on the morale of the forces and the civil-military relations at the grassroots level.

In the wake of a disaster the civilian authorities formally requisition for units from the armed forces through the Ministry of Defence. Local commanders react immediately on humanitarian grounds at times even without waiting for formal orders.

While the armed forces are seen as non-partisan, effective and professional in approach, it is noted that in a situation like Kashmir, where a “prolonged low intensity conflict right on the border

with a country with which India has had a long history of conflict poses special challenges to civil-military co-ordination”, like the psychological fallout of such an engagement manifest in the significant lowering of the morale of the uniformed services. This was observed in the Kargil Committee report that looked at the reforms needed to shape up the fighting forces. The Kargil Review Committee in its report of February 2000 pointed to the lack of training, organisation and equipment of the paramilitary and central police forces in dealing with trans-border terrorism. This has led to increased dependence on the military reducing it to a paramilitary force and that of the paramilitary forces, in turn, to the level of an ordinary police force.

Judicious use In the context of disaster relief too, though the involvement of the armed forces is accepted, it is felt that the function of the uniformed Services must be kept to the minimum. One former Chief of Army Staff, opposed the prolonged deployment of the army in disaster relief and called state governments to play a more important role. In his address to a seminar on “Disaster Management and the Armed Forces – A National Effort”, organised by the Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch at Army Headquarters and Institution of Engineers, Delhi State Centre, he opined that “The state governments must carry out relief in a systematic way. Unfortunately, once the (media) cameras are switched off, people are left to fend for themselves. The bulk

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

deployment of army in disaster relief works must be stopped in a fortnight’s time and it may not be used for menial tasks.” He further suggested that chemical and such other industries could be associated with the Territorial Army and separate battalions could be raised for disaster management. While the wisdom in using armed forces for disaster relief is still being discussed, the armed forces of India have performed an admirable feat in administering relief to even the remotest parts of affected areas. Though disaster mitigation and prevention are now occupying centrestage in the process of managing disasters, the armed forces are still being called upon time and again as the first rapid action force that deals with the actual issue of post-disaster relief. This means that with the increase in the number of disasters that affect national life annually, there has been a proportional rise in the frequency of employment of the uniformed forces in tackling the situation. With amazing efficiency, utmost dedication and zealous drive the Services have contributed immensely in providing succour and immediate relief to the people affected by natural disasters.

Repositories of capabilities The characteristics of organisational strength, resourcefulness, discipline and national spirit place the armed forces in the optimal position to execute relief missions with absolute ease and reliability. The long years of experience in dealing with disasters make the Services the most appropriate choice to provide immediate amelioration to the victims. The very fact that no major epidemic has hampered any of the post disaster operations in recent times is a testimony to the accuracy involved in their work. Also the havoc caused by the tsunami in the tri-Service command centre in the Andaman Islands is a reminder that even the armed forces could be a victim of such natural calamities. Not only in India but even in countries like the United States, it is felt that coordination with civilian authorities is an issue, in spite of the fact that the role of the military in leading relief efforts is appreciated.

Designated authority The role of the armed forces in alleviating the suffering of millions of people is to be acknowledged. But it does not warrant the dedication of separate units catering only to disaster relief, principally because disaster relief does not form the core of the duty of the armed forces but rather an obligation to the human society at large. In the age of revolution in military affairs and a slim and trim armed force any augmentation is viewed to be expensive and unnecessary. The field experts also point to various practical difficulties in the choice of the area of stationing such troops, the amount of equipment they would require and the fact that since disasters strike a very wide area, troops cannot be present at all probable points. Special equipment is needed when undertaking relief operations which require additional financial and technical support. Also, the sheer nature of disasters makes it impossible to train people for each one of them. Already different arms of the Services are looking after different types of disasters. The main role of the armed forces is in the fields of communications, search and rescue operations, health and medical facilities, transportation, power, food and civil supplies, public works and engineering, especially in the immediate aftermath of disaster. In fact the role is so vital that the Tenth Plan document of the Indian Government calls for a multi-level integration of the armed forces into the planning mechanism when it calls for an “Integrated planning for disasters, including the integration of relevant Armed Forces formations into disaster management planning at all levels from District to State and Central Government”.

Reorganisation After the series of recent natural disasters the government has paid heed to such recommendations. It is only after the Bhuj earthquake that India has drafted a Disaster Management Act in 2005 that puts in place a separate authority in charge of this. The Act constituted a planned organisational structure called the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that seeks to coordinate and make plans to

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

face disasters better. This governmental effort aims to involve the grass-root level institutions as well as the highest decision-making bodies of the country in the mammoth task.

active role in disaster management planning. This could also be seen as an indication of the health of the bureaucracy-armed forces relations in India.

The NDMA has the responsibility for laying down the policies and plans for disaster management. The Authority approves the National Disaster Management Plan. It lays down guidelines to be followed by ministries and aepartments of the central government and any state authority in drawing up the state plan.

Search and rescue, emergency relief, post-disaster relief and rehabilitation form the four main stages of disaster management. To analyse India’s case, two other rather more important factors have to be taken into account. First, the armed forces have acquired additional capabilities and gained experience far greater than any other single organisational unit within India making them the logical organisation for disaster rescue and emergency relief. With their emergency handling capabilities, the Services can reach any place to rescue people caught in a disaster situation. The same capability can also reach specialised equipment very rapidly where it is needed. The Services have all the communication capability needed and servicemen are ready to move at an hour’s notice.

The Authority coordinates the enforcement and implementation of the policies and plans for disaster management and arranges for and oversees the provision of funds for mitigation measures, preparedness and response. The Authority also takes such measures for prevention of disaster, of mitigation of its effects, or for preparedness and capacity building for dealing with a threatening disaster situation or disaster. Apart from the help during the post-disaster period, the Army’s expertise also lies in ‘advocacy planning’ in disaster preparedness specifically. In advocacy planning, the planning team acts as catalytic agents, presenting choices to various organisations like local self-government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations, while seeking support for that approach which seems to bring most benefits to a wide range of beneficiaries at a cost that is affordable. Through Advocacy planning the armed forces can assist in preparing the management machinery to analyse options, administer relief more effectively; allocate responsibilities; generate public awareness and assess the task later.

Yen for top spot The National Disaster Management Authority previously had a retired former Chief of Army Staff as the Deputy Chairman. However now, the only member of the NDMA with any defence forces connection is a serving Major General from the Army Medical Corps for his expertise in radiation related medical work. This indicates a neglect of the armed forces from a more

Secondly, till the formation of the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) in November 2010, there has been no alternative government organisation or unit that has been created for the specific purpose of managing disasters while the administrative structure has only recently been agreed upon. The NDRF that would ‘mount a professional response during disasters’, consists of nine battalions of the central paramilitary forces drawn from BSF, ITBP, CRPF and CISF that would be stationed at nine locations across India. The optimal utilisation of this newly formed mechanism would take time. While it should be agreed that the burden of post-disaster relief must be lifted off the shoulders of India’s armed forces, the experience of handling reconstruction and rehabilitation, so vital to post-disaster life, can never be discounted. Given the expertise and success of the Indian armed forces in helping the country face disasters there needs to be an expansion of the role of the three Services in governmental organisations that aim at mitigating disasters to a great extent including the recently established National Disaster Management Authority. The above discussion delineates the idea that the armed forces should

form an indelible part of any disaster management plan that the country envisages.

Pivotal role Relief and rehabilitation are the principal concerns in the period immediately after a disaster strikes. These also need to reach the affected people at the earliest. The response mechanism must operate with utmost alertness and be ever active. Our armed forces fulfill these requirements. Hence they are often the first to be called upon to assist the civil administration to evacuate and shift people to safer places; rescue stranded people; set up relief camps; distribute essential commodities and restore communication, roads and bridges among other things. In India, the men in uniform have played a vital role during disaster emergencies providing prompt relief to the victims even in the most inaccessible and remote areas of the country. In fact, armed forces have “an impeccable record of rising to the occasion”. The organisational strength of the armed forces including their disciplined and systematised approach, together with their skills in technical and human resource management make them indispensable for such emergency situations. While separate governmental mechanisms for disaster management should be welcomed these alone would not suffice. Together with the government’s efforts, initiatives like the Chennai Vision Document on the Strategic Approach to Surveillance Technologies and Responsive Action or SASTRA 2009, would provide helpful

policy guidelines from the other stakeholders in shaping a practical and much needed plan to further the attempts that have already begun. The uniformed Services are best placed in furthering such goals be they governmental or otherwise. In the light of the enormous contribution of the armed forces in countering disasters, it is felt that they now have to fulfill a logical task of guiding and assisting any national level management structure that deals with disasters. Disaster management plans for the present must also underline their contribution “so that the procedure for deploying them is smooth and quick”. Even if and when their operational services are replaced by the NDRF they must continue to provide strategic assistance. The Indian armed forces must be given a bigger role in planning for disasters and not only managing disasters after they have occurred, in the light of their single-handed success in alleviating the suffering of many millions of Indians who have faced disasters. Prof. Gopalji Malviya is Head, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Channai. His areas of specialisation include Sino-Indian Relations, Peace and Security in South Asia and Comprehensive Security Issues. He is also Research Advisor to National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. Dr. S. Utham Kumar Jamadhagni is Asst. Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chennai. His areas of interest are Strategic Dimensions of Indo-US Relations, Maritime Security Issues and Conflict Resolution. He is visiting faculty at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

SAVING LIVES

The threats have, by and large, become known and have been identified. It is the means of handling them that requires concentrated national effort. Increasingly technical means are becoming available for ‘sniffing out’ the presence of chemical, biological and radiation agents. It needs hardly be emphasised that there is no antidote for an attack by nuclear weapons except an assurance of mutual destruction if any side chose to take the initiative. It is, all said and done, an increasingly dangerous world.

t is common knowledge that disaster is an unexpected, catastrophic event bringing enormous damage, loss, destruction and devastation to life and both public and private property. This loss and damage could happen because of both natural and human-made events. The most critical aspect of any disaster is that all communities are vulnerable to disasters. The exact nature and the extent of the disaster would decide its influence on human beings. The damage cost of the disaster also depends on the nature of physical property and population density of the disaster struck area. Disasters leave a

significant ‘mark’ on the affected area and at times also influence a wider area, mainly depending on the exact type of the tragedy. Various natural or human-made calamities mainly influence economy and physical well-being of population. They also influence the mental, cultural, social and political makeup of the affected population.

Mission In present times, both the asymmetric threats to security and the increasing activity of disasters probably owing to climate change are increasing the

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

requirement of disaster management system several-fold. This process of ‘crisis management’ is a dynamic process. It involves organising, reacting, recovering and mitigating any ‘crisis’ situation. The entire process is aimed at saving valuable human lives, lives of animals and any loss to property and critical infrastructure. Earthquakes, tsunami, cyclones and floods are commonly known natural disasters. However, there are some disasters which happen mainly because of human-made acts. On occasions industrial disasters do happen due to accidents or in response to any

CBRN threats

large-scale natural disaster. Amongst various disasters, CBRN (ChemicalBiological-Radiological-Nuclear) disaster is one disaster which is gaining lot of international attention. This is one of the highly unpredictable disasters capable of causing widespread losses to humans, infrastructure and environment. The impact of this disaster is expected to be long-lasting particularly for the health of humans and environment.

WMDs Since World War II, the world is in the grip of WMDs (Weapons of Mass

Destruction are the CBRN weapons) threat. Amongst these, the threat from nuclear weapons or nuclear terrorism is one of the most discussed threats for many years. This essentially happens because the world has witnessed the impact of nuclear weapons during the World War II. The relevance of nuclear technology from the point of view of energy, military and power portrayal is far greater than ownership of chemical or biological technology / weapons. However, the world also understands that the impact from any significant chemical or biological threat cannot be taken casually. The extent of damage from CBRN threats could

Dr. Ajey Lele

be significant and more importantly is not easily quantifiable. In view of this it is important to factor in the CBRN disaster mitigation and disaster preparedness, in the country’s public policy organisation. Recently, the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant crisis has sent shock waves around the world. This accident along with the Three Mile Island incidence and Chernobyl crisis highlights the quantum of danger from any such accidents. It is important to note that along with bringing in various safety measures in regard to nuclear energy industry it is also important

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disaster management

SAVING LIVES

to upgrade the disaster management plans based on the lessons learned from such incidences.

Scenarios The CBRN threat is diverse in nature. It could happen because of the acts of terrorists or industrial accidents or due to natural disasters. There also exists a danger that some religious cult or disgruntled scientific community could carry out a CBRN attack. The world officially permits few States to possess nuclear weapons and there are few other States also in possession of nuclear weapons. Hence, there exists a danger of world witnessing a nuclear attack and the magnitude of this is expected to be of much higher degree than any non-State attack. A possibility exists that few States could even covertly undertake a chemical or biological attack or may even help non-State actors to do so. Till date no major CBRN terrorist attacks have taken place. This could be because, such a non-conventional terrorist attack is a very difficult operation, considering the knowledge and materials required. However, this does not guarantee that it will not happen in the future. Also, the nature of terrorism is changing fast and few terrorist organisations appear to have reached the level of desperation. Any disaster management planning has to cater for these realities.

Vulnerabilities Disasters like Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant accident, Bhopal Gas Disaster in India, SARS outbreak in China or cases of bird flu / E-Coli spread across Asia / Europe should form the basis for any disaster management plan in regards to CBRN disaster management. CBRN mitigation involves addressing both natural and man-made hazards. Firstly, it is important to fully understand the nature of the threat, as the CBRN threats in reality could vary between locations. Vulnerability assessment is also important for formulating any plans. A CBRN attack can cause mass destruction, either natural or created, through chemical and biological agents, radioactive isotopes or nuclear bombs. It is also important to understand that nuclear and radiological threats belong to same family while nature

of both chemical and biological threat is different. Appreciating these basic nuances, all over the world, the issues related to nuclear, chemical and biological threats are discussed together because many commonalities exist amongst them from science to policy to disaster management.

emergencies. Currently, investments are being made towards development of technology of detection systems capable of improving functionality (improved sensitivity as well as greater selectivity) and performance (particularly the portability) of such systems.

Universality of danger

Disaster-specific

Historically, CBRN concept has evolved as a pure military-related concept from weaponisation to development of the defensive mechanism. All these years various armies have developed plans for defending themselves from any CBRN attack. In the 21st century, the nature of security threats have evolved beyond military dimension and in this era of asymmetric warfare the common man faces similar risks as that of soldiers on the borders of the nation-States. Hence, any disaster-level response mechanism needs to be developed by learning from the experiences gained by the armed forces.

New technologies are being developed to provide accurate and precise information to the agencies regarding such disasters so that appropriate action could be taken before an incidence occurs and the disaster has struck. Amongst various detection systems the systems for chemical, nuclear and radiological detection are almost foolproof. However much needs to be done in the field of biological detection. Also for all CBRN detection systems what is important is to develop systems capable of performing real time or near real time detection.

Preparation to handle CBRN disasters involves analysis of the nature of the threat and creating infrastructure to address such threat. The infrastructure creation involves various issues from policy formulation to training the responders. The overall process should involve development of mechanisms for both defence and detection. Decontamination of the CBRN hazard is also an important part of this process.

Five processes The overall CBRN disaster management planning should involve five processes namely prevention, detection, defence, decontamination and damage control. At global level many individual and collaborative efforts are being made towards the development of various anti-CBRN technologies and equipment. Along with governments various private industries are also making investments towards developing various technologies to address this issue. Standard protective equipment like suits, boots, masks, goggles etc. are being used while dealing with any CBRN emergency. Detection equipment like scanners, sensors, air sampling systems etc. are also available with various agencies handling such

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

Decontamination is another major issue which any disaster management agency has to handle. It involves various facets from individual safety to area decontamination. Individual decontamination is necessary when a person visits an infected area. It is also important to carry out decontamination of the protective clothing of the individuals involved in disaster management. There are systems available like individual showers - a highly mobile shower system supplied with an enclosed shower tray. The lid of the container is used for pre-decontamination for boots and shoes, while the bottom is used as the main shower tray. Hazmat (hazardous materials) suits along with breathing equipment are worn by specialists cleaning up contaminated facilities, toxic spills or bio-contaminated area. Hazmat vehicles are available to carry out area decontamination.

UAVs as sentinels Developed countries have developed biological sentinel (bio-watch) systems. It also includes stand-off biological perimeter monitor systems. Aerosol sampling and analysis is carried out to collect and identify very small particles from air which if contaminated could enter the lungs of the people and affect them. Even small unmanned vehicles (UAVs) with appropriate sensors on

board are put in use for identification of the danger and some UAVs / manned aircrafts (spraying equipment on board) are also put in use to carry out decontamination.

Awareness campaigns Education, training and capacity development at various levels is an important aspect of CBRN disaster management architecture. Awareness generation is another vital obligation of any disaster management system. It is also important to emphasise that any disaster management system should be a proactive system and should work towards consciousness generation in a significant way. Modern tools like operational research, modelling and simulation techniques should be used both for training as well as planning. Vaccination is an important aspect in regards to any biological disaster. It may not be possible to keep large dosages of vaccines ready for any eventuality. However, it is required to have a well established vaccine research, development and production centres available to address any disasters. Presently information technologies like web enabled GIS technology are being put in use for emergency preparedness and disaster management. Pharmacists also can contribute in administration of CBRN emergencies both directly and indirectly. They could strengthen the capacities and capabilities of various agencies related directly or indirectly to the health sector.

NDMA mandate In India, CBRN disaster management

issues are mainly the mandate of the National Disaster Management Authority. They have developed a reasonably well structured system involving emergency response and operating procedures. NDMA has asked the Union Home Ministry to raise eight ( sanction for ten ) battalions (one battalion to have 1,158 personnel) to tackle natural disasters and combat nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Four battalions will gain expertise only in nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Each battalion is to provide eighteen self-contained specialist search and rescue teams of forty-five personnel each including engineers, technicians, electricians, dog squads and medical / paramedics. These battalions are deployed in strategic locations under the supervision of the director-general of civil defence. For nuclear disasters the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police have specific roles identified from training to disaster handling. Issues like response by hospitals, trained medical staff etc. are being worked out. Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratories like Defence Research and Development Establishment, Gwalior; Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences, New Delhi and Defence Laboratory, Jodhpur have specific charters related to CBRN issues. Indian armed forces also have their own establishments to cater for NBC issues.

Handling panic It is important to appreciate that any CBRN disaster would also generate a

major panic reaction in the targeted population. It would be important to control such situations too because it could have a major impact on the overall management of the disastrous situation. It would be important to manage media (both electronic and print) effectively to control such situation. In India issues like the proximity to the sea in respect of nuclear sites needs to be addressed effectively. In regards to any likely spread of communicable diseases, the large population of India is going to be a major problem. India needs to import modern technology available with few western countries. Also, there is a need to invest more in chemical and biological emergencies. There is a requirement to have mobile detection systems that are ready for immediate deployment. In the 21st century, the CBRN threats could originate from various quarters. It is essential to have structures available to address such threats at all levels including contingency planning. The after-effects of any CBRN attack / accident would be extremely disastrous. CBRN disaster management should not be treated a responsibility of any single disaster management agency alone. Government, NGOs, civil society and defence organisations all have a role to play towards the CBRN disaster management. The writer is a research fellow at IDSA, New Delhi. He has done his PhD in International Relations from JNU, New Delhi. His areas of interest include issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) Non-Military Threats and Strategic Technologies. He has recently authored a book titled ‘Strategic Technologies for the Military’.

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disaster management

RADIATION EMERGENCIES

Understanding the nature of radiation and creating antidotes for treatment is still a work-in-progress. Japan with its experience of being bombed with nuclear weapons and involved in civil engineering security in an endemically seismic environment is the best placed in terms of experience in matters nuclear. However, India has in the Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences - a Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratory - a core group involved in the detection and treatment of the nuclear aspects of CBRN attacks and incidents.

he pursuit of nuclear energy for human application began soon after the discovery of X- rays in 1895. Nuclear technology was first developed in 1940s and during the Second World War research was initially focused on producing bombs by splitting the atoms. In the 1950s attention turned to the peaceful uses of nuclear fission, notably for power generation. There are now over 440 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries providing 14 per cent of the world’s electricity requirement. However, eminent use of nuclear energy in diversified fields and the risk of enhanced threat of terrorism have increased the probability of detonation of nuclear weapons and dispersal of radioactivity, resulting in mass casualties.

Nuclear weapons In 1945, for the first time atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, resulting in large-scale death due to acute radiation sickness, burns and other injuries. The worst nuclear accident to date was the Chernobyl disaster that occurred on 26 April 1986 in Ukraine. The disaster began during a systems test leading to steam explosions and fire causing meltdown and releasing massive quantities of radioactivity into the atmosphere. More than five million people received low whole-body doses of radiation and about 1,000 emergency workers received the highest doses of radiation and some of them were fatal. Other serious nuclear accidents include Kyshtym, Russia, 1957, Windscale, UK, 1957, Three Mile Island in US 1979, Sellafield, UK, 2005, Atucha, Argentina, 2005. In India also, there was a radiological accident in April 2010, which was basically due to Cobalt 60 exposure. The radiation source was purchased about four decades ago for academic purposes in Delhi University. By thinking that the source had lived its active life, the lead container with the source was sold to a scrap dealer. The dealer unknowingly dismantled the container. As a consequence, around 8-10 workers were exposed to fractured doses of gamma radiation. Recently in March, 2011, 9.0 magnitude earthquake triggered tsunami in Fukushima, Japan, causing damage to nuclear power plants resulting in leakage of nuclear material for many days even after the accident.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

Biodosimetry:

An effective tool

Dr. Manju Lata Gupta

Savita Verma

Radiation accidents The occurrence of such nuclear and radiological emergencies essentially need individual, early and definite information on radiation dose assessment. In case of accidental exposure physical and biodosimetry is used to assess the amount of radiation in air as well as the radiation dose received by the individuals. Biodosimetry helps in quick segregation of exposed individuals from unexposed population and also supports in medical management of radiation victims. Appropriate medical intervention and intensive care may enhance the rate of survival.

Long-term effect A potential biomarker has to have certain characteristics such as: a) low inter-individual variation, b) minimum time taken in appearance, c) applicable in mass exposure scenario, d) significantly sensitive in case of mild, moderate and severe radiation exposures, e) involvement of minimally critical technologies and f) use of scientifically proven assays. Typical symptoms of radiation poisoning commence soon after radiation exposure depending upon individual radiation sensitivity, type of radiation and the radiation dose absorbed. Severity of the prodromal stage symptoms like nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, anorexia, elevated core body temperature etc., may provide valuable information regarding the absorbed dose range.

Catalyst to measure radiation 1. Blood cell count is a widely accepted radiation absorbed dose estimate and has been implemented meaningfully almost after every nuclear exposure whether accidental or therapeutic. Symptoms of hematopoietic syndrome start appearing when absorbed radiation dose is equal to or more than 01Gy. Occurrence of mild cytopenia indicates absorbed dose of less than 02Gy. Up to 50 per cent fall in Total Leukocytes Counts (TLC) within first 24 hours of exposure, followed by a further decline within 48 hours, predicts a potentially lethal exposure. Application range of this assay is estimated 01-10Gy.

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disaster management

RADIATION EMERGENCIES Radiation associated life threatening injuries

Dose Prodromal effects range (Gy) 1-2 Mild (up to 48 hours)

2-6

Mild to moderate (up to 24 hours)

6-8

Severe (within hours)

8-30

>30

Mortality

Decrease in blood cell counts

Only 0-5 per cent death within 6-8 weeks 10-100 per cent death within 4-6 weeks 95-100 per cent death within 2-4 weeks 100 per cent death within 2 days2 weeks

Mild to severe bone marrow damage, leucopenia, fatigue, weakness

Hemorrhage, blood cells depletion, infections, epilation, intestinal damage, weakness etc. Severe (within few hours) Severe leucopenia, high fever, diarrhoea, vomiting, dizziness, hypotension, electrolytes loss, combined gastrointestinal and bone marrow damage Severe (within minutes) Gastrointestinal, neurological and cardiovascular damage

Data on blood cell kinetics can be automatically generated within very short time period, with less than 100ul of blood and in large number of subjects. Since this assay gets activated in other disease forms also, therefore, it is suggested that this parameter should be used along with other sensitive biomarkers for radiation dose estimation. 2. Cytogenetic biodosimetry: Radiation exposure causes damage to DNA and in the process various kinds of symmetrical and asymmetrical changes appear at chromosomal level. Asymmetrical changes such as dicentrics, tricentrics and rings and symmetrical changes like inversions and translocations provide valuable information about absorbed radiation dose and it’s after-effects. Cytogenetic biodosimetry is internationally accepted assay for radiation dose estimation and provides individual dose assessment depending on frequency of specific type of chromosomal aberrations. 2A. Dicentric assay: A gold standard for radiation biodosimetry. Dicentrics count, a cytogenetic biomarker, has been assessed for decades to measure accidental radiation dose. In this assay, phyto-heamagglutinin activated lymphocytes are arrested at metaphase and chromosome spreads are analysed for the presence of

Associated symptoms

chromosomes with two centromeres instead of one. The frequency of dicentrics following radiation exposure remains stable upto few weeks. For rapid triage, only 50 metaphase plates are essential to be scored. Number of dicentrics per 50/100 cells shows direct relationship with the absorbed dose of radiation. Application range of this assay has been estimated as 01-05Gy. Automated metaphase finders have decreased the time spent in scoring metaphases to a significant extent. Automation of sample preparation, under investigation, would be useful in a casualty situation involving large number of victims. In support of using dicentrics as standard biodosimeter, large number of international data has been published by world renowned scientists. 2B. Micronuclei: Are fragments or whole chromosomes, which are unable to reach to the spindle poles during mitosis and remained encapsulated at telophase in the daughter nuclei. Analysis of micronuclei in cytokinesis-blocked binucleated cells is an easy and fast procedure and has been suggested as an alternative method to detect chromosome alterations induced by ionising radiation even at very low doses of radiation. The assay is however, comparatively less sensitive than dicentric assay but is useful when large population is

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

100 per cent death within 1-2 days

exposed during radiation catastrophe, as scoring of micronuclei is much easier as compared to dicentrics. 2C. Premature chromosome condensation: This technique enables direct observation of radiation induced chromosome damage in non-stimulated interphase human peripheral blood lymphocytes. PCC is the technique developed to overcome the apprehension related to non-availability of significant number of cells surviving after 2-3 mitotic divisions due to severe damage to genetic material. This technique allows the chromatin to condense when it is not in mitosis and which can be achieved by fusing interphase cells to Chinese hamster ovary or by chemical induction like okadaic acid or calyculin A. PCC, offers several advantages for biodosimetry particularly in case of radiation emergency or partial body exposures and also to overcome the apprehensions related to non-availability of significant number of surviving cells due to severely damaged DNA resulting into loss of cells during successive mitotic divisions. This is very promising biodosimeter and can measure even life threatening doses of radiation exposure (upto 20Gy). 2D. Fluorescent in situ hybridisation (FISH) assay: Due to unavoidable

circumstances if the bio-dosimetry could not be performed immediately after radiation accident, it can be done later on by using fluorescence in-situ hybridisation (FISH) technique. Reciprocal translocations being relatively stable, can be used successfully for retrospective dosimetry by using chromosome-specific DNA libraries. In this technique individual chromosome is labelled using chromosome specific fluorescent DNA probe. Application range of this assay is estimated at 0.3-04 Gy. However, this technique too has certain limitations for practical usage such as cost and time involved. 3. Electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) assay: This technique detects and quantifies unpaired electrons generated by exposure to ionising radiation. Concentration of these radicals increases with the increase in radiation dose. Intensity of EPR absorption indicates radiation absorbed dose. However, the changes measured by this method provide the information about external exposure but not the internal. In non-aqueous media including teeth, bone, fingernails and hair radiation, induced signals can be extremely stable. With this technique persistent free radicals formed in solid matrix of accidentally exposed victim can easily be detected and accurately estimated immediately or even many years after exposure. In some circumstances, certain clothing material, particularly hard plastics and buttons may be measured for absorbed dose estimation. 4. Glycophorin A (GPA) assay: The GPA alleles encode the cell surface proteins that determine the M and N blood group antigens. This assay is performed by two-colour immunofluorescence flow cytometry on peripheral blood erythrocytes. Estimation of absorbed radiation is based on measuring N/0 variants of erythrocytes displaying phenotype consistent with loss of expression of GPA (M) allele. However, this technique is applicable only for those individuals (approximately half of population) who are heterozygous at the locus that codes for the N/M blood group antigens. Methodology is prompt but requires complex and expensive equipment. Detection limit ranges from 0.5-5Gy. This assay was successfully used in human population exposed to radiation at

Chernobyl and Goiania.

to the field trials.

Upcoming biodosimeters

Molecular markers due to their specific features such as minimal inter-individual variation, long stability, dose dependency, non-expressive with other insults (chemical and biological), noninvasive detection (buccal mucosa, hair follicles, semen, urine, faecal matter etc.), once established, probably will have long lasting future as most potential bio-dosimeter. These markers are usually non-expresive to other stresses (chemical or biological agents).

Metabolites: Metabolites are valuable markers of radiation toxicity. Proteins obtained by using non-invasive (urine) or semi-invasive (blood) collection methods are analysed by using immunodetection techniques. Rise in the serum amylase level has been proved to be a unique biochemical indicator of radiation injury. Flt3-ligand (Flt3-L), a hematopoietic cytokine, is found to be increased in the individuals exposed to radiation. This marker can be estimated by quantitative sandwich enzyme immunoassay. Gamma H2AX: Ionising radiation causes phosphorylation of histone H2AX ((γ-H2AX) that always follows DNA double-strand break induction which assay may serve as rapid tool in radiation emergencies. As of now this marker has been reported for its highest sensitivity only at early time points (upto 48 hrs). However, in order to use γ-H2AX as a quick screening tool, it has yet to be optimised for sensitivity and rapidity. Considering the estimation of thousands of samples/day, global efforts to develop fully automated ultra-high throughput workstation using purpose-built robotics and advanced high-speed automated image acquisition are in progress. Molecular markers: Nucleic acid marker such as decrease in the level of p53BP1 DNA repair protein in response to increase of gamma radiation dose, has also been reported as an efficient biomarker for the detection of double-stranded DNA breaks. The cell triggers multiple pathways to repair the damage caused by ionising radiation. As a consequence many post-translational modifications occur in the cell. Various proteins such as CDKN1A (Cell cycle inhibition), BAX (Pro apoptotic), Bcl2 (anti-apoptotic), GADD45A and DDB2 (DNA repair), Cxcl10 (cell proliferation) and immune response proteins are under thorough evaluation. These markers reflect underlying damage at cellular and sub-cellular levels resulting in severe changes in gene expression profile leading to the modification of certain key proteins. This approach, however is still in its nascent stage and needs in-depth endeavour to reach

We, at INMAS, have had practical exposure of conducting radiation biodosimetry during Chernobyl reactor accident in 1986, Mayapuri radiation leak in 2010 and Fukushima reactor accident in 2011. In all the three accidents radiation exposed persons were evaluated for their radiation exposure at INMAS. In these cases dicentric assay, micronuclei, γ-H2AX, blood cell counts were successfully correlated to evaluate radiation absorbed dose. Biodosimetry, particularly in case of mass exposure where handling of large population, using multi-parametric approach and helping clinicians without losing valuable time is essential, requires an urgent attention. Need of automation in samples preparation and their evaluation is predominantly important. This will not only support the clinicians in making quick decisions related to medical treatment plan but also significantly reduce the probability of human errors. As far as Indian strength in the field of biodosimetry is concerned it certainly demands enormous efforts. Combining dispersed ends from government and private sectors including academia and medical institutions is explicitly needed. To have effective output an interactive network between expert laboratories along with assistance of clinical laboratories as satellite scoring centres is immensely important. Wherever required international agencies may be consulted.

The writers are scientists in the Radioprotective Drug Development group, Division of Radiation Biosciences, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) Delhi, India.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

SCANTY PROTECTION

With Pakistan Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani under siege from the jihadis within the armed forces the man with the finger on the nuclear button can change in the blink of an eye. The next Pakistan army chief could be a man with no compunction about mass murder and the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Pakistan arsenal. It could be all over for India in less than ten minutes because the first nuclear explosion will destroy all communications systems and make it difficult, if not impossible, to launch the promised “massive retaliation”.

he term disaster which originated from the French word disastre, is defined as a crisis which outstrips the capacity of a society to manage it, resulting in the colossal loss of life and property. Over the years, India has been witnessing the horrendous spectacle of disasters in one form or other such as plague, floods, fire, cyclones, landslides, drought, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and so on. In fact, quite a few regions are prone to locational disasters year after year with no permanent relief measures available to the affected population of such areas. Tonnes of money and material are pumped into those areas for providing relief to the people which seldom reaches the needy. The practice is repeated with sickening regularity and no lessons learnt.

The big lesson Disaster management is a specialised task. Just as the period of peace is also the time for the preparation of war, the same holds good for disaster management too. It involves a systematic observation and planned measures relating to disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation, emergency response, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Surely it cannot be handled in a ham-handed and misguided fashion, it should neither be made hostage to the event nor played to the galleries. The Gujarat earthquake was a natural disaster. But the resultant loss of death and destruction of man and material could be equated to the dropping of an atom bomb. The big lesson we could learn from the catastrophe is to prepare for the scenario when our adversary may choose to be adventurist. Have we calculated the reaction time from this sordid event since we have indoctrinated ourselves to the “No First Strike’, position on the nuclear front?

Nuclear threat It will be interesting to know that while the distance between New York and Moscow and New York – Beijing as crow flies is 4063 and 5946 nautical miles respectively; the distance between New Delhi and Islamabad and New Delhi – Beijing is 368 and 2043 nautical miles. In fact, India and Pakistan are the only two warring nations in the world which are neighbours and nuclear weapon power countries. Even though, India claims to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the Chinese nukes, the defined threat is more from Pakistan. Looking at the distance involved, there certainly will not be much reaction time. The development of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan is the latest in the series. While the internal turmoil in Pakistan raises doubts of those being produced indigenously, who then could be the probable suppliers of such short nukes. Until now, the United States has been the only country which has proclaimed assets of both strategical and tactical weapons. Again, US has also launched tirade against non-State actors for gaining access to nuclear weapons. But the use of fresh

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

tactical nuclear warhead controversy by Pakistan has certainly raised eyebrows. Amazingly, any strong reaction from the United States is still awaited.

No first use? Keeping in view our history of salvaging disasters, India needs to be very concerned about the risk of Pakistan using small nukes against it. It further pushes the country to review its ‘no first use policy’. It should be extended to the use of any tactical weapons either conventional or nuclear by the adversary. Any nuclear attack on India tactical or strategical by Pakistan must be answered in the severest of terms and this must be conveyed quite loud and clear. Arguing further on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, it may be underlined that US has a history of using such weapons against Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq despite its otherwise sensitivity towards NPT. The blatant use of Depleted Uranium by the United States which is abundantly made available free of cost to armament corporations is extensively dense and has a property to penetrate armour very easily. For instance, during Operation Desert Storm, the US had used 9,40,000 uranium bullets and 14,000 DU rounds of shells with no concern for health and environment. Further, nearly 60,000 lbs of DU dust is lying in the open in Iraq and Afghanistan with a shelf life of 2.5 million years capable of causing diseases like cancer, genetic mutation, heart diseases, diabetes, pulmonary, chronic fatigues, obesity and deformation of various kinds. While whole of South Asian countries are getting affected by the radiation effects of DU, the flying distance between Amritsar and Kabul is less than an hour.

Bhopal gas paradigm The country has still not wriggled out of 1984 chemical gas leak of Bhopal and rather than fighting and addressing such serious issues, there is a tendency of deflection say by asking for the recall of Mr. Anderson after 27 years, fully knowing that when he voluntarily came immediately after the accident, the then political leaders facilitated his departure as their top priorty. Further,

Dr. Rakesh Dutta

Prepare for the worst the threat of Anthrax in US should be enough to cause fear in Indian minds about the lack of effective remedial measures. India too had been a victim of contaminated spores when its cotton belt in Abohar and Fazilka got totally annihilated years ago and there was not even a protest naming Pakistan.

CRBN protection If shade one is determinant of low protective shield of salvaging disasters in the country then mitigating threats from chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear is certainly a far cry. For example, sometime back in a television report, a person from Mayapuri in New Delhi was shown suffering from radiation effect caused by articles lying in junkyards which could not be diagnosed by the medical fraternity. During Chernobyl nuclear accident also there was no medical technique to determine amount of radiations a person was exposed to. Besides, there may not be many doners available to treat thousands of disaster victims and situation has not changed much since Bhopal happened. The disaster in Fukushima this year is the classical example that if a nation like Japan finds itself incapable

of managing nuclear accident in 21st century, then a developing country like India may have to think twice as it is going all out for generating power from nuclear energy. Unfortunately, the political response to the Gujarat earthquake was not up to the expectations and it was further complicated by bureaucratic apathy. All the government had done was to constitute a 35 member Disaster Management Board headed by the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers from the important ministries as its members. Incidentally, these are the same people who have been nominated to the Board time and again to pull the nation out of grave crisis when struck.

Nuclear strike Any natural calamity striking the country will necessarily have a separate disaster management plan. But in a conflict situation involving nuclear weapons, demand is altogether for a different perspective. The magnitude of the crisis will be so severe that no relief supply could reach the effected areas. In the absence of any evacuation plan in the country, the people will just die with huge material destruction and the morale of the people in the rest of the

country will shatter due to the loss of their near and dear ones. It is unimaginable that in the event of any such disaster, the country will swiftly swing into action and muster enough courage to retaliate back. Any nuclear attack will completely overthrow all channels of command, control, communication and coordination with a crippling effect. Long back we have stopped preparing for conventional air attacks because civil defence organisation in the country has ceased to function as far as duties of educating people about emergency relief operations are concerned. At the same time, we are keeping defence forces away from undertaking relief operations. Their planning, execution and actions are resultant of their excellent military training and together could light up many shades of wisdom otherwise eclipsing minds of political masters in understanding the operational realities of managing disasters when it actually comes, regardless of its origin.

The writer is Professor and Chairman of the Dept. of Defence and National Security Studies, Panjab University. Chandigarh, India.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

THE HAND OF GOD?

The hand of God is immutable and inexorable. It strikes when it wants and the effect can be catastrophic. Yet there are areas where it is possible to predict that there is a risk factor present and at some time or the other disaster will strike. Mitigation could be in the form of removing those structures and populations that could fall foul of the impending disaster or creating firewalls to take the first brunt of the disaster, thereby reducing destruction and material and human loss. An assessment of hazards and vulnerability must be the first exercise in disaster management otherwise it will become a hit or miss affair. “I am the creator and I am the destroyer” - Bhagwat Geeta Chapter 7 Verse 6

he above mentioned statement in the Bhagwat Geeta itself articulates what it (God) can do or has done for the creation and devastation of mankind on this earth till date. However, this line also describes the importance of natural and man-made resources available on this planet, as well as gives a message for the people on this earth to learn and adapt new ways to mitigate such catastrophes which catch us unawares.

Cataclysmic changes A disaster has the power to transform a geographical and geostrategic landscape from a scenic to a tomb, as the power of the 1819 Gujarat earthquake deposited the ocean waters into the fort of Sindri, converting the latter into a 25 kilometres long lake. In a metter of seconds, the floods of 20th July 1970 converted Gohna, the largest lake of Uttaranchal into a riverbed filled with pebbles and stones brought down by the river Alaknanda. The above disasters not only mention the changes that have occurred in a geographical area, but it has strategic implications within the region as well which has both short term and long term implications on property and mankind.

Indian vulnerabilities In the case of India, history shows that India is often exposed to natural disasters due to its unique geo-climatic conditions. India is a large and populous country with over

1.2 billion population which is afflicted by a variety of natural and human induced disasters. Because of its high population density, natural calamities such as floods and typhoons can claim tens of thousands of lives. With an increasing number of population, it is estimated that India will cross 1.6 billion mark by 2025. On a worldwide scale, about 373 natural disasters killed over 2,96,800 people in 2010. The estimated costs of natural disasters in 2010 in which an earthquake in Haiti killed over 2,22,500 people and the Russian heat waves caused around 56,000 fatalities which is around US$ 110 billion. The ‘World Disaster Report 2010’ of Red Cross says that between one-third and one-half of the population of most cities in low and middle income nations, which include India, also live in informal settlements and vulnerable zones. This makes them more prone to urban disasters. In India, about 64,478 people died and over 6.6 lakh people were affected due to urban disasters during 2000-2009. The ‘World Disaster Report 2010’ cites the data of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters as, 351 natural disasters and 225 technological disasters were reported worldwide in 2009. Both the figures are the lowest of the decade in relation to casualties (natural disasters: 10,551; technological disasters: 6,707) and the number of persons affected (natural disasters: 142 million; technological disasters: 33,000). Since the mid-1990s there has been an increase in the recorded number of

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

all types of disasters and the number of recorded fatalities resulting from disasters, especially in developing areas and despite disaster preparedness programmes. People in low-income countries are four times more likely to die from extreme natural events than those in high-income countries. During the 1990s, more than two-thirds of deaths were from disasters that occurred in Asia. In this context, India is more vulnerable to a large number of natural as well as human induced disasters. About 58.6 per cent of the land mass is prone to earthquakes of moderate to very high intensity; over 40 million hectares (12 per cent of land) is prone to floods and river erosion; of the 7,516 km long coastline, close to 5,700 km is prone to cyclones and tsunamis; 68 per cent of the cultivable area is vulnerable to drought and hilly areas are at risk from landslides and avalanches where 1.42 million hectares of crop area are destroyed annually. According to World Bank estimates India loses about 2 per cent of its GDP and 12 per cent of its revenues every year due to losses from natural disasters. India is amongst the 15 countries facing “extreme risk” from natural disasters in a ‘Natural Disasters Risk Index’, with the annual mortality rate of 3,600.

Definitions Word disaster has been derived from Middle French desastre, from Old Italian disastro, from Latin pejorative prefix (Dis-Bad + Astrum-Star) is the impact of a natural disaster, natural

Praful Adagale

hazards and vulnerability

or man-made hazard that negatively affects society or natural environment. Disasters occur when hazards strike in vulnerable areas. The word disaster has its root from astrology: which implies that when the stars are in a bad position a bad event will happen.

The UN defines disasters as “An

event (occurrence) that causes sudden great loss”. The words in the definition itself indicate that such an event is unexpected, unpredictable due to which there is a great loss to life and property in short span. A disaster is a condition that may cause a deviation to the state of normalcy of life. A disaster can be also defined as an event that occurs

when a hazard affects a vulnerable population or area. Disasters are often represented using the following equation: Disaster = Hazard X Vulnerability. The above equation clearly mentions the two key elements involved are hazard and vulnerability.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

THE HAND OF GOD?

A hazard is defined as a dangerous condition or events that threaten or have the potential for causing injury to life or damage to property or to the environment. Based on their causes, hazards are categorised into two broad types: natural hazards and human-induced hazards. Natural hazards are classified as geological hazards, hydro-meteorological hazards, biological hazards. The human induced hazards are environmental degradation and technological disasters.

Vulnerability analysis It is the second step towards determining likely effects of any disaster. A population or area being affected by a hazard has to be vulnerable for a disaster to occur. The vulnerability of a population relates to how susceptible it is to the effects of hazards and its ability to cope when struck. Vulnerability is influenced by factors such as location, state of housing, level of preparedness and ability to evacuate and carry out emergency operation. Vulnerability to disasters of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear origin also exists. Heightened vulnerabilities to disaster risks can be related to the expanding population, urbanisation and industrialisation, development within high-risk zones, environmental degradation and climate change. While another factor responsible for determining the impacts of disaster is the risk factor. Risk can be defined in more specific terms, as it helps to find the exact location of likely damage and the extent to which measures have to be taken to reduce normalcy. Risk is one variable which changes as per the density of population, geographical location, climatic conditions, etc. Conventionally, risk is expressed as Risk = Hazard X Vulnerability.

management may be initiated when anything threatens to disrupt normal operations or puts the lives of human beings at risk. Disaster management encompasses the complete realm of disaster-related activities. It would involve the management of both risks and consequences of disasters that would include prediction, prevention, protection, mitigation, emergency response and post-disaster recovery. Disaster management would be most effective if it is approached from the grass-root level rather than the typical haphazard / unstructured ones that generally exist.

Disaster mitigation Disaster mitigation is the ongoing effort to lessen the impact disasters have on people and property. Fewer people and communities would be affected by natural disasters with the use of this process. It is not a new development; in the past the Cyclone Distress Mitigation Committee was launched nationwide during 1969 for the coastal states, with a major objective to formulate a communication system for quick dissemination of meteorological warnings and prevention measures thereof to minimise the damage to lives and property. There are various factors responsible for understanding why disaster mitigation is important in case of India. This is due to its geo-physical location, growing population, increasing urbanisation and most of the population is concentrated in hazardous zones as well, population settled near coastal zones and last but not the least the availability of resources in the disaster prone areas. Any disaster can bring serious setback to the economic development of the country.

Disaster management

Institutional framework

While managing disaster is a dynamic process or strategy that is implemented when any type of catastrophic event takes place, both pre- and post-disaster. Disaster management is sometimes referred to as emergency management or disaster recovery management. It can be defined as “a set of actions or processes designed to lessen disastrous effects before, during and after a disaster.” Disaster management is a combination of two terms disaster and management. The process of disaster

To deal with the growing challenges of disaster management, we have developed our own institutional and policy framework. The responsibility of disaster management shifted from National Crisis Management to National Disaster Management Authority in December 2005, ushering in a paradigm shift in disaster management. The Disaster Management Act of 2005 brought the Authority at national level. The Act lays down institutional and coordination

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

forces be strengthened and equipped to tackle similar problems?

mechanisms at the national, state, district and local levels and provides for establishment of Disaster Response and Mitigation Funds. The national disaster management policy will aim to strengthen capacity of all institutions concerned with disaster management and the community in order to mitigate the impact of disasters. New institutions may be set up where the existing mechanisms are found inadequate. In India, the basic responsibility for undertaking rescue, relief and rehabilitation measures in the event of natural disasters rests with state government concerned. The role of the central government has only been supportive, in terms of physical and financial resources and complementary measures in sectors such as transport, warning and inter-state movement of food grains. At the national level, the Ministry of Home Affairs is the nodal ministry for all matters concerning disaster management. The Central Relief Commissioner in the Ministry of Home Affairs is the nodal officer to coordinate relief operations for natural disasters. While, at the state level, it is Department of Relief and Rehabilitation which is responsible for disaster management. It would focus almost entirely on post-calamity relief. At the district level, the District Magistrate who is the chief coordinator. He will be the focal point for coordinating all activities relating to prevention, mitigation and preparedness apart from his existing responsibilities pertaining to response and relief.

Disaster relief battalions The Disaster Management Act, of 2005 has mandated the creation of a National Disaster Response Force (NDRF). Presently the NDRF comprises nine battalions which have been positioned in nine vulnerable locations with state of a disaster situation. Four of these battalions are equipped and trained to deal with NBC related disasters. Four training centres have also been set up by respective paramilitary forces to train the NDRF personnel ( See Diagram on page 91 ).

Sustainable development Efforts must be made to reduce disaster risks by systematically integrating policies, plans and

programmes for sustainable development and poverty reduction. This must be supported through bilateral, regional and international cooperation, including partnerships. Sustainable development, poverty reduction, good governance and disaster risk reduction are mutually supportive objectives and in order to meet the challenges ahead, accelerated efforts must be made to build the necessary capacities at the community and national levels to manage and reduce risk.

warning systems and mechanism for effective response. ■■ Develop emergency plans and early warning systems for vulnerable areas. ■■ Strengthening of R&D and technology transfer at national and international level. ■■ Quick and effective decision making process both at central and state level.

Major challenges

In the Indian context, strategies for disaster prevention and mitigation will need to focus on the following:

Besides the loss of lives and property, in future our country will be facing the following problems:

■■ Creating policy support at the national, state and local levels.

■■ Water pollution and air pollution

■■ Proper planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of matters relating to disaster management. ■■ Co-ordination among the different organisations for pre-disaster, during-disaster and post-disaster activities including preparation of disaster management guidelines. ■■ Improving public awareness and human resource development on the severity and risks associated with natural and human induced hazards. This can help reduce the damage to properties and lives in the wake of disaster. Otherwise, the implications of the disaster would be much worse and the post-disaster relief would be quite expensive. ■■ Improving instrumentation for hazard monitoring, forecasting and

■■ Food security problem ■■ Ecological degradation depletion of resources

and

■■ Health problems ■■ Global warming From the above analysis as highlighted, the question still looms over who will take the responsibility of any disaster if it occurs? Should the Police forces which are the first line of defence in civil society be well-trained, equipped and prepared to tackle the challenges faced by our nation? Traditionally, the pragmatic role of the army in disaster management cannot be overlooked; however, the question remains whether the armed forces should continue to be the first responders in any disaster situation. Will the civil defence and paramilitary

Like other issues such as food security, energy security, water security, disaster management must be given enough priority for its effective management and reduction in the national policy priorities of a country. If the issue related to disaster management is not taken into serious consideration then the future implications of the disaster to the community would be highly disastrous. Besides our vision 2020 of building a safer and secure India through sustained collective effort, synergy of national capacities and people’s participation would fail if the issue pertaining to disaster and its management is not taken into consideration. In this context, holistic and multidisciplinary approach would continue to be the key factor to effective disaster mitigation. The approach aims at sustainable development by integrating disaster mitigation with development process and planning. The policy makers and private sector should understand the importance of development and its relationship with uninformed disasters. The effective development of communication and transportation systems considering the future threats will help in reduction of the impact of disasters. A National Disaster Management framework has been drawn up, laying down a broad strategy and road map, covering institutional mechanisms, mitigation measures, legal and policy framework, early warning systems, preparedness and response, human resource development, training and capacity building. At the same time the mitigation and preparedness measures, which have been financed by the government should not be limited only to prevention of droughts and floods but must encompass all kinds of natural disasters. No doubt, the paradigm shift in our country’s approach to disaster management has brought some positive results although unevenly and not in a concerted and systematic way. The writer is a PhD Research Fellow working in YCNISDA, University of Pune, India. His areas of expertise include International Terrorism, National Security, European Studies and Nuclear Terrorism.

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

TERRORIST DIMENSION

Home Minister P. Chidambaram’s plans for a nationwide grid of terrorist-oriented likely targets and basic data of local conditions has been slow in taking shape. The orientation remains big city-centric much to the dismay of people living in sensitive smaller cities and towns that have become the targets of sleeper cells and dispersed terror groups. However, plans for tackling disasters must have a holistic approach to all kinds of traumas that can visit the common man from villages upwards.

n recent past, there has been a sea change in the threat prone places in India. Until the eighth decade of the 20th century, only the frontiers of India were vulnerable to attack from the security point of view. During the last two decades of 20th century it changed and the attacks were well organised even in the megapolises and state capitals. The attacks were well-planned and intended to cause maximum loss of life and property and get national and international media coverage publicity of their motive without any cost to themselves.

Shift in pattern of attacks The last decade saw a sudden upsurge of terrorist attacks in smaller cities after the demolition of disputed shrine in Ayodhya. The serial bomb blast in Mumbai during January 1993 enlarged the canvas of security threats. The 21st century saw a change in security threats. Now smaller cities and town were prone to attack, the reason is obvious - the megapolises improved their security management and big media houses reached smaller cities and towns. The laxity in security at smaller places gives them easy access to crowded places to execute their plans.

critical infrastructure system is on way but it is limited to metropolises only. Smaller towns and cities are left to the mercy of God.

operations. Administration acts at the eleventh hour on the information front, by that time the rumour mongers have had a field day.

Crisis management

■■ The local intelligence network in smaller cities is at its nadir which can be seen by the dismal information gathered by these agencies about the ‘sleeper-modules’ in the above-mentioned terrorist incidents.

A glimpse at the incidence of terrorist attacks, Naxal attacks, communal violence and natural calamities taking place in smaller towns and cities speak volumes about the inefficiency of the security agencies and government. The lack of the knowledge of crisis management techniques is evident by the few examples cited below: ■■ The bomb blasts of Golghar in Gorakhpur Railway Station and Sankat Mochan Temple, Dashwamegh Ghat in Varanasi caused the public to go haywire. All the roads were blocked by unruly mobs. Police and ambulance had to face huge problems in reaching and evacuating the affected. ■■ The mob at Varanasi and Gorakhpur took away many splintered parts of the bomb, which could have been a great help for investigating agencies.

The significant point is that our security agencies and government failed to protect the smaller cities and towns. The terrorists are moving at a faster pace than the government and security agencies. The result is blasts in Faizabad, Varanasi, Gorakhpur, Malegaon, Nasik, Rampur. The coincident is the resurgence of Naxalism on a big scale in Chattisgarh, Jharkhand etc. As a result, smaller towns and cities are becoming more threat prone.

■■ The most horrific flood of the century which heavily affected the eastern UP in 1998 exposed the state agencies of their preparations in tackling the natural calamity of this magnitude. The administration was not even aware from where to get the big boats to start the relief operations! It took three days to get the boats from Allahabad which cost dear to animal and human life. The worst part was the air dropping of relief materials by helicopters. The administration severely lacked the longitude and latitude details of the affected areas which hampered the air droppings.

In recent times the central government is trying to contain terrorism and Naxalism in a planned way. City surveillance for security of

■■ The similarity between natural calamity and terrorist incidents is the role of rumours and misinformation which always hampers the relief

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Harsh K. Sinha

■■ In the beginning of this year, a newspaper of Gorakhpur city conducted a sting operation by sending a few courier packets from different places situated along the Indo-Nepal border - just 100 kms away from this strategically important city. The packets were a bit bigger in size to make them suspicious at first glance. Ironically, all the packets reached their destinations without any investigations, though there being a standing order to check such packets. This proves the pathetic condition of preventive intelligence and security checks in smaller cities. A meagre amount to grease the palm of the police can allow movement of loaded vehicles without check or scrutiny of contents.

New vulnerable targets As we have discussed earlier there is a major change in the security threats and weaponry in recent times. History tells us that it has been happening in every age. In medieval age, the wars were fought in defined battlegrounds with conventional weapons. In World War I, we saw the execution of Douhet’s air power theory in the form of carpet-bombing on industrial cities, while in World War II the WMD emerged as N-Bomb. But in 9/11 it was an unbelievable weapon - a never before package of destruction and multi-dimensional impact. It is clearly evident that with the advent of newer and better technologies there is always an issue of security.

small city orientation Considering this, it can be said that in future years the critical infrastructure of the cities including the energy and water supply lines, transport system, industrial and commercial complexes will be the most vulnerable targets.

The Ministry of Home Affairs is gearing itself to create a supporting infrastructure for the long term with an organised and targeted development of India’s homeland security focused infrastructure. Creation of a centralised comprehensive database

called National Information Grid (NAT GRID), setting up of the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), providing a Unique Identification Number (UID), creating a Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and setting up a National Counter Terrorism

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

disaster management

TERRORIST DIMENSION

June 2 011

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Discounted Price Centre (NCTC) are a few among such initiatives. There is approximately Rs. 324 crore allocated for this endeavour.

Big city fixation But the point is that, if we look at the government plans, they are mostly centered around big cities. We need similar plans for the upcoming smaller towns and cities. Before presenting any alternative security management structure, it is mandatory to consider five inevitable components, which are always detrimental in crisis situations. ■■ Chaotic situation ■■ Lack of proper information ■■ Rumour mongering ■■ Indecisive crisis-management, and ■■ Non-availability of resources and crisis management strategy

Suggestions for action To achieve an optimal condition, few given suggestions can be fruitful. ■■ Cities must be classified according to their population and geographical contours.

■■ At district level potential risk zones (for natural or man-made disasters both) must be identified and arranged according to their level of threat. This account should incorporate the details of affected populace, nature and intensity of threat and the state of critical infrastructure units present in that area.

order problems of serious nature. These committees must have specialists / professionals along with police and revenue officers of the district. The above mentioned, expert committees should be headed by an apex level decision-making committee comprising the senior-most officers of civil, police, intelligence, paramilitary forces and health departments.

■■ To prevent concentration of mob at the place of incident effective traffic-diversion plans must be prepared. This plan must include the identification of special routes for the least interrupted movement of police and medical vans during crisis situations.

■■ Construction maps and details of emergency exit routes of the potential targets like malls and commercial complexes of smaller cities should be registered with these expert committees.

■■ Every district must have a database of emergency hospitals and ambulance services in general for potential risk zone / likely targets in particular.

■■ Every zone / district must have a detailed list of necessary equipment and man-power according to their crisis management plans.

quick and effective ■■ For dissemination of information during the crisis period, all the available and possible media resources (local cable channels, FM stations, public address systems, mobile SMS etc.) must be enlisted and used.

■■ With these plans we cannot completely avoid the threats which keep on changing their forms like chameleon but we can surely and certainly avert or reduce these threats to a minimum.

■■ Separate expert committee should be constituted to prepare the risk assessment and mitigation plans for natural calamities, technical disasters, terrorist attacks and for the law and

July 2011 Defence AND security alert

The writer is reader, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies in DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur. He has been a fellow of Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo and his areas of interest are conflict and media, strategic culture and non-traditional security threats.

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GLOBAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY EVENTS / SHOWS July 2011

Monday 4th July 2011 – Wednesday 6th July 2011

Tuesday 19th July 2011

Police Summer Conference and Exhibition

Countering Terrorism and the Threat of Crime at UK Transport

Harrogate International Centre, Harrogate,

Hubs

United Kingdom

Copthorne Tara Hotel, London, United Kingdom

Wednesday 6th July 2011 – Thursday 7th July 2011 Sicherheits Expo - Security Show München -

Tuesday 19th July 2011 – Saturday 23rd July 2011

Trade Fair on Security and Safety

Firehouse Expo

International Congress Centre Munich, Munich,

Baltimore Convention Center, Baltimore,

Germany

USA

Thursday 7th July 2011 – Friday 8th July 2011

Wednesday 20th July 2011

European Conference on Information Warfare and

IEDs: Defeat the Device

Security

Copthorne Tara Hotel, London,

Tallinn Univ. of Technology, Tallinn,

United Kingdom

Estonia Friday 22nd July 2011 – Wednesday 27th July 2011 Monday 11th July 2011 – Tuesday 12th July 2011

China International Sourcing Conference and Show on Public

Situational Awareness & Combat ID

Safety and Security (SSC)

Mayfair Conference Centre, London,

Baiyun International Convention Center, Guangzhou,

United Kingdom

China

Tuesday 12th July 2011 – Thursday 14th July 2011

Monday 25th July 2011 - Wednesday 27th July 2011

9th Annual Military Satellites Conference

Combat Vehicles Summit

America Square Conference Centre, London,

Washington DC,

United Kingdom

USA

Tuesday 12th July 2011 – Thursday 14h July 2011 Security Confab The Clement Monterey, USA Thursday 14th July 2011 – Saturday 16th July 2011 INDO FIREX 2011 expo & forum Jakarta Convention Center, Jakarta, Indonesia Monday 18th July 2011 – Thursday 21st July 2011 International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT) Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería Informática, Seville, Spain

Courtesy: Pawitra International Private Limited, New Delhi www.pawitra.com