On the Jammu-Samba front, plan was to launch an offensive into Pak territory with the dual aim of relieving pressure in the Akhnoor Sector on one part and on the other bring to battle Pak Forces in this sector and destroy these. Indian offensive, both in the Punjab and Jammu sectors achieved complete surprise. On the Punjab front there was some hard fighting and Indian Forces came under heavy air attacks by Pak Air Force, before troops could get to the Ichhogil Canal. However existence of aqueducts under the Ichhogil Canal were not known to Indian Army and it is through these that Pakistan launched its counteroffensive with its 1 Armoured Division, achieving complete surprise. On the Jammu-Samba front Indian Army failed to exploit surprise it had so successfully achieved. One of the regiments of Indian Armoured Division was badly mauled by the enemy. There followed a self-imposed and inexcusable freeze of 48 hours by the Indian Forces. On the Punjab front there were some goof-ups. So far the battle on both fronts could be termed as phase 2 of this very short war.
Phase Three
Hereafter the war entered into its phase 3. On the Punjab front Pakistan’s counteroffensive was brought to a halt and better part of its 1 Armoured Division was destroyed. On the Jammu front, in a series of brilliantly executed manoeuvres Pakistan’s 6 Armoured Division was decimated. When the fighting ended, Pakistan’s offensive potential had been comprehensively destroyed. That in brief is the story of 1965 War with Pakistan. Some have tried to belittle Indian Army’s achievements in this war. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, the highest field commander, in his book, War Dispatches, records, “I have heard that our concept of operations lacked offensive dash and dimension, forgetting elementary wisdom that unless ends are balanced against the means available, a campaign is foredoomed to failure.” Given force equation, to expect dramatic results or a resounding victory was unrealistic, bordering on foolishness. With the existence of high value population centres close to the border on both sides and other considerations, neither country was willing to concede territory and therefore pitched battles took place within a few kilometres on either side of the border. That was and will remain the dominant reality of offensive-defensive battles in the plains sectors of J&K and the two Punjabs.
India’s Plus Points
The complete destruction of Pakistan’s offensive potential by a weaker force was indeed a miracle. It was the skills of our commanders, the daring and proficiency of tank crews, the grit of infantry and gunners which brought about this miracle. When the war ended, undoubtedly and undeniably Indian Army was decisively on top with Pak offensive capability completely shattered. The dynamics of a short war, a very short war, are quite apart from our more common knowledge of conflicts between large forces spread over longer duration.
There were many acts of gallantry both on the Punjab front and during the armour battles of Phillora in the Jammu Sector. Maj Gen Rajinder Singh Sparrow added a bar to his MVC. On the Punjab front Havildar Abdul Hamid of Grenadiers won Param Vir Chakra by standing upto Pak Patton tanks with his anti-tank gun. Beside these two, there were innumerable acts of gallantry by the troops and officers of the Indian Army: Some noticed and some that went unnoticed. There were indeed some anxious moments during this war, as there are in any hard fought battles. Indian security and intelligence establishment had failed to anticipate threat from Pakistan. No effort was made to identify those in the MoD who had worked overtime to keep Indian Army starved of contemporary weapon systems, especially when Pakistan was being armed so heavily. Finally it is time we declassified complete war records with the MEA, RAW, MoD and Army headquarters for a clearer picture of the war to emerge.
Perennial Unpreparedness
Lt Gen Harwant Singh PVSM, AVSM (Retd) The writer was commissioned in 1955 and joined armoured corps. He has been Brigade Major of an Independent armoured brigade, General Staff Officer-1 of an armoured division and commanded School of Armoured Warfare. Has been senior instructor at the War College. Commanded a mountain brigade and an armoured brigade. Was Deputy Director Operational Logistics and Director General Weapon and Equipment at Army Headquarters. Raised first Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) and fielded it in Exercise Brass Tacks as defending commander. Commanded a corps in J&K and retired as Deputy Chief of Army Staff in August 1992.
India seems to repeatedly find itself unprepared for a war, be it 1962 War with China or 1965 War with Pakistan or later at Kargil. Even now one can see little change in this attitude of Indian defence establishment. We have learned no lessons from history, old and more recent. Now when Pakistan is arming itself with Chinese and Russian military equipment and China has been busy building military infrastructure in Tibet, India appears to be in no better state than that of 1962 period. Though we are now faced with the prospects of a two-front war.
Chief Of Defence Staff
Without the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) system in its full spectrum, it would be impossible to meet fully the challenges of a two-front war and yet there is no move to adopt the CDS system any time soon. Historically India has never paid adequate attention to national security and this malady persists to this day. Over 6 decades after independence India still imports nearly 70 per cent of its defence weapons and equipment. We have scaled down the essential requirement of fighter planes to mere 36 numbers. The mountain strike corps for the Tibet border is being reduced to half. Indian Navy is in no position to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean. There is no long-term national security architecture in the making.
August 2015
Defence AND security alert
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