Letter to the Editor

[John Rummel, Friday Harbor Partners LLC, USA]

Since I received the August issue of Space Research Today (SRT), I have come to the conclusion that I need to send you, for publication, some comments and clarifications in response to the editorial “Message” published by Len Fisk at the end of his mandate (SRT 214, August 2022).

While it is natural and usually beneficial for the outgoing COSPAR President to write his or her remembrances of their time in office, it is not normal nor helpful for the President to include remembrances with personal interpretations of professional events, involving many scientists, in a manner that results in the introduction of inaccuracies. Yet that is what ex-President Fisk has done, in the arena of planetary protection, in your August issue. I am concerned that SRT readers who are not versed in the history of COSPAR’s planetary protection activities, or their current status, will be confused by a comparison of what the ex-President wrote versus what the facts actually are.

After the first nine paragraphs of his Message which focus on other issues, Len turns to the subject of planetary protection. There he spins a personal interpretation of events that are documented otherwise, and that have been witnessed by a large group of individuals — hence his views can be easily challenged. His view needs to be countered in order to provide to your publication the respect it deserves and the objectivity that science requires. As a result I am requesting that you publish the following corrections in SRT.

Below find the quotations from Len’s Message in italics, and my corrections in normal type.

Paragraph 10 reads:

“In the beginning, the United States dominated planetary exploration, and the PPP (Panel on Planetary Protection), which was chaired by the Planetary Protection Officer (PPO) of NASA, very responsibly set reasonable requirements for planetary protection.”

This sounds nice, but the history is entirely different

(and to some, the quote may suggest that the PPP then went on to set unreasonable requirements). More to the point, the quote suggests a direct relationship between the size of NASA’s planetary exploration program and the NASA PPO being the Chair of the PPP. It is important to note that that was not the case. Independently of which organization may have “dominated” exploration efforts, Planetary Protection rules must be the same for all. COSPAR, as an independent body is not dominated by NASA or the USA, and had no PPP until March 1999, when the COSPAR Bureau approved the resolution to form one. That resolution was forwarded by SC F at the 1998 Nagoya Assembly. I supported it whole heartedly, together with other scientists, because it was clear that some space agencies were not fully aware of the scattered resolutions that then comprised the COSPAR planetary protection policy. When the PPP resolution was approved by the Bureau, I was named Panel Chair with François Raulin from France (nobody’s PPO, and the Chair of SC F) as Vice Chair. We were appointed because of our track record in the field and because we were initial supporters of the resolution to form the Panel.

‘‘I am concerned that SRT readers who are not versed in the history of COSPAR’s planetary protection activities, or their current status, will be confused’’

Our first step in the business of the Panel was not to “very responsibly set reasonable requirements,” for that was unnecessary. A set of reasonable requirements, previously approved by the Bureau and Council, already existed. Rather, the PPP’s task was to locate and incorporate into a single COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy the existing COSPAR resolutions and policies that were already found (but hard to find) in the COSPAR files.

Also in paragraph 10:

“As ESA emerged as a significant participant in planetary exploration, its PPO joined the NASA PPO in dominating the PPP by rotating between the chair or vice-chair positions, and since Panels in COSPAR generally have a loose structure, with no formal membership, the chairs and vice chairs determined the COSPAR Planetary Protection (PP) Policy.” First of all, recall that ESA was already engaged in planetary exploration well before 1999 (Giotto, Cassini/Huygens, and the ongoing preparation of Rosetta, MEX, and VEX). However, the position of PPO at ESA was created much later. Yes, in the timeframe of the PPP formation I was NASA PPO (for the second time, from late 1997 to late 2006, only), although at the invitation of successive COSPAR Presidents I stayed as Chair of the Panel until 2014. During that term I was fortunate to have François Raulin as Vice Chair from 1999 to 2008, when Gerhard Kminek, who had eventually been appointed by ESA as PPO, became Vice Chair. Gerhard took on the Chair’s role in 2014, but there was no “rotating” involved. It was a simple job-succession, and I was no longer working for NASA when it took place.

Len’s statement that “the chairs and vice chairs determined the COSPAR Planetary Protection PP Policy” is not only false, but should be seen as very offensive to the members of the PPP who were, and are, senior, independent, and qualified experts in the field.

During the period 1999 to 2014, the Panel produced eight different workshop or colloquium reports, and involved over 110 participants (scientists, engineers, etc.) in Panel business meetings and other Panel activities. This was a large community that one or two individuals could not manipulate, as suggested by Len.

That is a key point. I am surprised that a two-term President, as Len was, should not be aware of how COSPAR usually functions. The PPP’s initial work was constrained by the the existing (but hard to find) work of COSPAR, dating from 1964—and without approval by the Bureau and Council, NO changes were made to the COSPAR Policy during the period from 1999 until 2014. Thus, the extant COSPAR Policy was first assembled by the PPP for the Warsaw Assembly (2000), and after an April 2002 joint workshop with the IAU, and a further joint Assembly session with the International Institute for Space Law, the first complete COSPAR Policy since 1969 was approved by the COSPAR Bureau and Council at the World Space Congress (Houston) in 2002. (See COSPAR PP Policy 2002; COSPAR Information Bulletin 156, 67-74, 2003).

Thereafter, all new changes to the PP Policy until 2014 (when I stepped down as Chair) were approved by the Panel, within open business meetings at each biannual Assembly, and then by the COSPAR Bureau and Council. Panel participants were not somehow there to be swayed by rogue PPOs for their own purposes! We had good representation of all points of view in the Panel meetings and in papers delivered in the various PPP Assembly sessions, as documented in the Assembly events, papers, and other reports produced by the Panel. In order to ensure that the COSPAR Policy conformed to the latest findings, proposed changes to the Policy were based on new science and technology. These were generally introduced into the COSPAR Policy process as a result of studies performed by the US Space Studies Board (of which Len was Chair from 2003-2008), at COSPAR workshops, and under the sponsorship of the European Science Foundation. There were also inputs from the NASA Planetary Protection Advisory Committee and the ESA Planetary Protection Working Group, both of which had international membership.

These activities, rather than the wishes of the PPP Chair or Vice Chair, were what determined changes to the COSPAR Policy after the Panel was formed.

Paragraph 11:

“Almost immediately upon becoming President, and to my surprise since when I was NASA Associate Administrator, the NASA PPO reported to me and all was well, I was besieged by complaints about planetary protection.”

This statement is, to say the least, humorous. Indeed, Len appointed me as NASA PPO (for the first time) when he joined NASA as Associated Administrator for Space Science and Applications in 1987, and as he says, all was well. He should remember that !

Shortly after my NASA appointment (1990), I asked the Space Studies Board to look at planetary protection requirements for Mars landers, and the recommendations of their 1992 report were much easier to implement than those for the Viking landers. The new recommendations were brought into COSPAR’s (tough to find) policy through SC F in 1994, so, the engineers were comparatively happy, as were the other mission operators. Who, then, besieged Len in 2014 ? Given the span of possibilities, it would be appropriate for him to name the specific organizations that besieged him, at least.

Some of that, I witnessed. For example, at the Iguazu Falls Symposium in 2015 it was apparent that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had decided to work to remove some planetary protection requirements in a way more adversarial than had previously been the case. At the Symposium, I discussed those issues with Len, who shouldn’t have been surprised, given his then-membership on the JPL Advisory Council (as he still appears to be). Clearly, JPL has some of the most difficult roles in flying planetary science missions in a planetary-protection-compliant manner, so lobbying the COSPAR President on the issue might be classified as due-diligence, from their perspective. That the COSPAR President was also a member of the JPL Advisory Council during that period would seem to be something more broadly known.

Paragraph 11 (cont.):

“Of more importance, there was a legitimate structural issue. The PPOs were both making and enforcing the COSPAR PP Policy. While this does not imply that they did it poorly, nonetheless it is simply poor governance.”

It should not have to be noted that COSPAR does not enforce its PP Policy at all, not even in the sense of a university professor first teaching a class and then giving an exam to her/his students. This statement is simply a non sequitur regarding the power of the PPOs, etc.

And of course it is hard to separate an accusation of “poor governance” from a suggestion that something was done poorly! But that suggestion has no place here, given that at least until COSPAR-2018 the PP Policy was not ‘made’ by the PPOs, nor by the non-PPO Panel Officers. It was made by the COSPAR Bureau and Council.

Paragraph 11 (redux):

“Thus a great deal of time was spent during my first four years as President restructuring the PPP into its current form...”

It is all well and good to note improvements in the structure and functioning of the PPP, demonstrating, among other things, an improved appreciation by Len of the United Nations’ interest in planetary protection. Both I and Gerhard Kminek had asked Len for reform of the Panel structure when he became COSPAR President. And I appreciate that Len notes, here, that the new Panel has been “ably led by Athena Coustenis as Chair and Niklas Hedman as Vice Chair from the UN.” They are first-rate! I do not, however, understand why, in this moment of largesse, Len would fail to acknowledge Gerhard Kminek’s contribution both to the restructuring of the Panel, or his service (by invitation) as the new Vice Chair (Planetary Protection). Why not thank him for his willingness to step down as PPP Chair to enable the structural change to occur when it did ?

Paragraph 14:

“In fact, the companies used their influence to get legislation proposed in the US Congress that would delegate to the Secretary of Commerce the responsibility of certifying that a commercial space mission satisfied the planetary protection requirements of the Outer Space Treaty, and the legislation specifically said that the COSPAR PP Policy did not apply.”

This is a curious sidetrack, given the context. Whereas NASA, itself, is not responsible for compliance with the OST (US compliance is the provenance of the Department of State), from time-to-time one part or the other of the US government has tried to fill the regulatory gap left by the dearth of comprehensive OST-enabling legislation by the US government as a whole. It is therefore predictable, but not of great concern, when there is a Bill passed by one part of the US Congress (the House, in this case) that states, for example, that “Guidelines promulgated by the Committee on Space Research may not be considered international obligations of the United States.” The Bill in question (HR 2809) was not that much of a concern, as it was never passed into law, but on the plus side it did specify a process whereby the US would identify an appropriate source of guidelines to be followed to prevent harmful contamination. The failure of such a Bill to become US Law does suggest that the US needs to put forward a comprehensive regime for OST compliance, but has little effect on COSPAR’s Policy until that happens.

Paragraph 14 (cont.):

“Compliance with the COSPAR PP Policy is obviously voluntary and should the nation with the largest effort in planetary exploration decide not to comply, or in effect, make up its own policy, there is the potential for a major diplomatic incident, and COSPAR’s relevance would have been seriously diminished.”

Enforcing a voluntary policy is easier if the principles of the policy are shared. COSPAR provides for this shared perspective. Whereas in paragraph 11 Len states as a concern that “a growing number of nations...did not appreciate the dominance of NASA and ESA” in planetary protection, history suggests that most nations will accept jointly agreed principles if they need to do that in order to fly cooperative missions. It may not matter who sets out those principles for agreement, but COSPAR has the history and expertise to do this, and so we have done it as a service to space science and exploration. One role of the COSPAR President could well be to mediate between specific nations that show difficulties in implementing a specific COSPAR policy and tailor those along with the principles behind the COSPAR policy. In this retelling, there was no documented request by Len to the PPP to address the US and other government difficulties. Why not ?

Paragraph

“In fairness to the companies that want to use the Moon or Mars, the COSPAR PP Policy was never intended to take their interest into account...not even human exploration was seriously considered and cer-

At this point, in fairness, I would suggest that Len go back and read the COSPAR PP Policy, as I am concerned that somebody new to the field might otherwise be misled. For example, the Appendix section “Principles and Guidelines for the Human Exploration of Mars” is, indeed, a serious consideration of human exploration and the use of the planet Mars. The use of the Moon has been the subject of previous consideration as a body that may be an important place for both scientific exploration AND use. Consideration of these led to COSPAR’s relatively recent update of its policy regarding lunar missions.

It is clear that Len does not know about or appreciate the work currently being done regarding human missions under the COSPAR PPP umbrella and jointly with NASA (with contributions from ESA, DLR, CSA, IBMP, JAXA, and CNES). The Panel has (from 2016) conducted a workshop series on planetary protection for human missions to Mars that has included world-class bioscientists, mission planners and engineers, as well as commercial concerns such as Space-X, Lockheed-Martin, and Boeing.

‘‘It may not matter who sets out those principles for agreement, but COSPAR has the history and expertise to do this’’

Thus, it is completely incorrect that COSPAR has not paid attention to the interests of companies in these areas. Such an argument from ignorance is not a convincing one, and does not belong in a message that claims some authority and improvement in this vital area for COSPAR.

In the above sections, I have tried to be objective in correcting a number of Len’s statements that are either incorrect or that might cause embarrassment to the COSPAR scientific community. Not all of Len’s statements are of equal weight, of course, and some have been left unaddressed, but most of the statements that I have dealt with here need to be corrected to set the record straight.