Consilience: Issue V by Consilience The Journal of Sustainable Development

ISSUE V SPRING 2011

Consilience The Journal of Sustainable Development con.sil.i.ence (noun): The joining together of knowledge and information across disciplines to create a unified framework of understanding

http://www.consiliencejournal.org

EDITORIAL BOARD EXECUTIVE BOARD

Editor-in-Chief

Monica Varman

Lead Senior Editor

Vighnesh Subramanyan

Managing Editor Delphia Polle

EDITORIAL

Senior Editors

David Berke Alex Boyce Phil Crone Grant Graziani Jodie Liu Kimberley Rubin Alexandra Sing

Junior Editors

Sana Ahmad Abraham Avi Allison Rebecca Chan Victoria Diaz-Bonilla James Fleming Meagan Gamache Felipe Goncalves Kasey Koopmans Daniela Quintanilla Pierre Saddi David Solomon Patrick Woolsey

Managing Board

Leigh Huffine Shiyang Lindsay Lu Natalia Martinez Barrie Segal Kelsey Umemoto

PEER REVIEW AND ADVISORY

Corresponding Board Belinda Archibong Prabhat Barnwal Nicholas Cain Frank Cohn John Feighery Gordon McCord Hakim Williams Semee Yoon

Faculty Advisory Board Michael Gerrard Kevin Griffin John Mutter Shahid Naeem Jeffrey Sachs Saskia Sassen

Journal Advisor Louise Rosen

CONTENTS Scholarly Articles Reduced Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation: A Critical Review Marc L. Hufty, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Annie Haakenstad, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

Public-Private Dichotomy in Utilization of Health Care Services in India Chandan Kumar, Indian Institute of Technology Ravi Prakash, Karnataka Health Promotion Trust

Health or Agricultural Development: Boundary Objects and Organization in a Soya Project in Western Kenya Jennifer Lamb, Virginia Tech

Sustaining Culture with Sustainable Stoves: The Role of Tradition in Providing CleanBurning Stoves to Developing Countries Britta Victor, Princeton University

Global Climate Policies, Local Institutions and Food Security in a Pastoral Society in Ethiopia Pekka Virtanen, University of Jyväskylä Ero Palmujoki, University of Tampere Dereje Terefe Gemechu, University of Jyväskylä

Opinion Pieces Carbon Footprinting the Internet Joel Gombiner, Columbia University

119

The Role of Regional Institutions in Sustainable Development: A Review of the Mekong River Commission’s First 15 Years Mai-Lan Ha, Columbia University

125

Toppling the Tripod: Sustainable Development, Constructive Ambiguity, and the Environmental Challenge Frances C Moore, Stanford University

141

The ‘Necessity’ of Democracy for Sustainable Development: A Comparison between the USA and Cuba Marcus Rand, University of Jyväskylä

151

CONTENTS Field Notes Development For Tibetians, But By Whom? Diana Jue, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

168

An Exploration of Community Health Charlotte Eloise Stancioff, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill

176

Photo Essays The Art of Development: Images Promoting Dialogue and Alternatives to Poverty and Violence in Local Communities of Colombia Natali Rojas, University of Jyväskylä

190

The Winding Ways of Development: A Historical Journey of a Road in the Putumayo Region of Colombia Simon Uribe, London School of Economics and Political Science

201

Editor-in-Chief’s Note It is with great pleasure that I invite you to read the fifth issue of Consilience: the Journal of Sustainable Development. This issue marks another step in our endeavor to provide a platform for interdisciplinary dialogue among diverse, global actors on the topic of sustainable development. I would like to thank the editorial and managing boards of Consilience, and lead senior editor Vighnesh Subramanyan in particular, for the dedication and passion with which they worked on selecting and editing pieces for the journal. This issue preserves and furthers the journal’s mission to further solutions-oriented, open access discourse through a balance of scholarly articles, opinion pieces, field notes, and photo essays. Each piece in this issue challenges the reader to think more broadly, thoroughly, and analytically about sustainable development. As in our previous issues, we have pushed the boundaries of this incredibly complex concept, even going so far as to challenge the very paradigm itself, as author Frances Moore does in the opinion piece “Toppling the Tripod: Sustainable Development, Constructive Ambiguity, and the Environmental Challenge.” This issue features pieces by students, professors, practitioners, and researchers at highly prestigious research institutions across four continents. The content is incredibly diverse, with topics that include access to health care in India, the carbon footprint of Google searches, procurement of clean burning stoves, community based nutrition procurement in Kenya, and the centrality of the democratic process to the pursuit of development. I invite you to engage with the complex questions and challenges raised by our authors, and to bring your own, unique perspective and voice to the conversation. Please feel free to comment on pieces online, attend our events, and explore our other content. Consilience maintains a biweekly editorial column, and will be launching a blog shortly. The blog will act as a platform for more dynamic, time-sensitive coverage of news, events, and opinions in the sustainable development community. We invite you to contribute your reactions to the pieces in our journal to our blog. I am also excited to announce the launch of Sense and Sustainability, a podcast featuring interdisciplinary dialogue on research and policy in the field of sustainable development. It is hosted by Jisung Park, a graduate student studying Economics and Environmental Policy as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. Jisung is a former member of the editorial board of Consilience, and graduated from Columbia University in 2009. The podcast is a collaborative effort with Consilience, and can be accessed from our website. In our ongoing effort to facilitate the exchange of information and perspectives, we have partnered with Field Actions Science Reports (FACTS), an open-access, peer reviewed journal of field actions at Institut Veolia Environnement, to share content and scholarship. Our partnerships and collaborations enable our authors and readers to share best practices and ideas with a wider

Editor-in-Chiefâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Note audience. If you particularly enjoyed the field notes in this issue, I invite you to explore the case studies and field actions examined by FACTS. I hope you enjoy this issue of our journal, and invite you to contribute to the journal through comments, critique, feedback, or submissions at contact@consiliencejournal.org. Yours Sincerely, Monica Varman Editor in Chief Consilience: the Journal of Sustainable Development

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 1-24

Reduced Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation: A Critical Review Marc Hufty Development Studies Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland marc.hufty@graduateinstitute.ch Annie Haakenstad Development Studies Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland annie.haakenstad@graduateinstitute.ch Abstract “Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (REDD) is emerging as a major new climate change mechanism that could deeply impact the financial, social and institutional dynamics of deforestation, conservation, and development in many developing countries. It has the potential to influence global forest governance in a socially acceptable way. The mechanism as it stands needs much improvement to avoid the pitfalls of earlier forest governance mechanisms. The research, at this stage, is not sufficient to improve it. Most of the literature is fairly slanted towards technical issues and the prospective design of the scheme or normative opposition to it. Despite this copious amounts of scholarly and advocacy work, there is too little attention focused on the social and governance dimensions of the proposals. Author’s Note Forests are crucial in the struggle for sustainable development. Not only do they have a role in the preservation of global ecological systems, but moreover they are especially important for supporting the livelihoods of local populations. When forests were first addressed in the context of climate change, they were assessed in mostly financial and technical terms. We think there is a need to insert a social perspective into the debate, taking into account the lessons learned from many years of intervening in developing countries‟ forests. Engineers who have designed REDD as a brilliant, but top-down, scheme for tropical forests conservation seem to have forgotten such lessons. Without addressing deforestation, climate objectives cannot be reached. But further, drawing from years of work on forests, we see that without considering the impacts on local societies and the lessons learned from development aid REDD cannot succeed. This paper is part of the effort to ensure REDD will prevail in social terms.

Keywords: Reduced emissions, deforestation, forest degradation, tropical forests, environmental governance, social impacts.

1. Introduction

Forests cover 29% of the terrestrial surface (Schmitt et al., 2008) and provide vital ecosystems services (MEA, 2005a). They also store 50% of terrestrial organic

Consilience

carbon and contain much of the Earth‟s biodiversity. Tropical forests contain 50% of terrestrial biological diversity over 6% of the world‟s surface (Wilson, 1992). But globally, sustainable forest management remains insufficiently competitive compared with more destructive uses of forests (van Dijk & Savenije, 2009); 13 million hectares are lost annually to deforestation (approximately the size of the United Kingdom) (FAO, 2010), 97% of which takes place in tropical countries (Nabuurs et al., 2007). Deforestation is responsible for 18% of global CO2 emissions (Stern, 2006), adding as much carbon to the atmosphere as the transport sector. Moreover, deforestation inflicts high biodiversity losses (MEA, 2005b) and triggers the loss of key ecosystem services (Elmqvist et al., 2010). There is widespread agreement on the need to halt deforestation. Direct and underlying causes of deforestation are known (Geist & Lambin, 2001). They are traditionally divided into proximate causes (infrastructure expansion, logging, conversion of land for agriculture and ranching, extractive industries, etc.) and underlying factors (economic aspects, such as the global demand for timber, soybeans or meat, as well as policy-related, institutional, technological, socio-cultural, demographic, et cetera). These causes are interlinked; for example, a road built for logging will attract settlers, who may clear-cut forests to ready land for agriculture. Many mechanisms aimed at curbing deforestation are already in place, some more successful than others. Protected areas already cover 13.5% of the world‟s forests (Schmitt et al., 2008). If well managed, they can constitute an effective tool against deforestation (Bruner, 2001; Hayes, 2006), especially when they involve multi-user or indigenous governance systems (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Nelson & Chomitz, 2009). Other governance mechanisms, such as those led by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), the World Bank, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), have proven useful under certain conditions, but are manifestly insufficient if the global deforestation rate is considered (Humphreys, 2006). These programs lack an effective process of governance for forests at the global level, something weakly promoted by developed countries and fiercely opposed by developing countries under the principles of national sovereignty1 and differentiated responsibility. This has resulted in segmented, fragmented, underfunded, incoherent, or “non-binding” instruments. Two mechanisms have been particularly debated and tested in the context of the climate and biodiversity global governance processes. One prominent approach has been the forest-related carbon sink projects pursued under the Kyoto Protocol‟s Clean Development Mechanism. These projects harness the carbon market to compensate developed countries‟ excess carbon emissions with tree plantations in developing countries. The projects‟ contribution to mitigating climate change seems very modest, and they have been criticized for promoting large monoculture tree plantations (Kill et al., 2010), as well as involving problems of additionality, leakage Depending on the ideological lens employed, claiming sovereignty can be justified as an effort to thwart a neo-colonial attempt to control forest resources in the vein of Dependency Theory (see Fearnside 2009), or as an endeavor to preserve internal inequalities by enhancing the domination of national elites over natural resources, a view indigenous peoples often advance (e.g. Goldtooth 2010). Either way, the impact has been the same – evoking sovereignty has barred global governance structures from conserving forests. 1

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

and permanence (Plantinga & Richards, 2008). The other prominent approach is payments for ecosystem services (PES), which are payments to communities, individuals, or governments for safeguarding and maintaining ecosystem services like clean water (Gómez-Beggethun et al., 2010; TEEB, 2010; Wallace, 2007; Wunder et al., 2008).2 They are considered beneficial for the involved partners (Tacconi et al., 2009) but unlikely to replace other conservation instruments (Wunder, 2006). They must be carefully designed to avoid focusing excessively on one resource (e.g. water) or reproducing and even strengthening power asymmetries and social inequalities (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010). In the context of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, “avoided deforestation” was not originally included in its implementation agreement, the Kyoto Protocol. Controversial forest and other land issues were left out for a variety of reasons including the apparent complexity of managing deforestation and forest degradation (Morgan et al., 2005; Skutsch et al., 2007), fear of a possible flood of credits into the carbon markets (Silva-Chavez, 2005; Vera Diaz & Schwarzen, 2005) and possible negative biodiversity impacts (Greenpeace, 2003). At the 11th Conference of the Parties in 2005 in Montreal, developing countries3 proposed a mechanism called “Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD).4 Portrayed as a “win-win” for developing and developed countries alike, the mechanism has gained momentum and support. It became a widely discussed subject in view of post-Kyoto arrangements (after-2012) and is one of the few consensual solutions agreed to by the UNFCCC negotiators in Copenhagen (COP-15, 2009) and Cancún (COP-16, 2010). It has also generated an abundant literature, including academic papers,5 reports and advocacy papers. This is noteworthy for a mechanism that remains experimental, only due to start after 2012. Is there a chance that REDD will be the first successful attempt to manage forests at global scale (Grainger & Oberteiner, 2010)?

2. REDD: Nuts and Bolts

The basic idea of REDD is “to generate a significant level of compensation or economic incentive to outweigh the income generated through deforestation” A classic example is the New York watershed management plan for the Catskills, which disburses funds in upstream communities in the Catskills to assure water quality to downstream users in New York City (see Isakson, 2002). 3 It was proposed by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica in 2005. (UNFCCC, 2005). 4 The initial discussion was about “avoided deforestation” (AD), which would have covered slowing deforestation rates in existing forests. In 2005, the discussion turned to “Reduced Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries”, with only one “D” (RED). Gradually, the idea of including forest degradation was accepted and the acronym gained a second “D” (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). This was confirmed at Bali (UNFCCC COP 13) in 2007. The “Bali Action Plan” (Paragraph 1b.iii) also mentioned the role of conservation, sustainable management and carbon stock enhancement, an innovation that was dubbed REDD+. The debate on whether or not to include CDM‟s afforestation and reforestation (creating or re-creating a forest) in REDD is still ongoing. 5 For 2010 alone, we have compiled over 60 papers in international peer-reviewed journals such as Science, Global Environmental Change, Ecological Economics, Environmental Science and Policy, Climatic Change, International Environmental Agreements, The Journal of Environment and Development, etc. We therefore do not pretend to cover the entire literature base, but a selected sample. 2

Consilience

(FoEI, 2008, p. 9). Influential reports have presented avoided deforestation as a cost effective mitigation option for climate change and a potential development opportunity since it would provide additional financial resources for national governments and local communities to invest in health, education and sustainable development (Chomitz et al., 2007; Eliasch, 2008; Lubowski, 2008; Murray et al., 2009; Stern, 2006). While the prospective costs of deforestation‟s contribution to climate change have been estimated between $1 and $2 trillion USD annually (Eliasch, 2008; Lubowski, 2008; Tavoni et al., 2007), the annual costs for halving emissions from forests could be in the range of US$7 to $33 billion, sums developing countries would receive for their efforts (Eliasch, 2008; Kindermann et al., 2008; Torres et al., 2010). The message emanating from this body of work is that by preventing deforestation, global carbon emissions could be reduced significantly and at a lower cost, while simultaneously accomplishing important development objectives (Eliasch, 2008; Nepstad et al., 2009; Stern, 2006; Sohngen & Sedjo, 2006).6 The mechanism‟s design will be crucial and there are high expectations amid heated debates. In general, REDD can be seen as continuous with PES, with several specificities, such as scale and the focus on the carbon stocking function of trees, while PES may address different services and often focus on water. Indeed, while being more specific, proposals for REDD are based largely on experiences related to PES programs (perceived as highly promising) and the carbon offset market (not seen as very promising). However, the manner in which this basic idea will be applied under the REDD mechanism has been highly disputed and intensely negotiated. Many points of contention remain (Alvarado & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007; Angelsen, 2008; Densham et al., 2009; FoEI, 2008; Karsenty & Pirard, 2007), which can be summarized as follows.

2.1 Funding Several funding models have been proposed (Karsenty, 2008), including a specialized public fund (Brazil‟s proposal in 2006, also discussed by the Stern Review) (Grasl et al., 2003; Hoogeveen et al., 2008; Viana, 2009) and a private, carbon market-based approach (ICF International, 2009; Loisel, 2008). A third option is to include both public and private funds in a hybrid or “basket” approach (Thies & Czebiniak, 2008). Other concerns have involved prospects for long-term funding, phases of implementation, distribution and safeguards, and sensibility to carbon market variations (Brown et al., 2009; Minang & Murphy, 2010). Under the current negotiations, it appears that the framework would use a hybrid approach, with capacity-building funds available for start-up and financial links with the carbon market for scale-up (Minang & Murphy, 2010; UNFCCC, 2010; Verchot & Petkova, 2009).

2.2 Scale Different scales for implementation have been suggested as well. Under currently agreed terms, countries would report to an international funding To keep things in proportion, official development assistance from OECD countries is expected to reach US$126 billion in 2010 (OECD, 2010). 6

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

mechanism (UNFCCC, 2010), although the financial mechanism and the reporting system still have to be designed (COP-16, 2010). The mechanism would mainly follow a national or country-driven approach: states will be responsible for the implementation of REDD within their borders according to the principle of national sovereignty (Anderson & Richards, 2001; Plantinga & Richards, 2008; UNFCCC, 2010). This national model demonstrates another difference between REDD and PES. The latter is mostly oriented toward local and regional projects or carbon sinks, financed by the market-based mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol. REDD would, in certain versions, allow compensations for the maintenance of protected forests. Concrete REDD projects would nevertheless be “sub-national” (Santilli et al., 2005), and projects would be established on a small scale at the outset rather than immediately implemented nationwide. This combination is called the “nested” approach (Angelsen et al., 2008; Pedroni et al., 2009). The scale of REDD raises issues such as leakage, additionality, permanence, scope, baseline, and monitoring, as well as effectiveness, capacity, and governance (Angelsen et al., 2008; Pedroni et al., 2009; Densham et al., 2009). The national approach poses problems for countries with weak governance capacities or institutions (Plantinga & Richards, 2008), while a purely sub-national approach would risk leakage and raise questions of additionality and permanence (see below). Further questions, such as the relationship between a REDD carbon market and existing carbon markets, the question of which specific entities should manage REDD funds and coordinate the many funds recently created (e.g. the Oslo-Paris REDD Partnership), and under what monitoring system this would occur, remain open.

2.3 Leakage, Additionality, and Permanence Leakage is a situation in which deforestation avoided in one area results in deforestation in another, whether within or between countries (Plantinga & Richards, 2008), which could severely undermine the effectiveness of REDD (Schwarze et al., 2003). Additionality is the idea that reduction in deforestation should be greater than what would have occurred otherwise. A related concern is permanence, the maintenance of forests and their carbon sequestration capacities over time (Dutschke & Angelsen, 2008). Insurance policies, temporary crediting, shared liability, longterm accounting, buffering and pooling of credits have been proposed to combat the possibilities of accidents like fires or pest invasion or incidences of deforestation once credits have been distributed (Dutschke & Angelsen, 2008; Olander et al., 2009).

2.4 Scope The activities and forests eligible for financing are debated. The model presently accepted by UNFCCC parties is an enlarged version of REDD (“REDD+”) that includes activities such as conservation, reforestation, afforestation and other forest enhancement activities rather than simply deforestation and forest degradation. As FAO currently defines plantations as forests, a country could theoretically increase its forest area through plantations while deforesting its standing old-growth forests. This would distort some of REDD‟s environmental co-benefits, including those linked to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (van

Consilience

Noordwijk & Minang, 2009). As an answer to this concern, Paragraph 2(e) of the Annex I (Guidance and safeguards) of the Decision adopted in COP 16 states that REDD actions should be consistent with the conservation of natural forests and not used for their conversion (UNFCCC, 2010).

2.5 Baseline Another concern in designing REDD has been determining the “baseline” or “a level of emissions that would occur in the absence of a forest carbon policy and is used as a reference case for quantifying mitigation performance” (Olander et al., 2009, p. 32). Since baselines serve to assess the effectiveness of programs and allocation of emissions reduction credits, they have been a source of contention (Olander et al., 2007). The use of historical deforestation to project deforestation rates (Sathaye & Andrasko, 2007; Schlamadinger et al., 2005), or the use of “business-as-usual” projections (Soares-Filo et al., 2006) have been critiqued as perverse incentives encouraging adverse selection since those nations historically responsible for deforestation emissions are selected and rewarded rather than those who have historically left their forests intact (Plantinga & Richards, 2008).

2.6 Monitoring A consensus has emerged that emissions reductions should be measurable, reportable, and verifiable (Verchot & Petkova, 2009), but verifying how much carbon is in fact sequestered and the effective reduction of deforestation is difficult. Lack of transparency (Anderson et al., 2009), over- or under-estimations (Balzter & Shvidenko, 2000), and the cost and accuracy of current technologies (Anderson et al., 2009; Murray et al., 2009) are limiting factors. Monitoring deforestation and degradation and evaluating the carbon sequestered have greatly improved with remote sensing (DeFries et al., 2006; Gibbs et al., 2007). Still, many questions remain, such as who should certify REDD schemes, on what basis, with which techniques, and whether the capacity of developing countries to undertake the program‟s technical requirements and enforce restrictions is sufficient, even with capacitybuilding activities (Westholm et al., 2009). Most of the expansive, fast-growing body of literature has been dedicated to these questions, but it remains mainly prospective as relatively few field cases are available for early empirical assessment. In 2007 the UNFCCC called upon parties and international organizations to promote REDD through capacity-building and demonstration activities. Consequently, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO created a program (UN-REDD) to help countries prepare themselves for implementing REDD. To this end, the World Bank also administers the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). This support has prompted the involvement of many new actors of different natures (NGOs, private firms, research networks) in REDD activities and the rapid emergence of REDD experiments at the sub-national level. Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Metta Kongphan-Apirak studied over one hundred pioneer REDD projects underway and differentiated between REDD-readiness activities (65 cases of legal and institutional preparation of national strategies) and “demonstration activities” (44 projects implemented on a field level) (2009). Of the latter, half are located in Indonesia, the country with the highest amount of greenhouse gas emissions sourced from deforestation, and they all are local and pioneer experiments. One year later,

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

Cerbu et al. surveyed 79 preparedness activities (national level) and a hundred demonstration activities (sub-national level), in 40 countries, most of which took place in Brazil (17) and Indonesia (22) (2010). The survey concluded that a bias exists for activities in Latin America to the detriment of Africa. Factors such as prior experience, the quality of partnerships, the perceived threat to forests and biodiversity, and the quality of governance determine where projects are established. Clearly, the number of REDD projects are growing rapidly, a rush that could be harmful for the eventual social and even environmental impacts. Additionally, the concentration of projects in specific regions could be detrimental to future design. If success is highly dependent on specific conditions, reproducibility upon scale-up and across different nations might not be feasible.

3. Governance and Social Aspects

The review of literature and research on REDD reveals a clear gap on two issues: governance and social impacts. While governance and social aspects have been addressed in several studies and papers regarding REDD, systematic, and evidence-based arguments are still lacking. Governance includes the design of the mechanism at all levels, norms-setting procedures, related legal and informal institutional arrangements, and interactions between involved state and non-state actors. Additionally, governance encompasses horizontal (within a given level of government) and vertical (across levels of government) links with other issue areas (e.g. biodiversity, finance, trade, etc.), existing policies and institutions at the international, national, or local levels (Forsyth, 2009; Minang & Murphy, 2010; UNFCCC, 2006). In general, governance of forests is notoriously bad (Hoogeven et al., 2008). During the last 10 years, efforts to slow deforestation rates globally have had little success (Pfaff et al., 2004). Estimates contend that deforestation rates will continue in all geographic areas (Sathaye et al., 2007). Much of the literature covering the governance of REDD relates to comparing the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of the different proposed mechanisms like scale (Clarke, 2010; Kaimowitz, 2008; Viana, 2009), funding designs (Dooley et al., 2008; Viana, 2009; Hoogeveen et al., 2008; Clarke, 2010), monitoring systems (Lutrell et al., 2007; Peskett & Harkin, 2007), national forest policies, (Funder, 2009), state and non-state actors, and barriers and opportunities on the local scale (Scriven, 2009). While it appears that much of the „what‟ related to governance may have been resolved, the majority of the „how‟ is yet to be thoroughly investigated. Government competence at the national level will be a key factor in the success of REDD (Peskett et al., 2008). A significant concern is the problem of sending large sums of money to governments with poor track records, low institutional and governance capacities and weak commitments to transparency, accountability, and participation (Peskett et al., 2008; Ebeling & Yasue, 2008; Westholm et al., 2009). Some see REDD as an opportunity to strengthen forest governance, institutions and capacities (TNC, 2009; Olander et al., 2009). Others have questioned the capacity of REDD to produce such co-benefits (Bullock et al., 2009; Hall, 2008; Livengood & Dixon, 2009; REDD Monitor, 2009).

Consilience

Investing in governance institutions, engaging the local communities and addressing their needs has proven crucial to reducing deforestation in protected areas (Madeira, 2008). PES programs can be seen as indicating some of the effects of REDD, and the evidence thus far suggests that these programs have a bias against the poorest of the poor, although it is not clear whether this is due to correlation with other targeting criteria of the programs or to barriers to participation linked to poverty (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2007). Conflict over local and community land tenure, restricted access to forest resources, and unfair distribution of carbon revenues have been identified as possible consequences of poorly designed forest carbon programs (Olander et al., 2009). The effectiveness of PES schemes, conversely, have been shown to depend on an array of factors that enhance the role of the poor, such as community involvement, institutional and economic drivers, and resources for surveillance and policing (Mertens et al., 2004). Ensuring co-benefits could thus result in more efficient and effective programs (Durbin, 2007; Olander et al., 2009). A comprehensive, integrative approach with strong stakeholder participation may be more likely to address downfalls in REDD programs, as well as ensure success by preventing carbon emissions. In effect, legitimacy is a condition for effectiveness. In addition to governance, another central challenge for realizing REDD objectives is to ensure that social needs are met and sustained alongside the conservation of forests. The reduction of the biodiversity of forest areas, for instance, is a critical concern for REDD. Biodiversity is already under threat, as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment recorded in 2005. The assessment concluded that poor countries have made little progress in reaching the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) objectives of conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Loss of biodiversity deprives people of ecosystem services worth US$250 billion annually worldwide (MEA, 2005) and ecosystem services and other non-marketed goods are estimated to account for 47% to 89% percent of the GDP of the poor (TEEB, 2009). Poor people are most critically dependent on wellfunctioning natural environments for their survival (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003). The need to seek synergetic solutions for diverse social-environmental challenges is recognized in the report “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” (TEEB, 2008, p. 16). The TEEB study concludes that investing in the restoration and maintenance of the Earth‟s ecosystems (valued at several trillion dollars) from forests and mangroves to wetlands and river basins can have a key role in countering climate change while providing ecosystem services necessary for the sustenance and vibrancy of human life. The TEEB findings recognize that enhancing the resilience of ecosystems and maintaining the planet‟s biodiversity are key elements in mitigation and adaptation agendas, and are culturally and socially valuable to diverse groups of peoples (TEEB, 2010). If REDD were designed to contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services by protecting vast areas of standing forest, it could contribute to guaranteeing long-held cultural practices and social benefits. Aligning social and environmental goals to promote human well-being has always been and still is the weak link in implementing sustainable development and biodiversity conservation (GBO, 2010), and REDD is no exception. The appeal of REDD for many of its advocates has been the prospect of significant “co-benefits” for indigenous people and other forest dwellers in terms of development and

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

livelihoods (Brown et al., 2008), but fears about local rights, unfairness, impacts on development, land use, livelihoods and food production have driven critiques of REDD (Griffiths, 2007). Whether conservation and social goals can be achieved simultaneously is debated (Newmark & Hough, 2000; Adams et al., 2004; Barrett et al., 2005). Many authors have recorded how local and indigenous people have suffered under previous conservation schemes, whether due to forced resettlement from protected areas (Adams & Hutton, 2007; Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Bray & Velazquez, 2009; Colchester, 1997; Dowie, 2009; Krueger, 2009; Schmidt-Soltau, 2003), inadequate compensation for limitations on natural resource access (Peters, 1998; Shyamsundar & Kramer, 1996), or the exacerbation of local conflicts (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Koch, 1997). Moreover, evidence from benefit-sharing schemes based on forest taxes or other revenues that were intended to be pro-poor have not been particularly successful (Bond et al., 2009); these revenues have often not reached the intended beneficiaries (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; Egbe, 2001; Frost & Bond, 2008), or have had only modest impacts on livelihoods (Bond & Mayers, 2009; Porras et al., 2008). Given this history, many questions and concerns related to the impacts of REDD have emerged, but most recent literature is composed of preventive denunciations and policy recommendations. In responding to these concerns, research relies primarily on projections or hypotheses for the scheme, economic modeling, historical examples from PES or other conservation-development projects, or the few empirical examples existing to date, notably the Noel Kempf Project in Bolivia (Densham et al., 2009; Griffiths, 2007; TNC, 2009). Because of these methods and the limited information available until now, much of the work related to these concerns simply raises many more questions than answers.

4. Gaps in the Literature

The narrow breadth of literature covering the design of REDD means we are still speculating about how REDD will be governed and what prospective effects it will produce in terms of development, livelihoods, human rights, and equity. These issues are critical, as an estimated 1.6 billion people, 60 million of whom are indigenous people, depend on forests for their survival (CBD, 2009; WB, 2004). But as the literature stands now, much more information is needed in order to design REDD properly in these terms; little attention has been given to the social dimension of any of the proposals being made to address climate change and forest protection. Among the main social issues requiring investigation are rights, development and equity.

4.1 Rights, Local and Indigenous Peoples, and Land Tenure Widespread concerns relate to the impact of REDD on local and indigenous peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x;s rights, most particularly their right to land (Butler, 2008; Castro Diaz, 2008; Griffiths, 2007; Peskett et al., 2008). Funder hypothesizes that the implementation of REDD could be good or bad for local peoples, either solidifying recognition for their right to land or ignoring and abusing such rights (2009). According to its promoters, the Noel Kempff project in Bolivia demonstrated that REDD can reinforce and augment certain customary property rights (TNC, 2009). However, most of the literature questions this assertion. Weak land rights can potentially create

Consilience

or exacerbate local conflicts and leave local people open to manipulation (Mayers et al., 2006). Cotula Mayers lay out the complexity and variability of land tenure issues that REDD will be affect, emphasizing the past failures of benefit-sharing schemes associated with forests (2009). Similarly, Bond et al. look at PES schemes worldwide and observe their potential for weakening land and resource rights (2009). The risk is that REDD schemes may result in governments, companies, conservation NGOs or speculators carving up forest lands, along with forest protection approaches that marginalize rather than empower forest people through the recentralization of forest governance (Phelps et al., 2010; Sikor et al., 2010). Another worry is that REDD may lead to what have been known as “land grabs” (Castro Diaz, 2008; Griffith, 2007; Peskett et al., 2008; Robledo et al., 2008). Land grabs and the re-zoning of forest land by external actors without the participation of local people have been directly observed (Griffith, 2007). Castro Diaz demonstrates how indigenous people have been left out of negotiations related to REDD projects (2008). The recent case of Papua New Guinea further illustrates the importance of clear and enforced land rights (Melick, 2010; Mongobay, 2010; Palmer, 2010). Weak land tenure and associated problems also potentially play a negative role in poverty alleviation, for if payments depend on owning land, it is likely that they will not go primarily to poor people, even if they go to poor areas (Kerr et al., 2004; Grieg-Gran, forthcoming).

4.2 Development There is a general hope that REDD funds could contribute to providing the resources needed for economic growth and development (Olander & Murray, 2007). According to Patanayak et al., protecting forests in Brazil could equilibrate the distribution of income, health and education in favor of rural residents (2009). For example, watershed PES schemes have demonstrated significant potential for impacting poverty (Bond & Mayers, 2009; Bond et al., 2009; Porras et al., 2008). But this enthusiasm is tempered by many interrogations based on earlier experiences. Several issues must be addressed regarding the injection of large sums of money into national economies. Implementing the program on a large scale implies opportunity costs and a reorientation of economic activities based on forest exploitation (Chomitz, 1999; Chomitz et al., 2007; Grieg-Gran, forthcoming). The dependence on one source of revenue, comparable to external aid, has been highlighted, as well as the danger of provoking “Dutch disease” (the distortion of an economy due to high dependence on one economic sector) (Peskett et al., 2008). The possible impacts on internal prices for food or energy could produce depressive macro-level employment effects (Bond et al., 2009) and be detrimental to the poorest communities. Ebeling & Yasue correlate Human Development Indicators (HDIs) with areas likely to benefit from REDD schemes and find that the program will most likely not target the regions with the direst human development needs (2008). Griffiths foresees an unequal imposition of costs for the protection of forests onto local communities and indigenous peoples, underlined and enforced by inequitable and abusive contracts; he notes that the socioeconomic situation has sometimes worsened under these programs (2007). One of the most spectacular gaps in the related literature is an almost complete absence of interconnection between REDD and the abundant

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

development literature. One reason may be the divide among technical domains. Since most of the REDD literature concerns forestry, finance and technical issues, its authors tend not to be development experts. It appears that for some authors, REDD would emerge in a virgin world where everything is to be reinvented, whereas many of the issues facing REDD implementation are in fact well-known development problems. Building on the lessons learned in development over the last 50 years would probably avoid much disappointment and resource waste.

4.3 Equity Closely linked to the issue of poverty alleviation are concerns related to equity and whether REDD will instigate capture and control by the elite, to the detriment of those with less power and resources, as has been the case with other conservation schemes (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Fritzen, 2007; Kellert et al., 2000; Thompson & Homewood, 2002). Sommerville et al. hypothesize that REDD will benefit the elite more than the non-elite and that the failure to consider fairness and distribution issues can undermine PES or other conservation projects (2009). Cotula & Mayers observe that as the value of the standing forest increases, powerful actors look to gain power over these carbon-based assets, often to the detriment of the less powerful, arguing that elite capture and misappropriation of the funds are potential byproducts of REDD funding (2009). Opportunity and transactions costs have also been linked to inequity and the perception of fairness of distribution (Adhikari, 2005; Kumar, 2002). Bond et al. question the possibility that local peoples can participate as equals in selling carbon, emphasizing the potential for divergence in equity of payment levels and other terms due to negotiating capacity (2009).

5. Conclusion

The literature suggests major gaps in the way REDD is studied. The first and most salient gap is the absence of sustained analysis on the social impact of implementing REDD over the long term. This gap stems from the fact that most of the empirical studies conducted so far focus on how to make REDD work to reduce deforestation and channel funds to developing countries rather than the problems that such mechanisms, even if fulfilling the two aforementioned objectives, would pose from a social perspective. Conversely, the literature that does emphasize the potentially adverse social impact of REDD tends to be rather normative, condemning REDD as a dangerous and manipulative tool rather than objectively assessing its positive and negative contributions and proposing means to adjust it. If REDD is to become a socially acceptable large-scale mechanism for fighting climate change, managing forests and transferring resources, lessons must be learned from both earlier experiences (forest governance mechanisms, carbon sinks, PES) and from experimental REDD projects implemented thus far. Whereas forest conservation mechanisms have often required important legal reforms, most notably with respect to land apportionment and distribution, there is little material on how such reforms affect the human rights of both indigenous peoples (with non-formal entitlements to their traditional land) and other sectors of the population (with property and social rights, including access to unemployment benefits in case of relocation or professional re-orientation from forest-based activities to other sectors). Earlier experiences would suggest that if REDD were to

Consilience

fulfill the expectations of both developing (regarding funding) and developed countries (regarding cheaper emission reductions), such results would come at the price of considerable social costs. The extent to which such costs may be worth bearing in light of the potential benefits from the implementation of REDD is a matter requiring empirical assessment. The second gap concerns the link between the operation of REDD schemes and governance structures. The lionâ&#x20AC;&#x;s share of the literature focuses on those mechanisms that would be effective in making REDD work from the perspective of emissions reduction and financing. Some authors also mention the difficulties arising from implementing a complex system in countries and/or regions with a substantial governance deficit, but such difficulties are seldom, if ever, studied empirically. The experience of other forest-related mechanisms is typically brought to bear to shed light on the link between REDD and governance. However, the particular features of those other forest-related mechanisms make such assessments difficult to transpose. Only through an empirical assessment of ongoing REDD projects will it be possible to understand the link between REDD and governance structures. Based on the unprecedented crisis of climate change and the apparent consensus of the UNFCCC parties on this mechanism, REDD could be the first successful attempt to govern the forests at a global scale and to do so in a socially acceptable way. But with the mechanism as it stands, and with insufficient research to improve it, REDD could also constitute a missed opportunity to address these issues. There is still time to address these shortcomings and design REDD appropriately.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

Bibliography Adams, W.A. & J. Hutton. 2007. People, Parks and Poverty: Political Ecology and Biodiversity Conservation. Conservation and Society 5 (2): 147-183. Adams, W.M., R. Aveling, et al. 2004. Biodiversity Conservation and the Eradication of Poverty. Science 306 (5699): 1146–1149. Adhikari, B. 2005. Poverty, Property Rights and Collective Action: Understanding the Distributive Aspects of Common Property Resource Management. Environment and Development Economics 10 (1): 7–31. Agrawal, A. & C.C. Gibson. 1999. Enchantment And Disenchantment: The Role Of Community In Natural Resource Conservation. World Development 27 (4): 629–649. Agrawal, A. & K. Redford. 2009. Conservation And Displacement: An Overview. Conservation and Society 7 (1): 1-10. Alvarado, L. & S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff. 2007. Why are we Seeing REDD? An Analysis of the International Debate on Reducing Emissions From Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries. Analyses n°02/2007. Iddri Angelsen A. & S. Wunder. 2003. Exploring the Forest-Poverty Link: Key Concepts, Issues and Research Implications. Bogor: CIFOR. Angelsen, A (ed). 2008. Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options, and Implications. Bogor: CIFOR. Angelsen, A., C. Streck, L. Peskett, J. Brown & C. Luttrell. 2008. What is the Right Scale for REDD? The Implications of National, Subnational, and Nested Approaches. CIFOR Infobrief 15. Balint, P.J. & J. Mashinya. 2006. The Decline of a Model Community-based Conservation Project: Governance, Capacity, and Devolution in Mahenye, Zimbabwe. Geoforum 37 (5): 805–815. Balzter H. & A. Shvindenko. 2000. Map Accuracy Report – Siberia Forest Cover Map. Siberia Working Note 58. Laxenburg: International Institue for Applied Systems Analysis. Bandyopadhyay, S., J.C. Guzman & S. Lendelvo. 2008. Communal Conservancies and Household Gain in Namibia. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Consilience

Bond, I. & J. Mayers. 2009. Fair Deals for Watershed Services: Lessons from a Multicountry Action Learning Project. Natural Resource Issues no. 13. London: IIED. Bond, I., M. Grieg-Gran, S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff, P. Hazlewood, S. Wunder & A. Angelsen. 2009. Incentives to Sustain Forest Ecosystem Services: A review and Lessons for REDD. Natural Resource Issues no. 16. London, Bogor, Washington: IIED, CIFOR and WRI. Bray, D.B. & A. Velazquez. 2009. From Displacement-based Conservation to PlaceBased Conservation. Conservation and Society 7 (1): 11-14. Brown, C., L. Loisel, C. Peskett, C. Streck & D. Zarin. 2009. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment Report prepared for the Government of Norway. Washington: Meridian Institute. Brown, D., F. Seymour & L. Peskett. 2008. How do we Achieve REDD Co-benefits and Avoid Doing Harm. In Angelsen, A. Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications. Bogor: CIFOR: 107-118. Bullock, S., M. Childs & T. Picken. 2009. A Dangerous Distraction: Why Offsetting is Failing the Climate and People. London: Friends of the Earth. Butler, R. 2008. Conflict in Papua New Guinea between Government and Landowners over REDD Carbon Trading. Retrieved on Nov. 17, from http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1117-png.html. Cerbu, G.A. et al. 2010. Locating REDD: A global survey and analysis of REDD readiness and demonstration activities. Environ. Sci. Policy. In Press. Castro Diaz, E. 2008. Climate Change, Forest Conservation and Indigenous Peoples Rights. Paper Prepared for the Global Forest Coalition for the International Expert Group Meeting on Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change, Darwin, Australia, 2â&#x20AC;&#x201C;4 April. CBD (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity). 2009. Sustainable Forest Management, Biodiversity and Livelihoods: A Good Practice Guide. Montreal: CBD Secretariat. Chhatre, A. & A. Agrawal. 2009. Trade-offs and Synergies between Carbon Storage and Livelihood Benefits from Forest Commons. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (42): 17667-17670. Chomitz, K. 1999. Evaluating Carbon Offsets from Forestry and Energy Projects: How Do They Compare? Policy Research Working Paper. Washington: World Bank.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

Chomitz, K.M., P. Buys, G. De Luca, T.S. Thomas & S. Wertz-Kanounnikoff. 2007. At Loggerheads. Agricultural Expansion, Poverty Reduction and Environment in the Tropical Forests. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington: World Bank. Clarke, R.A. 2010. Moving the REDD Debate from Theory to Practice: Lessons Learned from the Ulu Masen Project. Law, Environment and Development Journal 6 (1): 38-60. Colchester, M. 1997. Salvaging Nature: Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas. In Ghimire, K. & M. Pimbert (eds). Social Change and Conservation. London: Earthscan: 97-130. Cotula, L. & J. Mayers. 2009. Tenure in REDD – Start-point or Afterthought? Natural Resource Issues no. 15. London: IIED. DeFries, R., F. Achard, S. Brown, M. Herold, D. Murdiyarso, B. Schlamadinger & C. de Souza. 2006. Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Considerations for Monitoring and Measuring. Global Terrestrial Observing System no. 46. Rome: FAO. Densham, A. et al. 2009. Carbon Scam: Noel Kempff Climate Action Project and the Push for Sub-national Forest Offsets. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International. Dooley, K., I. Leal & S. Ozinga. 2008. An overview of Selected REDD proposals. London: FERN. Dowie, M. 2009. Conservation Refugees. The Hundred‐ Year Conflict between Global Conservation and Native Peoples. Cambridge: MIT Press. Durbin, J. 2007. Voluntary Markets: How to Achieve Co-benefits for Climate, Biodiversity, and People. Presentation to Poverty and Environment Partnership Meeting, November 20, Washington. Dutschke, M. & A. Angelsen. 2008. How do we Ensure Permanence and Assign Liability? In Angelsen, A. (ed). Moving Ahead with REDD: Issues, Options and Implications. Bogor: CIFOR: 77-86. Ebeling, J. & M. Yasue. 2008. Generating Carbon Finance through Avoided Deforestation and its Potential to Create Climatic, Conservation and Human Development Benefits. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 363: 1917–1924. Egbe, S.E. 2001. The Concept of Community Forestry under Cameroonian law. Journal of African Law 45: 25–50.

Consilience

Eliasch, J. 2008. Climate Change: Financing Global Forests. The Eliasch Review. London: Earthscan / James & James. Elmqvist, T. et al. 2010. Biodiversity, ecosystems and ecosystems services. In Kumar, P. (ed) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Foundations. London: Earthscan. Chapter 2. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). (2010). Global Forest Resource Assessment. Rome: FAO. Fearnside, P.M. 2009. Science and Carbon Sinks in Brazil. Climatic Change 97: 373378. FoEI (Friends of the Earth International). 2008. REDD Myths: A Critical Review of Proposed Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing Countries. Amsterdam: FoEI. Forsyth, T. 2009. Multilevel, multiactor governance in REDD+: participation, integration and coordination. In Angelsen, A. (ed). Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. Bogor: CIFOR: 113-124. Fritzen, S. A. 2007. Can the Design of Community-driven Development Reduce the Risk of Elite Capture? Evidence from Indonesia. World Development 35 (8): 1359â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1379. Frost, P. & I. Bond. 2008. The CAMPFIRE Programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for Wildlife Services. Ecological Economics 65 (4): 776â&#x20AC;&#x201C;787. Funder, M. 2009. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD): An Overview of Risks and Opportunities for the Poor. Danish Institute for International Studies REPORT no. 21. Gibbs, H.K., S. Brown, J. O. Niles & J.A. Foley. 2007. Monitoring and Estimating Tropical Forest Carbon Stocks: Making REDD a Reality. Environmental Research Letters 2 (4): 045023. Goldtooth, T.B.K. 2010. Why REDD/REDD+ is not a solution. In Carbon Trade Watch. No REDD: A Reader: 11-23. Accessed Dec. 14, 2010, www.carbontradewatch.org. Grainger, A., & M. Obersteiner. 2010. A framework for structuring the global forest monitoring landscape in the REDD+ era. Environ. Sci. Policy. In Press. Greenpeace International. 2003. Sinks in the CDM: After the Climate, will Biodiversity go down the Drain ?! Amsterdam: Greenpeace International.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

Grieg-Gran, M. (forthcoming). Equity Considerations and Potential Impacts on Indigenous or Poor Forest-dependent Communities. CIFOR Working paper series. Griffiths, Tom. 2007. Seeing “RED”? “Avoided Deforestation” and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. Forest Peoples Programme. Hall, R. 2008. REDD Myths: A Critical Review of Proposed Mechanisms to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing countries. Issue 114. Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth International. Hayes, T.M. 2006. Parks, People, and Forest Protection: an Institutional Assessment of the Effectiveness of Protected Areas. World Development 34 (12): 20642075. Hoogeven, H. et al. 2008. Designing a Forest Financing Mechanism: a Call for Bold, Collaborative and Innovative Thinking. Medford: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. ICF International. 2009. Fostering Carbon Market Investments in REDD. The Meridian Institute. Isakson, R. 2002. Payment for Environmental Services in the Catskills: A socio-economic analysis of the agricultural strategy in New York City’s watershed management plan. Proyecto Pago por Servicios Ambientales en las Américas. San Salvador: PRISMA. Kaimowitz, D. 2008. The Prospects for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Mesoamerica. International Forestry Review. 10 (3): 485–495. Karsenty, A. 2008. The Architecture of Proposed REDD Schemes after Bali: Facing Critical Choices. International Forestry Review 10 (3): 443-457. Karsenty, A. & R. Pirard. 2007. Changement Climatique: faut-il récompenser la « déforestation évitée »? Natures Sciences Sociétés 15 (4): 357-369. Kellert, S.R., J.N. Mehta, S. A. Ebbin, L.L. Lichtenfeld. 2000. Community Natural Resource Management: Promise, Rhetoric, and Reality. Society and Natural Resources 13 (2): 705–715. Kerr, S., L. Lipper, S. P. Alexander, Pfaff, R. Cavatassi, B. Davis, J. Hendy & A. Sanchez. 2004. Will Buying Tropical Forest Carbon Benefit The Poor? Evidence from Costa Rica. ESA Working Paper no. 04-20. Kill, J. et al. 2010. Trading Carbon: How it Works and why it is Controversial. Fern.

Consilience

Kindermann, G., M. Obersteiner, B. Sohngen, J. Sathaye, K. Andrasko, E. Rametsteiner, B. Schlamadinger, S. Wunder & R. Beach. 2008. Global Cost Estimates of Reducing Carbon Emissions through Avoided Deforestation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105 (30): 10302. Koch, E. 1997. Ecotourism and Rural Reconstruction in South Africa: Reality or Rhetoric. In Ghimire, K. & M. Pimbert (eds). Social Change and Conservation. London: Earthscan: 214-238. Kosoy, N. & E. Corbera. 2010. Payments for Ecosystem Services as Commodity Fetishism. Ecological Economics 69 (6): 1228-1236. Krueger, L. 2009. Protected Areas and Human Displacement: Improving the Interface between Policy and Practice. Conservation and Society 71 (1): 21-25. Kumar, S. 2002. Does Participation in Common Pool Resource Management help the Poor? A Social Cost–benefit Analysis of Joint Forest Management in Jharkhand, India. World Development 30 (5): 763–782. Livengood, E. & A. Dixon. 2009. REDD and the Effort to Limit Global Warming to 2°C: Implications for Including REDD Credits in the International Carbon Market. Report by KEA3 for Greenpeace International. Loisel, C. 2008. Linkage between Forest-based Mitigation and GHG markets. Idées pour le débat No. 19. Paris: IDDRI. Lubowski, R.N. 2008. The Role of REDD in Stabilising Greenhouse Gas Concentrations: Lessons from Economic Models. Infobrief 18. Bogor: CIFOR. Luttrell, C., K. Schreckenberg & L. Peskett. 2007. The Implications of Carbon Financing for Pro-poor Community Forestry. Forestry Briefing. Vol. 14. Overseas Development Institute. Madeira, E.M. 2008. Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Developing Countries: An Examination of the Issues Facing the Incorporation of REDD into Market-based Climate Policies. Resources for the Future Report. Mayers, J., A. Bila, S. Khaukha, K. Opoku & W. Simwela. 2006. Forest Governance and Social Justice: Practical Tactics from a Learning Group Approach in Africa. International Forestry Review 8 (2): 201–210. MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment). 2005a. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report. Washington: World Resources Institute / Island Press.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

MEA (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment). 2005b. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity Synthesis. Washington: World Resources Institute / Island Press. Melick, D. 2010. Credibility of REDD and Experiences from Papua New Guinea. Conservation Biology 24 (2): 359-361. Mertens, B., D. Kaimowitz, A. Puntodewo, J. Vanclay & P. Mendez. 2004. Modeling Deforestation at Distinct Geographic Scales and Time Periods in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. International Regional Science Review 27 (3): 271-296. Minang, P.A. & D. Murphy. 2010. REDD after Copenhagen: the Way Forward. International Institute for Sustainable Development. Mongabay, 2010. Papua New Guinea strips communal land rights protections, opening door to big business. http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0630hance_png_amendment.html Morgan, J., C. Maretti & G. Volpi. 2005. Tropical Deforestation in the Context of the Post 2012 Climate Change Regime. In Moutinho, P. & S. Schwartzman (eds). Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change. Belem and Washington: Amazon Institute for Environmental Research, and Environmental Defense: 101-110. Mu単oz-Pi単a, C., A. Guevara, J.M. Torres & J. Bra単a. 2008. Paying for the Hydrological Services of Mexico's Forests: Analysis, Negotiations and Results. Ecological Economics 65 (4): 725-736. Murray, B., R. Lubowski & B. Sohngen. 2009. Including Reduced Emissions from International Forest Carbon in Climate Policy: Understanding the Economics. Nicholas Institute Policy Brief 09-02. Duke University. Nabuurs, G. J., O. Masera, K. Andrasko, P. Benitez-Ponce, R. Boer, M. Dutschke, E. Elsiddig, J. Ford-Robertson, P. Frumhoff & T. Karjalainen. 2007. Forestry. Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Nelson, A. & K.M. Chomitz. 2009. Protected Area Effectiveness in Reducing Tropical Deforestation: a Global Analysis of the Impact of Protection Status. Evaluation Brief 7. Washington: World Bank. Nepstad, D., B.S. Soares-Filho, F. Merry, A. Lima, P. Moutinho, J. Carter, M. Bowman, A. Cattaneo, H. Rodrigues & S. Schwartzman. 2009. The End of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Science 326 (5958): 1350.

Consilience

Newmark, W.D. & J. Hough. 2000. Conserving Wildlife in Africa: Integrated Conservation and Development Projects and Beyond. BioScience 50 (7): 585– 592. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2010. ODA: What are the expected aid levels for 2010? Accessed Dec. 14, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,de_34968570_35008930_44987 043_1_1_1_1,00.html Olander, L.P., B.C. Murray, M. Steininger & H. Gibbs. 2007. Establishing Credible Baselines for Quantifying Avoided Carbon Emissions from Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation. Nicholas Institute Working Paper WP 07-05. Duke University. Olander, L.P., W. Boyd, K. Lawlor, E.M. Madeira & J.O. Niles. 2009. International Forest Carbon and the Climate Change Challenge: Issues and Options. Nicholas Institute Policy Brief. Duke University. Pagiola, S., A.R. Rios & A. Arcenas. 2007. Can the Poor Participate in Payments for Environmental Services? Lessons from the Silvopastoral Project in Nicaragua. Environment and Development Economics 13: 299-325. Palmer, C. 2010. Property rights and liability for deforestation under REDD+: Implications for “permanence” in policy design. Ecological Economics. In Press. Pedroni, L., M. Dutschke, C. Streck & M.E. Porrúa. 2009. Creating Incentives for avoiding further Deforestation: the Nested Approach. Climate Policy 9 (2): 207-220. Peskett, L. & Z. Harkin. 2007. Risk and Responsibility in Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. Forestry Briefing 15. Overseas Development Institute. Peskett, L., D. Huberman, E. Bowen-Jones, G. Edwards & J. Brown. 2008. Making REDD Work for the Poor. A Poverty Environment Partnership Report. Peters, J. 1998. Transforming the Integrated Conservation and Development Project Approach: Observations from the Ranomafana National Park Project, Madagascar. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 11 (1): 17–47. Pfaff, A., S. Kerr, R. Cavatassi, B. Davis, L. Lippper, A. Sanchez & J. Timmins. 2004. Effects of Poverty on Deforestation: Distinguishing Behaviour from Location. ESA Working Paper no. 04-19. Phelps, J., E. Webb and A. Agrawal. 2010. Does REDD+ threatens to recentralize forest governance? Science 328 (16 April): 312-313.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

Plantinga, A.J. & K.R. Richards. 2008. International Forest Carbon Sequestration in a Post-Kyoto Agreement. Discussion Paper 2008-11. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements. Porras, I., M. Grieg-Gran & N. Neves. 2008. All that Glitters: A review of Payments for Watershed Services in Developing Countries. London: IIED. Robledo, C., J. Blaser, S. Byrne & K. Schmidt. 2008. Climate Change and Governance in the Forest Sector. Washington: Rights and Resources Institute. Santilli, M., P. Moutinho, S. Schwartzman, D. Nepstad, L. Curran & C. Nobre. 2005. Tropical Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol. Climatic Change 71 (3): 267276. Sathaye, J.A. & K. Andrasko. 2007. Special Issue on Estimation of Baselines and Leakage in Carbon Mitigation Forestry Projects. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 12 (6): 963-970. Sathaye, J.A., W. Makundi, L. Dale, P. Chan & K. Andrasko. 2007. GHG Mitigation Potential, Costs and Benefits in Global Forests: A Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Approach. Energy Journal Special Issue 3: 127-172. Schlamadinger, B., L. Ciccarese, M. Dutschke, P.M. Fearnside, S. Brown & D. Murdiyarso. 2005. Should we Include Avoidance of Deforestation in the International Response to Climate Change? In Murdiyarso, D. & H. Herawati (eds). Carbon forestry: Who will Benefit? Proceedings of Workshop on Carbon Sequestration and Sustainable Livelihoods, held in Bogor, Indonesia. Schmidt-Soltau, K. 2003. Conservation Related Resettlement in Central Africa: Environmental and Social Risks. Development and Change 34 (3): 525â&#x20AC;&#x201C;551. Schmitt, C. B. et al. 2008. Global Ecological Forest Classification and Forest Protected Area Gap Analysis. Analysis and Recommendations in View of the 10% Target for Forest Protection under the Convention on Biological Diversity. Freiburg University Press. Schwarze, R., J.O. Niles & J. Olander. 2003. Understanding and Managing Leakage in Forest-based Green-house-gas-mitigation Projects: Capturing Carbon and Conserving Biodiversity: The Market Approach. London: The Royal Society. Scriven, Joel. 2009. REDDy? Agency in Protected Area Governance along Peruâ&#x20AC;&#x;s Amazonian Frontier. Paper Presented at the 2009 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change.

Consilience

Shyamsundar, P. & R.A. Kramer. 1996. Tropical Forest Protection: an Empirical Analysis of the Costs Borne by Local people. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31 (2): 129-144. Sikor, T., Stahl, J., Enters, T., Ribot, J., Singh, N., Sunderlin, W. and Wollenberg, L. 2010. REDD-plus, forest peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x;s rights and nested climate governance. Global Environmental Change 20: 423-425. Silva-Chavez, G.A. 2005. Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Tropical Deforestation by Applying Compensated Reduction to Bolivia. In Moutinho, P. & S. Schwartzman (eds). Tropical Deforestation and Climate Change. Belem and Washington: Amazon Institute for Environmental Research, and Environmental Defense: 73-86. Skutsch, M., N. Bird, E. Trines, M. Dutschke, P. Frumhoff, B.H.J. de Jong, P. Van Laake, O. Masera & D. Murdiyarso. 2007. Clearing the Way for Reducing Emissions from Tropical Deforestation. Environmental Science and Policy 10 (4): 322-334. Soares-Filho, B.S., D.C. Nepstad, L.M. Curran, G.C. Cerqueira, R.A. Garcia, C.A. Ramos, E. Voll, A. McDonald, P. Lefebvre & P. Schlesinger. 2006. Modelling Conservation in the Amazon Basin. Nature 440: 520-523. Sohngen, B. & R. Sedjo. 2006. Carbon Sequestration in Global Forests under Different Carbon Price Regimes. The Energy Journal,Special Issue 3: 109-126. Sommerville, M., J. Jones, M. Rahajaharison & E.J. Milner-Gulland. 2009. The Role of Fairness and Benefit Distribution in Community-based Payment for Environmental Services Interventions: A case Study from Menabe, Madagascar. Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1262-1271 Stern, N. 2006. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. London: HM Treasury. Tacconi, L., S. Mahanty & H. Suich. 2009. Assessing the Livelihood Impacts of Payments for Environmental Services: Implications for Avoided Deforestation. Paper presented at the XIII World Forestry Congress, Buenos Aires. Tavoni, M. et al. 2007. Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize Climate. Climate. Change Modeling and Policy Working Paper. Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. TEEB. 2008. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity. An Anterim Report. European Communities. Cambridge UK: Banson. TEEB. 2009. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for National and International Policy Makers. European Communities. Cambridge UK: Banson.

Consilience

Hufty et al.: REDD

TEEB. 2010. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of TEEB. Thies, C. & R. Czebiniak. 2008. Forests for Climate: Developing a Hybrid Approach for REDD. Amsterdam: Greenpeace International. Thompson, M. & K. Homewood. 2002. Entrepreneurs, Elites and Exclusion in Maasailand: Trends in Wildlife Conservation and Pastoralist Development. Human Ecology 30 (2): 107â&#x20AC;&#x201C;138. TNC (The Nature Conservancy). 2009. Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project: A Case Study in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation. Washington: TNC. Torres, A.B., R. Marchant, J.C. Lovett, J.C.R. Smart & R. Tipper. 2010. Analysis of the Carbon Sequestration Costs of Afforestation and Reforestation Agroforestry Practices and the Use of Cost Curves to Evaluate their Potential for Implementation of Climate Change Mitigation. Ecological Economics 69 (3): 469-477. UNFCCC. 2005. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action. UNFCCC: FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1. UNFCCC. 2006. Background Paper for the Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, Part I: Scientific, Socio-economic, Technical and Methodological Issues Related to Deforestation in Developing Countries. Working Paper no. 1(a). UNFCCC. 2010. Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention. unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf van Dijk, K. & H. Savenije. 2009. Towards National Financing Strategies for Sustainable Forest Management in Latin America: Overview of the Present Situation and the Experience in Selected Countries. Forestry Policy and Institutions Working Paper 21. Rome: FAO. Van Noordwijk, M. & P.A. Minang. 2002. If we cannot Define, we cannot Save it. ASB Policy Brief No. 15. Nairobi, Kenya. Verchot, L. & E. Petkova. 2009. The State of REDD Negotiations: Consensus Points, Options for Moving Forward and Research Needs to Support the Process. Bogor: CIFOR. Viana, V. 2009. Financing REDD: Meshing Markets with Government Funding. IIED Briefing.

Consilience

Wallace, K.J. 2007. Classification of Ecosystem Services: Problems and Solutions. Biological Conservation 139 (3-4): 235-246. Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S., M. Kongphan-apirak. 2009. Emerging REDD+: a Preliminary Survey of Demonstration and Readiness Activities. CIFOR Working Paper No. 46. Bogor: CIFOR. Westholm, L., S. Henders, M. Ostwald & E. Mattsson. 2009. Assessment of Existing Global Financial Initiatives and Monitoring Aspects of Carbon Sinks in Forest Ecosystems: the issue of REDD. Focali Report. Wilson, E. O. 1992. The Diversity of Life. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Wunder, S. 2006. The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation. Conservation Biology 21 (1): 48-58. Wunder, S., S. Engel & S. Pagiola. 2008. Taking Stock: A Comparative Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services Programs in Developed and Developing Countries. Ecological Economics 65 (4): 834-852.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 25-52

Public-Private Dichotomy in Utilization of Health Care Services in India Chandan Kumar Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee c.kumar803@gmail.com Ravi Prakash Karnataka Health Promotion Trust ravistats@gmail.com Abstract This paper attempts to highlight the differences in utilization of health care services provided by the public and private sectors in India. In addition, it also explores a marked regional pattern in utilization of health services. Using the largescale national survey data (DLHS RCH-II, 2002-04 and 60th round National Sample Survey, 2004), the authors have selected socio-economic as well as demographic factors determining health treatment seeking behavior, in terms of availing services from public or private sources, which have been addressed with objectivity. Furthermore, selected states of India have been ranked on the basis of extent of inequality (in terms of economic status) in utilization of health services from public and private sources. The paper, in its totality, advocates for economically affordable and better quality health care services for the masses. Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Note Chandan Kumar received an M.Phil in Population Studies from the International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai in 2008. He is pursuing a Ph.D. in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee. His research interests include Population and Development, Health Care Services, Educational Inequality, Education and Development. Ravi Prakash received a Ph.D. in Population Studies from the International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS), Mumbai in 2010. Presently, he works with the Karnataka Health Promotion Trust (KHPT) in Bangalore, India.

Keywords: Health service utilization, Public vs. Private health sources, India, Regional pattern, DLHS RCH-II, National Sample Survey. In the present era of population growth and demographic restructuring, the burden of providing health care has increased. Many countries have pursued health services distribution to their citizenry through merely expanding services with nongovernmental organization (NGO) assistance. This solution is not permanent, especially in developing democratic countries like India, where the prime duty of the government is to provide better and equally accessible services to every strata of the population. Nonetheless, concerns about the ability of governments to finance health services adequately, the poor performance of public health service delivery systems and the desire to expand the choices available to patients have led a number of Asian countries to

Consilience

encourage the expansion of private-sector healthcare (William & Patricia, 1997). India is not an exception; private health care services are increasingly prevalent throughout the nation. Today, the private sector provides almost 75 percent of health services in India (NRHM, 2005-12). The real victims of this unregulated spread of private health services in India are the poor, who need better and cheaper services but are not able to afford high priced private health care. If the government assumes that the people prefer private services over public services as a matter of choice, it need only motivate private services to enter into the health sector. However this would be a problem for the development of sustainable health services in the country. The present study attempts to explore this issue of public-private dichotomy in Indian health care services. People, especially women—the focal point of country’s reproductive and child health care services—switch over to private health services once they get their first treatment in public care. This paper will also look into the factors that determine a patient’s decision to choose private health care sources over public ones.1 Almost seventy percent of India’s population lives in rural areas that lack adequate health facilities. Private health services are often concentrated in areas with better infrastructure facilities where they can profit more. Thus, they are unable to satisfy rural health care needs. Even if private services are available in rural areas, the quality differs as compared to that of private providers in urban areas. To some extent, private health services satisfy the needs of patients when compared to public health services. In some cases we find that the failure in providing treatment is not substantially lower in private services as compared to public services. Post-treatment, however, people are more likely to follow-up with private rather than public services. Bhat (1997) sheds light on the growth of private sector over the years. He argues that a number of factors have triggered it, including a new national economic policy, the rapid influx of medical technology, growing public sector hospital deficits and a rising middle class. Its growth has profound implications for the character of the current Indian healthcare system and its future course. Recent studies indicate that private health care significantly affects both the cost and quality of health care services in India (Uplekar, 1989; Duggal and Amin, 1989; Vishwanathan and Rohde, 1990; Yesudian, 1990). It is evident that the people of India, including the poor, make considerable use of the private health sector, but at what cost? The National Sample Survey (NSS) data reveals that the average cost of treatment in the private sector for rural and urban inpatients were 2.1 to 2.4 times higher than in the public sector respectively from 1995-96 (India Health Report, 2003). The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) document has states that curative services favor the rich. For every rupee spent on the poorest twenty percent of the population, three rupees are spent on the richest quintile (Singh, 2006). The recent findings (NSS, 2004) reveal that most of the people in northern states, especially Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal, and north eastern states, such as Nagaland, Mizoram and Assam, finance more than eighty percent of their health treatment expenditure from other sources, such as borrowings, 1

Public and Private health care services will be extensively used in this paper as modern institutional health care services. Public health care services which may even somewhere be used as Govt. health services includes all types of Hospitals (e.g. UHC/UHP/UFWC, CHC/Rural Hospital, Primary Health Center, Sub-Center/ANM, AYUSH Hospital/Clinic etc.) Mobile Clinic, Anganwadi/ICDS Center, ASHA, other Community-based health workers etc. organized and administered by Government of India or its states. Private health care services also include hospitals, clinics, mobile clinics, but administered by individuals or private organizations including private practitioners/doctors, Pharmacy/Drugstore etc.

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

contributions from friends and relatives, and by selling ornaments. The increasing gaps in health service utilization from public versus private sources reinforce existing inequalities in the country.2 The rich benefit from having access to both better quality health care services in the private sector and to subsidized services from government sources. The poor lose out on quality in the public sector and cannot afford private health care services. Utilization of health services differs by the demographic and socio-economic status of the individual as well, in addition to the availability, accessibility and quality of services in different places or regions. There appears to be a considerable convergence of both research and opinion concluding that the ability to pay is the major determinant of the utilization of health services, once symptoms are perceived as serious. The cultural and socio-psychological factors once thought to account for much of the observed variations among social classes and ethnic groups in their utilization behavior are largely irrelevant (Bice et al. 1972, 1973; Mechanic 1969; and Montiero 1973). As discussed later in the paper, the economic status of the individual affects the utilization of health care services in different states of India.3 Finally, for selected states of India (for which the sample size is sufficient), a ranking based on the extent of inequality in terms of the economic standard of the population in utilizing public and private health care services is presented. This paper will attempt to determine in which states inequality is higher in terms of utilization of different reproductive and child health (RCH) care services and in terms of general health care from the public and private sectors.

Data and Methods

The study utilizes data from National Sample Survey (NSS, 60th round: JanuaryJune, 2004), conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), a division of the Government of India. The survey covers the curative aspects of the general health care system in India and also the utilization of health care services provided by the public and private sector, while measuring the expenditure households incur from using these services. It is based on the information collected over six months in 2004, from 47,302 rural and 26,566 urban households spanning the entire country. The enquiry on morbidity was conducted with a reference period of 15 days. All ailments suffered by each member, both present as well as the deceased, and whether or not the patient was hospitalized for treatment, were recorded from sample households. In addition, information was collected for every hospitalization of a member, whether living or deceased at the time of survey, and during the 365 days preceding the date of enquiry. Information on the utilization of health care services by household members as inpatients of hospitals during the 365 days prior to the survey, separately for rural and urban areas, has been extracted from the above mentioned source. Information on the utilization of health services for different reproductive and 2

Equality of utilization is best understood as being a situation where patients with equal needs for health care receive equal treatment, both in terms of the volume and the quality of the services (Mooney, 1983). Equality of access represents a situation where people with equal needs have equal opportunity to use health services (Mooney et al., 1991). It is a supply side phenomenon; equal access is achieved when patients with the same needs face the same costs of health care consumption both in terms of time and money. 3 Economic status of the people is considered in this paper on the basis of the household standard of living and the monthly per capita expenditure, used for services received from DLHS-RCH-II survey and National Sample Survey (60th Round) respectively.

Consilience

child health care components have also been drawn from the District Level Household Survey (DLHS)-RCHâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;II. The survey extends the information on induced abortions, antenatal, natal and post-natal care, family planning services and the RTI/STI related components of the women in reproductive age group. This survey also provides information on child health care. In addition, maps have been prepared to reveal marked state-wise variations in the utilization of public and private health services in general, for different reproductive and child health care component and for the utilization of health care services in rural and urban areas separately, using a Geographical Information System (GIS) package. According to the recent NSS survey (2004), almost 97 and 96 percent of rural and urban inpatients of hospitals respectively received health treatment from the private sources during the period of one year before the survey. Accordingly, as such a vast majority of the studyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population had means to access such services, there is likely a bias toward a higher socio-economic background in the studyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s sample. A solution to correct for this potential problem employs a logistic regression model, separately for rural and urban areas. The dependent variable is the population, who received treatment as inpatients from private health services (Public health services=0, Private health services=1) during the last one year before survey in 2004. The age composition of the population, sex composition, marital status, religion, social group, education level, household size, monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) and nature of ailment are considered as independent predictors. Seven more separate regressions were carried out considering the inclination toward private health sources in the case of other reproductive and child health care services. These services were related to: induced abortion, antenatal check-ups, temporary contraceptive use, treatment for any health problem during pregnancy, place of delivery (excluding home delivery), RTI/STI related treatment, and the treatment of Diarrhea/Pneumonia to children below three years of age. These were considered as dependent variables in separate logistic regression models. The possible available variables were used as independent predictors in the model. Some of these were the age of women, years of schooling of women and spouse, marital duration, caste, religion, reasons for not visiting government health services, household standard of living, residential status, and a few macro regions of India. These macro regions encompassed: Northern Hilly Region, which includes the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Sikkim and the north-eastern states; Western high economy region, which includes the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab, Haryana and Delhi; CentralWestern-Eastern (CWE) Low Economy Region, which includes the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and West Bengal (the later might be referred to as representative of the EAG (Empowered Action Group) states); and, lastly, the Southern Region of India, which includes the four southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka. To study the inequality in the utilization of health services (i.e. public and private health services): (a) for general health indicator in rural and urban areas separately, and (b) for various reproductive and child health services (RCH) within public and private health services, among the three economic groups across the selected states of India, a simple measure of association has been used. The economic groups were represented by the proportions of three equally comparative groups in terms of MPCE quartile, which was used for NSS data set and in terms of standard of living (used for DLHS-RCH-II data set) in the present paper. The standard of living index (SLI) is based on different

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

facilities and possession of amenities in a household. To understand whether distribution of population by utilization of health services for different health care or treatment differs according to MPCE group or SLI group, the study employed a chi-square (χ2) test of association between the two variables. If the test revealed significant value of χ2 – which indicates an association or inequality in the distribution between two variables – the degree of association was measured by computing √(χ2/N). An association between MPCE or SLI and the utilization of health services by public and private sources revealed that the population of different economic groups was not equal in terms of their use of two different health services. Following from this finding, states were ranked according to the value of √(χ2/N). The lower rank indicates a strong association, which implies high inequality while a higher rank indicates weak association, impliying low inequality. In the case of states with the same values of √(χ2/N), tied ranks were awarded.

Results and Discussion Utilization pattern of health care services in India The National Sample Survey (2004) with its 250,862 sample size in rural areas and 132,638 samples in urban areas (out of which more than 40 percent of household members in both rural as well as urban areas had experienced any health problem in the last year and also received treatment as inpatients of hospitals) provided an opportunity to assess the utilization pattern of health care services empirically. Out of the forty percent of the population who experienced any health problem, two percent received services exclusively from public health sources, 53 percent exclusively from private sources and 45 percent from both, in rural areas. The figures are roughly the same in urban areas, where there is 3 percent exclusive use of public health sources, 57 percent exclusive use of private health sources, and 40 percent use of both. If we look at the information in another way, we can say almost 97 percent inpatients in rural and 96 percent in urban areas received treatment at least once in private health services in the year before the survey. The second round of the DLHS-RCH (2002-04) provides information on the treatment seeking behavior for many components of reproductive and child health care services. For instance, the incidence of women in reproductive age-groups experiencing induced abortions, antenatal, natal or post natal health care services, or any health problem during pregnancy, and the treatment of their children in infancy. Considering the three years period before the survey, 2002-04 (DLHS-RCH-II) data on the last pregnancy outcome of 38,182 women was extracted. It was found that, of the sample 94 percent of women had live births, 1 percent experienced stillbirths, 2 percent had spontaneous abortions and almost 3 percent of women reported induced abortions. About 66 percent of induced abortions were performed by private services, out of which almost 67 percent of the women experienced health problems within 6 weeks of abortion, compared to only 26 percent of such women in public health care services (Table 1).

Consilience

Table 1: India: Performed induced abortions and health problems experienced after abortion by health services, 1999-01 to 2002-04 (DLHS- RCH II) Induced abortion performed Health problem experienced during 3 years before survey within 6 weeks of abortion Govt. services Private services Others Total

No. of cases 314 752 80 1146

Percent 27.4 65.6 7.0 100.0

No. of cases 60 156 17 233

Percent 25.8 66.7 7.5 100.0

However, during the second term of treatment for the emerged health problems due to induced abortion, 27 percent of women who had earlier performed their abortions at public health centers now opted for private health services. On the other hand, despite having the large number of unsuccessful cases of induced abortions in private health care centers, only 7 percent of women who had earlier had their abortion at private health centers went to public services for their second treatment, and 12 percent of those cases received treatment or consultation from other sources as depicted in Table 2. Table 2: India: Health treatment after having health problem due to abortion by health services: 1999-01 to 2002-04 (DLHS- RCH II) Health treatment or consultation received after abortion Percent of abortions, earlier Percent of abortions, earlier performed by Govt. health performed services by Private health services Govt. services 68.8 6.8 Private services 27.1 81.5 Others 4.1 11.7 Total 100 100.0

Since the government of India drew special attention to reproductive and child health care services after the 1994 ICPD, provision of services like antenatal check-ups and the distribution of other supplementary courses in terms of iron folic acid (IFA) tablets and/or tetanus injections have substantially improved. However, 49 percent of women still received antenatal check-ups from private sources compared to 45 percent from public sources and 6 percent from other sources. On the other hand, the maximum proportion of women (55 percent) received IFA tablets during pregnancy from public sources, compared to only 18 percent from private sources and 28 percent from other sources. Such distribution becomes easily understandable since the services were free of cost. During the 1999-2000 period and 2002-04 (three years), out of the 507,622 women in reproductive age groups (which includes ages 15 to 44), 13 percent of women experienced any type of health problem during their pregnancy. Of these, 13 of percent women (66,747), more than 60 percent received treatment or consultation from private sources. There was no evidence of substantial variation in services received for different types of health problems during pregnancy. The proportion of women went for different health services for major health problems during pregnancy can be observed in Table A1

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

(Annexure) Table 3: India: Place of delivery and post-delivery complication by women for their last live or still births by health services during the 3 years before survey, 2002-04 Post-delivery complication (during the first week after Place of delivery delivery) No. of women Percent No. of women Percent Govt. services 7471 19.1 2104 28.2 Private services 8407 21.5 2024 24.1 Home 22956 58.6 7634 33.3 Others 313 0.8 94 30.1 Total 39146 100.0 11856 30.3

In the periods 1999 to 2000 and 2002-04, almost 59 percent of women (22,956) were reported to have delivered their children at home. 22 percent of women delivered their babies at private health centers, and 19 percent delivered in public health centers. As Table 3 illustrates, the chances of post-delivery complications appeared to be highest in cases of home deliveries and deliveries at other places, while there does not appear to be a significant different in post-delivery complication experiences between institutional (i.e. public and private) deliveries. This is a refutation of the myth that the quality of services in private sources is always better than the public sources, as the statistics show that the chances of failure in both theses institutional services are not considerably different. However, if post delivery complications emerged after deliveries performed at the home, more than 60 percent of women went for private health care services, compared to only 21 percent for public services and 18 percent for other services (Table 4). Table 4: India: Post-delivery treatment by health services during the 3 years period before survey, 2002-04

Govt. services Private services Others Total

Percent of deliveries earlier performed at Govt. services Private services Home 46.4 13.0 20.5 45.4 79.4 61.1 8.2 7.5 18.4 100.0 100.0 100.0

Consilience

Table 5: India: Modern contraceptive use and resulted health problems by health services during the last 3 years before survey, 2002-04 Govt. services Private services Others Modern contraceptive H.P.* methods C.U.* * C.U. H.P. C.U. H.P. Female sterilization 80.4 17.3 18.0 14.2 1.6 21.8 Vasectomy 78.4 11.2 12.3 23.8 9.4 18.8 IUD/Copper-T/Loop 44.6 18.0 53.7 12.3 1.7 28.6 Oral Pills 16.5 18.8 78.5 15.6 5.0 14.2 Condom/Nirodh 13.5 2.4 82.5 1.6 4.0 0.0 Total 58.9 16.8 38.6 10.5 2.5 14.8

* Contraceptive use

** Health problem emerged after contraceptive use

The proportion of health treatment or consultation sought after having problems with contraceptive use by health services, in the 3 years before the survey, i.e. from 20022004 is shown in Table 6. Almost 41 percent and 49 percent of women who had earlier received contraceptives from public and other sources respectively, used private health services. Table 6: India: Health treatment or consultation received after having problem with contraceptive use by health services during the last 3 years before survey, 2002-04 Percent of women, who used contraceptive methods earlier from Govt. sources Private sources Others Govt. services 47.1 4.6 9.2 Private services 40.5 80.3 44.8 Others 12.4 15.1 45.9 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Other sensitive health care treatments were also served primarily by the private health services. As can be seen in Table A2 (Annexure), almost 60 percent of women receive treatment or consultation for menstruation related problems and 61 percent for RTI/STI related problems from private sources (against 25 and 22 percent from public sources respectively). Similarly, 58 percent of women liked to go for private services in case of any abnormal vaginal discharge. These figures indicate a modest preference for private health services. In the case of child health care services, too, one can clearly observe the bias toward private services, except in the case of immunization (which is provided by the government free of cost) for children. Almost 13 percent children of age 0-71 months had diarrhea during the last two weeks before the survey, and for the same reference period about 16 percent cases of respondents reported cases of pneumonia. Out of these cases, 68 percent of children with diarrhea and 69 percent of children with pneumonia were treated with private services (see Table A3, Annexure).

State differentials in utilization of health care services By and large, there appeared a distinct geographical pattern that explained state

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

differentials in utilization of the two distinct health care services across the country. In general, in the Northern Hilly Region, the growth of private health care providers has not yet grown as much as in the central and southern states of India. This may be due to the fact that the level of urbanization or access to nearby, developed urban areas is positively associated with the development of private health services. This is apparent in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1. India (Rural): Treatment of Household Members (as inpatients) by Public and Private Sources exclusively, 2003-04

Figure 2. India (Urban): Treatment of Household Members (as inpatients) by Public and Private Sources exclusively, 2003-04

The utilization pattern of public and private health care services exclusively as well as the common services by the household members as inpatients of the hospital during the last year before survey (2004) in rural areas has been shown in Figure 1. This represents the utilization of health care services, especially hospital-based care in rural India, irrespective of age, sex, education, socio-economic status of the people, as well as the severity or kind of diseases. It is a crude picture of health care utilization, as it only includes inpatient cases. Nonetheless, it gives a large general overview. In these maps, one can easily observe the dominancy of private sector providers over public health care services, even in many rural areas. Maharashtra, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, are the states where, even in rural areas, more than 70 percent of the people exclusively utilized private hospitals. These are all states that, to some extent, are recognized as well functioning, where the peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to pay for high priced private health care providers might be relatively highly. However, Bihar, one of the poorest states in the union, is distinctly ahead of any state in India in terms of utilization of private services,

Consilience

where more than four-fifths (86%) of the residents in rural Bihar were reported to utilize private hospitals exclusively during the period. Among all the states in India, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Chhattisgarh had the highest proportion of people who utilized only public health care services during the period, yet in none of the states did more than 6 percent of the population do so. The higher proportions of public health care services in these less developed states of the country may indicate that people do not use private health care because they cannot afford it. It also suggests that better provision of health services by public institutions can raise public health service utilization. In almost every state in India, in urban areas, the utilization pattern of both the health care services is higher than in rural areas. In Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Meghalaya, Gujarat and Punjab, more than 70 percent of the people in urban areas utilized private hospitals during the year 2003-04. The utilization of public health services in urban areas is also far better than rural areas in almost all the states. Figures 3 and 4 display utilization patterns of public and private health care services for various reproductive and child health (RCH) care components. On average, 67 percent of women in India utilized public health care only to receive family planning services, about 11 percent each for delivery purposes and antenatal care services, about 6 percent for the consultation or treatment of RTI/STI related problems, and about 3 percent for child health care services, while the utilization is even less than 2 percent for any health problem during pregnancy. The proportion of women, who went for induced abortions in public health care services, is almost negligible (0.37%). This suggests this fact that the utilization of public health care services depends mainly on the subsidized services. This is because Family Planning Programs during the last three decades have been run from government sources. However, the proportion also varies by state. In Andhra Pradesh, around four in every five women received family planning services from public sources during 2002-04. In addition, more than seventy percent of women in Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Punjab had received only family planning services from public sources, compared to the less than 30 percent of women that received other RCH related care from public health care sources.

Consilience

Figure 3. India: Utilization of Private Health Services for different RCH Care Components, 2002-04

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

Figure 4. India: Utilization of Private Health Services for different RCH Care Components, 2002-04

On the other hand, the utilization pattern of RCH care components from private health care services did not appear as skewed as from public health care services. There were only 35 percent of women in India who reported receiving family planning services from private sources, while almost 21 percent did so for sensitive RTI/STI related problems, around 14 percent each for delivery purposes and child health care services, 11 percent for antenatal care services, 4 percent for any health problem during pregnancy, and almost all cases of induced abortions. This utilization pattern for the RCH care component from public as well as private providers reveals that for sensitive health care cases, e.g., health problem during pregnancy, abortions, delivery, and child health related problems, people always prefer to go for private services. Public services are used to benefit from government programs or to avail of free services or distribution of any health related component (e.g., medicines, contraceptives, immunization etc.).

Determinants influencing the utilization of health care services The characteristics of the population opting for private health services differs significantly in rural and urban areas. In rural areas, adjusting for the influence of different socio-economic and demographic determinants, the impact of income level of population seems more prominent and highly significant. The probability of using private health services, in rural areas, is higher in all quintiles, in comparison to the lowest quintile of MPCE (Table 10). Among inpatient cases, the probability of utilizing private health services was lower among higher age groups in both rural and urban areas. There was no clear distinction found between both the sexes and among the inpatients of different marital status in the utilization of private health services. Among different

Consilience

religion and social groups, both in rural and urban areas, the probability of using private health services seems different. In rural areas, the probability of utilizing private health services was found lower among Muslims compared to Hindus, while it was five times higher among Christians (odds ratio = 5.908, p<.001). On the other hand, the probability of utilizing private health services was higher among all other religious groups compared to Hindus, in urban areas. Assessing the role of different social groups or castes on the utilization of private health services, we observe a hierarchical pattern in the odds ratios, in rural areas, recording an odds ratio of 1.284 (p<.10) for schedule castes (SCs), 1.512 (p<.05) for other backward castes (OBCs), and a maximum of 1.564 (p<.05) for other castes, taking the scheduled tribes (STs) (believed to be the most deprived social group in India) as the reference group. On the other hand, the probability increases tremendously for the SCs (odds ratio = 2.345, p<.001) and the others (odds ratio = 2.149, p<.001) group, compared to STs, in urban areas. The level of education among the inpatients was not found to contribute significantly to their choice of private or public health services. Also, with an increase in household size, the probability of utilizing private health services also increases. This supports the hypothesis that the bigger the family size, and more wage earners, people will have greater economic security, which translates to better health security. The utilization of private health services was also observed likely to be more in case of sensitive diseases like gynecological disorders or heart diseases, compared to other kind of ailments. In rural areas, inpatients that suffered from any gynecological disorders were about two and a half times more likely to opt for private health services over public services, compared to general diseases like diarrhea or dysentery. On the other hand, in urban areas, gastritis/gastric or peptic ulcer, heart diseases, fever of unknown origin, accidents/injuries, and other diagnosed ailments (apart from gynecological disorders) were also observed to increase the probability of utilizing private health services significantly. Similarly, regarding the use of private health services among all other reproductive and child health care services (here in the present paper, seven health care services have been considered), the impact of standard of living (SLI) of the women appeared significant and implied that the utilization of private health services were more in high and middle SLI group in comparison to the women of low SLI group, except in the case of induced abortion (Table 11). Table 10: Results of Logistic Regression Models (odds ratios) for the population, who received treatment as inpatient from Private health services (during the last 1 year before survey, Jan-June, 2004) in India. Exp Î˛ (Odds Ratio) Demographic and socio-economic Rural Urban characteristics Age composition Below 5ÂŽ 5-15 15-35 35-60 60 & above Sex composition MaleÂŽ

0.925 0.646** 0.567*** 0.591**

0.973 0.482*** 0.365*** 0.538**

Consilience Female

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy 1.011

1.052

1.002 1.200

1.014 1.262

0.582*** 5.908*** 0.986

1.558*** 1.558** 1.864**

1.284* 1.512** 1.564**

2.345*** 1.953*** 2.149***

Education level Illiterate® Below Primary Primary Middle High School & above

0.727** 0.796** 1.021 1.070

0.978 0.881 0.925 1.095

Household size 1 to 5® 5 to 10 10 & above

1.119 2.150***

1.243** 2.006***

1.736*** 1.977*** 1.707*** 1.790***

1.148 1.033 1.238* 2.308***

1.109 0.734** 2.486*** 0.909

3.009*** 1.981*** 3.027*** 3.988***

1.098 1.381**

1.663*** 2.215***

Marital Status Never married® Currently married Others Religion Hindu® Muslim Christian Others Social groups ST® SC OBC Others

MPCE (in Quintile) Q1® Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Nature of ailment Diarrhea / dysentery® Gastritis/gastric or peptic ulcer Heart disease Gynecological disorders Fever(unknown origin) Accidents/Injuries/Burns/ Fractures/Poisoning Other diagnosed ailments α

Monthly Per Capita Expenditure ® Reference Category * Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level The most important result to emerge from this study is evidence of the bias toward the use of private health services, which may be due to the view that government health care services are not of good quality. As we can clearly observe in Table 11, women who went to private health services for induced abortions, when asked to give reasons for not visiting government health services, reported the poor quality of government services (odds ratio= 6.429, p<.001) and were more likely to be of the opinion that in government health care services cases are not examined properly, as

Consilience

compared to reason that government health services were inconveniently located (reference category). Among the four macro regions of India, the western higher economy region was found to have higher use of private health services for all selected reproductive and child health services than the other three macro regions.

Ranking of states by extent of inequality in the utilization of health care services Knowing there is a marked inequality in utilization of health services among people of different economic groups, it appears appropriate to assess which states of the country were characterized by higher extent of inequality among different economic categories using a complete summary measure of inequality. State values of √(χ2/N) given in Table 12 for the utilization of different health services show whether there was significant association between economic groups and the given indicator. If the value is not significant, it implies that economic status does not have any effect on that indicator, and the situation with respect to that indicator is more or less the same among the given groups. If the value is significant but low it means economic group has only a moderate effect on that indicator. If the value is statistically significant and high, it shows a strong correlation between given categories and that indicator implying that the specific category does affect the dimension represented by the particular indicator and that the value of that indicator is high in certain groups and not in others. It is obvious that if there is notable inequality among economic groups regarding the dimensions reflected in these indicators, the value of √(χ2/N) is likely to be high and significant. A value that is not significant but low can be taken as an indication of low inequality among the groups with respect to that particular indicator. In this sense, state ranks given in Table 12, represent the relative position of states by inequality among three economic groups in utilizing the selected indicators of health services. The first rank shows the highest inequality while 14th or 15th rank shows the lowest inequality. For the same values tied ranks have been assigned. This includes the services sought for the ailing persons during the fifteen days before the survey and the day before the date of survey. The average ranking of both these components, sought from services of public and private health centers, are calculated for rural and urban areas. The overall pattern of index values clearly shows that the extent of inequality among different economic groups is lower among the services provided by public health care centers and centers in rural areas. The result shows that the inequality in utilization of different reproductive and child health care services provided by public health care centers was the highest in West Bengal, followed by Assam, Orissa, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and so on. However, the index value was very low (below 0.2) for all these states, with the exception of West Bengal. This shows that inequality is rather low in the utilization of different health care services provided by public health care centers. In contrast, there was lower inequality in the utilization of reproductive and child health service from private sources in West Bengal. To some extent, this can be explained by the fact that private services are less encouraged by the communist state government. In addition, it could also be postulated that most of the reproductive and child health services that private sources provide were received by the people of almost same economic class. On the other hand, for the treatment of general

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

ailments, rural West Bengal had the highest economic inequality in seeking health care services (i.e. public vs. private) among all other states. In urban areas too, it is second to the state of Tamil Nadu, which recorded the highest economic inequality in utilizing health care services. Table 11: Results of logistic regression models for the utilization of private health services in case of various health care components Independ ent variables Age in complete d years Women's years of schooling Spouse's years of schooling Marital duration Age at consummatio n of marriage

Referenc e category

PDT3

TCU4

RTI/ST I5

Dia./Pn ea.6

AHP7

1.085* **

1.110* *

1.048* *

1.047* *

0.985*

1.05 3

1.042* **

0.977

1.059* **

1.017

1.046

0.985

0.990

0.994

1.147

0.942

0.742

1.057

1.126

0.95 7

0.394

0.581* **

1.277

0.951

0.697* *

1.321

0.683

0.828

1.263

0.656

1.478

0.955

0.844 0.291

1.101*

1.426 3.593* *

1.203*

1.092

0.971

0.910

0.963

1.549

1.509

0.732

0.58 4*** 0.66 4** 1.09 3 0.93 4 1.00 7 1.12 1

IA1

ANC2

1.112 * 1.111 **

1.022 0.869 **

1.02 7** 1.00 5*

18 years and above 3.858

< 18 years Age of women 25 years & above Social Groups (SC)

** < 25 years

Others

(ST) (OBC) Religion (Muslim)

Hindu

(Christian) (Others) Daughter (surviving) (2) (3 and more) Children (surviving) (4 & more) Reasons of abortion

0.473

1.149* 1.526* *

1.609

0.833

2.693

1.352

0.750

0.871 0.329* * 0.400* *

1.381 6.579

1-3 unplanne d pregnanc

0.631

Consilience y

complication in pregnancy last child too young Reasons of not visiting Govt. services Time not suited

2.010 * 0.743

not conveniently located

Poor quality of services

6.429** 1.659** * * 0.871

Not examine properly Standard of living (Medium)

1.678** 3.710** * 1.757

0.8 0.632** 0.470** 99 1.6 1.520** 95* * 1.294** 0.760 ** 1.7 74* 1.369** 1.728** 0.868 **

0.350

1.165** 1.675*

1.112

0.292*

1.940** * 1.246

1.537** 1.300

0.9 52 1.4 93* 2.084** *

1.426

0.987

2.090** * 1.187

1.310

3.701

1.845** * 1.268

2.499

1.182

3.927

2.318** * 0.830

(High) Residential status (Urban) Macro Regions Western higher economy region CWE8 low economy region Southern region

1.142

Low

Rural Northern hilly region

0.787** 0.822

1.608

1.781

0.870

0.975

1.061

1.0 66

1.8 94* 0.747 2.543** 3.207** * 1.9 17* 0.876 1.304 1.228 * 1.7 0.303** 96* * 1.264 1.656 *

Induced Abortion 2Antenatal Check-ups 3Post delivery treatment in Pvt. services of those women who delivered her child at home 4Temporary Contraceptive Use 5Problems related to RTI/STI 6 Treatment of Diarrhea /Pneumonia to children of age below 3 years 7Treatment for any health problem during pregnancy 8Central-western-eastern * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.5 *** p < 0.01

Kerala recorded the lowest economic inequality in utilizing different reproductive and child health care services from either source (i.e. public or private). However, the seventh and the fourth ranks of the state in seeking services for general ailment from public versus private sources in rural and urban areas respectively clearly indicates the use by lower income groups of public health care centers and higher income groups of private health care centers. Apart from West Bengal, the states of Gujarat, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh had the highest economic inequality in reproductive and child health care services rendered from both public and private sources. This means that services in both the service-groups (i.e from public and/or

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

private sources) were received by people from a variety of economic classes. This could further be observed in the increased utilization of private health care services by lower income groups, most probably due to an increase in affordable private services. The southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also recorded high economic inequality for the treatment of general ailments.

Consilience

Table 12: India: Ranking of selected states by extent of inequality across three economic groups based on SLI1 and MPCE2 groups in utilization of health care services Utilization of Public health services3

Utilization of Private health services4

Utilization of health services in rural areas5

States √(χ2/N) Rank √(χ2/N) Rank √(χ2/N) Rank Uttar Pradesh 0.152 6 0.331 7 0.095 13 Bihar 0.108 12 0.253 15 0.012* 15 West Bengal 0.242 1 0.284 12 0.236 1 Andhra Pradesh 0.103 13 0.326 8 0.193 4 Maharashtra 0.155 5 0.348 6 0.215 2 Rajasthan 0.112 11 0.315 9 0.134 8 Madhya Pradesh 0.145 7 0.400 2 0.121 10 Assam 0.198 2 0.259 14 0.096 12 Tamil Nadu 0.118 10 0.301 11 0.213 3 Orissa 0.196 3 0.303 10 0.074 14 Karnataka 0.102 14 0.386 4 0.105 11 Haryana 0.129 8 0.265 13 0.105 11 Gujarat 0.119 9 0.398 3 0.177 5 Jharkhand 0.159 4 0.377 5 0.122 9 Chhattisgarh 0.155 5 0.477 1 0.172 6 Kerala 0.046* 15 0.172 16 0.141 7 1 2 Standard of Living Index Monthly Per Capita Expenditure * not significant 3 Extent of inequality across three SLI groups in utilization of Public health services for different RCH health care components. 4 Extent of inequality across three SLI groups in utilization of Private health services for different RCH health care components. 5 Extent of inequality across three MPCE groups in utilization of public and private health services (for inpatient cases) in rural areas 6 Extent of inequality across three MPCE groups in utilization of public and private health services (for inpatient cases) in urban areas

Utilization of health services in urban areas6 √(χ2/N) 0.112 0.043* 0.322 0.207 0.258 0.102 0.282 0.271 0.328 0.151 0.199 0.218 0.183 0.057* 0.124 0.273

Rank 13 16 2 8 6 14 3 5 1 11 9 7 10 15 12 4

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The recent patterns in health care provision in India clearly show an inclination toward increased private services, as more than ninety-five percent of inpatients in rural and urban areas reported receiving treatment at least once in the year before the survey through private health services (2003-04). Among all the states in India, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Assam and Chhattisgarh had the highest proportion of people who solely utilized public health care services during the period, but this was no more than 6 percent of the population. The results also reveal the fact that the utilization of public health care services depends mainly on the provision of government-subsidized services. The utilization pattern of the RCH care component from public as well as private providers reveals that for sensitive cases like pregnancy complications, abortions, child delivery and child health, people preferred private services. In the case of general health indicators too, there appeared to be a higher likelihood to utilize private health services in cases with more sensitive diseases, like gynecological disorders or heart diseases, as compared to other ailments. The utilization of public services appeared to be most likely driven by a desire to use government programs that provided free services or distribution of medicines, contraceptives or immunizations. Most strikingly, it seems to emerge from this study that there exists a bias toward the use of private health services, due to the perception that government health care services are not high quality and patients do not receive adequate care. However, the study suggests that these misgivings are misplaced as an exploration of the pattern of treatment-failure in both institutional services suggests that in cases of delivery of babies the incidence of post-treatment complications does not differ significantly. The states of Gujarat, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal showed the highest economic inequality in reproductive and child health care services rendered from both public and private sources. However, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Gujarat were observed to be the five states that recorded the highest relative economic inequality in utilization of public versus private health services, for general health indicators in rural India. For urban areas, the top five were Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Assam. In a nutshell, the paper has provided a holistic view of the pattern of utilization of public and private health services for selected health components; explored a marked regional pattern in utilization of health services; analyzed the extent of economic inequality in choice of public or private health care services; and, finally, made an attempt to highlight those states where there is most need of more affordable health services. More specifically, the eastern and northeastern states of the country need to develop a better infrastructure in the health sector with special focus on child and reproductive health services. Further micro level study is needed, especially in rural areas of these regions, to devise specific health infrastructure development to improve the quality of public health providers, and, if possible, after micro-level mapping of the concentration of particular disease, subsidize treatment in a targeted manner. In addition, the scope for public-private partnership at a decentralized level, with absolute commitment from micro-level program executors, is desirable to facilitate better and more affordable health services.

Consilience

Acknowledgement

The authors express their deep sense of gratitude to the anonymous referees for their useful comments facilitating improvements in the paper.

References Bhat. R. 1997. Regulation of the Private Health Sector in India. In: Private Health Sector Growth in Asia, Issues and Implications, ed. by William C. Newbrander. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Bice, Thomas W., David L. Rabin, Barbara H. Starfield, and Kerr L. White. 1973. Economic class and use of physician services. Medical Care, vol.11, pp. 287-296. Bice, Thomas W., Robert Eichhorn, and Peter D. Fox. 1972. Socioeconomic status and use of physician services: a reconsideration. Medical Care, vol.10, pp. 261-271. NRHM. 2005. National Rural Health Mission: Mission Document, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Govt. of India. Mechanic, David. 1969. Illness and Cure. In: Poverty and Health, ed. by John Kosa, Aaron Antonavsky, and Irving Kenneth Zola. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Montiero, Lois. 1973. Expense is no object..: income and physician visits reconsidered. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, vol.14, pp. 99-115. Mooney, G.H. 1983. Equity in health care: Confronting the confusion. Effective Health Care, vol.1, p.179. Mooney, G., Hall J., Donaldsen C, Gerard K. 1991. Utilization of as a measure of equity: Weighing heat? Journal of Health Economics, vol.10, p.475. Singh, Amarjit. 2006. Private Public Partnership: A solution to maternal Mortality. The Journal of Family Welfare, vol.52 (Special Issue-2006), p.79. Uplekar, M. 1989a. Implications of Prescribing Patterns in Private Doctors in the Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis in Bombay, India. Research Paper No. 41. Takemi Program in International Health. Cambridge: Harward School of Public Health. Uplekar, M. 1989b. Private Doctors and Public Health: The Case of Leprosy in Bombay., India. Research Paper No. 40. Takemi Program in International Health. Cambridge: Harward School of Public Health. Vishwanathan, H., and Rohde, J. 1990. Diarrhea in Rural India: A Nation â&#x20AC;&#x201C;wide Study of Mothers and Practitioners. New Delhi: Vision Books. William N. and Patricia M. 1997. The Future of Health Sector Reforms in Asia, In: Private Health Sector Growth in Asia, ed. by William C. Newbrander. Chichester: John

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

Wiley & Sons. Yesudian, C. 1990. Utilization Pattern of Health Services and its Implications for Urban Health Policy. Takemi Program in International Health. Cambridge: Harward School of Public Health Draft.

Consilience ANNEXURE

Table A1. India: Health services received by women for health problems during last pregnancy: 1999-01 to 2002-04 Services received from Health Problems during Pregnancy Govt. sources Private services Others Swelling of hands and feet Paleness Visual disturbances Convulsions Others Total

31.9 34.1 36.3 37.0 31.0 32.9

64.2 61.9 54.1 54.0 62.4 61.2

3.9 4.0 9.5 9.0 6.6 6.0

Table A2. India: Treatment or consultation for RTI/STI related problems by health services during the last 3 months before survey, 2002-04 Treatment or consultation (percent of women) for problems related to Menstruation RTI/STI Any abnormal vaginal discharge Govt. services 25.5 22.0 23.8 Private services 59.5 60.9 55.7 Others 15.0 17.1 20.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table A3. India: Child health care by health services during the last 3 years before survey,2002-04 Percent of children, who were treated for or immunized Diarrhea Pneumonia Immunized Govt. services 18.7 17.5 62.3 Private services 67.8 68.9 15.1 Others 13.5 13.6 22.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table A4. India: Statewise Utilization# of Public health services by different RCH care component, 2002-04 (DLHS RCH-II)

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy Reproductive & Child Health (RCH) Care Component

State Jammu & Kashmir Himachal Pradesh Punjab Chandigarh* Uttaranchal Haryana Delhi Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Bihar Sikkim Arunachal Pradesh Nagaland Manipur Mizoram Tripura Meghalaya Assam West Bengal Jharkhand Orissa Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh Gujarat Daman & Diu * Dadra & Nagar Haveli * Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Goa Lakshadweep * Kerala Tamil Nadu Pondicherry * A & N Islands * India

Any health Problem during Pregnancy

Place of Deliver y

Induced Abortio n

Antenat al Care

0.05

4.17

1.84

15.24

60.38

8.79

9.53

0.28

9.20

1.94

8.82

61.76

3.56

14.42

0.38 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.44 0.84 0.35 -

16.83 11.57 21.28 17.03 15.72 12.88 28.29 8.33 9.38

1.31 5.22 1.28 1.68 1.66 3.21 3.30 2.62 0.78

5.14 13.43 7.49 6.03 17.73 11.49 11.24 10.16 17.97

71.01 44.78 58.38 68.74 50.70 60.04 45.66 72.54 59.38

0.92 1.87 2.96 1.10 2.07 4.66 2.59 2.18 3.91

4.41 22.76 8.44 5.25 11.56 7.28 8.09 3.82 8.59

0.45

16.29

3.17

17.19

42.53

9.05

11.31

0.56 1.28 0.34 1.51 0.26 0.52 1.42 0.23

28.09 19.49 5.86 5.93 28.52 26.97 11.40 15.53 12.36 16.95

4.49 2.31 0.42 0.85 3.87 3.85 1.22 3.08 3.14 1.40

10.11 30.77 15.90 23.73 29.58 14.77 17.76 6.84 13.26 6.09

47.19 28.97 64.02 51.69 22.54 37.06 61.95 65.43 54.25 67.74

2.81 9.74 6.28 6.44 11.97 4.72 1.20 3.97 7.31 3.00

6.74 7.44 7.53 11.02 3.52 11.11 6.22 4.63 8.26 4.60

0.15

9.06

1.60

10.42

68.53

3.59

6.65

0.24 -

7.73 8.00

1.17 -

8.42 12.00

76.31 64.00

2.05 8.00

4.07 8.00

18.37

2.04

8.16

53.06

10.20

8.16

0.29 0.02 0.19 0.48 0.39 0.21 0.29

5.83 4.17 5.22 4.33 11.76 1.60 3.96 1.18

1.64 0.54 0.63 0.96 5.88 0.54 0.59 0.29

10.68 6.77 9.38 30.29 47.06 13.27 14.02 17.11

74.65 83.32 76.09 55.77 11.76 70.07 73.33 73.16

2.73 1.18 2.83 4.33 11.76 2.29 1.60 1.18

4.18 4.01 5.66 3.85 11.76 11.85 6.29 6.78

3.60

0.72

17.27

63.31

7.91

7.19

0.37

10.87

1.69

11.12

66.96

2.71

6.28

Family Planning

Child health care

RTI/ST I

Consilience

Percentage of women utilized or consulted public health services for different RCH care component *Union Territories of India

Table A5. India: Statewise Utilization# of Private health services by different RCH care component, 2002-04 (DLHS RCH-II) Reproductive & Child Health (RCH) Care Component

Induced Abortio n

Antenata l Care

3.78

1.78

Any health Problem during Pregnancy

Place of Deliver y

Family Planning

Child health care

1.10

12.44

73.41

4.27

5.00

5.15

2.38

7.13

51.09

8.91

23.56

1.47 1.99 0.66 1.22 1.35 1.05 1.34 1.15 2.27

6.12 1.99 4.37 7.05 5.07 10.86 8.38 14.09 2.27

1.32 0.50 2.15 2.71 1.28 4.48 5.09 7.93 2.27

15.00 3.98 7.92 12.85 8.41 14.44 11.05 14.83 2.27

52.62 56.72 42.24 42.56 62.99 36.72 22.31 23.23 68.18

9.94 8.46 16.01 14.48 7.96 13.86 22.66 16.80 6.82

13.53 26.37 26.65 19.14 12.94 18.59 29.16 21.97 15.91

5.48

1.37

8.22

71.23

2.74

10.96

1.04 0.63 1.06 2.25 1.14 1.40 0.57 0.65 1.97 2.78

16.15 27.50 21.82 8.20 11.72 8.00 13.67 16.60 14.89 23.22 11.54 8.85 8.33

4.17 8.13 5.45 2.65 3.91 3.78 6.03 6.72 4.85 3.96 5.14 3.02 2.78

3.65 13.75 9.09 3.17 11.72 10.00 5.33 13.35 8.05 11.66 7.75 19.00 16.67

54.69 29.38 34.55 72.75 42.19 61.80 39.69 33.56 38.45 26.24 26.77 38.17 47.22

5.21 13.13 7.27 5.29 23.44 4.17 8.66 11.24 14.53 15.15 19.04 13.01 13.89

15.10 7.50 21.82 7.94 7.03 11.19 24.37 17.40 17.84 19.21 29.11 15.99 8.33

7.50

2.50

15.00

37.50

15.00

22.50

1.13 0.25 0.82

6.10 15.30 14.99

3.94 2.45 2.83

13.72 21.03 18.16

38.50 35.58 27.20

15.40 9.00 16.78

21.21 16.38 19.22

RTI/STI

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

2.42 5.31 0.97 36.71 26.09 12.56 Goa 33.33 33.33 Lakshadweep * 0.71 4.58 2.79 25.20 38.22 5.94 Kerala 2.41 10.14 2.11 22.90 42.08 4.95 Tamil Nadu 2.21 20.59 2.94 19.12 25.74 8.09 Pondicherry * 25.00 58.33 8.33 A & N Islands * 1.27 10.50 4.17 14.28 35.15 13.64 India # Percentage of women utilized or consulted private health services for different RCH care component *Union Territories of India

15.94 33.33 22.57 15.40 21.32 8.33 20.99

Consilience

Table A6. India: Household members (%) got treatment (as inpatient cases) in last 1 year before survey by Residence, Type of Hospital and by Economic Status, 2004 (NSS) Urban Rural Utilization of Utilization of Utilization of Utilization of Public Services Private Services Public Services Private Services Po Medi Ric Po Med Po Med Ric Po Med States or um h or ium Rich or ium h or ium Rich Jammu & 12. 36. 10. 42. 33. 61. Kashmir 4 50.7 9 2 2 47.6 4.8 9 3 - 28.2 71.8 Himachal 32. 34. 45. 11. 27. 61. Pradesh 8 32.8 4 6.3 6 48.1 1 0 9 7.3 26.0 66.7 18. 29. 25. 37. 10. 12. 76. Punjab 5 51.9 6 7 2 37.1 5 9 5 3.0 18.0 79.0 66. 17. 11. 80. Chandigarh 3.8 29.7 5 2 82.8 7.6 5 9 - 21.1 78.9 44. 15. 35. 39. 14. 55. 29. Uttaranchal 9 39.5 6 8 6 24.6 8 9 3 8.4 23.7 67.9 37. 26. 17. 44. 12. 81. Haryana 0 36.7 3 4 6 38.0 6.1 3 6 8.2 20.1 71.7 18. 32. 30. 100 Delhi 1 49.3 6 9.4 0 60.6 .0 - 14.0 86.0 35. 23. 26. 49. 27. 37. 35. 17. Rajasthan 7 40.9 4 3 3 24.4 5 1 4 7 35.8 46.5 58. 12. 46. 34. 37. 36. 26. 29. Uttar Pradesh 2 29.8 0 8 7 18.4 4 3 2 0 36.8 34.2 51. 14. 56. 31. 44. 36. 19. 45. Bihar 6 34.4 1 7 6 11.7 0 8 2 6 35.4 19.0 43. 27. 18. 43. 37. 11. Sikkim 7.1 49.1 8 5 72.5 8 4 8 1 20.6 68.3 Arunachal 41. 33. 52. 24. 29. 46. 27. Pradesh 0 52.3 6.7 3 6 14.0 0 1 8 9 25.5 46.7 43. 34. 91. Nagaland 4.0 52.4 7 1 65.9 8.7 3 2.8 97.2 32. 14. 68. 23. 74. Manipur 0 59.1 8.9 9 7 16.4 2.8 2 0 - 11.7 88.3 49. 32. 87. 100. Mizoram 5.7 45.2 1 9.8 2 58.0 4.1 8.1 8 0 45. 17. 14. 24. 34. 40. 25. Tripura 0 38.0 0 3 3 61.4 1 8 1 2.2 35.6 62.2 29. 17. 12. 37. 38. 55. Meghalaya 3 52.9 9 0 9 50.1 6.3 3 3 - 17.7 82.3 25. 29. 12. 31. 19. 35. 44. 13. Assam 3 45.2 5 2 8 56.1 8 3 9 3 30.8 55.9 44. 21. 21. 26. 37. 37. 24. 18. West Bengal 2 34.7 1 5 7 51.8 8 8 3 9 33.1 48.0 41. 20. 42. 33. 49. 30. 19. 41. Jharkhand 8 38.2 0 8 2 24.0 8 8 4 7 42.8 15.4 48. 17. 41. 27. 58. 25. 15. 50. Orissa 7 34.2 1 2 7 31.1 7 9 4 3 29.0 20.8 41. 14. 46. 32. 75. 16. 59. Chhattisgarh 8 43.7 6 8 3 20.9 5 0 8.5 3 29.0 11.7 Madhya 64. 40. 39. 43. 38. 17. 36. Pradesh 8 30.7 4.5 6 5 19.9 5 9 6 2 36.3 27.5 24. 20. 18. 41. 22. 37. 39. 17. Gujarat 1 55.5 4 6 8 39.6 9 9 2 6 24.1 58.3 Daman & Diu - 42.1 57. 4.0 38. 57.9 100 - 25.7 74.3

Consilience

Kumar et al: Public-Private Dichotomy

1 .0 38. 15. 18. 65. 43.5 9 42.6 6 8 6 - 37.1 62.9 39. 37. 37. 24. 19. Maharashtra 41.9 0 39.6 5 7 8 3 36.0 44.7 Andhra 42. 39. 34. 25. 22. Pradesh 43.8 3 30.5 4 7 8 8 33.4 43.8 40. 33. 43. 22. 27. Karnataka 42.2 9 27.0 4 9 7 8 39.7 32.5 36. 32. 67. Goa 51.5 7 35.6 8 2 - 15.4 84.6 46. 10. 89. Lakshadweep 52.5 9.5 9 43.5 6 4 - 14.1 85.9 36. 29. 13. 26. 59. Kerala 34.8 9.2 3 8 34.0 8 4 8 5.7 26.5 67.8 10. 24. 37. 31. 36. 32. 17. Tamil Nadu 39.2 3 2 8 38.0 0 5 5 3 30.3 52.4 15. 25. 33. 43. 48. 22. Pondicherry 44.2 0 0 6 41.4 8.0 8 2 7 77.3 A & Nicobar 34. 48. 20. 79. 100. Islands 5.6 59.9 5 6 51.4 5 5 0 39. 20. 29. 37. 30. 33. 36. 25. 2 40.8 0 5 5 33.0 3 1 6 9 33.0 41.2 India Table A7. India: Household members (%) got treatment (as inpatient cases) in last 1 year before survey by Residence and Type of Hospital, 2004 (National Sample Survey) Urban Rural Pri Pri Pub. vat Bot Pub. vat Bot hospital e Privat h hospita e Privat h / hos Public e ser l/ hos Public e dispens pita (Exclu (Exclu vic dispens pit (Exclu (Exclu serv States ary l sively) sively) es ary al sively) sively) ices Jammu & 17. 82. 10. Kashmir 82.6 4 0.5 17.4 1 89.8 2 0.7 10.2 89.1 Himachal 19. 78. 24. Pradesh 80.2 8 1.3 19.8 9 75.8 2 0.5 24.2 75.3 71. 28. 73. Punjab 28.9 1 71.1 9 27.0 0 0.7 73.0 26.4 14. 85. 10. Chandigarh 85.7 3 14.3 7 89.2 8 10.8 89.2 62. 30. 60. Uttaranchal 38.0 0 7.5 62.0 5 39.4 6 1.3 60.6 38.0 67. 31. 70. Haryana 32.6 4 0.8 67.4 8 29.6 4 0.2 70.4 29.4 54. 44. 69. Delhi 45.8 2 1.6 54.2 2 30.6 4 69.4 30.6 39. 55. 44. Rajasthan 60.1 9 4.6 39.9 5 56.0 0 0.8 44.0 55.2 Uttar 68. 27. 69. Pradesh 31.1 9 3.1 68.9 9 30.5 5 1.9 69.5 28.5 79. 17. 85. Bihar 20.3 7 3.0 79.7 3 14.2 8 1.3 85.8 12.9 26. 73. Sikkim 73.7 3 26.3 7 93.0 7.0 0.9 7.0 92.1 Arunachal 21. 73. 12. Pradesh 78.4 6 4.7 21.6 7 87.5 5 2.0 12.5 85.5 Dadra & Nagar Haveli

13. 0 42. 1 42. 4 47. 8 19. 4 20. 8 56. 0 50. 5 40. 8

9 43. 5 16. 0 13. 8 10. 1 29. 1 26. 7

18. 5 21. 3 27. 2 32. 1 27. 8

Consilience

Nagaland

48.3

Manipur

87.6

Mizoram

80.7

Tripura

83.6

Meghalaya

28.5

Assam West Bengal

60.8

Jharkhand

35.5

Orissa Chhattisgar h Madhya Pradesh

73.7

Gujarat Daman & Diu Dadra & Nagar Haveli Maharashtr a Andhra Pradesh

28.6

Karnataka

28.0

Goa Lakshadwe ep

53.4

Kerala Tamil Nadu Pondicherr y A& Nicobar Islands

32.9

India

43.1

65.2

46.4 46.3

23.2

29.9 27.9 36.1

40.7

34.1 65.2

86.9

51. 7 12. 4 19. 3 16. 4 71. 5 39. 2 34. 8 64. 5 26. 3 53. 6 53. 7 71. 4 76. 8 70. 1 72. 1 63. 9 72. 0 46. 6 59. 3 67. 1 65. 9 34. 8 13. 1 56. 9

51.7

2.4

12.4

1.4

19.3

16.4

0.6

71.5

5.2

39.2

3.7

34.8

8.5

64.5

4.3

26.3

1.2

53.6

7.4

53.7

3.7

71.4

76.8

70.1

2.2

72.1

3.5

63.9

72.0

8.3

46.6

59.3

1.2

67.1

0.3

65.9

34.8

1.9

13.1

2.7

56.9

48. 3 85. 2 79. 3 83. 6 27. 9 55. 5 61. 5 26. 9 69. 4 45. 2 38. 9 24. 8 23. 2 29. 9 25. 7 32. 6 28. 0 45. 1 40. 7 31. 7 33. 8 65. 2 85. 0 40. 4

71.8

28. 2

28.2

71.8

90.3

9.7

2.7

9.7

87.6

95.6

4.4

2.1

4.4

93.5

97.2

2.8 26. 9 22. 1 24. 9 59. 5 20. 9 57. 1 49. 4 70. 7 86. 6

2.8

97.2

26.9

73.1

5.4

22.1

72.4

0.9

24.9

74.2

6.3

59.5

34.2

1.1

20.9

77.9

3.3

57.1

39.6

5.7

49.4

44.9

2.7

70.7

26.6

86.6

13.4

7.4

32.6

60.0

1.7

73.3

24.9

1.1

72.0

26.9

63.4

36.6

64.2

35.8

51.3

48.7

1.5

63.0

35.6

0.6

53.2

46.2

16.4

83.6

2.5

97.5

1.8

53.1

45.1

73.1 77.9 75.1 40.5 79.1 42.9 50.6 29.3 13.4

67.4 26.7 28.0 36.6 35.8 48.7 37.0 46.8 83.6

97.5 46.9

32. 6 73. 3 72. 0 63. 4 64. 2 51. 3 63. 0 53. 2 16. 4

2.5 53. 1

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 53-70

Health or Agricultural Development: Boundary Objects and Organizations in a Soya Project in Western Kenya Jennifer Lamb Agricultural and Applied Economics Virginia Tech jenilamb@vt.edu Abstract Improving global health and agricultural development have been identified as two of the most important objectives in fighting global poverty. However, the two approaches come at development from different perspectives and can actually undermine each other in practice. Successful management of the competing demands of health and agriculture through organizations and technologies is crucial to advancing sustainable development. The turn toward local procurement of agricultural products in the administration of global food aid is evidence of attempts to bring these approaches together at the global scale, but has not delivered the promised benefits at the local level. This article presents a case study of a small Kenyan community based organization (CBO), Community Action for Rural Development (CARD), as it has attempted to negotiate between nutrition and agricultural development in global and local networks. Specifically, the case study addresses CARDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s experience with a small scale soya beans project as a part of a World Food Program (WFP) local procurement program and a transition toward developing a local soya bean project.

Keywords: soybeans, appropriate technology, agricultural development, food aid, boundary objects, boundary organizations

1. Introduction Health and agricultural development are consistently raised as key priorities in improving the livelihoods of smallholdersi and the rural poor. However, an analysis of the respective development discourses of health and agriculture reveals that the two more often compete, rather than complement each other in development practice (Escobar, 1995). Successfully managing the boundary between health and agriculture through organizations and technologies is crucial to advancing sustainable development. As one of the few crops to simultaneously answer to the demands of both fields, an analysis of soybeans (commonly known in the development context as soya beans) and their use in aid and development projects provides an interesting entry point into this boundary management discussion. The initial literature review situates soya beans within the framework of competing agricultural development and health and nutrition discourses to address food security. As a result of shifting prioritization of funding for health and nutrition from the late 1980s, the administration of global food aid is a primary mechanism for

Consilience

managing demands of nutrition and agriculture, especially through the turn toward local procurement policies. The core of the article presents a case study of a small Kenyan community based organization (CBO), Community Action for Rural Development (CARD), as it has attempted to negotiate between nutrition and agricultural development in global and local networks. Specifically, the case study addresses CARD’s experience with a small scale soya beans project as a part of a World Food Program (WFP) local procurement program and a transition toward developing a local soya bean project. The case study draws upon e-mail exchanges from November 2007-May 2009 and survey work and field notes collected during semi-structured interviews from JuneAugust 2009. Utilizing theory from the science and technology studies, nutrition, and agricultural economics literature, the concepts of boundary organizations, dietary diversity, appropriate technology and agricultural marketing are applied in an active interdisciplinary research framework for the development of successful local soya bean project.

2. Boundary Management in Health, Nutrition and Agriculture: Conceptualizations of Hunger and Famine In development policy and practice, the boundary between health, nutrition and agricultural development has proved to be one of the most difficult to manage. Health hinges upon adequate nutrition as a state of being which individuals accessed through consumption of sufficient quality and quantity of food in harmony with the local landscape. By contrast, agriculture is the process through which that quality and quantity of food are produced. Subsequently, health perspectives and their embodied nutrition development discourse have focused on the documentation of biophysical manifestations of malnutritionii and the delivery of food as aid to ameliorate these effects. Historically, the primary role of agricultural development has been to raise the supply of foodstuffs through technology transfer. More recently, development thinking in agriculture has shifted toward system based approaches (Barrett, 2001; Moore, 2009). The key moment in which these discourses come together is in the conceptualization of famine and hunger. Historic notions of famine capture the conflict between the symmetry of human nutritional need and the asymmetric distribution of resources to meet that need through agricultural production. In his path-breaking work in 1981, Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen reworked the conception of famine and hunger to create a common denominator between nutrition and agriculture. Sen describes starvation as “the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat…not the characteristic of there not being enough food to eat”. Sen argues that individual exchange entitlement, (ability to labor and earn an income) dictates the ability to obtain food. This recasts the problem of hunger as the need to increase access as well as availability of food (Sen, 1981). Today, the most common definition of food security is “access by all people at all times to enough and appropriate food to provide energy and nutrients needed to maintain an active and healthy life”(Barrett, 2001). Barrett (2002) describes three main phases of food security measurement: 1) supply based measures 2) household access and biometric measures 3) measures which assess constraints individual

Consilience

Food Aid and Public Private Partnerships Food aid consists of the provision of supplements and fortified food products. Fortification refers to the processing of staple foods so that they also include nutrients which may be deficient in the targeted population. Supplementation involves the provision of powders and/or pills to be blended or taken with meals to provide â&#x20AC;&#x153;missingâ&#x20AC;? nutrients1. Generally, these fortified products or supplements are produced on a commercial scale and often distributed as convenience style foods to targeted populations in an immediate, short term timeline. The WFP commonly refers to these programs as public private partnerships, wherein the WFP supplies of basic grains are processed by large food manufacturers at a reduced cost for distribution to developing countries.

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development choice, risk exposure, and lack of ability to cope with economic shocks. Evolving definitions which capture the increasing depth and complexity of the food security problem have translated to a rapid emergence of revised techniques through which food security may be measured(Coates, et al., 2006). Scales which measure behavioral coping mechanisms have been developed in the United States and adapted for application internationally. Additional access based indicators of food security include measures of dietary diversity and the recording of 24-hour dietary recallsiii.

3. The Food Aid and Agricultural Development Trap

The proliferation of measurement tools to address the complex nature of food security has not been matched by equally comprehensive development frameworks. Conversely, when nutrition and agricultural development projects operate at scale they tend to assume that improving either consumptive or productive practice will result in a food security benefit and can end up working in opposing directions. As evidence of this, agricultural development paradigms remain entrenched in the rhetoric of improving yields through technology transfer and systems based approaches, continuously hypothesizing that closing the yield gap between developing and developed nations will enhance food security for smallholders (Schreinemachers, 2006). In particular, scientists have recently identified declining soil fertility as a key barrier to obtaining and sustaining food security in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Soil fertility decline is caused by a cycle of population growth and reduction in farm size which leads to limited the opportunities for fallowing and increasing pressure on the land for food production. Examples of popular policies and programs to address soil fertility decline include national fertilizer subsidy programs, attempts to develop conservation agriculture production systems and experimentation with local soil fertility improvement technologies. Productivity growth must benefit farmers so that they are producing above a subsistence level. In particular, farmers must be able to link to input and output markets in at least semi-commercialized production processes for sustainable productivity growth. Despite the promise of agricultural development, the primary mechanism to address food insecurity in SSA has been through the delivery of food aid. Most often food aid is manufactured from developed country agricultural products and with

Consilience

developed country processing equipment. The introduction of food aid has short and long term implications for agricultural development. In the short term, ill-timed deliveries of food lower agricultural prices for developing country smallholders. In the long term, bypassing local structures undermines the development of agroindustry in developing nations and has the potential to increase food dependency. Unfortunately, with increased concentration on health and nutrition relative to agriculture in development programming since the late 1980s, the delivery of food aid has been the primary mechanism for boundary management between nutrition and agriculture (Ashley and Maxwell, 2001).

4. The Interpretive Flexibility of Soya in Agriculture and Nutrition Discourse and Application to Sub-Saharan Africa A global agricultural commodity commonly caught in the midst of this trap is soya or soybeans. Soya presents a diverse set of characteristics which allow it to be highly valued by both nutrition and agricultural development approaches. Agriculturally, soya beans have the ability to fix atmospheric nitrogen in the soiliv, for use by the growing plant and crops to be grown after soya in rotation (Chianu, et al., 2009; Misiko, et al, 2008). Moreover, soya is relatively easy to grow and has a low incidence of pest and disease. Further advantages include the structure of the crop itself. As a relatively low plant, most soya varieties are about 14 inches tall and once established fan out into a broad canopy that blocks out light for weed competition. Nutritionally, soya is the only â&#x20AC;&#x153;completeâ&#x20AC;? plant based source of protein, meaning that it provides ample quantities of all eight amino acids that the body cannot make on its own. Soya protein qualityv also outranks all other protein sources with the exception of egg-whites. Thus, in areas where high quality protein sources such as eggs, meats and dairy are not available or affordable, soya provides a nutritious substitute that is lower in both fats and cholesterol. Soya also provides a number of additional vitamins and minerals and is a source of Omega 3 and Omega 6 fatty acids, all of which combine for it to be considered a highly nutritious food (American Soybean Association, 2004). This combination of agronomic and nutritional properties has led soya to be a key aspect of systems based soil fertility agricultural development programs, while the affordability and nutritional value of soya (and its abundance in the United States) have made it a popular choice for food aid. In the social construction of technology literature the appeal of a technology or technological process to different sets of stakeholders is referred to as interpretive flexibility. Innovations with interpretive flexibility possess a broader range of appeal to stakeholders of different value systems and priorities, and when harnessed effectively can be developed and scaled more rapidly to societal benefit. The interpretive flexibility of soya beans has made it one of the most widely transferred and adapted crops around the worldvi(Chainu, et al., 2009). The soil fertility and nutritional opportunities of soya have not been fully explored in SSA. Despite its favorable agronomic and nutritional properties, soya is much more difficult to process and prepare than other legumes. Soya contains the enzyme trypsin, which prevents the body from actually being able to absorb any

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

protein. A number of techniques such as boiling the beans for thirty minutes in preparation for further processing and roasting can inhibit the enzyme’s activity. However, utilization of soya is constrained by the fact that it must undergo some form of value added processing before human consumption (American Soybean Association, 2004). As will be demonstrated, the technologies developed to process soya have confined the use of soya to largely nutrition-based and even undermined agricultural applications in the development context.

5. The Primacy of Processing and the Turn toward Local Purchase Programs With modern processing technology, soya beans have one of the most diverse ranges of use of any processed commodity. In developed countries, the majority of soya is processed in a large scale oil and meal processing facilities. The meal is mostly fed to livestock but also commonly blended with maize meal for delivery as food aid (American Soybean Association, 2004). Soya is also commonly processed into soy milk, tofu, and soy nuts. However, few developing economies have such extensive large scale processing facilities. In the development context, the lack of large scale processing has typically confined the application of soya beans to roasting, boiling, frying, and milling in local cereal grain millsvii. For conventional home preparation, boiling the soya beans, a process used to prepare most other legumes, requires as much as 3-4 hours until the beans are soft and consumable. As availability of energy and cooking fuel are often constrained in SSA, this additional preparatory burden, combined with the distinctive flavor of soya beans has been a major barrier to adoption. The necessity of more intensive value added processing in working with soya beans through nutritional and agricultural paradigms brings to light an important micro and macro disconnect in hunger and malnutrition approaches in SSA. Projects which have attempted to scale up agricultural production and use of soya beans in Africa have often had to overcome the use of soya in food aid programs. For example, Nigeria and Zimbabwe conducted outreach campaigns to promote soy as a nutritious food crop and as a soil friendly nitrogen fixing legume throughout the 1990s. These efforts involved education on soya nutritional, agricultural, and preparation applications at the household level. Specifically, both countries refused to import soya beans as food aid, in hopes of developing their own local production and processing capacity (Chianu, et al, 2009). As an alternative to this kind of tension between agricultural development and nutritional food aid programming, critics have argued that food aid should purchase food aid as close to the region where food aid is needed as possible (Lappe and Collins, 1998). Representative of this, the WFP has held what it refers to as a “local procurement policy” since 1996viii. However, it must be understood that local procurement does not necessarily imply procurement from developing countries. WFP financial regulations stipulate that only “when conditions are equal, preference will be given to purchasing from developing countries”(World Food Program, 1996). In the development context where conditions will clearly not be equal, the statement discredits the notion that local purchase will assist the rural poor in developing agricultural economiesix. The assertion reflects a desire to make legible the needs of

Consilience

nutrition sourcing as a higher priority than working with farmers toward longer term development goals (Scott, 1998). In 2006, the WFP recognized that it has been unsuccessful in sourcing food from developing countries, and that greater effort needs to be made in order to make local procurement programs “more friendly” to developing country producers(World Food Program, 1996). The latter half of this paper explores the experience of CARD as a part of a WFP soya beans local procurement contract and eventually the development of a community soya project in Western Kenya.

6. Local Procurement in the CARD Soya Beans Project in Western Kenya: CARD as a Boundary Organization in Local and Global Networks The concept of developing country CBOs and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as boundary organizations in agricultural development projects is not new, especially in Kenya (Golderberger, 2008; Schrum, 2001). Like many developing countries, Kenya has seen a massive surge in the number of registered non-governmental organization over the course of the 1990s. Many have diagnosed this as a function of the fact that international donors have utilized these organizations to avoid corruption and misuse of funds encountered when development projects are channeled through the state. Such NGOs have been given credibility (only sometimes deserved) as representations of local communities capable of translating the wishes of donors into actual change at the field level. In Kenya, Goldberger (1999) points out that such organizations have been crucial in the promotion and rise of alternative agriculture, while Shrum demonstrates how NGO’s have further been able to become an integral element of the agricultural development research apparatus (Goldberger 2008). CARD is a small CBO that was founded in 1998. Based in the provincial town of Kakamega, the CARD strategy has focused on creating opportunities for rural income generation as a way to reduce pressures on the Kakamega forest to harvest wood for fuel and conversion to charcoal. The organization’s founding projects in beekeeping and soya beans represented its desire to be viewed as an organization capable of facilitating rural development through global and local networks. CARD contracted with the WFP to supply soya beans for food aid just as the WFP began to experiment with local procurement programs in 1998. Initially, the interpretive flexibility of soya was capable of meeting CARD objectives to promote income generating activities through rural development and increase environmental sustainability. However, the structure of the WFP local procurement contract was largely incompatible to work with smallholder production calendars. The WFP required quarterly quotas from its suppliers, consistent with its objective to provide a steady nutritional supply but not with the seasonal nature of agriculture or smallholder production volatility. While farmers could double crop soya beans in the long and short rains for a July and November harvest, smallholders had to pool their production to meet the WFP quota. The role of CARD was to organize 40 farmers to gather their current stocks of soya shortly before the quarterly deadlines. As such, CARD positioned itself as a boundary organization between the

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

global nutrition network of the WFP and a local agricultural production network of soya farmers. The type of negotiation CARD was asked to perform as the contracting agent for the WFP local procurement program was dramatically different than the boundary management activities encountered in the works of either Goldberger or Shrum. In addition to translating between global to local scales, CARD was also caught in a more difficult mediation between the scaled discourses of nutrition and agriculture. CARD staff members still with the organization in 2009 from the first soya project recalled how they had felt inadequate to communicate to either side. Speaking with the WFP procurement officer, it was obvious that the project needed soy on a quarterly basis, but to the farmer this externalized the undue burden of storing and saving seed and losing the opportunity to sell soy at appropriate times in the local market. When a drought in 2005 prevented the double cropping of soya beans during the short rains, CARD missed two sequential production quotas. By the time the WFP dropped the CARD managed cooperative as a supplier, the farmers already had a crop of soya planted for the long rains. Frustration with the inability to either sell or process the beans at harvest because local markets were underdeveloped caused many farmers to abandon soya production all together. With a full-time staff of only eight people and in the face of the collapse of the project, CARD began to focus its efforts elsewhere. CARDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision to concentrate its efforts on its projects in beekeeping, biogas, and HIV/AIDS sustainable living reflected a shift in three primary areas: 1) the decision to engage in local versus global networks 2) to devolve control and ownership of the project back to stakeholders 3) to meet people where they are in recognizing the significant impact of HIV positive status on pursuing a livelihood. When I pressed members of the CARD staff on this last issue, they pointedly told me that community development simply could not go forward without working with HIV/AIDS. As HIV/AIDS affected nearly one of every five people in the community, literally everyone knew someone who was HIV positive and many households faced labor and income constraints as a direct result of the epidemic. In making a transition and moving out of its role as a boundary organization between the WFP and soya farmers, CARD actually strengthened its capacity to act as an effective boundary organization between the discourses of health and agricultural development. For one, it gave CARD a chance to work within the context of a social system where HIV/AIDS is a major factor in day to day livelihood choices, instead of attempting to operate in spite of those constraints. In devolving control to its stakeholders, CARD shifted toward a mindset of partnering rather than directing or leading development processes. Increased stakeholder control also freed up limited CARD human and financial resources, the staff also had increased opportunities to pursue adequate training to make themselves accountable to members of the health and agricultural communities in Kakamega. As evidence of its success in reorganizing itself as a boundary organization, by summer 2009 CARD had helped to install over 10,000 farmer managed beehives in the area and 15 biogas digesters to make use of animal feces for energy. CARD had also become increasingly well known as a major proponent of HIV/AIDS education and sustainable living.

Consilience

6. A Participatory Action Research Agenda: Measuring Nutrition and Agricultural Development with Smallholders When I contacted CARD in the fall of 2007 the organization had just begun to consider the possibility of a local soya project. First, fitting with its reorientation as a boundary organization in the Kakamega community, CARD emphasized the need to incorporate both producer and consumer perspectives. In March of 2008, the project was given a grant for $1,000 from the Jimmy and Rossalyn Carter Partnership Foundation to explore soya value added processing technologies for smallholders. During the summer of 2008, CARD held meetings with remaining soya project farmers and with some members of persons living with HIV (PLWHIV) sustainable living network to gauge interest levels from different groups. In April 2009 I was granted a research fellowship from the Fralin Life Sciences Institute from to explore consumption patterns and potential nutritional benefits of soya by persons in CARDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s network of PLWHIV over summer 2009. This positioning as a researcher, intern and project coordinator at CARD offered the opportunity to approach development reflexively in simultaneously striving to study and catalyze change processes at the intersection of nutrition and agriculture (Parfitt 2002). The participatory action research program wished to document and analyze the tradeoffs between health, nutrition, and agricultural decision making processes of agricultural smallholders. Upon arriving in Kakamega, an initial priority was to assess the opportunities and constraints of the soya project working with local persons living with HIV support groups, and a local farmer group composed of several previous soya farmers and a few additional farmers interested in transitioning some of their land to soya cultivation. Given the local orientation of the project, the sample size is small, including 15 farmers, 15 town-based Tujengane support group members, and 19 Jiinue rural support group members. Initially, surveys were distributed at the farmer and support group meetings. However, it quickly became clear in the support groups that literacy would be a major constraint in accurate reporting. Subsequently, a member of the CARD staff fluent in Kiluhya and Kiswahili and I followed up individually with members whose surveys appeared incomplete. While responses remained low amongst support group members even after this process, we felt that we could have relative confidence in the quality of the data.

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

Figure 1: Share of Experience in Soya

Figure 2: Comparison of farmer, Tujengane and Junue Support Group Consumption From an agricultural development perspective, project stakeholders were surveyed about their farming activities, including their experience, crops planted, lands and crop utilization. All the farmers surveyed had less than 5 hectares in production, and commonly produced products for home consumption and sale. This extended to a

Consilience

Figure 3: Vitagoat pressure cooker and stove in Bukura, Kenya

Figure 2: Soya Mill used to process soya flour and soya beverage purchased by CARD in July 2009 strong interest in cultivating soya for home consumption and processing for sale in the market. While all of the farmers had experience cultivating maize, Error! Reference source not found. provides a sense of the mixed experience with growing soya. Consistent with nutrition literature, weekly dietary recalls (where an individual reports on the number of servings consumed per day from a local consumption basket) were administered to the participating groups. These surveys were used to examine dietary diversity (Hoddinott & Yohannes 2002). In Figure 2, the project identified several interesting and relevant dietary patterns to the soya project. Meat and fish consumption were universally low across groups, and pulses consumption considerably high relative to other products in the rural PLWHIV support group. This suggested an opportunity to expand consumption of higher quality protein amongst this most vulnerable group by substituting soya beans for lower nutritional value pulses. Moreover, the chart suggests considerable differences in access to different types of foods, even within 10 kilometers of Kakamega. Not surprisingly, the PLWHIV rural support group members appear to be less food secure than the farmer or town based group members. Other significant findings include the fact that all of the participants surveyed reported that they consumed chai and ugalix regularly, the only two food commodities for which this was the casexi. Based on the results of the surveys, the CARD staff and I felt comfortable making several conclusions before moving forward:

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

Figure 4: Chart reflecting preferences for mandazi made with 25% soya flour as compared to regular mandazi prepared from Soya only had wheat flour major potential to improve protein consumption and income generation for PLWHIV who regularly face employment discrimination and have elevated protein needs. Continuing to work with the rural and town based support group would ensure that the project benefited those most likely to be food insecurexii. Farmers and support group members had extensive agricultural experience and knowledge, as well as enthusiasm for experimenting with soya as an additional crop. Ugali and chai were the most universally and commonly consumed foods. Subsequently, efforts for value added processing should seek to take advantage and not displace these socially and culturally important foods. CARD could utilize its existing networks to expand and the project to beekeeping participants and throughout its PLWHIV network.

7. Appropriate Technology for Managing the Boundary between Nutrition and Agriculture Exploring options for value added processing of soya beans to meet these recommendations, it was frustrating to discover that available technologies had been developed largely from a nutrition intervention rather than agricultural development perspective. Malnutrition Matters, the NGO most well-known for soy processing in developing countries, has been successful in creating two machines for soymilk production: the Vitacow (Figure 3) and the Vitagoat. The earlier technology, the Vitacow, was designed for large scale soya production and required the use of electricity and fuel to grind the soya beans and run the pressure cooker for soyamilk. In an attempt to adapt the technology to rural settings for use by farmers and development NGOs, the Vitagoat was designed to operate using manpower and locally available fuels (American Soybean Association 2004). Yet the â&#x20AC;&#x153;appropriatenessâ&#x20AC;? of the Vitagoat technology to the Kenyan context remained constrained despite its adaptations (Hazeltine, Barrett, & Bull 1999). The

Consilience

Vitagoat still could only be manufactured and serviced in India due to sophisticated design of its pressure cooker and low availability of high quality steel. The Vitagoat required also required an input of 8kg of soy per batch, greater than the yield of most of the part-time soya farmers surveyed, suggesting that the scale of the machines capability was also not suitable for smallholder processing. As a food product, soyamilk was forced to compete with dairy milk. As dairy milk is already accepted and integrated into the culture, even optimistic soymilk pricing scenarios estimate that soymilk would only command two thirds of the price of dairy milk in Kenya (Chianu, Ohiokpeai, Vanlauwe, Adesina, De Groote & Sanginga 2009). Furthermore, unlike dairy milk, soymilk cannot be high temperature processed and therefore must be marketed, delivered, and sold under refrigerated conditions. The lack of availability of a refrigerated distribution chain largely confined the optimal utilization of Vitagoat technologies to a feeding program rather than a mechanism for soya farmers to begin to capture higher returns for their agricultural products in Western Kenya. The low functionality of the Vitagoat system as a tool for smallholders was demonstrated on a field visit to the Agricultural Technology Center in Bukura. While the Ministry of Agriculture in Kakamega had reported the Bukura project to be an example of significant success in soya bean processing in Western Kenya, a field visit revealed that the nearly year-old Vitagoat system was operated at a quarter of its daily capacity and was utilized actively by a sole soya farmer, who operated a mildly successful soya yoghurt business by selling door to door in the surrounding area. In the wake of these disappointing findings, CARD leveraged its horizontal ties in the community in order to discover additional options for value added processing. From a reference of a posho millxiii owner, CARD learned that there were mills designed to process soya beans available in Nairobi. The decision to purchase one of these machines (See Figure 4) was the result of a culmination of factors. First, the machines themselves were much simpler in their design, using a sieve and grinder to produce fine flour from the oil seed. Therefore, the machine could be serviced by most posho mill operators. From a product standpoint, the mill allowed for the resource and labor saving production of soya flour and soya beverage, both shelf stable products that a farmer could store and market for a period of up to six months. Further, soya flour and soya beverage do not face the same constraints as soya milk in terms of having to compete with existing products. Rather, soya flour can be marketed as a nutritional extender of both maize and wheat flour. The acceptability of both products was measured through anonymous taste tests, in which 15 participants from the Tujengane town based support group were asked to compare the soya products to their non-soy or commercially scaled counterparts. Soya beverage is a local product made by roasting soya and then grinding it to a fine powder. The soya beverage is then added to tea or served with warm milk or water and sugar. While soya beverage was considered a luxury product by most of the project stakeholders, most reported that they would consume the product if they could produce it easily themselves. Above, Figure 5 highlights the results of the taste survey for soya mandazi. CARDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s search for the appropriate technology for value added processing was not only crucial to transforming the form utility of soya, but also opened the opportunity the nutritional and agronomic benefits of soya beans to be realized by producers. Moving forward, this rapid

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

Figure 5: CARD Project Design assessment had demonstrated that the experience with soya production (Figure 1), the need for protein resources (especially for rural PLWHIV as in Figure 2), and the commitment to a project to improve home consumption and income generation to serve as the foundation for designing a successful local soya project.

8. Discussion: Horizontal Networks in Designing a Successful Local Soya Project With the value added processing system in place and its previous experience in working with community members in health and agriculture, CARD was in a position to further leverage its ability to work in horizontal networks within the Kakamega community to capture the interest of a diverse set of stakeholders. Using its previous work with HIV/AIDS and sustainable living, CARD was able to link to a rural and town-based support group who agreed to volunteer and work a common plot of soya beans as a substitute for double cropping maize. CARD also hosted a training for soya farmers on how to use the processing machine and enlisted the support of several of the hold-over soya growers from its previous project as well as a small group of farmers interested in transitioning some of their land to soya. Working locally allowed CARD to appeal to the multi-dimensional nature of rural livelihoods. As one staff member put it â&#x20AC;&#x153;No one understands the need for good nutrition like an HIV positive mother working in the fieldâ&#x20AC;?. Relationships with agricultural and nutritional stakeholders were solidified through programmatic integration of larger scale organizations as well. From a nutritional perspective, the

Consilience

CARD staff met with officials from the Voluntary Counseling and Testing Center in Kakamega and Mukumu Hospital, who coordinated support group activities. Regarding agricultural development, an additional major outcome of the project was the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Kakamega branch of KARI. Through the MOU, KARI-Kakamega and CARD agreed to partner to establish plots for the growth of certified seed by CARD project farmers and to allow the KARI staff to provide training in CARD projects as an aspect of the KARI extension responsibility. In the longer term, CARD’s increased ability to use the soya processing system has also allowed CARD to reach additional stakeholders to benefit from the nutritional value of soy. Amidst a surplus of soya flour and soya beverage, CARD began contracting with local schools and orphanages to provide ingredients for the lunchtime meal. Through the process of developing its local soya project, CARD experimented first hand with many of the practical obstacles and considerations addressed by boundary management organizations. Specifically, Cash (et al 2003) identify three common organizing themes for successful boundary management and articulating knowledge into action. First, it is emphasized that boundary management should be treated seriously. Secondly, considerable effort should be dedicated to demonstrating dual accountability. Finally, effective systems utilize boundary objects (Cash, Clark, Alcock, Dickson, Eckley, Guston, Jager & Mitchell 2003.). As presented by Cash, these are projects or items in which individuals with diverse expertise may come together to develop a project and/or set of recommendations to improve the current situation. While Cash et al. extrapolate these themes to broader knowledge systems, the CARD experience as a boundary organization and with its soya bean project demonstrate that the interpretive flexibility of soya beans can improve both agricultural and nutrition outcomes at the local level. First, CARD identified that soya could serve stakeholders with multiple interests in improving nutrition, farm sustainability, and increasing their incomes by successfully identifying a processing technology (boundary object) that could meet these needs within the cultural framework. The CARD experience also raises issues of dual accountability. In a society where no one has enough, CARD constructed a project design to attempt to make benefits flow to those most in need of assistance. The organization also leveraged its previous experience in both fields to make itself equally accountable to its agricultural and health stakeholders. CARD’s success comes at an interesting juncture as advocacy of the use of soya beans in Africa has become an increasingly high profile issue, especially in Kenya (Misiko, Tittonell, Ramisch, Richards & Giller 2008). While soybeans remain a prominent component of food aid programs in Kenya, as captured in the opening quote, increasing levels of soil degradation and food insecurity in Western Kenya have been recognized by agronomists and nutritionists as an opportunity to introduce soya beans as a supplement to the maize dominated cropping system and diet (Chianu, Ohiokpeai, Vanlauwe, Adesina, De Groote & Sanginga 2009). In the works of one KARI Agronomist "I often tell Kenyans they have to supplement ugali with soybean blended foods because when there is no maize, they starve” (Njuguna 2009). However, as the CARD experience demonstrates, efforts to address food insecurity through soya production in local purchase programs have yet to be flexible enough to work with smallholders effectively. Nevertheless, a concern with current

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

efforts to scale up soya production through localized value added processing is that they seem to still be focused toward a food aid rather than agricultural development approach by continuing to promote the installation of Vitagoat technologies. How soya beans will integrate or fail to integrate into local knowledge systems in Kenya remains to be seen. What is clear is that local level soybean processing increases opportunities for production to be more profitable and sustainable while simultaneously meeting the protein needs of smallholders. The CARD experience emphasizes that the boundary between health and agricultural development can be effectively managed at the local level by bringing together stakeholders over their common interest to improve community well-being.

Consilience

Bibliography American Soybean Association. (2004). Improving Health Through Soy: A Basic Training Manual. Ashley, C. and S. Maxwell. (2001). Development Policy Review. 19(4): 395-425 Barrett, C. B.. (2001). Food security and food assistance programs. In: Handbook of Agricultural Economics Vol. 2B Agricultural and Food Policy. Bijker, W. E.. (1995). Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs: Towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Cash, D.W., W.C. Clark, F. Alcock, N.M. Dickson, N. Eckley, D.H Guston, J. Jager and R.B. Mitchell. (2003). Knowledge systems for sustainable development. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(14). Chianu, J.N., O. Ohiokpeai, B. Vanlauwe, A. Adesina, H. De Groote and N. Sanginga. (2009). Promoting a versatile but yet minor crop: Soybean in the farming systems of Kenya. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 10(4). Coates, J., E.A. Frongillo, B.L. Rogers, P.Webb, P. Wilde and R. Houser. (2006). Commonalities in the experience of household food insecurity across cultures: What are measures missing? American Society for Nutrition. Supplement: Advances in Developing Country Food Insecurity Measurement. Goldberger, J.R. (2008). Non-governmental organizations, strategic bridge building, and the"scientization" of organic agriculture in Kenya. Agriculture and Human Values 25(2). Hoddinott, J. and Y. Yohannes. (2002). Dietary diversity as a measure of food insecurity. International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper No. 136. Hazeltine, Barrett and C. Bull. (1999). Appropriate Technology: Tools, Choices, and Implications. San Diego: Academic Press. Lappe, F. and J. Collins. (1998). World Hunger: Twelve Myths. Second ed. New York: Grove Press. Misiko, M., P.J Tittonell, J.J. Ramisch,P. Richards and K.E. Giller. (2008). Integrating new soyabean varieties for soil fertility management in smallholder systems through participatory research: Lessons from western Kenya. Agricultural Systems. 7(1). Njuguna, C. (2009) Kenya: Soybean - the Seed for Wealth, Health, and Soil Fertility. Allafrica.com Available at:http://allafrica.com/stories/200909240168.html

Consilience

Lamb: Health or Agricultural Development

Parfitt, T. (2002). The End of Development: Modernity, Postmodernity, and Development. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. Pieterse, J. (2001). Development as Reflexive Practice in Pietierse, J. (ed) Deveolpment Theory: Deconstructions/ Reconstructions. London: Sage. Ruel, M.T. (2003). Is dietary diversity an indicator of dietary quality or food insecurity? Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper No. 140. Schreinemachers, P. (2006) The (ir)relevance of the crop yield gap to food security in developing countries: With an application to multi agent modeling of farming systems in Uganda. Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Bonn, Netherlands. Scott, J.C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Shrum, W. (2001). Science and story in development: The emergence of non-governmental organizations in agricultural research. Social Studies of Science 30(1). World Food Program. (2006). Food Procurement in Developing Countries. Policy Issues for Consideration: Agenda Item 5. Available at: www.wfp.org/eb ---. (1996). Food Procurement Policy, Executive Director Circular ED96/009, 11 April 1996 Available at: www.wfp.org/eb

Endnotes i

Throughout this text smallholders will be used to refer to small, semi-

commercialized farmers who hold back some of their production for subsistence. ii

Common metrics to address macronutrient malnutrition include Body Mass Index,

upper arm circumference and height and weight measurements. Measures of micronutrient malnutrition often look for physical manifestations of micronutrient deficiency, such as Vitamin A related blindness or goiter. iii

For triangulation, access based measures are also often paired with biometric

measures of food security such as the presence of a stunted child in the household, upper arm circumference, Body Mass Index, and weight to height ratios. iv

Like all legumes, soya bean leaves take nitrogen out of the atmosphere and draw it

down to the root structure to be used as energy for plant growth. v

In terms of protein availability for digestion.

Consilience

While soya beans originated in mainland China, today they are grown on all six

inhabited continents and are available in a broad range of varieties bred to meet particularized climatic, nutritional, and agricultural needs. vii

These mills are ill adapted to oil processing, and the oil can break down the blades

over time. Moreover, many mill owners do not want to take the time to clean the machine, allow for soya processing, and then re-clean the machine before moving back to grinding another grain. viii

A headline program of the food aid reauthorization in the 2008 Farm Bill is the

inclusion of a 60 million dollar local purchase program (Title III, Farm Bill). The local purchase program is a pilot designed to build the case for a larger restructuring of US food aid. In an idealized sense, the turn to local purchase seems a key opportunity for the potential complementary nature of nutrition and agriculture to be realized in the development context. Functioning local purchase programs may have the opportunity to raise the exchange entitlement for participating farmers, providing them the opportunity to pursue a more sustainable livelihood. ix

Not surprisingly the largest supplier of food through local procurement programs

is South Africa. x

Ugali is commonly considered the staple of the Kenyan diet. It is a pan-baked,

mostly solid corn meal usually paired with vegetables such as kale or with boiled meat xi

SPSS was used to conduct basic statistical analyses on the various surveys.

xii

This goal uses the phrasing of most likely to be food insecure as insufficient data

was collected to obtain a more confident estimate of individual food security. xiii

Posho mills are Kenyan corn mills, and are often managed by successful small-

scale entrepreneurs.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 71-95

Sustaining Culture with Sustainable Stoves: The Role of Tradition in Providing Clean-Burning Stoves to Developing Countries Britta Victor Department of Anthropology Princeton University, Princeton, NJ brittavictor@gmail.com Abstract The focus of climate change mitigation is on greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, but there is another form of carbon that contributes greatly to climate change and that, if cleaned up, seems to be a quick and easy way to slow climate change. This is black carbon, or soot, and the majority of the world's black carbon comes from the basic cooking stoves of poor people in developing countries. These same stoves also pose significant health risks to their users, and many researchers and philanthropists are working to put cleaner stoves in their kitchens. This quick fix is not so easy, though. In the quest for the perfect stove, a key detail is left out: the cooks do not want to give up their old stoves. This study juxtaposes the research of stove engineers with ethnographies of rural communities, writings on women's rights, and theories of imperialism, to explore the complex cultural obstacles to the success of clean stove programs in developing countries. Author’s Note Britta graduated in 2010 from Princeton University‟s Anthropology and Environmental Studies departments, for which a version of this piece was written as her senior thesis. She currently works for the International Waters Cluster of the United Nations Office for Project Services in Copenhagen, Denmark, protecting the world‟s oceans and missing the water back home in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands.

Keywords: climate change, stoves, culture, gender, development, health.

1. Black Carbon “How to Slow Climate Change for Just $15 Billion” boasts the title of an article in Wired Science. It sounds tempting: the solution is to donate stoves to the poor. They cannot use the stoves they already have, say the stove engineers, because they emit incredible amounts of black carbon into the atmosphere. While all of the climate change talk has centered on greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, there is another kind of carbon in our atmosphere that deserves attention. Black carbon, commonly known as soot, also contributes to climate change and may be much easier to control. Scientists are calling it a “low-hanging fruit,” a cheap and easy solution that will not provide a permanent solution to climate change but can, if addressed, have an immediate and significant effect on global temperatures.

Consilience

“We know how to cook without smoke,” explains V. Ramanathan, a leading stove expert from the University of San Diego. “A clean stove costs $30. Multiply that by 500 million households, and it‟s only $15 billion. This is a solvable problem” (Keim 2009:1). In comparison with other tactics for climate change abatement, stoves represent relatively basic, affordable technology. And the best part, enthusiasts claim, is that they represent a solution to a serious global health problem—they can save the world in two ways at once. It is not that these promising new stoves represent any groundbreaking technological developments. In fact, they are simple, cheap versions of the stoves we use every day in developed countries. But for approximately half the world‟s population, almost all from developing countries, these modern stoves can be lifechanging, even life-saving. “I am unable to breathe properly whenever I use the chula,” a rural housewife in Abdalpur, India, says of her traditional stove. “But I have been using it for over 20 years. It is the only thing I have with which to cook” (Bhattasali 2005:1). Difficulty breathing is just one of the consequences of working over traditional stoves, such as the chula, or open fires. It may also be a sign of a serious illness. Traditional stoves such as the chula spew black carbon (better known as soot) into the air in the home, producing indoor air pollution. The World Health Organization (WHO) has named indoor air pollution one of the top ten health risks facing our world today, “responsible for an estimated 2.7 percent of the global burden of disease” (Jetter and Kariher 2009:1). While Carbon Dioxide, or CO2, is still the leading cause of climate change, black carbon has surprisingly emerged in second place. Methane and nitrous oxide receive much attention, yet black carbon poses a much more serious threat than these gases. As much as 20 percent of the Earth‟s current warming can be attributed to black carbon, even though it is not a greenhouse gas. Black carbon consists of tiny airborne particles emitted when fossil fuels, biofuels and biomass are burned. Once in the atmosphere, these particles convert the sun‟s rays into infrared or heat radiation and warm the air around them, explains Dr. Mark Jacobson, co-founder and director of the Atmospheric Energy Program at Stanford University. He adds that greenhouse gases, in contrast, trap this infrared radiation while still allowing sunlight to pass through (H.R. Rep 2007:12). Thus, Jacobson says, while black carbon may only cause up to 20 percent of the earth‟s warming, controlling black carbon may actually reduce 40 percent of current warming. Removing black carbon from the atmosphere will produce less infrared radiation to be absorbed by steady levels of greenhouse gases (H.R. Rep 2007:12-13). When the particles of black carbon age in the atmosphere, they grow in size, which allows them to absorb and convert even more sunlight, but also allows them to form clouds. While these clouds block sunlight, cooling the earth to an extent, they can also contribute considerably to climate change, Jacobson explains. When the clouds of black carbon, which only remain in the atmosphere for a few weeks, settle on snow or sea ice, they darken the white surfaces. This inhibits the ability of the snow and sea ice to reflect sunlight, a process called albedo. The light is instead absorbed by the dark ice and snow, which then warms and melts, raising sea levels (H.R. Rep 2007:12). Ramanathan describes the extent of black carbon‟s effect: it may have as much as 60 percent the warming effect as that of CO2 and the particles originally

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

produce a haze around the area in which they were emitted travel fast, covering an entire ocean or subcontinent in as little as a week. (H.R. Rep 2007:49). One of the most exciting characteristics of black carbon, as compared with greenhouse gases, is this short lifetime: one to four weeks. Carbon dioxide, on the other hand, has a lifetime of 30 to 43 years and methane 8 to 12 years. Because of this short lifetime, reductions in black carbon emissions can have immediate results in combating climate change. “Yet,” Representative Waxman warns, “controlling black carbon has not been seriously examined at the federal level as a way of possibly mitigating climate change” (H.R. Rep 2007: 2). This is unsurprising, though, as the United States is only responsible for 6.1 percent of black carbon emissions (H.R. Rep 2009:7). It is actually the developing countries—especially India and China—that emit the most black carbon into the atmosphere (H.R. Rep 2007:7). This is because black carbon, unlike other gases contributing to climate change, is not a byproduct of modern industry. Open fires and basic stoves in developing countries, especially within rural communities with limited access to newer technology, are to blame for the majority of the black carbon in our atmosphere. Better stoves are the solution.

2. Sustainable Stoves Cooks in developing countries use one of three different methods for cooking their food: the open fire, an upgrade to the open fire, and a basic stove. Open fires usually consist of three stones, and this method of cooking can be found in at least some communities of every country, according to Gerald Foley, author of “Improved Cooking stoves in Developing Countries” (1983). Foley describes the upgraded open fire as one in which shielding has been provided for the fire or a platform has been built for convenience. The third cooking system in developing countries is the actual stove—though the form of stove that, like open fires, is still responsible for black carbon emissions—and these stoves vary in their design. Some designs are thousands of years old and range in materials from mud or pottery in Asia, metal “jikos” and “forneaux” in East and West Africa, and other brick and mud varieties (Foley 1983:12). The brightly-painted, shiny metal of the Envirofit stove looks nothing like these stoves found in these poor rural homes. Yet a lot of people are putting a lot of time and money into getting more Envirofit stoves, or other clean-burning and fuelefficient stoves, into those same homes. These stoves are often sold commercially but the engineers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations and charities that work to get these stoves into their target kitchens have only the best of intentions. Their work reflects their concern for the stoves‟ users and a concern for the environment as they endlessly strive to design and disseminate the perfect stove—one that will be safe and sustainable, one welcomed into the kitchens of the developing world. These modern stoves, according to tests of their efficiency, perform better “than even the most carefully operated fire” (Bryden et al. 2005:5). Their focus is on transferring heat from the burning fuel to the food as efficiently as possible. They use the same fuels that these cooks have available to them—wood, charcoal, coal, crop residues, animal dung, and other forms of biomass and waste—but they burn

Consilience

these fuels more efficiently. The stoves are also safer, especially for children, as they are not as hot to the touch as traditional stoves tend to be. A major benefit of these efficient stoves is their ability to cook the same amount of food with much less fuel. In areas where fuel is scarce, this saves time spent collecting firewood or other fuels. The new stoves also save time cooking, as they can heat food much faster. In areas where cooking fuel must be purchased, the stoves are an investment that will save their users an unbelievable amount of money in fuel costs. The reduction in indoor air pollution and its effects on human health, are the most valuable benefits of the stoves. More than 1.5 million people die prematurely each year from inhaling indoor air pollution (Bhattasali 2005:1). The smoke from traditional cooking methods has been shown to cause a long list of health problems, including acute respiratory infections, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease such as bronchitis or emphysema, cancer of the nose, throat, and lungs, asthma, cataracts, tuberculosis, heart disease, birth problems such as low birth weight, stinging eyes, chronic headaches, and coughing. (Thakuri 2009:2, Bhattasali 2005:1). These health concerns affect women and children in particular, as they spend much more time in the home and over the stove (Jetter and Kariher 2009:1). Manas Ranjan Roy of the Chittaranjan Cancer Research Institute in India asserts, “These women are actually inhaling pollutants equivalent to as many as 20 cigarettes every day” (Bhattasali 2005:1). There is a strong campaign against cigarette smoking throughout the world, yet there is little awareness of the greater threat of indoor air pollution to these rural cooks. Efficient stoves may also help to cook food more nutritionally—a major concern in developing countries where malnutrition is prevalent. A study of “balady bread,” a flat bread popular throughout the Middle East, has shown that cooking the bread at high temperatures or for long periods of time may reduce the bread‟s protein content. It is likely that these results would be similar with similar breads, and thus it is important to ensure that temperature and cooking time are carefully controlled. Modern stove technology allows food to be cooked at lower temperatures and in less time; thus, the new stoves may produce bread higher in protein than traditional stoves do.

3. The Challenge It is clear that modern stoves have significant economic, environmental and health advantages over traditional stoves. They seem an obvious solution to climate change and indoor air pollution. But they are not. There have been several challenges in the global initiative to swap cooking systems in the developing world to clean stoves. As Brandon Keim points out in his Wired Science article, it would only cost $15 billion to slow climate change with these stoves. But who is going to pay that $15 billion? There is little awareness about the importance and effectiveness of clean stoves and thus little funding. That funding is necessary, since the populations that cook with the culprit stoves are the populations that cannot afford new stoves. If we want residents of developing nations to switch to cleaner stoves, we must provide those stoves, because they simply do not have the resources to naturally create a market for them.

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

“People at the absolute bottom of the pyramid—those living on less than $1 or $2 per day—will not be able to afford a stove even with financing. In such cases, subsidies are necessary,” explain Xander Slaski and Mark Thurber, of Stanford University‟s Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. It is crucial that stoves and the threat of black carbon are brought to the world‟s attention in order to obtain this funding to subsidize stoves for those who need them. “On the other hand,” they continue, “various studies have shown that subsidized stoves turn into little more than scrap if target customers do not value the product to begin with.” This cultural disinterest in new stoves is the greatest obstacle in the development and dissemination of sustainable stoves. The focus in the search for the perfect stove needs to shift from efficiency to the stove‟s resemblance to its original counterpart—in ease of use and in ability to cook food in just the same way. Stoves designed for use in developing countries are constantly compared in terms of efficiency. Those that are just slightly more efficient are chosen for mass-production and mass-distribution. But distributing these stoves only represents the environmental disaster of unnecessary production if the stoves are not used. Douglas F. Barnes, Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith, and Robert van der Plas state an important message that should be heeded by all: No matter how efficient or cheap the stove, individual households have proved reluctant to adopt it if it is difficult to install and maintain or less convenient and less adaptable to local preferences than its traditional counterpart. On the other hand, households have been most receptive when the dissemination process takes full account of the capacities and needs of local stove producers and consumers (1994:v).

4. The Role of the Stove in Rural Life Aside from the countless environmental and health benefits of sustainable stoves, there are many ways in which these stoves may improve the daily lives of their users. As a result of their increased efficiency in transferring heat from the fuel to the food, the stoves can save cooking time, giving women more time in their day. Additionally, decreased soot emissions means that walls and clothing will no longer be discolored, a small but noteworthy benefit. The stoves themselves are also more attractive, often with handles to make them easier to carry, and can become symbols of modernity and higher status for their users (Barnes et al. 1994:10). Yet even when these stoves are made, and made affordable, cooks do not use them. In a review of past stove programs—both successful and unsuccessful— Douglas F. Barnes, Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith and Robert van der Plas write: The work on stoves continually refers to „stove dissemination,‟ which seems to imply that the improved stove need only be distributed to be adopted and that it is intrinsically and obviously superior to the traditional stove just because it has greater energy efficiency. As a consequence of this perhaps naïve thinking—

Consilience oblivious to the influence of custom, setting, and circumstance— many programs failed (1994:13).

As they argue, it is naïve to think that all of those benefits will necessarily lead to the stoves being readily accepted in the developing world. The perfect stove has yet to be created, because the new stoves are different and often cannot perform the same vital tasks that traditional stoves performed. While many stove designers may view the benefits from improved stoves as much greater than the forgone benefits of traditional stoves, it is important to take note of these shortcomings of the improved stoves. To many who still cook with traditional stoves, these are important details, and a truly ideal stove would fix the ways in which these new stoves fail to live up to the old ones. A major complaint of the improved stoves is their complexity and difficulty of use. In reducing heat loss, engineers have decreased the size of the hole in which to add firewood, and this makes the stoves harder to light and to control. It also means women have an added burden of cutting firewood down to smaller sizes (Barnes et al. 1994:10). As an added measure to increase efficiency, the stoves often have adjustable power outputs, which can be very difficult to control (Barnes et al. 1994:14). Other stoves, meanwhile, can focus too much on health and not enough on efficiency. Adding a chimney, for example, prevents indoor air pollution but may actually reduce the efficiency of the stove (Barnes et al. 1994:10). The fire in rural homes also serves an important social function, as families traditionally sit around the fire, and it is the only source of light for many families who cannot afford lamps, electricity or even candles. More significantly, a major benefit of fires or traditional stoves is their secondary role as space heaters, and stove designers who focus on increasing efficiency often overlook this role. That usually means increasing the efficiency with which heat transfers from the fuel to the food, losing no heat to the surroundings. This heat lost to the surroundings should not be considered a loss for stoves to be used in many parts of the world, though. Foley argues that “using more fuel than is strictly needed for cooking is not wasteful if it is meeting an essential family need for heating” (1983:13), and argues that this is a widespread necessity. Even some homes in tropical climates have a need for heating in winter mornings and evenings. Smoke‟s food preservation capacity is another sometimes crucial aspect of traditional stoves that is lost with healthier, more sustainable stoves. The smoke causes sickness and death among cooks, and the black carbon in the smoke contributes to climate change, but many households use the smoke to preserve and dry food hung above the fireplace. Most homes cannot afford refrigerators, and smoking food is essential to prolonging the life of the food, keeping insects and rodents away, and preventing molds and fungi during the wet seasons. Chomcharn describes that, despite women‟s complaints that the smoke causes eye irritation, they still like to allow the fire to smolder long after they are finished cooking (1991:1). Keeping insects away from people can be even more important than keeping them away from just the food, and the smoke from fires and traditional stoves often fills this role, too. Disease-carrying mosquitoes and other poisonous insects are a serious concern in many environments, but these insects are repelled by a home filled with smoke. While mosquito nets and repellents work, they are less effective than smoke and often too expensive to be practical (Chomcharn 1991:1). As a result,

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

stove designers have been surprised to see that, while asthma rates may drop after the introduction of cleaner stoves to a community, malaria rates may spike—an unforeseen and worrisome tradeoff. With these considerable benefits of fires and traditional stoves, it is clear that designing the perfect stove is a challenge. Cooks need to love the stoves. There is a large focus on the need for more affordable stoves, with the underlying assumption that the success of a stove program depends upon the stove‟s price. There is a considerable amount of literature and press surrounding sustainable stoves, but in much of this writing there is that assumption that if people in rural communities can afford the stove, they will definitely buy it and use it. Further, there is a sense that a stove is clearly superior to its user if it prevents pneumonia or other health concerns and reduces fuel use (saving its user time and money). And there is a sense that it is simply a “better stove” if it accomplishes these goals and also has a reduced impact on the environment and the atmosphere. Therefore, there are many arguments for engineers to design a stove that can be assembled at a low cost and for government agencies and charities to subsidize the stoves so that the world‟s poor will switch from fires and inefficient stoves to cleaner stoves. The race for more efficient, cheaper stoves is in fact the race for the perfect stove. It seems there cannot, however, be one perfect stove. Not all cooks will love the same stove, because members of each culture have different needs from a stove—from space heating and food preservation to the stove‟s ability to cook the perfect injera. And cooking the perfect injera—a flat bread that is a staple in Ethiopia—is a necessity to many Ethiopians. Peter Scott of the Aprovecho Research Center, tells Burkhard Bilger of The New Yorker, “The Ethiopians are unbelievably particular. If the injera doesn‟t have the exact size of bubble in the batter, they‟ll say it‟s garbage” (Bilger 2009:88). It is particular requirements like these, which abound among rural cooks, that constitute the “custom, setting, and circumstance” that Barnes et al. describe as so crucial to a stove program‟s success (1994:13). Engineers can design cheap, clean stoves, and philanthropists can make them even more affordable, but if they are not designed for the cooks who will use them, the cooks will probably not love them and probably not use them. Cooks like their traditional stoves because of tradition, and as Bilger writes, “the trouble with tradition…is that it can be remarkably thickheaded” (2009:94). It seems that no one stove can emit less black carbon into the atmosphere, repel mosquitoes, and cook everybody‟s meal just the way they like it. And while traditions may be very important to cooks, they may be detrimental to the community. This raises the question: should cooks change their traditions in favor of more sustainable stoves? Is sacrificing tradition necessary to the development of poor communities?

5. Cooking and Culture The film “The Gods Must Be Crazy” depicts the tragic scenario of one product of Western development (a Coca-Cola bottle) completely destroying the culture and the harmony in which a tribe of African bushmen lived. While the film itself may represent an offensive attempt at anthropology, it asked the world this

Consilience

same question: does Western development lead to the disintegration of a culture so beautiful as that of the bushmen? There may be huge cultural significance stored in something so simple as a traditional stove, or even a fire pit. “Cooking tools, as the durable objects that we take with us from place to place, or hand down in a family (usually maternal) line, come to be storehouses of memories which help tell stories of people‟s lives,” write David Sutton and Michael Hernandez of this certain kind of magic connected with cooking tools (2007:1). Stoves can be easily compared to tools in the sense that in rural communities, many generations have used the same stoves and many women have spent a large portion of their lives over these stoves cooking food for their families—a vital part of their lives. We must be careful to acknowledge that cooks in developing countries place much more value on their stoves and other cooking tools than we might understand. “In Western capitalist modernity such objects are often discarded in the name of progress,” Sutton and Hernandez write (2007:1). In other parts of the world, though, the connections people have with their cooking tools may be more important to them than progress. Food is not just a part of the culture in these communities; food is the culture. “The emergence of national cuisines is part of a process of assembling a national culture…Food is an important, if not crucial, contributor to both an individual‟s and to a group‟s collective sense of identity,” writes Igor Cusack, a scholar of cuisine, culture, and identity (2003:278). Like most valuable traditions, this means food must be cooked just right to truly represent and preserve that identity. Food may be an important aspect of identity in its ability to tell a community‟s history. In many parts of the world, textbooks and classes do not exist, literacy rates are low, and there are few ways for a people to remember their history. Food can tell this story in a language that takes no formal training other than the education a mother provides to her daughters. “Cuisines are not just innocent concoctions, but reflect the dominant ideologies of the societies in which they emerge so that, for instance, imperialism and colonialism have been crucial contributes to African cuisines,” Cusack writes (2003:278). A meal can illustrate the ways in which a community is unique as well as its connections with other cultures around the world through this combination of influences, representing that community‟s place in space and time. A meal can paint a personal history just as it can paint a national history. Signe Arnfred, author of “Sex, Food, and Female Power: Discussion of Data Material from Northern Mozambique” writes of a dish in Mozambique called “makeya,” which is said to have “a touch of the holy.” The locals say, “when you want to communicate with the government you take a pencil and write a letter. When you want to communicate with the ancestors, you pour makeya” (Arnfred 2007:148). The act of pouring the makeya is given significance here—not just eating it. Food preparation is in itself an art form, a form of expression, and a form of communication with one‟s ancestors, with one‟s community, and with the rest of the world. Cusack presents social psychologist Michael Billig‟s theory of food as “banal nationalism,” or “everyday, unnoticed nationalism” (2003:279). Just as food represents a people‟s national identify, cooking and eating that food is a way in which

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

any citizen can show their national pride, strengthening the nation and, through the sense of community, reinforcing the value of tradition.

6. The Other Side of Tradition There are plenty of practices aside from the customs of food preparation that accompany fires and basic stoves and which residents of developed countries would view as unnecessary or even harmful to some of these communities. These include not only the aforementioned use of a tool which is harmful to the health of its users and contributes to climate change, but also acts of deforestation and unjust treatment of women. Increasing stove efficiency decreases fuel requirements. In many areas, such as Honduras, fuel is firewood from nearby forests. The strain on the forests can cause deforestation, a concern in almost all developing countries. Deforestation is in itself a serious environmental problem, causing loss of biodiversity (including the loss of crops used for food), floods, and desertification, all serious threats throughout the world, especially in developing countries (Allen and Barnes 2010:164). Beyond this, though, the loss of forests causes fuel shortages, increasing the need for more efficient stoves. And the decrease in global forest cover affects carbon cycles since there is less vegetation to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, accelerating climate change. Even if connections are not made between the collection of firewood for cooking and floods, desertification, or climate change, it is clear that forests, the major fuel source for many communities, are growing scarce. It seems that it should be in the best interest of these communities to preserve the limited firewood resources. Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson warn against this assumption, though: Claims on behalf of community-based conservation often retain a rather simple quality. One such form such claims assume is that „communities‟ have a long term need for the renewable resources near which they live, and they possess more knowledge about these resources than other potential actors. They are, therefore, the best managers of resources…But such representations of community ignore the critical interests and processes within communities, and between communities and other social actors (2001:7). These “critical interests and processes within communities” may include traditional cooking practices and the community‟s willingness to change them, and the authors may argue that these interests take a higher priority in decision-making than concerns for the sustainability of local resources. In this way, these traditional cooking practices seem detrimental to the community‟s sustainability and should perhaps be sacrificed. Another tradition that may prevent the communities from using more efficient stoves, another one that Westerners would be quick to put an end to, regardless of its influence on the success of stove programs, is the treatment of women in many developing countries. Women perform more than 90 percent of the

Consilience

cooking duties in developing countries (Kammen), so the health risks of inefficient stoves disproportionately affect women. Yet men have historically been the decisionmakers in the developing world. While it may be impossible to prove that women‟s lack of decision-making power is to blame for the resistance to cleaner, safer stoves, it seems possible that men will choose how women cook their food and women, along with the children by their sides, will bear the burden of that decision.

7. Accepted Oppression of Women What is best for women and children is not necessarily best for the whole family. Health benefits for women and children do not directly affect the men of the family, nor does an extra hour in a woman‟s day. But most of traditional stoves‟ benefits—heating, food preservation, protection from insects and the cultural importance of dishes—are appreciated by the whole family. The decision whether to use sustainable stoves then becomes one that pits the interest of the family against the interests of the mother, and the family, led by the husband, often wins. Women may even prefer to cook on newer stoves—they may be willing to sacrifice the perfect injera in favor of healthier conditions for themselves or their children—but their husbands, removed from the health risks, may prefer their bread cooked just right. Igor Cusack says of cooks in Mexico, “Women were perhaps less concerned than men with the social stigma associated with the pre-Columbian dishes like tamales made of corn” (288). He extends these gender-based attitudes on food preparation to other cultures with a strong sense of tradition, arguing that women are more open than men to branching out to new recipes outside of their own ethnicity. If the men are more concerned with the preservation of culture through cooking, it is even more likely that the men will choose the stoves that their wives use. Clean stoves may be a threat to culture, but it is important to note that every aspect of a culture may not be worth protecting. Giving women, rather than the family, the choice in how to cook the family‟s meal will complicate the power structure ingrained in that culture. Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Margreet Zwarteveen write about water resource management in South Asia with an argument generally applicable to resource management in poor, rural areas. They say this power structure should be upset and women‟s rights brought to these areas, especially if women have a greater concern for environmental sustainability. “Romanticizing views of „communities‟ as homogeneous groups that have a strong common commitment to maintaining their local resource base, and ignoring the effects of power differences within the community on who can participate in decisions regarding management and the share of benefits, risks reinforcing inequality,” write Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen (2001:64). While the focus is on resource use rather than the design and use of clean stoves, clean stoves deal heavily with the use of fuel resources and represent a difference between men‟s and women‟s “needs”—health needs, fuel needs, and perceptions of sustainability as a “need.” This can be read as a call to all those involved in stove programs to recognize men‟s and women‟s decisions as separate, and to be sure to include women in the decision-making process. They should not assume that when a community rejects a stove, it is the choice of the entire community. When this

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

assumption is made, they warn, inequality may be reinforced as a feature of the culture. Efficient stoves heat up more quickly and cook food more quickly, so these stoves would save women huge amounts of time—a benefit that would only concern the woman herself or a very sympathetic husband. But most husbands are not sympathetic. “Studies have consistently shown that women in rural areas of developing countries work longer hours than men,” writes sustainable stove scholar Peter Watts, “and that much, if not most, of their time is taken up by the essential „survival activities‟ of food preparation, water hauling and fuel collection” (2008:1). He says a survey of five villages in India shows that women work an average of nine hours per day, while men work only five, the amount of time, coincidentally, women spend on food preparation alone. Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen refer to the view of the male perspective as that of the entire community as the “unitary model” (2001:64). Even with the focus on the risks stoves pose to women and women‟s cooking practices, it is likely the research and writing on stove programs which refers to a community‟s preferences is guilty of viewing the community as this unitary model. “Gender differences in power and influence are a recurring pattern,” Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen argue. “Women‟s participation has received considerable rhetoric, but less careful attention has been paid to the differences between women‟s and men‟s needs and priorities with regards to resource use, and to the barriers women face in achieving control over resources” (2001:64). One of these barriers, in fact, is their reluctance to voice their concerns—one reason that, despite the huge focus on women‟s participation, their needs and priorities are still not heard. Many women living in oppressive cultures stay quiet because they “often seem to acquiesce in their own noninvolvement,” not because of lack of interest but because they are aware of “the social costs and risks involved in contesting the masculine rules and norms” (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2001:83-84). This power struggle occurs at both the household and community levels. As Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen explain, “leaving this analysis at the household level is incomplete, because it does not take into account the effects of the community on gender relations in the household, or vice-versa” (2001:65). The community dictates this power distribution within the household because it is ingrained in the culture, and when men have more power in the household, they have more power in the community. As such, they are the ones who represent the desires of the entire community to researchers. It is the household that rejects the stove, but rejection of stoves can be a trend within the communities because the culture of that community plays a key role in the stove‟s acceptance. Just as ignoring women‟s cooking needs risks widening the gender gap, if women are given the power within the household to purchase a clean stove, they can improve their societal status. “Strengthening women‟s claims over common property can strengthen their position in the household and community,” Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen explain (2001:82). Stove programs, then, should focus on breaking down these barriers rather than reemphasizing the health benefits of clean stoves for women. It does not matter whether women want to reap these benefits, if their culture prevents them from saying so. As a result, the concern for sustainability of

Consilience

the “community” (which will transform from the unitary model to a more accurate depiction of the entire population) may change. Currently, women are not the only members of the household whose health is at risk due to soot-emitting stoves. Children often sit by their mothers while they cook, suffering from the same ailments as their mothers. In fact, children under the age of five are at a higher risk of respiratory infections. These infections often lead to pneumonia, the cause of 19 percent of deaths in children under five. Many children are even born underweight or with health defects such as asthma due to pregnant mothers inhaling soot while cooking (Williams 2005:1). As with women, children have no decision making power, though this is not as much a concern of justice as is women‟s status. However, fathers tend not to consider children in family decisions as heavily as they perhaps should. MeinzenDick and Zwarteveen describe this lesser concern of the fathers, writing “a number of studies have found that women and men spend income under their control in systematically different ways, with women more likely to devote a high proportion of their income on food and health care for children” (2001:65). Unfortunately, the income is usually under the control of the men, and therefore less money is spent on their well-being. Money is a form of power, and if men are less willing to spend money on healthcare for children, they are also probably less likely to use their power to protect children‟s health from threats such as stove smoke. Women‟s greater concern for their children is linked with their domestic responsibilities, which include childcare (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2001:82). These responsibilities, in turn, are both the result of “rule-setting by men only” (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 2001:82) and the reason for women‟s continued subordination: with their role limited to household duties, their power within the community is limited. But as women are better representatives of children‟s needs, it is even more important to work to hear women‟s true opinions. Even after growing up with such exposure to the health risks of indoor air pollution, and even with women as the primary influence in children‟s lives, each generation continues to value tradition over the health of women and children and the sustainability of resources. Liesbeth van der Hoogte and Koos Kingma, scholars in gender and development, explain: Women play a central role in socializing children to continue cultural practices, but if these cultural practices have a harmful impact on women and girls, they have very limited scope to question or change them. If women rebel against tradition, they run the risk of being excluded from the community. Exclusion carries a very high price, if you are also discriminated against in the wider society based on your membership of a marginalized group (2004:51). Again, women‟s lack of power actually ensures their continued oppression even as new generations, having suffered in the home alongside their mothers, grow up and make their own decisions. Some organizations are already taking note of this crucial step of recognizing women‟s perspectives. The “Global Assessment for Gender and Energy,” or GAGE, project was proposed at the World Renewable Energy Conference V on the

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

premise that “better understanding is needed about how renewable energy solutions affect men and women differently so that organizational responsibilities and resources can be accurately targeted (Farhar 2000:2). The project is aimed at increasing the role gender plays in the energy discourse and increasing women‟s power in making energy-related decisions. Analysts and development experts from several countries agreed at the Village Power ‟98 conference on sustainable energy development (SED) that recognition of women was a priority. Their consensus was: That access to sustainable energy in rural areas is particularly difficult for women; that participation of local people, including women, is essential for successful SED; that international financing agencies should integrate energy into their gender policies; that electricity access can be increased by matching resources to women‟s energy needs; and that financing should be actively extended to women to acquire sustainable energy systems (Farhar 2000:3). Farhar details many more instances of organizations realizing the importance of women. This provides hope that, in the future, the views of the community truly will represent the views of everyone within the community. Perhaps, at least where stoves are concerned, women‟s voices may even hold more weight than men‟s, as women are more directly involved in cooking than are men. Unfortunately, though, van der Hoogte and Kingma present a less optimistic view of organizations working with developing countries. They argue that often employees do not value women‟s perspectives, that they falsely assume they understand women‟s conditions without actually listening to the women, and even that, in an attempt to be sensitive to a culture which oppresses women, they purposely do not hire local women while still attempting to appear as though women‟s needs were taken into account. “It was reported that NGO staff attempted to solve the problem of traditional leaders opposing women‟s equal participation in the organization, by excluding women from responsible roles or on committees, or by including women only in limited areas of a project, to solve the problem of participation,” they write (2004:54). This has two effects: women within a community who are trying to change that element of culture which is so detrimental—their own oppression—are not supported by the outside organizations which are trying to help them (such as stove programs, for which success may depend on giving women the right to choose their cooking methods), and the staff of the organizations may dismiss an entire culture as backwards and fail to offer it the respect it deserves. Possibly as a result of dismissing the cultures as backwards, the organizations sometimes “accept gender inequality in a culture as unchangeable, and consider criticism of inequality as an offence against the culture in general” (van der Hoogte and Kingma 2004:54). This increases the likelihood that the community‟s perspective that is presented to stove programs the rest of the world may be simply the perspective of the men within the community. Striking a balance between respecting tradition and promoting development is thus incredibly difficult.

Consilience

Nevertheless, stove programs aimed at providing developing countries with clean, efficient, safe stoves may be overly intrusive if they were to interfere with gender relations, attitudes towards the environment and natural resources, or other aspects of culture which the communities themselves may view as important aspects of their lifestyles and parts of their collective cultural identities. This is especially true if the programs attempt to break down gender barriers not to increase the acceptance of stoves within a culture, but purely to help women gain power. And where do stove programs draw the line between believing that women within a culture truly want to use their traditional stoves and interpreting such a claim as women‟s forced acceptance of their husband‟s desires? Should a stove program simply give up if women truly do not want to cook with sustainable stoves?

8. Ethics of Adapting Cultures to Stoves It cannot be easily assumed that, simply because of the risks and burdens that women face in cooking with traditional stoves, women would prefer to use sustainable stoves. There is also a certain level of fulfillment many women feel when cooking the dishes that are important to their culture: the same dishes their mothers and grandmothers cooked and taught them to cook, and the same dishes their mothers‟ families and grandmothers‟ families ate and enjoyed. Cooking can be empowering for women. Signe Arnfred contrasts the conceptions Westerners have of the work of a housewife with those of developing countries. “Cooking in general is a female capacity and domain,” she writes, but warns that we should not interpret this as a form of oppression: “in a Western context this seems a trivial statement and may be equated with the burdensome household chores of a western „housewife,” suggesting that this is not how the role of the housewife is viewed outside of the Western world (2007:148). In societies which are based on subsistence production—the majority of poor, rural communities around the world—“cooking and distribution of food has a different status. Food is a female domain and a basis for female authority” (Arnfred 2007:149). Arnfred gives an example from Mozambique to represent the power associated with food production in all economies of subsistence production: Men and women are both involved in the production (they both work in the fields), but at harvest time the products from the field are stored in the granaries of the older women, the grandmothers. They are the ones who control the granaries, deciding what to take out, when, and for what purpose. A man who wants to control the granary of his wife gets a nickname, which is translated to avarento in Portuguese to mean “the one who wants to have it all for himself”—as opposed to the women who are supposed to administer the granary for the benefits of all (2007:149). This brings a new perspective to what appears to be the oppression of women in these communities—though they work longer hours and lack political power within the family and community, it seems they do have power over food production. To attempt to “free” women from the shackles of domestic work, or to dictate how they ought to cook, may improve their health and slow climate change, but it would come at a cost: removing the one source of power, and of pride, in these women‟s lives. And to call the housewife‟s role a form of “oppression” now

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

seems erroneous when, in fact, men are seen as selfish if they attempt to perform any tasks conventionally reserved for women. Through this compelling relationship between women and food, whether or not it is the result of oppression, ecofeminists argue that women may have a connection with nature and, by extension, they may be more likely to have strong feelings about sustainability. In this way, their traditional roles as cooks may actually increase the likelihood that they will embrace sustainable stoves. Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen describe this connection: Ecofeminists maintain that traditional communities lived in close harmony with nature, according to feminine principles. Colonialism and markets have broken up this harmony, often resulting in men engaging in life-destroying activities or having to migrate. The women meanwhile continued to be linked to life and nature through their role as providers of sustenance, food, and water. Hence, for ecofeminisits, in terms of environmental sustainability it is a fortunate scheme of events that women have been left out of development, because this has made it possible for them to retain their unity with nature (2001:68). The advent of technology that promotes sustainability, especially when this technology is sold in a capitalist market system, complicates this theory. According to the claim of ecofeminists that Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen present, women have retained their unity with nature as a result of their exclusion from markets and development. Thus, allowing women to make decisions about technology, and giving them purchasing power, would allow them to make the transition to sustainable stoves. But to introduce women to these markets would break them from their alleged harmony with nature, just as has occurred among the men in their community, and they may no longer have strong feelings about sustainability. If the Western world is to work to increase women‟s decision-making power in the developing world, we must be sensitive in how we do so. Their cooking practices extend far beyond simply the final result: the food on the plate. For women, cooking is a social activity and has several other rewards. A major argument for clean stoves is these speedy stoves will shorten women‟s time spent cooking. They already work so many hours more than men and deserve free time, many advocates state. And women can devote this extra time to economic activities, increasing their familial or, more progressively, their personal incomes. Peter Watts writes that this is an idealistic assumption, though: Because time is a limited commodity, women are required to make rational decisions concerning its use. The basis of those decisions is the contribution that a particular use of time will make towards sustaining the household. If the time required for one activity increases, then women must make a trade-off with time spent on another. Any development program which aims to increase women‟s productivity or improve women‟s welfare must first consider the activities which the women will have to forgo as a result (2008:1).

Consilience

The concept of spare time for these poor, rural women may in itself be a fantasy, negating the argument that clean stoves will help women. It may even have adverse effects: if women find high levels of satisfaction in cooking, time spent doing other activities may feel less rewarding and more suggestive of chores.

9. Technological Imposition Stove programs, especially those that developed countries initiate, do not always know what is best for the communities they are trying to help. This is no fault of their own; they simply do not understand the individual needs of each community, and perhaps they cannot. Local members of the community know best which stoves the community will embrace. It seems that, instead of designing a stove such as that pretty, shining, and mass-produced Envirostove to all of these communities, the best thing the developed world can do is to fund local stove projects. Kirk Smith contends that, while larger, government-funded stove projects are capable of producing stoves much quicker, at a lower cost, and of more uniform quality, they cannot beat local stove programs. He writes that such programs “suffer from high rejection rats and lack of integration into local social and economic development programs” (1989:521), implying that local stove programs will be much enthusiastically accepted by local communities. “Unfortunately, the local stoves currently available do not always represent the best designs that modern engineering can offer,” according to Mark Bryden, Dean Still, Peter Scott, Geoff Hoffa, Damon Ogle, Rob Bailis, and Ken Goyer of the Aprovecho Research Center (Bryden et al. 2005:5). While their argument is no different from that of Smith: the most efficient stoves are probably not going to be made by the designers who call rural villages in developing countries home, their definition of a successful stove is different. Smith‟s primary source of success is the acceptance of a stove by a community, while the researchers at Aprovecho define success as optimal energy efficiency. Jacob Moss of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency elaborates on this point while at Aprovecho‟s stove camp in Oregon: When we first got into this, we had this utopian vision of working with local communities to build locally grown stoves. We‟ve moved away from that—I won‟t say a hundred and eighty degrees, but maybe a hundred and sixty. I don‟t really listen to small stove projects anymore. When I hear Dean say that one millimeter can make a nontrivial difference, it‟s inconceivable to me that all these local stovemakers can make all these stoves efficiently. You have to work in a different way (Bilger 2009:96). However, if Moss is correct in saying that local stovemakers cannot make an efficient stove—perhaps they can make a stove that is “better” in some ways but still doesn‟t meet a certain standard—then the community‟s acceptance of that stove is irrelevant. If we are to agree with these representatives of the Aprovecho Research Center—leaders in sustainable stove design—and the Environmental Protection

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

Agency, then we agree that stoves for the developing world should be designed in the developed world and subsequently distributed to a variety of diverse communities. This does not mean that stovemakers from outside the communities should not take local preferences into very serious account. And the researchers at Aprovecho are aware of this. “The campers in Cottage Grove spent half their time agonizing over cultural sensitivity,” Bilger writes. “‟We‟re highly dominated by elderly white engineering types,‟ a stovemaker who‟d worked in Uganda told me. „So you get a lot of preposterous ideas that‟ll never fly in the kitchen‟” (2009:94). These expert stovemakers, advocating for stoves designed far from their future homes, are conscious of this drawback of their own method. The compromise, it seems, is stove design should be done by outside experts, with considerable input by the community members who will be using the stoves. Douglas F. Barnes, Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith, and Robert van der Plas advise that engineers must build the stoves, with heavy local influence on their design, rather than the other way around. Stove programs often fail, they explain, when outside engineers dictate to community artisans how the stove should be built (1994:14). Local cooks should instead dictate how outside engineers should build the stoves. The stoves will be technically better when Western engineers have control over those critical millimeters, but they will be more successful (even if a bit less efficient) if they take local preferences into account. There is, of course, a balance between too little local input and too much. Stoves must be custom-designed for communities, but they will fail if “critical stove components are custom built” (Barnes et. Al 1994:14). These critical components, such as the combustion chamber, should be mass-produced, while the body of the stove should be adapted to local needs. Unfortunately, this push for local input may have developed into a basis for false advertisement. Stove programs that claim to welcome local input may not actually take that expertise into account. As Smith argues, “you can have it in any color, as long as it‟s black,” he says of this false sense of choice consumers are offered (1989:521). The companies that design the stoves are so much larger and more powerful than the consumers, he explains, that the designers have no need to truly listen to their customers, and he suggests that in this way the designers are taking advantage of their customers‟ lack of power. “Even if legislation or policy boasts a „participatory‟ or „community‟ label, it is rare that individuals from the community have had any say at all in the policy. Further, many of these centrally imposed „community‟ programs are based on a naïve view of community,” seconds Elinor Ostrom (2001:ix). But programs using deception in this way, she writes, benefits nobody, as the programs are likely to fail. She is referring to any community resource legislation or policy, demonstrating that stoves fit in with other environmental initiatives—best understood by communities but often overtaken by outsiders. This idea is important to keep in mind: stovemakers are marketing their stoves. A quick Internet search of “sustainable stoves” will produce countless testimonies by local cooks detailing the ways in which the stoves have improved their lives. Most cooks in the developing world still cook with their traditional stoves and fires, though. There is a huge resistance to these stoves that the articles and YouTube videos carefully ignore. But because of this resistance, in order to sell the stoves, for

Consilience

profit or for a genuine concern for human health and the environment, the stove programs must market them. This raises new ethical dilemmas.

10. Marketing Strategies Sustainable stoves are not immediately successful because, for a variety of reasons, they do not immediately appeal to consumers. â&#x20AC;&#x153;They are expensive, imply a significant change in user habits, and, worst of all, are usually not highly valued by potential users at the offsetâ&#x20AC;? (Slaski and Thurber 2009:6). Many Westerners are surprised; we expect stove users to be as impressed by the long list of health benefits, if not environmental benefits, as we are. But even after consumers are told of these benefits, they still tend to value their traditional cooking methods over these stoves. There are two options for stovemakers in this case: give up, or find other ways to convince people to buy the stoves. Slaski and Thurber write to educate stovemakers on strategies for this latter option. They present a chart depicting products that are marketed to populations in developing countries. One branch of the chart shows why consumers promptly adopt products. The example is one that has initial perceived value and is affordable with disposable income, though it has a low magnitude of change: Coca-Cola. Several branches in the middle show different combinations of factors, and the bottom branch represents the complete opposite of Coca-Cola. This product has no initial perceived value but instead may be valued after education and social marketing. It is not affordable with disposable income (nor financing, so subsidies are necessary) but has a high magnitude of change (higher than vaccines): stoves. (Slaski and Thurber 2009:5) In order to create perceived value, Slaski and Thurber explain inherent motivation must be manipulated. Fortunately, motivation to purchase sustainable stoves is actually quite high in urban areas where fuel is usually purchased, often at a high cost. But the majority of black carbon is emitted into the atmosphere by rural stoves, and these communities do not always feel strained by resources. Their inherent motivation is low, and designers must target their strategies towards creating perceived value for stoves among these potential consumers: What have worked better are efforts that actually create and market new perceived value associated with the stove. A stove could be seen, for example, as contributing to a cleaner kitchen, adding new cooking functionality, or providing a status symbol associated with modernity. . .The commercial players who will be most successful in the cookstove space are those who are most innovative in creating these kinds of observable value for their customers (Slaski and Thurber 2009:6). It is a bit disconcerting that these stoves are now being marketed for selling points other than the humanitarian principles of improved health and climate change mitigation. Envirofit takes the marketing to another level. In these target communities, devoid of televisions and radios, the company has begun holding live demonstrations of the stoves. In order to capture the community membersâ&#x20AC;&#x;

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

attention, though, they have developed a few tactics: providing entertainment with games, song, and drama (Rehman 2009). Entertainment levels and social status are suddenly prioritized above the traditional cooking methods, which previously seemed so indispensable, that are still valued above the health of the cooks. The stoves also suddenly resemble commercial merchandise much more closely, risking some loss of their character as charitable contributions to their consumers. The problem with marketing and capitalistic methods, Agrawal and Gibson explain, is that they deconstruct community. For Marx and Engels, Spencer and Comte, and even for Weber and Durkheim, society moved along an evolutionary path. Status, tradition, charisma, and religion would increasingly give way to equality, modernity, rationality, and a scientific temper. This theorization of social change automatically pits community against the market, since marketization and urbanization erode community (2001:3). Modernization theorists, they add, agree with this concept of a linear evolutionary path in which culture and tradition are primitive ideals that are replaced through development by “equality, modernity, rationality, and a scientific temper.” These theorists view the culture and tradition, which forms such a strong identity for citizens of developing countries, as the “idiocy of rural life” (Agrawal and Gibson 2001:3). The entire concept of community, in fact, embodies this “idiocy of rural life.” In their opinion, the loss of tradition through development is not only acceptable, but a favorable consequence. And development is clearly a priority. This is evident, they say, in categorization of the world under the words “underdeveloped,” “developing,” and “developed.” These words are descriptive of the nations‟ actual circumstances, but by creating such a clear hierarchy, the words also reflect the desirability of development (Agrawal and Gibson 2001:3). To fulfill what many residents of developed countries and sustainable stove activists see as our responsibility to help the developing countries reach the status of “developed,” then, we must help them see that their culture and their traditions are holding them back, and convince them to purchase and use these stoves that will bring them one step closer to “developed.” We must teach them to cook in new ways and, according to Slaski and Thurber, encourage them to change their entire lifestyles to adapt to this new piece of technology, the basic stove: Cooking touches on an entire lifestyle, which can include gathering wood (an activity with a strong social component) as well as cooking (an activity heavily influenced by tradition). Changes in lifestyle may bring significant benefits—the ability to replace wood gathering with productive economic activities, for example—but they are not undertaken lightly. In addition, products like improved cookstoves that are more complicated than traditional technologies may require training and ongoing correct use to reap their benefits (Slaski and Thurber 2009:7-9).

Consilience

11. Accidental Imperialism “What does loss mean to whole cultures, whole peoples of the global South who have seen their societies penetrated, worked over, restructured, modernized and made more „civilized‟?” asks development scholar David Slater (2006:1372-1373). This connection between the civilizing of an entire people and the society‟s penetration raises concerns of imperialistic tendencies, and it seems to be exactly what stove programs that the Western world initiates are doing in developing countries. The willingness of engineers to sacrifice tradition in favor of modernity is closely aligned with Slater‟s definition of imperialism. He points out a key characteristic of imperialistic tendencies as the failure to recognize another community‟s culture and its inherent differences: It is important to emphasize that the imperial relation carries within it a lack of respect and recognition for the colonized or, expressed more broadly, imperialized society. Hence, processes of penetration and imposition are viewed as being beneficial to the societies that are being brought into the orbit of imperial power. The posited superiorities of Western „progress‟, „modernization‟, „democracy‟, „development‟ and „civilization‟, and so on are deployed to legitimize projects of enduring invasiveness that are characterized by a lack of recognition for the autonomy, dignity, sovereignty and cultural value of the imperialized society. Overall, there is a mission to Westernize the non-Western world (2006:1372). Slater also calls imperialism a “violation of the sovereignty of a Third World society” which “negates the autonomous right of peripheral societies to decide for themselves their own trajectories of political and cultural being” (Slater 2006:1371). By searching for any way to convince customers in developing countries to purchase new stoves (and consequently make significant lifestyle changes), developing nations are doing just this. They justify their means—manipulative marketing strategies—by claiming that the end result will be a more developed country with a better standard of living. The developed world thinks our stoves, our cooking practices, our household division of labor, and our concepts of women‟s rights are correct and desired by all. Stove programs also need re-evaluating in their ability to create a risky case of short-term stability. It may be ambitious to compare a stove program to a puppet regime, but both can seem beneficial in the short term but can have detrimental effects in the long run: “The semblance of short-term stability achieved by the installation of a puppet regime often evolves into long-term instability, creating the need for further intervention, as demonstrated by the repeated U.S. intrusions in several Latin American countries,” Slater writes (2006:1371). In the style of a puppet regime, a stove program simply provides a quick fix by sending stoves from the developed world to the developed world. By consciously excluding local stovemakers from the process, we are accidentally preventing these communities from developing their own technology. The stoves they buy now will not last forever, and if we stop

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

sending them subsidized stoves, they will never learn to make their own stoves or have control over the technological evolution of these stoves. This creates a dependency that is characteristic of imperial relations. Finally, the developed world is exploiting the developing world in this push for the transition to sustainable stoves. This may seem counterintuitive, as we are providing the communities with goods rather than taking them away. In fact, Slater describes this exploitation as “appropriating resources and raw materials” (206:1371), but climate change forces us to redefine the goods that fuel a nation. With global climate change conferences and cap-and-trade systems controlling the amount of damage any one country can do to the planet, carbon credits have become a new currency. A quantity of carbon not emitted into the atmosphere by one party can be sold to another like a commodity. While black carbon is not officially regulated, efforts to mitigate climate change abroad may satisfy the guilt of developed nations enough that they may continue spewing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere at the same alarming rates. This method of removing guilt is like a figurative system of carbon trading: by removing dangerous emissions from the developing nations through our kind, charitable acts, the developing world earns the credit to continue emitting greenhouse gases from our own side of the world. This exploitation is especially striking when remembering the huge cultural sacrifice stove programs demand of the developing world. Residents of developed countries have been incredibly resistant to give up driving or using excessive amounts of electricity in order to combat climate change, so the expectation that these communities give up the cooking methods that are so important to them is quite bold. If we will not change our culture, it is unfair to ask them to change theirs. By doing so, we are immorally shifting the burden of climate change. That burden is ours. Black carbon may pose a serious threat to the atmosphere, but it is only the second most significant warming pollutant after carbon dioxide. These rural communities contribute very little to the carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. The United States alone contributes 21 percent of the global carbon dioxide emissions. “Reductions in black carbon emissions could buy us significant time to reduce CO2 emissions,” stated Tom Davis, representative from Virginia, at a House of Representatives hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. “That would be a welcome respite to allow the world to develop consensus solutions that don‟t stall growth or give some nations competitive advantages over others” (H.R. Rep 2007:7). Davis demonstrates this desire to reduce black carbon abroad in order to continue our carbon-intensive behavior at home with minimal interruption. The fear of stalling growth shows this attitude of rich nations that growth is more important than culture. His desire to not give any country a competitive advantage is an amusing one, as he then proceeded to explain that “the developing world is the major source of black carbon emissions,” and therefore the United States must be sure to include developing nations in climate talks, as “failure to do so would forfeit a prime opportunity to bring about meaningful changes in behavior that both include quality of life and reduce the immediate impact of climate change on the planet” (H.R. Rep 2007:7). His insincerity is evident, as nobody is excited for the “prime opportunity to bring about meaningful changes in behavior”

Consilience

to combat climate change; it is seen as a burden by all, though some communities are more willing to make such changes than others. As an example, after deciding that the developing nations deserve the opportunity to change their lifestyles in an effort to slow climate change, Davis describes the necessity of energy in the United states: “As we look for ways to mitigate harmful greenhouse gases, we must do so while acknowledging that energy is essential to the economic activity that sustains and improves our quality of life” (H.R. Rep 2007:7). Eileen Claussen, President of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, feels differently about this burden. “Equity demands that developed countries—the source of most past and current emissions of greenhouse gases—act first to reduce emissions” (Chandler et al. 2002:1). Unfortunately, the majority of the developed world does not share this view. It is actually much more likely that clean stove advocates would agree with Claussen‟s argument, as they share a concern for the environment and human rights, yet they are responsible, at least in part, for this exploitation of developing countries through their approach to stove dissemination. They are not consciously attempting to exploit the communities with which they are working, though. The imperialistic tendencies of the stove programs are accidental.

12. A Message to Stove Programs To avoid this accidental imperialism, stove programs should be careful not to manipulate the marketing of their products. If the stoves are not selling, it is not because customers should be convinced in a different way of the stove‟s value. Rather, it is because the stove is not well adapted to the customer‟s needs. If the cooks that are exposed to the health threats accompanying traditional stoves are unwilling to switch to cleaner stoves, it is probably because there is something intrinsically unappealing about those stoves. “My number one piece of advice of doing successful work in the stove business is first listen to your clients. You cannot change your clients out there, it‟s much easier to change your technology, so if you‟re not selling your stoves you‟ve got the wrong product,” advises Christa Roth of the GTZ Program for Biomass Energy Conservation in Southern Africa (Toward Clean Cooking). Stovemakers may be unable to design stoves that appeal to the cooks because of their relentless quest for optimal efficiency. Perhaps a small degree of efficiency must be sacrificed in order to create the greatest magnitude of change, by shifting the emphasis from near-perfect efficiency to performance that can match that of traditional stoves when cooking traditional meals (Barnes et al. 1994:13). This performance standard has been ignored in most stove tests. In fact, the efficiency of the stove when cooking the traditional foods of one‟s community may be completely different from the efficiency measured in the laboratory. The most common test for measuring stoves‟ efficiencies is the Water Boiling Test (WBT). The models that boil water the quickest with the minimal amount of fuel and ambient heat loss are chosen to be mass produced and distributed to the rural communities. This test is preferred as it is an easy way to standardize between stoves when choosing the best model, but standardization is exactly what stovemakers should

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

avoid. Stoves should be custom-designed for each community, not used to perform a function that the stove may never actually perform in its lifetime. An example of a stove which may be preferred by many cooks enough that they may actually purchase it and use it, so that it may make a more significant impact on climate change and human health than those stoves which are never adopted, is the Ecostove. Jetter and Kariher describe this stove, just one of many they tested: This stove has a steel griddle top that is useful for making tortillas and frying foods, but it is not well suited for boiling water or cooking with a pot. . .The ecostove could be more fairly compared to other griddle stoves used for tortilla making and frying foods using a test protocol different from the WBT, such as the Controlled Cooking Test (CCT) (2009:7). For cooks who want to make tortillas (some variety of which is popular in communities in many developing countries throughout the world), this Ecostove may function similarly enough to their traditional stoves that they would be willing to make the switch. They will never make that switch, though, if the stove is rejected because its efficiency is slightly lower than that of another stove. In fact, Kariher and Jetter explain that the stove performs poorly in the WBT because the heat transfer from the griddle top to the pot is inefficient. “Some stoves are designed in the laboratory and then manufactured without prior field testing to verify that they actually perform the necessary tasks for persons who prepare meals,” Douglas F. Barnes, Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith, and Robert van der Plas explain (1994:15). The use of the phrase “necessary tasks” is noteworthy—these are not tasks that cooks should hope their stoves might be able to do—they are the tasks which these cooks demand from a stove, and it is the responsibility of the stovemakers to design stoves which can perform these tasks. Nevertheless, the marketing of stoves does have its advantages. The market competition leads to the development of better stoves, and the cost may actually increase their perceived value to consumers. The subsidies are important, too, as they make the stoves affordable to those who need them, and reflect their role in contributing to the public good (Smith 1989:521). “Clearly a balance must be sought among the perceived and real social benefits, which depend both on the stove and on the cooking customs of the people who use it. In some areas, there just may not be a balance between these factors that will permit the production of affordable stoves,” write Douglas F. Barnes, Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith, and Robert van der Plas (1994:10). The authors seem too quick to give up, though. The quest for the perfect stove is of serious concern, and this balance should be taken as a challenge, not a point of surrender. The failure of a stove program is just that—the failure of the program, not of the stove or of the community. Stove programs must do background research into the community‟s food preferences, cooking methods, and fuel sources, and run trials in the community, before attempting to simply “disseminate” a large quantity of stoves. Barnes et al. later explain, “differences among programs have proved even more important than differences in local conditions in explaining the relative successes of stove disseminations” (1994:16).

Consilience

Stove programs have the opportunity to save lives from premature death that indoor air pollution causes, to help protect the world from climate change, and to create social change. They should always be conscious of all of these opportunities. While it is easy to put a chimney on a stove and prevent indoor air pollution, the soot will still be released into the atmosphere and warm the Earth. And while some women may find fulfillment cooking traditional foods on traditional stoves, others may be afraid to express their desire to change their traditional cooking methods or their roles as housewives. Kanchan Sinha, a women‟s rights activist in India, proclaims that changes in culture can be necessary. “Changes in culture do occur, even if over long periods of time, and there are famous and heroic examples in history when such changes have been brought about through conscious and planned interventions,” she writes (2003:25). She explains that the development sector has the power and the responsibility to create this change, through working with local social movements. “This is of crucial importance if conditions are to be created whereby the right to equal citizenship is realized by women in societies like India” (2003:25). This is not to say that stove programs should always strive to fix all three of these challenges. Just as stoves must be custom-designed for the communities in which they will be used, stove programs should also be custom-designed to fit the needs of each community. Always, though, we must remember that providing sustainable stoves to developing countries is no substitute for changing our own behavior at home to live more sustainably.

Bibliography Agrawal, Arun, & Clark C. Gibson. (2001). Communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Allen, Julia C., & Douglas F. Barnes. (2010). The Causes of Deforestation in Developing Countries. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 75, no. 2 Arnfred, Signe. (2007). Sex, Food and Female Power: Discussions of Data Material from Northern Mozambique. Sexualities 10, no. 2. Barnes, Douglas F., Keith Openshaw, Kirk R. Smith, & Robert van der Plas. (1994). What Makes People Cook with Improved Biomass Stoves? Report no. 242. Energy. Washington, DC: World Bank. Bhattasali, Amitabha. (2005). A silent killer of rural women. Calcutta: BBC News. Bikram Malla Thakuri, Min. (2009). Revisiting the Need of Improved Stoves: Estimating Health, Time and Carbon Benefits. Kathmandu: South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics. Bilger, Burkhard. (2009). Hearth Surgery. New York: The New Yorker.

Consilience

Victor: Sustainable Stoves

Bryden, Mark, Dean Still, Peter Scott, Geoff Hoffa, Damon Ogle, Rob Bailis, & Ken Goyer. (2005). Design Principles for Wood Burning Cook Stoves. Eugene, OR: Aprovecho Research Center. Chandler, William, Roberto Schaeffer, Zhou Dadi, P. R. Shukla, Fernando Tudela, Ogunlade Davidson, & Sema Alpen-Atamer. (2002). Climate Change Mitigation in Developing Countries. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Chomcharn, Aroon. (1991). Cookstove smoke - The other side of the coin. Hedon Household Energy Network. Cusack, Igor. (2003). Pots, pens and 'eating out the body': cuisine and the gendering of African nations. Nations and Nationalism 9, no. 2. Farhar, Barbara C. (2000). Technical Report. Report no. NREL/TP-550-27999. Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Foley, Gerald, & Patricia Moss. (1983). Improved cooking stoves in developing countries. London: Earthscan. H.R. Rep. No. 110th-110-86 at 4 (2007). Kammen, Daniel M. Cookstoves for the Developing World. Berkeley: Daniel M. Kammen. Keim, Brandon. (2009). How to Slow Climate Change for Just $15 Billion. Wired Science. Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, & Margreet Zwarteveen. (2001). â&#x20AC;&#x153;Gender Dimensions of Community Resource Management." In Communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation, by Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Ostrom, Elinor. (2001)."Foreword." In Communities and the environment: ethnicity, gender, and the state in community-based conservation, by Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson. New Brunswick. N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Rehman, Hafeezur. (2009). In India, Battling Global Warming One Stove at a Time. Interview by Fred De Sam Lazaro. PBS Newshour. Rosenthal, Elisabeth. (2009). Third-World Stove Soot is Target in Climate Fight. The New York Times. Sinha, Kanchan. (2003). Citizenship degraded: Indian women in a modern state and a premodern society. Gender & Development 11, no. 3. Slaski, Xander, and Mark Thurber. (2009). Research Note: Cookstoves and Obstacles to Technology Adoption by the Poor. Publication no. 89. Stanford, CA: Program on Energy and Sustainable Development,.

Consilience

Slater, David. (2006). Imperial Powers and Democratic Imaginations. Third World Quarterly 27, no. 8 Smith, Kirk R. (1989). Dialectics of Improved Stoves. Economic and Political Weekly 24, no. 10. Sutton, David, & Michael Hernandez. (2007). Voices in the Kitchen: Cooking Tools as Inalienable Possessions. Oral History 35, no. 2, Conflicts and Continuity. Toward Clean Cooking. The Partnership for Clean Indoor Air. http://www.pciaonline.org/. Tsen, Cho C. (2008). Baking practices affect protein quality of flat breads. Editorial. Hedon Household Energy Network. James, Jetter J. & Peter Kariher. (2009). Biomass and Bioenergy. Research Triangle Park, NC: United States. Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Research and Development. Biomass and Bioenergy. van der Hoogte, Liesbeth, & Koos Kingma. (2004). Promoting cultural diversity and the rights of women: the dilemmas of 'intersectionality' for development organisations. Gender & Development 12, no. 1. Watts, Peter. (2008). The Value of Women's Time. Hedon Household Energy Network. Williams, Susan P. (2005). In Africa, Lifting the Pall of Smoke From Cooking. The Washington Post.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 96-118

Global Climate Policies, Local Institutions and Food Security in a Pastoral Society in Ethiopia Pekka Virtanen, PhD University of Jyv채skyl채, Finland pekka.k.virtanen@jyu.fi Eero Palmujoki, PhD University of Tampere, Finland Dereje Terefe Gemechu, PhD University of Jyv채skyl채, Finland Abstract This paper explores climate change adaptation within national policy priorities in a least developed country (LDC). The premise of the article is that when considering food security, climate is an exogenous trigger, while the deeper causes lie in social problems. Therefore, adaptation is subordinate to poverty alleviation. The paper examines how these two goals, climate adaptation and poverty alleviation, can be combined. Recent studies have shown that the most effective way to adapt to changing climate conditions in a poor country is to rely on local institutions that have established and sustainable mechanisms to deal with extreme climatic conditions. This research analyzes the stakeholder model, which calls for the participation of both governmental and non-governmental institutions, and how it is applied to climate change adaptation activities in Ethiopia. The study includes field research to analyze how local institutions are used to strengthen the resilience of communities in changing climate conditions. This research was carried out among pastoral communities in the Borana Zone and in the lowland areas of the Guji Zone in the Oromia Regional State of Ethiopia. The central methods of the study are semistructured interviews with key stakeholders as well as secondary materials in the form of of policy statements, project documents and research literature. This research concludes that local institutions are poorly integrated into the process, while traditional adaptation strategies such as mobility are practically neglected.

Keywords: LDC, stakeholder model, climate adaptation, poverty alleviation.

1. Introduction This research explores how global climate policies are articulated within national policy priorities in Ethiopia, which shares many common features with other least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa. The focus of the study is on pastoral communities, which have been adversely affected by climate change, which is generally expected to hit developing countries harder than industrialized countries.

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

This results since LDCs are less capable of mitigating or adapting to climatic changes due to poverty and high dependence on the environment for subsistence (UNDP, 2007). Recent research indicates, however, that in most cases of livelihood failure, climate is an exogenous trigger, while the deeper causes lie in social problems. The extent of the impact of climate change is determined by both the dependency of a national economy on climate-sensitive natural resources as well as the robustness or resilience of its social institutions to secure an equitable distribution in the face of such change (Barnett and Adger, 2007). Adaptation to climate change can be considered successful if it reduces the vulnerability of poor populations to existing climate variability while also strengthening their potential to anticipate and react to further changes (IGAD, 2007; UNDP, 2007). In Ethiopia, pastoralism provides the main livelihood for close to 15 million people spread across seven regions of the country. Affected by unpredictable climatic conditions, recurrent conflicts and a generally inhospitable environment, the pastoralists are among the poorest of the poor in terms of disposable income, access to social services and general welfare. Human development indicators and poverty rates among pastoralists are uniformly worse than non-pastoralists in Ethiopia. Health coverage is sparse, with only 10 percent of the population immunized and more than 90 percent living in malaria-infested areas. In terms of education, both primary and secondary levels of enrolment remain at 20 percent and three percent, respectively (Bekele, 2008; MoFED, 2006). The upredictable climate, coupled with low levels of human development, mean that the expected effects of climate change, are likely to exacerbate the problems of development in pastoral regions. These effects include increasing temperatures, a shift in rainfall patterns and distribution, as well as increased frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods (Anderson et al., 2009; Nassef et al., 2009). The local pastoralists have hitherto been able to cope with recurrent droughts through the resilience of their traditional livelihood system, but presently marked signs of crisis are visible. The pastoral modes of sustenance are under excessive – largely externally created – pressure, and the number of people dropping out of the pastoral system has increased considerably (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008; Tache and Oba, 2008). In global climate policies, as defined in international treaties, developed countries play the main role in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Beyond merely limiting their own greenhouse gas emissions, the developed countries have to assist developing countries in adapting to the variable climate conditions. Concerning the latter, however, the question of adaptation is subordinate to poverty alleviation. Recent studies have shown that the most effective way of adapting to changing climate conditions in a poor country is to rely on local institutions, which have wellestablished and sustainable mechanisms to deal with extreme climate conditions (Agrawal, 2008). In order to allocate assistance at the local level to local institutions, the traditional donor-recipient government model, termed the “shareholder” model, seems inappropriate. Therefore, the donor community is suggesting that a stakeholder model based on broad participation replace the shareholder model for governance in climate change adaptation. This paper analyzes how donors, the Ethiopian government and non-state actors (including the pastoralists) have prepared to carry out activities relevant for climate adaptation. The research does not explore global and national interfaces and their role in adaptation (i.e. how global ideas and norms are adopted in Ethiopia), but

Consilience

rather the preparedness of national and local institutions to tackle these issues. This calls for an understanding of the viewpoints of local stakeholders, especially the poorest groups. The study therefore includes field research to examine how local institutions are used to strengthen the resilience of community adaption to changing climate conditions. The field study was carried out among pastoral and semi-pastoral communities in the Borana Zone and in the lowland areas of the Guji Zone in the Oromia Regional State. The study is based on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and secondary material consisting of policy and project documents and research literature. Altogether 64 persons were interviewed, including representatives of the government of Ethiopia at the federal, regional and local levels (27 interviews), representatives of both national and international NGOs and academic institutions (19), bilateral and multilateral donors (9) and local project beneficiaries (9). 1 Interviews were in the format of open-ended informal discussions guided by a brief set of questions and took place in Addis Ababa (41 interviews) and in the field study area (23). Eleven interviewees were women. The interviews were carried out in English or in a local language (Afaan Oromoo or Amharic) between April and October 2009. In the field study area the researchers also visited six small- and medium-scale water projects, which were the sites of the beneficiary interviews.

2. Food Security and Ways of Adaptation Current estimates indicate that the greatest losses in suitable cropland due to climate change are likely to be in sub-Saharan Africa. The regionâ&#x20AC;&#x;s dependence on rain-fed agriculture means that production is vulnerable to climatic variability, which can adversely affect food security, human well-being and exports (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). Just a single climate disaster is capable of stagnating or even reversing the economic growth achieved over a decade. In the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid regions of Africa the situation is further complicated by increasing desertification (Cline, 2007; IGAD, 2007). Therefore, the poorest and most foodinsecure continent is also expected to suffer the most serious contraction in agricultural incomes, estimated to range from two to eight percent of the agricultural GDP (Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007). According to Arun Agrawal and Nicolas Perrin (2009, p. 354-55), the most important impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods include increases in environmental risks, reduction in livelihood opportunities and stresses on existing social institutions. The basic adaptation strategies can be classified into a set of four analytical types: mobility, storage, diversification and communal pooling. However, market-based exchange can substitute for any of the above adaptation strategies. When adopted, these responses can reduce spatial, temporal, asset-related and/or community-level risks directly, or minimize them by pooling uncorrelated risks associated with different livelihoods. The prospects of adaptation practices depend on institutional arrangements: the propensity of individual households to adopt When used as reference, the categories of interviewees will be identified by A for government staff, B for civil society organizations, C for donor organizations, and D for local beneficiaries. 1

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

specific practices depends on their social and economic endowments, social networks and access to resources and power. The effectiveness of adaptation can also be enhanced by external interventions and local collective action. In this study the above classification (summarized in Table 1) is used as a framework for analysing the adaptation practices adopted in Ethiopia. Successful adaptation to climate change is a highly context-dependent process, and Ethiopia is characterised by particularly high variability in terms of climate, physical geography and population (IGAD, 2007). As observed by the FAO (2003), an important intra-country gap exists in current analyses of food insecurity. The FAO tends to focus on the national level or the individual level, based on calculations of averages derived as ratios of national aggregates or national survey estimates. Important trends may not, however, be fully evident at the national level, emphasising the need for complementary analyses at different sub-national levels. This conception has also been confirmed by recent studies on climate change and food security, which show that while macro-level vulnerability and impact assessments can be beneficial, more detailed analysis is ultimately needed on the regional and local level. This is especially true among the most vulnerable populations, as to allow effective pro-poor targeting (Thornton et al., 2009). Such studies will also facilitate learning from existing local and/or indigenous mechanisms for coping with difficult climatic conditions and recurrent climate shocks (Devereux and Sharp, 2006).

3. Climate Change, Institutions and Participation In adapting to the variable conditions of climate change, institutional development is critical. Similarly, the effect of increasing climatic volatility and environmental degradation on food security is transmitted through institutions that shape the rules and rights of resource use. Institutions are often overlapping, and operate on various scales, exacerbating or alleviating the adverse effects of climate change, whether directly or indirectly (Barnett and Adger, 2007). Therefore, it is critically important to better understand the role of institutions, if adaptation is to help the most vulnerable social groups, as is required by the current emphasis on poverty alleviation (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). However, while the adaptation process is predominantly local, its effectiveness depends on both local and extralocal institutions through which incentives for individual and collective action are structured. This is because â&#x20AC;&#x153;institutional arrangements structure risks and sensitivity to climate hazards, facilitate or impede individual and collective responses, and shape the outcomes of such responsesâ&#x20AC;? (Agrawal 2008, p. 8). Different adaptation practises set different requirements for governance. Mobility in traditional society is realised through pastoralism, but in a centralised state system it may mean forced migration or wage labour migration, if such economic opportunities exist. To avoid coercive measures for migration in the present context, flexible institutions that respect the viewpoints of local population are necessary. The institutions of a centralised state have better possibilities for infrastructure strategies aimed at poverty alleviation through economic growth with multipurpose adaptation practices of storage, diversification and communal pooling. According to neoliberal policies,

100

Consilience

these development strategies may lead to developed markets, which are expected to be a central mechanism for dealing with adaptation (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). The debate on the inter-linkage between climate change and development has brought new dimensions and colors to the policies of international organizations and to issues of governance. The constant failings of developing countries in their attempts to follow neoliberal economic policies have illustrated that market-based systems do not function adequately without firmly established institutions and regulative systems (Lumley, 1999). The international organizations address the failings of the neoliberal model in development by introducing politico-economic concepts and models for governance, such as the multi-stakeholder (MSH) model. The MSH model is an economic-managerial model for broader civil society participation in governance (Hemmati, 2002). The MSH framework in the development industry contains all the main types of actors: states, international organizations, businesses, and global or local CSOs. Following the established language, the shift from the donor-recipient model suggests a move “from a shareholder model, in which financial contributors (donors) largely dominated, to a stakeholder model, in which the representatives of the affected parties – developing countries, NGOs, civil society organizations, private sector bodies – also play a role in decision making” (World Bank, 2006, p. 13). In the LDC context, the crucial question is to what extent non-state players and local institutions are involved in adaptation activities. Like most African countries, Ethiopia has a long history of religious and civil society organisations (CSOs), including local savings groups, mutual self-help groups and ethnic-based or regional development associations. Such groups provide support during times of stress and social events such as death or marriage (Berhanu, 2002). Since a devastating famine in 1972-73, the number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) has increased significantly, and they have become one of the main food relief and public service providers (Lautze et al., 2009). Currently, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentions 14 INGOs that are crucial public service providers in relief and development activities. Due to the decrease in emergency relief, the government has also suggested that INGOs participate in health, education, food security and water supply provision under close government guidance (MFA, 2009). While the INGO presence in Ethiopia is still relatively small considering the population size and the extent of poverty and food insecurity, the current federal government has taken steps to limit the scope of operation of the CSOs and especially the INGOs. Despite strong and repeated critical statements and appeals by both CSOs and donors highlighted in the interviews, in 2009 the government approved a new CSO law that bans domestic NGOs from receiving more than 10 percent of their income from foreign sources. Otherwise they are considered „foreign organizations,‟ and, like INGOs, are not allowed to participate in any activity deemed political by the government. Due to the extremely wide range of issues (but excluding the environment) included under this definition, including anything from women's rights to democratisation, the new law is especially problematic for the large number of NGOs. This includes most NGOs working with pastoralists, which have adopted rights-based approaches and engaged in advocacy work. By equating policy advocacy with politics, the government seeks to confine NGO activity strictly to service delivery under its supervision. The few national NGOs with sufficient means

Consilience Class of adaptation Mobility Storage Diversification

Communal pooling Market exchange

Virtanen: Global Climate Corresponding strategies Pastoralism, wage labour migration, involuntary migration Water storage, food storage (crops, seeds, forest products), animal storage, pest control Asset portfolio diversification, skills and occupational diversification, skills and occupational training, occupational diversification, crop choices, production technologies, consumption choices, animal breeding Forestry, infrastructure development, information gathering, disaster preparation Improved market access, insurance provision, new product sales, seeds, animal and other input purchases

Table 1. Major Classes of Adaptation Practices (Agrawal & Perrin, 2009, p. 358). for independent action are intimately linked to the ruling coalition (Interviews, B and C, cf. Lautze et al., 2009).

4. International Support to Adaptation: The NAPA in Ethiopia The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), which is the main funding mechanism for climate change activities, operates with different funding instruments to support climate change mitigation and/or adaptation in developing countries. The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which is the main channel for supporting adaptation, has relatively limited assets of USD 172 million (DESA, 2009). There is considerable criticism, mainly from developing countries and INGOs, with respect to the GEF funds in terms of adequacy and accessibility. The assets of the LDCF are barely sufficient for national planning. Another problem relates to the additionality criteria: the LDCFâ&#x20AC;&#x;s assets are intended for building resilience to change in a narrow sense, as distinct from more general climatic variability. In concrete projects it has proved particularly difficult to distinguish the adaptation component (to be funded from UNFCCC sources) from more general resilience building and development activities (to be funded from government budgets and/or ODA). With a very low funding capacity of its own, the offer to fund only the adaptation part becomes futile unless other external sources can be identified (Ayers and Huq, 2009). Under the LDCF, the projects concerned with adaptation are promoted by the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), which the LDCs introduced into the UNFCCC process in 2001. A major share of adaptation projects have focused on natural resources-related activities. For example, agriculture, forestry, water conservation, irrigation, the development of infrastructure, and disaster relief. Hence, they underline the development priorities of the LDCs (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009, pp. 363-364). The NAPA documents emphasise a participatory process involving stakeholders and local communities in the preparation of NAPAs (Huq and Khan

102

Consilience

2009, pp. 192-195). However, in contrast to actual instances of adaptation reported to the UNFCCC, most of the NAPA projects appear to be geared to building the capacity of national governments and agencies to coordinate adaptation, increase service provisions, and create infrastructure, rather than to strengthen local actors. According to a recent study, local institutions were incorporated as the focus of adaptation projects in only about 20 percent of the projects analysed. There is also little evidence of consultation and coordination between local and national levels in the description of the projects selected, despite the requirement for widespread consultations as a key part of the production of NAPA documents (Agrawal, 2008). In Ethiopia, most of the 11 projects selected for high-priority status are emphatically state-centric. Only in three project plans are non-state actors, such as CBOs, NGOs, or water users‟ associations, mentioned. In three others the nature of the project involves the possibility of the participation of non-state actors (project level and in the content of the project, i.e., markets, environmental conservation/ rehabilitation, etc.). Despite the NAPA guidelines‟ emphasis on civil society participation in the programme, there is only one NGO representative among the 10 institutions represented in the Ethiopian NAPA Steering Committee. In all 11 projects a federal ministry or other federal agency is indicated as the lead institution.2 The high-priority projects3 focus on the food security, water resources, infrastructure, health ecosystems and insurance sectors. The distribution is rather similar to the general profile of NAPA high-priority projects elsewhere (Agrawal, 2008, pp. 43-44). However, four projects focusing on the three first-mentioned sectors amount to 738 million USD, or 96 percent of the total investments estimated at 770 million USD. In fact, one project designed for the southern pastoral and agropastoral region, „Realizing food security through a multi-purpose large-scale water development project in the Genale-Dawa Basin,‟ covers 91 percent of all funds budgeted for the Ethiopian NAPA projects, with a total budget of 700 million USD (UNFCCC; Tadege, 2007). The Genale-Dawa undertaking, which can be considered the flagship, is a large-scale infrastructure project combining the development of hydropower, irrigation, water supply/sanitation and the upgrading of rural roads. It represents broad economic and social goals over a time-span of 30 years (Tadege, 2007). The project is clearly not a product of stakeholder discussion and participatory planning, but rather reflects broad government-defined economic goals which emphasise export-oriented agricultural production (see e.g. Stokes et al., p. 127-128). Although it is linked with the NAPA process, its roots in the Genale-Dawa River basin integrated development master plan (MoWR, 2007) give it a high position in overall Ethiopian development policies independently of the NAPA linkage. Few of the It was not possible to clarify the role of the local communities and CSOs in the NAPA preparation and appraisal process, as the lists of participants available only include staff from federal institutions. Leading NAPA representatives maintain that ideas and suggestions from the beneficiaries were transmitted adequately through the consultation workshops, but this cannot be verified from independent sources (interviews). 3 The high-priority projects were selected from a group of 37 project options with a total cost of about USD 874 million (Tadege, 2007). 2

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

authorities interviewed on the Genale-Dawa project even acknowledged that it is part of the climate change adaptation framework supported by the UNFCCC (interviews, A). The fieldwork and the interviews proved the almost total invisibility of the NAPA projects in Ethiopia. Some of the major barriers to adaptation gains listed in the national NAPA document include a lack of strong coordination mechanisms, inadequacy of cross-sectoral links, inadequate exchange between the coordinating institution (the National Meteorology Agency, NMA) and plan implementers, and a general lack of capacity. These are exactly the same problems that seem to characterize the current situation. One of the authors of this report visited all five federal ministries or agencies selected as lead institutions for the 11 projects, and it turned out to be extremely difficult to find anybody who was even aware of the NAPA projects.4 Any additional information beyond the brief descriptions included in the NAPA document was almost impossible to get a hold of. This is mostly because the projects are currently not being implemented or are not even close to the implementation phase. In some cases (such as the Genale-Dawa project), the team was given access to a parallel project document under a different heading. The overall conclusion from this work is that the NAPA projects are an extremely low priority within the government, and have been practically shelved. The funding available from UNFCCC does not allow for their implementation at the present time (interviews, A and C). There appears to have been no serious attempt to create governance based on the stakeholder model for climate change adaptation in Ethiopia. Proof of authentic grassroots consultations is lacking, as the NAPA document is more a product of the federal development authorities than of climate change realities felt on the ground. Integration of non-state actors has been minimal both on the level of program preparation and in project plans. As such, the focus is on capacity building for government institutions and investment in large-scale projects imposed from above by government technocrats. While government authorities blame the failure to release support funding through the UNFCCC, an equally important reason seems to be a low level of national commitment. At present, the NMA possess neither the institutional authority nor the capacity to monitor regional and local climate change interventions or even to report and analyze the experiences gained (interviews, A; cf. Ayers and Huq, 2009; Brockhaus and Kambiré, 2009). The process is not only statecentric, but moreover almost totally stagnant.

It appears that most „lead institutions‟ expected to be the forerunners of the process have not accessed and are not familiar with the NAPA document. There is a plan to print 3000 hard copies of the document to be delivered to the relevant institutions in late 2009, i.e., two years after it was submitted to UNFCCC. It would thus appear that NAPA has largely remained a secret of the Steering Committee and a few NMA staff (interviews). A similar situation has been reported from some other African countries (see, e.g., Brockhaus and Kambiré, 2009). 4

104

Consilience

5. Adaptation and Participation on the National Level: The National Food Security Program In an effort to improve governance in the context of the continued vulnerability aggravated by climate change, the Ethiopian government has sought to agree with the other key actors (mostly donors, but also the private sector and CSOs) on a common approach to food security. These were recorded in the 2002 Food Security Programme (FSP) developed within the framework of the national poverty reduction/development plan. The core objectives of the program reflect the results of a structural analysis: the first objective is to enable the 8.3 million chronically food-insecure Ethiopians to attain food security within a five-year period, and the second is to improve significantly the food security situation of the remaining 6.7 million citizens facing transitory food insecurity (MoFED, 2006). The most important element in the FSP is a Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which is the largest social protection scheme on the continent outside of South Africa. It commenced in 2005, and has two components: laborintensive public works and direct support for labor-poor households. The majority of beneficiaries are required to contribute labor to public works, while a further set of criteria are applied to identify those who qualify for safety net support but are not required to participate in public works. Payments to both groups of beneficiaries are provided in cash or food, and in theory each household member is entitled to five days paid work per month (MoFED, 2006; Negatu, 2009). The programâ&#x20AC;&#x;s target group consists of people facing predictable food insecurity as a result of poverty rather than temporary shocks (UNDP, 2007). As the government recognizes that small transfers of cash or food are likely to be consumed rather than invested, food security and livelihood promotion are to be achieved primarily through linkages with other modes of support, especially household extension packages intended to generate complementary streams of income. The assets constructed by the public works activities will, on the other hand, contribute to creating a favourable environment for market production rather than direct income generation (Devereux and Guenther, 2009). Most of the typical public works activities are designed for climate change adaptation. Improving access to drinking and irrigation water is important for storage, while land productivity improvement, soil fertility restoration activities, and increasing fodder availability are relevant for both storage and diversification. Communal land conservation measures, re-forestation, and improvement of school and health facilities are some of the typical communal pooling activities. Finally, market exchange can be improved through construction and/or rehabilitation of roads, bridges, market yards, storage and stock routes. It is interesting to note that none of the typical public works activities highlighted in the implementation manual address the issue of mobility (MoARD, 2006; cf. Agrawal and Perrin, 2009, pp. 357359). The relatively effective implementation of the PSNP is based on strong government ownership at the federal and regional level, and coordination between the key donors (Brown and Teshome, 2007). The complex institutional set-up creates considerable pressure for efficient collaboration between very different types of institutions. In theory, the mix of community and administrative targeting used in

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

the PSNP should help to ensure community participation, ownership and oversight (Sharp et al., 2006). However, while the responsibility for execution has been given to various actors, existing guidelines do not clearly specify the role of the different agencies. Especially at the district level, the planning and implementation capacity is hindered by shortages of staff and skills, along with rapid staff turnover (interviews, A and B; see also Frankenberger et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2006; Negatu, 2009). During the launch of the PSNP design process, many NGOs complained of being left out, as the government wanted sole ownership of the program (Sharp et al., 2006, p. 10). On the lower administrative level, representation in district-level task forces is limited to line ministries and sometimes NGOs, while ward and community level task forces consist of both elected and ex officio members. Civil society is only weakly represented. NGOs are usually included only in those districts where they are official implementing partners, even though they may be key actors providing important resources (Slater et al., 2006, p. 22). In practice, NGO programs frequently substitute for government activities instead of complementing them (interviews, A and B; Frankenberger et al., 2007, p. 6). The interviews indicate that, while the PSNP structure makes possible the engagement of key stakeholders on different levels, accountability is often upward rather than downward (interviews, cf. Sharp & al., 2006, p. 48). The actual power of non-state actors to influence is rather limited on lower administrative levels, though there are considerable differences between individual regional states and local administrative units. The top-down approach and the weakness of institutional linkages is manifested in the selection and timing of the public works activities implemented under PSNP. Such activities which communities would like to implement are not always given priority (Frankenberger et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2006), while the ownership of community assets created by a public work is often not clear (interviews, A, B and D, cf. Negatu, 2009, p. 18). Local institutions are, however, only seldom recognized by the official safety net system. In some cases, the PSNP soil and water conservation activities have actually usurped communitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x; initiatives to manage their natural resources (Frankenberger et al., 2007). In order for the programme to reduce vulnerability, it is crucial that public works do not obstruct the objective of supporting people in achieving improved and self-sufficient livelihoods. Data from different studies show that many beneficiary households were engaged in public works during peak farming periods in most areas (Sharp et al., 2006, p. 41; Slater et al., 2006, p. 34). Female respondents complained that participation in public works reduces significantly the time and energy available for other duties such as caring for children, the elderly, and the sick, or doing agricultural work on their own land (Frankenberger et al., 2007, p. 3). Even outside the peak periods, households with many non-workers, such as children and elderly, are forced to keep children out of school to take care of household livelihoods while the parents are engaged in public works. This has the perverse impact that such households become even more dependent on external support because the work requirement reduces their ability to participate in alternative livelihood activities (Slater et al., 2006, p. 42, 45).

106

Consilience

6. Adaptation in a Pastoral Society 6.1 Resilience among the poorest of the poor: nomadic pastoralism in the Borana Plateau The case study area, which comprises the Borana Zone and lowland areas of the Guji Zone in the Oromia Regional State, is characterized by erratic rainfall pattern between 400 and 700 mm annually. Semi-nomadic pastoralism is the dominant livelihood, although small-scale rain-fed agriculture is becoming increasingly widespread (Desta and Coppock, 2004). Mobility is the basis of the traditional coping strategy, based on opportunistic movements within and across geographically distributed grazing units, which are composed of those households that depend on common permanent water sources. The grazing units consist of semi-sedentary camps where the elderly, women, and children stay with dairy cows. The surplus herd, composed of dry cows, heifers, and male animals, join the mobile herd management unit herded by young men on more remote grazing lands. Rangeland rotation during the wet and dry seasons traditionally prevented overgrazing, while controlled access to water provided the key mechanism for guaranteeing sustainable use of the grazing lands (Angassa and Oba, 2008). Since the 1970s, various development interventions such as changing the patterns of land use through water development and sedentarization have undermined the survival strategies of pastoralists. Due to internal and external conflicts, the rangelands in Borana and Guji have decreased to about 40 percent of their extent in the 1960s. Currently, the system is subject to severe pressure due to population growth, conflicts over grazing lands, and compression of the livestock population into a much smaller geographical area. The remaining rangelands are threatened by ecological degradation from bush encroachment, land alienation and fragmentation due to the creation of ranches, expanding crop cultivation and the establishment of semi-private range enclosures (Tache and Oba, 2008). This has led to loss of mobility, which implies that the indigenous system of land use can no longer cope with the ecological and climatic variability likely to be amplified by the process of climate change (Desta and Coppock, 2004). Household data from longitudinal studies over two decades show a decline in cattle holdings, and there is substantial evidence that the Borana are poorer today than they were two decades ago (Desta and Coppock, 2004; Tache and Oba, 2008). Wealth rankings of individual households have shifted towards the poor and destitute households, and a large proportion of the households have fallen below the sustainable economic threshold, likely to drop out of the pastoral system. At present, the poor make up 80 percent of all households, suggesting that the collapse of the whole pastoral production system may be close (Tache and Oba 2008, p. 26). Those who fall out of the pastoral system resort to dryland farming, sale of forest products, crafts, petty trade, casual labour, or food aid. Many of the new subsistence activities of the poor, such as charcoal production and crop cultivation in marginal lands, are ecologically unsustainable and simply deepen the vicious cycle (interviews, A, B and D; see also Coppock, 1994; Morton, 2006). Increasing population spread over a diminishing land area has swallowed up traditional grazing reserves, which used to maintain stability under recurrent

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

ecological and conflict-related shocks (interviews, A and B; Homann et al., 2004; Oba, 1998). Combined with few emigration outlets, the degraded natural resource base has led to unsustainable population densities in an inherently risky environment (Desta and Coppock, 2004). Thus, the Borana plateau provides a good example of the complex relationships between increasing climatic stress, declining resource base, and inchoate development policies, where separating climate change adaptation from more general resilience building and development activities is not realistic.

6.2 NAPA initiatives in the case study area Somewhat surprisingly, mobility is not included among the adaptation practices supported through Ethiopian NAPA projects.5 Among the four projects that are directly relevant for the study area, two seek to address storage and communal pooling, one combines storage with diversification, and one deals with diversification and communal pooling. Three projects focus on alternative livelihoods through the development of irrigation (2 projects) and forestry (1 project). The sole NAPA proposal focusing on livestock development seeks to improve rangeland management. None of the four projects addresses primarily the market exchange issue (Tadege, 2007). Instead of mobility, the current government‟s development policy promotes irrigation schemes as incentive for pastoralist sedentarization, which is favoured as a means to reduce resource conflicts and facilitate service delivery (MoFED, 2006; Tache and Sjaastad, 2008). While the arguments are familiar, lessons learned from the previous failures recorded in numerous studies (e.g., Darkoh, 1992; NiamirFuller, 1999) seem to have escaped the policymakers' attention. Perhaps the most striking example of the government‟s strategy for non-pastoral development in the southern lowlands is the flagship NAPA proposal, „Realizing food security through multi-purpose large-scale water development project in Genale-Dawa Basin.‟ The planned project, which is expected to contribute to climate change adaptation through poverty reduction and improved food security, entails large-scale irrigation for crop cultivation, securing domestic water supplies, developing water for livestock, and hydro-power generation (Tadege, 2007). While the interviewed national and zonal authorities were enthusiastic about the gigantic water project, livestock and environmental experts in local administration and NGOs were more concerned over its negative impacts on existing management institutions and subsequent devastation of rangelands. They noted that even though the project may show positive results in the short-term, due to the high evapotranspiration rate and salt content of the soils, salination and other forms of land degradation are likely to become a problem in the mid-term. They also drew attention to the crucial role of management institutions: infrastructure building is only a means for development, not development itself. The means may bring While the absence of mobility is surprising in terms of its widely recognized importance for nomadic pastoralism (see e.g. Nassef et al., 2009; Niamir-Fuller, 2009), mobility is actually very rarely included in officially recorded adaptation practices. This probably reflects inbuilt bias against it in government circles, where it is often viewed as a maladaptation (Agrawal and Perrin 2009, pp. 357-359). 5

108

Consilience

positive or negative results depending on how the resources made available (e.g., water) are used and managed. With regard to alleged active local participation in the identification and planning of the project itself, the experts called this into question, noting that neither they nor representatives of local institutions were consulted or informed beyond a request to provide logistic support. On a more general level, they maintained that agriculture is not sustainable in the region due to unreliable rainfall and poor soil, as well as its negative impact on the long-term viability of pastoralism. Instead, some of the experts recommend focusing on social development and diversification to activities that do not take up more land (interviews, A). Parallel to sedentarization, the government promotes modernisation of the livestock economy focusing on marketing, veterinary services, improved range management and water development (MoFED, 2006). A recent development plan for the Borena-Guji agro-pastoral zone finds the main constraints to development in inefficient use of the existing natural resource base, market constraints and poor and inaccessible education and health facilities (MoWR, 2007). The same elements are also reflected in the current development activities in the field, albeit mostly implemented by NGOs (interviews, A and B; see also Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Aside from the one project focusing on rangeland resources management and inclusion of water development for livestock in the Genale-Dawa Basin project, these issues are, however, largely neglected in the NAPA projects.

6.3 PSNP in the case study area For the chronically poor in the study area, famine relief provides the main support mechanism. The first large famine relief operation in Borana was organised in 1973, and since then famine relief in one form or another has been distributed to the region every year (Helland 2001, p. 70-72). Currently famine relief is distributed mainly through the PSNP, where the government has assumed the leading position even though especially in the pastoral areas NGOs retain a major role in actual implementation. In 2009, more than 680,000 people in the Oromia Regional State were estimated to require emergency food assistance. Of these, 66,297 were located in the Borana Zone and 62,875 in the Guji Zone (MoARD, 2009). In Borana the Pastoral PSNP operates mainly through food-for-work (instead of the theoretically preferred cash-for-work), and the labor is used in rangeland development, water development, social infrastructure construction, feeder road construction and improving market facilities. In terms of the major classes for adaptation practices, the activities fall mainly under communal pooling, and secondarily under storage and diversification (dams for irrigation, pest control) as well as market exchange (MoARD, 2007). While "support and recognition of importance of mobility" in pastoral areas is emphasised in the guidelines (Ibid, p. 47), and is used to identify types of support required (e.g., recognition of customary pastoral institutions and land tenure arrangements, improved access to mobile services, improved security and conflict reduction), in practice these issues remain subject to conflicting views. Currently, different state authorities and aid agencies in Ethiopia are supporting and/or operating a plethora of largely uncoordinated food security modeling, planning, and coordination platforms. These come in the form of networks, programmes, and adaptation funds at the federal, regional, zonal and

Consilience Class of adaptation Mobility Storage Diversification Communal pooling Market exchange Communal pooling and diversification Communal pooling and market exchange

Virtanen: Global Climate No. of projects None 1 2 30 None 7 1

Implementing agency NGO or Government IO n/a n/a None 1 None 2 30 None n/a n/a 6 1 1

None

Table 2. Major classes of adaptation practices in the projects in PSNP districts (project data based on Palmer, 2007) district levels.6 In many cases collaboration with indigenous institutions is, however, left entirely to NGOs who have taken over much of the concrete work. Local administration does not even have the operational resources needed and has to rely on NGO support for transport, technical expertise and field expenses. For example, due to budget problems some districts do not have a food security plan as they lack resources for implementation. In reality they simply follow what the NGOs plan and implement, and report it upwards. It is often very difficult to differentiate between government and NGO roles in food-for-work projects, as both tend to take credit for individual projects (interviews, A and B; see also Frankenberger et al., 2007). A recent database of both governmental and non-governmental institutions with programmes engaged in food security, rural livelihoods, health and emergency response activities in PSNP districts lists altogether 41 projects in the seven districts falling within the area of this study.7 Six of the projects operated in all the districts, 11 projects operated in 2-5 districts, and 24 operated in only one of the districts covered. All three projects implemented by a government institution (Ministry of Agriculture), as well as the major food security project implemented by UN organisations (WFP and UNICEF) were nation-wide (Table 2). Regional level government authorities and FAO jointly implemented one project, while national or international NGOs implemented the remaining 36 projects with funding from international organizations (ADB, WFP, UNICEF, UNFPA), bilateral donors (USAID, CIDA, Norway) or NGOs (Palmer, 2007). In terms of major classes of adaptation practices, the projects deal mostly with communal pooling (30 projects), sometimes combined with diversification (7 projects). Most of the projects seek to improve service delivery in health and Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008) provide a useful review of the tangled institutional framework for drought management in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia. While local communities have a role in identifying beneficiaries for the PSNP program, the range of possible activities to be implemented through public works, as well as their timing, is largely set from above by the authorities and/or NGO staff (interviews). 7 The districts are Arero, Dire, Liben, Miyo, Moyale, Teltele and Yabelo. 6

110

Consilience

education, access to water and sanitation at the household level, or disaster preparation. The only projects focusing on storage (1) or diversification (2) were implemented by the government (in one case jointly with a UN organisation). The absence of projects directly addressing mobility or market exchange is striking.

6.4 Local institutions and pastoral resilience Resilience is a characteristic of the local system, and thus the federal government, donors and non-local NGOs can only facilitate the process, not provide a sustainable long-term solution. Nearly every recent study and assessment report addressing the current livelihood crisis in the study area highlights the importance of traditional pastoral institutions in finding and implementing a sustainable solution (e.g., Angassa and Oba, 2004; Homann et al., 2004; Muir, 2007). Collaboration with traditional institutions is also emphasised in recent government policy documents (see, e.g., MoFED, 2006 and 2007). It should be noted that in Borana society, chronic poverty means both secession from the pastoral production system and loss of pastoral identity (Tache and Oba, 2008). According to a recent study, the level of poverty (measured by herd size) and distance from the nearest urban center are the key explanatory factors for household trust in traditional institutions. The likelihood of trust increases with herd size and distance from an urban center, but it is inversely related to trust in external institutions. The results are consistent with the finding that households with eroded asset status settle in peri-urban areas in search of food aid and non-pastoral opportunities (Berhanu and Fayissa, 2009). The wealthy, when compared with the poor, dominate not only as contributors but also as recipients in traditional cattle distribution networks. Households facing prolonged hardships thus find themselves sloughed off from the network (Tache and Sjaastad, 2008). Overall, the findings point to a bifurcation of Borana society into two parts: a traditional pastoralist part and an impoverished non-pastoral part concentrated in peri-urban areas. Mobility remains the main indigenous response strategy among the traditional pastoralist part. Currently, it is often combined with diversification of livestock by acquiring more browsers such as camels and goats as an adaptation to changing climate and vegetation composition in the rangelands (interviews, A, B and D; see also Desta and Coppock, 2004; Homann et al., 2004). Since converting crucial dry-season grazing lands to crop lands causes further dislocation of the pastoralists, it is arguably more sustainable for them to buy the grain they need by using cash from livestock sales and non-agricultural livelihoods (Tache and Oba, 2008). Increasing the off-take of livestock through sales is not, however, a realistic option as long as the market prices are so low that the owners prefer to slaughter animals for their own consumption (interviews, B and D; Oba, 1998). Pastoralist communities have also been reported to support certain livelihood-based interventions by NGOs, namely commercial restocking, supplementary feeding, restocking and the construction of feeder roads to improve market access (Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). This view was supported in some interviews. On the other hand, those households who have dropped out of the pastoralist network need viable options to make a sustainable transition to alternative livelihoods. While opportunities for wage labor are currently very limited in the study

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

area, a number of households living in peri-urban areas indicated that their members participate or are willing to participate in urban labor migration. The migrants are mostly young people from poor households who seek unskilled employment in small rural towns in the region or in Kenya, where this mobility option is well established. The respondents were, however, aware that unskilled labor is not a viable solution to the coming livelihood crisis (Tache and Oba, 2008). As a long-term strategy, they increasingly see the education of their children as an investment for the future (interviews, B and D). There are some signs that representation of the different pastoral groups in consultative and policy formulation institutions has become stronger and better organized (interviews, A, B and D). Some researchers and NGO staff have reported a good working relationship between local government and indigenous institutions (Anderson et al., 2009; Muir, 2007), even though others refer to deep distrust and sometimes even open conflict (Homann et al., 2004; Tache and Oba, 2008; Tache and Sjaastad, 2008). A few NGOs regularly involve both local government (at ward level) and traditional institutions in their participatory resource management projects in forestry, rangeland and water development (interviews, B). Some of these have reported concrete results in particular areas of operation; for example, preventing forest fires, dismantling private enclosures or re-introducing controlled range burning (Gebru et al., 2007; Muir, 2007). In the half-dozen small-scale water projects visited by two of the authors, there appeared to be relatively good collaboration between indigenous management institutions and local state authorities in the technically simple earth dams and ponds intended for domestic use and small stock, as well as the rehabilitated traditional deep well. In the slightly more complicated earth dam constructed for irrigation purposes (which the team also visited), the blueprint management structure imposed by the Ministry on all agricultural production cooperatives seemed, however, to be experiencing serious problems only a year after the NGO supporting the project had withdrawn (interviews, A, B and D). The findings support the view that support should be directed to improvement of small-scale rain-fed water schemes using relatively simple technologies instead of large-scale irrigation for export crops, which draw land and economic resources from food production (Stokes et al. 2010, p. 127-128). Despite explicit public commitment to strengthen collaboration between traditional institutions and relevant state organs, the top-down administrative culture remains prevalent within state administration (interviews, A and B). In most cases, the enthusiasm for popular participation and strengthening of local institutions, shown by international NGOs and other key actors including the government, has failed to create efficient relationships of cooperation. Many of those NGOs that were initially committed to work with traditional institutions have reverted to formal government partners, at least in some cases under direct pressure from government authorities. Outsiders mostly make development interventions on behalf of pastoralists, and so-called consultations with local representatives are in many cases events of top-down information dissemination with no real powers conferred on local participants (Helland, 2001; Watson, 2003). The failure to involve all key actors and establish a political space where they can participate in a meaningful way is partly due to the unequal relationship between the pastoralists and the state authorities. The latter continue to claim hegemony and exclusive jurisdiction in the study area at the expense of indigenous institutions.

112

Consilience

Despite the government's self-reliance rhetoric, distribution through food-for-work has transferred responsibility from the indigenous institutions to the food aid organisations, which are not in practice accountable to the beneficiaries (interviews, A and B; cf. Homann et al., 2004; Pantuliano and Wekesa, 2008). Government (and/or NGO) patronage â&#x20AC;&#x201C; following the donor-recipient model - has thus become the dominant institution of adaptation to environmental stress for vulnerable pastoralists. The issue is that the process creates even more vulnerability in making destitution and powerlessness the key criteria for accessing crucial subsistence resources.

7. Conclusion The general idea that adaptation to climate change will take place on the local level is well established in the international community. Similarly, international organisations and donors suggest broad participation of civil society in the projects related to adaptation. The strengthening of local institutions, civil society, and private actors is expected to increase the capacity to carry out adaptation related activities, both traditional and modern, such as mobility and market-based practices. However, in LDCs such as Ethiopia, which are characterised by high incidences of poverty and a low level of food security, adaptation to climate change is seldom a political priority. The key objectives of the political leadership are rather economic growth and maintenance of a secure grip on political power. It is, therefore, not surprising that the interviews show that the ownership of Ethiopia's NAPA is rather weak. The most disturbing aspect of the practically paralyzed program is the low level of civil society and private sector participation in both preparation and envisaged implementation of the selected high-priority projects, which - unfortunately - is not particular to Ethiopia. In practice, the government is tackling climate change adaptation through national initiatives such as the FSP. In this program, the conditions for participation are somewhat better than in the NAPA process, and at least formally the procedural aspects are more compatible with the MSH model. The FSP enjoys strong government ownership at the federal and regional level and relatively good coordination between the key donors, but suffers from unequal representation of civil society on the lower administrative levels. In practice the program, and particularly the assets constructed by the public works activities under the safety net component, represent the major local level contribution towards climate adaptation in many rural areas. The weak and essentially subordinate role given to local CSOs, and even representatives of decentralised state administration, is particularly evident in peripheral pastoral areas such as Borana and Guji. In these regions, local institutions are eagerly courted for political support before elections, but otherwise mostly neglected or used as channels to facilitate project implementation with only marginal roles in planning and monitoring. The governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x;s economic policies, which rely on investment in medium and large-scale irrigation projects to produce export crops, exacerbate the problem. While the expected increase in the national GDP can theoretically be used to buy food from abroad, evidence shows that the resulting distribution problems are very difficult to solve equitably when administrative

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

capacity is weak as in many LDCs, including Ethiopia. At the same time the current policy orientation reinforces the already serious problem of dependency in the pastoral areas. A key finding with respect to both NAPA and FSP is the insignificant role of local institutions and knowledge in the formal adaptation strategies, particularly on the implementation level. This is rather worrying in the LDC context, which is characterised by high dependency on external funding for public service delivery and weak administrative capacity at lower levels. Instead of building on the diversity of local human and material resources, the programmes seek to transform local societies into a homogeneous mass controllable through its dependency from the centre. One example of this approach is the strong bias against mobility observed in both NAPA and FSP. None of the supported interventions in the case study area focus on strengthening conditions for mobility even though it was identified as a priority strategy by both traditional pastoralists and those sloughed off from the pastoral networks.

114

Consilience

Bibliography Agrawal, A. (2008). The role of local institutions in adaptation to climate change. Washington D.C.: Paper prepared for the Social Dimensions of Climate Change, Social Development Department, The World Bank, March 5-6, 2008. Agrawal, A. & Perrin N. (2009). Climate adaptation, local institutions and rural livelihoods. In N. Adger, I. Lorenzoni & K. Oâ&#x20AC;&#x;Brien (Eds.), Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, governance (pp. 350-367). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, S., Morton J. & Toulmin C. (2009). Climate change for agrarian societies in drylands: implications and future pathways. In R. Mearns & A. Norton (Eds.), Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World (pp. 199-230). Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Angassa, A. & Oba, G. (2008). Herder perceptions on impacts of range enclosures, crop farming, fire ban and bush encroachment on rangelands in Borana, Southern Ethiopia. Human Ecology, 36, 201-215. Ayers, J. & Huq, S. (2009). Supporting adaptation to climate change: What role for official development assistance? Development Policy Review, 27, 675-692. Barnett, J. & Adger, N. (2007). Climate change, human security and violent conflict. Political Geography, 26, 639-655. Bekele, E. (2008). Status of extreme poverty and hunger in pastoral areas of Ethiopia: Looking forward and inward. In S. Adi & D. Temesgen (Eds.), Millennium Development goals and pastoral development: Opportunities & challenges in the new Ethiopian millennium. Proceedings of the Fourth National Conference on Pastoral Development in Ethiopia (pp. 92-108). Addis Ababa: PFE. Berhanu, K. (2002). The role of NGOs in promoting democratic values: The Ethiopian experience. In B. Zewde & S. Pausewang (Eds.), Ethiopia: The challenge of democracy from below (pp. 120-129). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Berhanu, W. & Fayissa B. (2009). Recurrent shocks, poverty traps, and the degradation of the social capital base of pastoralism: A case study from Southern Ethiopia. Middle Tennesee State University, Department of Economics and Finance Working Paper, April 2009. Brockhaus, M. & KambirĂŠ H. (2009). Decentralization: a window of opportunity for successful adaptation to climate change? In N. Adger, I. Lorenzoni & K. O'Brien (Eds.), Adapting to climate change: Thresholds, values, governance (pp.399416). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

Brown, T. & Teshome, A. (2007). Implementing policies for chronic poverty in Ethiopia. Background paper for the Chronic poverty report 2008-2009. Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre. Cline, W. (2007). Global warming and agriculture: Impact estimates by country. Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Coppock, L. (Ed.) (1994). The Borana plateau of southern Ethiopia: Synthesis of pastoral research, development and change, 1980-91. Addis Ababa: ILRI. Darkoh, M. (Ed.) (1992). African river basins and dryland crises. Uppsala: Uppsala University. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (2009). World economic and social survey 2009. Promoting development, saving the planet. New York: United Nations. Desta, S. & Coppock, L. (2004). Pastoralism under pressure: Tracking system change in Southern Ethiopia. Human Ecology, 32, 465-486. Devereux, S. & Guenther, B. (2009). Agriculture and social protection in Ethiopia. Growth and Social Protection Working Paper 03. Sussex: Centre for Social Protection, IDS. Devereux, S. & Sharp, K. (2006). Trends in poverty and destitution in Wollo, Ethiopia. Journal of Development Studies, 42, 592-610. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2003). Trade reforms and food security: Conceptualizing the linkages. Rome: FAO. Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) (2006). Food Security Programme monitoring and evaluation plan. Addis Ababa: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Frankenberger, T., Sutter, P., Teshome, A., Aberra, A. Tefera, M., Tefera, M., Seyoum, A., Bernard, T., Spangler, T. & Ejigsemahu, Y. (2007). Ethiopia: The path to self-resiliency. Summary of findings. Available at http://www.chfpartners.ca/publications/documents

Gebru, G., Desta, S., Coppock, L., Gizachew, L., Amosha, D. & Taffa, F. (2007). Stakeholder alliance facilitates re-introduction of prescribed fire on the Borana plateau of southern Ethiopia. Global Livestock CRSP Research Brief 07-02-PARIMA. Davis: University of California. Helland, J. (2001). Participation and governance in the development of Borana, southern Ethiopia. In M. Salih, T. Diez & A. Ahmed (Eds.), African pastoralism: Conflict, institutions and government (pp. 56-80). London: Pluto Press.

116

Consilience

Hemmati, M. (2002). Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Governance and Sustainability: Beyond Deadlock and Conflict. London: Earthscan. Homann, S., Dalle, G. & Rischkowsky, B. (2004). Potentials and constraints of indigenous knowledge for sustainable range and water development in pastoral land use systems of Africa: A case study in the Borana lowlands of Southern Ethiopia. Eschborn: GTZ. Huq, S. & Khan, M. (2006). Equity in National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs): The case of Bangladesh. In Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, Saleemul Huq & M.J. Mace (Eds.), Fairness in adaptation to climate change (pp. 181-200). The MIT Press: Cambridge. Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 2007. Climate change and human development in Africa: Assessing the risks and vulnerability of climate change in Kenya, Malawi and Ethiopia. Human Development report Office Occasional Paper. New York: UNDP. Lautze, S., Raven-Roberts, A. & Erkineh, T. (2009). Humanitarian governance in the new millennium: An Ethiopian case study. London: HPG /ODI. Lind, J. & Jalleta, T. (2005). Poverty, power and relief assistance: meanings and perceptions of 'dependency' in Ethiopia. HPG Background paper. ODI: London. Lumley, S. (1999). Interpreting Economics, Rhetoric and Sustainable Development: some implications for policy determination. Australian Geographer, 30, 35 â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ethiopia (2009). Available at www.mfa.gov.et/download.php?file=Multilateral.doc Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) (2009). Food supply prospects 2009. Addis Ababa: MoARD. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) (2007). Draft guideline for the implementation of the Productive Safety Net Programme Pastoral Areas Pilot, Version 2. Addis Ababa: MoARD. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) (2006). Productive Safety Net Programme project implementation manual. Addis Ababa: MoARD. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) (2006). Ethiopia: Building on progress: A plan for accelerated and sustained development to end poverty, vol. 1. Addis Ababa: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) (2007). Genale-Dawa River Basin integrated resources development master plan. Final report, Part 1. Addis Ababa: MoWR.

Consilience

Virtanen: Global Climate

Morton, J. (2006). The 2006 drought and pastoral communities of southern Ethiopia: Report on a study in Borena zone and adjoining areas of Somali region. Greenwich: NRI. Muir, A. (2007). Customary pastoral institutions study. Addis Ababa: SOS Sahel, Save the Children US and Pastoral Development Initiative. Nassef, M., Anderson, S. & Hesse, C. (2009). Pastoralism and climate change: enabling adaptive capacity. London: ODI. Negatu, W. (2009). Food Security Strategy and Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia. In T. Assefa (Ed.), Digest of Ethiopia's national policies, strategies and programs (pp. 1-22). Addis Ababa: FSS. Niamir-Fuller, M. (ed.) (1999). Managing mobility in African rangelands: The legitimization of transhumance. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Oba, G. (1998). Assessment of indigenous range management knowledge of the Booran pastoralists of Southern Ethiopia. Negelle Borana and Addis Ababa: Report prepared for the Borana Lowland Pastoral Development Programme. Palmer, C. (2007). Institutional mapping of state and non-state actors in PSNP woredas in Ethiopia. Addis Abeba: MoARD. Pantuliano, S. & Wekesa, M. (2008). Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia. Somali and Afar Regions and Borena Zone in Oromiya Region. London: ODI. Schmidhuber, J. & Tubiello, F. (2007). Global food security under climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104, 19703-19708. Sharp, K., Brown, T. & Teshome, A. (2006). Targeting Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). London: ODI. Slater, R., Ashley, S., Tefera, M., Buta, M. & Esubalew, D. (2006). PSNP policy, programme and institutional linkages. London: ODI. Stokes, L., Scozzaro, A. & Haller, J. (2010). The Food Crisis in Ethiopia & Egypt: Contrasting Hydrological & Economic Barriers to Development. Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 3, 117-138. Tache, B. & Oba, G. (2008). Linkages between land use changes, drought impacts and pastoralists' livelihood responses in Borana, southern Ethiopia. In Boku Tache, Pastoralism under stress: Resources, institutions and poverty among the Borana Oromo in Southern Ethiopia (appendices). PhD Thesis no. 2008:33. Ă&#x2026;s: Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

118

Consilience

Tache, B. & Sjaastad, E. (2008). Mutual assistance and poverty reduction among Borana Oromo: The institution of Buusaa Gonofaa. In B. Tache, Pastoralism under stress: Resources, institutions and poverty among the Borana Oromo in Southern Ethiopia (appendices). PhD Thesis no. 2008:33. Ă&#x2026;s: Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Tadege, A. (Ed.) (2007). Climate change National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ministry of Water Resources and National Meteorological Agency. Thornton, P., Jones, P., Alagarswamy, G. & Andersen, J. (2009). Spatial variation of crop yield response to climate change in East Africa. Global Environmental Change, 19: 54-65. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007). Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. UNDP: New York. UNFCCC News 17, (2009). Available at http://news.unfccc.int/web/nllp.asp?o=52i26wej&s= hc8pkj4xl6iwc0fo Watson, E. (2003). Examining the potential of indigenous institutions for development: A perspective from Borana, Ethiopia. Development and Change, 34, 287-309. World Bank (2006). World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Strengthening the World Bankâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Role in Global Programs and Partnership. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 119-124

Carbon Footprinting the Internet Joel Gombiner Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences Columbia University joelhg@gmail.com Abstract Recent analysis suggests that global IT, a rapidly expanding sector, is responsible for two to four percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. How is the use of computers and networks affecting our planet‟s atmosphere? Through the example of Google, the world‟s most visited website, this article explores the ways in which the Internet generates GHGs, the difficulties in quantifying these emissions, and the possible mitigation of negative planetary impacts. Author’s Note

Keywords: Carbon footprint, Climate change, Global IT,

1. Sizing up the problem of the Internet’s carbon footprint 1.1 The magnitude of the Internet’s GHG emissions According to Saul Griffith, a leading innovator in green technology, “the Internet's energy and carbon footprints now probably exceed those of air travel... perhaps by as much as a factor of two” (Owen). This statement is surprising in at least two ways: firstly, that the Internet‟s carbon footprint has exceeded that of such a notorious greenhouse gas emitter like air travel and, secondly, that the estimated magnitude of the Internet‟s carbon footprint is so uncertain. Though online activities may seem benign, they are, in fact, a major contributor to global warming. So what is the extent of the problem, and what can we do to fix it?

1.2 What is a carbon footprint? Before exploring the energy use and carbon footprint of the Internet, it is important to understand what is meant by the term „carbon footprint‟ and why it is so hard to calculate it accurately. The word is somewhat of a misnomer, since a carbon footprint refers to “total greenhouse gas emissions caused directly and indirectly by a person, organization, event or product,” gases that include noncarbon compounds. The greenhouse gases (GHGs) are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Sulfur Hexafluoride (SF6) and a class of compounds known as fluorocarbons.1 To calculate a carbon footprint, the amount of 1

Water is also an important GHG, but its residence time in the atmosphere is too short to be included in this list.

120

Consilience

GHG emissions that a certain process causes is converted to a carbon dioxide equivalent. In other words, the carbon footprint is the amount of carbon dioxide that would cause the same amount of warming as all of the greenhouse gases actually emitted. There are a number of different databases used to calculate carbon footprints, and they often spit out drastically different values for the same process or product. These differences occur for two main reasons. One is that each database includes a unique set of greenhouse gases. The class of greenhouse gases known as fluorocarbons contains over a hundred compounds, some of which are included in certain carbon foot-printing databases and not in others. In this way, there is actually some disagreement about what is and what is not a greenhouse gas. The other difference between databases relates to how far upstream or downstream a calculation extends. For example, if you are carbon footprinting a bottle of soda, do you include the GHG emissions of the fertilizer used in the making of the corn syrup? Do you include the GHG emissions of the construction of the factory, which produced the bulldozer, which transported the fertilizer? Do you include the impact of the employees at that factory driving to work? (Do you include the carbon footprint of the bottle of soda those workers drank at lunch?) The complexity of these decisions explains why carbon footprinting is such a difficult process and why achieving consistent results across databases is nearly impossible. Many companies exploit this inter-database variation by simply choosing the database that calculates the lowest carbon footprint.

2. Global networks: the Internet and the atmosphere 2.1 How the Internet is responsible for GHG emissions With these inherent complications in mind, let‟s try to understand how the use of the Internet is impacting the world‟s atmosphere. The Internet consumes a huge amount of GHG-emitting energy, which can be divided into two pieces. Technology companies must manufacture (by extracting raw materials and assembling in factories) and ship (using airplanes, trucks, etc…) the Internet‟s hardware: servers, personal computers, iPhones, et cetera. Then, those devices must be powered and cooled, drawing electricity from their local grids, energy that is generated in different ways with varying GHG emissions. For example, in China, where Google maintains vast arrays of servers, coal power plants produce most electricity. Coal is plentiful and cheap, but the least efficient of the fossil fuels. In comparison with fossil fuels like natural gas and petroleum, coal emits the greatest amount of GHGs per calorie of energy produced. Gartner Inc., an international consulting firm, recently tried to quantify all of the components of global information technology, calculating that the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry is responsible for two percent of global CO2 emissions, the same as aviation (Remember that Griffith thinks it may be twice that of the aviation industry). Gartner‟s definition of ICT includes “in-use phase of PCs, servers, cooling, fixed and mobile telephony, local area network (LAN), office telecommunications and printers, all commercial and governmental IT and telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and the embodied (that used in

Consilience

Gombiner: Carbon Footprinting

Figure 1: The IPCC‟s 2007 sector-by-sector breakdown of GHG emissions does not include global ICT. design, manufacture and distribution) energy in large-volume devices.” Calculating the global GHG emissions of the Internet is unprecedented, and it is interesting to observe that the International Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC‟s) 2007 fourth assessment does not include the IT industry in its sector-by-sector breakdown of GHG emissions (Fig. 1). Given that global IT makes up a substantial percentage of global GHG emissions (two percent according to Gartner, maybe more according to Griffith), perhaps it is worth including in future IPCC reports.

2.2 A closer look at Google and YouTube A good model for understanding the energy usage and carbon footprint of the Internet is Google, the world‟s largest search engine. This multi-national corporation operates over one million servers around the world and processes one billion search requests each day (Pandia). At its current rate of expansion, Google is installing 100,000 servers per quarter (Kuhn). The production and distribution of these servers requires a huge output of GHG-producing energy. In addition to server production, there is also an output of GHG gases each time one searches Google. Every unique search requires multiple servers. Google works by indexing the Internet, creating a virtual copy of the web. To maximize the speed of each search, Google combs through multiple servers, on which these copies of the Internet are stored. By querying multiple servers there is a greater chance that one of those servers will respond quickly. This approach gives fast results, but is also power-hungry, using more energy than is truly necessary (Leake). Google could reduce energy usage (but compromise the speed of its searches) by querying one server instead of many. How much GHGs does an individual Google search generate? This question, one that has only been addressed in the last few years, recently generated buzz among prominent scientists and Google‟s public relations branch. The debate was

122

Consilience

sparked by a statistic from Harvard physicist Alex Wissner-Gross, who claimed that a Google search accounts for seven grams of carbon dioxide emissions. Seven grams of CO2 emissions is equivalent to boiling a pot of tea or driving a car 52 feet. The figure prompted Google to respond by publishing a counter-statistic of .2 grams of carbon dioxide per search (Hölzle). The wide-ranging disparity (over an order of magnitude difference) can be partially accounted for by the differing way each study interpreted a „search.‟ Google's statistic refers to one individual search, while Wissner-Gross's figure includes the multiple attempts it may take to find a desired result. However, for this explanation to make the two results compatible would require an average of 35 tries to complete a search, a number which is clearly too high. Therefore, these two statistics indicate an underlying uncertainty about how much CO2 a Google search truly emits into the atmosphere. If we adopt the middle ground between Wissner-Gross and Google and assume a Google search creates one gram of CO2 emissions, it is possible to calculate the total impact of Google searching on the Earth‟s atmosphere. With one billion Google searches occurring every day, there are one billion grams of CO2 being emitted into the atmosphere due to Google searches alone. This is the same as driving a car 2,375,000 miles (or 80,000 people commuting to work 15 miles each way). Of course, Google searches are only a single component of Internet activity. Wissner-Gross estimates that looking at a webpage with pictures or video emits .2 grams of CO2 per second. YouTube users watch two billion videos every day and upload hundreds of thousands more (YouTube factsheet). If the average time a user watches a video is ten seconds (a random guess), then watching of videos on YouTube accounts for another four billion grams of CO2 emissions, or an additional 320,000 car commuters. Given that the two examples of YouTube and Google only represent a portion of online content, it is easy to see how the Internet as a whole is a major contributor to global CO2 emissions. However, it may be some time before we can precisely quantify the impact of the Internet and global IT on our planet‟s atmosphere.

3. Powering the Internet with clean energy? The issue of energy consumption and carbon output is one that Google appears to be taking seriously. Its philanthropic subsidiary, Google.org, recently invested 15 million dollars in Makani, a wind-energy corporation. (Makani has a somewhat unconventional plan for creating renewable energy. They take advantage of the powerful and consistent winds at high altitudes by flying airplane-mounted turbines around in circles, thousands of feet above the Earth‟s surface (Owen)). While fifteen million dollars is an impressive investment, Griffith points out that for any alternative energy company to actually join the grid requires about 100 million dollars and five to ten years of time (Owen). That sobering reality makes Google's 15 million look a lot smaller. As the internet continues to expand its high-bandwidth content, there will be further demand for production of new servers, servers that require GHG-emitting energy to produce, distribute, power and cool. Google may be interested in lassoing

Consilience

Gombiner: Carbon Footprinting

the high winds, but like most other websites, the majority of its servers currently derive their energy from coal, the cheapest and most abundant fossil fuel. A transition to an Internet powered by renewable energy is remote and may be a cool and breezy dream.

124

Consilience

Bibliography Gartner, Inc (April 26, 2007). Gartner Estimates ICT Industry Accounts for 2 Percent of Global CO2 Emissions. http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=503867 Hölzle, Urs (January 11, 2009). “Powering a Google search.” The Official Google Blog. IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf Kuhn, Eric (December 18, 2009) “CNN Politics — Political Ticker...Google unveils top political searches of 2009.” CNN. Leake, Jonathan and Richard Woods (January 11, 2009). “Revealed: The Environmental impact of Google searches.” The Sunday Times. Owen, David (May 17, 2010). “The Inventor's Dilemma: A eco-minded engineer discusses the limits of innovation.” p. 42-50. The New Yorker. Pandia Search Engine News (July 2, 2007). “Pandia Search Engine News — Google: one million servers and counting.” Youtube Factsheet. http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 125-140

The Role of Regional Institutions in Sustainable Development: A Review of the Mekong River Commission’s First 15 Years Mai-Lan Ha Columbia School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University in New York City email: lmh2127@columbia.edu Abstract The implementation of sustainable development principles often comes into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth. The richly diverse Mekong Region–which comprises the six riparian nations of China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam–is in the midst of a regional debate between development and ecological preservation. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), the sole organization in the region tasked with managing this delicate balance, is struggling to find a balance between utilizing the Mekong’s waterways for economic growth without undermining the vitality of the river for use by future generations. In its 15 year history, the organization has never truly defined its basic principles on sustainability and has instead shifted positions as its leadership has changed. The MRC is also trapped in a difficult balance with its upstream neighbors; due to its limited authority, the MRC has been unable to effectively manage water usage and development along the Mekong region.

1. Introduction Vision for the Basin: An Economically Prosperous, Socially Just and Environmentally sound Mekong River Basin. Vision for the Mekong River Commission: A world class, financially secure, international river basin organization serving the Mekong countries to achieve the basin vision. Mission of the MRC: To promote and coordinate sustainable management and development of water and related resources for the countries’ mutual benefit and people’s well being (MRC). Sustainable development reverberates in policy discussions around the world. In practice, the implementation of sustainable development principles often comes into conflict with government driven needs for greater economic growth. The Mekong Region, comprising the six riparian nations of China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, is in the midst of a regional debate between development and ecological preservation. The sole organization in the region tasked with managing this delicate balance, the Mekong River Commission (MRC), is

126

Consilience

struggling to find a balance between utilizing the Mekong’s waterways for economic growth without undermining the vitality of the river for use by future generations. Ensuring the viability, history, and character of the basin system represents an enormous task for all professionals in conservation, sustainable development, and water resource management. Outside of China, the river basin in the lower Mekong remains close to its natural state. However, plans are being made to construct dams for hydropower and irrigation, improve river navigation for trade, and other policies that will change the nature of the river across the region. All of these changes are made in the name of pro-poor development.1 Yet, the poorest communities are often found on the banks of the Mekong and rely on the river’s natural abundance for their livelihoods. The MRC must find a balance between developing the basin and not destroying the natural resources the poor rely on. Since the founding of the MRC in 1995, the organization has faced many questions about its role and ability to adequately address development concerns. In many ways, the MRC has been insular, focusing mainly on answering the needs and requests of its member nations’ governments and select partnering agencies. Its ability to absorb and respond to outside considerations (public requests) has been dependent on the character of the organization’s leadership. At the same time, the MRC has played a significant role in shaping the Mekong basin as the greatest opportunity for sustainable development, trade facilitation, and navigation. The MRC’s greatest challenge has been how to include into development plans the much less quantifiable but equally important roles of culture, the ecological system, and social structures of basin residents. The question remains: How can the MRC use its knowledge and information base to facilitate dialogue between all parties (member governments, donors, and civil society), to coordinate and advise on sustainable development, and to manage water usage and resources of this rich ecological system for the benefit of the poorest, while maintaining the ecological integrity of the river system? Thus far, the MRC has not been able to adequately answer this question. It has done a poor job in its fundamental tasks of water management and sustainable development and has struggled to maintain dialogue with all parties. This article will demonstrate how the MRC’s changing understanding of sustainable development, along with its inability to coordinate information transfer, include public input, and influence national agendas, has hampered its ability to meet its stated mission. Beginning with a basic background of the MRC’s origins, this article will examine how the MRC has looked at sustainable development, water resource management, public participation, and role development. Finally, it will give some thoughts of what the future holds for the organization.

2. The Founding of the Mekong River Commission The MRC’s legacy can be traced back to geopolitics of the 1950s. Led by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United States Army Corp of Engineers, a United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) study viewed the Mekong as one of the greatest “untamed” rivers whose waters must be controlled to limit flooding, produce electricity, and support development through a series of hydropower dams in the region. During a historical

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

period fraught with concern over the rise of Communism in Southeast Asia, development in the region had little to do with actual local needs; instead, development was seen as a strategy to fight Communism. Hence, hydropower plans developed by the US Corp of Engineers gave the United States a clear advantage over others in the region. Following the decision to build a cascade of dams throughout the region, an agreement was signed in 1957 that established the MRC’s forerunner, the Mekong Committee, and included Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The committee’s main task during the time was to implement hydropower development plans throughout the region. During its early years, the committee predominantly surveyed, researched, and collected data for the construction of a series of hydropower dams throughout the basin. However, the committee could only complete a limited amount of work as Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam) slipped into outright conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. Meetings were suspended and little work was completed. In 1975, with the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the grouping, without Cambodia (who at that time was under the closed Khmer Rouge regime) signed a new interim agreement that allowed the 3 countries to continue implementing hydropower development studies and construction. In all, a very limited number of dams were built, none of which were on the Mekong’s mainstream waterways. In 1992, conflict in Cambodia ceased, and the country re-emerged from years of isolation. Consideration had to be made about where Cambodia fit into the existing 3 party Mekong Committee. However, since 1957, the economic make-up of the region had changed significantly. Thailand in particular was in the midst of great industrial growth and had become reliant on the river’s water. Several Thai development plans required diversions on the Mekong’s tributaries and mainstreams. However, the 1975 interim agreement contained specific clauses prohibiting the river water’s diversion without consent from other member countries. For the first time in over a decade, Cambodia’s re-entry into the Committee as the country most immediately downstream of Thailand posed a potential threat to Thailand’s own economic plans. Thailand was fearful that Cambodia would object to its water diversion plans and therefore, objected to Cambodia’s re-entry. However, excluding a stable Cambodia would undermine the regional legitimacy of the organization. This impasse threatened the existence of the Mekong Committee, something that the UNDP could not allow to happen. In this acrimonious atmosphere, negotiations led by the UNDP for a revitalized four member organization concluded in 1995 and established the current Mekong River Commission. The commission was tasked with ensuring sustainable development throughout the basin with explicit language to mitigate harm to the environment while protecting, preserving, and even enhancing its surroundings. The member countries’ governments heralded the Agreement as a great achievement. Within civil society, on the other hand, the 1995 Agreement was met with less enthusiasm. Although civil society applauded the agreement for establishing a mechanism for cooperation and discussion, the Agreement failed to acknowledge the negative attributes of large scale industrial development and to explicitly discard hydropower plans for the Mekong region.2 As a result, the MRC had to continue reassessing its role in the Mekong Region. Over the next 15 years, the MRC’s role and focus shifted as it struggled to define its position vis-à-vis other intergovernmental organizations and regional

128

Consilience

bodies. Its main strength continued to be its ability to increase its already significant knowledge base by amassing large quantities of macro level data and observations on the technical aspects of the river basin. However, it struggled to utilize this knowledge base for actual sustainable development and water governance.

3. Sustainable Development The 1995 Agreement that created the MRC was explicit in its goal towards, “sustainable development, utilization, conservation and management of the Mekong River Basin water and related resources… consistent with the needs to protect, preserve, enhance, and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions and maintenance of the ecological balance” (“1995 Agreement On the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin”). Within this framework, the MRC structure (Council, Joint Committee, National committees, and Secretariat) has been unable to present a coordinated work-plan meeting this objective. The MRC has found it particularly difficult to understand the implications of cross boundary programs in transportation, fisheries, hydropower, and irrigation. The very understanding of sustainable development and the degree of attention paid to environmental concerns and sustainability have been wholly dependent on the personalities of the MRC’s leadership. The MRC’s inability to institutionalize actual environmental and social considerations beyond the rhetoric undermines this element of the MRC’s core goals. During the first years of its existence, the MRC, under the direction of Yanasabu Matoba, a former Japanese engineer, differed little from its predecessor, the Mekong Committee. Its 1996 Work Program included a list of infrastructure programs for investment. Many of these projects were recycled from lists constructed by the Mekong Committee focusing extensively on centralized infrastructure. Other considerations, including its mandate for water utilization, environment, and social mitigation programs were considered with no progress made until the early 2000s. Following Matoba, Joern Christensen, was appointed the MRC’s Chief Executive Officer. During his tenure, from 2000-2004, development became much less project-specific. Instead, basin wide considerations were made with an emphasis on ecological conservation. Under Christensen, the Basin Development Plan was completed in 1999, and implementation began soon thereafter. The Basin Development Plan was one of the key projects stipulated by the 1995 Agreement. Its aim was to develop and coordinate development initiatives that would benefit all countries in the region by emphasizing cross border projects while also minimizing the possible negative impact associated with such projects. Sustainable development became less reliant on rapid infrastructural development and instead included consideration for basin wide resource management combined with social and environmental impacts. This did not mean a cessation of infrastructure projects, but greater attention was paid to the projects’ ecological ramifications. The environment, fisheries, and water utilization programs became integral for determining how the development agenda could be reconciled with socio-economic growth, a stark departure from preceding years.

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

By the mid-2000s, the basic frameworks and procedures for the MRC had been concluded.3 While the early 2000s were marked by basin wide management and integration of environmental and social considerations into development plans, the second half of the decade saw an increase in concrete investment and development projects. Under the MRC’s third CEO, Olivier Cogels, concrete action became the major concern. In 2005, he wrote, “the MRC is in an ideal position to act as a promoter and facilitator of well-coordinated investments in the water and water related sectors of the region, in close cooperation with the donor community and investment institutions” (Cogels, 2005). In this model, greater cooperation with both the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) became integral. 4 “Sustainable Development” now meant concrete projects in hydropower, navigation, fisheries, irrigated agriculture, environmental management, watershed management, etc.5 During this period, project completion, with a nod to sustainable development was extremely popular among riparian governments. By 2008, under its current CEO, Jeremy Bird, the MRC once again shifted positions. Greater consideration is now given to the social and environmental impacts related to project implementation. Core practices now include determining mainstream acceptable practices for hydropower development. The MRC’s new project to develop a strategic environmental assessment is indicative of its current efforts to pay more attention to the environmental ramifications of development projects. Over the past few years, greater attention has also been paid to impacts on one of the most diverse fisheries in the world, accounting for one quarter of global freshwater fishing and worth over 2.5 billion USD annually (MRC). The MRC’s latest two initiatives, Basin Wide Development Scenarios 2010 and its Strategic Environmental Assessment (Opportunities and Risks) for Proposed Lower Mekong Basin Mainstream Dams, takes a much more critical view of the impacts that development will have on the make-up of the region. The Basin Wide Development Scenarios 2010 looks at three cases: the baseline situation, the definite future scenario, and foreseeable future scenario. In each of these scenarios, the MRC has assessed how development plans created throughout the region will impact livelihoods, fisheries, hydrology, etc. The Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) on the other hand, analyzes for the first time the impact of mainstream hydropower construction on the communities, fisheries, and hydrology of the region. The SEA was recently released in October 2010 and actually found that hydropower plans should be halted for at least ten years because they could lead to irreparable harm (“Dams Spell Doom,” 2010). With greater emphasis on the social and environmental impacts of project implementation, the MRC has made significant strides in recent years towards sustainable development. The MRC’s understanding of sustainable development has changed through the years, and its evolution has not followed a linear path. Instead, the balance between how much environmental and social issues would be considered in the need for overall development depended predominantly on the personality of the MRC’s CEOs. During its first years, the MRC was concerned with continuing with previous hydropower plans. During subsequent years, the MRC shifted back and forth between developing more comprehensive and balanced development agendas and completing large centralized infrastructure projects. Recent years have seen a return to social and environmental considerations for project completion, though much progress remains.

130

Consilience

4. Water Resource Management The MRC’s second major task is to manage the water resources afforded by the Mekong River for the betterment of the communities it serves. In this respect, the MRC has followed a step-wise approach by passing a series of procedures dictated by the 1995 Agreement. The 1995 Agreement explicitly spelled out the MRC’s role in facilitating water use, determining the causes of disruptions, and facilitating disputes if they were to occur. The MRC also sought to increase dialogue with upstream Mekong countries, Burma and China, as a key cornerstone for water resource management. Yet this effort met only limited success in facilitating greater transparency in water use. In the end, the MRC’s effectiveness in water management was greatly hampered because the 1995 Agreement set out procedures that were not rules based and lacked real enforcement mechanisms. In essence, the MRC was unable to influence the national policies of its member countries. Although the MRC initiated its water utilization program in 1996, it was not until 2003-2006 that the majority of its stated mandates were completed, including Procedures for Water Use Monitoring, Prior Consultation and Agreement, and Maintenance on the Flows on the Mainstream. Another mandate, known as Procedures for Water Quality, is currently still awaiting approval. The delay in these procedures led to Thailand’s 1995 diversion of water from the Mekong mainstream for its own purposes and uncoordinated development along the river. As in the 1995 Agreement, the procedures are not rules based and member states are not bound to act by the procedures. Along with these procedures, the MRC has also developed a variety of modeling mechanisms and programs to focus its work. The current model is the integrated water resources management (IWRM) to complement its hydrological modeling under the Decision Support Framework. The IWRM in theory, “promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (“Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy,” 2007). By utilizing the IWRM, the MRC notionally acknowledges the need for both a bottom-up and top-down approach. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of the program relies on the organization’s ability to influence riparian governments’ policies, something that has not yet happened. The individual national Mekong committees are more concerned with national interests than the MRC’s regional role, thus straining relations among members. The MRC’s relations with its upstream countries, Burma and China, have led to some agreements between the parties for greater information sharing. However, it still took over ten years for China to agree to provide 24 hour water level and 12 hour rainfall data for flood forecasts. Only following this year’s major drought has China agreed to release limited data from two of its upstream dams. The fact that it took 15 years for China to agree to minimal data release is a testament to the relationship the MRC has with its upper riparian neighbor. These two aspects-the organization’s inability to affect real domestic policy changes in its riparian governments and insufficient information sharing with its upstream neighbors-limit any real affect the MRC can have on water use

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

management. Without effective water use management, the second core objective of the MRC cannot be met, leading to disruptions in water flow and depletion of water resources. For the communities living along the river who are reliant on its natural water flows, massive changes in expected water flows (both unforeseen), droughts, and floods have led to diminishing livelihoods.

5. Public Participation One of the greatest challenges the MRC faces is its relationship with the public. More than any other issue, the MRC’s inconsistent policy and the original disregard for public participation led many to question its legitimacy and effectiveness. By not engaging with the public, the MRC severely limited its own ability to adequately assess the needs of the people living along the Mekong. Without public input in its projects, civil society protested against the opaque decision making process that they believed benefited large private developers over their own needs. This undermined the MRC’s objectives to effectively manage the resources of the Mekong for residents in the area. The core problem is that the MRC is only directly accountable to the four riparian governments, not to the general public. During the 1990s, the MRC took a particularly aloof stance. Its first CEO, Yanasabu Matoba, stated, “Public participation is not the responsibility of the MRC but that of its member countries,” further noting that if the public needed information it must, “go to the embassies of the member countries or through the donors” (“Letters,” 1996). The utter exclusion of public participation in the MRC secretariat’s planning process was an inauspicious beginning to relations between the MRC and the public. Rather than seeing the public and civil society as key actors and allies, the dismissive nature of these first years fostered hostility and mistrust between the parties. Given the extremely different stages of political freedom and participation of its member states, the MRC has been unable to sustain public participation in its programs. Certain less contentious projects (environmental and basin development plans) include built-in mechanisms for dialogue and consultations with the public, while others (water utilization program) exclude the public completely. For example, the current Basin Development Plan and the State of the Basin Report both hold a series of stakeholder sessions to share preliminary results, garner feedback, and make amendments throughout the process. In April 2010, a representative from the MRC even attended a civil society forum to share the latest developments of the Basin Development Plan and to hear differing viewpoints. Still a key avenue for public engagement, the National Mekong Committees have failed to implement a mechanism for open dialogue. The Committees are established by each of the national governments. For Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, where public participation is a new concept, there is little precedent for establishing arenas for public dialogue. Instead, the National Mekong Committees are treated as merely another bureaucratic organization. It was not until 2009 that the MRC responded concretely to the problem by issuing a new communications strategy. This strategy explicitly declared the need for greater discussion, dissemination of information, publication of the MRC’s roles, and the need to establish avenues for public feedback on projects.6 By 2009, after nearly

132

Consilience

two decades of turmoil over the lack of information coming from the MRC, its new CEO, Jeremy Bird (who had previously been head of the World Commission on Dams) saw the vital need for a better communication strategy with the public. Over the years, public participation was a repeated refrain from both civil society and the donor community. Bird recognized donor demands as well as the importance of a coherent communications strategy from his previous position. Being accustomed to dealing with controversial issues, he realized the MRC must address these concerns and improve its information sharing. Over the past year, the MRC has released policy studies, posted meeting notes, and held stakeholder forums. Hopefully this genuine approach and engagement with the public will continue.

6. Its role: Knowledge Development, Investment, Regulation, and Coordination Most importantly perhaps is the image and overall role of the MRC. Over the course of 15 years it has developed, accommodated, and changed itself depending on pressures from governments, donors, and civil society. Striving to meet multiple objectives- including managing water resource information, coordinating activities, notifying members, and playing prominent advisory roles on sustainable developmentâ&#x20AC;&#x201C; these goals remain largely unmet.

6.1 Knowledge Development and Consulting From its very inception, the MRC has been a knowledge organization. Work since the 1950s resulted in a vast quantity of information on fishery levels, environmental surveys, water levels, etc. Many of its programs today continue to fulfill this purpose, since the MRC sees itself as a repository for technological knowledge about the riverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s resources and flows. Yet, it still lacks a depth of knowledge on the cultures and histories of communities along its banks that were originally deemed unimportant in its work. Stretching from China into Vietnam, the Mekong passes through villages and communities that are both among the poorest as well as most diverse. These include small fishing communities on the borders of Laos and Thailand, ethnic minority groups, and floating villages in Cambodia and Vietnam. Historically, these communities have relied on the riverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s natural ebb and flow for their livelihoods. Most dependent are the floating villages on the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) in Cambodia where the river naturally reverses its flow every year, yielding one of the largest fisheries in the world. Recently, the MRC has tried to increase its knowledge by publishing the Living Mekong, a volume documenting the rich diversity of communities and fisheries along its banks, but more should be done to effectively engage with these communities. As a knowledge organization, the MRC has used its role to act as a consultant and advisor for projects with the World Bank and ADB as well as to advise member countries. This has manifested into a number of consultancies with international financial institutions on pre-feasibility reports for the MRC as well as environmental studies for local member organizations. Recently, it has also begun to delve into developing recommendations for cross- border infrastructure projects across the

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

region, acknowledging the need for greater environmental and societal considerations. At the forefront of all infrastructure projects is a cascade of dams on the mainstream. The MRC’s “Sustainable Hydropower” program came about as Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia looked to build 11 mainstream Mekong dams. The MRC recognized that the completion of these 11 dams would change the very character of the Mekong river basin, leading to potentially catastrophic environmental and social considerations due to collapsed fisheries, relocations of communities, and a complete change in the ecology of not just a single country, but the entire region.

6.2 Private Investment The MRC has also played a role in attracting investment for development projects. Over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial institutions towards projects with private investors. The shift became prominent particularly under Olivier Cogel’s administration. The importance of the private sector’s increasing role in the Mekong basin is a significant challenge for the MRC. This is particularly true as private investors such as Chinese, Russian, and regional financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. As development organizations, such as the ADB, promote public-private partnerships, private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. In doing so, Jeremy Bird, notes, “The planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“Changing Currents: Navigating the Mekong’s past, present, and future,” 2008). With the private sector playing a greater role, the MRC must reassess its position in development programs and determine its relationship with private entities. However, this shift from a basin management and a knowledge coordination organization towards an investment attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of the organization. Instead, donors believe it should play the role of a manager and facilitator amongst governments rather than a project oriented organization (Donor Group Statement, 10th Meeting of the MRC-Donor Consultative Group).

6.3 Regulation The MRC has also played a role in attracting investment for development projects. Over time, this has moved from collaboration with international financial institutions towards projects with private investors. The shift became prominent particularly under Olivier Cogel’s administration. The importance of the private sector’s increasing role in the Mekong basin is a significant challenge for the MRC. This is particularly true as private investors such as Chinese, Russian, and regional financiers and companies enter the market for hydropower development. As development organizations, such as the ADB, promote public-private partnerships, private entities play an increasing role in determining development projects. In doing so, Jeremy Bird, notes, “The planning cycle for private sector projects tends to be much shorter than in the public sector, and less open” (“Changing Currents,” 2008). With the private sector playing a greater role, the MRC must reassess its position in

134

Consilience

development programs and determine its relationship with private entities. However, this shift from a basin management and a knowledge coordination organization towards an investment attraction organization does not fit donors’ conceptions of the organization. Instead, donors believe it should play the role of a manager and facilitator amongst governments rather than a project oriented organization (“Donor Group Statement, 10th Meeting of the MRC-Donor Consultative Group”).

6.4 Knowledge Management and Coordination Even without a true regulator’s role, the MRC as a knowledge base, advisor, and coordination center can do much more to highlight and regulate water flows. Yet, it continues to fail to successfully investigate, monitor, and notify governments of impending disasters. One of the prime examples is the Yali Falls Dam built 80 km upstream of the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Between 1999 and 2001, when partial operation of the dam commenced, flash floods destroyed fields and vegetable gardens while also leading to a number of deaths in Ratanikiri, Cambodia. It was only when local reports from Ratanikiri emerged that the MRC responded. Even then, the MRC’s could only take undertake several field studies to meet with the Vietnamese and Cambodian Mekong National Committee members to set up better communication and cooperation mechanisms. It was clear that the MRC’s position was limited; it could merely bring sides together but not force changes (“Cooperation for Sustainable Development,” 2000). In 2010, the Mekong basin faced its most severe drought in close to 20 years. Water flows and levels were considerably below average. The MRC claimed the low water levels were due to an unusually dry rainy season that ended in October, 2009. Holding this knowledge internally, the MRC made no public statement until local media began reporting on drought conditions. This inability to coordinate and share information or make early warnings was indicative of its communications and systemic failures. Even if seen solely as a knowledge organization, the MRC failed to meet its objectives. For the most part, the MRC has managed its large technical knowledge base to assist in member country and international financial institutional projects; however, it has struggled to adequately coordinate information transfer especially during times of crises.

7. The Future of Regional Cooperation The MRC provides a good case study of the difficulties facing regional organizations tasked with managing water resources and sustainable development in a trans-boundary context. The commission’s complex agenda among its four member states combined with finding a way to engage with its two upstream nonmember neighbors make its mission particularly difficult. Combined with regional and international interest in the Mekong from the ADB and WB, the MRC has struggled to find its niche in the development world. The MRC offers a number of lessons including the following: the importance of effective communications amongst governments and the public, true public engagement, the need for a mechanism to adequately enforce implementation of recommendations and

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

decisions, clearly defined understanding of development and real sustainability, and lessons in dealing with the geopolitics of upstream and downstream neighboring countries. Although it has made mistakes in the past, the MRC is also shifting positions and reforming itself for the future. After years of foreign leadership, the MRC is shifting towards riparianization, meaning the riparian states (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) will have greater power in the decision-making process. In the upcoming years, the CEO and other key positions will be turned over to a riparian country national rather than expat leadership. Decreased term limits for professional staff will also be amended to increase dedication and professionalization of the organization. This fundamental shift in the organization’s everyday working structure will further increase riparian governments’ ownership of the organization. These changes will, however, lead to more questions. Most significant of these questions will be whether this latest attempt at inclusivity will be institutionalized and continued by later regimes. How the secretariat manages its relationship with national governments will also change as the organization moves ahead. Time will tell whether increasing riparian ownership of the MRC will lead to greater cooperation or greater manipulation of the Secretariat as a tool of national agendas. The MRC stands at a pivotal moment when it must take a more assertive stand in using its knowledge to promote sustainable development and equitable water use in the basin. As dialogue on global warming increases, the MRC will need to find a truly equitable strategy that will enable it to meet the changes brought by global warming. It should also endeavor to implement water resource management that does not destroy the ecological system and livelihoods of those in the basin, while simultaneously alleviating poverty for the very poorest. Steadily over the past 15 years, the MRC has expanded its core strength as a knowledge institution in regards to technical and scientific data. At the same time, it has struggled to define its role in “sustainable development,” to effectively coordinate information transfer and to establish its public presence. In the past, much of this was due to a nonexistent communications strategy and shunning of public engagement. This is beginning to change, as the MRC recently passed a new communications strategy that establishes avenues for public input, responds to inquests, and utilizes the internet for information dissemination. It has also started taking more comprehensive steps to understand a dam’s impact on fisheries, sedimentation, and overall ecological impacts while issuing guidelines for further “sustainable hydropower” development. These are improvements, but they also signify the continued belief in the centrality of large scale infrastructure for development. The original question of how to use its knowledge base to increase environmental and social considerations and manage water resources has still not been adequately answered. At present, the MRC’s attempts have been inconsistent and dependent on the nature of its leadership. The true institutionalization of sustainability, environmental considerations, public participation and discourse has not yet occurred. Consequently, the regional organization established to both coordinate and advise on basin wide development has had little impact on the decision making of its national members, nor has it been responsive to civil society and local societal needs. This has led to uneven development with potentially disastrous long term effects.

136

Consilience

The MRC has, thus far, failed to fulfill its vision for the Mekong Basin. Sustainable development for the poorest Mekong residents still has a long way to go. In addition, its inability to coordinate information transfer about water fluctuations impacting the entire basin has resulted in greater hardship for large swathes of communities. The struggles that were noted above have hampered the MRC from undertaking projects that are both sustainable and beneficial to the wellbeing of citizens living on the banks of the Mekong. While large-scale infrastructure and agriculture projects have resulted in greater overall economic growth for the Mekong countries, greater income inequalities have also emerged in the basin, exacerbating local challenges. As the basin’s nations continue down a path towards rapid economic growth, more pressure will be placed on the river system. Currently, 11 mainstream hydropower projects are planned in Laos and Cambodia with potentially severe impacts on fish migration and the overall ecology of the basin. How the MRC navigates these projects will set precedence for the future and define its role in the basin. The MRC will need to confront and address its systemic failures in order to ensure that it may not only adequately manage the Mekong’s development and water resources but also gain public legitimacy and trust.

Endnotes 1

Pro-poor development: policies aimed specifically at benefitting the livelihoods of the poorest communities and individuals in the region. 2

Please see “Statement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin.” 4 April 1995, Chiang Rai, Thailand. http://www.terraper.org/key_issues_view.php?id=14. The grouping of Thai Civil society organizations stressed, “an end to the era of environmental destruction and the beginning of an era of sustainability that does not damage the natural environment and which benefits all members of society … a holistic approach and the decentralization of authority to local communities must replace the concept of large scale water development centralized within the State.” 3

The different procedures included: Procedures for data and information exchange and sharing, water use monitoring, and notification for prior consultation and agreement. 4

The IUCN and WWF also became cooperation partners during this same period. Today, twenty-seven organizations are amongst the Mekong Commission’s development partners. They encompass a wide array of organizations from NGOs to intergovernmental organizations. 5

In fact, the Cogel administration was notable for its control of information and was charged with withholding negative environmental reports. Please see “13 Years of

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

Bad luck: a relfection on the MRC and civil society in the Mekong.â&#x20AC;? Watershed. Vol. 12, No. 3, November 2008 for further information. Cogels also explicitly defended the building of hydropower dams, finding them critical for the region. http://www.mrcmekong.org/mrc_news/speeches/30-nov-06_open.htm. 6

Please see new communications strategy, http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/free_download/MRC-communicationstrategy- 250110.pdf for more information.

138

Consilience

Bibliography "Changing Currents: Navigating the Mekong's Past, Present, and Future". (2008, November). Watershed , 12 (3), p. 16. "Putting Emphasis on people's participation" Danish Aid in the Mekong Region. (1996, March-June). Waterhsed , 1 (3), pp. 44-46. A "shopping list for donors": Mekong River Commission launches 1996 Programme. (1995-1996). Watershed , I (2), 21-26. Bird, J. (2008, April 14). The Mekong River Commission. Retrieved March 2, 2010, from Foundation for Ecological Recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/MRCS%20CEO%20Response%20to%20 TERRA.pdf Cogels, O. (2006, November - December 30-1). Asia 2006 - The International Symposium on Water and Renewable Energy Development in Asia. Retrieved March 2, 2010, from Mekong River Commission: http://www.mrcmekong.org/mrc_news/speeches/30-nov-06_open.htm Cooperation for Sustainable Development: Death Disaster and the Yali Falls Dam. (2000, July -October). Watershed , 6 (1), p. 12. Forum: "Cooperation for Sustainable Development": Death, disaster and the Yali Falls Dam. (2000, July - October). Waterhsed , 6 (1), pp. 10-13. Hirsch, P. (2008, November). 13 years of Bad Luck? A Reflection on MRC and Civil Society in the Mekong. Watershed , 12 (3), pp. 38-43. Hirsch, P. (2006 - 2007, July - February). The Mekong River Commission and the Question of National Interest. Watershed , 12 (1), pp. 20-25. Lee, G., & Natalia, S. (November 2008). The Governance Role of the MRC vis-a-vis Mekong Mainstream Dams. Australian Mekong Research Center: Mekong Brief Number 10 . Lee, G., & Scurrah, N. (2009). Power and Responsibility: THe Mekong River Commission and Lower Mekong Mainstream Dams. Australian Mekong Resource Center, University of Sydney and Oxfam Australia. Sydney, Australia: Oxfam Australia and University of Sydney. Mekong Politics: "New Era", Same Old Plans. (1995, July). Watershed , 1 (1), pp. 2429.

Consilience

Ha: Regional Institutions

Mekong River Commission. (2009). Communications Strategy. Vientiane: Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Commission. (2003, April-June). Mekong News: The Newsletter of the Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Commission. (2004, August - October). Mekong News: The Newsletter of the Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Commission. (2005, February - April). Mekong News: The Newsletter of the Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Commission. (2005, May - July). Mekong News: The Newsletter of the Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Commission. (1995, April 5). Mekong River Commission. Retrieved March 12, 2010, from Agreements, Procedures and Technical Guidelines: http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/agreement_95.htm Mekong River Commission. (n.d.). Public Participation in the Context of the MRC. Retrieved March 15, 2010, from Mekong River Commission: http://www.mrcmekong.org/download/programmes/Public_Participation _Mrc_context.pdf Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy: Justifying Large Water Infrastructure with Transboundary Impacts. (2006-2007, July - February). Watershed , 12 (1), pp. 10-20. Mekong, T. P. (2008, August 16). Mekong Flood, MRC's Role, Dams in China, and a failed alarm system. Retrieved March 2, 2010, from http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/755 Nette, A. (1997, March-June). Mekong River Commission Going with the Money. Watershed , 2 (3), pp. 31-34. NGOS, T. (1995, April 4). Statement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. Retrieved March 1, 2010, from Foundation for Ecological Recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/Thai%20NGO%20statement%20MRC%2 095.pdf Philip, H., Jensen, K. M., Boer, B., Carrard, N., Fitzgerald, S., & Lyster, R. (2006). National Interests and Transboundary Water Governance in the Mekong. Australian

140

Consilience

Mekong Resource Center, DANIDA, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia. TERRA. (2008, March 27). Mekong River Commission. Retrieved March 02, 2010, from Foundation for Ecological Recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/Regional%20letter%20to%20MRC.pdf TERRA. (2007, November 13). Mekong River Commission Facing Crisis of Legitimacy. Retrieved March 3, 2010, from Foundation for Ecological Recovery: http://www.terraper.org/articles/Press%20Release%2013%20Nov%20200. pdf Woods, K. (2004-2005, November - June). Transboundary Environmental Governance in the Greater Mekong Subregion: The Politics of Participation. Watershed , 10 (2), pp. 10-23.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 141-150

Toppling the Tripod: Sustainable Development, Constructive Ambiguity, and the Environmental Challenge Frances C. Moore Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources Stanford University Palo Alto, CA fcmoore@stanford.edu Abstract Discussions of global environmental governance seem to have gotten nowhere in the last thirty years despite environmental problems that continue to grow in scope and magnitude. Here, the role of sustainable development in that failure is examined, particularly the constructively ambiguous nature of the paradigm. It is suggested that an emphasis on the shifting, contextualized and relative term ―needs‖ in the definition of sustainable development has led to paralysis at the international level in addressing environmental problems, particularly climate change. Contradictions that emerge when sustainable development is formalized in economic models as weak and strong sustainability are discussed. Finally, promising future pathways for environmental actions are explored.

Keywords: constructive ambiguity, environmental politics, climate change negotiations, global environmental governance.

1. Introduction

It is June 2009 in the small Swiss town of Glion overlooking the northern shore of Lake Geneva. In a beautiful hotel, some of the founding fathers of the environmental movement stare at a screen in quiet disbelief. They are gathered for the last day of a major conference on global environmental governance that has brought together three generations of environmental leaders: those that worked on the Stockholm Conference of 1972 and the Rio Conference of 1992, which established the environmental governance structure we know now, those leading the international environmental institutions today, and those emerging leaders who will be charged with solving the environmental problems of tomorrow. Over the past two days, these luminaries have discussed the original vision of the founders, the successes and failures of the last forty years, and ways of strengthening environmental governance in order to address the problems of the twenty-first century. At this moment, we are watching a video projected onto a screen in the same room where most of these discussions have taken place. The black and white video is from 1982, and it shows a conference held in London to mark the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Stockholm Convention. In it, environmental leaders of the time — many of them household names, some of them now sitting in the conference room, older and grayer, watching their younger selves on screen — make

142

Consilience

impassioned speeches about the environmental crisis and the need for collective political action to stem the decline. For the forty minutes that the video runs, the room is eerily silent. The conference descends into none of the last-minute conversations or slow drifting away that usually marks the end of a high-level meeting. Instead, the participants watch intently as, one-by-one, the speakers in the video stand up and repeat, almost word for word, the arguments of the last two days. The talking points are the same: the immediacy of the environmental crisis, the dire consequences if it is not addressed, the lack of an effective response so far, the overconsumption of the North, and the development aspirations of the South. Ignoring the scratchiness of the 1980s recording, the speeches of 1982 and 2009 become indistinguishable. The questions that hang in the room are almost tangible: Why have we been describing the same problems for over twenty-five years? Have we made any progress? And how can we expect to make progress now if we have no new solutions?

2. The Promise of Sustainable Development

For many years, environmentalists believed that sustainable development offered the key to solving the most basic socio-environmental problem â&#x20AC;&#x201C; how to encourage economic growth without destroying the natural environment. Working for the past few years in environmental think tanks in Washington, D.C., I too believed that sustainable development was a sound way of ensuring prosperity and environmental protection for all. I appealed to the framework described by the Brundtland Commission in 1987 in which environmental, social and economic values are given equal weight in decision-making. Maybe most environmental problems had gotten worse, not better, over the twenty years since sustainable development was first popularized, but I felt confident that this was only because no one was truly practicing it. After enrolling in a graduate program in environmental science, however, I began studying the tense relationship between North and South on environmental issues, particularly the deadlock in the international climate negotiations. This work has led me to believe that sustainable development is not only un-implemented but is actually un-implementable. Far from being the solution to our environmental problems, sustainable development actually stands in the way of a sober examination of what it will take to solve the environmental challenges posed by climate change, biodiversity loss, water shortages, overfishing, and desertification. As a young environmentalist, part of a generation charged with solving the environmental problems of the twenty-first century, I fear repeating the failures of the last twenty years. I fear the illusory promise of sustainable development, which projects a mirage of consensus that evaporates when confronted with real problems that require real solutions. I fear that we too, like the founding generation before us, will fall into the trap of casually relying on superficial agreement without engaging with the very real tradeoffs between consumption and conservation. I know that as environmentalists, we are often so focused on the future â&#x20AC;&#x201C; on the next battle, the next crisis, the next generation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; that we rarely take the time to look back and listen to the dusty recordings of twenty years ago. But a disinterested evaluation of our chances of success against the major environmental problems that

Consilience

Moore.: Toppling the Tripod

confront us in the twenty-first century makes it clear that we are in pressing need of a new strategy. And maybe that new strategy should begin by looking back, by taking a dispassionate look at the performance of sustainable development in the last twenty years. What was its original promise and why has that promise gone unrealized? Was sustainable development ever a real solution to the now decades-old questions posed by Northern overconsumption, Southern underdevelopment and global environmental constraints? Perhaps by doing this we can start a new conversation, one that really engages with the underlying drivers of environmental decline. If we don‘t, can we have any confidence that a summit similar to the Glion conference in twenty years time will not sound like a depressing repetition of the one in 2009?

3. Constructive Ambiguity

A precise definition of sustainable development is tough to pin down; there are over one hundred published definitions by some counts and still no clear agreement. Perhaps the most frequently cited is that of the Brundtland Commission. In its 1987 report Our Common Future, the Commission describes sustainable development as ―meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.‖ But what exactly does this mean? This seemingly simple question evokes many, frequently contradictory responses. Ask an official from a developing country, as I have done many times at climate negotiations, and you will get a response that emphasizes alleviating poverty and meeting the needs of the poor through economic development. Ask someone from a developed nation, and you will most likely hear about considering future generations in policymaking and extending the timehorizon of planning decisions. Ask a typical representative of an environmental NGO, and he or she will tell you that sustainable development is about redefining development to include environmental, as well as economic, objectives. At first, I believed that these multiple definitions simply represented confusion over the true meaning of sustainable development. Supporters will tell you that these different ideas are not fundamentally opposed but simply reflect complementary priorities in the implementation of sustainable development. But after seeing how the concept is used by governments and policy-makers, I have increasingly realized that this vagueness is not peripheral but is in fact central to sustainable development. Politicians and diplomats will often build agreement between parties on sensitive issues by using deliberately ambiguous language in order to create superficial consensus. It is likely that this process has existed for as long as diplomacy itself, but in the 1970s Henry Kissinger dubbed it ―constructive ambiguity.‖ Constructively ambiguous language can be helpful: it lets each party read its own interpretation while preventing a breakdown of talks. If the issue at hand is relatively minor or peripheral to the main agreement, then parties can still make progress while punting the controversy to later talks. In some cases, the passage of time, intervening events or improved relations makes the original disagreement simply disappear. But if the issue at hand is central to the dispute, then constructive ambiguity only serves to delay the tough political choices needed for a resolution.

144

Consilience

Looking back at the political landscape of the 1970s and 80s that produced sustainable development, it is easy to see how an outcome that Kissinger would recognize as constructive ambiguity might have arisen. Ever since the inception of the environmental movement in the 1960s in the United States and Europe, developing nations had been suspicious that environmental concerns would be used as a ploy to thwart their development aspirations. Many threatened to boycott the Stockholm Conference in 1972 and afterwards remained concerned that this newfound obsession with the environment was just another way for rich nations to pull up the development ladder behind them. The West had gotten rich while polluting and consuming resources and, in a new-found fit of environmental consciousness, was now telling developing countries they could not do the same. The Brundtland Commission–whose official name was the World Commission on Environment and Development–was a semi-political body selfconsciously made up of roughly equal numbers of representatives from each of the official UN world regions. Charged with squaring the circle of continued development for the poor and global environmental protection, the Commission‘s formulation of sustainable development was able to forge agreement only through ambiguity.

4. Two Cases

Sustainable development according to the Brundtland Commission promises to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This emphasis on needs constitutes the key ambiguity in the Brundtland Commission‘s definition. It seems like an intuitive concept, but is in fact a highly contextualized term. To see this, we simply need to compare two representative cases. Let‘s take Ismail, a Kyrgyz herder I met on my travels in Central Asia. Ismail lives in the Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan. In the winter he teaches at the primary school in his village. In the summer he takes his son, his wife, his extended family and their flock of goats and yaks to the summer pastures higher up the valley. Ismail needs many things: he needs electricity and piped water in his village; he needs economic opportunities in the region so his son doesn‘t have to migrate to Russia to find work; he needs a motorbike so his family, two days ride from the nearest town, is not so isolated in their summer encampment. At the same time, he is better off than many others. With a diversified and relatively stable income and a large share of capital in the form of livestock, Ismail is solidly middle-class for the region. Now let‘s take Jo, a housewife and mother of four living in the D.C. suburbs who is also solidly middle-income. Jo needs, and in fact has, many of the things that Ismail needs such as electricity, clean water, economic opportunities and transportation. But in addition, perhaps there are other things that Jo needs: a car big enough to transport a large and active family; reliable heating for the winter and air conditioning for the summer; a telephone and internet connection to maintain a standard level of connectivity. Perhaps Jo doesn‘t really need these things, but only wants them. Yet this highlights the ambiguity embodied in the Brundtland Commission‘s definition of sustainable development. Beyond the most basic biological necessities, what we feel we need becomes inextricably tied up with what we want. Our needs are constantly

Consilience

Moore.: Toppling the Tripod

evolving and are defined relative to what those around us have and want. If Jo truly feels that she needs an SUV to accommodate and protect her family, who has the authority to tell her that she doesn‘t? And if she needs one, it becomes increasingly hard to tell Ismail, and the other four billion inhabitants of the developing world, that they do not also need the same. In a constantly changing world of highly unequal consumption, distinguishing necessities from luxuries becomes not just difficult but highly politically charged.

5. International Climate Negotiations

It is easy to see why environmentalists believed that the sustainable development paradigm held so much potential. It promised to elevate environmental values alongside economic values in policy-making and, with its emphasis on future generations, promised to push planning horizons out so that the long-lived effects of environmental decline would be considered and averted. But this is the precisely the point of constructive ambiguity – all parties, environmentalists included, can read their own meaning into the ambiguous term. The international climate negotiations where I have most experience offer a classic example of how the constructive ambiguity at the heart of sustainable development plays out in environmental policy-making. Perhaps the only thing that all countries can agree on in these talks is the importance of sustainable development. But dig a little deeper and you find that this rhetoric disguises real and intractable differences, and these differences have made it extremely difficult to negotiate an effective climate change treaty. Industrializing countries such as China and India refuse to commit to any absolute caps on emissions by citing the energy and transportation needs of their still relatively poor populations. Developed countries such as the United States acknowledge the need to reduce emissions but argue that it shouldn‘t be done in a way that jeopardizes sustained economic development, a position that results in small emissions cuts and an emphasis on emissions offsets of questionable environmental validity. The combined result of these commitments to sustainable development has been continued growth in emissions with no prospect of reversing this trend in time to avert dangerous and irreparable climate change. Working at the Copenhagen climate talks as part of the Maldives delegation, I saw first-hand how a seemingly theoretical concept such as constructive ambiguity has produced very real consequences for this vulnerable island nation. From the Maldives‘ perspective, climate change has laid bare the inadequacy of the sustainable development paradigm: the needs of its future generations, the need for a homeland not sunk beneath the waves, are pitted directly against the needs of the current generation to maintain and increase an unsustainable standard of living. Unfortunately for the Maldives, this has always been, and will likely remain, an unfair and quite likely unwinnable contest.

6. Weak Sustainability, Strong Sustainability

The ambiguity described above, which forms such a central element of sustainable development, means that the concept does not lend itself to easy application. Attempts to practically apply sustainable development to policy analysis

146

Consilience

must involve confronting and resolving its inherent ambiguity. The risk is that this in turn will cause a breakdown of the political coalition supporting the idea, since this coalition only makes sense in the context of the multiple, conflicting interpretations permitted by constructive ambiguity. Nowhere does this contradiction become clearer than in the work of economists attempting to apply sustainable development to economic analyses and their competing definitions of weak and strong sustainability. The notion of weak sustainability recognizes three kinds of capital, reflecting the three legs of the sustainable development tripod described by the Brundtland Commission. Economic capital covers the traditional understanding of capital as goods or assets. Social capital covers human resources such as an educated workforce or networks of relationships. Natural capital consists of renewable and non-renewable resources such as forests, clean water, minerals and biodiversity. In the world of weak sustainability, all forms of capital are interchangeable and an economy is sustainable if the total stock of capital remains constant. This may sound arcane and just a little bit dull, but think for a minute about what counts as sustainable development under the weak definition. Crucially, an economy is sustainable even if it uses up all of its natural capital, as long as a portion of that income is invested to ensure equally high income for future generations. In other words, overfishing a fishery until it collapses would be a sustainable development pathway if roads, schools, power plants and other infrastructural investments were built with the fishing income. In fact, if the price is high enough, complete destruction of a nation‘s natural resource base could be considered sustainable. If you think this scenario is farfetched, consider the nation of Nauru. This tiny island in the central Pacific would be just an insignificant dot in the ocean were it not for the fact that the island is composed entirely of one of the highest grades of phosphate rock ever discovered. Since the beginning of the twentieth-century over 80% of the surface has been mined and shipped to Australia and Japan to produce fertilizer, turning the island‘s interior into a weird moonscape that is entirely unusable and largely inaccessible. The phosphate on Nauru is a non-renewable resource. Production peaked in the 1980s and will likely cease entirely within the next decade. Nine in ten Nauruans are now unemployed and the government employs 95% of those that do work. Nevertheless, a fraction of phosphate revenue was diverted into a $1 billion trust fund that could provide continued income to citizens. According to the doctrine of weak sustainability, Nauru once counted among the most sustainable economies in the world – even while it proceeded to render most of its terrain completely uninhabitable. Weak sustainability departs so far from what we instinctively understand as sustainability that it seems as if logical contortions are needed to connect the two. A natural and instinctive reaction is to dismiss weak sustainability as a manipulation of the true spirit of sustainable development, but its counterpart, strong sustainability, also has serious problems. For the requirements of strong sustainability to be met, the stock of natural capital must remain constant. This formulation ensures environmental protection but at the expense of economic development, a ―morally repugnant‖ effect in the words of Oxford welfare economist Wilfred Beckerman. Beckerman argues that strong sustainability would require devoting huge resources

Consilience

Moore.: Toppling the Tripod

to protecting every one of the million species of beetle for future generations, an inexcusable luxury in the face of acute poverty and real human needs today. Taken together, where does this leave us? Refreshingly, the formalism of economics leaves no room for ambiguity here. Either natural capital is exchangeable with other forms of capital or it is not. The former, resulting in weak sustainability, produces outcomes that few would consider sustainable. The latter, strong sustainability, prevents trade-offs between the environment and economic growth but could halt development as we understand it today. Sustainable development is constructively ambiguous because it holds out the promise of both environmental protection and economic growth, without engaging in the real exchanges that happen between the two. Because of this, sustainable development has not only failed in implementation, but has fostered the dangerous illusion that there are no trade-offs, that we can consume and conserve at the same time – that we can have our fish and eat them too.

7. A Voice of Reason

To understand exactly how sustainable development failed in the two decades since the Brundtland Commission, we need to go to the top – to those formulating environmental policy at the international level. The conference in Switzerland on global environmental governance brought together the current and all the former executive directors of UNEP for the first time in history. Cumulatively, this group represents almost four decades of experience at the helm of UN‘s most important environmental institution, working to navigate the treacherous waters of international environmental politics and to advocate for the environment at the highest levels of government. If any single collection of people can be said to be eyewitnesses to the politics of sustainable development, it is these four men and one woman, who together have experienced all the successes and failures of global environmental governance since Stockholm, as well as the back room political deals and horse trading that accompanied them. Even in this company, Mostafa Tolba stands out, though it is hard to put a finger on exactly why. Perhaps it is his venerable age, which at 86 makes him easily the oldest. Perhaps it is because, as an Egyptian native, he is the only representative of the global South. But I suspect that, most probably, it is the sheer length and depth of his leadership in the environmental field that singles him out and gives his remarks a special emphasis, as if his words are underlined in the minds of those listening. Tolba headed UNEP for a remarkable seventeen years, between 1976 and 1992, steering it through some of the most important environmental landmarks, including the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer, the CITES treaty to prevent trade in endangered species, and the preparations for the Earth Summit. Dr. Tolba leans forward when he talks and speaks quietly but distinctly into the microphone. He fixes the person he is addressing with a stare, made larger by the thick glasses he usually wears, and emphasizes his points with sharp jabs of his index finger. His words are direct and challenging. ―Look at all the work we have been doing for the last forty years, and human beings are still destroying the natural resources. Where is the impact on human behavior?‖ Tolba cites the Ecological Footprint Indicator, a measure of the land area needed to support the average individual, to make his point. Globally, the biological capacity of the Earth can

148

Consilience

support 2.1 hectares per person. In 2005, the average global citizen used up 2.7 hectares. This means that we are now consuming over 128% of the Earth‘s reproductive capacity every year, mining its natural resources to support our lifestyles. Tolba‘s conclusions are characteristically to the point: ―This means that in 2005, thirty five years after the establishment of UNEP and after all the discussion of global environmental governance, people are not shifting from over-consumption and they are not shifting from environmental destruction.‖ ―Let‘s remember that back in 1972 the slogan was ‗Only One Earth‘,‖ says Tolba, reminding us of the first major political conference of the environment in Stockholm, where he headed the Egyptian delegation. If current consumption trends continue, then we will require the productive capacity equivalent to a second Earth sometime within this century. ―We keep saying we borrowed the Earth from our children, but we are doing absolutely nothing to return back what we borrowed, either intact or with interest.‖ Tolba traces the failure to reverse environmental destruction directly back to the sustainable development paradigm. ―Thirty-five years ago we realized that there is a problem of deterioration and we came up with the famous slogan ‗alternative patterns of development and lifestyle‘. And at the Earth Summit in 1992 we had the Brundtland Commission and sustainable development. But did we change the lifestyles that are deteriorating the planet? Who of you changed his lifestyle over the last ten or fifteen years?‖ Hearing this direct challenge brings home some painful truths. I care about the environment – I ride a bike, I eat very little meat, I recycle, I shop at the farmers market. But I also know that as a citizen of a developed country I am a member of a privileged global elite whose ecological footprint is unsustainable. If everybody on Earth lived like me, we would face environmental catastrophe. ―You,‖ and here Tolba is addressing you, me, and the other one billion inhabitants of the developed world, ―are pulling us in the developing countries into this same mischief of over-consumption and destruction of the natural resources that we have. There will never be sustainable development if we don‘t change our own way of life.‖ If Tolba is right, then the core of the many environmental challenges is the huge per-capita resource use in the North that provides a massively unsustainable development model for the billions around the world seeking a route out of poverty. Sustainable development has failed because it doesn‘t engage with this development model. Instead it promises to meet the needs of the present generation when the needs and aspirations of developing countries will always be to become developed, to achieve the high levels or prosperity and accompanying resource consumption that prevail in wealthy countries – an outcome that can never be sustainable.

8. New Ways Forward

After Tolba‘s talk and the video screening, participants at the conference in Switzerland begin packing up and heading home, some perhaps a little subdued at hearing their speeches echoed in a crackly, black and white recording from 1982. Among the participants, there is general agreement that political momentum is building toward a major summit in 2012, a symbolic date, commemorating 20 years from Rio and 40 years from Stockholm.

Consilience

Moore.: Toppling the Tripod

From my perspective, anticipating the environmental challenges that lie ahead, there is little to commemorate. The U.N. Environment Programme established in Stockhholm is generally considered weak, marginalized and ineffective. The climate change, biodiversity and desertification conventions signed at Rio have all failed to halt the environmental deterioration they were designed to address. Many of the leaders that gathered in Glion seem to truly believe a new summit will make a difference but, given the record of the past, can we hold out any hope that they are right? I cannot say I have the answers, but the shortcomings of sustainable development may point the way forward. If, as Tolba suggests, sustainable development failed because it did not address the development model provided by wealthy countries, then this is the place to start. Ironically, this would imply that there should be less global environmental problem-solving, not more. If the environmental challenges of the 21st century such as climate change and biodiversity loss can be ultimately traced to unsustainable lifestyles in the developed North, then this is where these problems will be solved. Recognizing and acting on the longrange connections that link consumption with environmental degradation millions of miles away will allow us to treat the cause of environmental decline, not just its symptoms. Certainly this will mean exposing and rejecting the economic assumptions that underlie so much of how we understand development today: that more is always better; that the invaluable has no value; and that governments exist only to help us satisfy our superficial wants. More importantly it will mean ceasing to use the developing world as an excuse to avoid examining our own over-consumption. Fundamentally, climate change is not a problem of deforestation in Indonesia but of patterns of energy use in developed countries. Biodiversity loss is not caused by poor farmers trying to make a living, but by patterns of globalized commodity production that push ever outward into pristine wilderness areas. The real pressure on Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2DC;s resources comes not from population growth in the global South but from per-capita consumption in developed countries and growing per-capita consumption in those aspiring to be developed. These facts may be uncomfortable, but they should also be inspiring because they mean we can address these problems here and now, in our own communities, without waiting for the slow machinery of global environmental politics to grind into action. Ultimately, and perhaps inevitably, this article will end on an unsatisfactory note. The goal is to point out the inadequacies of our current approach to environmental problem solving, not to replace it with a new â&#x20AC;&#x2022;big ideaâ&#x20AC;&#x2013;. And, in fact, I suspect that any new big idea will prove as illusory as sustainable development for the simple reason that we do not know what a prosperous society with very low percapita resource consumption looks like. Instead, I believe that the next big idea may only be understood retrospectively. That, if we are successful at solving the environmental challenges of the twenty-first century, we will look back and see the actions of individuals and communities, which seemed at the time mundane, small, and perhaps hopeless, as part of a mighty normative shift that ultimately redefined how we understand the world and our place in it. The challenge now is therefore to resist the seductive glamour of the next big idea, but instead to see the potential in practical, local leadership and to foster that potential. In doing this, we can only hope that thirty years from now,

150

Consilience

environmentalists watching a crackly, color recording of the 2012 summit will not find the conversations so strangely familiar.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 151-167

The „Necessity‟ of Democracy for Sustainable Development: A Comparison between the USA and Cuba Marcus Rand Development and International Cooperation Programme University of Jyväskylä in Finland marcus.f.rand@jyu.fi Abstract Democracy is associated with, and often stated as a condition for, sustainable development. A comparison of Cuba and the United States shows that sustainable development can exist and grow in countries that do not possess a democratic form of governance. The results of the comparison indicate that, to promote sustainable development on a wider scale, it is necessary to focus on the values embedded in the dignity of humankind. To promote such values, it is imperative to present sustainable development as a set of values linked to the rights and dignity of humankind, not as the sole offspring of democratic ideology.

Keywords: sustainable development, democracy, United States, Cuba.

1. Introduction Experts from both hemispheres have stated unequivocally that democracy is necessary for sustainable development1 and that, conceptually, democracy is an extension of justice (Tage and Lars, 2003, p. 768). The text of Agenda 21, a UNproduced document that was developed at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, reinforced this notion. Agenda 21 is a “comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area with human impacts on the environment” (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA], 2009). In other words, it is a detailed plan of how sustainable development should be pursued at the individual, business and institutional level. Chapter two of Agenda 21 forges a conceptual link between democracy and sustainable development, stating that a necessary condition for sustainable development is “progress towards democratic government” (UNDESA, 2009). The apparent unilateral acceptance and promotion of democracy as a necessary ingredient for sustainable development begs the question: can sustainable development exist under other forms of government? In the dialogue on democracy and sustainable development, democracy has a somewhat nebulous definition. It is agreed, however, in the publications of the UN Democracy Fund that democracies have a constitutional design, a “legislative guarantee of human rights including freedom of expression and freedom of association, a legal system [that] ensures due process in the resolution of conflicts

152

Consilience

and the upholding of human rights, an accountable executive and public administration, and strong political parties” (United Nations Democracy Fund [UNDF], 2010). In addition, democratic governments permit and promote civil society participation, conduct national and sub-national elections, and provide access to information and transparency in the governing process [UNDF, 2010]. This idea of democracy has been fused with the idea of sustainable development. Experts argue that sustainable development is “conducive to democracy” since it emphasizes the role of civil society (Dryzek, 1999, 37). A transparent democracy shares political power by informing the constituent and involving him or her in the decision making process. The general consensus among academics appears to be that countries espousing the democratic system facilitate and encourage sustainable development more than their non-democratic counterparts. Peter Söderbaum argues that the strengthening of democracy makes the decision process at all levels more visible which, consequently, will “improve the prospects for sustainable development” (2006, 189). Similarly, Andy Spiess argues that good governance is difficult to achieve in an authoritarian government setting and that democratic structures of civil society are essential for sustainable development (2008, 244). Furthermore, some academics, such as Robert Deacon, posit that developed democratic countries practice and encourage environmental sustainability more than their authoritarian counterparts. According to Deacon, democratic countries pollute less because they have stricter environmental policies (Deacon, 2009) Deacon‟s research suggests that democracies exceed non-democracy provision “by roughly 100% for environmental protection…and roughly 25-50% for safe water sanitation and education” (Deacon, 2009, 260). It seems that most Western academics and international institutions, such as the UN, support the notion that sustainable development is most successful where participatory multiparty democracies exist. The seemingly inextricable link between democracy and sustainable development is flawed because it cannot account for the countries in which authoritarian governments have pursued and promoted sustainable development. For example, in a comparison of the top six democracies and the six strictest authoritarian states, ranked by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the authoritarian regimes have a greater average ecological reserve (Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU], 2010). This implies that authoritarian states do not necessarily live in a less ecologically sustainable manner. This finding inspired further investigation through the subsequent comparative study. Cuba and the United States were chosen for the following study because each of these countries is a prime example of differing governing systems. Though Cuba is commonly referred to as an authoritarian state, it is officially a communist state where one party holds complete political power. Conversely, the United States is a federal republic where power is divided between a federal authority and constituent regions known as states (Index Mundi, 2010). The Economist Intelligence Unit conducted evaluations of each country‟s electoral process, pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties. Each country was then assigned a score and ranking. The United States ranked 18th in the list of 30 full democracies while Cuba ranked 8th in the list of 50 authoritarian states (EIU, 2010), thus raising serious questions about the necessity of certain government structures for sustainable development.

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

This paper will endeavor to challenge the notion that democracy is necessary for sustainable development and establish through a qualitative case study that democracy is not inextricably linked to sustainable development nor is it the exclusive ideology or government structure necessary for sustainable development to be achieved. To illustrate this argument, systems of governance, “green” legislation, participation in international law, and sustainable practices in each country will be examined.

2. United States of America’s and Cuba’s Systems of Governance The United States Government clearly defines the purpose for democracy. According to United States Government publications, democracies promote decentralized rule, protect basic human rights, “conduct free and fair elections open to all citizens, and protect minorities. Democracy is believed to be a „government in which power and civic responsibility are exercised by all citizens either directly or through their freely elected representatives‟” (InfoUSA, 2009). In short, the simplest and perhaps most brazen statement, “democracy is the institutionalization of freedom” sums up the American notion of democracy (InfoUSA, 2009). The American idea of democracy resonates with Söderbaum‟s statement that participatory democracy is founded upon a respect for human rights, the sharing of political power and respect for “different values or orientations as long as these opinions do not contradict democracy itself” (Söderbaum, 183). This participation is deemed as necessary to facilitate sustainable development. Cuba‟s governmental system also contains mechanisms to promote sustainable development by allowing for public participation. The National Assembly of Peoples Power, the only body that holds constituent and legislative authority, is composed of elected deputies for a term of five years. The NAPP elects a president, one first vice- president, five vice presidents, and a secretary. In addition, 23 ministers are appointed by the president from among its deputies. This elected Council of Ministers forms the government of power (Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1992, 2009). The Council of Ministers is accountable to the NAPP and as Article 84 of the constitution states, it is the responsibility of the NAPP to “exercise their duties [for] the benefit of the people.” The NAPP is also held accountable to their electors (Articles 78, 79, 84 & 99, 1992). In this system of governance, which is designed with checks and balances of power, constituents get to choose their leaders as long as they are part of the communist party. In these regards, this system allows for power sharing and participation, elements that researchers such as Brown and Söderbaum deem necessary for sustainable development and associate with democratic systems of government. Just as Americans associate and espouse values for democracy that promote sustainable development, the communist state of Cuba does the same. According to articles 8 and 9 of Cuba‟s constitution, Cuba “recognizes, respects, and guarantees many freedoms and equal rights for all in the economic, political, social, cultural and familial spheres. It is the State‟s responsibility to „organize and conduct the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social and defence activities‟” (Article 98a, 1992). In the centrally planned system, it is clearly acknowledged that it is the state‟s responsibility

154

Consilience

to help the people and the preserve the environment by promoting sustainable development.

3. USA’s Sustainable Development and Green Legislation In the U.S. Constitution there is very little content devoted to the environment or sustainable development. However, Congress has created many acts to protect the environment and consequently to promote sustainable development. Examples of this relatively large body of green legislation include the National Environmental Policy Act (1970), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976) and the Oil Pollution Act (1990). In Section 101a of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, Congress declared: It is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans (1970). This Act, along with the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the same year, illustrates President Richard Nixon‟s response to public demand for cleaner air, purer water, and preservation of non-renewable resources. It is evident from this act that green legislation was formed to steward resources effectively and improve quality of life. Subsequent Acts reflect a similar spirit. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act addresses the life span of hazardous waste. It was amended in 1984 and 1986 to include interventions for waste minimization and more stringent guidelines for underground, hazardous waste storage tanks such as petroleum (US Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2010). Similarly, the Oil Pollution Act was created in response to the public‟s growing concerns about the marine ecosystems, especially after the Exxon Valdez spill off the Alaskan Coast in 1989 (EPA, 2010). Thus, the general pattern of sustainable development legislation seems to be that once a need is identified, appropriate legislation is created to address the concern. In this regard, the structure of the American government system facilitates sustainable development. More recently, in January 2007, President George Bush signed Executive Order 13423 Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, which created “policy and specific goals for federal agencies” to conduct their respective missions in an environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated, continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner” (EPA, 2009). Following his lead, in October of 2009, President Obama signed an executive order on federal sustainability, which allows federal agencies 90 days to “set a 2020 greenhouse reduction goal… targets for efficient, sustainable buildings, reduced petroleum use in vehicles, water efficiency, waste reduction, purchasing green technologies and products, and supporting sustainable communities” (EPA, 2009).

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

From these executive orders and Congressional laws one can see that concerns for sustainable development continue to be addressed.

4. Cuba’s Sustainable Development and Green Legislation Compared to the U.S., Cuba‟s constitution addresses the concepts of sustainable development much more directly. Since sustainable development has only recently become a significant political issue at the national and international level, the differences regarding references to sustainable development within the Constitutions are likely due to the fact that the Cuban constitution was drafted in 1976, while the American Constitution was drafted in 1788. However, both constitutions have undergone several amendments since their respective inceptions. Article 27 of Cuba‟s constitution clearly indicates a desire to pursue sustainable development: The State protects the environment and natural resources of the country. [It] Recognizes the close links with the economic and social development to make human life more rational and ensure the survival, welfare and safety of current and future generations. The state relies on the appropriate corresponding bodies to implement this policy. It is the duty of citizens to contribute to the protection of water, air, soil conservation, flora, fauna and all the rich potential of nature.2 The Cuban government acknowledges that the welfare of its citizens is linked to the environment and its natural resources. Similar to U.S. Environmental Policy, the government, in cooperation with appropriate bodies, is responsible for policy execution. The Cuban constitution carries this idea one step further and indicates that it is also the individual‟s responsibility to be a wise steward of the “rich potential of nature.” In the late 1970s, Cuba asserted itself as an international actor by becoming increasingly active in the United Nations (Gleijeses, 2002, 345). Realizing a need to attend to its environmental problems, the government created the National Commission for the Protection of the Environment and the Conservation of Natural Resources (COMARNA) (Houck, 2000, 15). COMARNA was similar to the American EPA as its composition consisted of a consolidation of agencies dealing with the environment. Further environmental legislation, known as Law 33, was developed to promote sustainable development in 1981. This law addressed water, soils, mineral resources, marine resources, flora and fauna, the atmosphere, agricultural resources, human settlements and landscape and tourism resources (Barba & Avella, 2009). This law, by several accounts, was not effective enough; thus, in 1990 Decree Law 118 was introduced (Barba & Avella, 2009). The intent of this law was to create more environmental responsibility. Decree law 118 distributed specific environmental responsibilities to eight ministries and created a ninth for enforcement (Ministry of Science Technology and Environment CITMA) (Houck, 15). In the early 1990s, there was another period of economic scarcity due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Cuban officials

156

Consilience

simultaneously addressed the economic problems with sustainable solutions. Because there was environmental legislation enforced by CITMA, Cuba was able to easily focus on localized centers of food production, which reduced transportation costs and encouraged urbanized farming (community gardens) (Davis et al., 2009, 87-88). This conserved valuable fuel resources while promoting healthier diets. In a desire to improve what were still viewed as unacceptable environmental conditions, sustainable legislation was refreshed more recently with the introduction of Law 81 of the Environment in July 1997. Despite difficult economic circumstances, Cuba implemented Law 81, which resulted in more rigorous enforcement of environmental standards (Houck, 18-21). As a result, Cuba is experiencing positive change; the marine ecosystem of the Havana harbor is “coming back,” industrial pollution is decreasing and reforestation has brought the amount of tree covered land back up to 21 percent (Houck, 5). It is evident that Cuban environmental law is evolving regularly to meet the new challenges that sustainable development brings.

5. America and Cuban Participation in International Law Both the United States and Cuba have participated in international conventions related to sustainable development. For example, both governments have joined, ratified and implemented the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)(1973) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (1992). The mission of the Ramsar Convention is the “conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable development throughout the world” (Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, 1971). Cuba and the U.S. both possess significant wetlands; thus, their willingness to pursue sustainable development by preserving most wetland areas illustrates both parties‟ commitment to sustainable development. In similar fashion, CITES is an international agreement that seeks to “ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival” (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1975). States that agree to be bound by this convention are responsible to create or modify domestic legislation that guarantees the framework of this agreement will be implemented at the international level. Implementation of this convention indicates that both the U.S. and Cuba are making a concerted effort to maximize the benefits of wild flora and fauna, while simultaneously preserving them so that future generations can reap the benefits of these sustainable practices. During the 1980s, some industrialized countries began shipping toxic waste to developing countries because increasing domestic environmental restrictions was raising the cost of disposal and cutting into profits. The Basel Convention (1992) was created in response to this practice of toxic trading. This international convention created criteria for “environmentally sound management” of toxic waste and a framework for controlling “transboundary moving of hazardous waste” (Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1992). Cuba‟s and the U.S.‟s participation in this convention suggests

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

that they are concerned about preserving the environment and pursuing a path of sustainable development. It appears, however, that Cuba is more willing to commit to international initiatives that are linked to sustainable development than the U.S. For example, Cuba signed and ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992) while the U.S. has signed but not ratified it. The convention‟s primary objective is to “halt the loss of biodiversity so as to secure the continuity of its beneficial uses through the conservation and sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992). This important conference has been identified by some as the conference that “catapulted” environmental protection and sustainable development forward in Cuba (Houck, 8). It is difficult to establish why the U.S. has not ratified the CBD. The most common suggestion seems to be that the influence of, “businesses based upon extracting and synthesizing natural information” such as pharmaceutical companies, has made it a challenge for the U.S. to ratify the CBD (Vogel, 1997, 4). In other words, it is suggested that lobby groups for industries, such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), have influenced policy and politics in this regard by coupling advocacy with targeted donations to political parties (PhRMA, 2010). This accepted practice of industrial lobbying in the American democracy does not exist in Cuba‟s system of governance. However, the current status regarding the CBD is that “the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification of the CBD in 1994, but the treaty remains before the US Senate” (U.S. Department of State, 2010). In other words, the CBD has been neglected for over 16 years. The Kyoto Protocol (1997), an amendment to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change remains in a similar status. Cuba has signed, ratified and implemented the protocol while the U.S. has only signed it. The American failure to ratify is surprising because the United States, like Cuba is a member of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Clinton-led government failed to ratify the protocol because “meaningful participation by developing countries in binding commitments limiting greenhouse gases had not been met” (Fletcher, 2010). In 2001, the Bush administration announced it was not interested in continuing the discussion of the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, Bush announced a new policy on climate change in 2002 that was based on voluntary domestic measures, not on the international protocol (Fletcher, 9-10). It is ironic that that United States government continues to refuse to implement the Kyoto protocol, yet maintains that the international community “must work collaboratively to slow, stop, and reverse greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a way that promotes sustainable economic growth” (US Department of State, 2010).

6. Sustainable Practices in the USA and Cuba Despite the apparent recalcitrance of the U.S. in regards to environmentally oriented international treaties, there are several initiatives that are worth mentioning. These initiatives relate to biofuel and biomass energy. In an attempt to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted and encourage alternative fuel development, the

158

Consilience

U.S. implemented the Energy Independence and Security Act (2007). This Act, in an endeavour to push the use of biofuel forward and reduce the consumption of and reliance on fossil fuels, requires the use of 36 billion gallons of cellulosic biofuels by the year 2022. In addition, the U.S. Department of Energy promised to invest $1.2 billion into the construction of six “commercial scale biorefineries” (Gutterson and Zhang, 2009, 442-445). Another initiative that has been pursued is the construction of biomass energy plants. The impetus for this action relates to the Energy Independence and Security Act as well as the Energy Policy Act (2005), which encourages energy conservation and efficiency by promoting residential efficiency, increasing the efficiency of appliances and commercial products, reducing Federal government energy usage, modernizing domestic energy infrastructure, diversifying the Nation's energy supply with renewable sources and supporting a new generation of energyefficient vehicles (United States Government, 2007). There are currently 170 biomass power-plants in over 17 states. These plants collectively create clean energy from a renewable resource and “reduce carbon emissions by 15.2 million tons each year” (Renewable Fuels Association, Growing Innovation- America‟s Energy Future Starts at Home, 2009). Of all the energy consumed (electricity and fuel) in the U.S. during 2008, 7% of it came from renewable resources. The renewable energy came from the following sources: solar (1%), hydroelectric (34%), geothermal (5%), biomass (53%) and wind (7%) (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2009). Although the renewable energy is a small percentage of the total energy that is consumed, it is obvious that the U.S. is making strides towards a more sustainable way of living. The diversity of the renewable energy resources also shows that many green technologies and sources of energy are being pursued simultaneously to try keep pace with the national legislation that has already been passed. As in the United States, Cuba has been attempting to reduce greenhouse gases, preserve its environment, and increase its self sufficiency by developing sources of green energy. The impetus for these changes was twofold. First, in the early 1990‟s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was no longer able to purchase subsidized oil from the former Soviet Union. Secondly, Cuba has committed to itself to interventions that promote sustainable development. It appears that Cuba has done more to promote sustainable practices and interventions than the U.S. In 2004, Cuba was operating 85 biogas plants, which on a per capita basis is almost 4 times as many as the United States (Chemi and Hill, 2009, 650). This trend is only growing as it was reported in 2009 and that Cuba had built 700 biomass plants to protect the environment and reduce the consumption of nonrenewable fuel sources (Cuba Verdad, 2009). In addition to developing biomass power plants, Cuba has tried to reduce its demand for energy. Cuba powers 65% of its sugar mills with “bagasse, a byproduct of sugar production,” and uses the waste fiber for paper products (Brodine, 1992). In addition, Cuba has promoted the use of bicycles with Havana now boasting over 800,000 bicycles. Using today‟s population, that amounts to more than 1 bicycle for every three people. Ultimately the efforts of the Cuban government have been rewarded. In 2009, Cuba‟s yearly per capita consumption of petroleum was one 1.0 liters, while the U.S. consumed approximately 3.75 liters of petroleum for every citizen (EIA, 2010).

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

Moreover, Cuba has equipped approximately 1900 schools and 280 medical facilities with photovoltaic panels and micro hydro plants. In 2004, Cuba boasted, “157 hydroelectric plants, 6687 windmills, 8597 solar panels, 1548 solar heaters, and 112 bio-digesters” (Chemi & Hill, 2009, 650). These initiatives, largely executed in rural, isolated areas away from the main power grid, facilitate sustainable local development by protecting the environment whilst simultaneously providing power for lighting and refrigeration (Chemi & Hill, 2009, 652-653). This is just a brief glimpse of the strides that are being made in the environmental facet of sustainable development. Since the 1970‟s, the U.S. environment has “improved dramatically,” especially in the area of air and water quality. Likewise, Cuba has shown remarkable progress in reducing pollution and promoting sustainable development (Houck, 2009, 5). Despite these improvements, overall U.S. consumption patterns remain unsustainable. After comparing the USA‟s ecological footprint to its total biocapacity, we find that on a per person basis, there is an ecological deficit of 4.6 global hectares (gha) (Global Footprint Network [GFN], 2009). This means that on average, it takes 4.6 more gha of land than the ecosystem can afford to support the lifestyle of each person in the U.S. When one compares Cuba‟s ecological foot print to its biocapacity, Cuba functions at a 1.3 deficit (GFN, 2009). On average, it takes 1.3 more gha of land than the ecosystem can afford to support the lifestyle of each person in Cuba. In essence, both countries are operating at a deficit; however, Cuba‟s deficit is considerably lower than the America‟s, indicating that Cuba is closer to the goal of living sustainably. According to the World Wildlife Federations 2006 Living Planet Report, Cuba was the only country to meet both criteria for sustainable development. The two criteria measured Human Development Index value and global hectares per person consumption. Four years later, the 2010 report indicates that Cuba has moved slightly over the sustainable limit of gha per person; thus, the country is just shy of maintaining sustainable development (World Wildlife Federation, 2006, 19). Critics may argue that quality of life is compromised when sustainable development is pursued. If this is true, one would expect the Cuban quality of life indicators to be lower as Cuba appears to be more involved with international environmental legislation and sustainable development interventions. To investigate this notion, basic education, demographic and economic indicators will be examined. These indicators are commonly used to determine how developed a country is. In the U.S., Primary school enrolment is 92% with gender parity, while in Cuba it is 97%. This suggests that education is very important to both countries. The American fertility rate in 2007 was 2.1, while population growth has remained at 1% from 1970-2007. In Cuba, the total fertility rate is 1.5, while the annual population growth rate declined from 1% (1970-1990) to 0.4% (1990-2007). Lower fertility rates are frequently associated with higher education, which also translates to lower child and maternal mortality (UNICEF, 2009). Both enrollment rates and fertility rates suggest that Cuba and the U.S. are on the same level of development. The American GDP per capita annual growth rate is 2% (1990-2007), while gross national income per capita is $46,040 USD. In Cuba, the GDP per capita annual growth rate is 3.6% (1990-2007). Cuban income is much lower; however, there are no visible negative implications in regards to the basic necessities of healthcare, shelter, food and education. For example, life expectancy of both the average American and the average Cuban is 78. In terms of the central government

160

Consilience

expenditure, the U.S. spends 25 % of its budget on healthcare and 3% on education. In Cuba‟s central government, 23% of the budget is allocated to healthcare, while 10% of its budget is designated for education (UNICEF, 2009). Both governments also appear to value healthcare similarly, but the Cuban government emphasizes education little more than their American counterpart. These statistics indicate that the quality of life is not affected adversely by the pursuit of sustainable development. As previously mentioned, even though average Cuban‟s income is lower, Cuba‟s greater visible commitment to sustainable development has not compromised the quality of life for its citizens.

7. Discussion This evidence alone should be enough to indicate that democracy is not the exclusive ideology or form of government for sustainable development to thrive. Cuba‟s constitution specifically addresses environmental protection and sustainability, while the U.S. constitution largely deals with the mechanics of governing a country. In the examination of the democratic and socialist governance structures, it was revealed that both countries have mechanisms for public participation, at least at the theoretical level. In other words, when promoting sustainable development, the existing mechanisms for individual expression and participation should be used. More specifically, countries and international organizations such as the UN should be flexible and work with existing forms of government to promote sustainable development rather than insisting that only a democratic government can achieve sustainable development. The case studies above show that it is possible to promote sustainable development through differing governing systems and political ideologies. In evaluating the environmental aspects of sustainable development, it appears that environmental protection and green technologies are being developed in both countries. Cuba and the U.S. want to reduce their dependency and increase their self-sufficiency, which simultaneously increases sustainable living and sovereignty. Cuba‟s smaller ecological footprint seems to further contradict the notion that democracy is necessary for sustainable development. Critics may counter that much more of Cuba‟s population is engaged in subsistence farming and has a significantly lower income. While this is true, indicators within the social context seem to indicate that income is not necessarily positively correlated to quality of life indicators such as education, life expectancy and health. Both Cuba and the U.S. have made notable steps in pursuing sustainable development, but Cuba has made more of a symbolic commitment internationally by signing, ratifying and implementing the Biological Diversity Convention and the Kyoto protocol. Basic quality of life, according to UNICEF, is very similar between the U.S. and Cuba except for the significant income difference. Moreover, according to the respective countries‟ constitutions, both have a system of participatory government where the individual‟s voice can be heard. Given this evidence, it is clear that multiparty democracy is not necessary for sustainable development. Since there is no global authority on sustainable development, a solution to the promotion of sustainable development must involve values and concrete incentives in a two-pronged approach. At the theoretical level, the values of

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

respecting human rights and of stewarding resources in a responsible manner must be promoted. These values must be embedded in the dignity of humankind and divorced from one political ideology. To maximize success, sustainable development must not promote one political system or country over another. Rather, if the rights of humankind are integrated with the basic values of sustainable development and presented in a more neutral manner, states will be more willing to promote them. In practice, this means toning down the overt ideological proponents in international discussions. For example, in documents such as Agenda 21, this would mean emphasizing the same human rights but not presupposing that democracy or “progress towards democratic government” (UNDESA) is the only way to fulfill the listed policy directives and objectives. If sustainable development is presented as a concept that is intrinsically linked with the dignity of mankind and not democracy, it will be more widely accepted in authoritarian, democratic, and „in-between‟ states. Similarly, if leaders at all levels would emphasize the same human rights but not presuppose that democratic government or progress towards democratic government is the only way to pursue sustainable development, we can begin to move towards broader acceptance and greater promotion of sustainable development. It may be a lot to ask of leaders, but it is a step that must be taken if we are to truly pursue sustainable development at a global level.

Endnotes

162

Consilience

The definition of sustainable development referred to throughout the paper comes from the Brundtland report paragraph 15 chapter 2. “Sustainable development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development; and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations” United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, (United Nations, New York, 1987) <www.undocuments.net/ocf-02.htm#I> (23.11.2009). 2

Original text ; El Estado protege el medio ambiente y los recursos naturales del país. Reconoce su estrecha vinculación con el desarrollo económico y social sostenible para hacer más racional la vida humana y asegurar la supervivencia, el bienestar y la seguridad de las generaciones actuales y futuras. Corresponde a los órganos competentes aplicar esta política. Es deber de los ciudadanos contribuir a la protección del agua, la atmósfera, la conservación del suelo, la flora, la fauna y todo el rico potencial de la naturaleza. Constitutión de la Republica de Cuba <http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cuba.htm> (26.11.2010).

Bibliography

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

Almananc of Policy Issues. Environment. <http://www.policyalmanac.org/environment/ index.shtml> (20.11.2009). America.gov, “Checks and Balances” <http://www.america.gov/st/usgenglish/2008/ January/20071116173344eaifas0.9917719.html> (23.11.2010). Barba, B. Ralph & Amparo E. Avella. Cuba’s Environmental Law. Dallas: University of Texas, 1995. (277-279) <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba5/FILE22.PDF> (20.11.2009). Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1992). <http://www.basel.int/> (30.11.2010). Biomass Power Association. Biomass Basics. 2009. <http://www.usabiomass.org/docs/ biomassbasics.pdf> (23.11.2009). Brodine, Virginia Warder. “Green Cuba” Multinational Monitor 14 no. 11(1992) <http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1992/11/mm1192_10. html> (20.11. 2009). Brown, Judy. ”Democracy, Sustainability and Dialogic Accounting Technologies: Taking Pluralism Seriously,” Critical Perspectives on Accounting 20 (2009):313342. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Cuba. <https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/cu.html> (19.11.2009). Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United States. <https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/us.html> (30.11.2010). Cherni, Judith A. & Yohan Hill. “Energy and Policy Providing for Sustainable Rural Livelihoods in Remote Locations - The Case of Cuba.” Geoforum 40 (2009): 645-654. Constitution of the Republic of Cuba 1992. <http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/const_92_ e. htm> (20.11.2009). Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). <http://www.cbd.int/sp/> (30.11.2010). Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1975). <http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml> (30.11.2010).

164

Consilience

Cuba, Constitutión de la Republica de Cuba. <http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cuba.htm> (26.11.2010). Cuba Verdad, “Cuba Builds Biogas Plants as New Energy Sources” 20.6.2009. < http://www.cubaverdad.net/weblog/cuba-builds-biogas-plants-as-newenergy-sources/> (1.12.2010). Davis, Lisa David M. Brommer, and Enrique Rodriquez-Loeches Diez-Argüelles. „Observations of Environnemental Change in Cuba.” Southeastern Geographer 49 no 1 (2009) : 84-93. Deacon, Robert T. The Political Economy of Environment-Development Relationships: A Preliminary Framework. Santa Barbara: University of California, (1999):1-31. <http://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/ucsbec/wp11-99.html> (12.11.2009). Deacon, Robert T. “Public Good Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy.” Public Choice 139 (2009): 241-262. Dryzek, John S. “Transnational Democracy.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 7 no.1 (1999):30-51. Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Economists Intelligence Unit‟s Index of Democracy 2008”. (2008) <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf> (26.8.2010) Energy Information Administration, Renewable Energy Consumption and Electricity Preliminary Statistics (2009) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew energy consump/ reaprereport.html> (26.11.2009). Energy Information Administration, Country Energy Profiles, <http://www.eia.gov/country/index.cfm?view=consumption> (1.12.2010) Fletcher, Susan R. “Congress Research Service Report for Congress, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol”. (2005): 1. <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/ rl30692. pdf> (1.12.2010). Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Global Footprint Network, “Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity 2006” (2009) <http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/footprint_ for_nations/> (26.8.2010).

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

Gutterson, Neal & James Zhang. “Important Issues and Current Status of Bioenergy Crop Policy for Advanced Biofuels.” Biofuels, Bioproducts, & Biorefining 3 (2009) 441-447. Houck, Oliver A. “Environmental Law in Cuba.” Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 16 no.1 (2000) 1-82. Index Mundi, “Cuba Government Type” <http://www.indexmundi.com/cuba/government _type.html> (23.11.2010). Index Mundi, “United States Government Type” <http://www.indexmundi.com/united _states/government_type.html> (23. 11. 2010). Menegat, Rualdo. “Participatory Democracy and Sustainable Development: Integrated Urban Environmental Management in Porto Alegre, Brazil” Environment and Urbanization 14 no.2 (2002) 181-206. Okereke, Chukwumerije. “Equity Norms in Global Environmental Governance” Global Environmental Politics. 8 no.3 (2008): 22-50. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971). <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsarramsar-movie/main/ramsar/1%5E24724_4000_0__> (30.11.2010). Renewable Fuels Association, Growing Innovation – America’s Energy Future Starts at Home (Washington, DC, February 2009). <http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry /outlook/> (26.11.2009). Spiess, Andy. “Developing Adaptive Capacity for Responding to Environmental Change in the Arab Gulf States: Uncertainties to Linking Ecosystem Conservation, Sustainable Development, and Society in Authoritarian Rentier Economies.” Global and Planetary Change 64 (2008): 244-252. Sundström, Tage & Lars Ryden, “Chapter 25: The Prospect of Sustainable Development,” in Understanding , Protecting and Managing the Environment in the Baltic Sea Region, ed. Rydén Lars, Migula Pawel & Anderson Magnus. Uppsala, Sweden: Baltic University Press, (2003). Söderbaum, Peter. “Democracy and Sustainable Development- What is the Alternative to Cost-Benefit Analysis?” Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 2 no.2 (2006):182-190. UNICEF, Cuba Statistics <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/cuba_statistics.html> (20.11.2009)

166

Consilience

UNICEF, USA Statistics <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/usa statistics.html> (18.11.2009). UNICEF, “Why are Millions of Women and Children Dying” (2009) <http://www.unicef.org/health/ index_problem.html> (1.12.2010) United Nations Democracy Fund, “Situating the UN Democracy Fund in the Global Arena”. <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/XSituatingDemocracy.htm> (31.08.2010). United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, Agenda 21, United Nations: New York <http://www.un.org/esa/ dsd/agenda21/res_agenda21_23.shtml> (14.11.2009). United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, United Nations, New York, (1987). <http://www.undocum ent s.net/ocf-02.htm#I> (23.11.2009). United States Congressional Declaration of National Environmental Policy (1970). <http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/nepa/nepaeqia.htm> (19.11.2009) United States. Department of State. “Climate Change.” <http://www.state.gov/g/oes /climate/index.htm> (1.12.2010). United States. Department of State. “Principles of Democracy”. (Washington D.C., 2005) <http://www.usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/what.html> (24.11.2009) United States Department of State. “Tenth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (Oct 26, 2010) <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/10/ 150020.htm> (30.11.2010). United States Government, “Fact Sheet: Energy Independence and Security Act 2007.” <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071219-1.html> (1.12.2010) United States of America, Environmental Protection Agency. Government Regulations and Practices (2009) <http://www.epa.gov/Sustainability/basicinfo.htm#advanc es> (20.11.2009). United States of America Environmental Protection Agency. Oil Pollution Act (1990.) <http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm> (26.11.2010).

Consilience

Rand: Necessity of Democracy

United States of America Environmental Protection Agency, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976) <http://www.epa.gov/regulations/laws/rcra.html> (26.11.2010). United States of America Environmental Protection Agency, Sustainability (2009) <http://epa.gov/Sustainability/> (20.11. 2009). United States of America, InfoUSA, US Department of State. Principles of Democracy Washington D.C. 2005 <http://www.usinfo.org/enus/government/overview/ what.html> (24.11.2009). Vogel, Joseph Henry. “White Paper,” Biopolicy Journal, 2, no.5 (1997): 1-12. World Energy Council, “Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050” (2007): 9. <http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/scenarios_study_online_1.pdf> (1.12.2010).

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 168-175

Development For Tibetans, But By Whom? Diana Jue Department of Urban Studies and Planning, International Development Group Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA dmjue@mit.edu Keywords: Tibet, China, development, design.

1. Introduction: Tibetans in China In addition to the Han majority, the People‟s Republic of China officially recognizes 55 ethnic minority groups within its borders. The degree to which minorities have been incorporated into the national mainstream community varies widely from group to group, with some demonstrating considerable resentment against the ethnic majority. Most notable are the Turkic Muslim Uyghurs, who made international headlines in July 2009 for the Urumqi riots; the Hui in Hunan province, where unrest broke out in 2004; and, of course, the Tibetans, whose high-profile protests were in to the spotlight in the months preceding the 2008 Olympic games in Beijing. The Tibet-China conflict is one of the most polarized disputes in which China is currently embroiled. At the core of this debate is Tibet‟s status as either an autonomous region of the People‟s Republic of China or an independent country. The Chinese leadership is staunchly against the “legitimate and meaningful autonomy” demanded by the Dalai Lama (BBC News, 2009); the Dalai Lama has also been labeled as a “separatist” by China‟s president Hu Jintao but maintains that he does not want to separate Tibet from China (Mazumdar 2010). Additionally, discontent among Tibetans is not limited to those residing in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). A majority of the 6.5 million ethnic Tibetans live in the neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, and Qinghai, where discontent among Tibetans is also pervasive. Dissatisfaction dates back 50 years to the failed 1959 Lhasa uprising against the invading Chinese Army. The violent demonstration resulted in the Dalai Lama‟s escape to Dharamsala, India, where the Tibetan Government in Exile is now based. The most recent large-scale Tibetan uprising began as a commemoration of this flight. The Tibetan unrest in 2008 (also known as the 3•14 riots) started in the Lhasa but spread to Tibetan Buddhist monasteries outside the TAR. The Tibetans‟ struggle extends beyond political and ethnic tensions. According to census data from 2000, Tibetans have the highest illiteracy rate of any ethnic group in China with a population of over 500,000. The illiteracy rate among Tibetans, 47.55%, is five times greater than China‟s national average illiteracy rate, 9.08%(Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005). This is partly due to

Consilience

Jue: Development For Tibetans, But By Whom?

lack of access to a bilingual Tibetan-Mandarin Chinese education system. Primary school is the only educational level for which Tibetans are comparable with the national average. Han migrants in culturally Tibetan areas graduate from universities at more than three times the Tibetan rate and from senior middle school at five times the Tibetan rate (Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005). This makes competing for employment and economic benefits vastly more arduous for Tibetans. Tibetans‟ low levels of education contribute significantly to their slow economic and social progress. In 2004, the annual per-capita income of Tibetan farmers and herdsmen was 1,861 Chinese renminbi ($225 US dollars), and the disposable income of urban Tibetans was 8,200 Chinese renminbi ($991 US dollars). According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the Tibetan Autonomous Region‟s 2009 GDP ranked 31st out of 31 province-level divisions and 28th in GDP per capita (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). It also ranked lowest on the Human Development Index in the same year (UNDP China, and Renmin University of China, 2010). While both numbers are exceptionally low for national averages, the Chinese government emphasizes that they are increasing at an accelerating rate (Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2005). Due to Tibet‟s suboptimal economic, social, and political situations, the Chinese government, interested foreigners, and Tibetans themselves have all put effort toward sustainable development. In this article I focus on both top-down policies instated by the national government and a number of grassroots efforts implemented by foreigners and Tibetans. I learned about these citizens‟ organizations when I was in Qinghai Province, China in January 2009 with a MIT team of undergraduate and graduate students. We attempted to implement villagelevel development projects, including water testing, air quality monitoring, energy usage surveying, and development worker training. Our team operated in collaboration with nongovernmental organizations operating out of Xining, the capital of Qinghai Province. I keep specific names and locations undisclosed to secure the privacy of Tibetan friends and colleagues.

2. For Tibetans, By China There have been a number of national policies implemented to benefit Tibetans, including the Great Western Development (GWD) program and the Qinghai-Tibet railroad. The GWD program was instated by China to increase the income of its less developed western regions, which have traditionally lagged behind since Deng Xiaoping‟s reform policies. Major components of the GWD program include developing infrastructure, attracting foreign investment, increasing ecological protection (e.g. reforestation projects), promoting education, and retaining talent to prevent brain drain. The Qinghai-Tibet railroad is a high-altitude railway connecting Xining, the capital of Qinghai province to Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region. One motivation for its construction was to increase the flow of industrial products and goods into Tibet from more developed regions, thus benefiting the TAR population. Many Tibetans believe that these policies and others exert additional pressure on Tibetan culture and heritage because they attract Han migrants to Tibetan areas. In 2000, state Ethnic Affairs Commission Minister Li Dezhu wrote that a westward

170

Consilience

flow of ethnic Han would be “in keeping with the execution of large-scale western development” (Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2005). Tibetans‟ suspicions are exacerbated by the persecution of prominent Tibetan religious leaders who are believed to have links to the Dalai Lama (Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 2005). Another policy that I had the opportunity to see the effects of in person is the resettlement of nomadic Tibetans in the TAR and adjacent ethnic Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces. According to a June 2007 Human Rights Watch report, “the Chinese government has been implementing resettling, land confiscation, and fencing policies in pastoral areas inhabited primarily by Tibetans, drastically curtailing their livelihood.” These efforts began in 2000 and have intensified considerably since 2003. Required to move into newly built housing settlements or nearby towns, many Tibetan herders have been forced to kill most of their livestock and abandon their traditional way of living. After moving to the resettlements, they are frequently unable to find jobs other than temporary or menial labor. This results from their inability to speak Mandarin Chinese, the lack of capital to start small businesses, the lack of skills training available on resettlements, and the inappropriateness of the newly resettled areas to their existing skill sets. Additionally, while the state purports to act as an indefinite caretaker, promising shelter, food, and fuel, resettled populations need to get food and fuel from elsewhere (often relatives), the provided shelter is of poor quality, and healthcare and education are mostly difficult to access (Shenk, 2009). The Chinese government has justified the relocations of Tibetan herders as necessary actions to protect the environment and to “develop,” “civilize,” and “modernize” China‟s western provinces. By concentrating Tibetans closer to towns, they arguably would have better access to jobs, education, and medical services. However, authorities failed to consider what Tibetans wanted and have not responded favorably to complaints. Tibetans had no opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, and the reasons they are given for resettling were unclear. I visited a resettlement after spending time in a nomadic village near Rebgong in Qinghai Province. With its rows of identical brick houses and small, fenced yards, the cramped resettlement area starkly contrasted with the pastoral village. Per the government‟s demands, nomadic families had begun moving into their houses by sending family members to live in them. The resettlement was mostly empty and physically generic, providing little to no room for individual preference. It was difficult to imagine its becoming a livable community. Considering these unlivable conditions, the policies of the Chinese government are often thought to have indistinct motives. Many Tibetans are still suspicious of the tens of billions of dollars spent by the state in the name of development. According to Tibetologist Parvez Dewan, coauthor of Tibet: Fifty Years After with Siddharth Srivastava, “even the most massive infusions of funds have never been able to buy the affection of the people. You can‟t get rid of the alienation of a people through development” (Mazumdar, 2010).

3. For Tibetans, By Foreigners

Consilience

Jue: Development For Tibetans, But By Whom?

Global interest in Tibetans is considerable, and the international media readily picks up Tibet-China issues. Events like the Dalai Lama‟s 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, the Tibetan uprising of 2008, and repeated reports of China‟s accelerating economic growth that is occurring at the cost of curtailed human rights have motivated the establishment of Tibetan-aiding social development organizations. During my team‟s visit to Qinghai Province, one of the nation‟s poorest and most ethnically diverse provinces, we met with many foreigners working for the development of Tibetans. In 2009, the province‟s GDP was only 108.1 billion Chinese renminbi, ranking 30th out of 31 province-level administrative areas. Its GDP per capita was 19,407 Chinese renminbi, ranking 22nd (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The population is approximately 5.5 million, among which the Han majority accounts for 54 percent. Other ethnic groups include the Tibetans (21 percent), Tu, Hui, Salar, and Mongols (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

3.1 The English Training Program Groups working on development issues for Qinghai‟s lowest income populations, usually ethnic minorities living in rural areas, include the Sanchuan Development Association and the Snowland Service Group. My team‟s main contacts in Qinghai were directly associated with the English Training Program (ETP), and four students served as our trilingual translators. ETP was specifically designed to address the lack of high-level educational opportunities for Tibetans by offering “innovative school practices that provide [minorities] with improved access to education and mainstream Chinese society” (English Training Program, 2009). Founded by Americans in 1991, the program operates out of the Nationalities Department at Qinghai Normal University in Xining, the capital of Qinghai. ETP‟s original goal was to use foreign teachers to train young Tibetans to become English teachers in rural Tibetan areas, thus addressing the lack of bilingual education. The program also teaches Tibetan youth “to expose and mentor students in small-scale rural community development, to train students to be community activists, [and] to encourage students in the importance of cultural development work” (English Training Program, 2009). ETP has accomplished the goal of offering a high-quality education to students who otherwise would have likely remained in low-quality middle schools and vocational training schools. Nearly all of the students are from low-income rural households. For these students, one of ETP‟s strongest draws is a full tuition scholarship, which make it possible for them to attend. Most graduates are working in rural areas and others are working for or have worked for nonprofit development organizations, environmental protection agencies, and cultural preservation groups (English Training Program, 2009). Students have traveled abroad and have returned to China to teach English at higher levels of education (Yi, 2008).

3.2 One Earth Designs Part of my team included members of One Earth Designs (OED), a nonprofit organization co-founded by a MIT graduate. OED “serves as a catalyst for socially and environmentally minded innovation among Himalayan…communities.

172

Consilience

Acting as a conduit through which communities can access technical and business support, [it] unleash[es] the potential of modern design.” (One Earth Designs, 2010). Current projects include SolSource, a lightweight solar energy device that provides users with a low-cost a portable means of cooking, heating, and electricity generation, and HeatSource, a product that captures and redistributes excess body heat. Both products were made with the input from partners in the Himalayan region. OED attempts to fill in the gaps existing in the development-oriented nongovernmental organization network by providing scientific analysis and designbased support, hosting web tools to connect communities with policy makers, and training for capacity building through workshops, school construction, and scientific and engineering curricula. It also plans to offer technical and financial support for developing sustainable businesses among local entrepreneurs–a method of development that few nonprofit organizations in the region have attempted. During our visit, OED members were engaged in a number of projects, including creating a water testing training video with local Tibetan students, demonstrating and testing a SolSource prototype, and surveying villagers about energy usage. The goal was to apply and transfer MIT students‟ engineering and scientific know-how to local Tibetan development workers so that projects can be carried out in the absence of OED members.

4. For Tibetans, By Tibetans An interesting consequence of ETP is spin-off development work that begins as extracurricular activities. As part of their coursework, students are first exposed to development through a popular sustainable development class, which teaches students theories of development and practical steps for implementing smallscale projects. Such projects include collecting Tibetan handicrafts from a village to sell or delivering books to a village to make a library. There are also workshops for students to learn how to write project proposals that solicit donor funding. Every small-scale development project is completely voluntary and student-initiated. According to the teacher, there are three main reasons for why students do projects. First, they want to follow in the footsteps of prior students, many of whom have established their own nongovernmental organizations. Second, by reading case studies in the sustainable development class, they understand issues of poverty and are made aware of their own villages‟ needs. Additionally, they can see the need for change, can envision a direction for change, and have been shown examples of how other people have helped. Third, exceptional English speakers have goals to study abroad, and in order to earn scholarships they first need to demonstrate their societal contributions. Spin-off organizations are another result of ETP. One organization, Imaging Tibet, began as an extracurricular workshop that provided ETP students with practical skills and technology to visually document their home villages. Imaging Tibet began in March 2007 by an ETP teacher, but plans have been made to entrust it to ETP graduates. Program members have created a digital archive of hundreds of photographs that are divided into three broad fields: small-scale development (visual documentation of students‟ development projects), cultural preservation (using

Consilience

Jue: Development For Tibetans, But By Whom?

photography to preserve elements of Tibetan communities‟ intangible heritage), and social documentary (small bodies of work describing life in rural Tibetan communities). Shem Women‟s Group helped set up our village visits. It describes itself as a group “dedicated to empowering Tibetan women and their communities through grassroots development” and began in 2003 as an ETP extracurricular course on gender studies (Shem Women‟s Group, 2007). Female ETP students wanted to become involved with development projects, so a teacher began to meet with a group of women to teach a small-scale development course. Now, members consist of female ETP graduates and typically come from communities where they are the only females with more than a middle-school education. The Shem women see themselves as strong female role models, which they hope will raise villager confidence in women‟s abilities and encourage villagers to value women‟s education. The organization offers sustainable development-related discussion groups, workshops, and training to female ETP students. Many of the development issues in communities are gender-related. Women shoulder much of the burden caused by limited access to clean water, electricity, basic health care, and basic education. Female ETP students not only have first-hand knowledge of this life, but also can talk one-on-one with women in their communities, which is why their leadership is so crucial. ETP graduates also return to their villages to advance their home community. My team had the opportunity to stay in one nomadic village where an ETP graduate had recently reinvigorated the local primary school as the new principal. Even at a young age, the young man had gained the respect of community elders and the local government. This ETP graduate‟s desire to see improvement in his community and his connections to people who could help were invaluable resources. Another ETP graduate was on the brink of establishing his own nonprofit organization, with which he hoped to start small handicrafts businesses for people in his village.

5. Conclusion: Who Should Do The Work? My trip to Qinghai revealed the various layers of who is doing work to help the Tibetan community. From talking to villagers and from accounts of development workers‟ experiences, I was able to gauge Tibetans‟ receptivity toward different sources of development. Most villagers I met continued to distrust the Chinese government and welcomed foreigners with open arms, but often to the point of dependency. ETP students I talked with told me that gaining respect was sometimes difficult, but if they could carry one project out successfully, they could gain their villagers‟ trust. Compared to other development organizations run by foreigners, I have great respect for the English Training Program because it trains Tibetans to help Tibetans. This is unique in that foreigners themselves do not carry out development work in the Tibetan villages, but rather encourage villagers to do so on their own through education. There are many advantages to this, with knowledge of the local culture and language being key. As natives, Tibetans are more sensitive to what could be considered “good” changes and “bad” changes. These are cultural issues that

174

Consilience

foreign development workers most likely do not consider when implementing projects. The viewpoints held by ETP graduates, who have straddled the worlds of their Tibetan background and a Western-style education, are beneficial in setting an appropriate mindset for development work. However, there are still some obstacles confronting the development workers trained by the English Training Program. They are well-trained in English, but they lack technical skills in engineering and business. It is in these areas where a lot of potentially beneficial work could be done for Tibetans in an economically, environmentally, and socially sustainable fashion. For now, many of the ETP student projects and the Shem Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x;s Group are one-time ordeals that are donor-funded and require immense effort on behalf of the implementing development worker. It is in these gaps where organizations like One Earth Designs can play an important role by building the capacity of local Tibetan development workers and introducing new technologies that are co-created with local users. This goes to show that any development work requires larger-scale collaboration across sectors, across skill-sets, and also, perhaps, across boundaries and cultures.

Consilience

Jue: Development For Tibetans, But By Whom?

Bibliography BBC News. (2009, March 10). Tibetan people „put through hell‟. BBC News. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7933207.stm Congressional-Executive Commission on China. (2005). 2005 Annual Report. Retrieved from http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt05/2005_6_tibet.php Human Rights Watch. (2007). “No One Has the Liberty to Refuse” – Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/10/no-one-hasliberty-refuse English Training Program. (2009, January 9). School Profile. Unpublished internal Document, Nationalities Department, Qinghai Normal University. Mazumdar, Sudip. (2010, January 27). Course Correction. Newsweek. Retrieved from http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/26/course-correction.html National Bureau of Statistics. (2000). 2000 Population Census of China. Retrieved from http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/ One Earth Designs. (2010). About One Earth Designs. Retrieved from http://www.oneearthdesigns.org/OEDabout.html Schenk, T.E.W. (2009). Finding the higher ground: Assessing Contrasting Approaches to Planning for Climate Change Induced Resettlement. (Masters thesis). Retrieved from DSpace@MIT. (463621783) Shem Women‟s Group. (2007). Welcome to Shem Women’s Group. Retrieved from http://shemgroup.org/ UNDP Chin and Renmin University of China (2010). China Human Development Report 2009/2010: China and a Sustainable Future – Towards a Low Carbon Economy & Society. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org.cn/pubs/nhdr/nhdr2010e.pdf Yi, L. (2008). Cultural Exclusion in China: State education, social mobility, and cultural difference. New York: Routledge.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 176-189

An Exploration into Community Health Charlotte Eloise Stancioff University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill cestancioff@gmail.com

1. Introduction Billowing white clouds begin to form over the horizon as the usual afternoon heavy rain shower, indicative of the rainy season in Bahia, will soon arrive. The air, heavy with moisture, is filled with the smells of fresh earth and sweet overripe fruit. The wind has begun to pick up, clattering the metal tools hanging outside Foringo’s house. We are under the shade of a giant palm, by his coffee plant in the back. He points out Quedra-pedra, “Good for urinary tract infections.” Pushing aside the coffee bush, he swiftly walks to the Quiou plant, “And this here, good for high blood pressure.” Continuing on, he quickly points out countless plants lost under the lush growth of his garden. I struggle to note each plant with their correct medicinal use as he zips through his garden, pointing out plants hidden beneath the bushes of beans and stalks of corn. He turns to me suddenly, “How can I go to the doctor when God gave us all these plants? I don’t need to. I have everything here.” Looking into his sun worn face, I see a man with years of experience and accumulated knowledge. He weaves in and out of the immense tropical plants. Each plant that he identifies for me, he touches, rubbing the leaf between his fingers. “But, the power of plants does not work if people do not believe.” When we finally reach the back fence of his garden, I thank him, explaining that I had no idea how many plants could be used to heal sicknesses, from the common cold to arthritis and paralysis. The sky has now become dark with the inescapable late afternoon rain. As I turn to go with a mango in each hand, a gift from his wife, I know it will be a wet walk home. I hear my name. “Wait, wait, have you already seen Fedegozo? It is good for antiinflammation.” I often visited Foringo to learn of medicinal plant uses in the month that I spent living in the Nova Suiça settlement, a rural farming community 90 minutes outside of Salvador, Brazil. While studying the Brazilian public health system, Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), for the previous three months in Salvador, professors, doctors and Ministry of Health officials constantly reminded me that SUS brings primary healthcare to isolated and historically forgotten populations. To assess the accessibility of SUS health programs for remote populations, I lived in the Nova Suiça settlement, a part of the larger social movement, the Movimento Sem Terra (MST), or the Landless Workers Movement. There, I studied the MST’s use of medicinal plants in conjunction with the SUS community health programs found at the nearby health clinic. Throughout my stay, I lived with Rosa, a member of the MST in her home on the Nova Suiça settlement. As both a member of the MST and a community health agent for the SUS health clinic, Rosa served as an ideal guide, allowing me to shadow her visits to the SUS health clinic and the settlers’ homes. By interviewing

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

settlers and health professionals, administering MST community surveys, and conducting fieldwork on the use of medicinal plants, I gained a more complete understanding of both the SUS public health programs and traditional MST medicine.

2. Background on Movimento de Trabaledores Sem Terra (MST) and Expansion in the Northeast of Brazil The darkness of the red brick house and the coolness of the simple cement floor are refreshing as I come in from the heat of the afternoon sun. She welcomes me warmly, offering me a chair and sugary coffee. The noise of chirping birds mingles with her grandchildren’s playful yells from outside. Sitting in a worn wooden chair, she says, “Now I want peace. I was a militant. I went to our marches, I fought for my land.” As one of the original Campenheiros to come to Nova Suiça from Terra Nova, a provincial city south of Salvador, Rita remembers the days of black tarp tents during the occupation. In 1995, MST settlers and new members came to an unused area of an old fazenda, or plantation, laying claim to the land. After attending an MST meeting in her own town that explained the movement and beliefs, Rita packed all that she owned, leaving behind a meager plot of land to become a part of something bigger. Without access to land or loans, rural farmers like Rita have lived a difficult life, as their small fields of manioc remain at the mercy of of cruel weather and they have seen flight to the cities lead to increased poverty. Finding few other options, Rita joined MST. For the next three years, the seventy-three families that first laid claim to land constituting the Nova Suiça MST settlement struggled against horrible rains, extreme droughts and food and water shortages. Yet, they were determined to finally reclaim the land that they felt was unfairly taken away. In 1998, the Brazilian government’s Instituto Nacional e Colonizacao e Reforma Agraria (INCRA), formally recognized the claim in Nova Suiça, granting the seventy-three families twenty-five acres each. The settlement received funds from the government for the construction of seventy-three concrete brick houses situated in a large circle around communal land, a school and a health post. Like Rita, each settler uses the land however he or she desires. The most popular crops are corn, beans, and manioc, which is then made into flour at the Casa de Farina, also located on the settlement. According to Rita, life on the settlement is what she has always wanted. She finally has no obligation to anyone, she does not worry about how she will feed her children, and she has peace of mind. According to Carneiro,“49 thousand landowners, representing only 1 percent of all landowners in Brazil, own 45 percent of all agricultural land in Brazil” (Carneiro, 2007). From centuries of discrimination came the outpouring of frustration in the early 1980’s through the form a new movement in the South of Brazil, where pre-existing peasant activism was strong. Unlike past land redistribution movements, the MST settlers saw themselves as a new type of exploited worker, one that lost land through the industrialization of agriculture and neo-liberal economic policies. Now, one of the most successful agrarian reform movements, the MST currently has 1.14 million members and 2,000 agricultural settlements.

3. Background on the Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS) According to Gesler, “Health is, to a large extent, constructed by the health care systems prevailing at any particular place and time” (Gesler, 1991). In Brazil,

178

Consilience

health is described in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution as “the right of all persons and the duty of the State,” which is why health “is guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and at universal and equal access to all actions and services for the promotion, protection and recovery of health.” Described as state and society synergy, the subsequently created national health program, Sistema Único de Saúde (SUS), provides any person in Brazil free medical attention and treatment from the most minor treatment to the most complicated operation. Despite the two grounding principles of SUS, universality and equity, health care delivery and access still remain divided along economic lines. Juxtaposed against the rural highway, The Unidade de Saúde da Família Walter de Figuerêdo strikes a stark contrast. Clean, white and gated, it looks out of place in the middle of outstretching green fields. Constructed only two years ago as part of the fifteen-year-old Programma Saúde da Família (PSF), the family health clinic is equipped with a team consisting of one doctor, two nurses, one dentist and twenty community health agents. In the Brazilian health system, the PSF is a relatively new development in community health. Following reforms initiated by the 1988 Constitution and subsequent additions to the SUS, the ideology behind healthcare was explicitly restructured. To combat top down inefficiencies and the inability of large urban hospitals to reach isolated populations, the PSF provides primary care to remote communities while recognizing local culture and beliefs that can be overseen in crowded hospitals. Before PSF, settlers of Nova Suiça had to travel the thirty minutes by public bus to Santo Amaro, the nearest municipality. The PSF has grown tremendously since 1994, becoming one of the world’s largest primary health care systems, serving more than 85 million people. Intending to bring medical access to places previously disregarded with the PSF model, Doctor Arinaldo José Monteiro of the Unidade de Saúde da Família Walter de Figuerêdo, notes that there is still much work to be done. According to the doctor, political corruption in Brazil still continues to strip health infrastructure, and SUS fails to overcome historic disparities in wealth and status that continue to plague Brazil. Despite the shortcomings of the PSF clinic, Dr. Monteiro is adamant that the changing nature of diseases that he encounters at the PSF health clinic indicates that Brazil’s health experience is in transition. He encounters fewer tropical diseases, traditionally found in the countryside of the harsh Northeast environment, and more chronic diseases common in aging populations. He states that the benefits of PSF are found in its attention to ninety five percent of all sicknesses, providing health on three levels: promotion, prevention and treatment. The program is especially effective in rural areas because it provides health to residents rather than forcing a trip to the hospitals of large urban cities, Dr, Monteiro states.

4. Walking with Rosa: Community Health Door by Door We enter João’s home and the brick of his walls and cement floor are refreshingly cool after spending the day in the afternoon sun. Rosa and I have spent the day administering blood pressure checkups as part of her monthly checkups for the settlement through the PSF program of SUS. João gives each of us a stool to sit on and offers coffee. Having lived in the same settlement as João for the past ten years now, Rosa asks him how his family is doing. João discusses how life has been hard

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

because there has been little rain, causing his family to worry about the prospect of an unsuccessful crop this year. With a livelihood so dependent on a dry landscape and unforgiving weather, João’s worries are similar to many of the families who live on the settlement. The settlers work hard to grow enough manioc or corn to sell in the market in Santo Amaro. She takes his blood pressure, asks him if he is taking Captopril, the drug of choice for high blood pressure, and how he has been feeling. João responds in a long sigh as he reaches for all the pills that he has been given by Doctor Monteiro at the PSF clinic. He empties the multicolored pills into his hand and tries to remember when he takes each one, morning or night, after dinner or before, once a day or twice. With a clipboard and blood pressure monitor, we continue the walk from home to home to speak with settlers who have high blood pressure. This checkup shows how the PSF program attempts to bring health care to remote areas or populations that may be unable to visit the PSF clinic. Occurring monthly, the visits are intended to reach aged populations, track those with high blood pressure, provide prenatal care and administer vaccines. During these visits, Rosa liaises between the PSF health post and the families. Walking back to her home after a long day of health door-to-door visits, Rosa and I often discussed the problems encountered throughout the day. We were often invited into the homes of settlers, and offered coffee or water. Discussions of health were usually short, as the conversation mainly covered news, weather and neighborhood gossip. Many times, settlers were unaware of the health care options available at the clinic, or unwilling to go the clinic for a follow-up procedure. Rosa explained that many settlers feel uncomfortable and judged in the presence of the doctor, especially when treated for the most common diseases on the settlement, hypertension and high cholesterol. In the heat of the afternoon sun, I find Ovo sweeping her front walk. After giving me a tour of her garden, she invites me into her home for tea. According to Ovo, the heavy afternoon sun is an indication that it is time for an afternoon tea, believed to combat high blood pressure. She creates an infusion of Chu Chu leaves and hot water and sips delicately in the cool of her home. We continue chatting about the varying strengths of herbal remedies the needed cautions, and the possible cures. She explains that her knowledge of the healing properties of each plant was passed to her from her mother, who in turn learned them from Ovo’s grandmother. She doesn’t believe that the pills Dr. Monteiro gave her are working. She understands that she has high blood pressure, but is not bothered by it as she is still capable of living her life as she did before. Besides, she adds, a life spent consuming pills each day is not her opinion of health. Any symptoms she may experience, such as dizziness or shortness of breath, can all be cured by drinking her own tea, trading allopathic medicine for her family’s own practice of traditional medicine. Rosa explained that Ovo is not alone in her misuse of the Captopril pills provided by the doctor. Settlers may take it for a day or two, but soon they revert back to treatments from medicinal plants that lower blood pressure (Table 1). Although Rosa always advises settlers to follow what the doctor’s prescription, out of the eighteen people on the settlement diagnosed with high blood pressure, only one, José, is currently taking his medicine properly. According to Dr. Monteiro, his first step in treatment is providing information and education. For example, he says that for hypertension and high cholesterol, the only changes that need to be made are in some of the habits of the affected populations, including smoking, alcohol consumption, and diet. Despite his efforts, he explained that no one changes their habits, referring to the rich feiojada, a meal of black beans and meat commonly eaten in the northeast countryside of Brazil with strong cultural links to African, Portuguese and indigenous influences. He

180

Consilience

suggests that his rural patients should realize that their own lifestyle choices are the causes of some ill health, such as hypertension and high blood pressure. While Dr. Monteiro claims that health education programs, such as workshops and outreach on hypertension, are present at the clinic, he had only a few pamphlets listing risk factors of hypertension to express the programs’ offerings. What he did have available was a chart outlining dosages of Captopril, the drug of choice for hypertension. I discussed the Doctor’s opinion that the lack of education and willingness to change lifestyle habits result in the poor health of rural residents who live with Rosa. According to Rosa, many rural families, including MST settlers, lack traditional schooling, but possess a rich knowledge of health that the doctor fails to understand. Rosa was quick to note that a diet of cachaça, beans and manioc flour is not a new development, but results from century old traditions of the Northeast. While diet is not the first example of misunderstandings between doctor and patient, I found that these misinterpretations had strong impacts with the rural settlers. Such rural traditions have been ingrained in a community long before the PSF clinic ever arrived outside the settlement, and they continue to serve as important manifestations of identity.

5. Discussion When I asked settlers to describe a common illness and how they would treat it, the clinic was never mentioned as a primary option for care. From my interviews, only people who needed vaccines, re-filled prescriptions or pre-natal exams went to the health clinic. This was not due to maltreatment, as only two people mentioned clear examples of being treated poorly at the clinic. Despite acknowledgement of the usefulness of the biomedical practices found at the health clinic, many settlers did not believe their health would be affected negatively or positively if they chose to use the health clinic. When asked why they did not use the PSF clinic, thirty-five households reported that the doctor lacked understanding. Many believed it was unnecessary to visit a medical clinic where their own knowledge regarding health and illness, such as the use of medicinal plants, was not appreciated. One settler mentioned that he did not visit the doctor because the doctor thought he was ignorant. To most settlers, the doctor represented the elite and city life, making him incapable of understanding life in the Brazilian countryside. Health, whether actual or perceived, is actively defined as better because of fewer environmental and social stressors. According to other thirty-four heads of households, life on the settlement is healthier without pollution, violence, and stress; furthermore, all food is naturally grown, without chemicals or pesticides, and all residents enjoyed leisure time. Rather than the absence of disease, the settlers attributed their health to the freedoms provided by their life on the settlement. An influx to Nova Suiça of previously urban residents suggests a growing upheaval in the surrounding cities. As economic policies further concentrated the geography of wealth, remaining unbalanced but influential to cut across local boundaries, a global agricultural modernization that severely disrupted the social structure and existence of the traditional family agriculturalist. The population of Nova Suiça created a different

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

definition of health than what could be found at the PSF clinic. The mental freedom gained from controlling the place in which they live brings awareness of other environmental and built factors that previously impacted a negative health experience in the city. After historically being socially excluded, settlers define health by improved social and mental well-being, instead of actual illnesses experienced.

Appendix Table 1. Commonly Mentioned Medicinal Plants - Uses at MST and Known Uses Plant (scientific name)

Use from Interviews

Observed Use Known Uses from Studies

Abacate (Persea americana) -cited once

Leaf- urinary tract infections (used with folha de Cana and cabelo de milho); rheumistism (used with inhame do brejo)

Tintura- grated avacodo heart and rubbed on the area

Alcerim (Lippia sidoides C.) -cited twice

Leaf- anti-inflamatory and diuretic, in high doses is toxic and abortive

Anti-inflamatory and anti-spasmodic Calmant and heart tonic

Alfavaca(Ocimums gratissimum L.) -cited five

Leaf- anti inflamatory and gastric Xarope for gripe ulcers -studies are being done on HIV drugs

Used for digestion and coughing

Alho (Hippeastrum psittacinum) -cited twice

Leaf/Clove/oil- used for rheumatism, ashtma and respiratory problems, stops the formation of gases and stomach ulcers

Anti-vermin, natural diabetes. bug replent,antithroat pains-gargling. bactarial • reduz o colesterol e diminui a formação de placas.

Aroeira (Myracrodruon urundeuva -cited three

Used to make soap, antimicrobial

Soap

Ass (Verbesina macrophylla) -cited once

Leaf- lower fevers

Berinjela (Solanum melongena Fruit- juice for high cholesterol L) -cited once

Diuretic, used for muscle pains, including arthritis. Must use dry leavesbecause fresh ones can cause taquicardia

Anti-infection, diuretic, hypertension Inflammations of ovaries and ulcers.

182 Calendula (Calendula officinalis) -cited once

Consilience Leaf- made into a pomade topic use of cuts, bruises, contusions, acne, mosquito bites

Figure 1. Map of Bahia, Brazil

http://www.v-brazil.com/tourism/bahia/map-bahia.html

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

Figure 2. Photo of community health visit.

Figure 3. Photo of community garden with medicinal plants

184 Figure 4. Photo of Rosaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s home in the Nova SuiĂ§a settlement.

Figure 5. Photo of Rosa conducting monthly checkups.

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

Bibliography Agrovila, V. Acocap. Itaberá. Airhihenbuwa, C. (1995). Health and Culture: Beyond the Western Paradigm. London: Sage Publications. Almeida, C, et al. (200). Health Sector Reform in Brazil: A Case Study of Inequity. International Journal of Health Services, 30.1, 129-62. Amaral, A. C., Rodrigues, A. G., Ribeiro, J. E., Girão dos Santos, M., & Netto Jr., N. L. (2006). A Fitoterapia No Sus E O Programa De Pesquisas De Plantas Medicinais Da Central De Medicamentos. Ed. Departamento de Assistência Farmacêutica. 1 ed. Brasilia: MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, of Série B. Textos Básicos de Saúde Amaral, A. C., Rodrigues, A. G., Ribeiro, J. E., Girão dos Santos, M., & Netto Jr., N. L. (2006). A Fitoterapia No Sus E O Programa De Pesquisas De Plantas Medicinais Da Central De Medicamentos. Ed. Departamento de Assistência Farmacêutica e Insumos Estratégicos. Brasília. Aparecida de Rezende, H., & Cocco, M. I. (2002). A Utlizacao De Fitoterapia No Cotidiano De Uma Populacao Rural. Revista Esc. Enferm, 36.3, 282-88. Atkinson, S, et al. (2005). Prevention and Promotion in Decentralized Rural Health Systems: A Comparative Study from Northeast Brazil. Health Policy and Planning 20.2, 69. Baer, H. (2004). Toward an Integrative Medicine. Oxford: AltaMira Press. Baer, H., Singer, M., & Susser, I. (2003). Medical Anthropology and the World System. Second ed. Westport: Praeger Publishers. Baer, W. (1964). Regional Inequality and Economic Growth in Brazil. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 12.3, 268-85. Bertoldi, A.D., et al. (2009). Medicine Access and Utilization in a Population Covered by Primary Health Care in Brazil. Health policy, 89.3, 295-302. Biehl, Joao. (2009). The Brazilian Response to Aids and the Pharmaceuticialization of Global Health. Anthropology and Public Health- Bridging Differences in Culture and Society. Ed. Marcia C. Inhorn Robert A. Hahn. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 480-511. Bodeker, G. & Kronenberg, F. (2002). A Public Health Agenda for Traditional, Complementary, and Alternative Medicine. American Journal of Public Health 92.10, 1582.

186

Consilience

Branford, S., & Rocha, J. (2002). Cutting the Wire: The Story of the Landless Movement in Brazil. London: Latin American Bureau. Calixto, J. B. (2000). Efficacy, Safety, Quality Control, Marketing and Regulatory Guidelines for Herbal Medicines (Phytotherapeutic Agents). Brazilian Journal of Medical and Biological Research, 33, 179-89. Carneiro, F. F. (2007). A Saúde No Campo: Das Políticas Oficiais À Experiência Do Mst E De Famílias De “Bóias Frias” Em Unaí, Minas Gerais. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Escola de Veterinária. Carter, M. (2009). A Luta Na Terra: Fonte De Crescimento, Inovacao, E Defsafio Constante Ao Mst. Combatendo a Desigualdade Social: O Mst E a Reforma Agraria No Brasil. Ed. UNESP. Sao Paulo. Carter, M. (2009). Social Inequality, Democracy, & Agrarian Reform in Brazil. Combatendo a Desigualdade Social: O Mst E a Reforma Agraria No Brasil. Ed. UNESP. Sao Paulo. Carter, M. (2010). The Landless Rural Workers Movement and Democracy in Brazil. Latin American Research Review. Casali, W.V. Personal Interview. Chine. Personal Interview. Constitution of Brazil. http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html. Accessed March 12, 2010. Cultivando Saúde Plantas Medicinais. (2008). Ed. ACOCAP. Sāo Paūlo: Coletivos de Mulheres e Saúde dos Assentamentos. Emperaire, L. & Peroni, N. (2007). Traditional Management of Agrobiodiversity in Brazil: A Case Study of Manioc. Human Ecology, 35.6, 761-68. Foringo. Personal Interview. Fundação Estatal Saúde Da Fámilia: Proposta Para Debate. (2007). Salvador: O Ministiro de Saúde. Gastaldo, D. (1997). "Is Health Education Good for You? Rethinking Health Education through the Concept of Bio-Power." Foucault, Health and Medicine. Ed. Alan Petersen Robin Bunton. London: Routledge,113-33. Gerard, B., Kroneberg, F., & Burford, G. (2007). Policy and Public Health Perspectives on Traditional Complementary and Alternative Medicine: An Overview. Traditional Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Ed. Gemma Burford Gerard Bodeker. Oxford: Imperial College Press, 9-38.

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

Gesler, W. M. (1991). The Cultural Geography of Health Care. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gold, J. (1985). Cartesian Dualism and the Current Crisis in Medicine--a Plea for a Philosophical Approach: Discussion Paper. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 78.8, 663. Gulliford, M., Figueroa-Munoz, J, & Morgan, M. (2003). Introduction: Meaning of 'Access' in Health Care. Access to Health Care. Ed. Myfanwy Morgan Martin Gulliford. London: Routledge, 1-12. Hayes, K. E. (2007). Black Magic and the Academy: Macumba and Afro-Brazilian OrthodoxiesĂŽ. History of Religions, 46.4, 283-315. Heel, R. C., et al. (1980). Captopril: A Preliminary Review of Its Pharmacological Properties and Therapeutic Efficacy. Drugs ,20.6, 409. Juliana de Oliveira, C. & Leite de Araujo, T. (2007). Plantas Medicinais: Usos E Crencas De Idosos Portadores De Hipertensao Arterial. Revista Eletronica de Enfermagem, 09.1, 93-105. Kearns, R. A., Gesler, W. M. (1998). Putting Health into Place Landscape, Identity, & Wellbeing. Syracuse University Press. Kirsch, M. (2006). Inclusion and Exclusion in the Global Arena. New York Routledge. Kom, J. Y. (2000). Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor. Monroe: Common Courage Press. La Forgia, G. M. & Couttolenc, B. F. (2008). Hospital Performance in Brazil- the Search for Excellence. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Leibing, A. (2007). Brazil- Much More Than Medical Anthropology: The Healthy Body and Brazilian Identity. Medical Anthropology- Regional Perspectives and Shared Concerns. Ed. Serge Genest Francine Saillant. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 58-70. Luna, E. (2008). Introduction to the Brazilian National Public Health System . 2008. Retrieved March 13, 2010. http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/files/Lecture_1_SUS_intro_jan2008.ppt. Lupton, D. (1994). Medicine as Culture- Illness, Disease and the Body in Western Societies. London: Sage Publications. Luzia. Personal Interview. Macinko, J., et al. (2007). Going to Scale with Community-Based Primary Care: An Analysis of the Family Health Program and Infant Mortality in Brazil, 1999Ăą2004. Social Science & Medicine, 65.10, 2070-80.

188

Consilience

Maria. Personal Interview. Maria de Fátima, A., França de Freitas, P., & Barbosa-Filho, J. M. (January/March, 2007). Synopsis of the Plants Known as Medicinal and Poisonousin Northeast of Brazil. Brazilian Journal of Pharmacognosy, 17(1), 114-40. Martinez, Francisco. Personal Interview. Massey, D. (1994). Double Articulation a Place in the World. Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question. Ed. Angelika Bammer. Bloomington Indiana University Press. McLaren, P. (1999). Research News and Comment: A Pedagogy of Possibility: Reflecting Upon Paulo Freire's Politics of Education: In Memory of Paulo Freire. Educational Researcher, 28.2, 49. Mitchell, K. (2001). Transnationalism, Neo-Liberalism, and the Rise of the Shadow State. Economy and Society, 30.2, 165-89. Navarro, V. (2002). The Political Economy of Social Inequalities. Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing Comapny, Inc. Ngokwey, N. (1988). Pluralistic Etiological Systems in Their Social Context: A Brazilian Case Study. Social Science Medicine, 26.8, 793-802. Oliven, R. G. Of Culture in Brazil. Latin American Perspectives. Ovo. Personal Interview. Petras, J. (1998). The Political and Social Basis of Regional Variation in Land Occupations in Brazil. Journal of Peasant Studies, 25.4, 124-33. Quitéria. Personal Interview. Rita. Personal Interview. RodrÌguez, E. B. (2006). The Role of the State in Land Reform Processes: The Case of Brazil. HAOL, 10, 47-57. Alves, R., & Rosa, L. (2007). Zootherapy Goes to Town: The Use of Animal-Based Remedies in Urban Areas of Ne and N Brazil. Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 113, 541-55. Sartori, M. S. (2002). Saude, Doenca, E Representacao: Um Estudo Com Mulheres Rurais. Santa Cruz do Sol: Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sol. Saude Da Familia . (2009). Departamento de Atencao Basica. Retrieved February 8th, 2010. http://dtr2004.saude.gov.br/dab/atencaobasica.php.

Consilience

Stanicoff: Community Health

SaĂşde PĂşblica (2009). (March 6th, 2010). Retrieved March 12th, 2010. http://www.mst.org.br/node/7713. Scheper-Hughes, N. (1992). Death without Weeping- the Violence of Everday Life in Brazil. Berkley: University of California Press. Stein, A. T., & Harzheim, E. (2006). Effectiveness of Primary Health Care Evaluated by a Longitudinal Ecological Approach. British Medical Journal, 60.1, 3. Thomas, V. (2006). From inside Brazil Development in a Land of Contrasts. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. To, A. (2003). Health for All Beyond 2000: The Demise of the Alma-Ata Declaration and Primary Health Care in Developing Countries. The Medical Journal of Australia, 178.1, 17-20. Weston, A. (1992). On the Body in Medical Self-Care and Holistic Medicine. The Body in Medical Thought and Practice. Ed. Drew Leder. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 69-84. Wolford, W. (2003). Families, Fields, and Fighting for Land: The Spatial Dynamics of Contention in Rural Brazil. Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 8.2, 15772. Wolford, W. (2004). This Land Is Ours Now: Spatial Imaginaries and the Struggle for Land in Brazil. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94.2, 40924.

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 190-200

The Art of Development Images Promoting Dialogue and Alternatives to Poverty and Violence in Local Communities of Colombia Natali Rojas Development and International Cooperation-Faculty of Social Sciences University of Jyvaskyla, Finland natalirojas07@gmail.com

Abstract Sueños Films Colombia is a grassroots organization based in Ciudad Bolivar, southern Bogotá-Colombia. For over ten years, this community-based project has offered diverse art activities including audiovisual training, documentary production workshops, forums on cinema and an international film festival. This innovative community organization promotes the active participation of local people, enabling them to use the arts to express themselves, to interact with others and to find collective solutions for their community. ‘The Art of Development’ collects material from the time that I have spent in Ciudad Bolivar and other marginalized barrios/neighborhoods of Bogotá and Manizales. Since May 2010, I have been assisting several projects that Sueños Films Colombia has organized, including filmmaking seminars and workshops, while producing ethnographic material for my Masters thesis. Through the following images, I hope to share the power of the arts in promoting alternatives to poverty and violence, along with, even more importantly, the strength of the local Colombian people. I have been inspired by children taking their first photos, elderly learning video editing from their grandsons or neighbors, and the energy moving groups of people from different generations to develop projects collectively. Author’s Note Natali Rojas is a Colombian who is completing a Masters in Development and International Cooperation at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. She has a background in Sociology and Art History, and her areas of research include community development, art and media studies, communication and culture. She has practice using video, documentary films and photography together with communities to document her work. She aims to contribute to the recognition of the people she works with through her pictures, videos and articles.

Keywords: community, arts, films, video, cinema, grassroots, development, Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá, Colombia.

Consilience

Natali Rojas: the art of development

1. Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá-Colombia

Ciudad Bolívar is located in the south of Bogotá. Although this locality is mostly rural, its urban area concentrates the poorest population (between 800,000 and 2 million estimated habitants) of the Colombian capital city. Ciudad Bolivar is a young and diverse community of immigrants and displaced people who come from all over the country. Poor urban infrastructure, informal and illegal settlements, stigmatization, and lack of communal spaces are problems Ciudad Bolívar has faced for years.

192

Consilience

2. Ciudad Bolivar’s audiovisual revolution

Sueños Films Colombia is a grassroots organization that has led an audiovisual ‘revolution’ in Ciudad Bolivar, Bogotá for over ten years. Through different art activities, including community audiovisual schools, video clubs, and its international community video and film festival Ojo al Sancocho, the organization promotes dialogue and alternatives to conflict and violence. The participants form creative groups that are generally diverse both in terms of backgrounds and ages.

Consilience

Natali Rojas: the art of development

In Ciudad Bolivar and other vulnerable communities like Usme or Soacha (located in southern Bogotá as well), families, children often spend a long time alone due to the long working days of their parents who generally work in construction, cleaning and security. In 2010, Sueños Films Colombia started a program in partnership with community culture houses of different barrios /neighborhoods of Ciudad Bolivar to offer children free audiovisual education before and after their school times. Similar night activities began this year and are becoming popular among adults and the elderly. Unfortunately, engagement to the activities has not been consistent. Job changes, relatives’ illnesses, residential movements and familial problems all result in students missing Sueños Films Colombia’s education programs.

194

Consilience

3. Ciudad Bolivarâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s EkoAudiovisual School

Through support fromby international cooperation and development agencies such as IOM and War Child Holland, Escuela EkoAudiovisual in Ciudad Bolivar was born in 2005. The project offers poor children education via films and encourages them to express themselves and tell their own stories. For five years now, the communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s children, along with their families and neighbors, have collaborated together in documenting community problems such as the poor street quality, the all-too familiar violence and high rates of drug consumption. Sebastian lives in Bella Vista-Ciudad Bolivar and has been attending the audiovisual school for just couple of months. In this video he shows what he likes doing in his free time and invite others children to join his school, his favorite activity: http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/IMzbpsqPAfg

Consilience

Natali Rojas: the art of development

3. International community video and film festival

Ojo al Sancocho is the name of the international community film and video festival that SueĂąos Films Colombia has been organizing in Ciudad Bolivar since 2008. Every year, the festival welcomes more than 5,000 participants who visit from different parts of BogotĂĄ, Colombia and the world. During one week, the festival screens audiovisual productions and runs diverse workshops that are open and free for anyone interested. Video, film, photography, performance and other visual arts are used to promote community engagement and dialogue. Three months before the 2010 festival, the children who are part of the EkoAudiovisual School helped design the festivalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s poster. They were asked to draw their own ideas about what meaning the festival has for them. Their drawings were later combined into one piece.

196

Consilience

Ojo al Sancocho is the only film and video festival in Bogotรก promoting activities with the people of the barrios/neighborhoods. With knowledge about and experience in making videos, children and young people use the Festival week to produce more videos that are often screened before the end of the festival and published later on the web. This year, the students from Semillas Creativas (a public library in one of the most dangerous barrios of Ciudad Bolivar, Juan Pablo II) and a visiting southern Colombia audiovisual children school produced a short video clip together. The group of youth used stop motion techniques to tell their own story through rap lyrics.

Consilience

Natali Rojas: the art of development

4. Local stories documented via Film

In 2010, Sue単os Films Colombia started a video project in Socaha, located nearby Ciudad Bolivar Legalizando un sue単o (making a dream legal) (http://www.vimeo.com/17083711) is the result of collective effort of children and the women who live Altos de la Florida, one of the poorest neighborhoods of Soacha. Rubi. In the film, women document their life during the years that they have been living in this illegal settlement, explaining how they survive and raise their children despite the social and economical difficulties. In the video, they bring up issues like the lack of water access, high erosion levels and pollution.

198

Consilience

Ojo al Sancocho participates in other art and film festivals around Colombia and the world. The official selection of its films is usually shown in other barrios/neighborhoods similar to Ciudad Bolivar. Last November, Ojo al Sancoho participated in Manizalesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s short film festival, running a community film workshop at barrio El Nevado. After five days of intensive training, fifteen youth finished a nine minute documentary that they called Casa de SueĂąos e Ilusiones (House of Dreams and Hope). In the video, they refer to the culture house of barrio El Nevado where they meet everyday for diverse cultural activities including circus activities, traditional music and dances. The film has been widely screen in alternative festivals and recently won an award in Ojo al Cine Festival.

Consilience

Natali Rojas: the art of development

Alaska is a neighborhood located in Usme, southern BogotĂĄ. As in many barrios/neighborhoods of Ciudad Bolivar, Alaska has poor urban infrastructure. There is no potable water and the little community spaces are mostly abandoned. As a member of SueĂąos Films Colombia, I documented an architectural intervention that a group of national and international non-profits made (http://vimeo.com/17564310). With the help of community members, the organizations renewed the only existing park in Alaska. During the shooting process children spontaneously used my camera to interview their friends. They were really happy to see themselves on the screen during the video premiere after the park was completed.

200

Consilience

List of videos and links: La historia de Sebastian/ Sebastian story: http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion#p/u/1/IMzbpsqPAfg Legalizando un sue単o/making legal a dream http://www.vimeo.com/17083711 Alaska, parque comunal/ Alaska community park http://www.vimeo.com/17564310

Websites of interest: http://ecoaudiovisual.blogspot.com/ http://www.youtube.com/user/ekomunicacion http://festivalojoalsancocho.wordpress.com/english/ http://www.youtube.com/user/ojoalsancocho http://www.urbanology.org/Bogota/ http://www.ciudadbolivar.gov.co

Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (2011), Pp. 201-216

The winding ways of development: A historical journey of a road in the Putumayo region of Colombia Simón Uribe Martínez Department of Geography and Environment The London School of Economics and Political Science S.Uribe1@lse.ac.uk Abstract Roads are by nature a contested subject. Although they represent vital infrastructure to enable the flow of people, goods and ideas, their potential detrimental effects for humans and the environment have been a constant source of debate and criticism. This is particularly true for natural resource-rich regions such as the Amazon, where the development of roads has been directly associated with rampant deforestation and resource extraction, uncontrolled colonization and dispossession of indigenous lands. Yet the impact of roads goes far beyond their direct social and environmental costs and benefits. In many places of the world, roads have a strong evocative power, as they represent spaces that materially and symbolically embody ideas such as „modernity,‟ „progress,‟ „backwardness‟ and „development.‟ Combining multi-sited ethnography and historical analysis, this photo essay attempts to document the past, present, and likely future of a road in Putumayo, a region of southwest Colombia that has been traditionally considered a marginal frontier, and which has also become internationally known for the production of cocaine and the violence that has come with it. The road, as I will try to show, invites reflection about the complexities inherent to the different meanings and realities of development. Author’s Note This paper is part of an ongoing doctoral research project supported by the Wenner-Gren Foundation PhD fieldwork grants, the LSE PhD Scholarship and the University of London Central Research Fund. The author would like to thank Gustavo Torres in Putumayo and the Capuchin Provincial Archive in Catalonia, for allowing me to digitally print some of the photographs included in the essay. The author would also like to thank María Elisa Balén, Nicolás Cárdenas, Catalina Holguín and Thomas Martois for their useful comments and suggestions.

Keywords: roads, development, Putumayo.

202

Consilience

1. First Capuchin friars established in Putumayo, teaching the gospel to indigenous children. Santiago, 1903. Capuchin Provincial Archive of Catalonia (CPAC) The Capuchin missionaries arrived to Putumayo in 1899, invited by the Colombian government to „civilize‟ the indigenous tribes scattered across the region. Since the state was practically absent and did not have the financial means nor the interest to expand its territorial control to a region of the country deemed remote and inhospitable, Capuchins were given free rein to impose „sovereignty‟ on the land and its „savage‟ inhabitants. Thus, along with spiritual jurisdiction over the whole territory, they were given civil, judiciary and police powers over the indigenous peoples, who at the time did not qualify as citizens since most of them, the government judged, had not yet been „reduced to civilized life.‟

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

2. Sibundoy Valley, c.1910 (CPAC) The missionaries embraced the assignment with religious fervor and military severity. They established the mission‟s headquarters in the valley of Sibundoy, a plateau located 2000 meters above the sea level in the heart of the Andes, inhabited by the Kamsá and Ingano indians. Soon, however, they found what they thought would be the major obstacle to achieve their long-term goal. Father Montclar, mission chief and a very enthusiastic friar, wrote a letter to the Ministry of Government in 1909 summarizing the problem: “Those territories,” wrote the friar in reference to the Putumayo lowlands, “are destined to be one of the richest and most peopled places of Colombia, if only the government would pay some attention. These lands are completely isolated from the republic, and only some bold caucheros have penetrated this rich new world, a world like the one Columbus dreamed about, by breaching abysses and crossing marshes, climbing rocks and defying wild rivers.”1 Father Montclar thus envisioned what he would later declare as the major accomplishment of the mission in the country: the construction of a road linking the Andes mountains with the Amazon forests.

204

Consilience

3. The Capuchins supervising the Indians and peasants working on the road, 1909-1930 (CPAC) Fearing that the Peruvians, engaged in the rubber trade and excited by the friarsâ&#x20AC;&#x; accounts of inconmesurable riches, would invade the territory, the central government provided the mission with the financial means required for the titanic enterprise. The mission devoted all its energy to the bridge-building project. Employing more than 1,500 Indian and peasant workers, the road advanced slowly but relentlessly through the abrupt topography of the cordillera. It took nearly three years to complete the 50 km strech descending the eastern slopes of the Andes, which separated the Sibundoy valley from the vast lowlands of Putumayo.

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

4. Inauguration of the Pasto-Mocoa road. March 10, 1912 (CPAC). Father Monctlar (on horse, second left) and members of a national government commission welcomed by the indigenous music band of San Andrés (Sibundoy Valley) Altough it took another 20 years to cut through the damp terrain of the plains to finally reach the port city of Puerto Asis on the Putumayo river, the completion of the first section of the road in 1912 was received with numerous celebrations and adulations for the Capuchin Mission. The government published a booklet for the inauguration filled with flamboyant phrases and manifestos such as this one, written by the General Inspector of the road, which emphatically reads: “Wounded by the strokes of relentless athletes, the unsurmountable wall, which like a sentinel placed by mighty nature blocked the way to the most beautiful and rich part of our territory as if it wanted to guard a potentate anxious to give happiness to all men and generously share its infinite bounty, was finally defeated” (Informe, 1912, p. 6).

206

Consilience

5. Alluvial gold mining, n.d. (top left, GT); colono from Puerto Asis with Jaguar, 1930 (right, CPAC); Capuchin cattle farm, Sibundoy, 1912 (bottom left, CPAC) The Indians were to pay a big toll. As part of their compulsory duties to the Church they were frequently forced to work on the road without remuneration. The road also attracted thousands of new settlers in search of those „empty‟ and „rich‟ lands. Since the Capuchins thought the best way to Christianize and „civilize‟ the Indians was to expose them to white and mestizo settlers, they encouraged the establishment of the newcomers by dispossessing the natives of their ancestral lands. The most radical experiment was carried out in Sibundoy: most of the valley was officially declared vacant in 1911, and its land assigned to the mission‟s sustenance farms and the founding of mestizo towns. The drastic demographic change during the first three decades of the past century epitomizes the dramatic social and cultural conflict in the valley: from 1906 to 1933, the indigenous population of Putumayo decreased from 32,600 to 13,997, while the number of settlers grew in the same period from 2,200 to 21,587 (Bonilla, 1972, p. 186).

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

6. Embarkation of troops in Puerto Asis, 1932 (CPAC); first trucks arriving in Putumayo, c.1955 (GT) Pressed by the growing tensions with Peru in the late 1920s and foreseeing a potential armed confrontation, the Colombian government decided to widen the Capuchin road to allow the transport of heavy artillery and military vehicles. It took almost 30 years to complete the 220 km dirt road connecting the Andean city of Pasto with Puerto Asis. The road—classified as a „national defense road‟—not only allowed the migration of thousands of poor settlers fleeing the political violence that had taken over most of the country‟s rural areas since early 1940; more importantly, it directed the way colonization and settlement unfolded across the whole region.

208

Consilience

7. Town born along the road. Villa Garzón, 1952 (GT), and 2010 (author) Rolf Wesche (1974), a German geographer who came to Putumayo in the early 1960s to research colonial development in the region, noted that at least 90 percent of the population lived at a maximum distance of one km off the road or main rivers. Those traffic arteries were not only synonymous with access to markets and mobility but were “a place of excursion, the route through which news travelled, and the primary means of social contact” (p.2). A distance of just one hundred meters off the road or river, he added, “could represent the difference between taking active part of daily life or total isolation” (p.2). Asking people what issues they considered a major obstacle for the region‟s development, the great majority answered transport problems as the most important.

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

8. Oil pipes and land cleared for cattle pastures and coca crops along the road. August, 2010 (author) The „development‟ and „progress‟ the road promised decades earlier, however, did not materialize. Instead, it assisted a process of chaotic colonization and deforestation, and consolidated the extractive character of the region, which traces back from the rubber boom in the early 1900s, to the discovery of oil in the 1960s, to the explosion of coca growing and cocaine production since the early 1980s.

210

Consilience

9. Truck accident, c.1960 (GT); crosses and commemorative plaques by the side of the road in the sector of Murallas, July 2010 (author) The road, moreover, had an additional issue. The engineer commissioned by the government to enhance the Capuchin road made what many deemed an irrational and catastrophic decision. On the most critical section of the road—the steep descent from the eastern slopes of the cordillera—the engineer avoided the trail that the Capuchins had forged. Instead, he designed a new road following a longer and more abrupt route. Those who travel along this hazardous unpaved road now pay the price for his decision. Eventually, this road came to be infamously known as „El trampolín de la muerte’—the springboard of death—due to the dozens of people who die in car accidents each year. The most tragic event took place in July 1991, when in the sector known as „Murallas‟ (Walls), a huge land slide buried several buses and cars, killing more than a hundred people. Only 50 bodies were recovered.

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

10. The Springboard of death, July, 2010 (author) The springboard of death has caused countless tragedies, many of them echoing nationally, ironically reinforcing the image of Putumayo as a remote and treacherous territory. Its fame has even reached foreign tourists, who through Internet forums and blogs tout the road as a daring experience for those who like to avoid the â&#x20AC;&#x17E;beaten trackâ&#x20AC;&#x; and taste something wild.2 Putumayenses, however, have invested this road with a moral content in which enduring feelings and memories of isolation, marginality, and abandonment from the state converge. From public demonstrations to Facebook groups,3 generations of Putumayenses have fiercely campaigned for the replacement of the road.

212

Consilience

11. National Forest Reserve of the Upper Mocoa River Basin, June 2010 (author) Although for decades the government remained reluctant to listen to the claims of Putumayenses, the construction of an alternate roadâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which, ironically, will follow the same route chosen by the Capuchins one hundred years agoâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;seems to be a certainty. Recently, the government finally signed a loan with the International Development Bank (IDB) to finance the project, promoted as a pioneering model of sustainable development, as it promises to foster economic growth and regional integration without compromising the environment. Yet the passage of the new road through the middle of a National Forest Reservoir has been a point of contention on environmental and social grounds. NGOs such as ILSA4 and Socivil Putumayo5 are sceptical of the assumed benefits and have emphatically highlighted that it could expose a vast area of forest to natural resource extraction, causing more deforestation, poaching and large-scale mining.

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

12. Indigenous communitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; demonstrations. June-July, 2010 (author) Concerns regarding the environmental and social costs of the future road are only one part of the picture. Another issue, which is likely to be more complex and difficult to settle, is current indigenous claims to their ancestral territory. With the imminent construction of the road and the projectâ&#x20AC;&#x;s plan to enlarge the actual National Forest Reservoir as a measure of environmental compensation, the tension between the government and the indigenous communities has risen sharply. In June 2010, about 5,000 KamsĂĄ and Ingano Indians blocked the road into the Sibundoy Valley (top left and right) to protest the measure and assert themselves as the legitimate owners of the road territory. D3ays later, in a more symbolic demonstration, around three hundred walked for two days across the 50 km abrupt trail Father Montclar considered his magnum opus (bottom left).

214

Consilience

13. Peasant settlers growing coffee and staple crops in the vicinity of the future road. August, 2010 (author) The demonstrations and protests of the indigenous communities have not been in vain. They have persuaded the government to start a negotiation process. However, the problem is not confined to the disagreements between the government and indigenous communities. Another relevant, though not as visible, party, is the dozens of mestizo peasant families living within the area that the future road will affect. Although they are aware of the indigenous claims over the territories, the mestizos also consider themselves the landâ&#x20AC;&#x;s legitimate owners. Referring to indigenous rights, a peasant told me recently, â&#x20AC;&#x153;What is the meaning of ancestral anyway? We were born and grew up here. Our grandparents arrived here many decades ago; they came walking through the Capuchin road and settled here to work the land. So this land is ancestral for us, tooâ&#x20AC;? (peasant settler from Putumayo, personal communication, June 20th, 2010).

Consilience

Uribe: winding ways of development

14. The road ahead Will the future road be an opportunity to change a long history of dispossession and environmental destruction to one where development does not clash with nature and the welfare? According the government and the IDB, the road project is designed to be an examplar of sustainable development for the country. But, and regardless of the road‟s assumed benefits, it is clear that the road itself will not be a panacea for the region and its people, especially when these kinds of projects cannot be isolated from broader political and economic dynamics. The biggest challenge will then not be for the government but for the people of Putumayo: they must build a shared view of the region they want and fight for it. The recent indigenous demonstrations and the increasing participation of local NGOs and social movements represent a huge step forward. Still, as has been true literally and metaphorically for decades, the road is long and the obstacles many.

Endnotes 1

Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá. Fondo Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Tomo 1407, folio 194-195. 2 See: Vivalatinamerica (2010, January 28). The best (and most dangerous) way to get to Pasto [blog entry]. Retrieved from

216

Consilience

http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/508/33196/The+Best+%28And+Most+ Dangerous%29+Way+To+Get+To+Pasto?destId=363333 (2010, September 15). Gauchito Gil (2010, March 28). San Agustin and the death road to Pasto, Colombia [blog entry]. Retrieved from http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/967/46035/San+Agustin+and+the+Dea th+Road+to+Pasto,+Colombia?destId=363333 (2010, September 15). 3 See: Por el cierre definitivo de la vía Pasto-Mocoa [Facebook group]. http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=672819922&v=wall&story_fbid=463293 399922#!/group.php?gid=24417331812&ref=ts 4 Latin American Institute for an Alternative Society. Non-profit organization which offers alternative legal services for social organizations and has been involved in the debate regarding the impacts of infrastructure integration megaprojects in South America. For more information visit: http://ilsa.org.co:81/node/141 5 A regional platform of leaders and social movements committed to the promotion of participatory citizenship and the environmental conservation of the Andean and Amazon regions. Socivil has been actively involved in the consultation process for the alternate road. For more information visit: http://socivilputumayo.org/

Bibliography Bonilla, Victor Daniel (1972). Servants of God or masters of men? The story of a Capuchin mission in Amazonia. London: Penguin. Informe sobre la terminación del camino a Mocoa (1912). Pasto: Imprenta del Departamento. Wesche, Rolf (1974). El Desarrollo del poblamiento en el alto valle del río Putumayo. Bogotá: IGAG.

Bibliographic note Photographs listed under the abbreviations CPAC (Capuchin Provincial Archive of Catalonia, Putumayo mission photographic archive) and GT (Gustavo Torres, private collection) are permitted to be digitally printed in this essay.