Defend & Reform: A Case Study in Effective Defense Cuts

AUGUST 2012

A Project of Concerned Veterans for America

One Year Later THE CLOSING OF JOINT FORCES COMMAND

A CASE STUDY IN

Effective Defense Cuts Background Established: October 1999 Disestablished: August 2011 Headquarters: Norfolk, VA 4-star combatant command

Personnel: 6,000 / 3,760 in Norfolk/Suffolk

Assigned Components: Army: Ft. McPherson, GA Marine Corps: Norfolk, VA Navy: U.S. Fleet Forces Command Norfolk, VA Air Force: Air Combat Command Langley, VA

Formerly known as the United States Atlantic Command, the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) was created in 1999 with the mission to develop joint operational concepts through training, education, and experimentation.

JCFOM was commanded by a four-star general and comprised of active and reserve military personnel, civil servants, and contract employees.

JFCOM also had a multinational aspect. The command worked to better align the U.S. military’s capabilities with those of the nation’s allies and other multinational partners. This was primarily done through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which had a long-standing relationship with JFCOM. In an increasingly interconnected world, with unpredictable and asymmetric threats, America’s services—Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard—needed better collaboration in training, technology, intelligence, and operations. JFCOM was established to meet that need. In a typical year, JFCOM coordinated and supported commanders through more than 70 joint training events, involving 46,000 participants. In 2006, JFCOM coordinated the deployment of more than 290,000 personnel in support of combatant commanders and DoD support agencies.1

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Background (continued) But JFCOM was not without its critics. In some ways, JFCOM accomplished its mission; it other ways it did not.

Today the U.S. military is a more efficient fighting force from a joint force perspective, but as Col. Bob Killebrew (ret.) noted in 2010, JFCOM wasn’t without significant missteps:

The disestablishment of JFCOM, headquartered in Virginia, was included in this proposal. This cut was part of a larger cost-cutting effort by Secretary Gates, who looked for savings in all aspects of the DoD in order to stave off looming, and deeper, defense cuts. By taking this action, Gen. Mark Kimmitt (ret.) noted that Gates was trying to “protect the muscle. By cutting away at some of the fat, he can keep the money necessary to keep the constantly increasing budget to maintain a strong and ready force.”4 Gates also stated that the Pentagon needed to get more bang for its buck by shifting resources from overhead to the military capabilities needed today and in the future.5

“JFCOM’s joint concept and experimentation program has been a flop. Semi-official concepts like ‘rapid, decisive operations’ and ‘effects-based operations’ have contributed to doctrinal confusion over the past decade and haven’t made many friends for the command. The millions spent on the headquarters—and on the high-tech contractors corridor outside its compound in Norfolk, Va. can be better spent elsewhere.”2

At the time, Secretary Gates noted, “training and generating joint forces still is important, as is developing and testing joint doctrine. But it does not require a separate four-star combatant command, which, in the case of [ Joint Forces Command] entails about 2,800 military and civilian positions and roughly 3,000 contractors of all kinds at an annual cost of at least $240 million to operate.” 6 According to Secretary Gates, the services had internalized the mission of JFCOM, and future collaboration could be achieved without a four-star command.

As with any organization, there were those who believed JFCOM’s mission was essential and should be continued (or even expanded) and others who believed its utility had run its course.

Joint Forces Command Closure Process

Admiral Mike Mullen, then serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later stated that JFCOM “had achieved its goal; through the course of two wars, we have built an incredible joint force… Our young men and women in theater are now not only fighting and operating, but thinking jointly. ”7 Within the highest ranks of the Pentagon there was consensus that JFCOM had achieved its mission and was the type of ‘cut’ DoD could afford.

In August of 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of Defense Department reforms, sending a shockwave through the department.3

Gates Announces Defense Spending Cuts

Gen. Mark Kimmitt (ret.) noted that Gates was trying to “protect the muscle. By cutting away at some of the fat, he can keep the money necessary to keep the constantly increasing budget to maintain a strong and ready force.”

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Reactions to Closure Announcement As expected, Virginia lawmakers foretold an economic armageddon that would result from the closure. Rhetoric was heated and directed squarely at the Secretary of Defense and the Obama Administration.8 Local politicians said they were not informed of this decision until it was too late; they also knew “job losses” in their district and state could hurt their economy…and their reelection prospects.

Army Gen. Ray Odierno, Commander of JFCOM, detailed the aspects of the closure in February 2011, stating that the majority of the cuts would be borne by contractors, but there would be some military and government civilian jobs cut.

Army Gen. Ray Odierno details JFCOM’s closure

Major US Military Command Closure Causes Concern in Norfolk

Governor Bob McDonnell remarked that “to take and dismantle the Joint Forces Command—an effective, efficient, low-cost joint command between all of our services —I believe is extremely shortsighted and not in the interests of the United States, our national security or Virginia.”

Senator Mark Warner stated that there was no rational basis for the closure and it was “a no-brainer that JFCOM is one of the commands that could use more resources.” Initial reactions from Virginia lawmakers can be found here.

The size of the new organization would be around half the size of JFCOM, and would be led by a two-star general.

The critical functions of JFCOM would be retained with a focus on training and education. Gen. Odierno stated that the educational aspects “will be underpinned by modeling and simulation, experimentation and lessons learned, and we’ll continue to work to better understand the environment our joint forces are operating in.”

In addition, in February of 2011 Virginia received a $500,000 grant from the Defense Department’s Office of Economic Adjustment to establish a Workforce Transition Center in Suffolk. This would allow displaced JFCOM workers access to resources from various organizations at the local, state, and federal levels.11

Details of Closure Announced In November 2010, it was announced that even after JFCOM was closed, its functions would likely remain in the Norfolk/Suffolk area.9 This was confirmed in January 2011, as Secretary Gates announced “roughly 50 percent of the capabilities under JFCOM will be kept and assigned to other organizations.”10

Finally, in August of 2011, Joint Forces Command cased its colors.

A PROJECT OF CONCERNED VETERANS FOR AMERICA

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Aftermath In April of 2012—just eight months after JFCOM’s closure—Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell praised the efforts of the private and public sectors in re-employing displaced workers. The Workforce Transition Center served over 1,700 individuals.12 These efforts are still ongoing today, as assistance is available via the Workforce Transition Center website.

In a 2011 Economic Activity Report, the Suffolk Economic Development Commission stated that Suffolk’s modeling and simulation industry was alive and well despite the closure of JFCOM.13 The new organization, Joint Staff, J7 Joint Force Development ( Joint and Coalition Warfighting ( JCW)), continues many aspects of JFCOM, focusing on training and development.

Lessons Learned JFCOM is an example of cuts that work. In an era of budget deficits and belt tightening of defense functions, the discontinuation of JFCOM is a powerful and timely example of how to “trim fat” from a bloated DoD budget.

Certain elements of JFCOM were no longer needed and therefore eliminated; other functions continued under a slimmed down command; and still other aspects were consolidated into other commands. The function of JFCOM still exists, but without the massive bureaucracy.

Fight back against the NIMBY phenomenon.

JFCOM’s closure highlights a powerful political aspect of fiscal restraint efforts— namely that local interests will fight back against any cut, whether it’s necessary or not. Our military leadership, in this case the Secretary of Defense, recommended JFCOM be cut, while local politicians said “not in my backyard!” The choice in this case, as with many others, is between strategic budget cuts and local job preservation. This is not to say that local politicians are wrong to go to bat for local interests against national interests; however, sometimes the good of the nation’s overall military and economic health must trump local issues. Bluntly put, the DoD is not a “jobs program.” Its mission is to defend the nation, and job cuts (or increases) should not drive strategic decisions.

Defense leads the way. The closure of JFCOM ultimately worked because top defense officials took the initiative, and stood together, in proposing targeted defense cuts. Rather than waiting for Congress or the White House to propose cuts from the outside, the DoD put forth cuts that did not compromise their strategic capabilities.

Too many contractors. When contractors vastly outnumber uniformed personnel, that is often a sign that there is room for cost-cutting measures. While this is not always true, the JFCOM case demonstrates that a heavy contractor presence can be a sign of bloated programs and hyper-bureaucracy. With a budget that was highly slanted towards contractors, it was a ripe target for efficiency measures.

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Lessons Learned (continued) But also plan for local impacts. During the debate over JFCOM’s closure, the community impacts were unknown—both sides emphasizing, or downplaying, the impact on the Norfolk area. However, one year later, few can dispute that JFCOM’s closure has been handled smoothly and with minimal impact on the local community. This happened because elected officials, state and local authorities, and military leaders planned properly for the closure. Care was taken to integrate successful aspects of JFCOM, while providing employment support for JFCOM employees who were left without a job. DoD and Congress would be well served to study the JFCOM model as they propose and execute future defense cuts.

Strategic cuts work. The closure of JFCOM worked because the cuts were identified, planned, and executed with a strategic eye toward cutting the fat. Imagine, however, if we had instead cut 10 percent off the top of the JFCOM budget in an attempt to reign in costs. This type of indiscriminate approach would not ultimately address the problem, and would likely hit some of the JFCOM programs that work (cutting muscle in order to get to the fat). The JFCOM closure shows that strategic defense cuts work, and stands in stark contrast to the across-the-board ”sequestration” approach currently pending in Washington.

Consider SecDef comments on JFCOM compared to sequestration. Secretary Gates called the JFCOM cuts “necessary” while Secretary Panetta has described forthcoming acrossthe-board sequestration cuts as a “meat axe” to our defense capabilities. Both are “cuts,” but the difference in the impact is like night and day.

Sources 1. These statistics were taken from the JFCOM website “about us” page. http:// www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm 2. Col. Bob Killebrew is a retired Army infrantryman and former Army War College instructor. BoB Killebrew, “Goodbye , JFCOM,” Armed Forces Journal, 2010 (http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/4783736 ) 3. Larry Shaugnessy, “Gates proposes cutting Joint Forces command from Defense Budget,” CNN, Aug. 10, 2010 ( http://news.blogs.cnn.com/ 2010/08/10/gates-proposes-cutting-joint-forces-command-fromdefense-budget/) 4. CNN wire staff, “Gates: Pentagon must cut overhead, restrain spending,” CNN, May 9, 2010 (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-09/politics/gates. defense_1_defense-budget-defense-secretary-robert-gates-pentagon?_ s=PM:POLITICS) 5. Dana Hedgpeth,“ Gates details $100 billion in defense cuts,” Washington Post, Sept 15,2010 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content /article/2010/09/14/AR2010091406909.html?sid=ST2010091702545) 6. Associated Press, “JFCOM closing spurs creation of Va. Commission on Military and National Security Facilities,” WVEC, Aug. 9, 2010 (http:// www.wvec.com/news/military/Military-command-in-Norfolk-to-beeliminated-100268549.html)

7. Jim Garamone,“ Joint Forces Command Cases Its Colors,” American Forces Press Service, Aug 4, 2011 (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64927 ) 8. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/09/ AR2010080906083_2.html?sid=ST2010081705450) 9. Bill Bartel and Bill Sizemore, “ Some JFCOM jobs may stay in Hampton Roads, “ The Virginian Pilot, Nov. 24, 2010 (http://hamptonroads.com/ 2010/11/some-jfcom-jobs-may-stay-hampton-roads) 10. Ben Pershing, “Obama accepts Gates’s plan to close JFCOM, but many jobs will stay in Norfolk,” Washington Post, Jan. 7, 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/07/AR2011010706152.html) 11. Jeff Caldwell, “Virginia’s Elected Leadership Responds in Bipartisan Way to Defense to Realign JFCOM,” Office of Gov. Bob McDonnell, Feb. 9, 2011 (http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=600) 12. Jeff Caldwell, “Governor McDonnell Applauds Success of Job Fairs for Displaced US Joint Forces Command Workers,” Office of Gov. Bob McDonnell, April 4, 2011 (http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=1191) 13. Suffolk Department of Economic Development, 2011 Economic Activity Report, http://www.suffolkva.us/docs/Final-2011-EAR.pdf, 2012

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