JIOS Vol. 5, Issue 2 by Henrike Landré

Journal of

International Organizations Studies

V O LU M E 5 , I S S U E 2 , FA L L 2 0 1 4

Journal of International Organizations Studies (JIOS) The Journal of International Organizations Studies is the peer-reviewed journal of the United Nations Studies Association (UNSA), published in cooperation with the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University. JIOS provides a forum for scholars who work on international organizations in a variety of disciplines. The journal aims to provide a window into the state of the art of research on international governmental organizations, supporting innovative approaches and interdisciplinary dialogue. The journal’s mission is to explore new grounds and transcend the traditional perspective of international organizations as merely the sum of its members and their policies.

Details on Submission and Review

JIOS is published twice annually, in March and September, online and print-on-demand. Submission deadline for the fall issue is 1 May each year and for the spring issue is 1 November of the previous year. JIOS publishes three types of articles: • Research papers (8,000–10,000 words, including footnotes and references) • Insider’s View (3,000–7,000 words, including footnotes and references): contributions from practitioners illuminating the inner workings of international organizations. • Reviews of literature, disciplinary approaches or panels/workshops/conferences (single book reviews, panel or workshop reviews: 800–1,200 words, multiple book or subject reviews: 2,000–3,000 words, including footnotes and references) Please send submissions to editors@journal-iostudies.org. For submissions and formatting guidelines, please see http://www.journal-iostudies.org/how-submit-your-paper. All papers will be reviewed by two or three external reviewers and then either accepted, rejected, or returned to the author(s) with the invitation to make minor corrections or revise and resubmit (medium to major changes). The final decision on acceptance of submissions rests solely with the editors.

Contact Information

UN Studies Association, c/o coconets, Hannoversche Str. 2, 10115 Berlin, Germany David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA E-mail: editors@journal-iostudies.org

Web: http://www.journal-iostudies.org

Kendall W. Stiles, Brigham Young University; John Mathiason, Cornell University REVIEW EDITOR

Klaas Dykmann, Roskilde University INSIDER’S VIEW EDITOR

Nicola Contessi, McGill University MANAGING EDITOR

Cory Leonard, Brigham Young University EDITORIAL BOARD Christopher Ankersen, Royal Military College of Canada Jonathan Koppell, Yale University Malte Brosig, University of the Witwatersrand

Henrike Landré, DIAS/UN Studies Association

Roger Coate, Georgia College and State University

Craig Murphy, Wellesley College

Donald C.F. Daniel, Georgetown University

Slawomir Redo, UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Martin S. Edwards, Seton Hall University

Bob Reinalda, Radboud University Nijmegen

Dirk Growe, Global Policy Forum Europe

Manuela Scheuermann, University of Würzburg

Julia Harfensteller, University of Bremen

Tamara Shockley, Independent Researcher

Darren Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Courtney Smith, Seton Hall University School of Diplomacy and International Relations

Ian Hurd, Northwestern University Christer Jonsson, Lund University Adam Kamradt-Scott, University of Sydney Kent Kille, The College of Wooster Ina Klein, University of Osnabrück

Kendall Stiles, Brigham Young University Jonathan R. Strand, University of Nevada Markus Thiel, Florida International University Andrew Williams, University of St. Andrews

Journal of

International Organizations Studies

V O LU M E 5, I S S U E 2, FA L L 2014

Table of Contents Contributors....................................................................................................................... 3 EDITORIAL Kendall Stiles....................................................................................................................... 5 FEATURE ARTICLES International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective Charlotta Friedner Parrat................................................................................................... 7 Democratic Inputs versus Output-Oriented Governance: The ECBâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Evolving Role and the New Architecture of Legitimacy in the EU Andrew Glencross.............................................................................................................. 23 Change in IMF Policy Advice to North Africa after the Arab Uprisings Bessma Momani and Dustyn Lanz..................................................................................... 37 The Autonomy of Bureaucratic Organizations: An Organization Theory Argument Jarle Trondal and Frode Veggeland.................................................................................. 55 Special Research Paper: In Memoriam

How Are Parliamentarians of States Involved in Global Governance, and How Should They Be Chadwick F. Alger with Kent J. Kille..................................................................................71 The Life-Cycle of Regimes: Temporality and Exclusive Forms of International Cooperation Llewelyn Hughes, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Mireya SolĂs....................................................... 85 REVIEW Contingent or Unconditional Hostility? U.S. Political Culture and the International Criminal Court Andrea Betti..................................................................................................................... 117

CONTRIBUTORS Chadwick F. Alger, after two tours in the U.S. Navy, received a PhD at Princeton in 1957 and taught at Northwestern University until 1971. Alger was then appointed Mershon Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Ohio State University, where he taught until his death in February 2014. The author of more than one hundred articles and numerous books on international organization and global governance, he was active as a mentor and colleague and served as president of the International Studies Association (ISA). The ISA’s international organization section named its annual book prize in Alger’s honor. Andrea Betti is an adjunct professor in the Department of Economics at the Universidad Europea de Madrid. Betti has conducted research on American and British foreign policies towards human rights enforcement and responsibility to protect. His main interest is in the theory of international relations, with a particular focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy toward international norms and institutions. Betti received an MA in international relations from the University of Bologna and a PhD in international studies from the University of Trento. Andrew Glencross is a lecturer in international politics at the University of Stirling in the United Kingdom. Glencross has published extensively on the interplay of law and politics in the European Union and on the development of European integration more generally, in journals such as Government and Opposition, International Theory, Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, and West European Politics. His most recent book is the Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided? (Wiley 2014). Llewelyn Hughes is senior lecturer in the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, where he specializes in business-government relations with a focus on the energy sector and climate change. Hughes is most recently the author of Globalizing Oil: The Politics of Oil Market Governance in France, Japan, and the United States (Cambridge University Press). He received a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Kent J. Kille is a professor of political science at the College of Wooster. Kille is an expert on international organization leadership, including authoring From Manager to Visionary: The Secretary-General of the United Nations and serving as editor of and contributor to the UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership. His current work in this area, with Bob Reinalda, is focused on constructing a Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations. Comparisons and connections between the UN and regional organizations are drawn in articles appearing in Global Governance, Journal of International Organization Studies, and Political Psychology. Jeffrey Lantis is a professor of political science and chair of the Department of Political Science at the College of Wooster. Lantis’ research focuses on international norms, foreign policy analysis, strategic culture, and nuclear nonproliferation. He is author the forthcoming book Arms and Influence: U.S. Technology Innovations and the Evolution of International Security Norms (Stanford University Press, 2015) and the Life and Death of International Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2009), as well as numerous articles on the evolution of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Lantis received a PhD from The Ohio State University Dustyn Lanz is director of research and communications at Responsible Investment Association (RIA), a political economist, and an author interested in global governance, green economy, and sustainable investment. Lanz is a former Balsillie Fellow with the Centre for JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

International Governance and Innovation (CIGI). He received a BA in political science from York University and an MA in global governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo. Bessma Momani is an associate professor at the University of Waterloo and at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation (CIGI). Momani has been a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., a visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s Mortara Center, and a Canada–U.S. Fulbright scholar. She has authored and co-edited over six books and over sixty scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters that have examined the IMF, the World Bank, petrodollars, regional trade agreements in the Middle East, and economic liberalization throughout the Arab Gulf and the Middle East. Charlotta Friedner Parrat is a research fellow and a PhD candidate in international politics at the Department of Government at Uppsala University in Sweden. Parrat’s research interests include English School theory, the United Nations, and IR theory more broadly. She received her master’s degree from Uppsala University and has previously published in Political Studies. Mireya Solís is a senior fellow and the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies. Solís is the author of Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries (Stanford University Press, 2004) and co-editor of Cross-Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia (Springer, 2008) and Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), as well as numerous articles and book chapters on implications of and responses to the recent economic crisis, Japan’s domestic politics and foreign and economic policies, and East Asian multilateralism. Jarle Trondal is a professor of public administration at the University of Agder and in European studies at the University of Oslo ARENA Centre for European Studies. Trondal is also an honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen. His main fields of research interest are in public administration, European Union studies, organizational studies, and international bureaucracy. Resent publications include An Emergent European Executive Order (Oxford University Press, 2010), Unpacking International Organizations (Manchester University Press, 2010, with M. Marcussen, T. Larsson and F. Veggeland), and the Agency Phenomenon in the European Union (Manchester University Press, with M. Busuioc and M. Groenleer, eds.). Frode Veggeland is a professor in public policy at the University of Oslo Institute of Health and Society. Veggeland is also a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of Agriculture Economics Research. His main fields of research include public policy, public administration, organization studies, European Union studies, and international bureaucracy. Recent publications include Unpacking International Organizations (Manchester University Press, 2010, with M. Marcussen, T. Larsson, and J. Trondal). Veggeland receivevd a PhD in political science from University of Oslo (2004).

EDITORIAL JIOS has experienced its first editorial transition. Before introducing myself, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to outgoing (and founding) editor Kirsten Haack. To begin a new journal is an all-consuming enterprise, and Kirsten is to be credited with having done so with care, erudition, and efficiency. Five years ago, JIOS was merely a visionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a place where serious students of international organizations could share in our work and move the field forward. With the help of members of the UN Studies Association and the support of members of ACUNS, Kirsten has done just that and is to be commended. I should add that she has been nothing but helpful, wise, and gracious during the transition period. I would also like to thank the board members and editorial staff who are continuing to devote themselves to making JIOS all it can be. I am particularly grateful to Tamara Shockley for shepherding the drafting of bylaws for the journal. As the incoming editor, my primary goal is to continue a solid record of scholarly achievement. I am a sincere believer that what happens in formal international institutions is among the most important developments in international relations. My work has focused primarily on international organizations, ranging from the IMF and WTO to UNICEF, the UN, and the ECHR. I have considered theoretical approaches including neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, rational choice, and even realism. My research methods have ranged from comparative case studies to textual interpretation to large-N data analysis. As a result of this eclecticism, I hope to show due respect and sympathy for a wide range of approaches to a broad range of institutions. The current issue reflects the best tradition of JIOS, offering work on regional and universal institutions from a range of theoretical perspectives. It also includes what we believe is the last piece published by Chadwick Alger (with Kent Kille, a JIOS board member and student of Chad), one of the foremost scholars of international organizations, who passed away in February. Kendall Stiles

JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

International Organization in International Society: UN Reform from an English School Perspective by Charlotta Friedner Parrat, Uppsala University The United Nations [UN] has not lived up to the ideal envisioned at its origin. Its role in the maintenance of peace is minor, and its influence on the solution of global economic and social problems very limited. However, while skepticism may prevail as to the effectiveness of the institution, there is growing interest in considering the possibility of its revitalization. Its financial crisis, in large part the result of an anti-UN mood in the U.S. Congress, has encouraged the acceptance of the need for reform. The above lines nicely summarize the most common argument for UN reform in the contemporary debate. However, the quotation is not contemporary but written by French high-level UN expert Maurice Bertrand some twenty-five years ago (Bertrand 1988: 193). As the age of this argument may suggest, the debate on UN reform is old—some even suggest it is as old as the organization itself (Roberts and Kingsbury 1988: 13). In recent years, reform debates intensified especially during Kofi Annan’s time as secretary-general, culminating in the reform of the human rights mechanism and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005. However, as Edward Luck states, pointedly, the UN “adopts formal reforms with great reluctance and glacier-like speed” (Luck 2005: 412). Not only is UN reform an eternal project, but the analysis of the reform project seems inconclusive. Perhaps this is due to the conceptual ambiguity as to the exact nature of the organization (Krisch 2008: 133). Depending on the theoretical assumptions adopted, both the nature of the organization and the drivers for its reform vary. For some, the UN is most of all an arena that can be controlled by the powerful, wherein states try to achieve enough influence to advance a predefined national interest or, if that option is not available, to support some other state whose predefined interest seems likely to harmonize with one’s own (O’Neill 1996). Proponents of this approach focus typically on the Security Council, as this is where competition for power is supposedly culminating. In questions of UN reform, the logical argument here is that the composition of the Security Council ought to mirror the distribution of power in the world outside the organization. For others, the UN is an intergovernmental enterprise with a direction, namely, ensuring peace, development, and respect for human rights (Slaughter 2005). Proponents of this approach typically focus on more parts of the UN system than the Security Council–General Assembly complex only, noting also the various committees, councils, offices, and specialized agencies that are meant to participate in achieving the organization’s goals. This approach is also more common in the UN literature as it takes the UN seriously and attributes it intrinsic value as an organization rather than merely as an arena. Studies are often explicit about the several levels of complexity of the organization, framing them as a problem of combining intergovernmentalism with transnationalism (Cronin 2002), as an issue of dynamics between the formalized structure of the organization and the informal groupings wherein most negotiation takes place (Prantl 2005), or more generally as “a synthesis between the necessary and the possible” (Franck 2005: 611). Consequently, when it comes to UN reform, JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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this literature has a hard time both seeing the forest through the trees and addressing it without falling into an idealist discourse of how the organization ought to be reformed to achieve a better world. Yet others see the UN as an actor or various parts of the UN system as actors (Abbott and Snidal 2010; M. Barnett and Finnemore 2004; M.N. Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Krook and True 2012). This perspective is also very common in popular discourse, as it is intuitive. However, it runs the risk of being inexact, since it avoids specifying exactly who that actor is or how a precise part of the UN system, for instance the Secretariat, is circumvented by member states. Normally, an actor would have to have more agency than the UN manages to muster most of the time. Moreover, this approach oftentimes combines with the idea of the noble purpose, which leads to inevitable disappointment if the organizationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s character as actor is exaggerated. In questions of reform, concepts such as norm cascades and internalization can be drawn on (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) but will not account sufficiently for the limits states set for what the organization may actually do, at least in the shorter term. When it comes to grasping UN reform, therefore, none of these perspectives does the job adequately. This is simply because they tend to assume what would need to be studied, namely the nature of the drivers of reform. If it is assumed that reform has to happen to ensure a distribution of power and influence in the organization, which is consistent with the distribution in the outside world, that outside distribution (however it is measured) becomes a scale of measurement with which to assess the success or failure of the reform process. If, on the other hand, reform has to happen to make the UN more effective in achieving better (humanitarian) outcomes, then the success or failure of the reform process is measured in relation to those outcomes (which is likewise a methodological challenge and rarely remains uncontested). There is also a point of view according to which reform has to happen to achieve better representation in the UN, which can, conveniently, imply either an updated distribution of power in the organization or a cosmopolitan ambition of fairer representation of people. Legitimacy has become a buzzword in efforts to cover theses various motivations for reform, and it has been used to denote both issues of power distribution, representation of states, effective decision making, and achieving good (humanitarian) outcomes (Hurd 2008; Lee 2011; Russett 1996: 264â&#x20AC;&#x201C;65). Unfortunately, a use this wide of a contested concept will not solve the problem of capturing what is at stake in the reform process. Instead, this conundrum can only be escaped by applying a larger frame of analysis in which the drivers of the reform project are not assumed but studied. I argue that a better way to achieve this is to relate UN reform to wider movements in international society where the motivations for UN reform can be studied in context. The research question to be answered is: What are the drivers of UN reform? The aim of this article is to spell out the drivers of reform by conceptualizing the UN as an institutionalization of international society. Using the English School concept of primary institutions, tensions and developments underlying the calls for reform may be identified and their implications more thoroughly understood. In opposition to the approaches cited above, I do not assume a pre-set underlying goal for the reform process; the drivers of reform are the object of study rather than a scale of evaluation of the reform process. For English School theorists, the slowness of UN reform is no surprise. Rather, the process of UN reform actualizes very fundamental questions about how international interaction should be organized and is, therefore, necessarily slow and constantly contested. For the purpose of this paper, I have singled out two aspects of UN reform to study: the proposals to reform the Security Council and the implemented abolishment of the Commission of Human Rights (CHR). Certainly Kofi Annanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s proposal that states should work to reform the Security Council first has been partly responsible for the recent upsurge in Security Council reform literature, but it is also widely recognized that the Security Council is the hardest reform nut to crack, a fact that reflects its embeddedness in conflicting underlying

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principles, which also makes it the most interesting case for an analysis of this kind. The case of the CHR is particularly interesting because it actualizes the very fundamental tension between the power play of states and the demand for a basic decency of a liberal kind (for this point, see Hurrell 2007). It is also a unique and important outcome of the reform process that a UN organ has been dismantled and replaced. The paper is outlined as follows: First, the theoretical tools of the English School are presented in brief, the concept of “primary institutions” is discussed, and criteria for recognizing them are specified. Second, these criteria are applied to two central parts of the UN reform project. Finally, the findings from that analysis are related back to the question of what drivers of reform are in the concluding section. The Primary Institutions of the English School The founding fathers of the English School pointed to a certain degree of order and predictability in international life—despite its formal anarchy—brought about by states’ common interests in preserving the very system of sovereign states (for instance Bull 2002 [1977]). This common interest is the foundation of an international society—an “Anarchical Society,” as in the title of Hedley Bull’s famous book, in which states that are “conscious of certain common interests and common values form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 2002 [1977]: 13). Order in international society is upheld by common interests in certain primary goals (relating to preserving the society itself, and its units, the states), by rules that guide the preservation of society and by institutions that safeguard the rules (Bull 2002 [1977]: 51). It is essential here to establish the difference between the common institutions of international society, sometimes denoted “primary institutions,” and international organizations, sometimes denoted “secondary institutions” (Buzan 2004: 187; Makinda 2002: 366). The common institutions that states share in international society are not of the same kind as those that scholars of international regimes would study (Bull 2002 [1977]; Buzan 2004; Holsti 2004; Keohane 1988). Rather, they are basic phenomena that states routinely acknowledge and reproduce, regardless of whether there are treaties or other formal arrangements surrounding them. In Barry Buzan’s words, the common institutions in international society “are constitutive of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and purpose of any such society. For second-order societies (where the members are themselves collective actors), such institutions define the units that compose the society” (Buzan 2004: 166–67). Famously, Bull defined “institution” as “a set of habits and practices” (Bull 2002 [1977]: 71) and this definition is what makes them discernible in empirical reality. Many scholars working in the English School tradition today seem to consider Bull’s set of five primary institutions (international law, diplomacy, war, great power management, and balance of power) outdated, and primary institutions have attracted a renewed interest from researchers in the tradition (Buzan 2004; Holsti 2004; Schouenborg 2011; Wilson 2012). For instance, it has been argued that Bull left out something essential when he chose not to include trade or the market in his list of institutions, and that the body of “common interests and common values,” which Bull writes that states share, would be considerably thicker if the economic order was included as well (Buzan 2004: 19–20). It has also been questioned whether the great powers and their special responsibilities of managing the international society can really be an institution, and other institutions to include in the list have been suggested (for instance by Buzan 2004: chapter 6; Holsti 2004: 25–27) By way of definition, K.J. Holsti suggests that “institutions, in Bull’s sense, are established patterns of action that contain normative elements and are sustained through tradition and culture” (Holsti 2009: 136). Cornelia Navari points out that “there is nothing ‘behind’ the balance of power or ‘behind’ the practice of recognition and the methodological approach

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[of the English School] is a direct encounter with self-understanding” (Navari 2010: 626). A primary institution, then, should be empirically recognizable. A state demonstrates its consent by abiding by the institution; consequently, the state may withdraw its consent by opposing the institution in words or in action (Bull 2002 [1977]: 70). An important corollary is that if the representatives of a state argue against an institution, in order to justify a decision not to conform to the routinized practice, the very act of justification means that the existence of the institution itself is acknowledged. Important, however, is the critical mass: There needs to be a widespread agreement on a practice for it to count as a primary institution. There are important similarities between primary institutions and norms as described by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, but there are also some important differences (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). First, whereas Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s norms come from a domestic constituency, a primary institution is truly international and applies between states only (Navari 2009a: 6). Second, primary institutions include norms, often several, and their interrelation (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891; Holsti 2004: 21–22). Third, primary institutions guide (conscious) conduct, never (mechanic) behavior; thus, it necessarily involves agents of states considering their options and choosing their conduct rather than behavior being “caused” by norms in any Humean sense of the term; “agents . . . do not have causes, they have intentions” (Navari 2009b: 48–49; 2010: 627). Through this discussion, we may extract several questions to ask about a candidate primary institution. We may even require that it fulfill all these demands in order to accept it as such. This list is obviously not foolproof, as fulfillment of the requirements is an issue of judgment and argumentation, but it may act as a useful checklist: • Is the institution truly international, or can the same institution exist within a state? • Is it a routinized practice based on ideas, and does it include norms, rules, and etiquette? • Is it consciously upheld by actors? • Is it quite stable over time and does a critical mass of states endorse it? • Is it co-constitutive of actors? Buzan suggests that clashes between primary institutions may be the most important drivers in processes of change (Buzan 2004: 186). As the calls to reform the UN are interpreted as a symptom of change in the wider international society here, we should look for drivers of reform in tensions between primary institutions. In the case of the Security Council reform debate, such a tension will be identified between great power management, sovereign equality, and regional representation. In the case of the replacement of the CHR, such a tension is identified between sovereign equality of states and a minimal standard for equality of people. International Organizations or Secondary Institutions Martin Wight, although his Power Politics contains chapters on the United Nations and the League of Nations, claimed that those chapters were named after the organizations “only by courtesy . . . and interested students of international relations consistently overrate their importance” (Wight 1978: 216). This is the traditional English School view of international organizations. Bull also explicitly cautioned against treating international organizations as pillars of order. He claimed instead to look at “institutions of the international society that arose before these international organizations were established, and that would continue to operate (albeit in a different mode) even if these organizations did not exist” (Bull 2002 [1977]: xxxiv–xxxv). Buzan suggests a development of Bull’s distinction between institutions and international organizations as one between primary and secondary institutions, where Bull’s “set of habits and practices” is the primary institution and the “organization or administrative machinery,” which sometimes exists to support the common goal, is the secondary institution (2004: chapter 6). Ian Clark notes that “an institution of international society may, but need not, in turn take on an institutional form: whether or not it adopts secondary institutions has no bearing on [its] standing as a primary institution” (Clark 2009: 219).

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There is something dissonant in Buzan’s idea of primary institutions leading to, or being the base for, secondary institutions. Buzan suggests that such varying international phenomena as the UN General Assembly, the UN as a whole, NATO, IMF, peace-keeping operations or the UN Security Council can be examples of secondary institutions (2004: 186–87). He also points to how the same secondary institution may be connected to several primary institutions, but the link between a secondary institution and an international organization is still too imprecise, as we cannot know whether it is only one aspect of the international organization that is a secondary institution or whether the international organization is the secondary institution. In the case of the UN, of course, this ambiguity is amplified as it is often treated as “a secondary institution” (Makinda 2002: 366), while I believe that few would object to the assessment that several primary institutions are visible within it. In keeping with the most traditional English School accounts, I conceptualize the UN instead as a permanent conference for international society. This conceptualization implies an organizational purpose, namely the functioning of international society, which distinguishes it from the realist conceptualization of the UN as merely an arena for power struggles. The status of purposive conference makes it possible for the organization to be the scene for several developments and conflicts of primary institutions simultaneously. After all, the idea of formalizing an existing international society by uniting the functioning of several primary institutions into one framework is not new, even though the specific format of an international organization is fairly recent. Writers in the English School usually see this sort of international society gathering happening after major wars. At Osnabrück and Münster, parallel seven-year negotiations finally gave rise to the—weakly formalized but very practically influential—Westphalian system in Europe (Clark 2005: chapter 3; Mayall 2000: 1); at Vienna in 1815, when a similar meeting resulted in the Congress of Europe; after the First World War came, the first effort to formalize a “constitution for the new global society of states” through the League of Nations (Watson 2009 [1992]: 284); and among international legal scholars, it is suggested that the UN Charter is indeed the “constitution of the international community” (Fassbender 1998). In this vein, the UN may be seen as a permanent conference where the workings of various primary institutions that are in play are continually negotiated and renegotiated. By no means, however, should international society in this conceptualization be seen as dependent on the UN; rather, I assume that the functioning of the UN is dependent on the underlying international society. In Robert Jackson’s words, “International society consists of what states are prepared to agree or accept in their relations [and] the international organizations that states institute to facilitate their relations should not be misunderstood as independent authorities” (Jackson 2000: 103). Consequently, it is in this spirit that I study the UN. It is a partial institutionalization of international society, some primary institutions of which may be traced through the UN system. What I assume, however, is that the UN reflects international society of 1945 rather than that of the present day. It is much more complex in the range of issues it needs to handle, a circumstance that the allied powers could not necessarily foresee when they created the organization, and it was conceived in rather static terms to lock a system in, except that the underlying society was precisely not locked in but kept evolving (for this point, see Franck 2005). This, in my view, is the reason why the reform debate is eternally present. The UN is too inflexible to adapt continuously to changes in the underlying international society, and so the calls for reform are recurrent. Studying the primary institutions visible in the UN reform process helps us see how developments in the overall global arena play out in the call for UN reform. Reform at the United Nations There is a long-lasting debate about the need to reform the United Nations, and, to some extent, in the present framework that is merely a sign of its good health. It goes without saying that one central purpose of a permanent conference for international society should be to house—and contain—the permanent squabble over power and resources among the members.

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It is hardly surprising, then, that a part of the squabble should concern the “meta issues” of the constitutional order of the organization itself—especially in case of a shock such as that provoked by the implosion of the Soviet bloc. The current reform project, which gained momentum with the end of the Cold War, has led to some reforms being implemented, notably the replacement of the Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights Council in 2006. The formal structure of the UN was an attempt to freeze world politics after the end of World War II. In Michael Howard’s words, “A general and equal interest was assumed in the preservation of the status quo post bellum. Change would be possible, but only by general consent. The postwar world was conceived, in fact, in somewhat static terms” (Howard 1988: 32–33, emphasis in original). The organization was designed to safeguard the common interests of its protectors (including the preservation of the society of states); the UN Charter was agreed on by the World War II allied powers in advance and only formally finalized at the San Francisco summit of 1945 (Luard 1988: 209). It turned out, however, that the postwar world was not constant, and the membership of the UN grew quickly. From the original fifty-one, it experienced a steady influx of members during the decolonization process to attain 193 today. Politically, this gradual enlargement meant the Western powers, and especially the U.S., which had at the start been able to count on majority support from the organization, increasingly found itself on the minority side of the General Assembly (Luard 1988: 201). Clearly, the world has changed since 1945, but the UN has, at least formally, changed very little. No reform of the Security Council has as of yet been agreed to, but it has been hotly debated, and this debate is well worth closer study in order to illustrate how primary institutions are playing out there. Moreover, the much less substantial reform suggestions concerning the General Assembly may also be included in a discussion of Security Council reform, as the two bodies are the two main political pillars of the organization, and the reform discussion tends to take the shape of a zero-sum game between them. The case of the CHR is also particularly interesting, because it is a unique and important outcome of the reform process that a UN body has been dismantled and replaced. Moreover, it actualizes the very fundamental tension between sovereign equality of states and the minimal standard for equality of people, a well-rehearsed theme in English School theory (see for instance Dunne and Wheeler 2004; Linklater 1982; Mayall 2000; Wheeler 2000; Vincent 1986). Security Council Reform Debates In English School terms, the very design of the Security Council manifests the primary institution of great power management. It is clearly international, and it is an established practice based on ideas, rules, and norms. It is also constitutive of the states to the extent that being recognized as a great power or not affects the role and power of a state. Although Holsti claims that great power is a status rather than a patterned practice (Holsti 2004: 25–26), I would argue that the practice consists in precisely the right routinely granted to the great powers by other states to have a say—and sometimes more than just a say—in any matter of world politics. That they not always put the interest of society as a whole before their own interest was recognized by Bull already in the 70s (Bull 1979) and does not disqualify great power management from being an institution. The crucial difference between the League of Nations and the United Nations was exactly the formalized position of the great powers, so that the smaller states should not be able to move ahead with decisions that any of the great powers were unprepared to accept (Mbuende 2008: 21). Therefore, the right to veto constitutes a breaking block safeguarding the great powers from too hasty developments. As we will see from the reform debate, great power management is consciously upheld by the participant states, and whether one state is a member of the council or not definitely affects its aspirations to great power status. France would hardly deserve that status without its membership, while India is not conceived of as a great power, because it lacks membership in the Security Council (Bull 1979: 438–39; Krisch 2008: 136). Since no reform of the functioning

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or composition of the Security Council has been agreed to, it seems safe to assume that great power management is endorsed by a critical mass of states and is quite sustainable over time. Needless to say, the five permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., China, Russia, UK, and France; P-5 in UN jargon) are not interested in letting go of their permanent seats nor of their right to veto. The General Assembly, on the other hand, is characterized by the primary institution of sovereign equality, meaning that all states count equally, regardless of their power, population size, economic or political status, or other criteria. I have chosen the term sovereign equality, as in the UN Charter, rather than just sovereignty, as is common in the English School literature, to emphasize that the main argument here is not about internal sovereignty but about the formal international level acceptance of the nominal equality of sovereign states.1 Sovereign equality, too, is clearly an international phenomenon as it is in relation to other states that it becomes important. It is a routinized practice, based on the ideas of recognition and formal equality, and includes norms, rules, and etiquette. States take great care to reproduce sovereign equality and to ensure it is stable over time and is, in principle, endorsed by all states. Finally, it is constitutive of the actors so that states would not be allowed to participate in the UN system unless they were recognized as sovereign equals by a critical mass. Two dimensions of great power management are striking in the debate on reforming the Security Council: First, there is a discussion surrounding the very institution, which concerns both the special rights of the great powers and the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly. This view is actualized when some states call for abolishment of the right to veto and/or hold permanent seats (von Freiesleben 2008: 5–6), thereby challenging the practice of great power management per se. It also begs the question of whether the special privileges of the great powers are accurately balanced by the special responsibilities they take on. This balance is expressed in the UN Charter only in relation to the nonpermanent members and has been interpreted to mean making contributions to the UN budget and to peace-keeping operations (Blum 2005: 638–39). Some small states (S-5)2 have called for a more transparent Security Council that would be more accountable to the General Assembly, a suggestion that was strongly disapproved both by the P-5 and by would-be permanent members (von Freiesleben 2008: 8). In English School terms, the proposal to make the Security Council more transparent and accountable was perceived as threatening, because it challenged the relationship between the exclusive Security Council and the inclusive General Assembly, thereby favoring sovereign equality at the expense of great power management. Second, there is disagreement on what states are to be counted as great powers today. While the U.S. and China are evident great powers and Russia is the heir of the Soviet Union, the special status of the UK and, especially, France is being questioned (Blum 2005: 363). The World War II losers—Japan, Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy—advocated after the end of the Cold War for permanent seats on the Security Council for themselves (von Freiesleben 2008). This suggests a traditional concert approach, where the power that loses the war is not to be left out in the cold for long but is free to come back to its former position in international society once it again abides by its rules (Clark 2005: 173–80). The former losers’ calls for permanent seats on the Security Council then not only amount to support for great power management as a primary institution, but it is also a sign of how the institution is interpreted as essentially constant since before the war, so that the same powers are still the relevant players. Japan and Germany have also backed their claim to great power status by being sizable contributors, second and third, to the UN budget (Blum 2005: 238). There are other candidates for an expanded Security Council as well. New contenders are Brazil, Egypt, India, Nigeria, and South Africa, which all claim uneven geographical represen1. This choice also has precedents in the English School literature; see for instance Manning 1972: 310. 2. S-5, “the Small Five group,” comprises Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, Costa Rica, and Lichtenstein.

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tation in their favor as well as regional great power status (von Freiesleben 2008: 2). This suggests a different—and new—primary institution, namely that of regional representation. Since decolonization, regional cooperation has been evolving around the globe, manifest for instance in the development of regional organizations. In the UN, this phenomenon takes the shape of regional groups within which much of the practical work takes place. I argue that regional representation is a primary institution, because it is a clearly an international phenomenon, which is routinely practiced, based on ideas and including norms, rules, and etiquette. States are expected to engage in continuous dialogue with their regional neighbors in the regional groups. Regional representation is consciously reproduced by actors. States routinely negotiate their positions within their regional groups before resolutions are presented or voted on, and, whenever they manage to agree, the president of the regional group (a revolving task) delivers a speech on behalf of the whole group. Regional representation was not a primary institution in 1947 but has been evolving since de-colonization and is today endorsed by virtually all states, with the possible exceptions of Israel, which has been at pains to find a group, and Turkey and Japan, which are members of two groups. Finally, it is constitutive of states to the extent that being a member of a certain regional group influences states’ self-image and conduct in the organization. It is also through the regional groups that states are nominated for election to various UN bodies. In the Security Council, regional representation grounds in the formulation about “equitable geographical distribution” in chapter five of the UN Charter, and it is routinized through the five regional groups: the African Group, the Asia and Pacific Group, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean states (GRULAC), the Eastern European Group, and the Western and Other States Group (WEOG). The 2005 high-level panel suggesting two models for enlarging the Security Council tried to replace the five regional groups with four “regional areas,” namely Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and Americas (Blum 2005: 640). That modernized regional categorization was refused, however, which is an indication of the degree of internalization of regional representation as a primary institution. In conclusion, the three primary institutions of great power management, sovereign equality and regional representation are all important in the discussions on reforming the Security Council. Only if the Security Council should agree to let go of the right to veto would it be a sign that great power management is becoming obsolete. Regional representation, with its link to sovereign equality through the idea of proportional representation of states, on the other hand, is developing, and, moreover, clashing with great power management over the composition of the Security Council. If there is a change in the relation between the General Assembly and the Security Council so that the former gets more control over the latter as suggested by the S-5, it would mean great power management was ceding ground to sovereign equality. It seems more plausible there will be a compromise between great power management and regional representation, so the Security Council will be enlarged with semi-permanent seats allotted per region to the most important states or with regional seats whose occupancy revolves within the region. The Human Rights Council The Commission on Human Rights was a subsidiary organ to the Economic and Social Council, one of the principal bodies of the UN. In the post–Cold War reform project, it is one of the few mechanisms that has actually been reformed. It was abolished in 2006 and replaced with a marginally smaller Human Rights Council (HRC), which is organizationally subsidiary to the General Assembly. Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan motivated the need for reform by assessing that “the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. . . . States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others” (Annan 2005: para. 182). States that had a very bad human rights

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record had no difficulties to be elected to the CHR, and Libya (then clearly an international pariah) chaired it in 2003, much to the frustration of the Western states (Alston 2006: 192). On the other hand, arguments about the confrontational atmosphere in the CHR also abound. For instance, in speeches by the ambassadors of Cuba and Pakistan, respectively, during the reform debate: We peoples of the South, besides continuing to be the target of unjust condemnatory resolutions. . . . The Commission was discredited, we believe, not so much by the worst violators, but by the readiness of some States to condemn each other rather than help each other. (quoted in Scheipers 2007: 232–33, emphasis added) What is often forgotten when discussing the role of the CHR is how much it achieved during its sixty years of existence. Based on vague and general charter provisions at the outset, the originally technical, rather than political, CHR contributed to creating a human rights framework comprising the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, two binding covenants, and a host of likewise binding conventions and protocols as well as an impressive fauna of “special procedures,” including special rapporteurs, technical experts, working groups, and complaints procedures (Gutter 2007: 96; Schrijver 2007: 810–12). This points to a gradual and important expansion of the international human rights system since the end of World War II, and it suggests that the CHR was not only discredited, but it had also clearly grown out of its “institutional jacket” (Schrijver 2007: 812). From an English School perspective, the reform of the human rights machinery is clearly important as it points to a need that has evolved within the institutional setting of the UN and was not there before. To the extent that the human rights mechanisms of the UN represent any underlying primary institutions, these have evolved, or at least become established, from the platform the UN provides. Jack Donnelly argues that “positive international law is becoming supplemented by human rights norms that, like those of the classic standard of civilization, hold even against resistant states” (Donnelly 1998: 16). The replacement of the CHR with the HRC was decided by means of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly (Scheipers 2007: 227). The resolution was a broad compromise where 170 states voted in favor, four against (the U.S., Israel, Palau and the Marshall Islands), and three abstained (Belarus, Iran, and Venezuela). Interestingly, the U.S. and its foreign policy allies chose to vote “no,” because they would have preferred a smaller HRC with formal negative membership criteria; that is, states with bad human rights records should be excluded (Scheipers 2007: 228–30), while the abstainers instead chose that option in protest against the decision to make the HRC non-universal and against the continued use of the CHR’s “special procedures” (Yeboah 2008: 82–83, 95). The distribution of votes points to a fundamental divergence of opinions regarding the structure of the HRC, where the resulting compromise had to accommodate both ambitions to create a small “society of the committed” and the desire to create a body with universal participation and only cooperative (as opposed to confrontational) mechanisms. This distinction of an insider/outsider vision of human rights contra a universalist idea pinpoints the fundamental issue of a recognized standard of conduct for membership in international society. In English School theory, it is becoming quite common to see human rights as a primary institution (Buzan 2004: 187; compare Vincent 1986), but in my view, the compromise on the HRC with its implications on membership suggests that this was not only about human rights as such but about the right to enforce a minimal standard of conduct. It embodied the tension between “sovereign equality understood in radical legal positivist terms” and “the morally appealing idea of adherence to shared standards of justice as a condition for full membership in international society” (Donnelly 1998: 13–14). Human rights as such imply state sovereignty (internal and external), since the idea is exactly that states are responsible for respecting and protecting certain basic rights of their citizens and can be held to account if they fail to do

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so. Rather than treating human rights as one primary institution, therefore, I argue that human rights are related to two primary institutions: sovereign equality on the one hand and a shared minimal standard of acceptable conduct on the other. Finding a convincing name for this shared minimal standard is no easy matter, but following Buzan’s lead, let us call it equality of people (Buzan 2004: 187). As the substance of the minimal standard is the idea that basic rights should apply to all humans regardless of the state in which they are born, so equality of peoples captures the essence of the institution. Equality of people in this sense is an international phenomenon, as it is founded on adherence to a shared standard between states. (Human rights, on the other hand, are enforced primarily via national adaptations.) Equality of people is routinized, both through its monitoring via UN channels and via bilateral diplomatic contacts (and sometimes suspension of those contacts in case of serious misbehavior). It is based on ideas of human dignity and equality and includes norms and rules (although it is less clear about etiquette). It is consciously reproduced by actors, endorsed by most states, and constitutive of them to the extent that respecting the minimal standard is what makes a state a “full” member of international society. The fact that the resolution that established the HRC was accepted by 170 states also points to the critical mass of states that endorsed the notion of a common minimal standard. (It is worth noting here that the U.S., which argued for a more exclusive HRC and voted “no” to the ensuing compromise under the Bush administration, subsequently turned to endorse the new human rights body under the Obama administration and sought election to it in 2009.) The balancing act of reconciling sovereign equality and equality of people in the creation of the HRC initially turned out to put greater emphasis on sovereignty, and its corollary non-intervention, than expected. “What many diplomats did not realize until late in the negotiations was that any new UN body would have to be created along customary UN lines of equitable geographical distribution,” writes Amnesty’s Yvonne Terlingen (emphasis added), and explains how this fundamentally changed the majority structure in the HRC from that of the CHR. “The African and Asian members now have a comfortable majority (at least twentysix out of forty-seven votes) in the UN’s main political human rights body; and they are definitely using it to set the agenda. . . . The changed political dynamics point to the need for European and Latin American countries to adopt a cross-regional approach to address human rights issues of common concern (Terlingen 2007: 171).”3 Creating a new body without taking regional representation into account was apparently inconceivable for a majority of states. A novelty of the HRC is its Universal Periodic Review (UPR), an arrangement by which all states are to have their human rights performance reviewed at regular intervals. Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, first secretary at the Ethiopian delegation, notes that African states pushed for an “essentially state-driven process while others wanted to maintain a robust participation of NGOs in the review” (Abebe 2009: 4). The UPR became, importantly, a review by peers; that is, states are being reviewed by other states and not by independent experts. This arrangement signals how some states prefer to emphasize sovereign equality over equality of people by keeping procedures strictly intergovernmental, while others are more interested in achieving a certain human rights standard, even at the expense of reducing state control over the process. Significantly, however, Abebe also notes that the UPR is not restricted to holding a state under review up against the standards of human rights documents to which it is a party (as is the case with the UN’s Treaty Monitoring Bodies, which review State Parties’ human rights performance in relation to particular agreements which they have ratified), but it may likewise draw on the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration as well as on voluntary pledges and 3. Understanding the implications of this observation requires some background knowledge of traditional human-rights voting patterns: The WEOG often votes as a block, with the support of the Eastern European EU member states and candidate states and GRULAC (with some exceptions, primarily Cuba and Venezuela). African and Asian states also tend to block vote, which means that the Commission usually housed two camps of roughly equal strength so that what members of the GRULAC and the Eastern European group were elected could decide the majority situation in the Commission. This is not the case in the HRC, where the Asian and African groups together enjoy a comfortable majority.

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commitments made by the state (2009: 4). This is an interesting exception to the usual legal positivism that supposes that states are only held responsible in relation to provisions to which they have explicitly concurred (Donnelly 1998: 6, 14). It also points to an evolution of equality of people through the new institutional platform, which allows the institution to expand. In conclusion, the very notion of human rights has expanded from holding a small place at the creation of the UN system immediately after World War II into becoming one of its main pillars. This is reflected in the establishment of the new HRC as a subsidiary organ to the General Assembly, rather than to the Economic and Social Council, as was the case with the CHR. This signals the emergence of a new standard of equality of people as a primary institution in international society, a development that the UN has been under strain to accommodate institutionally, hence the reform. While some states emphasize sovereign equality by striving to limit the influence of NGOs, holding on to intergovernmental control over the UPR and protesting the “special procedures” established by the CHR, the compromise creating the HRC nevertheless carried forward a strong case for respecting at least a minimum standard for human rights. The emphasis on equality of people is also clear from the fact that the UPR has been mandated to depart from the hereto dominant notion that a state can only be held to a standard to which it has actively agreed. Finally, in the human rights domain, too, we see regional representation, mainly in the final institutional design of the HRC but also in united regional fronts on human rights issues, where there is a tendency to intra-regional loyalty and inter-regional criticism. Conclusion It seems clear the repeated bids to reform the Security Council are due to the clash between great power management and sovereign equality, which is institutionalized in the organizational design of the United Nations. In Adam Watson’s comparative study of historical international systems (Watson 2009 [1992]), great power management is understood as a special case of hegemony, namely one where hegemony is diffused over several great powers. Today, this diffusion of hegemony is institutionalized in the United Nations Security Council. The various bids, all unsuccessful, to reform the Security Council point to the interpretation that collective management by the great powers is still a primary institution. There is, however, evident disagreement on who should be included in the great power club. A case could be made that the membership would have developed differently had the primary institution not been formalized through the UN as the squabble for seats suggests. Given this understanding of Security Council reform, it is unsurprising that compromises are hard to strike. In international society, there is no understanding of “almost great powers,” which are just slightly more than sovereign equals. Perhaps, however, this is a possible way forward. If there were such a thing as “middle-power states” (Foot 2007), these could quite logically be granted an in-between status, such as semi-permanent seats without veto. It has also been argued in this article that regional representation has emerged as a primary institution. It is based on a norm of equal representation (of states, not of people) over the globe and the possibility of creating a new UN body without regional representation was perceived as impracticable by a majority of states. Whether the primary institution of regional representation could have emerged independently of the UN is unclear, as decolonization could potentially have given rise to it regardless of international organizations. Yet, it seems that the specific provisions of sovereign equality in the General Assembly must have been especially conducive to it through their emphasis on proportionality in numbers rather than in influence, so that an international society with a heavier reliance on great power management alone would have been at pains to develop it. Interestingly, too, a recent proposal on how to overcome the Security Council reform stalemate has emphasized regional representation even further, suggesting that longer term seats are allocated to regional groups and that occupancy rotates within those groups (Swart 2013: 51).

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The observation on regional representation and its relation to sovereign equality ties into the observation on diffused hegemony above, as the sovereign equality practiced in the General Assembly is, in Watson’s terms, rather a formalization of the other extreme condition: multiple independencies. In Watson’s historical comparison, this is a rare and unstable condition; but in the UN, it is formalized as a basic—and somehow timeless—understanding. As for equality of peoples, it has been around for a long time as an idea and a norm, but it has been channeled and built up by the way in which it is implemented through the UN system. If it was for the first time formally stated and agreed to with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947, it could be argued that it has since then evolved from an international norm to an international rule and further to an established international practice, under the mediation and guidance of the UN system. As the UN founding members all agreed to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, subsequent members had to endorse it as well. In the English School framework, it is understandable that the establishment of a primary institution such as equality of people takes time. UN reform, with its drivers and obstacles, may only be understood in its historical context. The conclusion of this study is that UN reform is driven by efforts in the underlying international society to accommodate the evolution of several competing primary institutions. Specifically, it has been argued that the main driver for Security Council reform is the continuous need to reconcile great power management with sovereign equality. Regional representation seems to have evolved partly in response to this institutional tension and may turn out to contribute to overcoming it in the future. Meanwhile, the main driver for reform of the human rights system has been the need to reconcile sovereign equality with equality of peoples, an equally serious institutional clash that will likely stay with us for a long time to come. REFERENCES Abbott, K.W. and Snidal, D. (2010). “International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration.” The Review of International Organizations, 5(3), 315–44. Abebe, A.M. (2009). “Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council.” Human Rights Law Review, 9(1), 1–35. Alston, P. (2006). “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human Rights Council.” Melbourne Journal of International Law, 7, 185–224. Annan, K. (2005). “In Larger Freedom: Development, Security and Human Rights for All.” Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations: United Nations. Barnett, M.N. and Finnemore, M. (1999). “The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations.” International Organization, 53(4), 699–732. Barnett, M.N. and Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bertrand, M. (1988). “Can the United Nations be Reformed?” In A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury (Eds.), United Nations, Divided World. The UN’s Roles in International Relations (pp. 193–208). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Blum, Y.Z. (2005). “Proposals for UN Security Council Reform.” The American Journal of International Law, 99(3), 632–49. Bull, H. (2002 [1977]). The Anarchical Society (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bull, H. (1979). “The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order.” International Journal, 35, 437–47. Buzan, B. (2004). From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Democratic Inputs versus Output- Oriented Governance: The ECB’s Evolving Role and the New Architecture of Legitimacy in the EU by Andrew Glencross, University of Stirling This article examines the relationship between European integration and democratic governance during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis. It does so by analyzing the evolving policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) against the backdrop of tension between input and output legitimacy in economic and monetary union. This tension makes the ECB’s actions a test case for understanding the functioning of supranational output legitimacy in a time of economic crisis. The evidence shows that the ECB stayed focused on outputs and pursued a strategic policy to prompt governments to create new treaties providing bailouts in return for conditionality. Hence this new legal-political architecture is also analyzed but in the context of how input legitimacy is institutionalized at a time of a “constraining dissensus.” What this shows is that political constraints did not prevent the emergence of a new architecture of legitimacy, although this remains beholden to a national model of input legitimacy. The result is a disconnect between de facto Europeanization of fiscal decision making and de jure national implementation measures. Consequently, the relationship between integration and democratic governance is more complex than ever with input legitimacy likely to play a disruptive role in the future. In particular, the national debt brakes introduced via the Fiscal Compact mean that the tension between output and input legitimacy may well play out at the national level as well as EU-wide. Introduction: Democratic Inputs versus Output-Oriented Governance The eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis, is perhaps the hardest challenge the EU has faced (Moravcsik 2012). Although it is a multifaceted policy problem, this crisis above all revealed the eurozone’s vulnerability to having bad bank debt spill over into a wider sovereign debt maelstrom. This structural weakness stemmed from the fact that the European Monetary Union (EMU) established a single currency without an accompanying banking union, let alone a fiscal union (Lane 2012). The EU’s response involved tackling both the banking (or private debt) side of the crisis as well as the sovereign debt problem by, inter alia, creating a bailout fund for member states, establishing a new treaty that further restricted national borrowing capacity alongside an evolution of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy. While the origins of the problem and the efficacy of the hastily cobbled-together solutions have been—and will continue to be—much discussed (e.g., Sadeh 2012; Shambaugh 2012; Hall 2012), this article examines a different, less-studied element of this crisis. The analysis explores the way the ECB interacted with demands stemming from national politics in the debate over what could and should be done to rescue the EMU. Throughout the protracted eurozone crisis, the EU faced what is presented here as a fundamental contest over the legitimacy of decision making when taking steps to shore up the EMU. Central to this contestation were competing claims made by actors and institutions that legitimately represented the interest of the eurozone and how far this could trump individual national interest. JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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Reprising the analytical categories of Fritz Scharpf (1999), the article highlights how bearers of national “input legitimacy” (elected politicians and governments) challenged the preferences and decisions of “output legitimacy” (oriented institutions, notably the ECB). According to Scharpf’s model, policies and policy making can be legitimate by virtue of the benefits they produce, which constitutes in his terminology “output legitimacy” (Ibid.). In the context of EMU, as well as of EU governance more broadly, decisions may thus be legitimate not because citizens have had a role in shaping them, but “because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question” (Ibid., 6). This form of legitimacy contrasts with “input legitimacy,” stemming from preferences expressed via political participation, namely citizens actually voting for parties with specific policies. Consequently, when policy preferences between elected and unelected actors differ, there is the possibility of tension between these two forms of legitimacy. Indeed, this tension between democratic inputs and output-oriented governance has been present from the outset of the EMU. In particular, the ECB has been treated as a classic instance of delegation for the sake of making interstate commitments credible (Dyson 2009), making this non-majoritarian, technocratic institution a bearer of output legitimacy and, therefore, subject to few democratic channels of accountability (Amtenbrink 1999; Berman and McNamara 1999). However, as the article demonstrates, during the eurozone crisis the ECB came under great EUwide political pressure to carry out bond market and other forms of intervention. Moreover, it often had to fulfill its role as guardian of the euro in the absence of political consensus, notably when bailout terms were being negotiated with countries such as Greece. The first core wager of this article then is that studying the evolving role of the ECB, combined with the politics behind the adoption of two new treaties (the so-called Fiscal Compact, formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the European Stability Mechanism treaty), offers up fundamental insights into the relationship today between European integration and democratic governance. The very ingredients of the EU response—huge sums committed for bank and sovereign bailouts counterbalanced by unprecedented top-down macroeconomic policy conditionality—are politically highly salient aspects of democratic politics. This saliency means the eurozone crisis is a test case for understanding the functioning of supranational output legitimacy in a time of economic crisis. In particular, the actions of the ECB demonstrate a strategic logic for encouraging political actors to find consensus over fiscal policy and bailouts, which were the quid pro quo for implementing nontraditional monetary policy. At the same time, changes in the legal-political structure of EMU made to resolve the sovereign debt crisis offer novel insights into the constraints on integration imposed by democratic inputs. The context behind these constraints is not just the emergency of the financial crisis, but also the growth of what Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009) call a “constraining dissensus” facing the EU. This theory suggests that increased national political contestation over European integration makes EU policy making and treaty reform more uncertain and harder to undertake. The reason for these difficulties is that elites are split over how to pursue integration, while citizens are wary about justifications or arguments in favor of greater integration. In these circumstances, the expectation is that there is a lack of input legitimacy (both national and pan-European), which makes it harder to generate the consensus necessary for the development of greater supranational competences. The second goal of this article is to analyze the legal-political architecture of the EMU in order to assess how input legitimacy is institutionalized following the new treaty changes, with particular attention placed on the way democratic inputs affect policy choices designed to fix the sovereign debt crisis. Of special interest here is the extent to which input legitimacy is embedded within a national, as opposed to a supranational, setting and how this relates to satisfying voter demands about retaining national control over fiscal policy. In this context, contestation over how input legitimacy should be articulated is treated as a way of testing

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whether the presence of a constraining dissensus did in fact disrupt attempts to proceed with further integration during the eurozone debt crisis. Overall, the article links together the interactions of the ECB, national political elites, and ordinary voters, demonstrating the relationship between integration and democratic governance is more complex than ever. To this end, the argument proceeds as follows. The theoretical framework used to conceptualize the tensions in the governance of EMU and the EU more generally is put forward in the first section. What follows in the second section is the analysis of how the need to resolve the sovereign debt crisis highlighted the way that input and output legitimacy rub against each other without the latter yielding to the former, notwithstanding superficial appearances to the contrary. Finally, the last section shows how the retention of a national model of input legitimacy—begotten by a constraining dissensus—is increasingly at odds with the Europeanized decision making system underlining the new bailout system. The article concludes by reflecting on what these developments mean for the role of input legitimacy and the effects of the constraining dissensus in the future political economy of European integration. Theoretical Framework: The Two Tensions in Democratic Governance in the EU The EU’s democratic practices have long been a vexing topic, with much scholarly ink spilled over whether European integration has created a fundamental democratic deficit (Føllesdal and Hix 2006) or if the EU should be absolved of such stigma (Moravcsik 2006). This debate over a deficit of democracy is broadly framed in terms of how far the EU mimics nation-state style democratic practices (Ibid.), whereas the aim here is not to compare different ways of institutionalizing political accountability. Instead, this article explores the tensions inherent in EU legitimacy arising from the response made to the eurozone crisis. These tensions exist because of multiple claims of democratic accountability and legitimacy wielded by actors within the EU system (Coultrap 1999; Glencross 2012). In this context, Scharpf’s notion of the twofold nature of democratic legitimacy is particularly useful for understanding dilemmas of EU democracy characterized by competing claims to legitimacy and its use in holding EU institutions to account. The output versus input model of legitimacy is essential for understanding one of two fundamental tensions within EU democratic governance, that is, the rivalry between bearers of output legitimacy, focused on policy effectiveness and with a longer-term perspective afforded by not having to seek electoral mandates, and bearers of input legitimacy, whose preferences and priorities reflect the partisan results of elections. Hence technocratic, unelected institutional actors such as the commission, courts, and the ECB, whose legitimacy comes from delivering policy results, see their decision making challenged by political actors. Another way of conceptualizing this split, using the analysis of delegation pioneered by Giandomenico Majone (2001), is between majoritarian institutions (e.g., parliamentary bodies) and non-majoritarian institutions (e.g., courts or specialized agencies). In the EU, national majoritarian institutions have delegated certain policy competences to expert, nonpartisan institutions such as the commission or the ECB on a fiduciary basis (Ibid.). That is, a fiduciary or trustee acts not as an agent—doing the bidding of the delegating body—but as an independent body responsible for making sure the principals stick to their treaty commitments. This tension between delegating institutions and the trustees to which they have delegated certain policy competences is not just a question of rivalry between majoritarian and non-majoritarian bodies over competence or jurisdiction. In addition to their separate mandates (electoral versus delegated), these institutions have separate time horizons, as illustrated by the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence designed to create conditions for long-term change in the EU legal system rather than scoring immediate political points (Alter 1998). Political bodies are inevitably affected by time inconsistency, i.e., their preferences are dynamic, based on changing voter inputs. In this context, the EU’s apolitical, non-majoritarian bodies are designed to avoid time inconsistency by being purposefully detached from short-term

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electoral exigencies. This separation allows trustees to take decisions necessary for long-term policy success, thereby generating a credible and binding order that national governments cannot overturn for the sake of short-term gains. The bearers of output legitimacy, such as the commission or the ECB, have long time horizons likely to clash with the short-term interests of national governments or with the European Parliament. This does not mean supranational apolitical bodies are completely aloof from public sentiment and the broader political climate. For instance, the ECB “has a strong interest in finding ways to be perceived . . . as accountable and transparent (and within a wider EMU cum EU governance system, responsive) and . . . as acting effectively on behalf of the interest of European or eurozone citizens (output legitimacy)” (Torres 290). Consequently, a moment of crisis such as that experienced by the eurozone since 2010 can be framed as an overt contest between output and input legitimacy and one that reveals how the two interact in practice. Yet the input/output (majoritarian/ non-majoritarian) tension interacts with another fundamental tension within EU democratic governance, one that emerges from the multilevel or compounded nature of this polity. Within member states themselves there is a growing tension between political elites and ordinary voters, which in turn is destabilizing attitudes toward integration among national elites (Hooghe and Marks 2009). This trend contrasts with the situation at the start of the European integration process when questions about how it should be organized and what policies should be pursued were kept largely separate from national politics. Diplomatic deals cut by political elites were insulated from publicity and public opinion, a feature known as the “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). This consensus rested on two elements of trust: citizens’ trust in political elites’ ability to devise a mutually beneficial system of governance that could secure peace, strengthen the state, and increase prosperity, and elite trust that economic integration could achieve all these goals. It is the spread of EU competences that has increased the salience of the integration dimension in national politics (Schmidt 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009). This added saliency has challenged both elite consensus and citizens’ permissiveness toward accepting greater integration. This trend, as well as that of increased media coverage, began with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Hooghe and Marks 2009), which was hugely contentious in many countries. Since this time, mainstream political parties have been forced to reconsider their stance on integration, often revealing internal divisions on a subject they for good reason tried to avoid debating (Eijk and Franklin 2004). Overall, mainstream parties are increasingly divided over what stance they should take on integration as they are confronted by fringe parties able to mobilize Eurosceptic opinion, especially in European parliamentary elections (Mair 2007). Electorates increasingly question the need for further conferral of competences to the EU. The result is that bearers of input legitimacy (i.e., parties and leaders) are subject to a “constraining dissensus,” whereby what they can do at the EU level is increasingly scrutinized and challenged in national politics (Hooghe and Marks 2009). This “dissensus” operates as a domestic constraint on the kind of deals elites can make to solve EU policy problems, thereby adding an extra complication to the tension between elected and unelected institutions. However, the major threat posed by the constraining dissensus articulated within member states is that of rejecting not just output legitimacy—rule for the people, whether by unelected institutions or diplomatic deals made by EU political elites—but also input legitimacy stemming from other countries. Instead of having a single political community, or demos, the EU consists of multiple democratic communities or peoples, which is why it has been described as a “demoicracy” (Nicolaïdis 2004) or “compound democracy” (Fabbrini 2007), rather than a plain democracy. The separate peoples do form, to a degree, a single European-wide democracy through representation in the European Parliament and the supra-majority voting procedure in the council (Coultrap 1999). Yet these compound or aggregated elements coexist

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alongside distinct national democratic practices such as elections to establish governments and sometimes referendums on EU matters. Hitherto, EU democratic governance has accommodated the existence of more than a single democratic political community, leading to the messy coexistence of multiple accountability claims made in the name of different definitions of the people (Glencross 2012). In this context, the growth of a constraining dissensus raises more than just the thorny question of where the hierarchy of democratic legitimacy resides in a multi-layered polity, i.e., at the member state level or not (Ibid.). The attempt to enshrine a national vision of input legitimacy at the same time as reinforcing the non-majoritarian macroeconomic regulatory environment risks creating an even greater division between the preferences stemming from input legitimacy and the rules pursued for output reasons. Therefore the eurozone crisis provides an opportunity to study the interaction of both these tensions as manifested in battles not just over the ECB’s interpretation of its output legitimacy mandate, but also the clashes over how to institutionalize new rules for bailing out countries and ensuring the future stability of the euro. Output Legitimacy and the ECB’s Evolving Monetary Policy As explained above, output legitimacy relates to a non-majoritarian institution’s ability to promote the common welfare of a particular constituency. In the case of the ECB, the output that is rendered legitimate by policy effectiveness—rather than electoral inputs—is price stability (low inflation), from which other macroeconomic benefits flow. This goal is laid out in Article 127 TFEU as the “primary objective” of the European System of Central Banks, although this goal coexists with the more general tasks of coordinating monetary policy for the eurozone, managing foreign exchange for the euro, and supporting “the general economic policies in the Union.” The delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank in this fashion is a development associated with the rise of the “regulatory state” from the 1970s onward (Majone 1996). This model replaced government efforts to manage demand on the premise that central bank independence is the most effective way of controlling inflation, either through instrument independence or goal independence (Fischer 1995). Yet the payoff from this act of governmental delegation is limited to the degree that fiscal policy can affect price stability (Woodford 2000). In this context, central banks are proponents of fiscal discipline, which explains the German Bundesbank’s insistence on the adoption of a Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) during the Maastricht negotiations for EMU (Marsh 2009). As part of the means to secure price stability, fiscal constraints such as those imposed by the SGP (total debt of no more than 60 percent of GDP and annual deficits of less than 3 percent) are designed to convince investors to lend money to governments at sustainable interest rates. When the terms of the SGP had to be jettisoned as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis—necessitating bank recapitalization and leading to sudden tax revenue shortfalls— it was precisely governments’ ability to borrow sustainably that was called into question (Shambaugh 2012). The eurozone sovereign debt crisis, where a succession of countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) were frozen out of the international bond markets and investors got nervous about Spanish and Italian debt, forced a complete overhaul of the EMU. This eventually entailed scrapping the infamous no-bailout clause (which prohibited mutual debt assistance) and reconfiguring the SGP. In addition, a range of political actors called upon the ECB to help not just the general EU economy but specific governments that were punished by the bond markets as the SGP was hollowed out completely. Output legitimacy encountered input legitimacy in terms of debating the proper role and necessary emergency actions of the ECB. However, actors imbued with input legitimacy have no practical direct levers to control the ECB, whose independence from political interference was a sine qua non of monetary integration for the German government at Maastricht and thereafter. Since the very goal of price stability is enshrined in the EU treaties, this objec-

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tive is in effect “constitutionalized,” meaning that it is not part of and subject to ordinary EU political decision making (Bartolini 2010). Only a revision of the treaties—a highly unlikely possibility—could alter this hierarchy of priorities. Nevertheless, in a moment of crisis, the internal decision-making process of the ECB did allow for responsiveness to a novel and potentially catastrophic scenario. It is this responsiveness that needs to be examined in order to understand the functioning of output legitimacy at a time of great policy uncertainty when elected actors sought to influence ECB decision making. In particular, it is important to focus on the strategies followed by the EU’s central bank in order that long-term goals superseded short-term political desiderata. External Pressure and the Implementation of Non-Standard Policies The ECB’s Governing Council, regrouping the governors of the central banks from across the eurozone countries, as well as a six-member executive board, is the key decision-making body of this institution. In May 2010, as the sovereign debt crisis erupted in Greece, the Governing Council took a radical decision to purchase government debt on the secondary market (i.e., from banks and other financial institutions). This bond buying was designed to relieve pressure on governments facing high interest rates for financing their debt, providing them with more time to make the policy adjustments needed to improve public finances and thus reassure investors. Direct purchases from governments are illegal under the EMU rules. ECB intervention in the secondary market (a policy enthusiastically pursued by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve), though not formally prohibited, remains nonetheless highly controversial. This is because of the supposed inflationary risk of flooding markets with this money, as well as the legal uncertainty surrounding a move that could be considered contrary to the spirit of the no-bailout clause (Article 125 TFEU). As a result, the establishment of the Securities Market Program (SMP), eventually involving the purchase of circa ₤75 billion of government debt, led to serious internal conflict within the Governing Council. (Though it was only the April 2011 resignation of the president of the Bundesbank, Axel Weber, that made public the level of internal dissent over SMP.) Indeed, SMP—reauthorized in 2012 under the guise of the potentially much larger Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)—was only one of several “non-standard measures” (Torres 2013) adopted by the ECB in response to the deepening eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The other major policy was the provision of extraordinary liquidity to ailing eurozone banks, which began earlier in May 2009. Already in July 2009, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet described the effects of its unconventional measures as akin to the quantitative easing pursued by British and American central banks (Trichet 2009). Nevertheless, these initial policy measures were succeeded in late 2011 by a second, long-term refinancing operation, followed by a third in February 2012. Time and again, therefore, the ECB acted during the crisis in a way that eased the pressure on governments who were on the hook for bank recapitalization and at risk of having to pay higher interest rates on debt. This remarkable evolution in monetary policy is a testimony to pragmatism, but was it also a response to the innumerable demands for ECB activism by bearers of input legitimacy? External pressure on the ECB came notably from politicians in Mediterranean Europe, with figures from both the left and the right in France notably asking for a change in monetary policy. Already in 2007 the presidential candidates Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal had called for reform of the ECB’s statutes to include a commitment to growth and employment (Esch and Jong 2012). In the summer of 2008, just before the financial crisis hit, France assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers, which Sarkozy used as a platform to denounce interest rate hikes from the ECB, which feared inflationary pressures. This criticism came to naught because of the insulation of the ECB from political control, although it was a sign of things to come as mounting bank debts forced sovereigns in the eurozone to desperate volumes of borrowing.

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In 2011, Sarkozy applied great political pressure to change the composition of the Executive Board as Jean-Claude Trichet stepped down from presiding the ECB. This paid off at least to the extent that it prevented Axel Weber from becoming president. In terms of policy substance, the French president also asked the new ECB president, Mario Draghi, to announce unlimited bond-buying operations—assuming public lender of last resort functions (Grauwe 2011)—on the secondary markets to contain contagion effects on Italian and Spanish public debt. Indeed, the practice of banks using ECB liquidity to purchase government debt in countries facing hikes in borrowing costs entered financial parlance as a “Sarkozy trade.” Naturally, these moves put Sarkozy at odds with Angela Merkel, so much so that on 24 November 2011 the two leaders publicly declared to stop airing their divergences over the ECB’s role in public, a clear sign of the dissensus operating behind the scenes amongst the EU elite. Consequently, the pressure experienced by the ECB to adjust its policies during the eurozone crisis has come largely from outside the ordinary and highly limited accountability process behind EMU. The European Parliament, tasked with providing an annual non-binding report on the ECB’s activities, has nevertheless sought to flex its muscles through the economic and monetary affairs committee. This body questions the ECB president on a trimestral basis and has notably used this platform to advocate plowing ECB liquidity into loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. Moreover, European Parliament president Martin Schulz explicitly supported the creation of OMT in autumn 2012. The European Parliament thus followed other bearers of input legitimacy in calling for a change in policy direction by the ECB. The ECB’s Successful Strategy for Pursuing Long-Term Effectiveness Sometimes portrayed as a purely crisis-management response designed to “compensate for delays and set-backs in the intergovernmental creation of fiscal capacity” (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013) or as “short-term measures” (Vilpišauskas 2013), the ECB’s resort to unorthodox policies is not merely a case of muddling through until market conditions improve. In particular, the introduction of a raft of policy measures seemingly in line with the demands from elected politicians calling for a loosening of monetary policy does not mark a departure from output legitimacy as it may initially appear. Looked at in detail and in relation to the political decisionmaking calendar, the unprecedented market interventions by the ECB were doubly strategic. They were intended to prop up the eurozone economy while also ensuring that long-term effectiveness of the EMU was not undermined by short-term political preferences for looser monetary policy. To achieve this dual objective, the ECB sought to accompany and encourage political actors in taking decisions deemed necessary for the health of the euro in the long run. Therefore, it was the strategic actions of the ECB—using its policy competences rather than relying merely on a different time horizon—that ensured supranational output legitimacy resisted the countervailing pressures of input legitimacy. The ECB’s nonstandard policies were by no means a blank check to insulate banks and governments from the crisis in order to assuage elected actors. Rather, these measures were designed to support eurozone countries without generating moral hazard, and without relieving member states of their obligation to return to fiscal discipline as well as to increase certain kinds of financial solidarity across the eurozone. For a start, SMP was authorized by the ECB’s Governing Council only the day after the creation of a European Financial Stability Fund was announced. In this fashion, the ECB’s move to purchase government debt on the secondary markets was conditional on prior political agreement to supply emergency credit to Greece through the EFSF, i.e., to associate a political remedy with a monetary one. This not only meant transferring responsibility to the member states but also introducing stricter fiscal conditionality than is possible through the ECB emergency measures. In its press release justifying the temporary bond-buying program on the back of the launch of the EFSF, the ECB specifically referred to eurozone countries’ commitment to meet their fiscal targets (ECB 2010). Hence, SMP was not a policy designed to please governments

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under pressure by providing short-term, commitment-free succor. This concern with moral hazard explains why by autumn 2010 the ECB started to worry about banks’ over-reliance on its emergency liquidity (Gabor 2013). This fear was compounded by the fact that banks were using the ECB lending to fund sovereign debt purchases—engaging in the Sarkozy trade—thereby strengthening the inter-dependence between private lending and sovereigns (Shambaugh 2012). In response—and against the preferences of both governments and banks—the ECB acted strategically by changing track. It sought to phase out its emergency bank lending over the course of 2011, suggesting that the EFSF should take on this role while also reducing its SMP bond-purchases (Gabor 2013). At the same time, the ECB insisted on seniority (i.e., precedence in repayment) for its holdings of Greek debt, as the IMF-ECB-Commission troika negotiated a partial default to the tune of €100 billion. ECB holdings of Greek debt had risen substantially during 2010 owing to SMP. Despite the fact that this move scared off investors in other eurozone countries’ debt, the ECB considered a default on its bond holdings as tantamount to an illegal monetization of public debt (as prohibited under Article 123 TFEU). The results of this return to orthodoxy were almost immediate and politically (as well as financially) damaging: Ireland and Portugal followed Greece in requesting a bailout, while Italy and Spain experienced worrying interest rate differentials thereby raising the prospect of further bailouts. As the situation in the eurozone deteriorated 2010–11, the ECB was castigated for exacerbating pressures on government finances and failing to act as a lender of last resort to restore the market confidence necessary to finance otherwise manageable levels of public debt (Grauwe 2011). This criticism targets decisions that increased instability in the shortterm, thereby jeopardizing the ability to provide long-term outputs that are legitimate by virtue of their efficacy. However, by reducing its market interventions and thereby generating market uncertainty, the ECB confronted national governments with the need to contribute themselves to the long-term viability of EMU by taking concrete measures of fiscal discipline allied with financial solidarity. Instead of yielding to external pressure from bearers of input legitimacy, the ECB shaped the strategic space to encourage the political pursuit of long-term solutions to the sovereign debt crisis. As a bearer of output legitimacy, the EU’s central bank did not want political expediency to trump policy effectiveness in the long run. Paradoxically, the fact that the ECB soon backtracked and went all out in its pursuit of unconventional measures actually further demonstrates this strategic intent. This interpretation is borne out by the ECB’s role in negotiations over the European Stability Mechanism, which had its first iteration in July 2011 based on a March agreement by the European Council. The ESM deal was based on a strengthening of the SGP—part of the so-called “six pack” of measures for improving fiscal health in the eurozone—in line with the ECB’s preference for member states to provide temporary financial support rather than fiscal transfers (ECB 2011). It was this political decision, providing borrowing facilities in return for conditionality, that prompted the ECB to extend SMP in April 2011 to purchase Italian and Spanish debt. The ECB clearly preferred a long-term political-fiscal remedy to a purely monetary one, even at the cost of prolonging instability in the short-term. Indeed, the previous pattern seen with the SMP was repeated soon after the ESM deal, as ECB President Trichet expressed concerns over the robustness of the revised SGP rules and continued to point the finger at national fiscal mismanagement, something that ought not be remedied by monetary policy (Gabor 2013). This criticism, alongside market skepticism about the size of the ESM, was the context for a modified ESM announced by the European Council in February 2012. In the new version, the ESM was associated with the so-called Fiscal Compact. This was highly significant as the Fiscal Compact ties provision of emergency financing (including funds going directly to bank recapitalization) to the introduction of national debt brakes to provide medium- and long-term fiscal discipline. It was precisely this more robust version of conditionality that gave the ECB the confidence to establish the OMT—designed as a much

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larger program than the SMP—in August 2012. That is, the OMT purchases of government debt are dependent on that country having requested help from EFSF/ESM and thus subject to strict fiscal conditionality. Finally, the ECB’s actions in the context of the bailout for Cyprus also point to the overarching dual strategy that has characterized the institution during the crisis: an unwavering commitment to fulfill a mandate based on output legitimacy and a desire to facilitate political agreement on long-term reforms. As the sovereign debt crisis struck the eurozone, Cypriot banks used the ECB liquidity to purchase high-risk Greek debt—offering the high returns needed to afford the high interest rates used to attract rich depositors from outside the EU. The ECB pulled the plug on this unsustainable funding model in March 2013, when it gave Cyprus and the EU/IMF a deadline by which to agree a bank recapitalization loan or else lose access to emergency liquidity assistance. In other words, the ECB forced the hand of political actors whose indecision ran counter to taking the drastic measures necessary to save a (possibly contagious) run on Cypriot banks and overhaul the Cypriot banking model. There is ample evidence to suggest that the ECB’s actions—although ostensibly focused on achieving short-term outcomes—were designed to meet long-term objectives rather than to yield to calls for change from bearers of input legitimacy. Moreover, the ECB acted strategically throughout 2010–13 to accompany and encourage political actors—even when its inaction made short-term conditions more unstable—in taking decisions deemed necessary for the health of the euro in the long run. What remains to be seen then is how far the requisite political consensus was affected by the presence of a constraining dissensus across the multiple levels of the EU polity. Input Legitimacy, the Constraining Dissensus, and the Post-Bailout Architecture As noted in the introduction, the eurozone crisis provides an opportunity to see not just the tension between output and input legitimacy over monetary policy but also exactly how input legitimacy is institutionalized in the new legal-political architecture the ECB wanted to see put in place. The spread of a “constraining dissensus” amongst EU member states means that the insulation of national politics from questions about the merits of integration or how it should be organized is now over (Hooghe and Marks 2009). This situation increases the difficulty of reaching consensus over new treaties, especially when this requires electorates to accept a further transfer of competences in salient areas such as macroeconomic policy. In this context, the expectation about the behavior of national politicians is twofold. As well as being tempted to reassure skeptical voters by insisting that input legitimacy—especially as articulated at a national level—trumps output-oriented policy making, national leaders will also operate under increased domestic constraints when it comes to transferring new competences to the EU. This section analyzes the extent to which the presence of a constraining dissensus affected the governance architecture created, as per the desires of the ECB, to stabilize the EMU. To explore this topic, it is necessary to move beyond chronicling instances where bearers of input legitimacy in various countries challenged the choices of output-oriented institutions and existing macroeconomic rules. Instead, the analysis scrutinizes the nature of input legitimacy—notably according to how it defines the political community that provides democratic inputs—institutionalized in the evolving legal-political architecture. What has to be ascertained is whether the influence of the constraining dissensus has been felt in the way input legitimacy is institutionalized and the difficulty present in agreeing to two new treaties: the European Stability Mechanism and the so-called Fiscal Compact. That these treaties were signed and ratified already shows that consensus remains possible among EU elites, even though sixteen EU countries experienced a change in government in the years 2010–12. To measure the potential impact of a constraining dissensus requires a fine-grained analysis of the provisions of these new treaties.

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The European Stability Mechanism First, it is useful to explore the structure of the European Stability Mechanism and how this relates to various conceptions of the political community (or communities) that generates input legitimacy. The ESM was established in 2012 (in its second guise), prompted by the ECB, as a permanent fund to provide emergency loans to countries that ratify the Fiscal Compact. Overall, its mode of functioning suggests that input legitimacy is considered in compounded terms, albeit with certain qualifications, meaning that it is via pan-EU democratic inputs that bailouts should operate. In this case, elite consensus has prevailed over dissensus. The intergovernmental ESM treaty, which operates under EU law but outside formal EU institutional structures (Bardutzky and Fahey 2013), is designed in a way that permits national parliaments in some countries to have a veto power over increasing available ESM funds. In their national implementing legislation, countries such as Germany, Estonia, and Finland have specified that parliamentary approval is required for any rise in capital contributions. In Germany, this measure became necessary following judicial review of the ESM treaty by the Constitutional Court. The latter ruled that there is a limit on how far the executive can commit German taxpayer money without the authorization of the Bundestag, which the constitution entrusts with overall budgetary responsibility (haushaltspolitische Gesamtverantwortung). Significantly, however, the terms of the treaty specified that it would not require unanimity to enter into force. Article 48 provides for entry into force when ratified by member states representing 90 percent of the total capital subscription. In that sense, national political communities—whether through parliamentary or even directly democratic mechanisms—were not granted a veto on the creation of this bailout fund. At the same time, the decision-making procedure of the ESM (within the confines of funds already allocated) relies on a super-majoritarian two-thirds threshold, while also allowing a one-third blocking minority based on countries’ capital share (i.e., countries representing 34 percent of the capital can block a decision). Consequently, the ESM model is consistent with the supranational, compounded—akin to concurrent majorities (Schmitter 2000)—model of democratic decision making typically found in the council. In this way, the existence of a supposed constraining dissensus did not prevent the establishment of a bailout fund with a standard supranational form of decision making. In Ireland, the Supreme Court rejected a legal challenge over the need to ratify this treaty by referendum (as is the case for any constitutional revision), meaning that input legitimacy came in the form of parliamentary ratification through signatory states rather than via direct democracy. As noted in the previous section, the original size of the ESM and the weakness of conditionality it posed when disbursing funds meant the ECB and the financial markets were unconvinced by the nature of the 2011 diplomatic deal, which resulted from the caution of elites aware of domestic constraints. In this case, therefore, it was by virtue of the strategic action of the ECB that the effects of the constraining dissensus were overcome, and a more robust form of conditionality, in the shape of the Fiscal Compact, was adopted. The Fiscal Compact Turning to the Fiscal Compact element of the new post-bailout architecture, it appears that this instrument bears important traces of the impact of a constraining dissensus. This is certainly the case from a British perspective, since David Cameron refused to sign the treaty, because he was concerned that without UK-specific concessions the treaty change might not muster a commons majority to enter into law (Beach 2013). Nevertheless, it was adopted outside EU law by other EU member states, but, more significantly, the Fiscal Compact is predisposed toward a national concept of input legitimacy, reflecting the domestic constraint felt by political elites when negotiating. At the heart of the Fiscal Compact is the implementation of debt brakes or balanced budget rules, which go beyond the strictures of the SGP. According to the terms of the treaty, debt brakes have to be adopted into national (and, if so desired, constitutional) law, although

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these are set to function without a supranational oversight mechanism (Dullien 2012). That is, while the Court of Justice of the EU has been granted competence to check for the actual implementation of debt brakes, it lacks the power to review their functioning. National parliamentary and/or judicial mechanisms will be responsible for the enforcement of the debt brakes in line with the principle that the national arena is responsible for budgetary decision making. Each signatory country has the ability to choose whether to politicize enforcement by using a parliamentary mechanism or delegate enforcement to courts and rely on output legitimacy. A more supranational enforcement model was envisaged at one time, with Germany’s finance minister calling in 2012 for the commissioner for economic and monetary affairs to have a direct say in national budgeting decisions. The rejection of this non-majoritarian regulatory EU-level approach to budgetary decision making is another sign of the constraining dissensus in operation, as agreement was only possible on a less sovereignty-curtailing mechanism for ensuring fiscal discipline. The result leaves national parliaments (and potentially courts) in charge of tax and spending decisions within the parameters of EU-wide fiscal rules. And so the vision of input legitimacy enshrined in the bailout architecture rests on continued reliance on national inputs within a non-majoritarian macroeconomic regulatory environment. It is national political and judicial processes that are expected to find a way to accept and thus legitimize the supranationally decided fiscal framework as it functions in practice, with limited supranational intrusion. In another indication of the constraints facing elites seeking to pool more competences the operation of this national model of input legitimacy was initially deferred. The treaty commitment to pay back 1/20th of total debt over 60 percent of GDP can only be enforced after a three-year period from entry into force of the Fiscal Compact, i.e., not before 2016 (Dullien 2012). This reliance on a national model of input legitimacy leaves little room for a compounded or even supranational variant—peoples deciding in common via their representatives in the European Council or aggregated together in the European Parliament. Consequently, macroeconomic policy for eurozone countries appears to rest on national decision making (to the exclusion of supranationalism) in line with the reinforced regulatory framework of the reconfigured SGP and the Fiscal Compact. Yet there remains an element of fiction in this national-oriented model of input legitimacy. This is because the imposition of stricter budgetary rules on member states is subject to a significant issue of interpretation. The fundamental ambiguity at the heart of this system is the difference between headline budget deficits and structural deficits, with the latter excluding one-off measures and the effects of the business cycle. Since both the new SGP and the Fiscal Compact are based on member states’ cutting structural deficits, there is bound to be an intense definitional debate on the criteria separating headline from structural deficits. Resolving this ambiguity—a precondition for identifying compliance—is not something that can be achieved solely through national channels of input legitimacy. At least this is the evidence from the current operation in practice of this mechanism. The European Commission undertakes an annual review of national fiscal practices, alongside policy recommendations for countries subject to an excessive deficit procedure, and submits this to the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Given the council’s decision-making responsibility for enforcing the SGP, defining the actual kind of deficit any individual eurozone country has is bound to be a pan-European affair, including the input of the commission. In this way, input legitimacy on fiscal matters is not the prerogative of national actors or institutions. This combination or compound of multiple political actors from across member states fits with the already well-noted fact that this crisis has produced a startling Europeanization of fiscal politics (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). Nevertheless, though these rules and their interpretation are the subject of supranational or compounded input legitimacy, the conceit of the Fiscal Compact’s debt brake provision is that the national community is responsible for legitimizing and enforcing them. This separation suggests a disconnect between de facto Europeanization of fiscal decision making and de jure national implementation measures.

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Conclusion: The Future Role of Input Legitimacy and the Constraining Dissensus in the EU’s Political Economy Both the eurozone crisis itself and the EU’s response to it illustrate fundamental characteristics of contemporary European integration. Never before have complicated EU policy debates played such a central role in national politics, as shown by government instability in the face of meeting EU budget rules. Equally, the response to the crisis, notably the evolution of the ECB’s role and the scrapping of the no-bailout policy, shows the EU’s capacity for flexibility. As is the historical trend (Moravcsik 2012), an unexpected situation revealed incompleteness in the stage of integration reached—the construction of monetary union without a banking union—and forced policy makers to respond. The need to compensate for this absence highlighted two tensions in the democratic governance of the EU: that between input and output legitimacy and that between rival national definitions of input legitimacy. In this regard, the EU response to the eurozone crisis reveals important dynamics in the relationship between democracy and integration, notably including the effects of the constraining dissensus in the political economy of European integration. At first glance, input legitimacy, as illustrated by politicians’ calls for a loosening of ECB monetary policy, altered the decision making pursued by the EU’s central bank. Yet the evidence presented in section two showed that the unorthodox policies pursued by the ECB cannot be reduced to either crisis management or kowtowing to input legitimacy. The chronicle of the ECB decision making is one of pursuing a strategic policy that prompted governments to form a political consensus concerning financial solidarity and conditionality. It was only in this context that the ECB pledged to act as lender of last resort. Hence, the bearers of input legitimacy were ineffective in changing the priorities of an institution founded on output legitimacy. Indeed, the ECB’s strategic interactions with EU policy elites have resulted in a policy outcome in which, despite the constraining dissensus, macroeconomic policy is increasingly Europeanized. This Europeanization is the product of treaties that the ECB wanted to see put in place to shore up EMU. The new legal-political architecture privileges a national definition of input legitimacy, at least in the form of the debt brake system, whose operation is not supervised by supranational, output legitimacy institutions such as the Court of Justice or the commission. While it is up to national parliaments and courts to enforce the fiscal rules of the treaty, the very definition of the structural deficit and the decision to start an excessive deficit procedure are inherently supranational, EU-level processes. From this perspective, the tension between national bearers of input legitimacy is yet to be felt fully as the enforcement mechanism of the Fiscal Compact will not apply before 2016. Thereafter, the constraining dissensus, which did not prevent—under German leadership, if not hegemony (Paterson 2011)—the adoption of more robust rules on fiscal discipline, is likely to manifest itself in the form of rival attempts to weaken or enforce these very rules. EMU is thus set to be a battleground for bearers of input legitimacy across eurozone countries over national budgetary policies. A foretaste of these clashes may be seen in the efforts of Italy and France to extend the deadline for meeting the 3 percent rule of the SGP, as well as internecine conflict within the French government over how to cut public spending. Added to this complex equation will be the role of national non-majoritarian institutions such as courts, which in many countries have been delegated the power of supervising compliance with balanced-budget rules. Consequently, the tension between output and input legitimacy may well play out at the national level, as well as EU-wide. What is clear then is that the tensions in EU democratic governance are at the mercy of political economy, in that growth rates and public finances will determine eurozone countries’ ability to abide by the new rules for macroeconomic policies. Since integration in this policy area has not been accompanied by a Europeanized form of representative politics, input legitimacy will continue to be defined in predominantly national terms. In turn, the presence of a constraining dissensus means that input legitimacy at the national level will continue to chafe

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with the policies of output-oriented institutions as well as with the supranational decisionmaking structure of macroeconomic policy. So while, in spite of the constraining dissensus, the EMU was rescued for the present, its future prospects remain uncertain. REFERENCES Alter, Karen (1998). “Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice,” International Organization 52 (1): 121–47. Amtenbrink, Fabian (1999). The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study, Oxford : Oxford University Press. Bardutzky, Samo and Elaine Fahey (2014). “Who Got To Adjudicate the EU’S Financial Crisis and Why? Judicial Review of the Instruments of a Postnational Legal Order: Adjudicating the Practices of the Eurozone” in Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014). Bartolini, Stefano (2010). “Taking Constitutionalism Seriously,” in Andrew Glencross and Alexander Trechsel (eds), EU Federalism and Constitutionalism: The Legacy of Altiero Spinelli, Lanham, MA: Lexington. Beach, Derek (2013). “The Fiscal Compact, Euro-Reforms, and the Challenge for the Euro-Outs,” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 113–33. Berman, Sheri and Kathleen McNamara (1999). “Bank on Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public Oversight,” Foreign Affairs 78: 2. Coultrap, John (1999). “From Parliamentarism to Pluralism: Models of Democracy and the European Union’s ‘Democratic Deficit,’” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (1): 107–35. de Grauwe, Paul (2011). “The European Central Bank: Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Markets?” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3569. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1927783. Dullien, Sébastien (2012). “Reinventing Europe: Explaining the Fiscal Compact.” Available at http:// ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_reinventing_europe_explaining_the_fiscal_compact. Dyson, Kenneth (2009). “The Evolving Timescapes of European Economic Governance: Between Unitary and Differentiated Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy 32(1): 286–306. European Central Bank (2010). “The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis,” ECB Monthly Bulletin, October: 59–74. Fabbrini, Sergio (2007). Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe are Becoming Similar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, Stanley (1995). “Central Bank Independence Revisited,” The American Economic Review 85 (2): 201–6. Føllesdal, Andreas and Simon Hix (2006). “Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (3): 553–62. Gabor, Daniela (2013). “The ECB and the European Debt Crisis,” unpublished paper. Genschel, Philipp and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2013). “Vision vs Process: An Institutionalist Account of the Euro Crisis,” EUSA conference paper. Glencross, Andrew (2012). “The Uses of Ambiguity: Representing the ‘People’ and the Stability of States Unions,” International Theory 4 (1): 107–32. Hall, Peter A. (2012). “The Economics and Politics of the Euro Crisis,” German Politics 21: 355–71. Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2009). “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” British Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 1–23.

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Lane, Philip R. (2012). “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (3): 49–67. Lindberg, Leon and Stuart Scheingold (1970). Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mair, Peter (2007): “Political Opposition and the European Union,” Government and Opposition 42 (1): 1–17. Majone, Giandomenico (1996). Regulating Europe, New York: Routledge. — (2001). “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance,” European Union Politics 2 (1): 103–21. Marsh, David (2009). The Euro: The Politics of the New Global Currency, New Haven: Yale University Press. Moravcsik, Andrew (2006). “What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?” Politische Vierteljahresschrift 47 (2): 219–41. — (2012): “Europe After the Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency,” Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2012. Nicolaïdis, Kalypso (2004). “We the Peoples of Europe,” Foreign Affairs 83:6. Paterson, William E. (2011). “The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49: 57–75. Sadeh, Tal (2012). “The End of the Euro Mark 1: A Sceptical View of European Monetary Union,” in Hubert Zimmerman and Andreas Dür (eds), Key Controversies in European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Scharpf, Fritz (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, Vivien A. (2005). “Democracy in Europe: The Impact of European Integration,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (4): 761–79. Schmitter, Philippe (2000). How to Democratize the EU . . . and Why Bother, London: Rowman and Littlefield. Shambaugh, Jay C. (2012). “The Euro’s Three Crises,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Spring 2012. Torres, Francisco (2013). “The EMU’s Legitimacy and the ECB as a Strategic Political Player in the Crisis Context,” Journal of European Integration 35 (3): 287–300. Trichet, Jean-Claude (2009). “The ECB’s enhanced credit support,” Keynote address at the University of Munich, 13 July. van der Eijk, Cees and Mark Franklin (2004) “Potential for Contestation on European Matters in National Elections in Europe.” In Gary Marks, ed., European Integration and Political Conflict, 32–50. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. van Esch, Femke and Eelke de Jong (2012). “Institutionalisation without Internalisation. The Cultural Dimension of French–German Conflicts on the European Central Bank,” International Economics and Economic Policy 10(4): 631–48. Vilpišauskas, Ramūnas (2013). “Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political Spillback,” Journal of European Integration 35(3):361–73. Woodford, Michael (2000). “Monetary Policy in a World Without Money,” International Finance 3 (2): 229–60.

Change in IMF Policy Advice to North Africa after the Arab Uprisings by Bessma Momani, University of Waterloo, and Dustyn Lanz, Responsible Investment Association The Arab uprisings lead the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to treat Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia differently than it had in previous years. In response to the uprisings in these countries, the IMF has focused more sharply on the social dimensions of its macroeconomic policy advice. By incorporating organizational theory into our analysis, we can appreciate the exogenous and endogenous factors that produced the IMF’s policy change. It appears that the fund had a number of norm entrepreneurs in the management team who noted the need for a paradigm change of fund thinking and a post-Arab uprising reflection on how the social dimension of IMF policy advice was overlooked. Specifically, the IMF has changed its policy advice concerning growth, inequality, and health and education spending. Introduction Across North Africa, feelings of discontent among the population had been on the rise throughout the 1990s and 2000s; it was not until late 2010 that political uprisings and social protests became more pronounced in the region. The Arab uprisings began in Tunisia and soon spread to Egypt. Both of these uprisings resulted in the fall of the entrenched presidencies of their respective countries. In countries like Morocco, constitutional reforms were put in place to heed off continued protests. It seemed as though the winds of political and economic change were about to sweep the Arab world, emanating from popular protests throughout North Africa. Did this seeming monumental moment lead international financial institutions like the IMF to treat and respond to these Arab countries differently than they had in previous years? This paper examines whether relations between the international financial institution and the three North African countries had been affected by the Arab uprisings. Specifically, we ask what degree of change and/or continuity may be observed in IMF policies toward Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. A few years after the Arab uprisings, there is undoubtedly some pessimism about how far transitional countries can and will transform. Indeed, some have observed a retreat to authoritarian ways, particularly in Egypt. Although there remain far too many questions beyond the scope of this article as to what will happen next, the post-Arab uprising moment provides an interesting temporal period to study in the context of evaluating potential change of IMF policies in response to external political changes. One thing is for sure, for a few years after the Arab uprisings, the Arab people had sustained calls for a break with decades of authoritarianism, poverty, chronic unemployment, and social injustice. Among the populist slogans roared by the North African people, many were calling for better accountable governments, more economic growth, and wider distribution of wealth, as well as cleaner governments. Many international institutions and powerful Western states supported or championed this new “democratic turn” in Arab politics. The global mood, so to speak, was favorable to the Arab uprisings. This article, therefore, asks: “Did the IMF change its policy advice to these transitional governments in response to the Arab uprisings?” This article provides a micro-level analysis into measuring the degree of change in IMF policy advice resulting from the Arab uprisings. To answer our central research question, we JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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look for a number of qualitative changes in the IMF’s narrative and framing of its relationship with the three North African states and qualitative changes in the terms of IMF advice on economic policy captured in the annual Article IV consultation reports. To achieve these objectives, we use process tracing, qualitative content analysis, and discourse analysis. Specifically, we conduct a tracing of IMF policy advice given to the North African countries from the mid-2000s to 2013 to capture potential variation and changes in rhetoric, framing, and understanding of the economic conditions that provided the context for IMF policy advice. To achieve both ends, we use IMF official documents, such as annual Article IV Consultations, Regional Outlook Reports, and IMF media transcripts. Furthermore, we supplement these official records with personal interviews and secondary media reports. Indeed, in order to put empirical teeth into an organizational study on policy change, it is useful to trace the process of internal decision making on the matter. In the case of the IMF, due to the retroactive nature of this study, participant observation was not possible. The best available methodology—that is, the methodology that would provide us the most detailed answers to our research question given the data available at hand—is the combined process tracing, qualitative content analysis, and discourse analysis we carried out on IMF staff and Executive Board documents, publicized press releases, and interviews with IMF staff members. This comprehensive qualitative assessment provided us the context through which to trace how the fund processes decisions and policies at an organizational level, which in turn gives us a better understanding of how the IMF, as an institution, responds to change. Using this approach, we find observable changes in IMF policy advice toward Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia that have occurred after the Arab uprisings. Our findings suggest the IMF changed its policy advice in response to the Arab uprisings in substantive ways on issues related to the social dimensions of economic policy. The analysis of this paper further elaborates on why perspectives changed at the IMF by looking at the role of ideational change among IMF staff. Policy Change at the IMF Much of the international politics literature has assumed the IMF is controlled by its key creditors, especially the U.S., which dictates policies that are favorable to their own economic interests (see Kapur 2000). In the case of the IMF, an overwhelming number of studies have argued that this international organization is an agent of an external principal. Usual suspects include the U.S., Western-liberal industrialized countries, systemic capitalist interests, or transnational corporations (Thacker 1999; Killick 1995; Peet 2003; Stone 2011). However, in searching for policy changes, realist approaches argue for a more dynamic process in which change in the nature of the international political system explains change within international organizations. As the global political environment had not changed, the chances of change within organizations like the IMF were highly unlikely (see Taylor 1987). For these realist theorists, international organizations are studied as “empty shells or impersonal policy machinery to be manipulated by other actors” and as having “no ontological independence” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 704). For decades, these realist approaches have dominated the literature on international organizations until principal-agent theory and constructivism provided analytical space for academics to think of international organizations as sociopolitical contexts worth unpacking. This started with the seminal work of Barnett and Finnemore (2004) and was further studied and validated empirically by many other international organization (IO) scholars who decidedly went micro in their analysis to unpack IO policies and give IMF staff agency (ee author 2004). After a decade of writings by numerous international organization scholars who have extensively documented policy changes in the IO, responding to both internal and external stimuli, realist theories have been seriously challenged (see volume by Park and Vetterlein). IO theorists have varied methodologies in approaching the study of international organizations. Nevertheless, a common thread among them is to give international organizations ontological

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purpose. Consequently, IO theory has come to its own by looking at institutions, like the IMF, through critical lenses that do not presume that the fund is controlled by key creditors or other external and internal actors but rather as a place of political contestation and debate where the outcome of policies is not necessarily predictable. To understand international organizations, including the prospects of policy change, IO scholars would be well served by examining the principles and observations from established organization theory. As David C. Ellis aptly contends: IO scholars may be brought together by adopting a corporate paradigm of international organizations instead of a state-centric paradigm of international organizations. Moreover, IO scholars do not need to start from scratch in this endeavor. They may turn to Organization Theory for great insight into the internal workings of IOs. Although OT is confronted by its own epistemological difficulties, its ontology of organizations is superior to that adopted by IO scholars, and its levels of analysis are analogous to that of IO scholars. By adopting a corporate ontology of IOs, IO scholars may conceptualize IO agency and autonomy in more meaningful ways so that greater detail and insight comes from their research. With this movement, the decades-long return to interest in the internal working of IOs will lead to an appropriate and necessary organizational turn in International Organization. (26) According to organizational theory, there are a series of exogenous and endogenous factors to international organizations that may induce organizational changes in perspectives and policies. Exogenous factors that may stimulate policy change in international organizations include structural changes in the international political and economic system, crises and disasters causing shocks to ripple in international organizations, competition between and among international organizations vying for additional jurisdictional turf, changes in international norms and values, and changes in attitudes and policies in the domestic polities of key international members (Kapur 1999: 8–18). Endogenous factors that may provoke change include dissent and conflict within an organization leaving an ideational vacuum, positive leadership with new vision that gains the trust of staff, powerful leaders that co-opt energy-driven individuals that agree to change, and an internal paradigm shift that changes the raison d’etre of an organization (Bennis 2000). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) add that a key element of securing organizational change in perspectives and policies is to have “norm entrepreneurs” spearheading change both within and outside of the organization. These norm entrepreneurs are dissatisfied with the status quo and seek some form of change. Similarly, there is a series of exogenous and endogenous factors to international organizations that may resist organizational change in perspectives and polices. Exogenous factors that may resist change include the veto power held by states and other international organizations, denial of financial resources to implement change by external actors and ideological and norm change resistance outside of the organization. Arguably more important, there are endogenous factors that resist organizational change, given “the sociology of institutions is fundamentally antichange” (Bennis 2000: 492 emphasis added). Simply put, organizations are comprised of individual personalities and vested interests. Consequently, “organizations resist change because people resist change” (Heffron 1989: 154). Organization theorists contend that staff often resist change because they fear the unknown, have selective attention and retention to new information, prefer habit and routine, need security of the known, and feel threatened by change (Trice and Beyer 1993: 393–428). At the group level, organizations resist change because there is a lack of trust, differing perceptions and goals, social disruption with change, a limitation of resources to devote to change and, most importantly, change requires a change in an embedded organizational culture (Ibid.). Organizational theory expects that in the process of introducing policy changes, organizations set ideal standards and goals, but often end up with solutions that effectively satisfy all vested interests in the organizations.

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IMF Policy Advice to North Africa: The Social Dimension after the Arab Uprisings This section looks at qualitative evidence to examine for possible variation of IMF policy advice toward three case countries that were affected by the Arab uprisings. As our tables in the Appendix demonstrate, in all three North African countries there are visible changes concerning the social dimension of IMF economic advice. Prior to the Arab uprisings, numerous studies documented how the IMF staff had a difficult time assessing the impact of IMF policies on what it calls the “social dimension”—this includes policies affecting poverty, equity concerns, unemployment, and provision of social services like health and education. The internal rethinking of IMF policies toward the social dimension began in the early 1990s under the former managing director Michel Camdessus, who once noted that “we [at the IMF] are striving to improve the design of our programs to ensure a better blend of adjustment, growth, and equity and, in particular, to ensure that the plight of the poor is properly recognized” (Camdessus 1990: 11). The goal was “high-quality growth” whereby the fund would maintain its objective of designing programs that promoted overall economic growth, but these programs would be mindful of and steer away from potentially negative social and distributional effects (Ibid.). For the first time, Camdessus brought equity concerns onto the IMF agenda, marking a change in previous internal arguments that the IMF staff had no business in what had been considered a sovereign matter of its member states. Camdessus’ view of how to improve equity was starting to align with the World Bank’s view that spurring economic growth was part of the remedy to inequality. One year after introducing the term “high-quality growth” into fund parlance, all IMF department heads were told to consider the effect of IMF programs on the poor in all IMF lending programs (Boughton 2001: 698, fn 144). Management’s emphasis on “high-quality growth” made poverty reduction and economic growth conceptually inseparable in the 1990s (IEO 2007: 33). Despite having a managing director be a norm champion of policy changes about the social dimension of the fund’s economic policy advice throughout the 1990s, IMF staff did not internalize these changes for several years. Fund research papers written by IMF staff after Camdessus had often argued that it was objectively difficult to carry out social impact studies of IMF policies and advice given the lack of data (Momani 2010). Moreover, the IMF had pointed out there were a number of counterfactual arguments that could be made to explain why IMF programs produced negative social costs; in particular, the lack of implementation or government “slippage,” the short-sighted nature of measuring social costs, the condition of borrowing countries before taking on fund loans, and global economic pressures (Ibid.). Despite mandated self-reflection by fund management, however, IMF staff tended to avoid using the terms “poverty” and “inequality” as social factors. Instead, economic growth and income distribution were discussed in macroeconomic terms (Vetterlein 2008). Our research suggests the IMF, in response to the Arab uprisings, had another moment of truth where its views on the impact of its policies on the social dimension had altered its perspective on economic advice to Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. To emphasize, our paper does not argue that IMF policy has changed. Rather, we trace how the IMF’s perspective on its policy prescriptions is itself undergoing change. Specifically, IMF policy advice was visibly different in inclusive growth, redistribution and inequality, and emphasis on health and education spending. As supported by the tables in the Appendix, the following section is divided into three chronologically organized subsections that make reference to IMF staff reports and news articles in order to show the IMF has indeed changed its discourse and thinking on these more populist topics, and, as we posit, it has done so in response to the Arab uprisings. Inclusive Growth The term “inclusive growth” refers to economic growth that is “sustainable and effective in reducing poverty.” Used in this context, the concept of inclusiveness comprises “equity, equality of opportunity, and protection in market and employment transitions.” Prior to Arab

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Spring, the term inclusive growth was completely absent from the IMF’s communications with, and objectives in, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Instead, the fund advocated a simpler, less-qualified approach to growth that did not prioritize inclusiveness. Rather than prioritizing inclusiveness alongside economic growth, the IMF’s previous approach viewed “growth” and “inclusiveness” as two distinct variables. Although the term “inclusive” was formerly absent from the IMF’s lexicon, the IMF’s use of related terminology indicates that it actually viewed “growth” and socioeconomic “inclusion” as independent and dependent variables, respectively (Momani 2010). To illustrate, following a visit to Morocco in 2006, Agustín Carstens, former IMF deputy managing director, publicly stated that for Moroccans “a significant acceleration of growth is required in order to enable a more rapid job creation and improvement in the standard of living” (IMF 2006d). Carstens’s comments indicate the IMF’s perception of a dependent relationship between growth and socioeconomic inclusion. Similarly, in 2007, former IMF Deputy Managing Director Murilo Portugal made comments about Tunisia that paralleled those of Carstens’s. Portugal stated that the main challenge for Tunisia and the other Maghreb countries was “to reach an even higher sustained growth path that would enable the region to reduce the still high unemployment rates and raise living standards faster” (IMF 2007b). Here, it is clear that Carstens and Portugal viewed economic growth as a precursor to improving living standards. In this approach, the concept of inclusiveness is not a central issue, because accelerated growth is assumed to improve living standards, which implies less poverty and more prosperity for all. Thus growth, without qualification or exception, was the primary objective. Consistent with this line of thought, the IMF regularly championed unqualified fiscal consolidation. In 2006, the IMF advised the Moroccan government to “take advantage of the favorable economic environment to pursue a more rapid pace of fiscal consolidation, which remains a key objective to support strong and sustainable growth” (IMF 2006b). Here, the IMF viewed unqualified consolidation as a precursor to “sustainable growth.” Similarly, in 2006, the IMF advised Egyptian authorities that “fiscal consolidation is central to achieving [their] growth objectives (IMF 2006a). Yet these pro-consolidation arguments offered no qualifications or conditions. The IMF’s prescriptions for fiscal consolidation were not particularly concerned with social outcomes. Moreover, they were equally unconcerned with human capital development and aggregate demand management. To borrow the language of Paul Krugman, “It was simply assumed that these countries could be run like companies” (Krugman 1996). Prior to 2011, neither consolidation nor growth strategies were guided fundamentally by societal objectives. This fact contrasts sharply with events in the post-Arab uprising era (1996). Since 2011, the IMF has adopted a new approach to growth in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. The IMF now views inclusiveness and improved livelihoods as intrinsic features of its growth strategies. A statement made by Masood Ahmed, IMF director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, leaves little doubt that the Arab Spring propelled the IMF toward its new perspective on inclusiveness. In February 2011, Ahmed explained, “The recent events [in Tunisia, Egypt, and across the Middle East] brought into sharp focus the need for more inclusive growth and better governance” (IMF 2011a). A recent IMF report on Morocco elaborated the reasoning behind the IMF’s new support for inclusiveness. The report explains: Addressing inclusiveness in growth is not only important for redistributive purposes and to ensure social cohesion, but also because non-inclusiveness can have detrimental effects on economic activity and macroeconomic stability through a number of economic, social, and political channels. (IMF 2013) Following up on the February comments, Ahmed said in October 2011 that “measures aimed at restoring confidence and fostering more inclusive growth will help [Middle Eastern] countries enhance activity and ultimately address the needs of the population” (IMF 2012a). In contrast to Carstens and Portugal’s remarks made in 2006 and 2007, respectively, Ahmed’s

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2011 statements indicated that inclusiveness and “the needs of the population” are central tenets of a growth strategy. The IMF now explicitly advocates inclusive growth. In September 2012, IMF staff advised the Tunisian government to “lay the ground for a comprehensive set of reforms to achieve higher and more inclusive growth and reduce unemployment in a sustainable way” (IMF 2012e). The new emphasis on inclusive growth brings with it a stronger emphasis on human capital development and financial inclusion. In December 2012, IMF staff member Jean-François Dauphin argued that Morocco was in need of structural measures to promote investment in human capital as part of a strategy to realize higher, more inclusive growth (IMF 2012d). Moreover, an April 2013 IMF report advised Egyptian authorities to improve access to financing, particularly for small enterprises (IMF 2012a). Today, the IMF’s language and policy recommendations significantly diverge from the pre-2011 era. The concepts of socioeconomic inclusion, human capital development, and financial inclusion are now embedded in growth strategies. In short, economic policies are now guided by societal objectives. Again, this contrasts sharply with Carstens’s and Portugal’s earlier comments, which viewed economic growth and socioeconomic inclusion as entirely separate variables. As the table in the Appendix shows, there are marked differences in the IMF approach to all three countries in regard to inclusive growth. Redistribution and Inequality The second category in which the IMF has changed its policy advice concerns inequality and redistributive policies. Before the Arab uprisings, IMF staff did not make explicit recommendations to address inequality or to enhance redistributive polices. Additionally, on some occasions IMF staff advocated fiscal tightening which, without qualification, was likely to exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities. However, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, IMF staff made explicit recommendations to address inequality and to enhance redistributive polices. Moreover, following the Arab uprisings, IMF staff have attached crucial qualifiers to their recommendations. Tracing the IMF staff’s recommendations and appraisals of policies in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia from 2006 supports this claim. In 2006, the IMF’s staff reports on Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia made zero recommendations to address inequality or to enhance redistributive policy (IMF 2006ace). The same holds true for 2007 (IMF 2007acd). In that year, IMF staff recommended fiscal consolidation without attaching conditions, such as protecting the poor from the negative impacts of consolidation. In its 2007 staff report for Egypt, IMF staff wrote, “Achieving the short and medium-term fiscal targets will require policy measures such as forceful reductions in energy subsidies . . .[and] continued retrenchment in the wage bill” (IMF 2007a). IMF staff made similar recommendations in its 2007 report on Tunisia. “Further consolidation is necessary to maintain long-term fiscal sustainability” (IMF 2007d). To be certain, the IMF still advocates fiscal consolidation for highly indebted countries and it continues to criticize Egypt’s energy subsidies today. There is an important difference between the IMF’s positions before and after the Arab uprisings. In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the IMF now accompanies its pro-consolidation strategies with recommendations to protect the poor from the negative impacts of consolidation. Consistent with previous years, IMF staff made no recommendations to address inequality or to enhance redistributive policy for our case countries in 2008 and 2009. It was only in 2010, just as unrest was beginning to brew in the Arab Spring countries, that the IMF began to change its language on inequality and redistribution. Although there was no staff report for Morocco in 2010, IMF staff advised the Tunisian government that the “key pillars” of its effort to reduce public debt should include “better targeting of transfers and subsidies to the most needy” (IMF 2010c). IMF staff gave the same advice to Egyptian authorities in 2010. In that year, IMF staff wrote that “priorities [for reducing Egypt’s fiscal deficit] include . . . complementing energy subsidy reform with better-targeted transfers to the most needy” (IMF 2010a).

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Although IMF staff changed the IMF’s language in 2010, it was only in 2011 that staff began to make explicit recommendations to address inequality and to enhance redistributive policy. There were no staff reports for Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, but IMF Director Masood Ahmed made comments that indicate a stark contrast with the IMF’s previous strategies. In 2011, Ahmed said of the MENA region: “In our view, it is crucial that governments help poor households, and even more so during difficult periods” (IMF 2011a). In the same interview, Ahmed said of Tunisia: “[In] going forward . . . and [recognizing] the full potential of the Tunisian economy, there will be a need for programs to enhance job-creating and inclusive growth, and to design a well-targeted social safety net that would protect the most needy, especially in difficult times” (IMF 2011a, emphasis added). Here, there is a distinct change in tone. Protecting the needy had not previously been a central feature of the IMF’s recommendations. IMF staff took the same position in the 2011 staff report for Morocco: “A well-targeted subsidy system will be less costly and would better support the poor . . . [and] universal subsidies should be replaced by targeted transfers, which would allow for more effective social spending, providing more room for social protection and health and education spending” (IMF 2011b). Here, IMF staff explicitly acknowledge the need for enhancing redistributive policies and provide more nuanced critiques of subsidies, which now attach key qualifications such as protecting the poor. In 2012, trends toward addressing inequality and enhancing redistributive policies became more pronounced. An excerpt taken from the IMF’s 2012 staff report on Tunisia shows a significant departure from the IMF’s previous positions: Addressing pockets of poverty and implementing targeted policies to protect the most vulnerable groups in the population will be needed. Revised poverty estimates indicate that poverty rates and inequality are higher than previously stated, in particular in the underdeveloped regions of the interior. At the same time, improving the quality of spending––by putting in place a targeted social safety net and shifting budgetary resources to infrastructure investment, education, and health––should improve growth prospects and social outcomes. (IMF 2012e, emphasis added) This excerpt contains two key highlights. The first is the IMF’s explicit consideration for inequality. Although the IMF had previously focused on raising living standards, it did not explicitly consider inequality before the Arab uprisings. The second highlight is the IMF’s advocacy for redistributive policies to improve both growth prospects and social outcomes. In 2012, the IMF’s staff report for Morocco echoed these policy recommendations. In that report, IMF staff welcomed the Moroccan government’s plan to implement “transfers targeting the poorest segments of society and possibly the lower middle class” (IMF 2012b). These positions contrast sharply with the IMF’s previous positions, which did not explicitly favor or advocate policies to address inequality or to enhance redistributive policy. There was no staff report for Egypt in 2012. The trend continued in 2013. In that year, IMF staff wrote that one of the “most immediate challenges” for Egypt is to “protect the most vulnerable segments of the population” (IMF 2012a). In the same year, IMF issued explicit policy recommendations to reduce income inequality in Morocco (IMF 2013). According to IMF staff: Reducing income inequality would require strengthening redistribution policies. For this purpose, a reallocation of government spending would be needed to free resources for the social sector. The increase of the budgetary resources in the social sector could be obtained through reforming the current subsidy scheme, and redirecting savings from this reform to well-targeted social programs. Increasing social expenditure for disadvantaged groups would allow reducing inequality and sustaining demand in the short/mediumterm. (IMF 2013: 14) In the above quote, IMF staff are explicitly recommending redistributive policies to address income inequality in Morocco. IMF staff made similar remarks for Tunisia. “Generating higher and more inclusive growth to absorb high unemployment and reduce social and eco-

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nomic disparities across regions is the key challenge for Tunisia” (IMF 2012a). Here, the IMF views inclusive growth as the means to the ends of reducing social and economic inequality In 2013, Adnan Mazarei, deputy director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, argued that Egypt’s fuel subsidies were regressive and should be replaced by well-targeted transfers to benefit the poor (The New America Foundation 2013). Mazarei said that replacing fuel subsidies, which primarily benefit the affluent, with strong “social safety nets” for the poor would result in a redistribution of wealth that would in turn help to mitigate potential social unrest resulting from subsidy reform (The New America Foundation 2013). Regarding the IMF’s apparent departure with its pre-Arab Spring perspectives, Mazarei stated, “The world is changing, and we [the IMF] have to change with it . . . we discuss issues and concerns with NGOs, but we feel and they feel we need to do a better job” (The New America Foundation 2013). Strengthening Education and Health Services and Spending The third category in which the IMF has changed its policy advice is education and health policy. Tracing the recent history of international relations between the IMF and our case countries reveals a change in attitudes toward government spending on health and education programs in the wake of the Arab Spring. Specifically, there has been a significant change in the IMF’s language and policy recommendations regarding health and education spending and services. Whereas before 2011, the IMF was scarcely concerned with expanding health and education spending and services, it now makes explicit recommendations to expand health and education spending and services. An examination of the IMF’s staff reports for our three case countries, dating back to 2006, supports this proposition. In the IMF’s 2006 staff reports on the Article IV consultations with Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, IMF staff made zero recommendations to expand heath and/or education services (IMF 2006ace). The same holds for 2007 (IMF 2007acd) and 2008 (IMF 2008; IMF 2009ab). In fact, in 2008, IMF staff issued a warning against Egypt’s proposed expansion of health care services, which the IMF said would “pose a significant burden on the budget” (IMF 2009a: 14). In 2009, IMF staff again made no recommendations to expand health and/or education services in Tunisia (IMF 2009b). In the same year, although IMF staff noted that strengthening education and health services would be important for improving Morocco’s social indicators (IMF 2010b), staff did not explicitly recommend expanding services or spending. There was no 2009 staff report for Egypt. In 2010, the IMF again made no recommendations to expand health and/or education services for Egypt (IMF 2010a) and Tunisia (IMF 2010c). In contrast, IMF staff prioritized containing the cost of pension and health expenditures in Egypt (IMF 2010a). There was no 2010 staff report for Morocco. However, in 2011, the story changed dramatically. Staff reports for all three countries began to advocate expansionary health and education programs. For example, in 2011, IMF staff made recommendations to Moroccan authorities to help officials allocate funds for universal health care and education (IMF 2011b). Also in 2012, the IMF greatly emphasized health and education spending as key contributors to inclusive growth, which it now viewed as a priority for Morocco (IMF 2012b). In the same year, Jean-Francois Dauphin, division chief of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia Department, argued that Morocco should ramp up its efforts to improve social indices, such as the illiteracy rate, and expand access to health services and education (Morocco World News 2012). For Dauphin, structural reforms capable of freeing up funds to improve social protection and invest more in human capital were now crucial to the viability of Morocco’s public finances (Morocco World News 2012). A similar story unfolded for Tunisia. In 2012, IMF staff said that health and education were now “priority spending” for Tunisia (IMF 2012e). The IMF advocated the use of public funds for “enhancing vocational training” to address skill mismatches among Tunisia’s labor force (IMF 2012e). In the same year, IMF staff advised Tunisian authorities to reform the country’s subsidy system and argued such reforms could make room in the government’s bud-

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get to reallocate fiscal resources for expanding infrastructure, health, and education outlays, which would better address “social demands” (IMF 2012e). Here, the IMF’s use of the term “social demands” is critical. It reflects a change in both the IMF’s language and approach to economic policy making. Instead of advocating unqualified macroeconomic growth to resolve social problems, the approach is now to more explicitly embed social demands into economic policy making. The trend continued in 2013. In that year, IMF staff recommended “shifting budgetary resources to infrastructure investment, education, and health . . . [and] improve growth prospects and social outcomes” (IMF 2012a) for Egypt. Here, the IMF advocated education and health spending as antecedents to economic growth. This contrasts sharply with the IMF’s previous approaches to growth in our case countries, which supported fiscal consolidation as an antecedent to economic growth (IMF 2006b). Also in 2013, IMF staff advocated policies to improve the quality of, and access to, health services in Morocco (IMF 2013). Analyzing IMF Policy Change By incorporating organizational theory into our analysis, we can appreciate the dynamics that produced the IMF’s policy change. To the extent that we can attribute the IMF’s shift in discourse to any overarching force it would be, in fact, change as it emerged from the series of exogenous and endogenous factors that arose in the aftermath of the Arab uprising throughout the three countries under study. On the internal front, it appears that the fund had a number of norm entrepreneurs, such as Christine Lagarde, Nehmat Shafik, and Masood Ahmed in the management team who noted the need for a paradigm change of IMF thinking and a post-Arab uprising reflection on how the social dimension of IMF policy advice was overlooked. However, unlike in the 1990s when former managing director Camdessus tried to mandate high-quality growth, we also see a supportive and enabled staff that was motivated to change policy course following the Arab uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Furthermore, the fund had a supportive external political environment where powerful G8 states wanted to support the Arab countries after their uprisings through the Deauville Partnership. These factors are further elaborated in this section. To begin, we found a great deal of evidence of positive leadership from IMF management who articulated a need for an internal paradigm shift as a result of the Arab uprisings. In a speech hosted by the Safadi Foundation at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., in December of 2011, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde noted: We all learned some important lessons from the Arab Spring. While the top-line economic numbers—on growth, for example—often looked good, too many people were being left out. And, speaking for the IMF, while we certainly warned about the ticking time bomb of high youth unemployment in the region, we did not fully anticipate the consequences of unequal access to opportunities. Let me be frank: we were not paying enough attention to how the fruits of economic growth were being shared. It is now much clearer that more equal societies are associated with greater economic stability and more sustained growth. While each country in the region must find its own path to change, the over-arching economic goals of the Arab Spring remain clear—higher growth, growth that creates more jobs, and growth that is shared equitably among all strands of society. (IMF 2011c, emphasis added) Lagarde’s remarks reflect the IMF’s increased sensitivity and appreciation of the social dimensions of its policy design following the events of the Arab Uprisings. Similarly, in 2011, the Masood Ahmed stated: We are witnessing an historic shift in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It is clear that the popular uprisings that began 10 months ago were born of a desire for greater freedom and for a more widespread and fairer distribution of economic opportu-

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nities. . . . Like others, we had pointed to the ticking time bomb of high unemployment, but we did not anticipate the consequences of the unequal access to opportunities. We had focused our efforts on helping countries in the region build solid macroeconomic foundations, liberalize economic activity, and introduce market-based reforms that would generate higher economic growth. IMF lending, policy advice, and technical assistance have indeed contributed to improving the economic indicators of many countries in the region. However, with hindsight, it is clear that we were not paying enough attention to how the benefits of economic growth were being shared. (Ahmed 2011, emphasis added) Moreover, speaking at a news conference during his visit to Tunisia in November 2012, David Lipton, first deputy managing director of the IMF, stated in light of high unemployment rates of Arab youth and the resulting social turmoil that ensured during the Arab uprisings, “The time has come to implement reforms that can deliver higher and more inclusive growth and create new jobs for millions of people” (Al-Arabiya News 2012). Similarly, in her remarks at Arab Economic Forum in Beirut in May of 2012 regarding the current political and economic realities of the MENA region, IMF Deputy Managing Director Nemat Shafik noted how the IMF needed to change its policies: For its part, the IMF is not sparing any efforts to support homegrown reform agendas [in Arab transition countries]. We are helping on three main fronts: Policy advice, capacity building, and financing. On policy advice, we have adapted our analytical work to face the new realities on the ground. The IMF is integrating the concept of inclusive growth more systematically in its policy advice and capacity building. We are focused on five areas critical to achieving more socially inclusive growth than in the past—job creation, better-targeted social safety nets, strong governance and business environments, access to finance, and greater trade access and integration. (IMF 2012e, emphasis added) Shafik also remained optimistic about the outcome of the Arab Spring, while also highlighting the need for a more substantive policy approach in order to ensure economic and political stability in the MENA region. Shafik reiterated these views in 2012: “The uprisings that spread across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 taught us that even rapid economic growth cannot be maintained unless it is inclusive, creates enough jobs for the growing labor force, and is accompanied by policies that protect the most vulnerable. And the absence of transparent and fair rules of the game will inevitably undermine the development process” (Shafik 2012, emphasis added). Again, the above statements of key members of the IMF management team were further supported by a supportive IMF staff. In personal interviews with IMF staff members, we see evidence of this rethinking on the social dimension of fund policies. One IMF staff member, for example, stated: Tunisia, just before the [Arab] Spring, we had an Article IV report that everything was glowing, and then it falls apart. If we had talked to CSOs [civil society organizations] would we have known? No one saw it falling apart the way it did but we would have heard different things. Good [IMF staff] have been doing this all along. They get their economists out and they visit factories and they see something real, but there’s this idea that we’re macroeconomists and we just don’t do that, and that’s just wrong. (Interview 18 March 2013) With support from management and an internalization of this shift in views among staff, there remains the question, “Why now?” Here, we found a number of themes from staff members’ interviews. One staff member noted, “The world out there has changed. One, staff has to realize that they don’t know much about the world. Two, decision making is becoming more pluralistic. Now you have to go out and explain things and moderate” (Interview 18 March 2013). This was echoed by another staff member who, noted: We’re [IMF] an organization that realizes that the world is much more integrated. Information is everywhere and before we had this sort of vertical way of looking at the world where

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we were at the top looking at the finance and central bank where policies were implemented and nobody else really had a voice. Now it’s much more horizontal and much more integrated and everybody has a voice, and we have to be able to hear those voices. We can’t just communicate “at,” we have to communicate “with.” (Interview 19 March 2013) Similarly, underscoring the changes that the IMF has undergone in recent years, the IMF’s Masood Ahmed also stated in an interview in Dubai in May 2013, that “the IMF itself today is not the IMF that many countries remember from the 1990s. Every country has to find its own way and the IMF has to work with them to ensure that the policies that they are implementing meet the objectives that we and they share” (Shahine and Rastello 2013, emphasis added). Finally, in an interview during the 2013 World Economic Forum conference on the Middle East and North Africa, Ahmed stated that as the consequences of the Arab uprisings continue to manifest themselves, “The big challenge . . . is to manage the expectation of an increasingly impatient population to undertake the measures that will stabilize the economy and would begin to lay the foundations of an economic transformation that would generate more job creating and inclusive growth” (Al-Khalidi 2013, emphasis added). What is more, Lagarde has noted that in order to promote real political, economic, and social change, the countries of the Arab Spring must have the “firm support of the international community” (United Press International 2014). Here we have seen external support for Arab transition countries in the form of the Deauville Partnership. The Deauville Partnership was initiated by the G8 members on 26–27 May 2011 to connect its developed economies with Arab countries undergoing the political and economic transition to good governance and inclusive economic growth. The Deauville Partnership envisioned the development of economic cooperation to assist Arab governments undergoing rapid social and political transitions. The IMF and the World Bank were further tasked with assessing the MENA region in order to help G8 members formulate coordinated economic policies with an expanded list of partner countries— namely, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, and Morocco. The fund recommended a greater emphasis on the social dimension and suggested this be further seized upon with good governance, coordinated economic and foreign donor policies, and stronger intra-regional economic integration and coordination under the auspices of the G8. Supported by IMF studies, there was G8 acceptance of fund recommendations for inclusive economic growth that considered the social dimension of IMF economic policy advice. The G8 continued to endorse IMF policies and ideas on ways to promote better policy reform in the Arab countries experiencing uprisings. Moving Forward: IMF Relations with Arab Transition Countries Although IMF policy advice now focuses on inclusive growth, inequality, and health and education spending, its advice on improving these social dimensions remains vague compared to its advice on other topics such as financial, monetary, and broader fiscal policy. For instance, the IMF often identifies specific targets for inflation management and deficit reduction and assesses countries’ banking sectors against specific capital and liquidity ratios outlined by the Basel Accords. IMF staff do not identify such specific targets for achieving inclusive growth, improving health and education outcomes, and reducing inequality. Nor do they assess governments’ performance in these areas against benchmarks. These ambiguities leave room for doubt about the IMF’s commitment to improving the social aspects of economic policy. Although the IMF has sharpened its focus on the social dimension of economic policy, the fund’s narrow scope of expertise impedes its ability to deliver well-rounded policy advice. The IMF typically recruits only economics graduates, hiring almost exclusively those with backgrounds in macroeconomics, international economics, monetary economics, public finance, econometrics, and financial economics. This is understandable given that the IMF has historically focused primarily on financial and macroeconomic policies, while providing less attention to the social dimensions of policy outcomes. With its recent emphasis on inclusive

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growth, enhanced health and education outcomes, and reducing inequality, the IMF should possess a more diverse range of expertise. To reinforce its commitment to improving the social implications of macroeconomic policy IMF staff may wish to consider the following policy recommendations: First, the IMF should develop more specific and tangible policy advice for countries to achieve inclusive growth, reduce inequality, and improve health and education outcomes. The IMF could lend its technical expertise to governments by advising them not only that they should improve performance on social dimensions but also how they might do so. For instance, in developing policy advice to catalyze inclusive growth in a particular country, the IMF could draw lessons from other countries and other organizations, such as the World Bank and United Nations, who both have longer histories in dealing with the social dimensions under consideration. Second, the fund could also identify specific targets for achieving inclusive growth, improving health and education outcomes, and reducing inequality. Such targets could include country and region-specific Gini coefficient improvements and customized healthcare and education benchmarks. Setting specific targets and drawing from other experience to achieve those targets could enable the Fund to have a more robust impact on the social dimensions of policy formation. If the IMF wants to further achieve inclusive growth, reduce inequality, and improve health and education outcomes, then it should diversify its expertise. Rather than recruiting almost exclusively economists, the IMF should recruit analysts whose expertise lies in other branches of economics and social sciences. Third, recruiting development economists, health economists, and other social scientists whose expertise focuses squarely on the social dimensions and impact of public policy would strengthen the fund’s ability to improve social outcomes. This proposed diversification of expertise could take the form of a special new division of staff responsible for assessing the social implications of fund policy strategies. Alternatively, it could simply mean the IMF brings alternative perspectives into existing divisions/departments, which would create a multidisciplinary approach to policy analysis and development. Conclusion In contrast to rationalist approaches that view international organizations as “empty shells” affected by outside actors, understanding how organizations such as the IMF respond to change from within and without provides a more nuanced and contextualized paradigm from which we may begin to trace the forces that lead to such change, and, perhaps more importantly, to put forth policy recommendations that effectively respond to key shifts in the global political environment. By using process tracing with internal IMF documents and media reports, we were able to discern the IMF policy advice to Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. In all three cases there were visible differences in the type of economic policy advice prescribed to the three North African states. Specifically, there were visible differences in the social dimension of economic advice, in three issue areas: inclusive growth, redistribution and inequality, and an emphasis on health and education spending. The IMF has become more sensitive to the social and populist revolutions of the Arab world and has changed its policy advice to reflect this sensitivity. The IMF’s greater emphasis on the social dimensions of economic policy is a welcome transition. There are several areas of ongoing concern that could hinder the fund’s commitment to improving the social dimension of its policies. In response to the uprisings in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, IMF staff members have changed their perspectives and language regarding the social dimensions of economic policy. By incorporating organizational theory into our analysis, we can appreciate the exogenous and endogenous factors that produced the IMF’s policy change. It appears that the fund had a number of norm entrepreneurs, such as Christine Lagarde, Nehmat Shafik, and Masood Ahmed in

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the management team who noted the need for an IMF paradigm change of thinking and a postArab uprising reflection on how the social dimension of IMF policy advice was overlooked. In the wake of the uprisings, the IMF now explicitly promotes inclusive growth, reduced inequality, and increased attention and spending on health and education services. Although this change is laudable, there is room for improvement. The IMF could reinforce its commitment to improving the social dimensions of public policy by offering more tangible policy advice for governments to achieve inclusive growth, reduced inequality, and to improve health and education outcomes. The fund should also consider broadening the scope of its expertise. By implementing real change in the three issue-areas explored in this paper, the IMF would be better positioned to deliver on its commitment to improving the social outcomes of economic policy. REFERENCES Al Arabiya News. (2012, November 16). Fragile recovery of Arab economies at risk: IMF. Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Retrieved August 16, 2013, from http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/16/249968.html. Al-Khalidi, S. (2013, May 25). Arab spring nations face delayed economic recovery: IMF. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved August 19, 2013, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/26/us-imf-middleast-economy-idUSBRE94P00720130526. Ahmed, Masood (2011) “What the Arab Spring has Taught Us” IMF Direct Blog. Retreived January 29 2014. http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2011/10/19/what-the-arab-spring-has-taught-us/. Anand, R., Mishra, S., and Peiris, S. (2013). Inclusive Growth: Measurement and Determinants. Washington: IMF. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13135.pdf. Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organization. International Organization, 43(4), 699–732. Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. New York: Cornell University Press. Bennis, W. (2000). Managing the Dream. Cambridge: Perseus Books. Boughton, J. (2001). Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Camdessus, M. (1990). Aiming for ‘High Quality Growth.’ Finance and Development, 27, 10–11. Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917. Heffron, F. (1989). Organization Theory and Public Organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. IMF. (2006a). Arab Republic of Egypt: 2006 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Arab Republic of Egypt. IMF Country Report No. 06/253, Washington. Retrieved November 8, 2013, from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06253.pdf. IMF. (2006b, June 20). Concluding Statement of the Article IV Consultation mission. Rabat, Morocco. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from https://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2006/062006.htm. IMF. (2006c). Morocco: 2006 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by theExecutive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Report No. 6/413, Washington. Retrieved Novemer 12, 2013, from http:// www.mafhoum.com/press10/291E12.pdf. IMF. (2006d, April 14). Statement by IMF Deputy Managing Director Agustín Carstens at the Conclusion of his Visit to Morocco. Washington. Retrieved December 13, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/ external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0672.htm.

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IMF. (2006e). Tunisia: 2006 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Tunisia. IMF Country Report No. 6/207, Washington. Retrieved November 11, 2013, from http://www.imf. org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06207.pdf. IMF. (2007a). Arab Republic of Egypt: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement;Public Information Notice on the ExecutiveBoard Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the. IMF Country Report 07/380, Washington. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07380.pdf. IMF. (2007b, November 28). Introductory Remarks By Murilo Portugal, Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. Tunis, Tunisia. Retrieved Novemer 16, 2013, from http://www. imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/112807.htm. IMF. (2007c). Morocco: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Profile No. 7/323, Washington. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07323.pdf. IMF. (2007d). Tunisia: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Tunisia. IMF Country Report No. 07/302, Washington. Retrieved November 11, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07302.pdf. IMF. (2008). Morocco: 2008 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Report No. 08/304, Washington. Retrieved November 18, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/ cr08304.pdf. IMF. (2009a). Arab Republic of Egypt: 2008 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Arab Republic of Egypt. IMF Country Report No. 09/25, Washington. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr0925.pdf. IMF. (2009b). Tunisia: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice. IMF Country Report No. 09/329, Washington. Retrieved November 20, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09329.pdf. IMF. (2010a). Arab Republic of Egypt: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Arab Republic of Egypt. IMF Country Report No. 10/94, Washington. Retrieved December 11, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1094.pdf. IMF. (2010b). Morocco: 2009 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Report No. 10/58, Washington. Retrieved October 12, 2013, from https://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1058.pdf. IMF. (2010c). Tunisia: 2010 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Tunisia. IMF Country Report 10/282, Washington. Retrieved November 19, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10282.pdf. IMF. (2011a, February 16). Mideast Needs More Focus on Inclusive Growth. Washington: IMF Survey Online. Retrieved October 12, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/ new021611a.htm. IMF. (2011b). Morocco: 2011 Article IV Consultation —Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Report No. 11/341, Washington. Retrieved November 11, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11341.pdf.

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IMF. (2011c, December 16). Press Release: IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Hopeful of Economic Potential of Arab Spring. Washington. Retrieved December 19, 2013, from https://www.imf. org/external/np/speeches/2011/120611.htm. IMF. (2012a). Arab Countries in Transition: Economic Outlook and Key Challenges. Deauville Partnership Ministerial Meeting, Tokyo. Retrieved September 10, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ np/pp/eng/2012/101212b.pdf. IMF. (2012b). Morocco: 2012 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Two-Year Precautionary and Liquidity Line—Staff Report; Public Information Notice and Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion ; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco. IMF Country Report No. 13/96, Washington. Retrieved November 10, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1396.pdf. IMF. (2012c, November 12). Press Release: David Lipton, IMF First Deputy Managing Director Enabling Economic Transformation in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington. Retrieved October 13, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/111312.htm. IMF. (2012d, December 17). Press Release: IMF Staff Concludes Discussions for the 2012 Article IV Consultation and First Review under the PLL Arrangement with Morocco. Retrieved October 14, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr12489.htm. IMF. (2012e, May 10). Press Release: Nemat Shafik Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, A Region in Change- Hopes and Challenges. Washington. Retrieved August 17, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/051012.htm. IMF. (2012f). Tunisia: 2012 Article IV Consultation —Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Tunisia. IMF Country Report No. 12/255, Washington. Retrieved November 12, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12255.pdf. IMF. (2013). Morocco: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No. 13/100, Washington. Retrieved October 10, 2013, from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.pdf. Indepedent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund. (2007). Annual Report. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Kapur, D. (2000). Processes of Change in International Organizations. Cambridge, MA, United States. Retrieved January 5, 2014, from http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/164__Helsinki3.wcfia.pdf. Kapur, D. (2002). The Changing Anatomy of Governance of the World Bank. In J. Pincus and J. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank (pp. 54–75). New York: Cornell University Press. Killick, T. (1995). IMF Programmes in Developing Countries: Design and Impact. London: Routledge. Krugman, P. (1996, January). A Country is Not A Company. Retrieved from Harvard Business Review: http://hbr.org/1996/01/a-country-is-not-a-company/ar/1. Momani, B. (2004). American Politicization of the International Monetary Fund. Review of International Political Economy, 11(5), 880–904. Momani, B. (2010). IMF Rhetoric on Reducing Poverty and Inequality. In R. Wilkinson & J. Clapps Global Governance, Poverty, and Inquality. London: Routledge. Morocco World News. (2012, December 17). IMF says Morocco’s ‘healthy’ policies behind ‘robust’ macroeconomic results. Fes, Morocco. Retrieved August 12, 2013, from http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2012/12/70545/imf-says-moroccos-healthy-policies-behind-robust-macroeconomic-results/. Peet, R. (2003). Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. London: Zed Books. Shafik, N. (2012, May 10). Making Sure Middle East Growth Is Inclusive. Washington: iMFdirect. Retrieved November 12, 2013, from http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2012/05/10/making-sure-middleeast-growth-is-inclusive/.

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Shahine, A. and Rastello, S. (2013, June 5). IMF Arab Aid Rises to Record as Stiglitz Sees Dramatic. Shift. Washington: Bloomberg News. Retrieved December 10, 2013, from http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2013-06-04/imf-arab-aid-rises-to-record-as-stiglitz-sees-shift-to-equality.html. Stone, R. W. (2011). Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy. Cambridge University Press. Shafik, N. (2012, May 10). Making sure Middle East growth is inclusive. iMFdirect. Retrieved from:http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2012/05/10/making-sure-middle-east-growth-is-inclusive/. Taylor, P. (1987). Prescribing for the Reform of International Organization: The Logic of Arguments for Change. Review of International Studies, 13(1), 19–38. Thacker, S. (1999). The High Politics of IMF Lending. World Politics, 52(1), 38–75. The New America Foundation. (2013, June 25). Revitalizing IMF Engagement in the Middle East. Washington. Retrieved September 14, 2013, from http://inthetank.newamerica.net/blog/2013/06/ revitalizing-imf-engagement-middle-east. Trice, H. and Beyer, J. (1993). The Cultures of Work Organizations. Upper Sadle River: Prentice-Hall. United Press International. (2014, January 15). IMF official sees optimism for global economy in 2014 and beyond. Washington. Retrieved January 20, 2014, from http://www.upi.com/Business_News/2014/01/15/IMF-official-sees-optimism-for-global-economy-in-2014-and-beyond/UPI81071389837751/?spt=rln&or=1. Vetterlein, A. (2012). Lacking Ownership: The IMF and its Engagements with Social Development as a Global Policy Norm. In S. Park and A. Vetterlein, Owning Development: Creating Global Policy Norms in the IMF and World Bank (pp. 93–112). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. World Bank. (2009, February 10). What is inclusive growth? Retrieved October 20, 2013 from http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-1218567884549/WhatIsInclusiveGrowth20081230.pdf.

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APPENDIX Table 1: Tracing IMF Policy Advice on the Social Dimension Morocco

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Inclusive growth

–

Strengthen healthcare and education

–

Improve redistribution/ inequality

–

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Inclusive growth

–

Strengthen healthcare and education

–

Improve redistribution/ inequality

–

Tunisia

Egypt

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Inclusive growth

–

Strengthen healthcare and education

–

Improve redistribution/ inequality

–

‘X’ denotes that the IMF gave explicit recommendations to improve the stated policy objective. ‘–’ denotes that the IMF did not give explicit recommendations to improve the stated policy objective. ‘NA’ denotes that there were no Article IV’s or comparable data available. Chart is based on data from Article IV Consultations, supplemented by IMF 2013ab.

The Autonomy of Bureaucratic Organizations: An Organization Theory Argument by Jarle Trondal, University of Agder, and Frode Veggeland, University of Oslo and the Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute The craft of international organizations is to a large extent supplied by the autonomy of its bureaucratic arm. The ambition of this paper is twofold. The first and most important ambition is to theorize conditions for the autonomy of bureaucratic organizations. The second ambition is to offer some minor empirical illustrations of autonomy among office holders in international bureaucracies. Benefiting from interviews with civil servants from three international bureaucracies, two illustrations are suggested. First, actor-level autonomy is present among civil servants within three international bureaucracies embedded in three seemingly different international organizations. Second, a theoretical lesson is that international bureaucracies may possess considerable capacity to shape essential behavioral perceptions among its staff in particular, and foster behavioral autonomization more generally, through the two causal mechanisms: behavioral and role adaptation through organizational rule following and behavioral and role internalization through “in-house” socialization processes. The paper also argues that future research programs are needed to provide larger-scale data sets that might complement these suggestive findings. Introduction This paper1 argues theoretically and illuminates empirically that common political order necessitates the rise of independent administrative resources and capacities. One necessary, although not sufficient, factor in building common political order is the establishment of common institutions, including a permanent administration, independent of national governments serving the common interest (Trondal and Peters 2013). The rise of common political order through institutional capacity building and bureaucratic autonomization is seen as one key ingredient of state formation (Bartolini 2005). Order formation above nation-state structures, however, is much less studied and poorly understood. If one focuses on order formation in a European context, what matters is the extent to which a common European political order is in practice autonomous from key components of an intergovernmental order, not whether it is autonomous in general. The ambition of this paper is twofold: The first and most important ambition is to theorize conditions for autonomy of bureaucratic organizations. The paper argues that the autonomy of bureaucratic organizations is supplied within these organizations and not merely due to cost-benefit analyses (Lipsky 1980; Wilson 1989) or socialization processes outside bureaucracy (e.g., Hooghe 2007). The secondary ambition is to offer some minor empirical illustrations or footnotes on the autonomy among office holders in international bureaucracies. 1. This paper is financially supported by the Norwegian Research Council basic research grant “DISC: Dynamics of International Executive Institutions,” as well as by the Norwegian Research Council research grant “GOFOOD” under the BIONAER-programme. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual Norwegian Political Science Conference in Trondheim, Norway, January 2012, and at the workshop “Organization Theory and International Relations: Setting Bridges and New Directions,” convened at Ibero-American University October 2013. The authors acknowledge comments from the conference participants at both venues, as well as from the anonymous referees.

JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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Modern governments daily formulate and execute policies with consequences for society (Hupe and Edwards 2012). With the gradual increased role of international bureaucracies, one unresolved question is to what extent and under what conditions such institutions may formulate their own policies and thus transcend a mere intergovernmental role. The craft of international organizations (IOs) is to a large extent supplied by the autonomy of its bureaucratic arm, that is, by the ability of international bureaucracies—and their staff— to act relatively independently of mandates and decision premises from member-state governments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Biermann and Siebenhuner 2009, 2013; Cox and Jacobson 1973; Reinalda 2013; Trondal 2013). “International rules are prepared by top-rank administrators” (Papadopoulos 2013: 84). It is thus essential to know how autonomous these administrators are and what can explain it. “Autonomy is about discretion, or the extent to which [an organization] can decide itself about matters that it considers important” (Verhoest et al. 2010: 18–19). As an area of research, the extent to which and the conditions under which international bureaucracies are independent of member-state governments has become increasingly vibrant, however, still offering inconclusive findings (e.g., Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Moravcsik 1999). The empirical focus of this study is actor-level autonomy as enacted by international civil servants. There are at least two rationales for applying an actor-level focus. First, the discretion available to bureaucracies is made real by individual office-holders (Cox and Jacobson 1973). Secondly, institutional transformation—as with the rise of relatively autonomous international bureaucracies—requires that international civil servants’ “preferences and conceptions of themselves and others” are affected (Olsen 2005: 13). Moreover, one often neglected proxy of actor-level autonomy is the extent to which they activate a supranational behavioral logic (hereby termed “actor-level supranationalism”). This paper argues and empirically suggests that international organizations in general, and their bureaucracies in particular, may possess considerable clout to form actor-level supranationalism among its personnel (Marcussen and Trondal 2011). Actor-level supranationalism denotes the rise of some shared norms, values, goals, and codes of conduct among international civil servants. A supranational logic entails that staff is loyal to the mission and vision of the IO and show this loyalty by guarding against attempts, either by member-state governments or other actors, to direct the organization in other directions. The civil servants are expected to become “defenders of the system” and to acquire collective behavioral perceptions independent of particular national interests. The appearance of actor-level supranationalism denotes actors’ feelings of loyalty and allegiance toward the IO as a whole—or toward parts of it (Deutch et al. 1957: 5–6; Haas 1958: 16; Herrmann et al. 2004: 6). In classic theories of European integration—such as neo-functionalism—it is assumed that one of the key driving forces of integration is the shift of individual loyalties from the national to the international level (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006). International institutions are assumed to have a capacity to create a sense of community and belonging beyond the nation-state, i.e., they socialize staff (Checkel 2007). The enactment of a supranational role may imply that individuals report loyalty to and a sense of belonging to an IO, and share, and act according to some shared norms, ideas, beliefs, and goals of the organization. This paper thus poses two research questions: • To what extent are international bureaucracies “hothouses” of actor-level supranationalism? • To what extent are actor-level supranationalism formed within international bureaucracies? (Theoretically, two mechanisms of organizational studies are shown to matter in this regard: organizational rule-following and “in-house” organizational socialization.) The observations reported benefit from a large and novel set of 121 interviews with civil servants working in three international bureaucracies: The secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the secretariat of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the European Commission (EC) administration. Comparing three seemingly different international bureaucracies in three IOs, this study suggests that bureau-

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cratic autonomy may be fostered equally inside bureaucratic organizations if they supply fairly similar organizational capacities and in-house socialization processes. This study shows that actor-level supranationalism is present among civil servants in all three international bureaucracies studied. Interestingly, the EC is not substantially any different from the two other international bureaucracies in this regard. One theoretical lesson learned from this observation is that international bureaucracies may possess considerable capacity to shape essential behavioral perceptions among its staff through the two causal mechanisms: behavioral and role adaptation through organizational rule-following and behavioral and role internalization through in-house socialization processes. Future research programs are, however, needed to provide larger-scale data sets that might complement these suggestive findings. The paper proceeds in the following steps: The next section outlines an organizational theory approach to public sector organizations to explain variation in actor-level supranationalism among international civil servants. The subsequent sections outline the methodology and data used to illuminate actor-level supranationalism, followed by an empirical section reporting key findings. Theorizing Bureaucratic Autonomy: An Organization Theory Approach A Weberian bureaucracy model assumes that bureaucracies possess internal capacities to shape staff through mechanisms such as socialization (behavioral internalization through established bureaucratic cultures), discipline (behavioral adaptation through incentive systems), and control (behavioral adaptation through hierarchical control and supervision) (Page 1992; Weber 1983; Yi-Chong and Weller 2004, 2008). These mechanisms ensure that bureaucracies perform their tasks relatively independently from outside pressure but within boundaries set by the legal authority and (political) leadership of which they serve (Weber 1924). Causal emphasis is put on the internal organizational structures of the bureaucracies. The Weberian bureaucracy model provides a picture of formal organizations as creators of “organizational man” (Simon 1965) and as a stabilizing element in politics more broadly (Olsen 2010). According to this model, bureaucracies develop their own nuts and bolts quite independently of society. The model implies that civil servants may act upon roles that are shaped by the organization in which they are embedded. The organizational structure of international bureaucracies consists of the bureaucratic structure, as well as how this structure is embedded in the wider IO structure. Organizational dynamics and decision-making behavior is framed by “in-house” organizational structures (Radin 2012: 17). Organizations create elements of robustness, and concepts such as “historical inefficiency” and “path dependence” suggest that the match between environments, organizational structures, and decision-making behavior is not automatic and precise (Olsen 2010). An organizational approach suggests that the supply of organizational capacities have certain implications for how organizations and incumbents act. This approach departs from the assumption that formal organizational structures mobilize biases in public policy, because formal organizations supply cognitive and normative shortcuts and categories that simplify and guide decision-makers’ search for problems, solutions, and consequences (Ellis 2011; Schattschneider 1975; Simon 1965). There may be several reasons why international civil servants enact a supranational behavioral logic. This paper suggests two main mechanisms: Adaptation through organizational rulefollowing and internalization through “in-house” socialization processes. This paper makes an analytical distinction between actor-level supranationalism caused by the internalization of roles and behavioral perceptions on the one hand (e.g., Checkel 2007) and actor-level supranationalism caused by behavioral and role adaptation through control and discipline on the other (e.g., Trondal et al. 2008). Whereas much existing literature argues that actor-level supranationalism originate from outside of the international bureaucracies (e.g., Dehousse and Thompson 2012; Hooghe 2007; 2012), this paper argues that actor-level supranationalism may largely emerge from within the structures of international bureaucracies.

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Lipsky (1980: 19) claimed that bureaucratic autonomy is driven by actors’ conspicuous desire for maximizing their own autonomy. By contrast, it is argued here that bureaucratic autonomy is organizationally contingent. It is the formal rules established in a bureaucracy that regulate, constitute, and bias the decision-making behavior and role perceptions evoked by civil servants, ultimately advancing bureaucratic autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 3). Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent information that may be attended to at decision situations. Formal organizations guide the decision-making behavior of civil servants due to the computational limitations and the need for selective search. Organizations provide collective order out of cognitive disorders by creating local rationalities among the organizational members (March and Shapira 1992). Formal organizations are systematic devices for simplifying, classifying, routinizing, directing, and sequencing information toward particular decision situations (Schattschneider 1975: 58). Formal organizations “are collections of structures, rules, and standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life” guiding officials to systematically de-emphasize certain aspects of organizational realities (March and Olsen 2006: 4). Derived from this organizational approach, two organizational variables may systematically foster actor-level supranationalism: organizational rule-following and “in-house” organizational socialization. Organizational Rule-Following An organizational approach suggests that the supply of organizational capacities have certain implications for how organizations and humans act. An organizational approach assumes that organizational capacity-building supplies government institutions with leverage to act independently (Trondal and Peters 2013). This approach departs from the assumption that formal organizational structures mobilize biases in public policy, because formal organizations supply cognitive and normative shortcuts and categories that simplify and guide decisionmakers’ behavior (Schattschneider 1975; Simon 1965). The behavior role and identity perceptions evoked by international civil servants are expected to be primarily directed toward those administrative units that are the primary suppliers of relevant decision premises. In this study, international bureaucracies are arguably primary suppliers of relevant decision premises for international civil servants. Organizations tend to accumulate conflicting organizational principles through horizontal and vertical specialization (Olsen 2005). When specializing formal organizations horizontally, one important principle (among several) has been suggested by Luther Gulick (1937): Organizations by major purpose served—like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle of organization tends to activate patterns of cooperation and conflicts among incumbents along sectoral cleavages (Egeberg 2006). Coordination and contact patterns tend to be channeled within sectoral portfolios rather than between them. Arguably, organization by “major purpose served” is likely to bias decision-making dynamics inward toward the bureaucratic organization where preferences, contact patterns, roles, and loyalties are directed toward sectoral portfolios, divisions, and units. This mode of horizontal specialization results in less than adequate horizontal coordination across departmental units and better coordination within units (Ansell 2004: 237). This principle of specialization is uppermost among most international bureaucracies. For example, the EC is a horizontally pillarized administration, specialized by purpose and with fairly weak organizational capabilities for horizontal coordination at the top through presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and Kassim 2005). The WTO and OECD secretariats are horizontally specialized administrations consisting of divisions or directorates responsible for different areas of cooperation (such as agriculture, environment, development, statistics, etc.,) (Trondal et al. 2010). Essentially, international bureaucracies serve as the primary organizational affiliation for international civil servants, rendering them particularly sensitive to the organizational signals and selections provided by this organization. As argued, the horizontal specialization of inter-

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national bureaucracies by major purpose is conducive to autonomization of the behavioral dynamics of incumbents. This argument derives the following hypothesis: H1: International civil servants embedded within international bureaucracies and specialized by purpose are likely to evoke supranational enthusiasm based on the stated purpose of the IO and the underlying and linked purpose of the specialized bureaucratic unit. In other words, we assume that formal organizational structures matters regarding the civil servants’ enactment of supranational roles. “In-House” Organizational Socialization A vast literature reveals that the impact of pre-socialization of actors is modified by organizational re-socialization (e.g., Checkel 2007). Officials entering international bureaucracies for the first time are subject to an organizational “exposure effect” (Johnston 2005: 1039) that may contribute to such re-socialization. Socialization is a dynamic process whereby individuals are induced into the norms and rules of a given community. By this process, individuals come to internalize some shared norms, rules, and interests of the community (Checkel 2007). Socialization processes are conducive to “autonomization” of the socialized, because the one socializing may educate, indoctrinate, teach, or diffuse his or her norms and ideas to the one being socialized. The socialization argument also claims that behavioral autonomy is conditioned by enduring experiences with institutions, accompanying perceptions of appropriate behavior (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 14). The potential for socialization to occur is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction amongst the organizational members. Chief to the neo-functionalist approach, the potential for re-socialization to occur (“shift of loyalty toward a new center”) is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction among actors (Haas 1958: 16). This claim rests on socialization theory that emphasizes a positive relationship between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which members of this group develop perceptions of group belongingness and an esprit de corps. Intensive in-group contact and interaction is conducive to the emergence of relative stabile social, normative, and strategic networks that provide autonomous impact on the participants’ perceptions of strategic and appropriate behavior (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 161; Börzel 1998: 259; Hay and Richards 2000; Knox et al. 2006: 120). Often, such networks resemble “ego-networks” “between a given individual and his or her ‘alters’” (Knox et al. 2006: 118). The literature suggests that networks are transformative entities that considerably bias the behavior of the participants (Börzel 1998: 258; Windhoff-Héritier 1993). However, as an explanatory tool-kit, network approaches have to be supplemented by more generic causal mechanisms, such as socialization mechanisms, in order to explain behavioral implications (Marin and Mayntz 1991: 44). In sum, the length of stay in international bureaucracies—or the individual seniority of incumbents—may foster socialization toward a supranational behavioral pattern. Hence, behavioral and role autonomy is fostered by the sheer quantity and quality of actor-interaction inside international bureaucracies. Ultimately, such actor-interaction contributes to the surfacing of tight networks inside international bureaucracies rather insulated from memberstate influence. This argument derives the second hypothesis: H2: International civil servants with long seniority within international bureaucracies are likely to evoke a “general” or diffuse supranational enthusiasm. In other words, we assume that long tenure among employees and, thus, persistent interaction with the norms and values of the IO (formal and informal), increase the capacity of the organization to create defenders of the system and supranational enthusiasts. Data and Methodology The empirical illustrations benefit from synchronized comparative studies of permanent officials in the EC administration, the WTO secretariat, and the OECD secretariat. The

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study is synchronized in the sense that the same interview guide has been applied to all three bureaucracies and with respect to the selection of administrative subunits within each bureaucracy. The seventy-one interviews were semi-directed, using a standardized interview guide that was applied flexibly during interviews. The interviews were carried out during 2006 and 2007 in Brussels, Geneva, and Paris. All interviews were taped and fully transcribed. All interviewees were treated with full anonymity. Consequently, quotations from interviews are referred to as follows (EC 2, WTO 15, etc.). The questions posed in the interviews were directed at measuring the behavioral perceptions among the civil servants. Key themes covered during interviews were interaction patterns, the role of nationality, the development of esprit de corps, the emergence of shared perceptions of identity among staff toward different institutions and actors, and the role perceptions deemed important by staff when doing daily work (see Appendix). Interviewees were selected from similar administrative subunits in all three international bureaucracies in order to control for variation in policy sectors. These subunits were first trade units (such as DG Trade in the EC and the numerous trade units in the OECD and WTO secretariats) and second the general secretariats (such as the secretariat-general of the EC, the offices of the deputies of the director general in the WTO secretariat, and the general secretariat of the OECD). General secretariats represent the bureaucratic centers of international bureaucracies, and the trade units represent one among several policy sectors of international bureaucracies. Finally, interviewees were selected from different levels of rank in these subunits—from director generals to executive officers. However, by concentrating on officials at the “A” level, we aim to study officials who are involved in policy-making activities. Two general caveats are warranted: First, the selected cases are merely illustrative devices to examine actor-level supranationalism within international bureaucracies; second, these cases also merely illuminate causal mechanisms. Table 1 summarizes the interviews conducted. Table 1. List of interviewees among permanent officials by formal rank Top managers (director-generals, deputy directorgenerals, or equivalent)

Middle managers (directors, heads of unit, deputies, or equivalent)

Desk officials (advisors, counsellors, case handlers, analysts, officers, or equivalent)

Total

The EC

The OECD Secretariat

The WTO Secretariat

Total

Empirical footnotes from international bureaucracies

Organizational Rule-Following Socialization sometimes cannot fully occur if the mechanisms of internal and external control and discipline operate alone (Checkel 2007; Gheciu 2007). This section shows that control and discipline, through supervision, incentives, and rewards, do shape both what we have termed supranational sector enthusiasts and general supranational enthusiasts among international civil servants. Reflecting the latter, one aspect of actor-level supranationalism among international civil servants is related to external representation of the IO. The enactment of a supranational role—as a representative of the IO as a whole—is evident in the following quote:

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It is obvious that when we are operating outside the WTO, in other intergovernmental organizations, then we are representing the WTO as an institution, and we have to be aware of that. (WTO 1) The WTO official indicates in this quote that one has to be aware of the supranational role; it is considered mandatory to represent the WTO as a whole. In their external representation, civil servants report that if they act in conflict with core rules of the organization they may be subject to sanctions, internally from the bureaucratic leadership and externally from the member states. When asked about how to behave when representing the WTO externally, one WTO official responded: Yes, of course you have to be careful not to say weird things and things that are totally just not acceptable, or contentious. To say things about the negotiations sort of . . . on some contentious issues . . . or to express a strong opinion that you support one view or another—that is dangerous and it is not to be tolerated. But it’s not a question of asking permission. Now of course, to speak at conferences you have to get permission, for obvious reasons. But it’s not so much that you send your statement to your boss to check. (WTO 13) When asked about the possible sanctions for going against these norms, the same official said, “You are fired . . . or you are called in.” (WTO 13) Another official was asked, “Even though the assessments are made according to the WTO rules, do you, as a secretariat official, have to be careful about making formulations such as ‘This is the best solution according to what I believe?’ Because if that sentence is there, is there a risk that the paper will just be ‘shot down’ by the member states?” The official responded: Oh yes, oh yes, there are things you have to be aware of and, you know, sometimes you get caught by surprise. There’s a sensitivity that you weren’t aware of and somebody reacts very strongly to something and you . . . “Oh. Where did that come from?” (WTO 15) This quote shows that civil servants have to “tread a careful path” because of the awareness and control of member-states. The following quotes from OECD officials are also illustrative: As an OECD person, you should be kind of neutral. I’m not working for the French or U.S. government, I am working for the OECD. Period. (OECD 26) It is quite imperative not to be biased by your nationality. (OECD 15) So I am aware of the OECD line and agreed position, and I know it is incumbent upon me to reflect that agreed line and the conclusions of the work that we have done. It’s not my position to bolster independent opinions on some policy issues that we have not done any research on or where my research hasn’t been done as part of an agreed OECD process. (OECD 17) When asked if they all consider themselves international civil servants, one OECD official responds: “Yes. You have to, in that job; you wouldn’t last long otherwise. We are not here to represent our own countries in any way” (OECD 2). In sum, external and internal control and discipline seem to enhance the adoption of the supranational enthusiasts among international civil servants. Some officials seem to enact a supranational role in the form of “guardians of the system.” A quote from one WTO official illustrates this. The official was asked whether the WTO agreements amount to a kind of constitution that the civil servants have to relate to at all times: Exactly! But I don’t really think . . . I don’t think I will ever come across someone who doesn’t really believe in that. But some people have different views about . . . you know, some people look at it more from a developing-country perspective and other people from other perspectives. Some of the people might think that some of the rules are more or less equitable. (WTO 1) The observations from the interviews show that even though civil servants may become “guardians of the system” and have to constantly relate to the organization’s rules, they do not necessarily believe in or agree with all of the rules. Internal control from the bureaucratic leadership and external control from the member states, in addition to discipline through career

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opportunities, may foster a supranational role among civil servants in the sense of appearing as “guardians of the system.” Civil servants gain authority and credibility through their expertise and impartiality against particular national interests and through their emphasis on the aims and rules of the organization—what in this context appear to them as the “common good.” In this way, the bureaucracy may gain autonomy within the boundaries set by the vision and mission of the IO. However, the degree to which the norms of the organization have been internalized among the civil servants may still vary. Some are true believers. For others, the defense of the system is conditional. Still, both these groups are shaped and socialized into following the same basic codes of conduct: to represent, defend and follow the logic of the system, not particular national interests. “In-House” Organizational Socialization Civil servants may share the norms of IOs even before entering. These civil servants are predisposed to become loyal to the organization’s vision and mission quite quickly upon arrival. Moreover, if such pre-socialization is salient, there is a potential for a biased (self-) selection among the respondents. In line with the idea of representative bureaucracy, the international bureaucracy will in such cases be representative mainly of the enthusiasts and true believers in the organization. Some civil servants indeed start working for an IO because they truly believe in the organization. It is, however, less clear from our data how such beliefs affect actual decision-making behavior among staff. Thus, pre-socialization might indeed happen but would also be fairly unimportant in order to understand decision-making behavior among international civil servants. The need to be dedicated to the organization is emphasized in the following quotes from two WTO officials: We are the guardians of the book. We have to believe in what is in here, because if we don’t believe, nobody believes. Then we might as well go home. (WTO 9) I think we have to be committed to what the WTO is as an institution, which basically is for trade liberalization, and so clearly you have to believe in that. Otherwise it could be very difficult, personally, if you don’t believe in the goal of your organization, that the WTO is an institution which basically is a force for good—you know, the goals of the WTO.” (WTO 3) One OECD official was a general supranational enthusiast for a long time, not in relation to the OECD in particular but in relation to IOs in general. Another OECD official indicated that enthusiasm toward the OECD comes from prior experience in private sector: I think there was probably something philosophical in the beginning, because when I finished university I was very attracted by the international organizations: the values, the mission, things like that. (OECD 27) I am the treasurer of the OECD, and I have a business card. And I am proud of the OECD. That is one of the things I like about working at the OECD: I like what the OECD does. It has a positive influence in the world. Coming from the private sector as an American, I am very much in favor of a lot of the things the OECD does—like free trade, like intelligent government policy over business, over taxation, having environment regulations that work, that businesses and people can work with. That governments can promote better policies in areas such as taxation, thanks to the work that the OECD does, is very positive. (OECD 23) One WTO official believed in the GATT/WTO before starting working there but emphasized particular aspects of the organization’s mission: I believed that market access for products, and how countries become less dependent on money by helping them to sell abroad . . . I believed in that . . . but across the border, random trade liberalization . . . when I came, no I didn’t think. . . . But the GATT never stood for that either. The GATT was not about free trade, the GATT was about, the WTO is about, breaking down certain barriers and trade-distorted measures so that countries at least have more opportunity to sell abroad. (WTO 2)

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These observations illustrate pre-socialization toward a general supranationalist enthusiastic orientation toward the vision and mission of an IO. As indicated above, socialization may take several forms. One important distinction runs between the “true believers”—those who believe in the overall mission of the organization, even as a “force for good”—and the “sector or portfolio enthusiasts”—those who believe in particular issues that the organization deals with and in the organization’s role in solving and handling these issues. Even though pre-socialization remains as a factor to be considered in relation to supranational enthusiasm, an important finding in this study is that the civil servants are further shaped by the organization setting in which they operate. Our data clearly shows that international civil servants are affected by internal factors, i.e., they are shaped and socialized toward supranational enthusiasm through experience. This form of socialization is linked to the Weberian bureaucracy model, i.e., socialization within organizations. In the following, we look in particular at how experience from working within an international bureaucracy may affect civil servants’ commitment and loyalty to the organization. Pre-socialization, however, does not exclude the effect of re-socialization: Someone who shares the norms of the IO before working there may be further socialized within the organization. To illustrate this dual mechanism, one civil servant responded: Oh yes, I am convinced. As a junior diplomat I participated in the making of this organization. I saw this organization being born. I was here in Geneva when the organization was created, and I was here in Geneva when these agreements were negotiated. So I truly believe in the ideas. (WTO 9) This official relates beliefs in the organization to the close contact with the WTO in previous jobs. One EC official also mentioned that commitment to the EU began a long time before joining the EC, “But I always bore in mind the possibility to work for the institutions, maybe not from sixteen years old but certainly from twenty-two years old.” (EC 20) When asked if it was a wish early on to come to the EC, the official replied: I was very much conscious of the project of building Europe. . . . And I knew about Jean Monnet . . . and I thought “It’s a big project, an important project, and it is a project qui vient féderer les états.” It’s politically a very difficult project, but it is certainly a project I want to work for with my very small means, my very small competencies and capacities. (EC 20) One official was asked: “Is it easy to follow that vision—your European vision—in your dayto-day work?” and responded: Yes, because the vision is very strong. My vision of what I want to do and of what the commission wants to do is very coherent. They match one another. But also that vision is stronger than, let’s say, the everyday life and problems I can have. That is my view. Some other people are more concerned with their own career. (EC 20) These observations illustrate how pre-commitment to the vision and mission of an IO can enhance the subsequent enactment of general supranational enthusiasm after being hired. The following quote from an OECD official illustrates how long tenure in an international bureaucracy may nurture socialization of staff toward a general supranational enthusiasm: Fundamentally, my impression is that when people have joined the OECD, and they have worked here for a while, they no longer behave as nationals of any particular member country, but they serve the interests of the organization. And it doesn’t really matter whether they are Canadian, Australian, or Belgian—they work toward the common aim of the organization. (OECD 11) When asked about the general commitment to the goals of their organization, two officials responded as follows: Yes, I think so. I mean I’ve spent thirty plus years of my life here, so it would be bizarre if I did not. I do feel commitment to the organization. . . . Yes, I feel a commitment. I think it would be difficult if you didn’t believe in an open-rules-based trading system, that it was in the basic interest of humanity. (WTO 1)

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But, as I said, I think that being an international civil servant and the more years you do that type of job, the more you tend to represent the organization rather than individuals or divisions or whatever. (OECD 16) Socialization into the norms of the organization may also be illustrated by the following response from a WTO official when asked what advice to offer the members: “Of course it has to be WTO-friendly, and then after a while you get . . . you cannot go against the philosophy of what this institution stands for” (WTO 2). When asked to what extent the WTO secretariat should be the “guardians of the treaties,” one WTO official confirmed having taken on the role of a “guardian.” However, the official also includes a more proactive role as an agent for improving the system: I think this is what has been agreed, but I have my views, and I think there are things that should be changed in this agreement to make it fairer, to make it more effective, and I will be happy to defend my views. But I think it has to be changed by negotiation in this organization. You are not going to change it by destroying the WTO. That is the message. I am the guardian of the book. The book is not perfect. So my task is to convince people that this book should be improved, here. That is the mission. The mission is to make a multilateral trading system which is fair, which is fair to the developing countries, and which is better than what it is now. (WTO 9) This observation illustrates both a sense of commitment to the organization and at the same time seeing the secretariat’s role as being more than a neutral facilitator. This WTO official emphasizes the role as a defender of the system but includes in the role the task of suggesting needs for change. Socialization within international bureaucracies may also strengthen civil servants’ feeling of being part of a collective, being part of something “beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17). In-house socialization like this tends to foster general supranational enthusiasm among staff. Two EC officials also report supranational enthusiasm by emphasizing that their feeling of belonging is aimed toward European integration generally and not toward particular EU institutions or member-states: Definition-wise, I am working for the European Commission and, in a broader sense, for the Union. So I wouldn’t have any ideological problems working for the council secretariat, for example. (EC 11) Well, it is the community interest in the matter which is prime, and this interest of the community is not necessarily identical with the interests of any single member state— even if you take them all together. (EC 14) This last quote indicates that the civil servant sees the EC interest as something more than the aggregate of member-state collective interests. It alludes to a general belief in a supranational interest—a collective EU interest relatively independent of member-states. Another EC official illustrates beliefs shaped by the organization. However, in this case, socialization within the EC seems to have caused less dedication to the “EU project”: I am more focused on what I do. I am very happy with the job I have, with the colleagues I have, I couldn’t be happier. I have to struggle to remain faithful to Europe. I am still, but when I joined the commission I was for a very long time enthusiastic. I mean I was very proud working in the commission. Not only proud, I thought we were going to take us very far. But today I am much more skeptical. (EC 24) This quote illustrates that socialization within organizations may sometimes result in less enthusiastic attitudes toward the organization. Socialization should not be conflated with the emergence of “pro-norm behavior” (Zurn and Checkel 2007) or “pro-social” behavior (Lewis 2007). Lack of organizational enthusiasm may more easily emerge when organizations face periods of enlargement or internal reforms, potentially challenging pre-existing norms and long-cherished beliefs among the personnel (see Ban 2013; Bauer 2012: 469; Dehousse and Thompson 2012: 126). “Socialization processes do not necessarily entail harmony and the absence of conflicts” (Beyers 2010: 912).

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Conclusion This paper shows that “supranational actors” are present among civil servants both in the WTO secretariat, the OECD secretariat, and the EC administration. The EC is not any different in this regard when viewed from the perspective of civil servants’ behavioral perceptions. This study substantiates that international bureaucracies may possess considerable capacity to act relatively independent of member-state governments. This capacity is demonstrated when international civil servants develop a supranational mind-set through mechanisms of discipline and control, as well as through behavioral and role internalization and adaptation. The most important ambition of this paper is to theorize two conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. The empirical illustrations above suggests that actor-level supranationalism tends to arise foremost through processes internal to IOs. As a consequence, a larger variation in actor-level supranationalism is observed within, rather than between, international bureaucracies. What is surprising is not the observation of a supranational behavioral logic but the fact that the same behavioral logic among international civil servants is observed almost to the same extent within three international bureaucracies embedded in three seemingly different IOs. Thus, one theoretical lesson learned is that international bureaucracies may possess considerable capacity to shape essential behavioral perceptions among its staff in general, and foster behavioral autonomy in particular, through the two causal mechanisms: behavioral and role adaptation through organizational rule-following and behavioral and role internalization through “in-house” organizational socialization. In line with the Weberian model of bureaucracy, international bureaucracies have the capacity, through socialization as well as discipline and control, to create codes of conduct and senses of community and belonging that are relatively independent of constituent states. Future research projects are needed to provide data that might offer firm tests of the theoretical hypotheses offered by this paper. There is a growing literature on the “public administration turn” to IO studies that support the findings reported here (Trondal 2007). Studies demonstrate that international bureaucracies, not only the EC, may have powers to autonomize its staff. Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 3) demonstrate that the secretariat of IMF, the UN high commissioner for refugees (UNHCR), and the UN secretariat “were not simply following the demands issued by states but instead acting like the bureaucracies that they are.” Similarly, Lewis (2007) observes organizational socialization inside the COREPER whereby national officials internalize new community roles. Conzelmann (2008) shows that international secretariats may have some leeway in organizing and structuring debates and, moreover, that secretariats may gain influence and authority in IOs based on their expertise in technical, complex areas. Others have also stressed the importance of the (legal) expertise of international bureaucracies (Marcussen 2004; Mathiason 2007; Schmeil 2004; Yi-Chong and Weller 2008). As Mathiason (2007: 16) has phrased it, “The source of legitimate power is essentially legal.” Yi-Chong and Weller (2004: 278–79) conclude their study of GATT/WTO by stating that secretariats “provide the continuity and the cement, the credibility and the connections. . . . The final decision may not be theirs, but the creativity surely is.” Finally, Johnston (2005: 1037) observes, “Some evidence that those individuals most directly exposed to intensive social interaction are more likely to have a positive attitude toward multilateralism.” Thus, international bureaucracies tend to foster supranational defenders of the system “from within.” REFERENCES Ansell, C.K. (2004) “Territoriality, authority, and democracy,” in C.K. Ansell and G. Di Palma (eds.) Restructuring Territoriality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Atkinson, M.M. and W.D. Coleman (1992) “Policy networks, policy communities and the problems of governance,” Governance 5(2): 154–80.

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Ban, C. (2013) Management and Culture in an Enlarged European Commission. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Barnett, M. and M. Finnemore (2004) Rules for the World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bauer, M.W. (2012) “Tolerant, if personal goals remain unharmed: Explaining supranational bureaucrats’ attitudes to organizational change,” Governance 25(3): 485–510. Beyers, J. (2010) “Conceptual and methodological challenges in the study of European socialization,” Journal of European Public Policy 17(6): 909–20. Biermann, F. and B. Siebenhuner (2009) Managers of Global Change. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. Biermann, F. and B. Siebenhuner (2013) “Problem solving by international bureaucracies: the influence of international secretariats on world politics,” in B. Reinalda (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Organization. London and New York: Routledge. Börzel, T. (1998) “Organizing Babylon—on the different conceptions of policy networks,” Public Administration 76(2): 253–73. Checkel, J.T. (2007): “International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and framework,” in J.T. Checkel (ed.) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Concelmann, T. (2008) “Beyond the Carrot and the Stick: State Reporting Procedures in the WTO and the OECD,” in J. Joachim; B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) International Organizations and Policy Implementation. London: Routledge. Cox, R.W. and H.K. Jacobson (1973) The Anatomy of Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dehousse, R. and A. Thompson (2012) “Intergovernmentalists in the Commission: Foxes in the henhouse?” Journal of European Integration 34(2): 113–32. Deutsch, K. et al., (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Dimitrakopoulos, D.G. and H. Kassim (2005) “The European Commission and the debate on the future of Europe,” paper presented at the CONNEX workshop, 27–28 May, Oslo. Egeberg, M. (ed.) (2006) Multilevel Union Administration. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (ed.) (2006) Debates on European Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ellis, D.C. (2011) “The organizational turn in international organization theory,” Theorizing International Organizations (http://www.journal-iostudies.org/sites/journal-iostudies.org/files/JIOS1012.pdf). Gheciu, A. (2007) “Security institutions as agents of socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe,’” in J.T. Checkel (ed.) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gulick, L. (1937) “Notes on the theory of organizations. With special references to government in the United States,” in L. Gulick and L. Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University. Haas, E. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hay, C. and D. Richards (2000) “The tangled webs of Westminister and Whitehall: The discourse, strategy and practice of networking within the British core executive,” Public Administration 78(1): 1–28. Herrmann, R.K. and M.B. Brewer (2004) “Identities and institutions: Becoming European in the EU,” in R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse, and M.B. Brewer (eds.) Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp.1–22.

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Herrmann, R.K., T. Risse, and M.B. Brewer (eds.) (2004) Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Hooghe, L. (2007) “Several roads lead to international norms, but few via international socialization. A case study of the European Commission,” in J.T. Checkel (ed.) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, L. (2012) “Images of Europe: How Commission officials conceive their institution’s role,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50(1): 87–111. Hupe, P. and A. Edwards (2012) “The accountability of power: Democracy and governance in modern times,” European Political Science Review 4(2): 177–94. Johnston, A.I. (2005) “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward mid-range theorizing and beyond Europe,” International Organization (Special Issue) 59: 1013–44. Knox, H., M. Savage, and P. Harvey (2006) “Social networks and the study of relations: Networks as method, metaphor and form,” Economy and Society 35(1): 113–40. Lewis, J. (2007) “The Janus face of Brussels: Socialization and everyday decision making in the European Union,” in J.T. Checkel (ed.) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipsky, M. (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (2006) “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism,’” in R.A.W. Rhodes, S.A. Binder, and B.A. Rockman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. March, J.G. and Z. Shapira (1992) “Behavioral decision making theory and organizational decision theory,” in M. Zey (ed.) Decision Making. Newbury Park: SAGE. Marcussen, M. (2004) “Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD: Playing the Idea Game,” in K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds.) The OECD and the European Welfare States. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Marcussen, M. and J. Trondal (2011) “The OECD Civil Servant. Between Scylla and Charybdis,” Review of International Political Economy 18(5): 592–621. Marin, B. and R. Mayntz (eds.) (1991) Policy Networks. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. Mathiason, J. (2007) Invisible Governance: International Secretariats in Global Politics. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Inc. Moravcsik, A. (1999) “A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation,” International Organization 53(2): 267–306. Olsen, J.P. (2005) “Unity and diversity—European style,” ARENA working paper 24. Olsen, J.P. (2010) Governing Through Institutional Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page, E.C. (1992) Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Radin, B.A. (2012) Federal Management Reform. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. Reinalda, B. (2013) “International organization as a field of research since 1910,” in B. Reinalda (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Organization. London and New York: Routledge. Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration. New York: Palgrave. Schattschneider, E.E. (1975) The Semisovereign People. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. Schmeil, Y. (2004) “Expertise and political competence: consensus making within the World Trade Organization and the World Meteorological Organization,” in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) Decision Making Within International Organizations. London and New York: Routledge.

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Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Simon, H. A. (1965) Administrative Behavior. New York: The Free Press. Trondal, J. (2007) “Is the European Commission a hothouse for supranationalism? Exploring actor-level supranationalism,” Journal of Common Market Studies 45(5): 1111–33. Trondal, J. (2013) “International bureaucracy: organizational structure and behavioral implications,” in B. Reinalda (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Organization. London and New York: Routledge. Trondal, J., C. van den Berg, and S. Suvarierol (2008) “The compound machinery of government. The case of seconded officials in the European Commission,” Governance 21(2): 253–74. Trondal, J., M. Marcussen, T. Larsson, and F. Veggeland (2010) Unpacking International Organizations. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Trondal, J. and B.G. Peters (2013) “The rise of European administrative space. Lessons learned,” Journal of European Public Policy 20(2): 295–307. Verhoest, K., P.G. Roness, B. Verschuere, K. Rubecksen, and M. MacCarthaigh (2010) Autonomy and Control of State Agencies. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Weber, M. (1924) “Legitimate Authority and Bureaucracy,” in D.S. Pugh (ed.) (1990) Organization Theory. Selected Readings. 3rd edition. London: Penguin Books. Weber, M. (1983) On Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion. Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers. Windhoff-Hèritier, A. (1993) “Policy network analysis: A tool for comparative political research,” in H. Keman (ed.) Comparative Politics. Amsterdam: VU University Press. Wilson, J.Q. (1989) Bureaucracy. Basic Books. Yi-Chong, X. and P. Weller (2004) The Governance of World Trade. International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Yi-Chong, X. and P. Weller (2008) “To be, but not to be seen: Exploring the impact of civil servants,” Public Administration 86(1): 35–51. Zurn, M. and J.T. Checkel (2007) “Getting socilalized to build bridges: Constructivism and rationalism, Europe and the nation-state,” in J.T. Checkel (ed.) International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

APPENDIX Interview guide to officials at the European Commission, the WTO secretariat, and the OECD secretariat. Background • Nationality? • What is your educational and professional background? • For how long have you worked in your current institution, unit, or portfolio? • When, why, how and from where were you recruited to this institution? • What are the main differences between working here and in previous positions? General Institutional Questions • How would you generally describe your daily work? • Currently, what issues are central in your work? • What is your current position, rank, or unit? • Do you have a clear-cut work description? • Inside your unit, division, or portfolio, what issues cause divisions of opinion or conflicts? (Are these large or minor conflicts?)

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Behavioral Questions • With whom do you regularly interact at work? ◦ Colleagues in your unit or division ◦ Other units or divisions ◦ Head of unit ◦ The top administrative leadership of your institution ◦ Domestic government institutions—ministries or agencies (within your own portfolio or across portfolios) ◦ External experts, universities, or research institutions? ◦ Industry, consultancies, etc. ◦ Other international secretariats or organizations • With whom do you regularly interact outside office? ◦ Colleagues in your unit or division ◦ Own nationals ◦ Other nationals • In general, what would you consider to be the most important contacts in your position? Personal Perceptions • Does your nationality or the nationality of your colleagues “matter” with respect to your daily work? • Has an esprit de corps developed within your unit or division? • Explain to what extent you identify with, or feel a personal attachment toward the following: ◦ Your unit or portfolio ◦ Your organization as a whole ◦ Your profession or educational background ◦ The member-state administrations • What kind of roles do you regularly emphasize at work? ◦ Representative for the institution as a whole ◦ Representative for the unit or portfolio ◦ Representative for your professional expertise ◦ Representative for the member states or for your own country of origin • What considerations are vital for you? ◦ Your institution as a whole (e.g., goals, mission, etc.) ◦ Your unit or division ◦ Your profession or expertise ◦ The member states ◦ Your policy sector or portfolio ◦ Formal rules and procedures within your institution or unit

How Are, and Should, Parliamentarians of States Be Involved in Global Governance? by Chadwick F. Alger, The Ohio State University, with Kent J. Kille, College of Wooster1 Inter-State organizations of parliamentarians are operating in the international system in significant numbers and are increasingly involved in the United Nations (UN) system. This research paper bolsters our ability to understand how the parliamentarians are involved in global governance through reviewing and categorizing these actors. Some are global, some are regional, and some are interregional. Some have a broad agenda, and some focus on specific issues, including small arms and light weapons, nuclear proliferation and disarmament, drug control, corruption, and democracy. There are also organizations of secretaries general, presidents, and speakers of State parliaments. In addition, as global governance becomes more extensive, there is increasing concern about how this global governance may be made more democratic. Those expressing this concern should become more aware and consider the implications of this involvement of inter-State organizations of parliamentarians. Further research is needed that considers the impact this experience has on participating parliamentarians and how it affects the influence they have on both the parliament of their State and the inter-State parliament in which they participate. Introduction Participation in the UN system has been accelerating in recent years, moving beyond primarily representatives of member States and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).2 For instance, in 1999 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed the Global Compact to involve business corporations in meeting standards in UN declarations and covenants on human rights, labor, and environment. There are now over ten thousand business participants in this UN Global Compact. In addition, a broader understanding of useful UN–Civil Society connections to address relevant issues was emphasized by the 2004 Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (Cardoso Report). Such developments motivated research on the involvement in global governance of both local governments and parliamentarians (Alger 2010, 2011). The effort to acquire an overview of the involvement of parliamentarians of States in the UN system led to the awareness of the existence of at least sixty-seven inter-State organizations of parliamentarians of States and revealed the previously unrealized extensive efforts that these parliamentarians have made to become directly involved with parliamentarians of other States, 1. JIOS received a submission from Chadwick Alger just weeks before he passed earlier this year, and before he had a chance to undertake suggested revisions. With the permission of Alger’s family, Kent Kille, a former PhD student (and editor of an International Journal of Peace Studies special issue on his peace tools work) and a member of the JIOS Editorial Board, has edited the piece, while carefully ensuring that Alger’s voice and ideas are retained. As such, this article represents a last think piece from Alger that is a fitting endnote to his research and writing legacy. For further information about Alger’s work, see the three-volume compendium Chadwick F. Alger: Pioneer in the Study of the Political Process and on NGO Participation in the United Nations, The UN System and Cities in Global Governance, and Peace Research and Peacebuilding, published by Springer in 2014. 2. Throughout this paper the term “State” is intentionally capitalized to refer to those government units recognized as sovereign by other States. This avoids confusing the use of this term where the sub-units of the State are referred to as “states” (such as those within the United States of America), which is intentionally lowercased.

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instead of permitting the executive branches to dominate the foreign relations of their State. International parliamentary institutions are part of the growing networked global society and show signs of continuing to evolve as an important part of the shifting international structure (Cutler 2001). Parliamentarian involvement in the UN system has linked these dimensions of global governance. This includes parliamentarians in attendance at sessions of the UN General Assembly. The Inter-Parliamentarian Union (IPU), which was founded well before the existence of the UN (or even the League of Nations) in 1889, has established and maintained important connections to the UN. This has recently included a special session held at the General Assembly Hall in celebration of the UN’s fiftieth anniversary in 1995 and an agreement of cooperation with the UN was signed the following year (Johnsson 2003). The UN Millennium Summit reinforced the importance of cooperation between the UN and IPU and subsequent meetings, reports, and resolutions have assisted in maintaining the organizational partnership across different parts of the UN system, and the General Assembly has extended special observer status to the IPU. The consideration of parliamentarians of States relates to a broader exploration of the democratic implications for and the possibilities of widening participation in global governance (Alger 2007, 2011). The potential role of parliamentarians harkens to Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte’s (1973) treatise on Size and Democracy. After observing that democracy is most compatible with small political units, they noted the challenge to democracy presented by problems that transcend political boundaries: The central theoretical problem is no longer to find suitable rules, like the majority principle, to apply within a sovereign unit, but to find suitable rules to apply among a variety of units, none of which is sovereign. . . . At the same time that transnational units will increase the capacity of the system to handle critical problems . . . transnational units will also increase the ineffectuality and powerlessness of the individual citizen. . . . Theory, then, needs to do what democratic theory has never done well: to offer useful guidance about the appropriate relations among units. (Dahl and Tufte, 1973, 135) Since Dahl and Tufte’s assertion, many more problems are now transcending the boundaries of States. As a result, there has been an increasing focus on the challenges that this presents for achieving global democracy. The role that parliamentarians of States might play in such global democracy should be a focus in these considerations. Indeed, it has been recognized that international parliamentary institutions could play a role in building more democratic global governance (Sabic 2008; see also Sabic 2010). Proposals in the Cardoso Report for addressing the democracy deficit in global governance points to the need for “enhanced United Nations–parliamentarian relations.” This includes a “four-pronged strategy” to: Take United Nations issues to national parliaments more systematically; ensure that parliamentarians coming to United Nations events have more strategic roles at those events; link parliaments themselves with the international deliberative process; and provide an institutional home at the United Nations for engaging parliamentarians. (1994, 46) The fact that there are now at least sixty-seven inter-State organizations of parliamentarians, and expanding involvement in the UN system by parliamentarians, is certainly providing a significant challenge to democratic theory. How to best address this challenge cannot be resolved until scholars, government officials, and citizens of democracies become more aware of the growing direct involvement of parliamentarians of their State in global governance. Due to the relatively limited knowledge that people have in this area, this paper provides a helpful descriptive overview based on reviewing and undertaking a classification exercise of the organizations. The hope is that this will then motivate others to build upon this material to undertake research that will extend knowledge about their impact on efforts to make global governance more democratic. Further, following the overview and clas-

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sification of inter-State organizations of parliamentarians, the conclusion indicates related research questions that this activity raises. Inter-State Organizations of Parliamentarians of States The titles of the sixty-seven organizations of parliamentarians of States identified reveal that they have a diversity of formats. These titles include not only parliament, but also parliamentary assembly, parliamentary council, parliamentary conference, parliamentary committees, parliamentary dimension, parliamentary union, parliamentary forum, parliamentary network, conference of speakers of parliaments, conference of presidents of parliaments, conference of parliamentarians, interparliamentary assembly, international council of parliamentarians, and assembly. Such diversity is recognized by Lluís Maria de Puig (2008) in International Parliaments. De Puig has been a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly of the Western European Union, and the Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and notes: These are various forums, committees or conferences which meet occasionally or periodically, sometimes even frequently, which satisfy the criterion of meetings or gatherings of groups of parliamentarians but do not have either the structure or the status of what could be regarded as a permanent supranational assembly. (25–26) De Puig then provides “those assemblies which I believe satisfy the basic conditions for being considered as true international parliamentary assemblies.” When these organizations appear in the organizations listed in the tables below, an asterisk is placed before their name to indicate the overlap with de Puig. Of course, all forms of parliamentarians deserve attention. We are now challenged to differentiate the impact that various kinds of inter-State parliamentary organizations are having on global governance. For this research exercise, the organizations have been usefully classified with respect to their geographic scope and also the scope of their agenda. The organizations have been placed into five categories: 1) global/broad agenda, 2) global/specific issue, 3) regional/broad agenda, 4) regional/specific issue, and 5) interregional. These categories were previously established from what was then a review of forty-seven parliamentarian organizations but only an initial group of those with a global reach was addressed (Alger 2010). The effort here revisits, updates, and greatly expands the review and categorization exercise. There are sixteen global organizations, forty regional (thirteen in Europe), and eleven interregional. The fifteen organizations that are focused on specific issues reach across a wide range of issues. The issues addressed include development, corruption, democracy, environmental concerns, security, drug control, education, nuclear proliferation and disarmament, and small arms. The diversity of participants in these organizations includes members of parliaments of States, speakers and presidents of parliaments of States, members of regional legislative assemblies, and Jewish parliamentarians. Global/Broad Agenda There are nine global—broad agenda organizations. Five are included in what de Puig identifies as “true international parliamentary assemblies” (marked by an asterisk from this point forward). One global organization of parliamentarians has a language focus: the Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophone (APF). The APF is an association of the parliaments of francophone States. The organization was established in Luxembourg in 1967 and was then known as the Association Internationale des Parlementaires de Langue Française. APF has members from eighty-one parliaments across four continents, and the organization’s goals are to promote democracy, human rights, and the international diffusion of French-language culture and diversity (www.apf.francophonie.org).

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Table 1. Global/Broad Agenda (9) *Assemblée Parlementaire de la Francophone (APF) *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) *Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO) *Inter-Parliamentarian Union (IPU) *Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP) African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)–European Union (EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly International Council of Jewish Parliamentarians (ICJP) Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (PUIC) The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), an organization of British origin, was founded as the Empire Parliamentary Association in 1911. The association’s primary goals are good governance, democracy, and human rights. Branches exist across a range of areas, including Africa, Asia, Australia, the British Islands and Mediterranean, Canada, Caribbean, Americas and Atlantic, India, and Pacific and Southeast Asia (www.cpahq.org). The Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO) draws parliamentarians from a range of European States along with Russia and the Ukraine. Also participating are groups of parliamentarians from Australia, Asia, Africa, and the United States. Because of this level of engagement, the organization has been placed in the global category, although the agenda has been focused on Europe. IAO advocates a widening of the use of orthodoxy in responding to challenges and expanding knowledge of how orthodoxy may contribute to the building and establishment of peace and justice. The effort to create global involvement is explained as recognition that European problems are now problems encountered in the entire world, and the body’s name was intentionally changed from European Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy to the broader Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (www.eiao.org). The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which was referenced in the introduction of this paper, was founded in 1889 in Paris (and has been based in Geneva since 1921) and focused on promoting the ideas of peace and international arbitration and encouraging multilateral cooperation. Started as an association of individual parliamentarians, the IPU transformed into an organization of the parliaments of States and now has members from 164 State parliaments in conjunction with ten associate members. The IPU’s main areas of activity are representative democracy, international peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian law, women in politics, and education, science, and culture (www.ipu.org). Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) was set up in Washington, D.C., in 1978–79 and is currently headquartered in New York City. The founding ideal was to draw together parliamentarians from across different countries in order to better address global issues through joint action. The PGA links together approximately eleven hundred individual legislators from 139 parliaments. The three central programs of PGA are international law and human rights, peace and democracy, and gender, equality, and population, with the organization working with a range of bodies in the UN System as well as NGOs and related research institutions (www.pgaction.org). The Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP) aims to facilitate personal connections between parliamentary assembly secretaries general. ASGP studies the different laws and practices across parliaments and can propose means of improving these

HOW ARE, AND SHOULD, PARLIAMENTARIANS OF STATES BE INVOLVED. . .?

practices and encouraging cooperation between the parliaments. The association functions on the basis of its own rules and working methods, but is a consultative organ that assists the IPU (www.asgp.co; http://www.ipu.org/asgp-e/rules.htm). The African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP)–European Union (EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly is placed in the global group, because the assembly involves over one hundred States across four regions. The ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly seeks to promote human rights and democratic processes through dialogue and consultation, to facilitate greater understanding between the peoples of the contributing States, and to raise public awareness and promote north–south interdependence on development issues. Work is carried out in several main committees: political affairs, economic development, finance and trade, and social affairs and environment (www.acpsec.org; www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp). The International Council of Jewish Parliamentarians (ICJP), which has its headquarters in Jerusalem, brings together Jewish members of parliaments of States and the European Parliament, as well as cabinet or deputy ministers of States. The ICJP’s mission statement explains the purpose of the council as: To promote an ongoing dialogue and a sense of fraternity among Jewish legislators and ministers; To uphold the principles of democracy, further the cause of human rights and promote the rule of law; To combat racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, terrorism and Holocaust denial by all means available to parliamentarians and ministers; To support Israel, conduct dialogue on political issues between Jewish parliamentarians and the political leadership in Israel, and contribute toward the creation of enduring peace in the Middle East; To ensure the welfare, both material and spiritual, of Jews and Jewish communities worldwide. To create international cooperation on projects relevant to ICJP members. (www.icjp.net/about) Another global organization of parliamentarians, the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (PUIC), instead has an Islamic focus. PUIC membership ranges across Eastern Europe, Caucasia, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (www.puic.org). Finally, in addition to these organizations, there is a global e-Parliament designed to inform, connect, and build coalitions among parliamentarians to undertake needed policy improvements on important global issues (www.e-parl.net). The e-Parliament’s initial emphasis was on two issue areas, climate change and the spread of democracy. The e-Parliament is now focusing on promoting renewable energy and addressing climate change via its Climate Parliament subsidiary (ww.climateparl.net). Global/Specific Issue The seven global organizations of parliamentarians working on a specific issue are focused on corruption, democracy, drug control, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, small arms and light weapons, sustainable urban development, and international financial institutions. Five are referred to by de Puig as “true international parliamentary assemblies.” Table II. Global/Specific Issue (7) *Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) *Global Parliamentarians on Habitat (GPH) *Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons *Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund *Transatlantic Interparliamentary Drug Control Conference International Movement of Parliamentarians for Democracy (IMPD) Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND)

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The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) was created in October 2002 at a conference in Ottawa, Canada, with 170 parliamentarians from over fifty States participating. Built upon the core values of integrity, accountability, collaboration, and diversity, GOPAC’s vision is to “achieve accountability and transparency through effective anti-corruption mechanisms and inclusive participation and cooperation between parliamentarians, government and civil society” (www.gopacnetwork.org/overview). As part of the operating structure, GOPAC includes regional and national chapters. Global Parliamentarians on Habitat (GPH), founded in 1987 in Yokohama, Japan, in the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, has maintained close cooperation with UNHABITAT, which notes: “UN-HABITAT believes that partnership with parliamentarians is vital to build support for its mission and the implementation of HABITAT Agenda and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Because parliamentarians act as the bridge between the people and their government, they are instrumental in advocating for the rights and needs of the people” (www.unhabitat.org). GPH has held five Global Forums of Parliamentarians that usually attract over two hundred parliamentarians and about three hundred other participants from over fifty States around the world. In April 2009, GPH met and passed a resolution in support of UN-HABITAT’s main theme, promoting affordable housing finance systems in an urbanizing world challenged by a global financial crisis. The meeting also established the African Parliamentarians chapter of GPH, and African parliamentarians were elected to its board of directors. The Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons was established in 1999 at the instigation of parliamentarians from Europe and Central America but now brings together a network of parliamentarians who are focused on addressing this issue area from across much of Latin America, Europe, and Africa. The forum is designed “to support parliamentarians in their small arms related work, contributing to the advancement of the small arms agenda, and providing a space for parliamentarians to meet and join forces with other stakeholders and actors, such as civil society organizations” (www.parliamentaryforum.org/theorganization). Another global/specific issue organization of parliamentarians involved with a particular organization in the UN system is the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (the Parliamentary Network). Drawing parliamentarians from over 140 States, the Parliamentary Network is focused on providing “a platform for parliamentarians around the globe to advocate for increased accountability and transparency in International Financial Institutions and multilateral development financing,” and activities are guided by the principles of “dialogue, advocacy, networking, partnership, and increased accountability” (www.pnowb.org/about/mission). Membership is open to elected parliamentarians from World Bank member States who are willing to represent their own views and their constituents, not act as country representatives, and the work is carried out in conjunction with a wide group of related partners. In a very different issue area, the Transatlantic Interparliamentary Drug Control Conference has been organized in conjunction with the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). For example, in 2002 the conference was held Tokyo with the Federation of Japanese Parliamentarians to Fight against Abuse of Narcotics and Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2002/ socnar841.html). The International Movement of Parliamentarians for Democracy (IMPD) was founded in 2003 and formalized at the second meeting in 2004 as part of the third assembly of the World Movement for Democracy, with the listed purpose “to strengthen, re-invigorate, reform, and bolster democracy worldwide, and to defend democratically elected parliamentarians who are denied their seats or who face harassment” (www.wmd.org/assemblies/third-assembly/ workshops/international-democracy-assistance-and-solidarity/international-). Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) is a global network of over seven hundred parliamentarians from seventy-five countries working as “a non-partisan forum for parliamentarians nationally and internationally to share resources and information, develop cooperative strategies and engage in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament issues, initia-

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tives, and arenas” and links as well with nongovernmental experts (www.pnnd.org/about-us). A program of the Global Security Institute (www.gsinstitute.org), PNND provides information on related issues, meetings, resolutions, and legislation along with encouraging the building of contacts and the development of joint strategies. European Regional Moving to regional organizations, we begin with Europe, because it has the most extensive array of parliamentary organizations. A broad descriptive overview of the region’s twelve parliamentary organizations is provided because of the great diversity of regional organizations, the overlap of the regions, and their reach beyond Europe. Eight of the twelve parliamentary organizations in Europe are included in de Puig’s “true interparliamentary assemblies.” The European Parliament is a directly elected parliament of the EU that has twenty-eight member States. It has been described as one of the most powerful international legislatures in the world and serves as a model for those who are advocating the creation of a directly elected UN Assembly. It is important to mention that, as the EU developed, the role of the Western European Union (WEU) declined, and it ceased to exist in June 2011. The assembly of the WEU held its last session in May 2011. Table III. European/Broad Agenda (12) *European Parliament *Baltic Assembly *Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference *Benelux Parliament *Euro–Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly *Nordic Council *Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) *Parliamentary Dimension of the Central European Initiative British–Irish Parliamentary Assembly Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALREC) Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments European Conference of Presidents of Parliaments On a much smaller scale among the “true parliamentary assemblies” are the Baltic Assembly, which encompasses Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (www.baltasam.org); the Benelux Parliament for Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (www.benelux-parlement.eu); and the Nordic Council, drawing members from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland (www.norden.org/en/nordic-council). Unlike the narrow Baltic Assembly, the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference draws together participants from across the entire region to allow for dialogue between parliamentarians operating at the national, regional, and parliamentary organization level (www.bspc.net). The Euro–Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) includes representatives from the national parliaments of EU member States, the European Parliament, and national parliaments of partner States in the European Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey to Tunisia and allows for consultation and recommendations related to the region (www. europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/content_en.html). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which consists of over three hundred individuals from parliaments of the

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forty-seven member States, is designed to “uphold the shared values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law that are the ‘common heritage’ of the peoples of Europe” (www.website-pace. net/en_GB/web/apce/in-brief). Finally, there is the Parliamentary Dimension of the Central European Initiative, which operates as one of three pillars of the overarching organization along with the governmental and business dimensions (www.cei.int/content/parliamentary-dimension). Out of the four not specified by de Puig as “true interparliamentary assemblies,” one is rather unusual in the diversity of the participants. The Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies (CALREC), which “unites seventy-four presidents of European regional legislative assemblies: the parliaments of the Spanish communities, Italian regional councils, the federated states of Germany and Austria, the Portuguese regions of l’Açores and Madeira, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, Åland Islands in Finland, and Belgium community and regional chambers” (www.calrenet.eu/index.php/what-is-calre/history). The British Irish Parliamentary Assembly encompasses quite a small grouping (www.britishirish.org). The final two involve specific offices of parliaments: the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments (www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/8) and European Conference of Presidents of Parliaments (www.website-pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/conferences). Table IV. European/Specific Issue (1) Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC) There is only one European organization that focuses on a specific issue: the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC). COSAC was created in 1989, when members of the parliaments of the EU member States agreed to strengthen the role of the State parliaments in relation to community matters by bringing together their committees on European Affairs (www.cosac.eu). Regional Outside Europe/Broad Agenda The twenty regional parliamentary organizations with broad agendas that are outside of Europe cover regions around the world: Arctic (1), Africa (4) America (3), Latin America (7), Arab (2), Asia (1), Pacific (1), and former USSR (1). Available space only permits a brief comment on each region that illuminates the diversity of parliamentary organizations, and the following sections provide a categorized listing of related organizations for reference. For the Arctic there is the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR), with parliamentarians from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the U.S., the European Parliament, and permanent participants representing indigenous peoples. CPAR works on initiatives to improve Arctic cooperation and serves as a parliamentary forum for issues relevant to the efforts of the Arctic Council. Between conferences, Arctic parliamentary cooperation is carried on by a Standing Committee (www.arcticparl.org). The four identified African organizations include a Pan-African Parliament (www.pan-africanparliament.org) and two sub-regional organizations in East Africa (www.eala.org) and West Africa (www.parl.ecowas.int). In addition, there is an African Network of Parliamentary Staff (www.asgp.co/node/30132). The three American organizations include the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA), which involves State, provincial, and territorial parliamentarians or legislators from across all of the Americas (http://www.copa.qc.ca/). Parliamentarians for the Americas (ParlAmericas), which was previously named the Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas (FIPA), brings together delegates to formulate recommendations to take back to the legislatures across the hemisphere (www.parlamericas.org). There is also a different form of representation provided through the Indigenous Parliament of America (www.parlatino.org/es/ enlaces/parlamentos-regionales/parlamento-indigena.html).

HOW ARE, AND SHOULD, PARLIAMENTARIANS OF STATES BE INVOLVED. . .?

Table V. Regional Outside Europe—Broad Agenda (20) Arctic (1) *Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region Africa (4) *East African Legislative Assembly *Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Parliament *Pan-African Parliament African Network of Parliamentary Staff America (3) *Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) Indigenous Parliament of America Parliamentarians for the Americas (ParlAmericas) Latin America (7) *Amazonian Parliament *Andean Parliament *Assembly of Caribbean Community of Parliamentarians (ACCP) *Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) *Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) *Mercosur Parliament Forum of Presidents of the Legislative Bodies of Central America and the Caribbean Basin (FOPREL) Arab (2) *Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union * Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union Asia (1) *ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly Former USSR (1) *Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States Pacific (1) *Association of Pacific Island Legislatures Located in Caracas, Venezuela, the Amazonian Parliament works “to promote political and parliamentarian exchange in the Amazon Basin” (www.insouth.org). The Andean Parliament is an organ of the Andean Community of Nations created in 1979 and adapted in 1997. With representatives chosen from each State, the parliament’s “functions are to participate in the legislative process of putting forward to the bodies of the system draft provisions of common interest. It also promotes the harmonization of member country legislation and the growth of cooperative and coordinated relations with the Parliaments of the Andean countries and of third countries” (www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/sai/ estructura_6.html). The Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) first met in 1996 and brings together representatives from thirteen member States and one associate member parliaments (www.caricom.org). The main tasks of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)

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are to provide leadership for representative democracy in Central America and to promote institutional cooperation on issues including integration, sustainable development, and human rights (www.parlacen.int). There is also a Forum of Presidents of the Legislative Bodies of Central America and the Caribbean Basin (FOPREL), which has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Organization of American States (OAS) (www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_ release.asp?sCodigo=E-015/07). The Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) covers an extensive set of members: Argentina, Aruba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Martin, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Parlatino pursues the defense of democracy and Latin American integration along with promoting economic and social development and respect for human rights (www.parlatino.org). Finally, the Mercosur Parliament brings together representatives from the States in this regional organization that promotes a common market in South America (www.parlamentodelmercosur.org). There are two Arab parliamentary organizations identified. The Arab Parliamentary Union, with parliamentarians from twenty-two States, was established in 1974 (www.arabipu.org). The Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union, which includes Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia, brings together thirty representatives from each country selected by their respective legislative organs (www.maghrebarabe.org). In Asia, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) has the goal of contributing “to the attainment of the goals and aspirations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through inter-parliamentary cooperation” (www.aipo.org). In 1992, parliamentarians in States from the former Soviet Union created the Interparliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Representatives are from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikstan, and Ukraine. The Interparliamentary Assembly has the “overarching mission” of “law-making and alignment of national laws” and discusses a range of issues, adopts recommendations and model legislation, and assists with the exchange of information (www.iacis.ru). Finally, the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures (APIL), founded in 1981 and consisting of members from American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Island of Guam, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, State of Hawaii, Republic of Nauru, Republic of Kiribati, and four States from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), meets to “consider matters in areas where regional cooperation, coordination, exchange and assistance may help governments achieve their goals through collective action” (www.apilpacific.com). Regional Outside Europe—Specific Issue Seven regional parliamentary organizations outside of Europe that focus on specific issues have been established. Four African organizations are involved in development, corruption, forest ecosystems, and education. An Asian organization is concerned with population and development. Two Latin American organizations are focused on environment and democracy. Interregional There are eleven organizations identified that are categorized as interregional. Nine are drawn from the “true international parliamentary assemblies” provided by de Puig. It is not surprising that seven of these link Europe with other regions. Most of the connections are mentioned in the titles, but it should be pointed out that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) includes members from the former Soviet Union and North America. Four link parliaments in other regions: the Black Sea, Islamic States, African and Arab States, and Asia and the Pacific.

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Table VI. Regional Outside Europe—Specific Issue (7) Africa (4) *Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (APNAC) (www.apnacafrica.org) Network of Parliamentarians for the Sustainable Management of Central African Forest Ecosystems (REPAR) (see http://pfbc-cbfp.org/news_en/items/repar-positionREDD-en.html) Forum of African Parliamentarians for Education (FAPED) (in cooperation with UNESCO, see: https://en.unesco.org/about-us/how-we-work) Asia (1) Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD) (www. afppd.org) Latin America (2) *Conference of Presidents of Democratic Ibero-American Parliaments *Latin America Interparliamentary Commission on the Environment Table VII. Interregional (11) *Asia–Pacific Parliamentary Forum *Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) *Association of Senates, Shoora and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World *Conference of Presidents of Euro–Mediterranean Parliaments *Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Parliamentary Assembly *Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM) *Parliamentary Association for Euro–Arab Cooperation (PAEAC) *Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference NATO Parliamentary Assembly (www.nato-pa.int) Parliamentary Assembly for Black Sea Economic Co-operation (PABSEC) (www. pabsec.org) Conclusion The involvement of governments of States in global governance has greatly expanded as the global governance agenda has extended. Now it includes not only foreign offices but also many other departments of the governments of States. At the same time, parliamentarians of States are increasingly involved with parliamentarians from a great diversity of other States. Overall, the diversity of these efforts is very impressive. Some parliamentarians maintain a broad emphasis, while others are focused on specific issues, and there are a great range of specific issues encompassed. The parliamentary meetings across State borders can be global, but in other circumstances, they are limited to a regional focus (with a range of examples included across all forms of region) and also include a variety of interregional parliamentary organizations. In a few cases, parliamentarians from a small region are involved. There are organizations that include parliamentarians who are representing the parliament of their State and others in which parlia-

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mentarians are only representing themselves. Participants in others are only secretaries general, speakers, and presidents of parliaments. Given the overview of the diversity of inter-State organizations of parliaments, what conclusions and questions does this exercise raise about their present and potential impact on global governance? For de Puig, writing in the last chapter of International Parliaments, titled “History in the Making,” “five final considerations” are reached. First, international parliamentarianism “is a form of parliamentarianism that does not look backwards. . . . There is a dynamic here which makes it inexorable that a forum in which citizens’ representatives discuss and take decisions on all the problems of society and the world will spread to every territorial, sectorial, political, and geo-strategic sphere.” Second, “it is a global phenomenon but one with regional roots. Having started in Europe, it has been spreading everywhere— with a special momentum in Latin America, but also in Africa and Asia.” Third, “it is a factor in the development of democracy in a progressive direction. . . . These assemblies have demonstrated, parliamentarians are less bound by governmental commitments and act with greater freedom” (111). Fourth, “it is an expression of the reality of world economic and political complexity. Bringing states, economies, and territories together and harmonizing legislation in a joint decision-making process, it affords more and better responses.” Fifth, “parliament is society’s proper representative in promoting, criticizing, and, if necessary condemning. Governments are much mistaken if they seek to disregard the parliamentary dimension. The people will not allow them to.” But “the limitations of this form of parliamentarianism, its lack of sovereignty, its inability to set and impose standards, are to be regretted. . . . And the danger exists that the multiplicity of these structures may render them superficial and purely symbolic.” (112) From the author’s perspective, the developments challenge the long-established practice that only the executive branches of States should represent themselves in interstate organizations. In relation to the UN context, should the present, largely IPU-defined parliamentary relationship with the UN be permitted to evolve? Should a more explicit future vision of an IPU-led parliamentarian–UN relationship be developed? Instead, would the best peacebuilding strategy call for a directly elected UN Parliamentary Assembly? In the European context, the existence of a significant parliamentary organization presence in Europe challenges us to ponder two questions in particular: Are developments in Europe a model that other regions should aspire to follow? And/or are developments in Europe a model that the entire world should follow? The review of parliamentarian bodies makes it very obvious that those who are interested in the democratic quality of global governance must consider the contributions made by parliamentarians of States. Key questions include: Should parliamentarians of States become involved with parliamentarians of other States in coping with problems that transcend the borders of their State? If they should, how should this be done? How does their personal involvement with parliamentarians of other States impact the nature of their agenda in their home parliament? How does it affect their policy on existing issues? Does it cause them to add new issues to the agenda? How are their policies affected by the regional membership of organizations in which they are involved? In addition, it is useful to know how much influence members of a specific State parliament have when they are participating in interstate parliamentary organizations. Clearly, further research is needed that considers the impact this experience has on participating parliamentarians and how it affects the influence that they have on both the parliament of their State and the inter-State parliament in which they participate. Certainly those engaged in the activities described are engaged in “experiments” that are responsive to the “democratic theory” needs identified by Dahl and Tufte in the introduction to this paper. What are the implications of this growth in the array of actors in world politics? Why are civil society, business, local authorities, and parliamentarians now extending their activities into global governance? Obviously, it is because the boundaries of all significant public policy issues now reach across the entire globe. Nevertheless, each of these public

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policy issues has a diversity of local dimensions. Thus, efforts at global governance confront the need for simultaneously coping with issues on a global scale and in the context of governance for a diversity of more local boundaries. This is, indeed, a difficult challenge. Although individual actors have not explained their behavior in these terms, the totality of their efforts implies this hypothesis: In a world of escalating interdependence, local democracy is not feasible without global democracy, and global democracy is not feasible without local democracy. But these practitioners have no theory to guide them. REFERENCES Alger, Chadwick F. (2011): “Searching for Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance: What Are the Implications of Regional and Global Involvements of Local governments?” International Journal of Peace Studies 16 (2): 1–24. Alger, Chadwick F. (2010): “Expanding Governmental Diversity in Global Governance: Parliamentarians of States and Local Governments,” Global Governance 16(1): 59–80. Alger, Chadwick F. (2007): “Widening Participation,” in Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of the United Nations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Alger, Chadwick F. (2003): “Searching for Democratic Potential in Emerging Global Governance,” in Bruce Morrison (ed.): Transnational Democracy in Critical and Comparative Perspective. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Cardoso Report, Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations [A/58/817 and A/58/817/Corr.1]. Childers, Erskine and Brian Urquhart (1994): Renewing the United Nations System. Uppsala, Sweden: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. Commission on Global Governance (1995): Our Global Neighborhood. New York: Oxford University Press. Cutler, Robert M. (2001): “The Emergence of International Parliamentary Institutions: New Networks of Influence in World Society,” in Gordon Smith and Daniel Wolfish (eds.): Who Is Afraid of the State? Canada in a World of Multiple Centres of Power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Dahl, Robert A. and Edward R. Tufte (1973): Size and Democracy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. de Puig, Lluís Maria (2008) International Parliaments. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. Hoffmann-Contreras, Carlos (2007) “Interparliamentary Organizations in the World: Objectives, Functions and Areas of Interest,” Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP), available at http://www.asgp.co/node/29908. Johnsson, Anders B. (2003): “A Parliamentary Dimension to International Cooperation,” in Saul Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker (eds.): A Reader on Second Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals. Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education. Karns, David A. (1977): “The Effect of Interparliamentary Meetings on the Foreign Policy Attitudes of United States Congressmen,” International Organization 31(3): 497–513. Katz, Richard S. and Bernhard Wessels (eds.) (1999): The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration. New York: Oxford University Press. O’Brien, Mitchell, Rick Stapenhurst, and Niall Johnston (eds.) (2008): Parliaments as Peacebuilders in Conflict-Affected Countries. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Roche, Douglas (2003): “The Case for a UN Parliamentary Assembly,” in Saul H. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker (eds.): A Reader on Secondary Assembly and Parliamentary Proposals. Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education.

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Sabic, Zlatko (2010): “Parliamentarians as International Actors: Members of the U.S. Congress and International Parliamentary Institutions,” Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 17–20. Sabic, Zlatko (2008): “Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions,” Parliamentary Affairs 61(2): 235–71.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER READING3 Cofelice, Andrea and Stelios Stavridis (2014): “The European Parliament as an International Parliamentary Institution (IPI).” European Foreign Affairs Review 19(2): 145–78. Costa, Oliver, Clarissa Dri, and Stelios Stavridis (2013): Parliamentary Dimensions of Regionalization and Globalization: The Role of Inter-Parliamentary Institutions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Malamud, Andrés and Stelios Stavridis (2011): “Parliaments and Parliamentarians as International Actors,” in Bob Reinalda (ed.): The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors. Farnham: Ashgate. 3. Our thanks to Zlatko Sabic for providing these references.

The Life Cycle of Regimes: Temporality and Exclusive Forms of International Cooperation by Llewelyn Hughes, Australian National University, Jeffrey S. Lantis, College of Wooster, and Mireya Solís, Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies In three important areas of international cooperation—global trade, nuclear security, and climate change—states are shifting away from inclusive multilateralism toward more exclusionary forms of interstate cooperation. In this article, we offer a historical institutionalist account of this change. We propose that the maturation of the existing multilateral regimes changed the payoff structure, creating incentives for states to establish alternative institutions centered on the principles of selective and discriminatory cooperation. Our findings suggest that the growth in exclusive forms of cooperation in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change should not be considered aberrations but are rather part of a process of regime maturation.

Introduction In this article, we explain an empirical puzzle. In three important areas of international cooperation—global trade, nuclear security, and climate change—states are shifting away from inclusive multilateralism toward more exclusionary forms of interstate cooperation (which we term “exclusionary cooperation agreements” or ECAs). Governments are increasingly negotiating lower barriers to trade and invest on a bilateral or regional basis for example, rather than through the GATT/WTO framework. In the area of nuclear nonproliferation, bilateral contracting and mini-lateral arrangements appear to take precedence over multilateral negotiations through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Finally, in the case of climate change, important forms of cooperation are increasingly occurring outside, rather than within, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). How can we explain this common trajectory despite little evidence of a weakening in the commitment of states to the public policy goals each is designed to achieve? In this article, we propose that temporality and policy feedbacks, concepts central to historical institutionalism, help explain this pattern of change in international cooperation. We propose that states in each of these areas made a choice to cooperate through inclusive multilateral organizations (IMOs), defined by principles of inclusivity and homogeneity. This choice, we argue, had important consequences for future cooperation. Specifically, the initial decision to pursue cooperation through inclusive and homogeneous rules increased the likelihood states would choose more exclusive forms of cooperation over time. We suggest that the shift toward more discriminatory forms of cooperation is a natural result of the initial choice to pursue interstate cooperation through multilateral, inclusive organizations. In making this argument, we contribute to the scholarship on international cooperation in two ways. First, we explain the puzzling evolution of three important but substantively different areas of interstate cooperation toward a common outcome. The shift from multilateral forums to more exclusionary forms of international cooperation remains under-studied in the literature on institutional choice (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2004; Raustiala and Victor 2004). We propose that incorporating temporality makes it possible to account for changes in forms of JIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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international cooperation across these different issue areas. While the explicit inclusion of temporality is not inimical to a rationalist approach to explaining international cooperation, it has not been a sustained focus of research (Martin and Simmons 2001: 203; Peters 2005; Drezner 2010). Theoretically, our study demonstrates the utility of using analytic tools drawn from historical institutionalism for explaining recent changes in patterns of international cooperation. Concepts advanced in comparative political economy and American political development are increasingly deployed by scholars seeking to explain patterns of international cooperation (Farrell and Newman 2010; Fioretos 2010; Sell 2010). We show how a historical institutionalist explanation focused on the role of policy feedback may help to explain changes in patterns of international cooperation in trade, nuclear security, and climate change, three areas with important public policy implications. We proceed in four stages: First, we situate our argument within existing explanations of changes in forms of international cooperation. Second, we introduce our argument, which focuses on the importance of sequencing, through the analytic framework of the regime life cycle. Third, we demonstrate the utility of the framework for explaining recent changes in forms of international cooperation across trade, nuclear security, and climate change, three important areas of international cooperation with substantially different characteristics. We conclude by discussing the scope conditions and generalizability of the argument and broader lessons for policies and theories of international cooperation. Explaining Choice in Forms of International Cooperation International organizations are defined as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior” (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001: 762). Studies show that forms of cooperation vary across membership, issue, organizational design, and rules. There is also variation within each of these categories. Membership of international organizations (IOs) range, for example, from a few members to larger, inclusive regimes (Downs et al. 1998). An important focus of studies on international cooperation asks why particular forms of cooperation are reached in equilibrium and what effects they have (Martin and Simmons 1998). A number of studies of international cooperation also seek to explain change in forms of international cooperation (Jupille and Snidal 2005). One notable focus is explaining the shift toward greater inclusivity over time. Ruggie (1992), for example, describes a shift toward multilateral regimes characterized by homogeneity and universality. Other scholars have focused on the diversification in forms of cooperation and growth in the number of IOs, identifying a regime complex of “nested, partially-overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered” (Martin and Simmons 1998: 736–38; Aggarwal 1998, Koremenos et al. 2001). Here, newly emerging IOs fit within broader regimes, ensuring a certain measure of conformity with institutional arrangements (Rixen 2010; Rixen and Rohlfing 2007). There has been less scholarly focus on why exclusionary forms of international cooperation might emerge to challenge inclusive multilateral forms of cooperation. This is an important gap, given the trend toward more exclusionary forms of cooperation in the areas of trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change. We identify two general theoretical approaches that could be adapted to explain this outcome. The first focuses on ideational change. Here, new organizational forms are taken to follow shifts in the preferences of states. This shift in preference in turn occurs because of changes in information or because of normative changes (Oye 1985: 11). Yet there is little evidence that information or normative changes are responsible for the shift toward more exclusive forms of international cooperation in the areas examined in this paper. In the case of trade, governments remain committed to lowering barriers to trade and investment, as evidenced by the regional and bilateral trade agreements that extend international cooperation beyond tariffs into investment-related measures and nontariff measures. The launch of

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the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) demonstrates the even greater commitment among participants to adopt a deeper agenda of economic liberalization. In the area of nuclear nonproliferation, NPT member states have not given up on the goal of limiting nuclear proliferation. Western powers regularly pressure countries like Iran and North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons states also remain formally committed to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. Finally, in the area of climate change, members of the UNFCCC remain committed to the need to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and agreed at COP 18 in 2012 to negotiate a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, the scientific evidence in favor of an anthropogenic explanation for climate change is increasing over time, suggesting that information should be mitigating in favor of greater cooperation, rather than against it. A second possible explanation for a shift toward more exclusive forms of international cooperation focuses on changes in relative power. A well-known strand of realismâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;hegemonic stability theoryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;links greater levels of international cooperation to extreme concentration of power (Krasner 1976). Realists argue changes in the balance of international power alter the range of possible cooperative outcomes between states. Great powers, for example, may use access to their internal markets and lower levels of vulnerability to external coercion to alter forms of international cooperation (Drezner 2007). Hence, changes in forms of interstate cooperation in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change could reflect the shifting balance of international power. Power-based arguments are insufficient, however, to explain patterns of international cooperation. In general, the raw capabilities of states are a poor indicator of patterns of cooperation given that the leading state in the system may be unwilling to display leadership in regime construction. Further, the timing of changes in relative power are not consistent with shifts in forms of interstate cooperation in the cases examined here. The U.S. negotiated preferential trade agreements both in moments of unipolarity (NAFTA soon after the end of the Cold War) and of emerging multipolarity and diminished economic influence (the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement). The number of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) has risen steadily over the past five decades, despite shifts in polarity structures. NCAs have also been negotiated between states that lack strategic relationships. Finally, the preferences of states central to negotiating within the COP process toward forms of cooperation are poorly predicted by relative levels of power. Policy Feedback and Decreasing Returns to IMOs The continued commitment to the pursuit of interstate cooperation in each area makes it difficult to explain change in forms of cooperation using changes in norms or information. Changes in relative power are also an implausible explanation for outcomes. How, then, can we explain the shift toward exclusionary cooperation agreements in the areas of trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change? We propose that in these areas cooperation was initially commonly pursued through IMOs, which in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change shared three traits. First, they sought to establish universality, allowing any state to join, subject to conditions of membership. Second, they attempted to achieve homogeneity by adopting a common set of rules. Third, these institutions strove for regime deepening by expanding the scope of cooperation and improving compliance with regime rules. The initial choice of establishment is informed by statesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation through existing or alternative arrangements. Once made, however, we suggest it marked the beginning of a process we refer to as the IMO life cycle. In the first stage of the life cycle, states perceived sufficient benefits obtainable through cooperation to overcome the costs associated with the establishment of an international organization. In the second stage,

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participants sought to expand cooperation by acquiring more members (universality), adopting a common set of rules (homogeneity), and increasing issue scope (regime deepening). While each of these accomplishments may be characterized as an improvement, we argue that over time their combined effects made it increasingly difficult to deepen cooperation in multilateral forums. Thus, in the third stage, which is the primary empirical focus of this study, states shifted to pursue cooperation through alternative, and more exclusive, forms of international cooperation. Why might this be the case? Scholars of historical institutionalism argue feedback effects tend to increase the returns to existing institutions (Pierson 2000). This argument is incorporated in studies of international cooperation, which emphasize the “the costs and risks of institutional change” (Jupille and Snidal 2005: 35). Recent theoretical advances in historical institutionalism suggest, however, that in addition to promoting institutional stability, feedback mechanisms can also drive endogenous change in which the “expected operation of institutions itself . . . generates pressures for change” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 9). Adapting this to the problem of international cooperation, we identify two mechanisms that led to decreasing returns to cooperation through the existing IMOs governing trade and investment, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change over time. First, expanding participation, adopting homogeneous rules, and deepening cooperation—each of which are features of the IMOs promoting cooperation in these areas—increases the possible benefits from cooperation. As the number of states grew, however, this also increased transaction and information costs (Oye 1985). Membership expansion also increased the likelihood a state determines that the distributional consequences of an agreement are not in its favor, which is a reason for choosing alternative institutions as the focal points for cooperation (Jupille and Snidal 2005). Second, the adoption of egalitarian and stricter decision making in each of these areas increased the costs of compliance. This in turn gives states dissatisfied with the distribution of costs and benefits greater incentives to pursue alternative forms of cooperation (Kahler 1992; Tsebelis 1995; Depledge 2006). In the case of trade, the move toward greater legalization of dispute-resolution practices increased the transparency concerning the distributional costs of proposed outcomes, while in the case of climate change, the move to expand legally binding national emissions targets increased the costs of compliance, contributing to the problems in deepening the regime. Together, we argue this creates a trilemma of universality, legalization, and deeper collaboration in the IMOs governing cooperation in trade, nonproliferation, and climate. As cooperation Figure 1: Cooperation trilemma in mature IMOs Universality

Homogeneity

Regime Deepening

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within these international organizations approached this ideal type (depicted in Figure 1), difficulties in negotiating further regime advancement increased. How did states respond to the falling returns to cooperation through the IMOs governing trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change? Existing research suggests states facing stagnation in IMOs have two choices: internal adjustment by seeking to change rules within the IMO or external adjustment through the pursuit of more exclusive forms of cooperation. Institutional choice theory suggests internal adjustment is more likely because of the costs of creating new institutions (Goldberg 1974; Majone 1989; Hall 2010:207; Koremenos et al. 2001). In the cases examined here, the costs to shifting toward forms of cooperation that relaxed the principles of universality or homogeneity were not prohibitive because cooperation through the IMO already revealed information about states’ negotiating positions, reducing the transaction costs of pursuing new forms of cooperation. Together, these feedback effects reduced the likelihood of deepening cooperation through inclusive, homogeneous organizations. This does not mean, however, that existing IMOs are rendered redundant. Instead, to the extent states cease seeking to deepen cooperation through the IMO, it can remain useful. In the case of the international trade regime, dispute resolution processes are likely to continue to be useful even as states increasingly pursue further cooperation through ECAs. Member states regularly participate in review conferences for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) program of monitoring, inspections, and verification of nuclear safety and security remains a centerpiece of the regime. In the case of climate change, reporting requirements under the UNFCCC continue to play a useful function in tracking national changes in GHG emissions. The willingness to pursue cooperation through ECAs does suggest, however, that IMOs in these areas are likely to be displaced as the focal point for forward-looking cooperation. To borrow once again from historical institutionalism, the emergence of exclusionary forms of international cooperation may be characterized as a form of incremental change akin to “layering” identified by Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 16–17) and Streeck and Thelen (2005). Just as within domestic societies institutions emerge that overlap existing institutional structures and may displace them over time, so differential rates of growth in the degree of cooperation pursued through more exclusionary forms of cooperation, as opposed to IMOs, may lead to a substantially different structure of international cooperation over time (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 23–24). Empirical Section The temporal explanation for changes in forms of international cooperation in trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change focuses on the timing and content of alternative forms of cooperation. Governments are likely to identify and consider more exclusionary forms of cooperation after stagnation has set in the IMO. Empirically, this means we should see evidence of extended times to agreement and an increased likelihood of failed summit meetings (Narlikar 2010). Compared to a baseline of prior rounds of bargaining within the IMO, once the IMO stagnates, negotiations for further regime deepening should remain inconclusive for much longer periods of time, and will result in open failures of high level meetings that operate as markers of critical events in the negotiation process. We also expect the newly emergent forms of cooperation to relax at least one of the principles of the IMOs identified above. Additionally, we should see a shift in intentions among policymakers, who express unhappiness with the IMO and consciously decide to shift the location of cooperation. In this case, the evidence should be manifest in speech or documentary evidence. In the section below, we assess the usefulness of our explanation for changes in forms of international cooperation in the areas of trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate

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change in that order.1 We then move on to discuss the generalizability of the findings and the implications for theories of international cooperation. International Trade Timing The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged as the focal point for multilateral trade liberalization by default. Architects of the Bretton Woods system planned for an international trade organization (ITO) with an extensive mandate, an expansive administrative structure, and judicial enforcement through the International Court of Justice (Barton et al. 2006). Disagreement within the U.S. doomed this institution (Narlikar 2005). By 1950, an obscure agreement negotiated under the shadow of the ITO talks in Havana in 1947 to deal with tariff reductions in manufactures (GATT) emerged as the international regime for trade liberalization. GATT nevertheless launched multilateral cooperation based on two core principles: nondiscrimination and reciprocity, with periodic exchanges of trade concessions in multilateral negotiation rounds. GATT successfully delivered several rounds of tariff cuts (with participating countries ranging from thirteen to twenty-six). After the mid-1960s a qualitatively different process of expansion began with the Kennedy (1964–67) and Tokyo Rounds (1973–79): country participation grew significantly (to sixty-two and 102 nations, respectively), and GATT began to focus on nontariff barriers through codes that were voluntary but had dispute settlement mechanisms, thereby creating a multi-speed GATT in which countries could sign on to a diverse range of commitments (Winham 1986). The multilateral trade regime slipped with the emergence of a complex system of textile quotas embodied in the Multi-Fiber Agreement, but overall GATT membership increased, new economic issues were covered, and decision-making processes were put in place. By the late 1980s there was widespread consensus that the GATT regime was in trouble. While developing countries complained about the agricultural and textile carve outs, industrialized nations were frustrated by the lack of liberalization in services and knowledge-based industries. States also manipulated loopholes in the multilateral regime through voluntary export restraints, anti-dumping charges, and countervailing subsidies, as well as blocking the implementation of panel rulings against them. The Uruguay Round (1986–94) represented an attempt at internal adjustment. It restructured cooperation in four ways. First, it engineered a “grand bargain” whereby developing nations agreed to new rules in services, intellectual property, and trade-related investment measures, in exchange for developed countries accepting that textiles and agriculture would be subject to GATT disciplines. Second, regime members adopted a single undertaking approach where all disciplines would apply equally to every member. Third, the trade regime acquired a much firmer institutional footing with the establishment of a formal international organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the creation of an appellate body that made nonimplementation of panel rulings rare. These internal reforms moved the multilateral trade regime closer to the IMO ideal type. The WTO acquired near universality in membership with 153 participating economies. A sharp north-south disagreement emerged with developing countries mostly expecting “transfers” (nonreciprocated market concessions) in order to rebalance the skewed distribution of net benefits from the Uruguay Round, whereas industrialized nations expected to bargain for fresh concessions in order to acquiesce to demands from the south (Collier 2006: 1428). Hence, developing countries have engaged in purely distributive bargaining strategies and have developed strong south coalitions that do not fragment internally and whose members cannot be peeled off individually by offers from industrialized nations (Narlikar and Van Houten 2010: 151). 1. Together, the three cases examined in the paper are “most different” research design, in which the characteristics of the cases differ, or are invariant, across theoretically relevant variables other than those identified as important in the study (Seawright and Gerring 2008).

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The WTO also approached homogeneity and deepened rules. In GATT, countries had the option to subscribe or not to the pluri-lateral agreements to deal with nontariff barriers such as dumping, subsidies, and government procurement. However, in the WTO, members eschewed the à la carte approach in favor of a single undertaking whereby all disciplines would apply to every member.2 The new WTO deepened the process of interstate cooperation in several key ways. First, all WTO commitments now apply across the entire membership. Second, the WTO became a vehicle for multi-sectoral liberalization as textiles, agriculture, and services were incorporated into its liberalization mandate. Third, the WTO tackled “behind-the-border” issues such as intellectual protection that affect core regulatory capabilities of states. The bite of these commitments was increased given the changes to the dispute settlement mechanism. The limitations of the new institutional formula to sustain trade liberalization nevertheless came to the fore. Disagreement emerged over expanding the mandate of the WTO: Developing countries refused to incorporate labor standards and rejected the adoption of the Singapore issues (investment, competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation). This ended in the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial in 2003. Whereas in the past the U.S. and Europe had de facto controlled the decision-making process by dominating green room proceedings where decisions on market access and rules adoption were made, this process broke down (Bluestein 2008), and developing nations have challenged the governance practices of the WTO. As early as 1996, most of the ninety-member delegations present in the Singapore Ministerial argued, “The way in which the draft declaration had been prepared was undemocratic, unfair, and disgraceful” (Blackhurst and Hartridge 2004: 705). Agriculture has been one of the most divisive issues. Industrialized countries have resisted the elimination of agricultural subsidies (U.S.) or steep cuts to tariff peaks (EU) while developing nations have demanded exemptions to sensitive products and a special safeguard to protect subsistence agriculture (Narlikar and van Houten 2010: 149). But the fundamental flaw is of institutional design. Hence, the main proposals for WTO reform address in piecemeal fashion each of the vectors of the trilemma. On universality, there are now calls to establish executive boards or steering committees that aim for small-N bargaining to ensure effectiveness (Jones, 2010; Collier, 2006; Blackhurst and Hartridge 2004). On the depth of collaboration, there are appeals to revert back to the pluri-lateral approach or to restrict the organization’s scope to market access (dropping behind-the-border issues) (Hoekman and Vines 2007; Collier, 2006). And on enforcement, some have advocated for carving out areas from the enforcement process or returning to a diplomatic style for dispute resolution (Collier 2006; Barfield 2001). None of these institutional fixes have been implemented, and the Doha Round has drifted from failed ministerial meetings to an actual suspension of negotiations in 2006, with no successful conclusion in sight. The signs of decay of the multilateral trading system are evident in open negotiation failures at high-level events (Seattle 1999, Cancun, 2003) as well as the unprecedented length of the Doha Round (eleven years and counting).3 The institutional crisis of the WTO has coincided with the robust proliferation of preferential trading agreements. Regional and preferential trade agreements are not new. Previous waves of regionalism occurred in the interwar period, in the late 1950s with the launch of the European community and in the 1960s and 1970s as developing countries sought to enhance regional autonomy under the aegis of an ISI development model (Mansfield and Milner 1999). But the speed of free trade agreement proliferation during the WTO years is dramatically different. There were thirty-one active FTAs in 1994, and that number increased to 303 in 2011. Virtually all WTO 2. Through special and differential treatment, developing countries are given more time to implement obligations, but they cannot excuse themselves from all the agreements that constitute the WTO (Narlikar, 2005). 3. The Bali package adopted in December 2013 represented the first membership-wide agreement since the WTO was established. However, WTO members were unable to ratify the trade facilitation agreement by the deadline of July 2014 as India refused to do it citing the lack of progress on relaxing rules on trade distorting-subsidies for food stockpiles. The Bali process underscored once again the fragility of a negotiation process where the veto of any country may torpedo an agreement years in the making.

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members have now signed at least one FTA, rendering preferential liberalization a universal practice in the world trading system precisely at the time when the cooperation trilemma symptoms have manifested at the WTO. Content Continued deadlock at the WTO led policymakers to pursue their trade strategies in preferential forums due to the decreasing returns to cooperation within the existing institution, and the gains available through preferential agreements. Policymakers have explicitly cited these concerns to justify their departures from multilateralism. In the words of USTR Zoellick: “The key division at Cancun was between the can-do and the won’t-do countries. . . . As WTO members ponder the future, the U.S. will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries” (Wall Street Journal, 17 November 2003). Similarly, the European Union decided to put aside a de facto FTA moratorium (in effect since 1999) after its key priority for the multilateral agenda—the incorporation of the Singapore issues—came to naught in the aftermath of the Cancun meeting (Wolcock 2007: 5). The EU Commission (2006) noted: “The EU would be putting itself at a disadvantage if we did not seek to improve investment conditions in our bilateral negotiations.” ECAs relax the principles of universality and legalization to customize the negotiation agenda and facilitate the process of inter-state bargaining. The large number of ECAs prevents easy characterization of the content of these agreements. Some broad trends, however, are unmistakable. The vast majority of these trade agreements are bilateral (90 percent) pairing countries at very different levels of development (69 percent of these agreements are northsouth) (Acharya et al. 2011: 42–43). Thus, states are attracted to FTAs, because they can select “common view” partners and increase the likelihood of bypassing negotiation deadlock due to unbridgeable differences. For industrialized nations, the north-south bilateral FTAs offer the advantage of relying on asymmetrical bargaining since developing countries are more dependent on access to the larger economy and cannot resort to coalition tactics (Pekkanen et al. 2007). And developing countries agree to the inclusion of issues they reject at the multilateral level, because “the smaller number of negotiating parties makes it easier to exclude issues that are sensitive and to identify quid pro quo deals” (Hoekman 2011: 99). Further, while earlier FTAs dealt mostly with tariff reduction, FTAs incorporating rules on competition, investment, customs, government procurement, etc., grew to the hundreds in the 2000s. This agenda deepening has been pursued with an a-la-carte approach. Sectoral carve outs are rampant in sensitive areas, and the most divisive topics of export subsidies and domestic support programs have been left as under the purview of the WTO. An analysis of 28 EU and U.S. preferential trade agreements reveals that services, intellectual property, and labor standards are always present in the U.S. FTAs but not in the European ones. On the other hand, European trade agreements have more exacting disciplines in the area of competition (Acharya et al. 2011: 47). Japan, too, has added its own spin to preferential trade agreements with a cooperation chapter that addresses issues such as human resource development and small enterprises (Solís and Katada 2009). Moreover, the incorporation of regulatory issues in FTAs has called for the customized application of legalized dispute resolution to reflect the sensitivities specific to each nation (Chauffour and Maur 2011: 30). While the competition chapters in European FTAs generate legally enforceable provisions, the U.S. and Japanese do not (Acharya et al. 2011: 48). Nuclear Nonproliferation Timing Leaders explored a range of alternative arrangements to respond to international security challenges in the early nuclear era. U.S. representative Bernard Baruch proposed the creation of a UN Atomic Development Authority, a multilateral oversight body to control all aspects of the

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nuclear fuel cycle, in 1946. Soviet opposition scuttled the deal, however, and the 1950s and 1960s saw a rise in the number of nuclear weapons states, coupled with alliance formation and the development of regional security pacts. The NPT was opened for signature at the UN in 1968, and it became the cornerstone of a nonproliferation regime that grew to include a network of multilateral nonproliferation agreements, export controls, and safeguards. The NPT established three pillars: 1) Nonproliferation: nonnuclear weapons states pledge not to acquire weapons, while nuclear weapons states pledge not to share them; 2) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Civilian Cooperation: all parties have the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes “without discrimination,” with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for weapons; and 3) Disarmament: nuclear weapons states should “pursue negotiations in good faith at an early date on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament.” By the early 1970s, the NPT had established principles for multilateral cooperation that helped move it closer to the IMO ideal type. The expansion phase of the regime included the enlargement of NPT membership and widening of the scope of nonproliferation initiatives. The IAEA concluded safeguard contracts with member states of the NPT and commenced regularized inspections. These achievements moved the multilateral regime closer to the cooperation trilemma. The NPT acquired near universality in membership with 190 member states.4 The NPT also approached homogeneity and deepened rules. The five declared nuclear-weapons states were granted special status by the treaty and had de facto dominance in the decision-making process of the organization, but they were held to most elements of the treaty and singled-out in the Article VI call to pursue disarmament. Once established, parties to the NPT held Review Conferences (RevCons) every five years. In general, progress was made toward preventing the diversion of peaceful technologies or materials to weapons programs, and, in 1995, the Fifth NPT RevCon called for the “indefinite extension” of terms of the agreement. The first signs of regime decay emerged soon after India’s nuclear test in 1974; the cornerstone of the regime, the NPT—with its principles of universality and nondiscrimination, sharing technologies and “peaceful uses”—appeared flawed. In response, countries engaged in a process of internal adjustment by forming the London Suppliers Group to control the spread of technologies that could be used for clandestine weapons programs. Seven member states adopted new controls on technology exports through the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG reflected basic principles of the NPT, but offered a more focused institutional arrangement: a cartel of nuclear supplier states with a requirement for consensus. The NSG developed lists of nuclear material, equipment, and technology to be subject to export controls (a discriminatory selection of “what” could be shared and “with whom”). The NSG helps enforce monitoring and verification programs, and refers safeguards violations to the UN Security Council (Verdier 2008). While member states were secure in the knowledge that they could control the spread of key technologies, nonmembers of the NSG were resentful that a new and exclusive organization would regulate a market guaranteed for it by the terms of the NPT. However, the NSG faced two immediate problems. First, members of the NSG disagreed over many specifics of the nuclear trade. Relations in the group were so bad from 1978 to 1991 that “the founders lost their capacity to sanction nonparticipants and monitor cheating” (U.S. General Accounting Office 2002: 8). NSG member states divided into two groups with different interests in the regime: The U.S., Canada, and Australia held near monopolistic control of supply of uranium, and France, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium dominated technology exports for the nuclear fuel cycle. For more than thirteen years, “no change was 4. The NPT did fall short of inclusion of several non-declared nuclear weapons states, including Israel and, later, India and Pakistan. This evolution of institutions in the nuclear realm was driven by a diverse array of security objectives along with the temporal process itself.

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made to the NSG Trigger List, despite pressing need for regular updating and extension to keep up with new technologies” (Verdier 2008: 461). States began to break away from adherence to NPT principles in this period. Treaty signatories Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea all began clandestine nuclear programs. Nonsignatories Brazil and Argentina launched nuclear weapons programs, and South Africa successfully built a nuclear device. States also negotiated nuclear sharing deals for sensitive technologies, including a 1975 agreement for Germany to provide Brazil with elements of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. France concluded reprocessing plant contracts with Pakistan and South Korea (which they later cancelled under direct U.S. pressure), and China provided technology and assistance to Pakistan. By the 2000s, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan showed countries could break with the NPT despite the threat of sanctions. The Nuclear Suppliers Group also deadlocked over two critical issues. The IAEA Board of Governors passed the Additional Protocol in 1997, which offered a more rigorous nuclear inspection program and cooperation by all states, but NSG members could not reach consensus on whether the protocol should be a requirement for future trade of all nuclear materials. NSG members became locked in a stalemate over restrictions on uranium enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. The George W. Bush administration pushed this issue in the NSG, but each round of negotiations saw a new set of opponents and arguments against the plan. Thus, the “expansion of regime membership and the inclusion of states with highly varied perceptions of threat and concern regarding trade in sensitive technologies” stymied progress (Hibbs 2010). The 2005 NPT RevCon represented the nadir of the multilateral nonproliferation regime. Since 2000, diplomats found little common ground on multilateral standards. Differences arose at the 2005 RevCon over how to respond to noncompliant countries, and the implications of secret supplier networks for states and non-state actors. Developing countries in the non-aligned movement also became more vocal in their criticism of greater power reluctance to accept Article VI commitments (Verdier 2008; Strulak 1993). All precepts of the cooperation trilemma served to foster divisions at the conference. Some states resisted commitments to deeper collaboration due to their differences, questions were raised about the universality of the NPT, and the rule of unanimous consent to pass an Outcome Document also contributed to the collapse of diplomacy. One expert, Harald Müller, characterized this as the “biggest failure in the history of the NPT” (2005: 1). In response, states have moved toward bilateral arrangements and exclusive mini-laterals to pursue nonproliferation objectives. States have not ignored opportunities to address concerns in multilateral settings, rather they have shifted to bilateral or mini-lateral arrangements outside traditional channels to achieve specific objectives. Nuclear weapons states and other suppliers have negotiated bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs—a form of exclusionary cooperation agreements) with client states since the 1950s. In the spirit of the Atoms for Peace pledge, these were primarily designed to help developing countries achieve the promise of nuclear energy. Indeed, the vast majority of NCAs worldwide focus on civilian nuclear assistance, not sensitive technologies that might be more easily diverted for weapons programs. Uncertainty coupled with deadlock has fostered substantial growth in the number of NCAs, however. In the ten-year period after India’s nuclear test, NCAs increased by 70 percent (from 344 in 1974 to 573 in 1984) (Keeley 2009). In the past seven years, negotiations underway have reached an all-time high. Today, 441 nuclear power reactors operate in thirty countries. Fifty reactors are now under construction outside the U.S., and more than forty new countries have expressed their desire to develop nuclear energy programs, including Albania, Morocco, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Nigeria (Gourley and Stulberg 2009). Content Great powers and nuclear supplier states have entered into arrangements that relax the boundaries of the NPT. They have established exclusionary regimes that challenge principles of

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universal membership and broader “democracy” in decision making on nuclear technology. Bilateral nuclear agreements sometimes allow countries to relax the rules of multilateral institutions—providing latitude for states to shape the content of export deals, the partners engaged with, and the monitoring of, exported materials. U.S. leaders became vocal about multilateral cooperation in the 2000s. Christopher Ford, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Verification, criticized the past administration for its “fetishistic attachment to formal instruments” at the cost of U.S. interests (Ford 2008). In 2003, President George W. Bush created the new Proliferation Security Initiative, a program for interdiction of illicit shipments of materials related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And in 2004, he announced that future U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements should include a clause banning client states from the development of uranium enrichment or reprocessing. The Bush administration subsequently signed a series of memoranda of understanding for nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Bahrain that included statements regarding uranium enrichment and reprocessing. The 2005 decision to negotiate an NCA with India also allowed nuclear trade without the guarantee of full-scope IAEA safeguards (von Hippel 2009). India would remain a nonsignatory of the NPT, agreeing only to open fourteen of its twenty-two nuclear reactors to international inspections. In addition, it promised to carefully contain its nuclear program and avoid exporting technology to third parties (Levi and Ferguson 2006; Carter 2006; Tellis 2005; Joshi 2007). How could U.S. leaders rationalize a dramatic turnaround in policy and a potential challenge to the nonproliferation normative order? Bush administration officials acknowledged this as a challenge to the old way of doing business. They viewed the NPT as flawed, because nonproliferation policy “should not be to constrain or burden good actors . . . but rather to concentrate power on removing or nullifying bad actors” (Perkovich 2006: 2; Ayoob 2001; Harrison 1997). Under this new approach, officials said, “The non-proliferation policies of other countries would be judged more in terms of whether they constituted a threat to U.S. national security than whether they contributed to strengthening the international regime” (Weiss 2007: 440). Western powers also faced frustration in the multilateral setting of the UN Conference on Disarmament. Beginning in 1995, diplomats attempted to launch negotiations in the Conference on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. However, the organization has been largely paralyzed and inactive since completing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. One expert identifies the primary problem in the conference’s operation on an “extreme version of the consensus rule” whereby “no decision, procedural or substantive, can be taken by the conference without the approval of all sixty-five member states.” Opponents of an FMCT have stopped progress on the treaty. Meanwhile, all outside pressures for the conference to move on with its work have been “ignored by the [organization], mired as it is in a procedural bog of its own making” (Meyer 2011). The U.S. and other great powers continue to focus on bilateral and mini-lateral arrangements. In 2010, the president invited foreign nations to attend a Nuclear Security Summit set up outside the purview of the UN or traditional NPT membership. Both the 2010 and 2012 summits directly addressed the challenge of proliferation of fissile materials and debated mini-lateral initiatives to control or eliminate stocks of highly enriched uranium. In the realm of nuclear cooperation agreements, President Obama pledged deeper cooperation with India through a strategic partnership. In 2011, a senior U.S. official announced plans to negotiate up to seventeen new or renewed NCAs with other countries by 2014. And at this writing, U.S. diplomats continue to press clients in ECA negotiations to renounce plans for uranium enrichment or reprocessing.

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Climate Change Timing International negotiations over climate change began more recently than the cases of trade and nuclear nonproliferation, reflecting the more recent consensus that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions require coordination between sovereign governments.5 In 1985, a scientific conference released a statement that increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere made it “‘highly probable’ there would be significant climate change” (Bodansky 1993: 458). The establishment phase began with the creation of a scientific body through the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Program (UNEP) to assess the size and impact of climate change. The choice of the UNEP made this the locus for discussions over how to develop an international agreement. A committee for negotiating a climate agreement was established in the UN in 1990, and the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992. The expansion of membership was rapid: 166 countries signed the convention in the first year, and the convention entered into force in 1994, once fifty states ratified it in domestic legislatures. By 2012, 195 states and the European Union were parties to the UNFCCC (United Nations Treaty Database 2012). All states are eligible to join the UNFCCC, and, by ratifying, agree that greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere should be stabilized to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2). Under Article 4, parties commit to collecting and to publishing data on national anthropogenic emissions and publicizing national measures taken to mitigate climate change. Parties to the convention also agree to promote the development and diffusion of technologies useful to achieving these ends and to support mitigation and adaptation policies adopted by developing countries. The UNFCCC, therefore, establishes the twin goals of homogeneity and universality. It also establishes a Conference of the Parties (COP), through which negotiations over regime deepening are conducted. As with trade and nuclear nonproliferation, efforts to deepen cooperation have proven fraught. The U.S. and European governments deadlocked over whether to include quantitative targets in a binding multilateral agreement (von Stein 2008). Developed and developing countries were also divided over how to distribute the costs associated with responding to climate change. As a result the UNFCCC included no mandated minimum level of international transfers to support technology transfer or adaptation measures in developing countries, and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which was established within the GEF to support the transfer of technology to developing countries, approved just US$128 million for thirty-one projects by 2010. Countries also were not required to take on commitments to lower GHG emissions levels within the UNFCCC. While the UNFCCC was established as an IMO with universal membership and homogeneous rules applied across members, it had limited legal commitments between member states in the initial agreement. Attempts to deepen cooperation have focused on expanding commitments through the UNFCCC and are carried out in negotiating rounds called the Conference of the Parties (COP). The first agreement reached through the COP process was the Kyoto Protocol. The negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, and its subsequent adoption and ratification, demonstrate the difficulty of deepening cooperation while retaining the principles of universality and homogeneity. The protocol was adopted by the COP in 1997, but it took eight years to enter into force. It included greater commitments than the UNFCCC by relaxing the IMO principles by binding thirty-seven industrialized countries, in addition to the EU, to national emissions targets across six GHG gasses. Developing countries, in contrast, were not required to take on quantitative targets under the protocol. Instead, three market-based mechanisms were established to enable the transfer of technology and finance: emissions trading, the clean development mechanism, and joint implementation. A system for monitoring performance was also established along with a registration 5. This section draws on Bodansky’s review of the establishment of the UNFCCC (Bodansky 1993).

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system for projects initiated under the Kyoto mechanisms. In 2001 at Marrakech, Morocco (COP 7), governments adopted more detailed rules governing the Kyoto mechanisms. The creation of national emissions targets for industrialized countries recognizes these states are responsible for the majority of the stock of GHG emissions, and the unwillingness of developing country governments to cap GHG emissions. Regime deepening through differential targets has nevertheless proven impossible to implement through the IMO structure. The protocol took eight years before entering into force in 2005, once fifty countries representing at least 55 percent of global GHG emissions ratified. The U.S. initially committed to reducing emissions by 6 percent from 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The Clinton administration did not bring the Kyoto Protocol up for ratification, however, because it would not survive a senate vote (Harris 1999). The U.S. Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997, calling for the White House not to sign a treaty that bound the U.S. to emissions cuts, while not imposing binding emissions constraints on industrializing countries or countries that threatened the U.S. economy. Difficulties with deepening cooperation, as demonstrated by the length of time for the Kyoto Protocol to be ratified and the nonparticipation of the U.S., led to two responses. The first—internal adjustment—is designed to reestablish homogeneity as a key principle of the IMO. The second—external adjustment—could be seen in government negotiation of alternative forms of cooperation through ECAs. Further, the rate at which these agreements are signed has increased as regime deepening under the UNFCCC has faltered, as expected by the life-cycle model. Between 1990 and 2011, 118 agreements were signed by the major emitting countries outside the UNFCCC.6 Nine percent of these agreements were signed between 1990 and 1997 when countries sought to deepen cooperation through the UNFCCC by negotiating the Kyoto Protocol with a mean annual number of agreements of 1.2 signed during this period. Between 1998 and 2011, during which time governments failed to deepen cooperation beyond the Kyoto Protocol, the mean annual number of agreements reached 7.6 (107 agreements). Of these, forty-seven agreements were signed from 2008, which is the first year the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, with a mean number of annual agreements reaching to 11.75 agreements during this period. A significant number of these agreements are signed by countries that refuse to adopt emissions caps under the Kyoto Protocol, as discussed below. This suggests they function as substitutes for, rather than complements to, the IMO. Content The Kyoto Protocol itself relaxes the principles of universality and homogeneity within the UNFCCC framework. Yet deepening cooperation has proven impossible. Developing countries agree to voluntary targets but reject countries “graduating” from developing to developed country status (von der Goltz 2009). The most important developing countries, negotiating as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) propose a two-speed approach, in which developed countries take on more ambitious targets under a second commitment period, while developing countries are not required to adopt national targets (Bodansky 2010). The BASIC countries are willing to set targets for improving energy intensity, measured as the use of energy per unit of GDP, and urge developed countries to commit to long-term financing for developing countries to promote GHG emissions mitigation and adaptation. How have governments responded to slow progress within the UNFCCC framework? One response has been to seek to renegotiate terms within the IMO framework. Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, negotiations have focused on operationalizing the flexibility mechanisms, and negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement. Industrialized states have sought but failed to redefine “common but differentiated responsibilities” to include binding emissions commitments from developing countries. At the 2009 Copenhagen conference, the final agreement was not adopted because of opposition by Bolivia, Cuba, Sudan, Nicaragua, and 6. See Appendix for a full list of agreements.

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Venezuela. Rather, an agreement was reached to “take note” of the accord. In the COP meeting at Cancun (COP 16), Japan, Canada, Russia, and Australia announced they would not take on national targets for GHG emissions reductions under a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. While negotiations continue within the existing IMO, therefore, it is unclear whether we remain in a process of regime deepening, or whether more exclusionary forms of cooperation will become the dominant form of international cooperation. A second response has been to develop ECAs that function as partial substitutes to the UNFCCC process. These ECAs relax the principles of universality and homogeneity at the core of the UNFCCC–COP process. The most pronounced growth in ECAs began in the 2000s, as progress to ratification of Kyoto floundered. These agreements commonly involve countries that have not taken on targets under the Kyoto process. The Bush Administration, for example, announced the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) in July 2005. Six countries initially joined: the U.S., Japan, Australia, China, India, and South Korea, followed by Canada in 2007. Although smaller in number, the APP member countries represented 50 percent of global GHG emissions and 48 percent of global energy use. The charter of the organization claimed it was designed as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, the UNFCCC process. It nevertheless relaxed a number of the conditions associated with the IMO. First, membership was limited geographically to the Asia–Pacific region. Second, membership was constituted by states that were either not Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol, or had not ratified the agreement, suggesting these states saw the APP as an alternative to cooperation through the UNFCCC. Third, the APP did not focus on legally binding national emissions targets. Instead it used a sectoral approach focused on nonbinding targets in technology development and transfer. It simultaneously promised deeper cooperation in technology, which was only weakly incorporated in the UNFCCC-COP commitments while relaxing the principles of universality and enforcement. Taken together, the APP tended to act as a substitute for, rather than a complement to, the UNFCCC-COP process (McGee and Taplin 2007). Though the APP was abolished in 2011 by the Obama administration, the approach of focusing on ECAs has not disappeared. The Major Emitters’ Forum was established in 2007 and again relaxes the universality principle. It was transformed into the Major Economies’ Forum in 2009 and is made up of the seventeen largest economies globally. It relaxes the notion of hard targets, asking member countries for voluntary commitments in funding for research, development, and deployment. The Obama administration has also focused on signing bilateral agreements, such as the U.S.–China Renewable Energy Partnership with the People’s Republic of China to promote research, development, and deployment of a portfolio of renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. Neither the U.S. nor China has commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, demonstrating that cooperation in this format represents a substitute for U.S. and Chinese participation in the UNFCCC process, rather than acting as a complement to it. The bilateral agreements signed by the U.S. relax the principles of universality and homogeneity, allowing for greater flexibility. The U.S. government has begun to pursue a similar bilateral structure with other countries, announcing an agreement in 2009 between the U.S. and Mexico, called the U.S.–Mexico Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change. Once again it relaxes the principles of universality and homogeneity and allows for greater flexibility in outcomes. This is also the case with the U.S.–India Partnership on Clean Energy, Energy Security, and Climate Change, announced in 2011. Less comprehensive agreements have also been signed with Indonesia, such as the Indonesia Marine and Climate Support (IMACS), which is managed by USAID and seeks to improve marine resources management in order to protect biodiversity and to respond to climate change. The signing of ECAs is not limited to the United States. India, Indonesia, South Korea, China, Japan, and other states have also signed agreements that operate outside the principles of universality and homogeneity at the heart of the UNFCCC. The number of these agreements has increased over time.

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Discussion The goal of this paper is to explain an empirical puzzle. Exclusionary and bilateral forms of cooperation are typically considered inferior to multilateralism since they may generate large transaction costs and idiosyncratic rules and undermine the principle of nondiscrimination. Yet across three issue areas, states are shifting towards exclusionary forms of cooperation despite states’ continued commitment to the public-policy goals existing regimes are designed to promote. We argue that the increasingly exclusionary nature of international cooperation is best understood as a temporal process. The initial choice of cooperation through IMOs marks the beginning of the IMO life cycle, followed by the maturation phase, in which states seek to universalize membership, deepen cooperation, and adopt more stringent enforcement. In the third stage of the life cycle, the principles of universality and homogeneity make it harder to deepen cooperation. Cooperation within IMOs thus has diminishing returns, increasing the likelihood states will promote further cooperation through ECAs. We developed two arguments associated with the timing of the shift towards exclusionary arrangements and the content of the ECAs. Our empirical analysis offered support for these arguments. Across the diverse issue areas of trade and investment, nuclear nonproliferation, and climate change, ECAs proliferated as negotiations within the relevant IMO deadlocked, and states responded by external as well as internal adjustment strategies by signing ECAs. We also found these ECAs relaxed principles that limited progress through the IMOs. In the area of climate change, the APP, Major Economies’ Forum, and bilateral agreements relax the principle of homogeneity and universality and do not aim to establish legally binding targets. The nuclear exclusionary regimes also move away from the principle of universal membership and offer greater flexibility in terms of partners involved, the content of export deals, and issues of control of exported materials and byproducts. Finally, in trade, FTAs offer an à-la-carte approach to undertake deepening commitments in WTO plus areas and flexibility in the areas subject to hard law enforcement. What do our findings suggest about the nature of international cooperation? Scholars have moved from examining whether and how international organizations matter to analyzing the nature of regime complexity. For some, institutional nesting deepens cooperation by binding actors ever further to internationally agreed upon regulations. For others, regime complexity undermines the prospects for cooperation through regime shopping and increasing complexity. Our study demonstrates that the changes in international cooperation are best understood as a temporal process in which decisions made by states about the best forum for international cooperation are influenced by choices made about the structure of previous forms of cooperation. Rather than understanding newly emerging organizations as nested within the relevant regime, or as undercutting IMO agreements, the emergence of more exclusionary forms of international cooperation is part of an evolutionary process. The emergence of these agreements is a symptom of IMO maturation, rather than a cause of dysfunction. Our findings suggest that rather than opposing the proliferation of more exclusionary forms of international cooperation, we should accept them as a natural part of the life cycle of international cooperation in which smaller groups negotiate deeper cooperation over issues that are no longer amenable to bargaining between larger numbers of actors. What is the generalizability of these findings? We argued above that the cases examined in the paper are dissimilar in terms of the structure of public policy problems being addressed, and the balance of power cannot explain the timing of ECA proliferation and the institutional design choices made to further international cooperation through exclusive arrangements. We also argued that the ideational commitment to the public policy goals has not changed over time in the three cases, making each of these accounts implausible explanations for outcomes. Instead, we contend the three are the same in terms of temporal dynamics introduced by the similar way in which international cooperation was institutionalized. As such, the cases repre-

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sent a different research design in which “just one independent variable as well as the dependent variable, covary, and all other plausible independent variables show different values.” (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 306). This research design offers a promising approach to identifying causal relationships, particularly when coupled with process-tracing techniques. The ability to generalize beyond the cases examined through this technique, on the other hand, is limited. While there is no a priori reason why the temporal logic outlined in the paper should not hold in other institutional settings, there are at least two ways in which the external validity of this explanation might be limited. Most obviously, it is clear that not all IOs seek to achieve the goal of inclusiveness and homogeneity. The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, limit membership based on levels of development or geographic area, while the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) takes a voluntary approach to solving problems of international cooperation. In these cases, it is plausible that a different temporal dynamic might emerge. As such, they do not fit the characteristics of an IMO. This is also likely to have an effect on the probability of the mechanisms identified above. A geographically defined organization, such as ASEAN, is less likely to face the problem of the growing heterogeneity of preferences that may reduce the likelihood of cooperation. The dynamics also may not apply to an organization such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), given that decision making does not occur along the lines of universal democracy, which is another characteristics of the IMO. We noted above that states have two responses to increasing difficulties promoting cooperation through existing IOs: internal adjustment or using alternative organizations that relax IMO conditions. An important question is what the conditions are under which states are likely to choose the former or the latter strategies. Historical data from the trade case suggests one possibility: Internal reforms only exacerbated the situation of diminishing returns to cooperation as the WTO approximated even further the cooperation trilemma. Confronted with the limits of internal advancement, external options with more negotiation flexibility became more enticing. Recent developments in the climate case suggests another possibility: Exogenous changes in the public policy problem affect states’ perception of the benefits of continuing to seek to cooperate within the existing institution given its potential for deeper and broader cooperation. Identifying the relative importance of these and other factors in determining when internal adjustment or exclusionary cooperation occurs requires the addition of new data, ideally testing across a large number of cases. While beyond the scope of this paper, this represents an important topic for further research on the relationship between institutions, temporality, and changing forms of international cooperation. REFERENCES Acharya, Rohini, Jo-Ann Crawford, Maryla Maliszewska, and Christelle Renard (2011) “Landscape.” In Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook, edited by Jean Pierre Chauffour and Jean-Christophe Maur, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp. 37–67. Aggarwal, Vinod. K. (1998) “Reconciling Multiple Institutions: Barganing, Linkages, and Nesting.” In Institutional Designs for a Complex World, edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.1–31. Alter, Karen J. and Sophie Meunier (2009) “The Politics of International Regime Complexity,” Perspectives on Politics 7(2): 13–24. Annan, Kofi (2005) “Break the Nuclear Deadlock,” Opinion/Editorial, International Herald Tribune, May 30, 2005, www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/29/news/edannan.php (accessed May 20, 2008). Ayoob, Mohammed (2001) “South Asia’s Dangers and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Orbis 45(1).

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Myer, Paul (2011) “Free the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Functionality over Forum.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/free-the-fissile-material-cuttreaty-functionality-over-forum (accessed August 22, 2012). Narlikar, Amrita (2005) The World Trade Organization. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Narlikar, Amrita and Pieter Van Houten (2010) “Know the enemy: uncertainty and deadlock in the WTO,” In Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions, edited by Amrita Narlikar, New York: Cambridge University Press. Oye, Kenneth (1986) “Explaining cooperation under anarchy,” In Cooperation Under Anarchy, edited by Kenneth Oye, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pekkanen, Saadia, Mireya Solís, and Saori Katada (2007) “Trading Gains for Control: International Trade Forums and Japanese Economic Diplomacy,” International Studies Quarterly 51(4): 945–70. Perkovich, George (2010) “Global Implications of the U.S.–India Deal,” Daedalus 139(1): 20–31. Perkovich, George (2006) “A Realist’s Case for Conditioning U.S. Nuclear Cooperation,” In Henry Sokolski, ed., Gauging U.S.–Indian Strategic Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute. Peters, B. Guy (2005) Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism,’ Second Edition, London: Continuum Press. Pierson, Paul (2000) “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13(4): 475–99. Putnam, Robert D. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42(3): 427–60. Rixen, Thomas (2010) “Bilateralism or Multilateralism: The Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation,” European Journal of International Relations 16(4): 589–614. Rixen, Thomas and Ingo Rohlfing (2007) “The Institutional Choice of Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation,” International Negotiation 12(1): 389–414. Ruggie, John Gerard (1992) “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” International Organization 46(3): 561–98. Seawright, Jason and John Gerring (2008) “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61(2): 294–306. Shanks, Cheryl, Harold K. Jacobson, and Jeffrey Kaplan (1996) “Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992,” International Organization 50(4): 593–628. Simmons, Beth A. and Lisa L. Martin (2001) “International Organizations and Institutions,” Handbook of International Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, New York: Sage, pp.192–211. Snidal, Duncan (1985) “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 4: 579–614. Strange, Susan (1998) “Why do international organizations never die?” In Autonomous Policy-Making by International Organizations, edited by Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek, London: Routledge: 213–21. Strulak, Tadeusz (1993) “The Nuclear Suppliers Group.” The Nonproliferation Review 1:2–10. Tellis, Ashley J. (2005) “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States,” Carnegie Endowment Report, July 2005, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006. FINAL.pdf (accessed March 1, 2010).

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Tsebelis, George (1995) “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science 25(3): 289–325. Verdier, Daniel (2008) “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” International Organization 62(3): 439–76. von der Goltz, Jan. “High stakes in a complex game: a snapshot of the climate change negotiating positions of major developing country emitters.” Centre for Global Development, Working Paper 177 (2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1473506 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1473506. von Hippel, Frank N. (2009) “Why Reprocessing Persists in Some Countries and Not in Others: the Costs and Benefits of Reprocessing,” Paper for the Non-proliferation Education Center, April 9 (author’s copy). von Stein, Jana (2008) “The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(2): 243–68. Weiss, Leonard (2007) “U.S.–India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner,” The Nonproliferation Review 14(3): 429–57. Winham, Gilbert (1986) International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wolcock, Stephen (2007) “European Union Policy Towards Free Trade Agreements,” ECIPE Working Paper available at http://www.felixpena.com.ar/contenido/negociaciones/anexos/2010-09-european-union-policy-towards-free-trade-agreements.pdf (accessed January 17, 2012).

APPENDIX

Intergovernmental and Subnational International Climate Change-related International Agreements (Non-UNFCCC related), 1990–2012* Name of Agreement

Participants to Agreement

Top Ten Country Participant

Year of Creation

Energy Cities*

Union of the Baltic Cities, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,NALAS-Network of Associations of Local Authorities, The Netherlands, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

Germany, United Kingdom

1990

International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change

Ministry for Education and Research, Germany, National Science Foundation, USA, Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche, France, Ministry of Science and Innovation, Spain, Royal Academy of Arts & Sciences, The Netherlands, Chinese National Committee for the International Human Dimensions Programme, China (Beijing), The Research Council of Norway, AustriaDelegation of the Finnish Academies of Science and Letters, ICSU Regional Office for Africa, The Swedish Secretariat for Environmental Earth System Sciences, Sweden, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), David and Lucile Packard Foundation, Asia Pacific Network for Global Change Research (APN), “Schweizerische Akademie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften, Switzerland” Academia Sinica, International Social Science Council, (ISSC), UNESCO, International Council of Science (ICSU), United Nations University

China, United States, Germany

1990

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

Local Governments for Sustainability

Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Equador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Ocidental Mindoro, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe

China, United States, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea

1990

The Asia–Pacific Network for Global Change Research

Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United States of America, Viet Nam

China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, United States

1990

Enterprise for the Americas Iniative in Bolivia

United States, Bolivia

United States

1991

Union of the Baltic Cities

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden

Russia

1991

ENERGY STAR International Partnerships

Australia, United States, Canada, European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan

United States, European Union, Japan, Canada

1992

Enterprise for the Americas Iniative in Colombia and Fondo Para la Acción Ambiental

United States, Colombua

United States

1992

El Salvador Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Fund

El Salvador, United States

United States

1993

Enterprise for the Americas Iniative in Argentina

United States, Argentina

United States

1993

Environmental Foundation of Jamaica

United States, Jamaica

United States

1993

Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects

European Atomic Energy Community, European Coal and Steel Community, European Community, Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

European Union, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan

1994

Forest Conservation Agreement

United States, Peru, Conservation International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and the World Wildlife Fund

United States

1998

Integrated Environmental Strategies

United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and South Korea

United States, China, India, South Korea

1998

105

106

HUGHES, LANTIS, AND SOLĂ?S

Memorandum of Understanding on environmental matters

Germany, India

1998

Americas Fund of Peru

United States, Peru

United States

1999

Collaborative Labeling & Appliance Standards Program

ClimateWorks Foundation, Sweden, United States, Argentina, GEEA Member Countries, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, China, Colombia, Israel, Pakistan, Denmark, Slovakia, Vietnam, France, India, New Zealand

China, United States, India

1999

Prototype Carbon Fund

Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Japan International Cooperation AgencyBritish Petroleum - Amoco, Chubu Electric Power Co., Chugoku Electric Power Co., Deutsche Bank, Electrabel, Fortum, Gaz de France, Kyushu Electric Power Co., MIT Carbon, Mitsubishi Corp., Norsk Hydro, RaboBank, RWE, Shikoku Electric Power Co., Statoil ASA, Tohoku Electric Power Co., Tokyo Electric Power Co.

Canada

2000

Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers

United States, Canada

2001

MOU on Science and Technology Related to Meteorology, Hydrology, Environmental Prediction and Climate Change:

China, Canada

2001

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/France

United States

2001

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/Republic of Korea

United States, South Korea

2001

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Belize

United States, Belize, Programme for Belize, Toledo Institute for Development and the Environment, PACT Foundation

United States

2001

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with El Salvador

El Salvador, United States, FIAES

United States

2001

FORCLIMIT-India research network

India, United Statea

India, United States

2002

Group on Earth Observations

Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guinea, Madagascar, Mali Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom

China, United States, European Union, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, Iran, United Kingdom, South Korea

2002

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition

Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Rep. of (Brazzaville), Cook Islands, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Estonia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland; Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morroco, Nauru, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, The Gambia, The Netherlands, The Philippines, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vanuatu

Germany, United Kingdom, European Union

2002

Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development

Portugal, France, Spain, Argentina, Peru, Democratic Republic of Congo, Belgium, Brazil, Fatick Senegal, Haut Bassins, Zambia, Uganda, Burkino Faso, Indonesia, Canada, Mozambique, Mali, Romania, United Kingdom

United Kingdom, Canada

2002

Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development

United Kingdom, Canada

2002

Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation

United States, Philippines

United States

2002

Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership

Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Union, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, the US and the United Kingdom

United States, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom

2002

SAARC Environment Plan of Action

Nepal, Afghanistian, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka

India

2002

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/OECD-NEA

United States

2002

Bangladesh Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation (The Arannayk Foundation)

Bangladesh, United States

United States

2003

Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum

Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Unites States

China, United States, EC, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea

2003

Community Development Carbon Fund

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Companies and organizations: BASF, Daiwa Securities SMBC Principal Investments, EdP, Endesa, Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd., Göteborg Energi AB, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, IBRD as Trustee of the Danish Carbon Fund, Idemitsu Kosan, KfW, Nippon Oil Corporation, Okinawa Electric Power Co., Rautaruukki, Gas Natural, Statkraft Carbon Invest AS, Statoil ASA, Swiss Re.

Canada

2003

107

108

HUGHES, LANTIS, AND SOLÍS

International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy

Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Commission, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Republic of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States

China, United States, India, Russia, European Union, Canada, United Kingdom

2003

Memorandum of Understanding for Enhanced Cooperation in the field of Renewable Energy

India, China

2003

Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation

China, Canada

2003

Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programmet in the Russian Federation

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the European Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community

Germany, Russia, United Kingdom

2003

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/Brazil

United States

2003

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/Canada

United States, Canada

2003

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/European Union

United States, European Union

2003

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Panama

United States, Panama, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)

United States

2003

Japan-People’s Republic of China Climate Change Dialogue

Japan, China

2004

The Climate Group

Governments • Belgium, United Kingdom, Australia, China, India, United States, Philippines, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, France, Senegal, Sweden, Basque Country, Italy, Poland, Scotland, Germany, Austria, Malaysia Corporations • Alstom, Arup, Barclays, Better Place, Bloomberg, Broad Group, BT, CBRE Group, CECEP (China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Group), China Mobile, Cisco, CLP Holdings Limited, Coca-Cola Company, Dell, Deutsche Bank, Duke Energy, EN+ Group, GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd, Goldman Sachs, Greenstone Carbon Management, Hanergy Holdings Group, HDR, Hewlett Packard, HSBC, IWC Schaffhausen, Johnson Controls, JP Morgan Chase, Landsea, Munich Re, News Corporation, Nike, Origin Energy, PassivSystems, Philips Lighting, Procter & Gamble, Skadden LLP, Smith Electric Vehicles, Standard Chartered Bank, Suntech, Suzlon, Swire Pacific, Swiss Re, Taobao, Tiptop Real Estate, TNT, VantagePoint Venture Partners, Veolia Environment, Visy”

China, United States, India, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom

2004

The International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative

United States/Japan

United States, Japan

2004

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

The Jamaica Protected Areas Trust Limited

United States, The Nature Conservancy Jamaica Program, Jamaica Environment Trust (JET), Jamaica Forestry Department, University of the West Indies,National Environment & Planning Agency

United States

2004

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Colombia

the U.S. and Colombia, The Nature Conservancy, Conservation International, the World Wildlife Fund

United States

2004

C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group*

USA, Ethiopia, Greece, Thailand, China, Germany, Colombia, Argentina, Egypt, Venezuela, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, Pakistan, Nigeria, Peru, United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, Mexico, Russia, France, Brazil, Italy, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Poland, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Denmark, Germany, Chile, Sweden

United States, Japan, India, Russia, China, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea

2005

EU–India Joint Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change

European Union, India

2005

India–US Energy Dialogue

India, United Statea

India, United States

2005

Joint Committee on Environmental Cooperation

United States, China

2005

The Canada-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG)

China, Canada

2005

World Mayors Council on Climate Change

Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chinese Tapei, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States

United States, India, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan

2005

Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

Australia, Canada, India, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, South Korea, and the United States

United States, China, South Korea, India, Japan, Canada

2006

Connected Urban Development

The Netherlands, United States, South Korea, Portugal, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain

United States, United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea

2006

International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

Russia, the USA, the European Union, Japan, China, South Korea, India

US, EU, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Russia

2006

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Botswana

Botswana, United States

United States

2006

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Guatemala

United States of America, the Republic of Guatemala, The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International

United States

2006

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Paraguay

United States, Paraguay

United States

2006

109

110

HUGHES, LANTIS, AND SOLÍS

CEBU declaration on East Asian Energy Security

Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Union of Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam), Australia, People’s Republic of China, Republic of India, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand

India, China, Japan, South Korea

2007

China–Canada Joint Committee on Environmental Cooperation

China, Canada

2007

India–Japan Energy Dialogue

India, Japan

2007

International Carbon Action Partnership

Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Japan

European Union, Germany, United Kingdom, United States, Japan

2007

ISO GHG Account ing Standards 14064–14065

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Rep., Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, China, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

China, United States, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea, Iran

2007

Joint Statement by the Republic of India and Japan on the Enhancement of Cooperation on Environmental Protection and Energy Security

Japan, India

India, Japan

2007

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate on Industrial Energy Efficiency

United States, China (The Department of Energy of the United States of America (DOE) and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China (NDRC))

United States, China

2007

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord

United States, Canada

United States

2007

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Costa Rico

United States of America and Costa Rica, Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy

United States

2007

U.S.–China Biofuels MOU

United States, China (The Department of Energy of the United States of America (DOE) and the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China (NDRC))

United States, China

2007

Western Climate Initiative**

United States, Canada

2007

Cool Earth Partnerships (Cool Earth 50)

Japan, Peru, SICA, Surinam,e, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue, Vanuatu, Marshall, Bangladesh, PNG, Philippines, Egypt, Colombia

Japan

2008

Cool Earth Program Loan

Indonesia, Japan

Japan

2008

International Renewable Energy Agency

AlbanIRENA Members - 88 Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, European Union, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Grenada, Greece, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uruguay

United States, European Union, India, Japan, Germany, Iran, United Kingdom, Swouth Korea

2008

IRENA Signatories/applicants for membership - 68 Afghanistan, Algeria Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte D’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe Japan–UNDP Joint Framework for Building Partnership to Address Climate Change in Africa

Japan, UN, various African countries

Japan

2008

The Tripartite Policy Dialogue among Japan, People’s Republic of China, and Republic of Korea on Climate Change

Japan, South Korea, China

2008

111

112

HUGHES, LANTIS, AND SOLÍS

Transatlantic Climate Bridge

Germany, United States

2008

United Nations Collaborative initiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation

Norway, Denmark, Spain, Japan, European Commission, Bolivia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zambia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Suriname

European Union, Japan

2008

21st Century Coal

United States, United States, China Power Engineering and Consulting Group Corporation, Peabody Energy, GE Energy and China’s Shenhua Group , AES, Shenzhen Dongjiang Environmental Recycled Power Company and Songzao Coal and Electricity Company. U.S. National Energy Technology Laboratory, West Virginia University, the Wyoming State Geological Survey, the Shaanxi Institute of Energy Resources and Chemical Engineering

United States, China

2009

Energy Efficiency Action Plan

United States, China

2009

High Level Dialogue between Japan and Republic of Korea on Climate Chang

Japan, South Korea

2009

International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation

Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU, France, Germany, Italy, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom, United States

Canada, European Union, India, Russia, South Korea, The United States, United Kingdom, China, Japan, Germany

2009

Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate

Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States

China, United States, European Union, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom

2009

Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the area of energy

India, Canada

2009

Russian–German Energy Agency

Russia, Gemany

2009

Sino–German electro-mobility Forum

Germany, China

2009

Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment

Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States

United States, EU, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom

2009

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

The U.S.–China Energy Cooperation Program

United States, China, AECOM, Applied Materials, Boeing, Caterpillar, Celanese, Cisco, Cummins, DOW, Duke Energy, First Solar, GE, Honeywell, IBM, ICF, Lanza Tech, LP Amina, Peabody Energy, Rockwell Automaton, Timken, TRAX, UPC Renewables, United technologies

United States

2009

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Indonesia

United States of America, the Republic of Indonesia,Conservation International and Yayasan Keanekaragaman Hayati Indonesia (KEHATI)

United States

2009

U.S.–Canada clean energy dialogue

United States, Canada

2009

U.S. DOE and the Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

United States, India

2009

U.S.–China Clean Energy Research Center

United States, China

2009

U.S.–China Electric Vehicles Initiative

United States, China

2009

U.S.–China Renewable Energy Partnership

United States, China, NREL, China’s State Grid Energy Research Institute, Alcoa, General Electric, HydroChina and Duke Energy

United States, China

2009

U.S.–Mexico Bilateral Framework on Clean Energy and Climate Change

United States, Mexico

United States

2009

Carbon Capture, Use and Storage Action Group

Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Aker Clean Carbon, Alstom, Bellona, the Carbon Capture and Storage Association, the Center for American Progress, the Clinton Foundation, the Global CCS Institute, the International Energy Agency, the International Energy Agency Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, Sasol, Scottish Power, Shell, the World Coal Association, and the World Resources Institutes

China, United States, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea

2010

Carbon n Cities Climate Registry

Japan, South Africa, Canada, Argentina, Belgium, India, Nigeria, Portugal, Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, Ghana, Brazil, Italy, Philippines, Chinese Taipei

Japan, Canada, India

2010

Clean Energy Education and Empowerment

Australia, Denmark, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States

United Kingdom, United States

2010

Clean Technology Fund

Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey. the World Bank, Multilateral Development Banks

Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, China, India

2010

Global Methane InitIative

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, European Commission, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Serbia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam

China, United States, EC, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom, South Korea

2010

113

114

HUGHES, LANTIS, AND SOLĂ?S

Global Shale Gas Initiative

United States, China, India, Jordan and Poland

United States, China, India

2010

Global Superior Energy Performance Partnership

Canada, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden and the United States

Canada, European Union, India, Russia, South Korea, The United States

2010

Indonesia Marine and Climate Support Project

Indonesia, United States

United States

2010

Joint Statement between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Planning Commission of India on the Occasion of the Fourth Meeting of the Japan-India Energy Dialogue

Japan, India

India, Japan

2010

The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves

Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway*, Spain, United Kingdom, United States of America*, Dow Corning Corporation, Shell*, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (National Institutes of Health and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention)*, U.S. Department of State / Agency for International Development*, U.S. Department of Energy*, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency*, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)*, Morgan Stanley*, Shell Foundation*, SNV Netherlands Development Organisation*, United Nations Foundation*, World Bank, Barr Foundation, Bosch and Siemens Home Appliances Group, The Korein Foundation, Love The Earth Project 21 managed by Fuji Television Network, Inc., Osprey Foundation, Baker & Mckenzie, Deloitte (* indicates founding members, implementing members can be found on the website)

Germany, United Kingdom, United States

2010

Thimphu Statement on Climate Change

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

India

2010

Tropical Forest Conservation Act with Brazil

Brazil, United States

United States

2010

USAIDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Indonesia Forestry and Climate Support

Indonesia, United States

United States

2010

Global Green Growth Iniative

South Korea, Australia, Cambodia, Brazil, Denmark, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, United Arab Emirates,Asian Development Bank, Danfoss Group, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Zusammenarbeit European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Global Green Growth Forum, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Mexico, National Research Council for Economics, Humanities and Social Sciences, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific, Vestas Wind Systems A/S, World Economic Forum

South Korea, Japan

2010

Clean Enery Solutions Center

Australia, France, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, and the United States, as well as the International Energy Agency and ClimateWork

Japan, India, United States

2011

THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGIMES

Framework Agreement on Cooperation on Development between India and Maldives

Maldives, India

India

2011

Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, UK, USA, Uruguay and Vietnam

Canada, China, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Germany

2011

International Smart Grid Action Network

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, European Commission, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States

China, United States, European Union, India, Russia, Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom,

2011

MOU between India and Bangladesh on Renewable Energy Cooperation

Bangladesh, India

India

2011

Partnership to Advance Clean Energy

India, United Statea

United States, India

2011

Sustainable Development of Hydropower

Brazil, France, United States, Mexico, Norway

United States

2011

The Indonesia Clean Energy Development

United States, Indonesia

United States

2011

115

* Note on data collection procedure: Climate-related agreements for the top-ten emitters were identified as follows. First, we used government websites to identify agreements. We then used internet resources dedicated to the agreement or alternative sources of data on the agreement—usually in the form of a press release or other official public material. The process differed by country as the information available differed. Major data sources were: 1. United States—Department of State and the Department of Energy websites, White House releases; 2. United Kingdom—Department of Energy and Climate Change, main government website of the United Kingdom; 3. China—Press releases, which were sorted through filters of climate, environment and energy. and White Papers; 4. European Union—EU treaty database sorted by relevant key words (climate, energy, environment); 5. India— Government database of bilateral agreements and treaties from 2000–2012; 6. Russia—Press releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian President’s website, archives of country visits; 7. Japan—Ministry of Foreign Affairs website; 8. Germany—Official government website; 9. Canada—Official government website; 10. Iran—No significant data identified; 11. South Korea—White papers on climate change, government website. In selecting for agreements, wefirst ensured there was no direct ties to the UNFCCC, and then reviewed the stated mission or goals to see if combating climate change was explicitly mentioned or implicitly through issues such as carbon emissions, clean energy, etc. When possible and practical all actors are listed, but for some agreements with a preponderance of industry members, only a representative sample was included for brevity sake. All member countries are included.

REVIEW Contingent or Unconditional Hostility? U.S. Political Culture and the International Criminal Court by Andrea Betti, Universidad Europea de Madrid All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals by David Scheffer, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012, ISBN: 9780691140155, 568 pages. Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and Its Vision of World Society by Jason Ralph, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN: 9780199214310, 244 pages. Introduction Reviewing two books dealing with a similar topic from very different perspectives is never an easy task. Jason Ralph’s Defending the Society of States is an academic work that aims to explain the main causes of U.S. opposition to the 1998 Statute on the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ralph is a professor of international relations whose analysis relies on the English School approach to argue that specific characteristics of U.S. political culture prevent the superpower from endorsing the most relevant development of international criminal responsibility. Ambassador David Scheffer’s All the Missing Souls is not, strictly speaking, an academic book. A prominent international lawyer, the author was appointed ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues by President Clinton in 1997. As the main figurehead in U.S. foreign policy on international justice in that period, Scheffer presents an invaluable recollection of one of his country’s most important negotiations between 1997 and 2001. Despite their different backgrounds and intents, both books provide us with relevant material to explore the uneasy relationship between international justice and power politics. As indicated by Scheffer, this relation often reveals “how fragile the weapons of international justice can be when confronting political and military interests” (p. 293). Both Ralph and Scheffer guide us through the complex world of U.S. political and bureaucratic cultures and offer an exhaustive analysis of the highly political nature of processes related to the construction of international regimes, especially when these involve crucial national and security interests. Ralph puts forward a well-argued interpretation of U.S. foreign policy as “driven by deep-rooted cultural and political factors” (p. 3), which are at the basis of the erratic relation between the identity of the country and international law. Scheffer, despite his academic background, focuses more on the “policy” part of the story by identifying bureaucratic inefficiency and competition among governmental agencies as the main factor behind U.S. inconsistencies and contradictions in the building of international criminal justice. Together, the books shed light on U.S. behavior towards the complexities of international norms and regulations. Moreover, they correctly highlight how the task of understanding U.S. attitudes toward interJIOS, VOL. 5, ISSUE 2, 2014

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national law cannot be merely read through the lenses of international legal analysis.1 Drawing from different sources and arguments, Ralph and Scheffer provide us with a complete picture of the issue. In a way, their contributions complement one another, representing respectively the official and unofficial stories of U.S. strategy toward international justice. Thus, their analyses may guide scholars and observers interested in the debate on continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. Politics and the ICC Treaty: Westphalia all over Again? Published during the most difficult years of the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, Defending the Society of States may be intellectually located in the international relations debate concerning the evolution and consolidation of international constitutional structures intended as sets of fundamental rules capable, under specific conditions, of guiding the behavior of actors.2 As the author explains, the 1990s were characterized by a “call for change in the constitutional rules of global politics” (p. 23). This process found a “tipping point” in the ICC, which is the first permanent international criminal court and promises to enforce justice without merely depending on the will of states or the Security Council. Drawing on Hedley Bull’s classification of international societies, Ralph interprets the ICC as a significant step toward a Kantian “world society” in which transnational tribunals would enforce a universal interest in prosecuting war criminals in an impartial manner. However, Ralph does not ignore the idea that international norms should limit state sovereignty and be enforced transnationally still encounters large contestation.3 During the negotiations for the ICC, for example, the U.S. exerted a powerful opposition against attaching any universal meaning to the court. For Ralph, this attitude is the product of a domestic alliance composed of congressmen, scholars, and executive leaders, often regardless of their ideological affiliations. On the one hand, there are those who believe in a Westphalian international system made up of states and their security exigencies. On the other hand, this realpolitik interpretation of U.S. interests often fuses with a certain brand of American nationalism, which is driven by an understanding of the U.S. Constitution as based on the notion of “popular . . . accountability” (p. 122). According to Ralph, Americans have a constitutive skepticism toward institutions and tribunals that aim to enforce international law without being authorized by the American people. Thus, the U.S. is not against the ICC Treaty per se but rather against some specific provisions, such as the power of the prosecutor to independently start an investigation,4 the impossibility for veto members of the Security Council to block any proceedings,5 and especially the fact that the court has jurisdiction over citizens of states that have not previously agreed on 1. One of the main characteristics of the literature on the ICC is that it mostly belongs to the legal realm. This has often meant a lack of political and sociological analyses of the phenomenon, for example, in terms of its impact on the foreign policy of states. Analyzed as a mostly juridical problem, there has been a tendency to overlook its highly political nature both in terms of functioning and outcomes. The few political scientists that have dealt with the issue have recognized the problem. See for example, Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Joshua W. Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 210–53. Michael J. Struett and Steven A. Weldon, “Explaining State Decisions to Ratify the International Criminal Court,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Annual Meeting, September 2, 2006, Philadelphia, PA. David Wippman, “The International Criminal Court” in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 151–88. 2. The literature on this theme is quite large. Some seminal examples are Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Christian Reus-Smith, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997): 555–89. 3. For contributions on the contested meaning of norms, see Antje Wiener, “Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework,” Comparative European Politics No. 5 (2007): 1–17; Uwe Puetter, Antje Wiener, “Accommodating Normative Divergence in World Politics: European Foreign Policy Coordination,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 45, No. 5 (2007): 1063–86. 4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 53. 5. Under art. 13(b) of the ICC, the Security Council may refer a situation to the court. However, according to art. 16 the Security Council may block a proceeding or an investigation for a period of twelve months (renewable) but only in case a resolution is adopted under chapter VII of the Charter.

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its jurisdiction.6 Specifically, this latter point represents the main attack on the way the U.S. interprets the international system, which is mostly based on sovereignty and state consent. Along these lines, Ralph indicates that this domestic alliance between realists and nationalists finds a favorable terrain in a prevailing Vattelian legal culture, which orients the mentality of the country on issues like what ought to be considered legitimate sources of law (ch. 2) or who is entitled to prosecute individuals in an international system (ch. 3). The U.S. has a clear answer to both: State consent should be the main source of international law, and states should be in control of international criminal prosecutions. These two answers respond to a strict logic based on persistent and change-resistant notions of both exceptional responsibilities (national interests) and values (constitutional patriotism). As a result, continuity is the most important characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. Any international regime that goes toward a supranational community is very likely to find U.S. rejection. Any regime that does not respect its vision of popular sovereignty or national interest is deemed to live without U.S. participation. For these reasons, Ralph dedicates several chapters to U.S. unilateralism under the Bush administration. Both U.S. policies to boycott the ICC after its entry into force (ch. 6) and the philosophy of the global war on terror (ch. 7) are studied as examples of how universalist conceptions of justice represent a “threat not just to a set of legal principles but to a specific national identity” (p. 143), the U.S. Constitution providing the ultimate benchmark to measure whether international norms are consistent with U.S. values and interests. U.S. Opposition to the ICC: The Return of Exceptionalism? Ralph explains the largely political nature of the ICC debate through an elegant application of the English School approach. The ICC challenges traditional interpretations of sovereignty, of which states are still very jealous. By focusing on this conflict of legitimacy, Ralph effectively summarizes the main reasons for U.S. opposition: the independence of the prosecutor and the jurisdiction over nationals of third states. This position depends on a set of constitutive and structural characteristics of U.S. political culture, which Ralph shows by focusing, for instance, on the bipartisan nature of Congressional opposition to the court. Even though admittedly “a . . . Democrat administration would not have been as forceful” (p. 157) in its fight against the court as the Bush administration, Ralph notes that few democrats would make a strong effort in favor of the treaty. This was witnessed by their substantial support for the Bush administration in its search for exemption of U.S. citizens from the court’s jurisdiction.7 Ralph’s argument is particularly convincing when he explains that the U.S. “had always supported the idea of a permanent international court if the sole means of referral was through the Security Council” (p. 177). Not unlike other perspectives on the issue,8 Ralph concludes that any court that cannot guarantee complete control on its activation and jurisdiction is very likely to be “dead on arrival” in the U.S. Senate. Ralph’s analysis has many merits and offers a particularly useful account of U.S. foreign policy on international justice. However, the main argument somewhat reifies U.S. political culture and its foreign policy. It is not always clear whether the ICC is objectively a step toward a Kantian world society for Ralph or whether he considers this representation of the 6. Art. 12.2. 7. For a good and synthetic account of the conflictive approach of the Bush Administration toward international law, see Dowling J. Campbell (ed.), A Bird in the Bush: Failed Domestic Policies of the George W. Bush Administration (New York: Agora, 2008): chapter 3 on the Kyoto Protocol and 6 on the ICC; John R. Bolton, then U.S. ambassador at the UN under the Bush administration. He provided one of the most authoritative conservative arguments against the ICC in “Courting Danger: What’s Wrong with the International Criminal Court,” National Interest, No. 54 (Winter 1998–9). 8. Sarah B. Sewall, Carl Kaysen, and Michael P. Scharf, “The United States and the International Criminal Court: An Overview,” in The United States and the International Criminal Court. National Security and International Law, ed. Sarah B. Sewall and Carl Kaysen (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Paul W. Kahn, “Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000); Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (eds.), Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002). William A. Schabas, “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All about the Security Council,” European Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, 701–20.

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ICC as a rhetorical device employed by U.S. policy makers to politicize the debate and make the court appear unacceptable (pp. 99–122). Numerous American scholars have participated in this debate in order to underscore the limited nature of the court as based on the principle of complementary jurisdiction according to which the prosecutor can act only in case of inability or unwillingness of states to prosecute.9 Additional elements contribute to qualifying and limiting the powers of a prosecutor that seem quite far from the fears of those who worry of the creation of an all-powerful and unaccountable world magistrate.10 This partial misunderstanding leads Ralph to excessively rely on an exceptionalist view of U.S. democracy to explain U.S. opposition to the ICC. The court is interpreted as a body that “fundamentally challenges America’s understanding of itself” (p. 122), because it strips the U.S. of the possibility to exert a democratic review of the court. The fear that U.S. federalism and democracy would be contaminated by excessive concessions to democratically unaccountable international institutions has always been present in U.S. political discourse. Nevertheless, positivist conceptions of international law as based on state consent and “exceptionalist” views of U.S. democracy seem to be the expression of one specific part of U.S. political culture.11 Hence, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton’s views of a Hobbesian international system in which the U.S. has to take care of its interests unilaterally do not exhaust the entire debate on America’s role in the world.12 Ralph proves to be aware of this debate, for example, in his reference in chapter 2 to rulings of the Supreme Court that recognize the legitimacy of international customary law. In conclusion, alternative and equally powerful views of international relations and justice would have deserved greater attention. For example, the liberal internationalist tradition is substantially absent from the analysis. Such a tradition has always influenced U.S. foreign policy to varying degrees, depending on the administration in charge and on the general political mood of the country. An explanation of how and why this tradition was somehow marginalized during the closing years of the Clinton presidency, and especially during the George W. Bush administration, could have been appropriate. The portrait of a Hobbesian and Vattelian United States opposing its Kantian and post-Westphalian European allies (p. 154) might reinforce a historical image of America as a superpower incapable of accepting and implementing international norms. An “Ambassador to Hell”: On the Difficult Enterprise of International Justice Scheffer’s analysis takes a very different viewpoint. As the memories of the U.S. chief negotiator on international tribunals, the book contains a large amount of detail on recent U.S. attitudes toward international justice. The most interesting part is section II, containing three chapters on the ICC Treaty. As opposed to Ralph, Scheffer does not seem to interpret U.S. opposition as the result of constitutional, political, or cultural factors that prevent the country from recognizing the legitimacy of the ICC. Although he does not deny that some aspects of its statute, especially jurisdiction over nationals of third party states, were particularly difficult to accept for a bipar9. See for example, Bartram Brown, “U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response,” Journal of International Law and Politics Vol. 31 (1999): 854–91. M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favouring the Establishment of the International Criminal Court,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1999): 795–810; Michael P. Scharf, “The Politics Behind U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court,” Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 1999): 97–105. Monroe Leigh, “The United States and the Statute of Rome,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol.95, No.1 (January 2001): 124–31; Diane Marie Amann and M.N.S. Sellers, “The United States of America and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 50, Supplement: American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the 16th International Congress of Comparative Law (Autumn, 2002): 381–404. 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, see articles 13(c), 15 and 53(1). 11. Some of the foundations of the “exceptionalist” interpretation of U.S. historical experience, which still has large impact at least in terms of political discourse, can be found in Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (Harcourt: Brace, 1955) and Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963). 12. John Bolton, “Why an International Criminal Court Won’t Work,” Wall Street Journal, March 30 1998.

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tisan array of U.S. domestic actors, Scheffer’s account of how things went tends to focus on more contingent reasons. These have to do with bureaucratic competition among governmental agencies and an absence of pro-ICC sentiments in the U.S. Senate. The main goal of the book is to illustrate “the tug-of-war between peace and justice” (p. 4) through a historical account of recent U.S. policy on international tribunals. From international action to create international tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia to the effort to make the ICC acceptable for the U.S., Scheffer had to learn how to be an international lawyer and a diplomat at the same time. This meant constantly dealing with “the realism of political negotiations” (p. 312), as opposed to the abstractions of legal theory. This makes the book a great contribution for all those interested in seeing how in-practice justice and power interact at the international level. The book does not linger on a general explanation of America’s inconsistent behavior on international justice. Scheffer’s is not the analysis of how two different world views (Westphalian and Kantian) fought one another in Rome but rather “a story of trial and error, innovative lawmaking, political intrigue, and obstinate personalities” (p. 12). It is the story of the fight of a diplomat with an academic background against the Washington bureaucracy and its political gridlocks. Large portions are dedicated to the powerful influence of domestic politics on negotiations. The problem is not only that “no member of Congress wins votes back home for the building of courts overseas” (p. 28). Also, governmental bureaucracies can often exert a considerable capacity to freeze debates and resist innovative interpretations of international law, which can easily lead to inaction and decision paralysis. Chapter 2, on whether widespread violence in Rwanda in 1994 amounted to genocide, is an illuminating example, and a harsh critique, of how bureaucrats can get hopelessly distracted by second-class priorities when pursuing international justice.13 The Rome Conference on the ICC: From ‘Engaged Opposition’ to Diplomatic Failure An interesting example of the influence and power of governmental and legislative bureaucracies played out at the Rome Conference on the ICC where Scheffer led the U.S. diplomatic delegation. The author describes the way in which hostile domestic actors hindered U.S. negotiating capacity by undermining coordination between negotiators in Rome and bureaucrats and politicians in Washington. As he argues, this sort of “dialogue of the deaf” was at the basis of one of the U.S. biggest diplomatic failures. Scheffer provides many examples of negotiations on specific parts of the treaty in which the U.S. delegation had very little leverage due to a mix of presidential indecisiveness and open opposition by sectors of Congress, the Pentagon, and the Justice Department. Scheffer proved pragmatic enough to ensure a U.S. contribution on highly important parts of the treaty, such as the definition of crimes and the qualifications of the power of the prosecutor. Nevertheless, with a president overwhelmed by the Lewinsky scandal, domestic opponents to the ICC Treaty did not find it hard to let their voice be clearly heard in Rome. The U.S. government’s main line of opposition focused on the already mentioned jurisdiction over nationals of third states. Scheffer argued both during and after the conference about the legal weakness of that provision. Nevertheless, his position and that of many other U.S. lawyers and members of the delegation was the U.S. should have offered reasonable compromises on other parts of the treaty in order to “stay engaged” and soften opposition by the strongest supporters of the court, for example EU members, including the UK.14 Instead, the U.S. distinguished itself in this phase only for its request of total immunity. The author soon realized 13. For an academic analysis of these events, see Michal N. Barnett, “The UN Security Council, Indifference and Genocide in Rwanda,” Cultural Anthropology Vol. 12 No. 4 (1997): 551–78. 14. Engagement with the ICC was theorized by Scheffer in several articles, such as “Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court,” Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 35 (2001–2): 47–100.

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that offers for compromise were not acceptable to the majority of states, in whose eyes U.S. credibility in Rome was constantly jeopardized by domestic anti-ICC hardliners. Nobody was ready to make concessions to a delegation whose senate was largely influenced by “far right extremists” for whom “international treaties . . . somehow will rob the country of its sovereignty or will threaten federalism and democracy within our borders” (p. 162). Genuine attempts to reach diplomatic deals in Rome clashed with the instructions from Washington, which only focused on full exemption for U.S. nationals. Many of these requests usually reached the media before any important negotiations, which created the disastrous impression, even among traditional European allies, of a superpower bent on shielding its citizens from the court’s jurisdiction. President Clinton’s direct intervention could have solved various policy gridlocks. However, such help only came after the conference on the very last day available for signature of the treaty. Thus, thanks to Clinton, the U.S. signed the treaty on 31 December 2000. But the administration’s lack of a serious policy on the issue practically left the faith of the treaty in the hands of a powerful and highly unfavorable Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In conclusion, for Scheffer the negotiation of the ICC was a story of regrets and missed opportunities. The main culprit was a coalition of highly organized and politically capable bureaucrats and politicians, which still believe that “the United States is a different nation of extraordinary attributes that simply cannot be lowered . . . to the same level of performance as other nations” (p. 165). Scheffer tried to oppose the principles of reciprocity and equality of nations that hold that “no nation and no people have superior rights or exceptional privileges” (p. 166). His notable criticism against a treaty that extends the court’s jurisdiction even over nationals of third party states was not reason enough for Scheffer to consider the ICC as a “world court” that can challenge the stability of an international system based on sovereignty and national interests. Several months after the conference, Scheffer realized that the entry into force and non-retroactivity clauses contained in the treaty could probably constitute good enough protection against the risk of prosecutions targeting U.S. citizens.15 Interestingly, the book interprets exceptionalism as a generic excuse that can be indistinctively used by any state whenever sensitive interests are at stake, rather than as a specific characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. Scheffer’s experience in post-conflict theatres actually reveals that the feeling that “our own” nation is different may be found in many other contexts. For example, African Union members strongly lobbied against ICC attempt to arrest Sudanese President Al Bashir by relying on a specific form of exceptionalism mostly driven by anticolonial sentiments (pp. 415–16). Any individual or state looking for impunity and exemption from international tribunals will tend to argue in favor of a sort of self-proclaimed right to be left alone. At the basis of state reluctance to recognize or collaborate with international tribunals there is a rather “ordinary” problem: States, especially the most powerful, are quite jealous of their sovereignty. Despite attempts to base their opposition on the existence of some supposed “special rights,” states mostly worry about more immediate and contingent interests. Winners and losers in the struggle for international justice often depend on political battles and debates that are won or lost at the domestic level. States do not seem to be bound by history or culture to oppose the evolution and consolidation of international criminal responsibility. Being mostly a book of memoirs and personal recollections, All the Missing Souls leaves various theoretical questions unanswered. For example, more analysis could have been dedicated to the relationship between international justice and national security, which poses the fundamental problem of how to effectively combine these two dimensions in the foreign policy making of the U.S. superpower. Scheffer decidedly argues in favor of making political lead15. The compatibility of the ICC Treaty with the U.S. constitutional system has been argued by Scheffer in, for example, “The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court,” (with Ashley Cox) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 98, No. 3 (2008): 983–1068; David J. Scheffer, Richard Cooper, and Juliette Voinov Kohler, “The End of Exceptionalism in War Crimes,” Harvard International Review (August 12, 2007).

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ers accountable for criminal justice in case of serious violations of human rights. In one of the last sections (pp. 437â&#x20AC;&#x201C;40), the ambassador includes some former U.S. politicians as examples of leaders who could have been prosecuted by an international criminal court. In an idealistic fashion, Scheffer concludes by arguing that international justice should appraise any violations of human rights no matter who commits them. This abstract principle requires a discussion on how to make it possible in a world of independent and sovereign nations that are still very preoccupied with defending the interests of their populations from unpredictable and asymmetrical threats, such as international terrorism. The battle for better international justice should always take into account that justice and peace do not always go together, and sometimes leaders have to be ready to partially compromise on the pursuit of international justice in order not to jeopardize their security. Failure to pursue such interests may lead to worse violations of justice, security, and peace. Conclusion Both volumes contribute to the debate on continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy and on the capacity for international constitutional structures to consolidate and win state consent. In their approach to the issue, the authors embark on two very different undertakings and reach partially different conclusions. Hence, both books also contribute to the debate on U.S. capacity of supporting and contributing to international norms and institutions. Long studied as mere legal instruments, international tribunals must really be explained with reference to their highly political nature. On the one hand, they are judicial institutions for the enforcement of international criminal responsibility. On the other, they are international organizations that need to elaborate specific strategies to achieve their purpose and, above all, to win the support of international and domestic actors. Relying on state support means, for example, that while acting as criminal courts, these tribunals face â&#x20AC;&#x153;highly politicized environmentsâ&#x20AC;?16 and should accommodate the interests of a wide range of domestic, political, and legal cultures. Both volumes help to understand the difficult question of domestic responses to international norms, in this case international criminal responsibility. The nature of the U.S. political system and the sometimes equivocal character of its foreign policy, composed of different views of the international system and partially distinct political cultures,17 create ambiguities and misunderstandings that require complex analyses. Combining a theoretical explanation of U.S. political and legal culture (Ralph) with a detailed story of how things went during the Rome Conference on the ICC (Scheffer) significantly augments our knowledge of the difficulties related to processes of norm consolidation. 16. Benjamin Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, 258. 17. On the issue, see the seminal work by Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).