U.S. congressional supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, which links Afghanistan to a very different operation and does not allow for long-term planning. The Task Force recommends the following: • Funding for the ANSF and other components of assistance to Afghanistan should be separated from funding for Iraq. It should either be integrated into the omnibus foreign assistance act or become the subject of independent legislation. • Funding for ANSF, as well as other forms of institution building and long-term development for Afghanistan, should be moved from supplemental appropriations to continuing appropriations in the permanent budget. The United States, NATO, the UN, and others should also develop mechanisms for long-term, multiyear, and predictable shared international funding of the ANSF and other Afghan institutions. • Funding for and expenditures by the ANSF should be subject to examination by the government and the National Assembly of Afghanistan, even if the funds are appropriated from foreign assistance, to ensure accountability and civilian oversight of the security forces. The long-term goal should be to make Afghanistan self-sufficient in its security forces through a combination of threat reduction, restructuring of security forces, and increase in the fiscal capacity of the Afghan state. Restructuring proposals include moving from an all-volunteer force to one that also includes conscripts and partly changing compensation from cash to in-kind, particularly in the form of housing, education, and family benefits. Some members of the Task Force believe that Afghan security forces need to be substantially expanded in order to meet the twin goals of securing the population and allowing the eventual drawdown of foreign military forces. Afghanistan has a much lower ratio of police to population than countries without an insurgency (the U.S. ratio, for example, is nearly double that of Afghanistan). The current targets (not yet met) for building Afghan security forces are one-third of those already formed in Iraq. By any standard, they are woefully inadequate for the critical task of securing the population in homes, workplaces, and travel. Without a substantial increase, it is unclear how we can avoid maintaining large international forces that are well beyond the likely limits of U.S. and Afghan domestic political support. Support in NATO nations is already fraying. Some members of the Task Force worry about building Afghan forces that are larger than the country can sustain and pay. Others counter that if the war is lost militarily, there will be no need to worry about long-term sustainability. Therefore, the Task Force recommends the following: • A n immediate and rapid reevaluation of the Afghan force levels needed to secure the population against an ongoing and spreading insurgency. • U.S. and international commitment to pay the equipment and recurrent costs necessary to build whatever expanded force such an evaluation recommends.
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