Shar i ngt heSpac e ASt udyonEduc at i onandTr ai ni ngf orCompl exOper at i ons
Pr e pa r e dby: J onGunde r s e na ndt heEduc a t i ona ndTr a i ni ngSur ve yTe a m UNI TEDSTATESI NSTI TUTEOFPEACE I npa r t ne r s hi pwi t h THECONSORTI UM FORCOMPLEXOPERATI ONS
About the United States Institute of Peace The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and democratic transformations, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in peacebuilding efforts around the globe. For more information, please visit www.usip.org.
About the Consortium for Complex Operations The Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) is a developing network of civilian and military educators, trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to improving education and training for complex operations. Principal roles of the CCO are to serve as an information clearinghouse and to cultivate a civil-military community of practice for complex operations training and education. The CCO is a Department of Defense led collaboration with the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development.
About the Team
Acknowledgements
This study was conducted by the United States Institute of Peace in partnership with the Consortium for Complex Operations. The USIP team was lead by Jon Gundersen, and included the following individuals:
The United States Institute of Peace study team would like to thank all of the participants of the workshops and focus validation groups that USIP hosted in support of this effort. In addition, we would like all of the individuals and institutions, both civilian and military that participated in our survey. Finally, we wish to thank, in particular, the leadership and staff of both the United States Institute of Peace and the Consortium for Complex Operations Support Center for their continuous support and guidance throughout this process.
Ingrid Harder, Program Officer William Story, Senior Consultant Gregory Maly, Consultant E. Jill Parlett, Consultant Brian Rose, Program Assistant Researchers Timothy Bertocci Adriana Brazelton Elizabeth Detwiler Kimberly Formo Charles Wesley Gould Alexander Johnston Christopher Jonas Jon Newstrom Thomas Oakley Emily Siegel Kyana Woolridge Natalie Zajicova
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace or the Consortium for Complex Operations, which do not advocate specific policy positions.
Table of Contents I.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION................................................................ 5
II.
METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................11
III.
OVERVIEW OF COURSES: INVENTORY RESULTS .....................................................13
IV.
INTERACTIVE WEB PORTAL.....................................................................................21
V.
KEY ISSUE AREAS.....................................................................................................23 Whole of Government / Whole of Community ..................................................... 23 Leadership and Management................................................................................ 25 Situational and Cultural Awareness ...................................................................... 27 Local Capacity Building .......................................................................................... 29 Information and Public Diplomacy ........................................................................ 31 Lessons Learned Processes .................................................................................... 33 Professional Development .................................................................................... 34
VI.
NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................37
VII.
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................41 Appendix A. Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consulted .................. 41 Appendix B. Training and Education Survey Questions ........................................ 48 Appendix C. References Consulted........................................................................ 51 Appendix D. Previous Studies and Surveys ........................................................... 53 Appendix E. Portal Fact Sheet ............................................................................... 54 Endnotes ................................................................................................................ 56
3
4 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & IN TROD UCTION A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools. –Thucydides
New World For most of the Cold War, the United States was engaged in an existential struggle with the Soviet Union. The international environment was dangerous, but relatively straightforward, at least for American policymakers. Our diplomatic and defense policy was designed for a long Cold War with a competing superpower and for conflict between sovereign states. Today we face a new world – a world of fragile and failing states, sectarian and civil wars, insurgents and terrorists, famines and contagions, human rights violations and ethnic cleansing and (not always distinguishable) good guys and bad guys. Americans are currently engaged in complex operations in this chaotic and often ambiguous environment throughout the world – from Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and Haiti. These operations occur in the gray area between conventional warfare and traditional peacemaking. They require “soft” nonkinetic power as well as hard power. In Deft diplomacy and directed other words, deft diplomacy and directed development must go hand development must go hand in hand with in hand with strong defense strong defense to promote and defend American interests. And the United States to promote and defend will be involved in this world and in these American interests. operations for the foreseeable future. Americans will be sharing this complex stage with numerous actors from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and allies to international civil servants and private contractors. Therefore, we need a better understanding of other nations and institutions, their interests and capacities and how they prepare their personnel to operate in this shared space. Finally, we will continue to be engaged on the ground in some capacity in sovereign states far beyond our borders. These states have their own history, culture, and expectations for the future. We need to factor in host country interests and ownership as we promote and protect American interests overseas in the 21st century.
The CCO and the USIP Study This new world has challenged policy makers not only to rethink the nature of warfare, but how to prepare for – and how to prevent – armed conflict in the future. With this in mind, the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) was created to foster unity of effort in how the U.S. Government (USG) educates and trains its personnel for complex operations.i As a first step, the CCO asked the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to survey U.S. educational and training institutions and to develop an inventory of courses relevant to complex operations. To do this properly, we surveyed not only educators and trainers, but also experts and practitioners. Consequently, this project is as much an environmental scan as a course inventory.
5
The scope of this study did not include rewriting doctrine or addressing resource issues. Nevertheless, as noted frequently by Secretary Gates, there is a real and recognized need to increase civilian capacity to conduct complex operations. Clearly, enhancing the quality and availability of education and training in the civilian sector would improve our ability to conduct complex operations more effectively. In fact, recent policy Recent policy directives ‌ have directives such as National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 to recognized the need to elevate Department of Defense Directive the status of stability operations, (DoDD) 3000.05 have recognized the to enhance civilian capacity, and need to elevate the status of stability to better prepare U.S. personnel operations, to enhance civilian capacity, and to better prepare U.S. for complex operations. personnel for complex operations.
From Workshops to Web Portal Over the course of the past six months, USIP visited key educational and training facilities, surveyed more than 200 institutions, both military and civilian, representing over 600 courses, interviewed more than 500 experts, participated in 25 conferences, and hosted 30 focus and validation groups. The issues and gaps identified by the workshops, focus groups, and validation groups were then cross-walked with the data collected by USIP’s team of surveyors. Data from the surveys have been entered into an interactive web portal that will be available to the CCO community. While the survey and website cannot claim to be all-inclusive, it is, we believe, the most comprehensive catalogue of relevant civilian and military courses available to USG stakeholders. We encourage the community to participate actively in populating the portal and in future CCO activities.
Survey Overview There is a growing cast of actors involved in complex operations sharing the stage with American personnel throughout the world. Recognizing this, our survey focused on eight distinct yet overlapping types of institutions: U.S. Military U.S. Government Civilian Agencies U.S. Academic Institutions – public and private Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Civilian Police Private contractors International Organizations Close allies Section III includes a series of charts and narratives based on our survey of over 200 institutions from the above sectors. The information and analysis contained in this section represents a snap shot rather than a finished documentary of the field. In other words, this report and portal are more of a departure point than a destination.
6 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
The survey identified a number of key issues. First, the majority of the courses are available to personnel across the sectors. However, often, these courses only have a small number of slots available for outside participants, many of which regularly do not get filled. Second, while there are numerous courses offered, there may not be enough capacity to accommodate a surge of students, particularly on the civilian side. Finally, the majority of courses are lecture based, and are taught in a classroom environment, whereas practitioners have recommended that case studies, field-based and experiential learning are critical for preparing to work in a complex environment.
Recurring Issues and Recommendations Based on numerous surveys, workshops and focus groups, as well as extensive discussion with members of the key sectors presently involved with complex operations, the study team identified a number of key issues and recommendations. Some of these may inform follow-up CCO activities, such as workshops, conferences, or academic dialogue; while others might be addressed by policy makers and others in the field. These findings are presented across the following issue areas:
Whole of Government / Whole of Community Issue: Recent policy directives have recognized the need for a “whole of government” approach to complex operations. Furthermore, participants in the study reinforced the need to go beyond a “whole of government” to a “whole of community” approach, i.e., including the spectrum of operators involved on the ground. However, institutional stovepipes, differences in organizational cultures and even the lack of a common lexicon present barriers to developing fully integrated training opportunities. Recommendations: Support efforts to increase “jointness” between military and civilians and between civilian agencies involved in complex operations; Harmonize civilian-military doctrines and also doctrine/guidelines among civilian agencies; Conduct training exercises driven by civilian objectives with the U.S. military in a supporting role, e.g., humanitarian relief, prevention of genocide; Coordinate U.S. and allied programs to increase civilian capacity for stability operations, e.g., share best practices; Sustain and increase portal content with fresh data, new features and continuous outreach to consortium members; Utilize survey data to analyze each sectors’ approach to education and training with a view to harmonizing with other agencies and institutions; Clarify and coordinate qualification standards and training requirements for private contractors in complex operations.
7
Leadership and Management Issue: Leadership and management courses are available to both military and civilian personnel. However, they need to be adapted to take into account the skill sets required to operate effectively in a complex, ambiguous and often chaotic environment. Recommendation: Introduce the latest management techniques into education and training for complex operations, e.g., flexible and adaptive business models attuned to local conditions.
Situational and Cultural Awareness Issue: While there is no shortage of courses on cultural awareness in general, these courses frequently boil down to “tourism 101�. Practitioners need guidance on how to interact within the culture at a professional level, which requires a more nuanced and even interactive approach. Recommendations: Offer more courses, simulations, and exercises to enhance situational and cultural awareness; Develop and offer mediation and negotiation courses for the interagency community, taking into account local cultural context.
Local Capacity Building Issue: Capacity building as a concept has expanded beyond the transfer of technical expertise to include a broad range of post conflict reconstruction and statebuilding initiatives. It is not enough to be a subject matter expert or to simply expect to transfer a U.S. based model. Practitioners need to know how to recognize and respect host-country capacity, how to do baseline assessments and how to transfer knowledge to local counterparts. Recommendations: Train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to host country counterparts, i.e., mentoring skills combined with technical expertise; Identify and train a cadre of people with the specialized skills needed for capacity building; Increase inter-sector understanding and cooperation on issues such as local security sector reform.
8 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Lessons Learned Systems Issue: While the U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process, the USG as a whole is not as advanced in capturing and weaving lessons into the educational and training process. The process is also not as effective on the operational and strategic level as it is on the tactical level. Furthermore, civilian agencies are too often limited by resource and time constraints to identify and document effective practices. Recommendations: Identify case studies to reinforce emerging doctrine and lessons learned/best practices into the classroom; Develop a capability to capture lessons from current operations and integrate those lessons into course content across the sectors.
Information and Public Diplomacy Issue: Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions, however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and too often do not even use the same language or lexicon, e.g., public diplomacy, information operations. This lack of coordination in developing common communication and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of the host population and affect mission legitimacy. Recommendation: Integrate shared doctrine into education and training, including developing a coordinated approach to public diplomacy among the military and civilian agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs, taking into account multiple audiences, including the host nation.
Professional Development Issue: Most institutions reward service in a recognized field. Yet, there are few systematic motivations to pursue expertise in a field such as complex operations. Multi-disciplinary expertise and “joint� assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Furthermore, there are few career incentives to develop an expertise in stability operations. Recommendation: Develop career incentives throughout the community for professional level education and training for, and deployments to, complex operations.
The Way Forward In sum, this report is intended to offer educators and trainers, as well as policy-makers and practitioners, a supporting foundation to better prepare U.S. personnel for complex operations. The study reflects the need and urgency to adjust education and training to 9
support a whole of government approach to civilian and military complex operations. There are, however, notable obstacles towards doing so. Challenges include ensuring knowledge and information is current and accurate; factoring in host country interests and expectations; achieving unity of effort through coordinated doctrine, education and training across government; and collaborating on and sharing content and course materials currently available to limited audiences. Finally, since we seem destined to share the complex world with multiple players, including allies, NGOs and IOs, we need to utilize a whole of community approach. This report, along with the supporting catalogue of courses, highlights opportunities to help the CCO “community of practice” target common solutions through coordinated efforts. By applying this report’s findings and recommendations, members of the CCO, and more broadly the U.S. Government, will be better prepared to navigate the often uncharted seas of complex operations.
10 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
II. METHOD OLOGY Scope In order to conduct a thorough study, we included not just U.S. military and civilian governmental institutions, but all institutions preparing personnel for deployment to complex operations. Therefore, the study examined courses delivered by: U.S. military; USG civilian agencies; the private sector (e.g., contractors, USAID implementing partners); NGOs; civilian police; academic institutions; international organizations; and, Our survey tried to capture foreign training programs. In addition to those courses and course content, we examined the education programs that taught and training processes of each sector.
practical – not theoretical
There is a vast universe of courses in both or historical – information the public and private sector, which offer and skill sets needed to important substance and skills – language operate in complex, often courses, regional studies programs, etc., and are of general interest to anyone deployed ambiguous, environments. overseas. However, our survey tried to capture those courses and programs that taught practical – not theoretical or historical – information and skill sets needed to operate in complex, often ambiguous, environments. For example, we included courses on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, but not historical overviews or theoretical discussions of insurgencies or terrorism; we included regional study courses in areas with ongoing complex operations (e.g., the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa), but not other regional courses (e.g., Europe, Latin America). We also included practical courses related to specific skill sets that have been identified as relevant to complex operations such as leadership, mediation, negotiation and conflict analysis. Therefore, this survey is not intended to provide a definitive compilation of all available courses, but rather a snap shot of relevant practical courses. As such, we can always widen the lens as conditions change. The course inventory and associated data will be available to the CCO community through the Web Portal (see Section IV).
Activities Workshops/Focus Groups. As a first step, USIP conducted three substantive workshops to identify common requirements and gaps in education and training for preparing personnel in complex operations. The workshop topics included stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. Over 100 educators and practitioners, from both U.S. military and civilian government institutions, and select outside experts participated in the workshops. These groups discussed how we educate and train for complex operations. Participants agreed that the knowledge and skills needed to conduct complex operations cut across the above topics. Above all, they affirmed that we must move beyond separate institutional and parochial interests; in other words, towards “unity of effort” both within USG and with other institutions both foreign and domestic. The workshops also identified certain core skill sets needed in a non-permissive environment such as adaptive leadership, situational flexibility, knowledge of and cooperation with other operators in the field and capacity building skills.
11
Survey of Course Offerings. Following the workshops, USIP conducted a survey of course offerings based on the needs identified during the sessions. The survey was sent to over 400 education and training institutions. USIP hired an experienced thirteen-member survey team to follow up and catalog course information which formed the basis for the study. The survey project was broken down into sectors, as referenced above. Interviews and Focus Groups. USIP conducted close to 500 phone interviews, attended and/or participated in 20-25 conferences, made 10 site visits to education and training facilities, and conducted upwards of 30 focus groups with experts and practitioners. In addition, USIP hosted a series of sector-specific focus groups to validate the initial findings of the study. Five of the discussions were held with representatives of institutions that provide education and training, while one discussion was held with practitioners on the receiving end of such training. Portal. In parallel to the survey, USIP developed an interactive portal to store and share survey results and to serve as a hub of interaction for the CCO and its members. Specifically, the portal includes a comprehensive database of courses and institutions related to complex operations, interactive discussion forums, blogging capabilities for thought leaders, a acronym glossary, subject matter expert directory, directory for complex operations tools and resources, and a CCO calendar detailing information regarding complex operations events, including archived files. The course database is searchable by CCO portal members (see Section IV for more information). Sector Analysis, Key Issues and Recommendations. Each sector team analyzed how that sector was engaged in complex operations, the status of education and training, and major issues and gaps in that sector. We then cross-walked the perceived gaps and needs with the survey results. Finally, USIP identified crosscutting issues and gaps in education and training and identified specific recommendations for courses, conferences, and future activities for the CCO.
12 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
III. OVERVIEW OF COURSES: IN VEN TORY RESULTS This survey is arguably the most comprehensive collection of courses related to complex operations available to dateii. The following overview provides a breakdown of 616 courses delivered by the U.S. Military, U.S. Civilian Agencies, U.S. Academic Institutions, Nongovernmental organizations and institutes, as well as foreign and international institutions. Recognizing that this is not a clearly defined area of study, courses were selected based on workshop outcomes and consultations as outlined in the methodology section. Over half of the courses are offered at the graduate or postgraduate level. Nearly half are professional or specialized in-house courses. Only 6 percent of courses surveyed are offered at the undergraduate level.
BREAKDOWN OF COURSES BY SECTOR
21%
25%
U.S. Military = 152
2%
USG Civilian = 86 U.S. Academic = 236 Nongovernmental = 12 14%
International = 130
38%
Given the interdisciplinary nature of complex operations, many of the courses cover a range of topics. Subject categories were selected based on the main themes covered in the course. For example, it may appear from the chart that there are no related courses on ethics and codes of conduct offered by USG civilian agencies. However, ethics may be woven into courses on other subjects such as intercultural awareness or leadership and management. One of the recurring themes from the study is the lack of a common lexicon or definitions across and even within organizations. Therefore, there is some crossover in the subject categories. We did not attempt to define areas of study such as stabilization and reconstruction vs. stability operations. Rather, courses are self-defining as much as possible based on the terminology used by the course provider.
13
Breakdown of Course Subjects Offered by Sector Stability operations/peace operations (general) Leadership and management Conflict resolution/mediation/negotiation International/multilateral organizations Reconstruction and Stabilization (general) Regional courses Courses on working with other agencies Humanitarian assistance Civil-military Ethics and codes of conduct Counterinsurgency Cultural/intercultural awareness Interagency planning and coordination Public security Situational awareness Economic stabilization Governance Communication and public diplomacy Rule of Law Train-the-trainer courses Irregular warfare
0%
5% U.S. Military
10% USG Civilian
15% U.S. Academic
20% Nongovernmental
25% International
N.B. Courses were selected for their direct relevance to complex operations. For example, the category “regional courses� only includes courses covering recent or ongoing operational areas.
14 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
30%
Course subjects
U.S. Military
USG Civilian
U.S. Academic
Nongovernmental
International
Total
Percentage of total
Stability operations/peace operations (general)
30
8
36
0
79
153
25%
Leadership and management
33
28
17
4
13
95
15%
Conflict resolution/mediation/negotiation
8
8
48
1
13
78
13%
International/multilateral organizations
8
3
18
0
40
69
11%
Reconstruction and stabilization (general)
25
10
28
0
5
68
11%
Regional courses
44
4
14
0
3
65
11%
Courses on working with other agencies
19
13
12
0
15
59
10%
Humanitarian assistance
1
5
37
1
13
57
9%
Civil-military
19
1
13
0
11
44
7%
Ethics and codes of conduct
10
0
20
0
13
43
7%
Counterinsurgency
22
1
16
0
2
41
7%
Cultural/intercultural awareness
12
4
15
2
4
37
6%
Interagency planning and coordination
15
11
1
0
0
27
4%
Public security
9
2
1
0
14
26
4%
Situational awareness
8
9
6
1
1
25
4%
Economic stabilization
2
9
9
0
2
22
4%
Communication and public diplomacy
6
3
4
0
7
20
3%
Governance
1
5
11
0
3
20
3%
Rule of Law
0
5
8
0
1
14
2%
Train-the-trainer courses
1
1
1
0
4
7
1%
Irregular warfare
5
0
0
0
0
5
1%
15
Accessibility Given the recent emphasis on interagency planning and coordination, it is not surprising that most of the surveyed courses offered by the military and the government civilian agencies are open to participants across the sectors. Ninety-five percent of courses delivered by the military are accessible to participants beyond U.S., military personnel. Of the 86 courses offered by USG civilian agencies, 77 percent are open to participants from other sectors. More often than not, however, courses have limited quotas set aside for outside participants. These often go unfilled due to resource issues (either personnel time or direct costs associated with attending a course) as well as the lack of awareness of available courses across organizations. As a result, courses are less integrated than reflected in the survey results.
ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY THE MILITARY
ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY USG CIVILIAN AGENCIES
5% 3% 10%
Internal to Host Agency Only
3%
23%
Open to U.S. Military Only
29%
Open to Other USG Civilian Agencies Only
Open to U.S. Military and Civilian Agencies Only Open to U.S. and Foreign Military Only
Open to Host Agency and Implementing Partners Only
Open to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies, Foreign Military Only Open to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies, Foreign Military and Private Sector Open to all, including I0s and NGOs
32%
10%
Open to USG Civilian agencies and U.S. Military Only Open to all (including Ios, NGOs, Private sector)
26%
47%
(n=152) (n=86)
16 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
12%
Target Participants The majority of courses offered by the military are available only to mid and senior level officials, whereas only 14 percent are open to entry-level personnel. This is in contrast with government civilian agencies, where 75 percent of the courses are open to entry-level officials. For civilian agencies, this survey considers entry level to include GS-05 through GS-09 and up to FO-05. Mid-level is equivalent to GS-10 through GS-14 and FO-06 through FO-02. Senior level equates to GS-15 or above and FO-01 or above. For the military courses, entry level is O-1 through O-3, mid-level is O-4 and O-5, and senior level is O-6 and above.
TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF U.S. MILITARY COURSES
11%
3%
TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF USG CIVILIAN COURSES
6%
3%
Entry level only 16%
Entry level only
39%
30%
Entry and Mid-level Mid-level only
Entry and Mid-level
Mid & Senior level
Mid-level only
Senior level only
Mid & Senior levels
All levels
Senior level only All levels 7% 10%
67%
(n=152)
8%
(n=86)
17
Capacity The vast majority of courses are offered in classroom settings with capacities of 11-30 students. An additional 35 courses are offered as distance learning online, on CDROM or by correspondence. COURSE CAPACITY
(n=47 0)
250
Number of courses
200
150
U.S. Military USG Civilian U.S. Academic Institution Nongovernmental International
100
50
0
1
6
3
1
1 to 10 students
11 to 30 students
5
31 to 100 students
1 100+ students
18 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Frequency Academic and military institutions that operate on a semester schedule tend to offer courses once or twice a year. Conversely, civilian agencies offer courses on a more regular basis to accommodate for deployment schedules. Courses provided by other sectors are offered on an ad-hoc or as-required basis. Such courses may be self-paced online, CD-Rom based, short seminars. COURSE FREQUENCY 250
Number of courses
200
150
U.S. Military USG Civilian U.S. Academic Nongovernmental Internationals
100
50
0
1 1-2 times/yr
4
3
3-5 times/yr
3
0
0
6+ times/yr
2
5 No set frequency
(n=526)
19
Teaching Methods Courses were surveyed to determine teaching methods and the various tools used to support the learning process. Many courses use multiple teaching methods; however, over 90 percent of the courses surveyed rely on lectures or seminars as the basic format for the course. This corresponds to the finding that 87 percent of courses are offered in a classroom setting. Case studies are also common although many respondents recommended the need for more quality case studies related to complex operations. Military-offered courses provide the most instances of simulation as a method of teaching. TEACHING METHODS & TOOLS
COURSE DELIVERY
100% 90% 3%
6%
4%
80% 70% 60%
USG Military USG Civilian U.S. Academic Institution Nongovernmental Internationals
50% 40%
87%
Classroom based
30%
Field-based
20%
Distance Learning (Online, Correspondence, CD) 10%
Multiple site l/ In te rn sh ip s
St ud y
n
Ex pe r
ie nt ia
G ro
up
at io Si m ul
St ud ie s Ca se
Le ct ur
e/ Se m in
ar
0%
(n=543)
20 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
(n = 590)
IV. IN TERACTIVE WEB PORTAL As part of the project, USIP developed an interactive web portal to store and share the course inventory, and to serve as a virtual hub of interaction for the CCO and its members. The portal is an essential tool for the CCO to grow and sustain a robust community of practice. The portal is located at www.ccoportal.org. Current features and functions include: Comprehensive database of complex operations courses; Expansive database of education and training institutions; Interactive member discussion forums; Blogging capabilities for thought leaders to debate ideologies and paradigms; Interactive acronym glossary; Subject matter expert member directory; Directory of complex operations tools and resources; and Complex operations calendar detailing information regarding complex operations events, including archived files from previous events. The CCO plans to develop additional portal functionality to support a growing CCO community to include chat capabilities, conference registration, electronic journal, and a wiki function. The CCO anticipates that new features and functions will be driven by member needs to ensure a positive user experience. When USIP turns the portal over to the CCO it will contain over 600 courses on complex operations. Courses are easily searchable using a user-friendly interface that allows members to search by numerous fields including keywords, institution type, accessibility, and length. Both basic and advanced search functions are available. The portal provides the infrastructure to expand. The portal and the databases that underpin it are living tools that the CCO Support Center plans to maintain. To that end, members are encouraged to submit content through the portal, including courses, events, documents, queries, and discussion topics.
21
22 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
V. KEY ISSUE AREAS A number of issues regularly arose during interviews and working sessions. These crosscutting issues are summarized below. They are relevant to each of the eight sectors studied and form the basis of the recommendations presented in Section VI.
Whole of Government / Whole of Community Recent policy directives – NSPD-44, DODD 3000.05 – have recognized the need for a “whole of government” approach to complex operations. USG civilian and military education and training institutions are working to integrate these policy issues into education and training. Throughout the course of this project, participants have reinforced the need to (1) institute a whole of government approach; and (2) go beyond whole of government to a whole of society or whole of community approach. Complex operations involve multiple actors, underscoring the need for coordination at multiple levels, and for joint education and joint training exercises. The U.S. government is making important strides on this front, as are other governments and institutions. However, lack of resources and cultural differences often hinder progress. And, across the sectors, there is still more work to be done.
Sharing the Space Overcoming organizational divides is critical for personnel working in the field. Complex operations involve multiple institutions, often including nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, militaries and advisors from multiple countries, private companies, host government organizations, and non-state actors. Each of these groups has its own organizational culture, language, and interests. Additionally, it is important to recognize and understand host country interests, cultures, sensitivities and needs. To work effectively in complex operations, practitioners must have an understanding of all of the actors Overcoming organizational working on the ground.
divides is critical for personnel working in the field.
Once practitioners understand the range of operators involved in a complex environment, training is necessary to be able to function across cultural boundaries. Our surveys noted that integrated efforts are difficult in a shared environment, and that more work is needed to enhance interorganizational cooperation. Three obstacles stand out: The need for more open lines of communication, better information sharing practices, and synchronization of goals and objectives; The absence of a universally agreed upon language. The lack of a common lexicon, set of definitions, and terminology for complex operations was noted in several surveys. Terms such as irregular warfare, stability operations, security, stability, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency are often used interchangeably and not altogether accurately across the community. The need to leverage the capabilities of interagency and international partners when working in a shared space. This requires not only an understanding of other
23
institutions, but an awareness of the capabilities and limitations of their own institutions, and ability to explain the institution to others. Shortcomings in this regard cannot necessarily be linked to education and training course curriculum. Gaps in training and education have more to do with the limited opportunities for joint training. Enhanced cooperation and “unity of effort” between interagency and international players, particularly between civilian and military institutions, pose challenges for training and educating for effective planning, implementation, and analysis of complex operations. An additional issue is that disciplinary stovepipes separate critical experts from working together. Some areas of complex operations are outside of current disciplines and academic structures. These intellectual stovepipes result in a lack of ownership and no clear responsibilities for tasks that lay between them. Finally, there is a significant knowledge gap at all levels concerning other organizations in the field, and how they interact across the military/civilian, governmental/nongovernmental, public/private, and cross-cultural divides.
The Civilian-Military Divide The gap between military personnel and civilians working on the ground in complex operations is often a major source of friction. Both civilian and military interviewees noted that civilians generally lack basic knowledge of military command structures. Similarly, the military lacks knowledge on the role of USG civilian personnel, NGOs and IOs on the ground in complex operations. More often than not, military and civilian personnel train separately. However, recent changes in national security directives require DoS and DoD to integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military contingency plans where appropriate, and coordinate these plans with relevant government and nongovernmental organizations. One effort to bridge the divide between the two cultures is the Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations. Spearheaded by InterAction, the U.S. military, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, these guidelines were developed to serve as “rules of the road” for how the two entities should operate in hostile environments. The United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has undertaken similar efforts, and has even gone as far as to offer Civilian-Military Coordination Training. This is offered at three levels to combined civilian-military classes.
The Civilian-Civilian Divide The divide between military and civilian agencies is not the only gap. There is also a divide between the various civilian agencies involved in complex operations. For example, DOS and USAID and at least eight other agencies play a role in stability and reconstruction operations. Restricted funding and cultural barriers within and among civilian agencies limit their ability to offer and receive interagency education and training courses. Furthermore, civilian agencies need to develop shared conceptual frameworks and shared approaches based on best practices. Education and training should, in part, cascade from these. USIP, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and other agencies are currently engaged in a project to develop just this type of civilian doctrine. There are also a number of relevant interagency education and training efforts underway, including: the National Security Education Consortium (NSEC), the Reconstruction & Stabilization Senior Roundtable, and the National Security Professional Development Initiative.
24 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Leadership and Management Good training is only part of what it takes to develop good leaders. The workshops held at the outset of our study underscored the need to develop adaptive leadership as a core skill set, particularly for working in a rapidly changing, chaotic environment. Leaders, especially at the mid-level, must be able to assess the changing operational environment, analyze their assessments, recalibrate and adjust objectives accordingly. Leadership and management issues cut across all sectors involved in complex operations. Our survey findings suggest that training and education programs across sectors are indeed attempting to address leadership challenges specific to complex situations. The military is arguably the most systematic of all sectors in training its cadre of leaders for a wide range of operational challenges. However, civilian training institutions such as the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and USIP’s Education and Training Center, as well as a range of universities and NGOs, offer numerous courses ranging from high-level strategic planning to team-building and other personal leadership skills.iii Yet, across the No amount of training can sectors, we found that while this is a fully prepare personnel for priority issue, there are still “gaps.”
Teaching the Right Skills
every situation. Training programs should instead inform participants of potential scenarios and instruct them on how to utilize available resources.
No amount of training can fully prepare personnel for every situation. Training programs should instead inform participants of potential scenarios and instruct them on how to utilize available resources. Understanding the mechanisms of other organizations (e.g. financial authorities, chains of command, and human resource policies) becomes much more critical when decisions need to be made quickly, or when official authorization is not available. Additionally, individuals need to understand their role within the broader context in order to ensure smooth sequencing of activities and coordination with other initiatives. This includes knowing how to work with local authorities and other organizations working on the ground. Critical analysis has also been flagged as key competency across all sectors. Finally, knowledge and technical expertise must be linked up with cultural awareness and host-country knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, understanding local and international legal frameworks, and adherence to standards and codes of conduct. In addition to these adaptive leadership skills, several organizations stressed a need for more training in basic managerial skills. One of the shortcomings of training for management and leadership is the fundamental difficulty of planning, making assessments and evaluating during a conflict or postconflict situation. This will be discussed further in the section on capacity building; however, it is also a management issue.
Teaching to the Right Level Peace and stability operations are often characterized in military terms by the compression of traditional strategic, operational and tactical levels of decision-making. The notion of the “strategic corporal” responds to the emerging leadership demands presented by complex operations, in that the nature of these operations demands a higher level of leadership from junior officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the 25
ability to carry out a wider range of activities under pressure – from war fighting to civil administration to humanitarian assistance. It is not uncommon for relatively junior level personnel to be charged with administering programs in the field with leadership responsibilities well beyond their rank. Within a military organization, especially at the tactical level in the field, very young and junior-ranking personnel serve in leadership positions that entrust them with substantial responsibilities. As such the military provides leadership training at all levels. At the same time, some skill sets that would greatly benefit and enhance the effectiveness of the tactical level leaders – negotiation skills, for example – are primarily taught to higher-level military leaders at senior officer professional development courses. Junior military leaders need this training as well. In contrast to military personnel, lower-ranking civilian officials lack the focused and deliberate leadership development and experience of the military personnel serving in the same space. Even if practitioners are not in a formal leadership or management position, they will likely be navigating fluid or ambiguous “chains of command,” or find themselves in situations which demand a higher level of flexibility and leadership capabilities. For example, it is not uncommon for a lawyer to be charged with helping to develop government legislative structures, oversight mechanisms and committee systems. A health practitioner may be charged with helping set up a public health care system. Yet leadership specific courses for civilian personnel are often reserved for senior levels. In addition, civilian leadership training must be relevant for the audience. For example, senior-level civilians may be political appointees and may not have had prior related experience or access and/or incentives to undergo training to prepare for a specific operation. A renewed effort to provide the right skills at the right level, and the leadership development at the right time would greatly enhance the effectiveness of both civilian and military leaders at the tactical level.
26 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Situational and Cultural Awareness There is no shortage of culture or language courses offered by government, military or academic institutions. It is widely recognized that those working on the ground in complex operations require situational awareness, which includes an understanding of local culture, geography, social structure and sensitivities. Cultural awareness provides personnel with the ability to function across cultural lines in multicultural environments. Additionally, cross-cultural communication is considered an important skill for all levels of practitioners working in the field. This includes language training, as well as conflict resolution and negotiation skills. USG institutions such as the Defense Language Institute (DLI), FSI, and the National Defense University (NDU) offer negotiation, cultural awareness and area studies courses, as well as language training to personnel being deployed into the field. USIP also offers numerous courses and conferences on the above topics. The importance of cultural issues in training and education for those being deployed into the field cut across all sectors and organizations involved in complex operations. Gaps in education and training for issues related to culture and situational awareness primarily relate to how nuanced courses are, and how well personnel are able to transfer skills taught The importance of cultural in training courses into practice.
Cultural Awareness
issues in training and education for those being deployed into the field cut across all sectors and organizations involved in complex operations.
General cultural awareness skills are important for teaching personnel how to live and work effectively within a multicultural environment, and are core skills for practitioners at every level. This includes providing individuals with a broadened awareness of the similarities and differences between one’s own culture and surrounding cultures. Additionally, cultural awareness provides practitioners with the ability to identify and analyze the nature of cultural differences as drivers of conflict. While courses teaching these skills exist within education and training institutions, our survey found such courses are not as prevalent or nuanced as is necessary to work in a complex environment.
Situational Awareness Situational awareness, as opposed to cultural awareness, provides individuals with regional specific knowledge. Practitioners should be well versed in the societies in which they are operating, in order to effectively engage all parts of those societies. This includes understanding local political and social structures, as well as environmental, and geographic knowledge of the region. This information is widely available across the spectrum of training and education institutions accessible to practitioners. Area studies programs are regularly offered at both USG training institutions, as well as academic institutions. However, situational awareness also involves understanding local sensitivities, understanding the nuances of working in conflict societies, and the impact of one’s presence and actions on local society. When local sensitivities are ignored, a foreign presence can have a negative impact on a mission, and what began as a welcomed presence, can quickly become a negative relationship with a host nation.
27
One of the most significant gaps in training and education related to situational awareness has to do with understanding how to transfer knowledge into action when working on the ground. Often, training and education occur well in advance of deployment, and far from the theater of the operation. As such, practitioners do not have the opportunity to integrate classroom education into everyday practice until on the job. In country training, for example, allows personnel to interact with a culture as a professional, preparing them for future work in that environment.
Cross-Cultural Communication In addition to understanding local culture, practitioners need to understand how to communicate across cultural lines. This includes communicating with citizens on the ground, local leaders, and others working in the shared space. Cross-cultural communication, including language skills, as well as mediation and negotiation, is highly regarded as important for practitioners working in the field. Multiple languages are often spoken in a shared environment, and can lead to misunderstanding of intent when working together toward a common goal. Practitioners working in a complex operation ideally speak the language of the host population; however, this is seldom the case. To prepare practitioners for working in complex operations, the government has identified priority languages, and offers short courses and longer-term proficiency courses at a number of training institutions around the country. When language proficiency is not an option for all personnel, basic operational language skills build good will and legitimacy with host populations. In addition to speaking the local language, it is important for personnel to be taught the process of selecting and making use of interpreters and translators, particularly in negotiations. Because of the multinational nature of complex operations, most personnel cannot communicate effectively with the local population without assistance. Because of this, the UN, for example, includes the utilization of translators as a key component in communication and negotiation courses. Selection of interpreters is important because they may come with their own biases, which may affect a mission’s success. Additionally, understanding cultural sensitivities is key, so as not to put them in uncomfortable situations. Mediation and negotiation skills are also generally recognized as essential for practitioners working in the field. While these strategic skills are important in any environment, they are particularly needed in a chaotic conflict situation. Consensus building, negotiation, and dispute resolution are essential in shared environments when multiple parties are involved. These skills are particularly relevant to one’s ability to recognize and analyze the elements of conflict situations. Cultural issues need to be tied into these courses as cross-cultural negotiation has its own set of nuances and sensitivities. Courses on mediation and negotiation are available to personnel through a variety of institutions, including USG, NGO, and academic institutions. USIP is integrating its series of critically acclaimed handbooks on cross-cultural negotiation behavior into its negotiation training (i.e., books on French, Russian, German, North Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Israeli and Palestinian negotiating styles). In addition, the Combined Arms Center includes an introduction to negotiation and mediation in conflict management as a core course for senior officials.
28 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Local Capacity Building Capacity building has become a catch-all label for a host of initiatives designed to support and develop host-nation organizations, e.g., local civil society organizations, militaries, police forces, businesses, and governments. The concept is not new: developing the capacities of poor countries has long been the cornerstone of development aid. As a reconstruction process, capacity building often refers to the methods used by interveners to help national institutions and/or to improve their performance. Therefore, beyond the provision of basic short-term security and humanitarian assistance, most postconflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in the areas such as security sector reform, rule of law, governance, or economic sustainability are essentially capacity building. Furthermore, the development of local capacity – to the degree to which this can be assessed – underpins the ability of the intervener to define an exit strategy. It follows that capacity building should be a key element of preparing practitioners across all sectors for working in complex operations, particularly stabilization and reconstruction. In some areas, the U.S. and other donor countries have become proficient at delivering capacity building programs. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) helps countries develop professional civilian-based law enforcement institutions. The State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) is designed to enhance the capacity of African partner nations to participate in multinational peace support operations in Africa. To date, ACOTA has provided training and non-lethal equipment to over 52,000 peacekeepers from African partner militaries. In addition, the Treasury Department offers technical assistance and mentoring in a number of areas, including finance and tax collection, preventing money laundering, and tracking terrorist financing. The military also has a long history of working with other countries to enhance their military skills through individual training courses as well as international programs such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides over 2,000 courses at 150 military schools and installations to military members of friendly and allied countries. The courses enhance and promote regional stability, defense cooperation, democratic values, the rule of law, and human rights. The Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program assists nations that need to curb lawlessness or that need protection from rogue nations.
Participatory Approaches and Partnerships However, capacity building goes beyond a menu of trainings or skill sets to be delivered. “Capacity building” proposes a set of practices that put the emphasis on participatory approaches and partnership. In this sense, capacity building requires the ability to recognize and build on effective local approaches and contextual awareness. This should be incorporated into planning as well as the way practitioners conduct their work. On the planning side, assessing and recognizing existing capacity should lay the foundation for follow on efforts and future evaluation. Interveners should not start from zero when planning a development strategy but rather focus on building on what already exists – on strengthening pre-existing capacities. What we found, however, is that baseline assessments are either not being done, or are not being done well.
29
Local Ownership Nurturing local “ownership” is an important element of capacity building and in many ways is its primary goal. Capacity building programs aim at developing local competences, in order to prevent or end dependency. In practice, however, interveners inevitably attempt to transplant their own systems, procedures and values to host nation institutions. As in medicine, transplantation of a non-indigenous organ or model may well result in transplant rejection. A more collaborative and customized approach may take more time, but is far more likely to succeed. It is not enough for practitioners to be experts in subject matter; they need to recognize their role in developing local expertise and to support local training, mentoring and technical transfer of know-how. Unlike the military, civilian agencies do not consider Interveners inevitably teaching or mentoring skills an integral part of professional development. Military officers attempt to transplant their can expect to spend approximately one third own systems, procedures of their professional time either being trained and values to host nation or training others. Even civilian institutions with a strong training component do not institutions. As in always develop teaching, mentoring and medicine, transplantation advising skills in a systematic way. As a of a non-indigenous organ result, practitioners selected for their expertise or model may well result may have no experience in training or mentoring others. There is no single formula in transplant rejection. for this and it can be a very personal experience. However, there are effective practices that require knowing how as well as when to teach, mentor and advise. This demands an understanding of the local culture and context. Practitioners also need to understand their role within the broader capacity building effort.
Specialized Knowledge In addition to “soft” skills such as collaborative skills and training and mentoring skills, advisors and capacity builders need relevant specialized skills to be effective and credible. An advisor cannot successfully advise a justice minister, for example, without strong rule of law expertise. However, there is a lack of subject matter expertise in a number of key capacity building areas and only limited corresponding education and training programs in areas such as security sector reform. Agencies responsible for capacity building programs need to identify and develop a cadre of individuals with the prerequisite skills in this area. In particular, the interagency team needs to recruit a deeper “bench.” The Civilian Response Corp is a step in the right direction.
30 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Information and Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy and information operations are critical to mission success. Moreover, gaining the trust of both the host population, and the population back at home, is necessary for building mission legitimacy, managing spoilers, and building constituencies for peace. Maintaining a common message and successful communication with the host population is often difficult due to the complex nature of the environment. Because the work of various players is often difficult to coordinate, let alone integrate, they frequently use different means of speaking with a host population, including using different lexicons and communication outlets. This lack of coordination in developing common communication practices and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of the host population. Even individual agencies often do not convey the same message, both vertically at all levels of command within an organization and horizontally to other organizations working on the ground. Effective public diplomacy involves implementing a consistent message at all levels of operation – whether it be when interacting with people on the street or mass communication via television and/or radio – and choosing communication outlets that are most appropriate for that particular working environment. In other words, good public diplomacy requires situational awareness. Training should include lessons learned and best practices on what communication methods and types of messages are most effective among difference audiences. Military and civilian personnel often use the terms information operations and public diplomacy interchangeably. However, they are different terms of art. For the purposed of this report, we have chosen to use the term “public diplomacy.”
Staying on Message Public diplomacy involves all efforts to communicate a message to the public, from speaking to individuals on the ground, to utilizing media outlets. These skills are considered core skills for both civilian and military personnel, and are offered at government education and training institutions. However, in the field, public diplomacy messages are too often not coordinated between institutions. For messages to successfully permeate all aspects of society, consistent messages must be delivered across all chains of command. To stay “on message,” all levels of command, and all organizations, must make every attempt to coordinate efforts from the classroom to the field.
Knowing the Environment Complex operations include a number of actors, each with their own methods of communications and cultural sensitivities. Those conducting information operations and Public diplomacy and public diplomacy must know the multiple information operations are audiences to whom they are conveying messages. This is necessary to determine what critical to mission success. resonates with what population, including how they interpret messages, pictures, and other forms of expression. As such, cultural awareness must be woven into training and education on media management and public diplomacy. Finally, different actors have their own forms of media and information sharing practices, which need to be understood to effectively communicate with a host population. 31
Additionally, the nature of conflict situations can complicate efforts to communicate with the public. Because media outlets that are readily available in the U.S. may not be accessible in a conflict environment, situational awareness is necessary to identify the capabilities and limitations of mass communication mechanisms within host countries.
32 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Lessons Learned Processes Practitioners regularly demonstrate the ability to make “ingenious adaptations� in the field. More often than not, however, lessons that could be shared with others remain lessons noted or worse, lessons lost. The military is renowned for its lessons learned capacity at the tactical level. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, for example, has a sophisticated and timely feedback loop for troops operating in the field. Joint Forces Command maintains an extensive database of lessons and resources on past and ongoing joint operations. Lessons learned are also systematically More often than not, identified unit by unit. However, these lessons do not always percolate vertically or horizontally. however, lessons that Moreover, the process reportedly falls short at the could be shared with operational and strategic levels.
others remain lessons noted or worse, lessons lost.
Civilian institutions simply do not have the same feedback mechanisms to conduct systematic lessons learned. While agencies recognize the need to gather lessons from the field, there is a constant struggle to turn these into valuable information for future deployments. When it comes to conducting complex operations, civilian agencies are too often limited by time and resource constraints to focus on identifying and documenting effective practices. The bottom line is that lessons learned are hard to systematize at the operational and strategic levels. The further someone is from the impact of their actions, the harder it is for them to connect a unique experience to generalized lessons for the future. Personnel need to be trained to recognize an experience as something that could be converted to a lesson. Equally important, practitioners need to learn how to report lessons back to their superiors effectively. Organizations also have to be willing and able to absorb and process lessons learned from the field and to adapt when lessons point to the need for a course correction. This can demand substantial resources. For example, even if relevant interviews are conducted, there may not be funding available for transcription and conversion into lessons learned. Increasingly, with the help of new web and cell-phone technology, practitioners are making use of reach-back resources as way to access expertise and lessons learned from the field. Practitioners point out that it is more useful to know where to find information when needed than to try and get trained on everything they would need to know ahead of time. That said, if training and education programs are to reflect ground truth, effective programs that incorporate lessons learned into complex operations’ education and training curricula are vital.
33
Professional Development The effort to enhance education and training for complex operations at the professional level becomes a much less meaningful exercise unless it is linked up with career progression and other incentives. Yet, a common theme across all sectors surveyed in this study is that there are few systemic motivations to pursue expertise in the field of complex operations. The disjuncture is in part due to the current status – or lack of status – of “complex operations” as an area of practice. It also has to do with institutional approaches to professional-level education and training. Most institutions, both within and outside the government, reward service in a recognized field. Developing expertise as an infantry officer or a professor of Asian studies, for example, rather than in an interdisciplinary area such as stability operations, is seen to be more career enhancing. The military has taken steps to address this tendency to specialize by rewarding “joint” assignments. However, multi-disciplinary expertise and “joint” assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Even in the military, heretofore, there have been few career incentives for personnel to develop an expertise in stability operations.
Learning Cultures The organizational cultures of military and civilian institutions further influence their disparate approaches to professional development. Quite simply, civilian government agencies do not have the entrenched learning culture that exists in the military, where training is an integral part of professional development. Military personnel spend up to one third of their time in training and it is seen as mission essential. Conversely, civilian organizations generally view expertise as something that comes with a new hire or can be learned on the job. Civilian agencies have begun to take steps to remedy this, e.g., former Secretary of State Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. These steps have only partially addressed the real need to enhance the ability of civilian agencies to participate effectively in complex operations. The lack of a “training float” in USG civilian agencies is still largely a factor of lack of resources. Budget constraints also contribute to and exacerbate the lack of a training culture on the civilian side. Furthermore, in the civilian government sector, honing an expertise while employed too often is either done on one’s own time or at the expense of active job duties. The increasing use of private contractors underscores this reality. Government agencies claim that one of the benefits of using the services of outside contractors is that they can tap into existing expertise, rather than develop it in-house. This then places the onus on the private sector to screen for and/or develop expertise to fit the bill. Moreover, civilian agencies often treat education and training as an administrative function. When learning programs are offered, they are often not considered “mission essential.” This is reflected in the reliance on “elective” and even ad hoc courses offered through government agencies.
Career Incentives The lack of career incentives around education and training within civilian agencies also extends to deployments to complex operations. Recently, the State Department had difficulties filling all Iraqi assignments. While there are numerous reasons for this, one stated reason is scepticism that such an assignment would be career enhancing. Furthermore, previous deployments to zones of conflicts were done without requisite
34 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
training, so as to fill immediate requirements. This is beginning to be rectified by FSI and other institutions. Government agencies are by no means alone in not adequately rewarding service in complex operations. However, these deployments are far from career enhancing within the police force. There are no provisions within policing organizations to allow officers to participate in such operations while maintaining active duty status – let alone take time to train for such missions. As a result, civilian police deployed abroad are either retired or have had to quit the force and There needs to be an treat international policing as a new increased emphasis on career.
professional development and incentives for those engaged in complex operations.
In short, there needs to be an increased emphasis on professional development and incentives for those engaged in complex operations. Clearly, an understanding about the importance of training, i.e., a training culture, would benefit from increased resources, particularly on the civilian side. In addition, an assignment to complex operations, should promote, not sideline, career advancement.
35
36 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
VI. N EXT STEPS AN D RECOMMEN D ATION S This report has identified a series of crosscutting issues and “gaps” common to most of the sectors we surveyed. Based on the wide array of inputs, we have highlighted a number of these. We believe they are ripe for follow-up. They speak to the need to expand our definition of “jointness,” to capture lessons learned in our education and training process, and to increase civilian and military cooperation. In order to identify concrete outcome-based projects, the CCO may consider workshops, conferences, exercises, research, or other activities to address the following issues.
“Whole of Government” to “Whole of Community” Expanding the Concept of “Jointness” In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act reworked the command structure of the U.S. military, increasing the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and bringing together the services of the armed forces. This concept of “jointness” needs to be expanded beyond the military. Complex operations involve multiple actors sharing the space and not always working toward a common goal. Interagency coordination has been improved in recent years to increase the U.S. capacity for working in conflict zones. However, work is needed to create a “whole of community” approach to working in complex operations. This includes USG, NGOs, IOs, the private sector, and foreign governments working and training together for work in complex operations, where appropriate.
Best Practices from Other Governments The U.S. is not alone in its efforts to create a civilian operational capacity for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. A number of allied governments have their own programs and are currently in the process of reviewing how to recruit, train and deploy civilians to conflict zones. The multinational character of stability operations also demands interoperability between partner countries. The USG has an ongoing dialogue with allied government interagency entities on a range of issues related to stability operations. However, more pressing operational demands often subsume intergovernmental dialogue on training and preparing personnel for deployment in these operations.
Exercises and Simulations Training exercises are effective for preparing military and civilians for fieldwork. The military conducts training exercises more regularly than civilian agencies. These exercises often include interaction with other types of organizations, but the emphasis, understandably, is normally on military operations and objectives. At the same time, more exercises and simulations are needed that are driven by non-military objectives (e.g. humanitarian crises) and include the multitude of actors involved in complex operations. In these cases, the military will most likely play a supporting role. Civilian players must be involved in designing and planning, and not only playing in, these exercises.
Civil-Military Doctrine Historically, civilian and military agencies have difficulty coordinating efforts, communicating effectively on the ground, or even speaking the same language. Steps have recently been taken to develop common doctrine and guidelines; however, more 37
needs to be done. Civilian and military actors must train together, have open lines of communication, and speak the same language to operate effectively on the ground.
Portal In addition to the features and functions noted in Section IV of this report, the Portal should consider adding such features as chat capabilities, conference registration, exercise calendars, electronic journals, and wiki functions.
Sector Papers The USIP survey team has collected an enormous amount of information on each of the sectors involved in complex operations. This includes information on where personnel from each sector (e.g. military and civilian personnel, allies, NGOs, international organizations and the private sector) are deployed as well as their approach to education and training for complex operations. The study team has drafted a “gaps” analysis for each sector. This work formed the basis for this report. In addition, it might be useful to analyze and present this information from a sector-perspective and to explore how a particular sector could more effectively integrate its education and training with other sectors.
Contracting Contracting in complex operations has increased in recent years; however, oversight and coordination with contracting agencies have been minimal and sporadic, often with unforeseen political results. Private contractors have differing qualification standards and training requirements. Due to the ever-growing number of contractors working in complex operations, increased coordination is necessary both at home – in terms of education and training – and in the field.
Leadership and Management Applying Business Models to USG Training and Education In today’s fluid foreign policy environment, the hierarchical, highly centralized organizations, which were prevalent during the Cold War, have difficulty understanding and responding to complex crises that require multi-faceted, cross-functional approaches. Globalization, rapid worldwide transfers of information, and technological innovations have forced highly centralized business enterprises to re-organize in order to be flexible, adaptive and attuned to local markets throughout the world. Tiger teams, open source business development models, and other de-centralized approaches to business planning and operations have helped companies adapt to doing business in rapidly changing, ambiguous environments. U.S. companies know how to operate effectively in different cultural environments and mentor partners in other countries to advance corporate interests and build corporate capacity. These skills may be highly useful to U.S. educators and trainers, as well as practitioners in complex operations.
Situational and Cultural Awareness Including Host-Country Interests into Training and Education Host countries have their own sets of interests, values and sensitivities. While U.S. personnel are rightfully charged with promoting and defending American national interest, this cannot be done without understanding the interests and culture of the host country. There are numerous survey, area study, and culture courses available. However, 38 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
these are often tailored to the generalists and not the practitioners. Course content should include integration of lessons learned and case studies in order to better understand the impact of one’s actions on the local society.
Mediation and Negotiation Mediation, negotiation and cultural awareness courses are readily available to practitioners. However, such courses should take into account cultural context to better prepare personnel to work in intercultural environments. Simulations and exercises can also be used to enhance cultural awareness, offering practitioners a more realistic experience.
Local Capacity Building Mentoring Field personnel are quickly rotated in and out of positions without working with others who have held the same position. Similarly, mentoring and capacity building is about understanding difference between being the expert and helping develop the expertise of others. There is a real need to train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to host country counterparts and to understand their role in developing host country capacity. Moreover, there is a need to develop and utilize reach-back resources that can be accessed from the field.
Civilian Police Civilian police forces working in complex operations come from multiple nations, and have different training methods and approaches to working on the ground. Furthermore, UN police are recruited from different pools (e.g. from national police in France and Italy, to local law enforcement in the U.S.). These are often retired personnel, especially in the U.S. There is a need for increased training, cooperation, and synchronization among these groups before working in zones of conflict. Additionally, consideration needs to be given to the police-military interface in peace and stability operations. This could include the development of guidelines, doctrine or joint training around issues such as intelligence gathering and sequencing from the provision of short-term and longerterm public security.
Civilian Reserve Corps NSPD-44 has identified the need to develop a cadre of individuals in the civilian sector to be able to deploy quickly to complex operations. This ambitious program is a national priority. The CCO should work closely to assist the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) wherever possible, and particularly on the education and training side.
Cross-Disciplinary Issues (DDR & SSR) Issues, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR), that are not the primary responsibility of a single agency or organization often fall through the cracks and are not adequately addressed through training and educational programs. Overall, there is a need for increased training in DDR and SSR, and other cross-disciplinary issues, for both security and civilian forces.
39
Information and Public Diplomacy Messaging and Audience Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions, however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and too often do not even use the same language or lexicon. Education and training for complex operations needs to address how to develop a coordinated approach to public diplomacy among the military and civilian agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs, taking into account multiple audiences, including the host nation.
Lessons Learned Lessons Learned Capacity and Processes The U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process unequal to the civilian sector. However, operational and strategic lessons learned processes are less developed within both the military and civilian agencies. Furthermore, training and education programs often do not have systematic feedback loops or evaluation procedures to draw lessons from the field in a timely manner. Best practices and issues from the field are therefore slow to work their way into course content. There is a need to develop a community-wide approach to, and tools for, evaluation and lessons learned which is linked up with course development.
Case Studies Most educators identify the value of case studies as teaching tools, but claim that there is a lack of quality case studies in the areas of practice that make up complex operations. The CCO is well place to help facilitate the development of relevant case studies that integrate emerging doctrine, concepts and lessons learned/best practices for use in the classroom.
Professional Development “Incentivizing� the Field Deployments to complex operations are not systematically linked up with professional development and career enhancement for personnel working within and outside of government. It would useful to provide a forum to address these concerns and identify common sense incentives to attract and retain the best personnel to the field.
40 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
VII. APPEN D ICES Appendix A. Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consultediv Institution Name
School/Department
Africare Air University Air University Air University
Air Command and Staff College Air War College U.S. Air Force JAG School
American Red Cross
City
State/ Country
Washington
DC
Maxwell AFB
AL
Maxwell AFB
AL
Maxwell AFB
AL
Washington
DC
American University
International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program
Washington
DC
American University
Peacebuilding and Development Institute
Washington
DC
American University
Washington College of Law
Washington
DC
Williamtown
Australia
Williamtown
Australia
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Stadtschlaining
Austria
Booz Allen Hamilton Boston University
McLean Boston
VA MA
Waltham
MA
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Ontario
Canada
Atlanta Baltimore Nairobi
GA MD Kenya
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
Brandeis University Brookings Institution Business Executives for National Security Camber Corporation Canadian Forces Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Operations Training, The CARE Catholic Relief Services Catholic Relief Services Center for a New American Security Center for Global Solutions
Alan B. Slifka Program in Intercommunal Coexistence, The
41
Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum f체r Internationale Friedenseins채tze) Center for the Study of the Presidency Centre for Intercultural Learning Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ) Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC)
Berlin
Germany
Washington
DC
Quebec
Canada
Buenos Aires
Argentina
La Reina
Chile
New York
NY
New York
NY
New York
NY
New York
NY
Congressional Research Service
Washington
DC
Development Alternatives, Inc.
Washington
DC
Reston
VA
Harrisonburg
VA
Harrisonburg
VA
Stadtschlaining
Austria
Arlington
VA
Arlington
VA
Washington GarmischPartenkirchen
DC
Fairfax
VA
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Columbia University
Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War & Peace Studies Center for International Conflict Resolution International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution School of International and Public Affairs
DynCorp Eastern Mennonite University
Eastern Mennonite University
Conflict Transformation Program Summer Peacebuilding Institute
European University Center for Peace Studies Foreign Service Institute Foreign Service Institute
Leadership and Management School School of Professional and Area Studies
Fund for Peace George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies George Mason University
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Germany
42 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
George Mason University
Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP) School of Public Policy Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service John F. Kennedy School of Government Law School School of Public Health
Fairfax
VA
Fairfax
VA
Washington
DC
Cambridge
MA
Cambridge
MA
Cambridge
MA
Henry L. Stimson Center, The
Washington
DC
Initiative for Inclusive Security
Cambridge
MA
Institute for Defense Analysis
Washington
DC
InterAction International Human Rights Network (IHRN) International Medical Corps International Peacekeeping Operations Association International Republican Institute International Rescue Committee International Resources Group
Washington
DC
Oldcastle
Ireland
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
New York
NY
Washington
DC
Harrisonburg
VA
Suffolk
VA
Norfolk
VA
Hurlburt Field
FL
Strand
UK
Accra
Ghana
Quantico
VA
Quantico
VA
Quantico
VA
Washington
DC
George Mason University Georgetown University
Harvard University Harvard University Harvard University
James Madison University Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
Mine Action Information Center Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Center (JKDDC)
Joint Forces Staff College Joint Special Operations University Kings College London
Department of War Studies
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, The Marine Corps University Marine Corps University Marine Corps University Mercy Corps International
Marine Corps War College School of Advanced Warfighting Senior Leader Development Program (SLDP)
43
Monterey Institute of International Studies MPRI National Defense University
National Defense University
International Policy Studies Interagency Transformation, Education and Analysis School for National Security Executive Education
National Democratic Institute Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Postgraduate School
Naval Postgraduate School
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy Graduate School of Operation & Information Sciences School of International Graduate Studies
New America Foundation Noetic Northern Virginia Mediation Service Oxfam America Oxford Brookes University
Centre for Development and Emergency Practice
Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping Peace Corps Pearson Peacekeeping Centre RAND
Pardee RAND Graduate School
RedR International Refugees International RONCO Consulting Corp. Rutgers University Save the Children Stanford University
Syracuse University The Ohio State University The Ohio State University
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Department of International Studies The Mershon Center for International Security Studies
Monterey
CA
Alexandria
VA
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Monterey
CA
Monterey
CA
Monterey
CA
Washington Washington
DC DC
Fairfax
VA
Boston
MA
Oxford
UK
Washington
DC
Washington Ottawa
DC Canada
Santa Monica
CA
Edegem Washington Washington Camden Washington
Belgium DC DC NJ DC
Stanford
CA
Syracuse
NY
Columbus
OH
Columbus
OH
44 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Tufts University Tufts University Tufts University
Tufts University
ALLIES Program at Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, The Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The
Medford
MA
Medford
MA
Medford
MA
Medford
MA
U.S. Agency for International Development
relevant divisions
Washington
DC
U.S. Air Force
Special Operations School
Hurlburt Field
FL
Colorado Springs
CO
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Ft. Leavenworth
KS
Ft. Leavenworth
KS
Carlisle
PA
Ft. Leavenworth
KS
New London
CT
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington
DC
U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Education U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Department of State
Washington Washington
DC DC
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
Quantico
VA
Quantico
VA
Quantico
VA
Kings Point
NY
West Point
NY
U.S. Air Force Academy U.S. Army U.S. Army U.S. Army Combined Arms Center U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
U.S. Army War College
Headquarters Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 Medical Stability Operations Center for Army Lessons Learned U.S. Army Command & General Staff College U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
U.S. Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center U.S. Coast Guard Academy
U.S. Institute of Peace
Education and Training Center
U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare U.S. Marine War College U.S. Merchant Marine Academy U.S. Military Academy
Social Sciences Department
45
U.S. Naval Academy U.S. Naval War College U.S. Office of Personnel Management U.S. Treasury
Annapolis Newport
MD RI
Washington
DC
Washington
DC
New York
NY
New York
NY
New York
NY
New York
NY
New York
NY
Londonderry
UK
New Delhi
India
Alberta
Canada
Irvine
CA
Irvine
CA
Chicago
IL
Chicago
IL
Boulder
CO
Boulder
CO
Storrs
CT
Denver
CO
Denver
CO
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
College Park
MD
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
College Park
MD
United Nations United Nations United Nations United Nations United Nations United Nations University and the University of Ulster United Service Institute of India
University of Calgary
University of California, Irvine University of California, Irvine University of Chicago University of Chicago University of Colorado University of Colorado
Department of Peacekeeping Operations Integrated Training Service Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Peacebuilding Support Unit UNITAR-POCI International Conflict Research Centre for UN Peacekeeping Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program, The International Studies Program International Studies Program Department of Sociology Human Rights Program Conflict Information Center Conflict Information Consortium
University of Connecticut University of Denver University of Denver
Graduate School of International Studies Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)
46 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
University of Maryland, University College University of Massachusetts University of Massachusetts University of Massachusetts
Department of Political Science Criminal Justice Department Criminal Justice Department
University of Miami University of Michigan University of North Carolina University of Washington USAID University
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy Institute for Defense Business
College Park
MD
College Park
MD
Amherst
MA
Lowell
MA
Lowell
MA
Miami
FL
Dearborn
MI
Chapel Hill
NC
Seattle Washington
WA DC
47
Appendix B. Training and Education Survey Questions PART I. Institutions/Programs 1. Institution/Program Name 2. Institution Type a. USG Civilian b. USG Military c. International Organization d. Non-governmental Organization e. Academic Institution f. Other 3. Website URL 4. Contact Information a. Institution Mailing address i. Address 1 ii. Address 2 iii. City iv. State/Province v. Zip Code vi. Country b. Institution Phone Number c. Institution Fax Number d. Institution Email Address 5. Description 6. Institution/Program Director Information a. Director Name b. Director Phone Number c. Director Email Address 7. Does your institution provide training and education programs? 8. Where are graduates from this institution/program employed? 9. What are your program completion rates? 10. Point of Contact Information a. POC Name, title b. POC Phone Number c. POC Email Address PART II. Courses 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
Institution/Program Course Title Course Number Course Instructor Instructor Contact Information Course Description Course Goals/Objectives When was this course developed? (Date) Course Level (check all that apply) a. Undergraduate b. Graduate
48 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
c. Post-Graduate d. Professional/Continuing Education e. Other (fill in the blank) Course delivery (check all that apply) a. On-site classroom b. Off-site classroom c. Field-based d. In-country e. Distance learning (online or correspondence) f. Multiple site g. Other (fill in the blank) Teaching Method (check all that apply) a. Lecture Seminar b. Group Study c. Self-taught d. Simulation e. Case studies f. Guest experts/speakers/lecturers g. Internships/fellowships/experiential learning h. Other (fill in the blank) Course length (check all that apply) a. Academic term i. Full year ii. Half year b. Intensive (fill in the blank) c. Self-paced d. Total hours of course (required) Course capacity (choose one) a. 1-10 b. 11-30 c. 31-100 d. 100+ How often is the course offered? a. 1-2 times per year b. 3-5 times per year c. 6+ times per year d. Other (fill in the blank) Cost/fee (choose one) a. Yes b. No c. Amount (fill in the blank) Prerequisites (choose one) a. Yes b. No c. If yes, list prerequisites (fill in the blank) Course accessibility (check all that apply) a. Internal only b. USG civilian agencies c. USG military i. Available to a specific service branch (fill in the blank) ii. Available to joint service 49
18. 19.
20.
21. 22.
23.
24.
d. Foreign military e. International organizations f. Non-governmental organizations g. Private sector h. Public (fill in the blank) i. Registered student body j. Partner institutions k. Other (fill in the blank) Target participants/audience (fill in the blank) Target participant level (check all that apply) a. Senior officials b. Middle-level officials c. Entry-level officials d. All e. Other (fill in the blank) Course type (check all that apply) a. Stand alone course i. Mandatory ii. Elective b. Part of a certificate program i. Mandatory ii. Elective c. Part of a degree program i. Mandatory ii. Elective What evaluation tools do you use for your course? (Fill in the blank) Course orientation (check all that apply) a. Interdisciplinary – approaching a subject from various angles and methods in order to form new methods for understanding the subject b. Multidisciplinary – crossing disciplinary boundaries to explain one subject in terms of another c. Survey or Overview d. Oriented to specific discipline/program Course update (check all that apply) a. Incorporation of lessons learned b. Incorporation of current events c. Incorporation of latest theories/policies/discoveries in the field d. Incorporation of real-life cases Course completion rates (fill in the blank)
PART III. Additional Comments 1. If you were talking to the U.S. Government about how to train for complex operations, what are the key points you would want to address? For example: What would you recommend be taught? How would you recommend it be taught? Whom would you recommend be in that course? 2. In your view, what gaps or areas of weakness, if any, are there in training and education (in general) for complex operations? 3. Additional comments?
50 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Appendix C. References Consulted Arnas, Neyla, Charles Berry, and Robert B. Oakley. “Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations.” Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2005. Carreau, Bernard. “Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations.” Case Studies in Defense Transformation. Number 6. Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2007. Center for International Cooperation. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. Crocker, Chster A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Grasping at the Nettle. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005. Davidson, Janine. “Toward a Unity of Effort: The Case for the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO).” Unpublished manuscript. Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV. War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2008. McCausland, Jeffrey D. Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. Office of the President of the United States. Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. December 7, 2005. Perito, Robert M. ed. Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007. Perito, Robert M. Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, January 2007. Scully, Megan. “RAND Study Says U.S. Lacks Resources to Defeat Insurgencies.” CongressDaily. February 11, 2008. [http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=39265&dcn=e_tma] Tierney, Dominic. “America’s Quagmire Mentality.” Survival 49.4 (2007): 47-66. U.S. Department of Defense. Headquarters Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24. 2006.
51
U.S. Department of Defense. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Directive Number 3000.05. November 28, 2005. U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006. February 6, 2006. U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. April 1, 2007. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress. Department of State Publication 11456. October 2007. U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks. 2005. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DoD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549. May 2007. Yates, Lawrence, A. U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations. Global War on Terror Occasional Paper 15. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf
52 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Appendix D. Previous Studies and Surveys Several surveys, studies, and initiatives have been undertaken in recent years to examine training and education tools, practices, and needs related to complex operations. The following list and accompanying summaries elaborate on some of these efforts, which have informed this study. Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Office of the Secretary of State. Final Report of the Workforce and Training Working Group, 29 January 2008. BearingPoint. Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve Corps. 2006. BearingPoint. Plan for Establishing and Delivering Training for a Civilian Reserve Corps, 2007. Carstarphen, Nike, Craig Zelizer, Robert Harris, and Senior Partners of the Alliance for Conflict Transformation. Bridging the Gap: Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Conflict Work. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005. Linder, Rebecca. Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006. National Defense University. Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) program. International Organization Education and Training Practices: Review and Analysis. Schoenhaus, Robert M. “Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations: Advancing Best Practices.� Peaceworks, 43. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002. Stabilisation Unit. Operational Management and Delivery Group. United Kingdom. Compendium for Training & Development Delivery Resource. U.S. Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities. RL32862, updated September 2006. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. November 2007. U.S. Institute of Peace. Peace and Conflict Studies Programs in North America. 2002.
53
www.ccoportal.org With information on more than 600 courses from over 200 institutions, the CCO portal is the most comprehensive listing of complex operations course data available on the web
Interactive forums allow members to discuss and develop thought and theory
A blogging feature provides an environment for thought leaders to debate on ideologies and paradigms
The CCO calendar contains detailed information regarding complex operations events For additional information or for assistance with complex operations training and education questions, please contact the CCO Support Center. Phone: 703.602.3431 Email: info@ccoportal.org *The CCO Portal was created in collaboration with the U.S. Institute of Peace.
CCO Portal Instructions To become a member of the CCO Members Portal: 1. Visit www.ccoportal.org 2. Click the “Request New Account” button 3. Fill in the Member Profile Form including contact details, professional experience, and areas of expertise 4. Click “Request new account” to submit your request 5. The CCO Support Center will review your membership request 6. Once approved, you will receive an email with further instructions on how to login to the members portal using a temporary password To manage your account as a member: 1. Visit www.ccoportal.org 2. Click the “Login” button 3. Login using your username (firstname.lastname) and password 4. Click the "My Account" link at the top right corner of the members homepage 5. You may change your password by clicking the “Change Password” tab above your name 6. You may edit your member profile by clicking the “Edit” tab above your name. In edit mode you may add a professional picture or modify your personal information using the “Account Settings, “ Expertise” and “My Details” tabs If you forget your password: 1. Visit www.ccoportal.org 2. Click the “Request New Password” button 3. Enter your username (firstname.lastname) OR email address 4. A temporary password will be sent to your email address April 21, 08
Endnotes i
While there is no standard definition of complex operations, for the purposes of this study, the term encompasses stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular operations, as well as humanitarian, postconflict reconstruction and state-building activities. ii
Previous and ongoing surveys (within the U.S. and internationally) have focused on particular aspects of complex ops. For example, a Bearingpoint survey recently catalogued courses related to R&S, the military has surveyed for courses on Stability Operations, the UN is currently conducting a survey of courses on peace operations, and other governments are going though similar exercises. iii
We did not survey the numerous business and executive programs available through academic institutions, but there is clearly scope for incorporating elements of these programs into leadership development for complex operations. iv
Surveys were sent to over 400 institutions worldwide. This list represents over 100 institutions that our staff has met with or that have courses cataloged on the CCO web portal. While the authors recognize that there are many additional institutions and courses that are highly relevant to this study, this sample has provided a solid basis for our analysis, and the starting point for the development of a comprehensive catalog of education and training institutions on the CCO web portal.
56 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations