Government refused, and in the agreement that was signed at the end of July 1941, the frontier question was left open."13 As late as the time of the Teheran conference, Mikolajczyk was telling Eden that the Polish people expected to emerge from the war with their eastern provinces intact.104 In a meeting with Eden in March 1943, Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky argued that the Soviet-Polish border should be the Gurzon Line with minor adjustments."15 On 10 January 1944, the Soviet government publicly proclaimed the Gurzon Line as its border with Poland.1"' On February 4th, Stalin complained to Churchill that the Polish leaders had not yet publicly abandoned the Riga Treaty frontier in favor of the Curzon Line.107 By the Moscow conference of October, 1944, the London Poles were willing to accept the Gurzon Line as "a line of demarcation between Russia and Poland," but the Soviet government insisted on regarding the line as "a basis of frontier." Neither side would budge. By this time, Stalin was doing business with the Lublin Poles and had no interest in accommodating their London counterparts.108 Despite these continued difficulties between Stalin and the exiled Polish leaders, discussions of the eastern frontier of Poland among the three major Allies went fairly smoothly. As early as March 1943, Roosevelt expressed to Eden his opinion that, if granted concessions in the west, Poland would gain by accepting the Gurzon Line, and would in any case have to abide by the eventual decision of the Big Three."109
JL he Polish frontier was discussed by the Big Three at the Teheran conference. Stalin defended the 1939 (Molotov-Ribbentrop) frontier as being "ethnologically the right one." Churchill proposed that Poland's frontiers be based on the Gurzon Line and the Oder (including East Prussia and Oppeln), but that the actual tracing of the frontier line be done only following a careful study of the population questions involved. Stalin's attempt to treat the 1939 border and the Curzon Line as the same did not succeed. Maps were produced, and the discussion centered for a time on whether Lvov lay to the east or to the west of the Gurzon Line. Stalin said he would gladly give up his claim to any district with a Polish population.110 Agreement was soon reached. Churchill said he was "not prepared to make a great squawk about Lvov." Stalin replied that, with Lvov and Konigsberg left in Soviet hands, he was prepared to accept Churchill's formula.111 Much more labored were the discussions between Churchill and Eden on the one side and the London Poles on the other following the Teheran conference. Acting initially through Eden because of a serious illness, Churchill took a very hard line in urging the Poles to accept the Teheran formulation, at least in principle.
Noting that the Teheran agreement left the Poles with "a magnificent piece of country," Churchill warned that if the Poles cast the agreement aside, "I do not see how His Majesty's Government can press for anything more for them..."112 The initial hostility of the London Poles to any reduction of their eastern provinces angered Churchill, who felt that he had done all that could be done for them under the circumstances. In a 7 January 1944 telegram to Eden, Churchill said he was contemplating telling the world that Britain had never undertaken to defend Poland's pre-1939 borders. He noted that Russia had a right to the "inexpungeable security" of her western frontiers, and that Poland now owed its life to the Russian armies. Churchill threatened to withdraw help and recognition from the London Poles, scoffed at the idea that Britain would consider going to war against Russia over Poland's eastern frontier, and concluded pointedly that "[n]ations who are found incapable of defending their country must accept a reasonable measure of guidance from those who have rescued them and who offer them the prospect of a sure freedom and independence.""3 Time and circumstances would not bear out his optimism. On January 20th, Churchill met in London with Mikolajczyk, Tadeusz Romer (Polish Foreign Minister), and Edward Raczynski (Polish Ambassador in London) to discuss the frontier agreement. According to an aide, the Prime Minister "gave it to them hot and strong.""4 He said the Curzon Line was the best Poland could hope to obtain, and that valuable German land would be awarded to Poland in return for the eastern lands (including extensive marshland) that would go to Russia. In return for the agreement of the London Poles, Churchill said he would stoutly defend their legitimacy against Russia. When Mikolajczyk replied that he could not survive politically if he ceded any eastern lands, let alone Vilna (now Vilnius, Lithuania) and Lvov, Churchill urged him and his colleagues to make a settlement quickly. On January 28th he told Stalin that he had advised the London Poles to accept the Curzon Line, and warned Stalin against setting up a rival Polish government. As Martin Gilbert points out, Churchill had thus acted against the deepest wishes both of the London Poles and of Stalin, and had begun a long and ultimately futile effort to reconcile these wishes.115 More Anglo-Polish talks were held, but they were marked by acrimony and little progress. At a February 6th meeting at Chequers, Mikolajczyk reported that the Polish underground adhered firmly to the eastern frontier established by the Riga Treaty. Churchill, in reply, again defended the Gurzon Line and pointed out that "...the people of Poland have been unable to maintain their independence throughout the centuries, and even during their short period of freedom, had not had a record of which they could be proud. Now they had a fine opportunity if they were prepared to take it."116 FINEST HOUR 84 / 43