GRACE
147
As an act of a person who has an identity, who is unique and irreplaceable, it must be seen as completely distinctive, subjective and responsible. fREEDOM AS MOTION
Viewed as motion from, freedom is an escape. It is flight from being just an essence, from being what one already is. It is an evasion of stereotyping. It is an avoidance of being boxed in, of being able to he totally comprehended. As direction to any number of possible goals, freedom is election or preferment As emanating from a formed and distinct personality freedom cannot he seen as complete indetermination. Unde1· this aspect it is immanent necessity, self-limitation and affirrna· tion. As the most characteristic act of the ego, freedom is totally subjective and completely defined by what the "I" perceives itself to he. As a responsible act, the exercise of freedom can· not hut reflect the personal ego-synthesis of the individual. It cannot be, if it involves the full disposition of one's being, anything hut the full expression of the inner depths of the "[." The fact that an act does reflect the sel£-image of the one who placed it is precisely what makes it free. If it in no way responded to the personality of the agent, the agent could in no sense be considered responsible for it. That is precisely what responsibility means. And it is the notion of responsibility that founds freedom and its perception. When one feels responsible he knows that he has acted freely. If his action does not correspond to what he perceives himself to be, the agent cannot acknowledge his responsibility for it. Still he knows that he could have acted in another way. This reflection also is essential for the conscious apprehension of one's acts as free. Yet it cannot imply a complete indifference before alternatives. A person to be responsible must choose what he perceives is in accord with his self-image. He must choose the good that is best suited to himself as he apprehends himself at the mo· ment of election. The alternative of which he is aware--the possibility of having done otherwise--cannot be conceived except in terms of a different disposition. The person who
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