I
Those who have done their moral theology in the tradition of early 20th century manualisis doubtlessly are familiar with this argument: the natural law does not change because human nature does not change ( cf., e.g., Noldin I, n. 116). But they probably are not familiar with St. Thomas Aquinas' argument that the natural law does change because human nature changes ( cf. Sup pl. 41, 1, ad 3; 50, 1, ad 4; 11-11, 57, 2, ad 2; De Fuchs' relative Malo 2, 4, ad 13.). The mannatural law and • ualists reasoned from the subRohner's existential stantia]¡ immutability of huethics take us beyond man nature to the immutability the static essentialism of the natural law. It has been characteristic of mediocre theof Noldin. ology in the past not to have + recognized the important effect that accidental changes in JOHN F. DEDEK man's nature have on the natural law. + Natural law is founded on human nature. But human nature IS not a univocal term. Some scholastic manuals of moral theology seem to take it to designate pure nature, that is, human nature as a philosopher might see it, unelevated, independent and altogether outside of a supernatural order or destination. But pure nature is only one of MoRAL SuRVEY
Jhe flew
rl!/oraAt'1, LalhoAc St'Jfe
115