Ethics and the Need for God By Melanie Susan Barrett, Ph.D., S.T.D. In his paper, “Just How ‘Good without God’ are Atheists Justified in Being?”, Notre Dame University professor Christian Smith evaluates the ethical arguments made by some prominent contemporary atheists: Philip Kitcher (a philosopher), Sam Harris (a neuroscientist), Greg Epstein (Harvard’s Humanist chaplain), John Figdor (Stanford’s Humanist chaplain), and Lex Bayer (a technology entrepreneur who also leads an atheist/agnostic/humanist nonprofit organization in the Bay Area). Smith observes that notwithstanding certain methodological differences, what all of these thinkers share in common—aside from their metaphysical commitment to atheism—is the belief that “a robust, universal, humanistic ethic of care and respect for the rights and wellbeing of all other human beings can be derived rationally from atheism.” 1 Upon dissecting the various arguments that each thinker proposes, Smith acknowledges that atheism can rationally ground an “ethically modest” standard of moral goodness—one which sets “a moderately high bar of moral expectations on human behavior.” 2 However, he ultimately concludes that “this modest standard of morality falls far short of the kind of robust, universal, humanistic morality that most atheist activists have in mind today when they insist that we can be ‘good without God.’” 3 In my estimation, Smith’s analysis is sufficiently comprehensive and internally coherent as to be persuasive; hence, I will neither rehearse nor critique the precise contours of his argument. In principle, one could offer an external critique of Smith’s argument, by citing philosophers other than the ones he specifically engages: philosophers who do succeed at erecting a “robust, universal, humanistic morality” upon an atheistic foundation. 4 But to offer such a critique, one would first have to find such thinkers, and in my own study of the Western philosophical tradition, I have yet to discover one. There have many been laudable attempts, however. Aristotle’s virtue-based approach sets a fairly-high bar for morality, and without reference to Christian (or any other religious) revelation. But for Aristotle, not all humans are equal (i.e., women are rationally inferior, and slaves lack the capacity to reason), so his ethic is not fully universal. This universality is further limited by the fact that the moral norm guiding practical reason (what Aristotle terms “phronesis”) always emerges within a particular context—how the esteemed “wise man” in one’s particular polis would reason—so different moral norms could arise in diverse communities. In addition, Aristotle metaphysically grounds his ethics on a teleological structure to the universe (in which all creatures are oriented naturally to some end, and consequently ought to act in accord with the proper function bestowed upon them by nature), which itself relies upon postulating God as the universe’s unmoved mover. David Hume, for his part, rejects such classical metaphysical underpinnings, though he does propose an ethic in which human beings are deeply relational. According to Hume, we human beings are internally motivated to care for one another because we tend to value agreeableness and utility, and we derive happiness from pleasing others. Hence, sympathy is natural to us, so we enjoy being friendly, gracious, and benevolent toward others; and we will relate to them with truthfulness, fidelity, and justice if we have been properly formed by our families and communities to appreciate what is useful. However, because of Hume’s thoroughgoing skepticism—most notably his declaration that one cannot logically derive an “ought” (a normative claim regarding what should be the case) from an “is” (a descriptive claim regarding what is the case)—he provides no rational basis to justify why individuals “ought” to act with sympathy or justice toward others.
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