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European choices for Gordon Brown
have emerged: the ‘EU-3’ of Britain, France and Germany, with the support of foreign policy ‘High Representative’ Javier Solana, handles the problem of Iran’s nuclear programme; the ‘G-6’, the interior ministers of the six largest member-states, focuses on counter-terrorism and criminal networks; and the signatories of the Treaty of Prüm – the Benelux three, France, Germany, Austria and Spain – have agreed to share sensitive information on policing. Traditionally, the British government has opposed greater use of variable geometry. It feared that if new avant-garde groups were established without the UK, British influence in the broader union would diminish. But in fact more variable geometry would cre a t e opportunities for the UK. Sometimes Britain may wish to opt out of integrationist initiatives, as it did with the euro. But at other times, it may welcome the chance to team up with like-minded countries in particular areas, such as defence, foreign policy or counter-terrorism, without having to worry about the views of all 26 other governments.
The new institutional settlement T h e re may be more discussion of variable geometry in the coming years, partly because the new treaty will be so much less ambitious than many members-states wanted. The EU summit on June 21st and 22nd gave a detailed mandate to an inter- g o v e rnmental conference to draw up what will be known as the Reform Treaty. Governments expect to sign the new treaty before the end of 2007 and to ratify it 3 For an analysis of the Reform in 2008. Ireland may be the only government to hold a re f e rendum on the new document; Treaty, see Hugo Brady, ‘Hurrah for an end to EU navel most of the others will ratify by gazing’, CER briefing note, parliamentary vote. The plan is for the new June 2007. t reaty to come into force in 2009.3 The Reform Treaty will not consolidate all the existing treaties, as the constitutional treaty would have done, so it will be much shorter. It will, like the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht,
Changes and challenges in the new Europe
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Amsterdam and Nice, amend the existing treaties. It will include neither the constitutional tre a t y ’s re f e rences to constitution, fla g , anthem and national day – nor key articles such as that asserting the supremacy of EU over national law. But the Reform Treaty will include some of the key institutional provisions of the constitutional treaty, such as the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV), which means the abolition of national vetoes, in areas such as justice and home affairs; a formula for ensuring that the number of commissioners is less than one per country; a decision-making rule known as ‘double majority’ voting, whereby a measure would pass if 55 per cent 4 Double majority voting would of governments vote in favour, so long as increase Britain’s voting weight they re p resent 65 per cent of the EU’s in the Council of Ministers by population; and the creation of the job of a 45 per cent. In order to please Poland, which dislikes double full-time EU president, to chair the European majority voting, it will not Council, instead of the rotating presidency.4 apply until 2014. Some of the most significant provisions of the new treaty concern foreign policy. The jobs of the current High Representative and the commissioner for external relations (currently Benita FerreroWaldner) will merge into a new High Representative who will speak for the Union externally. This person will be supported by the analytical expertise of an ‘external action service’, bringing together officials from the Council, Commission and member-states. G o rdon Browns’ government should champion the Reform Treaty, for t h ree reasons. First, it will make the EU institutions work better. One cannot argue that the EU has ceased to function since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 – it can still pass laws and take decisions. But in two a reas, in particular, the institutions do not work well. One is foreign policy. The rotating presidency – under which the c h a i rmanship of the EU passes from one member to another every six months – is an increasingly ineffective and anachronistic institution. Each presidency has a tendency to prioritise its own pet projects, and