CHINA’S MILITARY
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THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030
In addition to these more power-projection-oriented elements of the PLAN fleet, China also has deployed about 60 stealthy fast-attack vessels (Type 022 Houbei class) oriented toward littoral defense, each of which can be equipped with up to 8 advanced antiship cruise missiles. These vessels would likely form an important element of Chinese efforts to deny access to U.S. surface ships in the event of a Taiwan or East China Sea contingency.83 Although some of the above-noted technologies already introduce a degree of uncertainty into a potential maritime battle between the PRC and the United States within the first island chain, the PLAN’s surface fleet still does not directly compare with advanced U.S. or even Japanese naval forces.84 In this regard, China is still far from achieving the sort of naval capabilities envisioned in the 1980s by Admiral Liu Huaqing, a prominent figure in the development of the Chinese navy. Liu reportedly felt that China should seek to establish control over the first island chain by 2000, exert sea control out to the second island chain by 2020, and create a global, carrier-driven force by the mid-twenty-first century, between 2040 and 2050.85 However, compared with this highly ambitious and decidedly unofficial statement of long-term PLAN objectives by a strong advocate of Chinese seapower, as indicated above, Beijing’s overall naval modernization program remains quite limited in scope and capability, focusing on antiaccess or counterintervention missions over sea control.
The Air Domain Relative to other capabilities—particularly conventional missiles and submarines— China’s air force, naval aviation, and army aviation are at a relatively immature stage of development. The PLAAF’s reported goal of conducting air campaigns within 1,000 kilometers of China’s periphery by 2010 has proven elusive.86 Only one-quarter of China’s current aircraft possess basic capabilities comparable to Western fourth-generation aircraft, and only a small fraction of those aircraft can operate beyond 500 to 1,000 kilometers of China’s shores, at night, and in poor weather.87 Only a small fraction of China’s fighters are combat-ready at any given time, and the PLA lacks the demonstrated capability to sustain a rapid sortie rate at long ranges.88 Moreover, PLA air forces apparently do not conduct any training in close air support operations. To contest airspace in a Japan-related contingency, China would have to develop the advanced avionics required for a fifth-generation fighter and improved aerial refueling capabilities to extend the combat range of its fighters beyond the airspace over its near seas. The PLA Air Force has at least 150 Su-27/30 fighters, as well as 95 J-11s and more than 44 J-11Bs.89 The J-11 is similar to the Su-27 in that it is designed primarily for air-to-air combat (equipped with the advanced PL-12 missile), whereas the J-11B is supplemented with a surface attack capability and has been described by some observers as superior to that of the U.S. F-15.90 The PLAAF also possesses as many as 150 indigenously produced J-10 fighters, whose combat radius without inflight refueling is between 463 and 555 kilometers. With aerial refueling from an H-6U tanker (of which the PLA currently has about 10 in total), the range of the J-10 could, in principle, be extended further.91 52