CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
This strategy would focus on a less ambitious goal: to increase Chinese uncertainties about risks and outcomes through an emphasis on a variety of limited military measures and more extensive political interactions. Also implicit in this approach would be the recognition that attempting to secure traditional levels of operational access for power projection against China’s antiaccess network would force the alliance to bear unacceptably high risks and costs, both in terms of regional instability that could result from an accelerated arms race and in uncontrolled escalation that could erupt during a crisis. The operational military core of this strategy would therefore rely less than the strategies described above on offensive strike capabilities and more on defensive, area denial architectures, involving systems designed to deflect attacks and mete out punishment at levels at least equal and ideally superior to those of which the PLA is capable. The military doctrine associated with this strategy would focus on successfully surviving initial PLA attacks in relevant domains and then responding with limited attacks on relatively nearby PLA weapons platforms and cyber capabilities. The capabilities associated with this doctrine would include multiple platforms capable of standoff precision strikes against coastal and offshore PLA or paramilitary assets. This approach would entail substantial revisions to the extant U.S. force structure of carrier groups and short-range tactical aircraft supported by forward bases. Instead, the United States would shift to a more dispersed, multilayered forward presence, with capabilities positioned according to their survivability and effectiveness vis-à-vis China’s web of antiaccess weapons. Stealthier, more survivable capabilities, including a larger contingent of submarines, small and mid-size surface ships, and long-range drones, each of which would be equipped with significant numbers of standoff weapons, would operate within the inner reaches of the first island chain. A smaller number of carrier groups and their air wings would operate at extended range, although they could be surged into the theater in the event that key power projection capabilities, such as large sorties of short-range fighters, were deemed sufficiently necessary to justify the risks of operating in an antiaccess environment. Preconditions for this approach would include the forward pre-positioning of resources, prior Japanese assurances of a very high level of U.S. access in a crisis, and a significant reliance on early warning and rapid response. The foremost articulation of this military approach is the Mutual Denial Strategy (also known as “Mutually Denied Battlespace Strategy” or “Mutual A2/AD Concept”). This approach, mentioned in chapter 4, would rely primarily on U.S. maritime and some air capabilities—especially attack submarines and long-range antiship cruise missiles, longrange air-to-air missiles, and sophisticated decoys—to create an effective A2/AD deterrent against Chinese attempts to threaten Japan, establish sea control over surrounding waters within the first island chain, or seize and hold disputed territory. Rather than targeting China’s A2/AD capabilities through the use of either deep penetrating attacks or more limited offensive actions against air, maritime, and coastal A2/AD assets, this approach would focus on destroying at sea whatever significant offensive air and maritime capabilities Beijing might deploy against Japanese and allied interests in a severe crisis or conflict, as 303