11.8. Other states that have ignored the provisions of the Conventions, for example, Uruguay, have also utilised this human rights argument. 11.9. The Jamaica Commission was reticent about this human rights approach and gave much significance to the limitations of the saving law clause in an international context. However, the Commission reiterates that these seek to preserve existing law, but do not deny the existence of human rights principles in such laws per se. It is open to each CARICOM state to change its law to bring it into conformity to the Constitution. The law is saved only if challenged in the absence of legislative reform. Given that our Constitutions do contain human rights that can protect from prosecution on criminal charges for personal use of cannabis, this is one route to bypass the international obligations imposed under the Conventions.
The drug treaty
11.10. Further, the Commission notes that saving law clause restrictions have system risks effect only in the domestic context and do not apply in relation to international becoming even more law, so that it remains open to CARICOM states to argue that the Convention offends important human rights principles. The view suggested by Former ineffectual and Chief Justice Rattray, highlighted in that Jamaican Report and which emphasised redundant. the value of human rights as an exception to the Conventions was not apparently influential in that Report. However, it is noted that this was a 2001 document and the jurisprudence has advanced since then. The Commission believes that Rattray’s initial views are preferred and are now adequately supported in jurisprudence and legal policy. 11.11. The SDGs also emphasise human rights as the centre of development, goals which CARICOM have endorsed. Important human rights principles in the cannabis/ marijuana paradigm include the right to privacy or private life, equality before the law, particularly in sentencing policy, non-discrimination, religious freedom, liberty, the right to health and procedural rights relating to proportionality and due process. All of these provide grounds to avoid treaty obligations which violate them.
Removing Illegal Status Removes Legal Problems Relating to Proceeds of Crime
11.12. Quite apart from issues surrounding identifying loopholes under the Convention which would permit a more liberal attitude toward marijuana, it is evident that the international stance in favour of criminalisation can lead to sanctions, either direct, or indirect, if a country acts unilaterally. The problems relating to transactions with banks and financial institutions mentioned above, are exacerbated here, given the fact that banking in the region is largely carried on by international correspondent banks. Already, there has been negative fall out in the banking and financial sector, blacklisting in relation to correspondent banks, for those who wish to use the traditional financial sector for their profits from marijuana, despite the double standards in a global environment where both Canada and the US have legalised cannabis/ marijuana. 11.13. The underlying threats of money laundering and proceeds of crime offences are significant even within the domestic sphere. Considering the issue in the international arena compounds it. It is evident that the only way to avoid such a categorisation of the profits of any business involving cannabis, whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, is to remove entirely the illegal status from the plant.
Unified CARICOM Approach to Lobby for Change to the International Regime
11.14. CARICOM Member States should negotiate the tensions arising between redundant treaties and other requirements, not unilaterally, but as a unified entity. A clear, informed roadmap within a regional framework to address these real issues – at the very least, how to create exceptions in the law, is needed. 11.15. CARICOM must be cognisant of the inherent power imbalances between Member states and other states. The fact that the US has de facto legalised marijuana in many states and has gotten away without being deemed to be in conflict with international conventions in the name of legal flexibility, is of little comfort to CARICOM as we renegotiate our situation. However, it is not anticipated that in the current 60