Line of Defence - Spring 2020

Line of Defence Issue 17 • Spring 2020

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Bioterrorism as a national security threat

New Zealand’s future maritime helicopter options

Introducing the Sovereign capability New Zealand and a trans-Tasman Information Domain single market

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CONTENTS Editor’s Note

Kia Ora and welcome to the Spring 2020 – and 17th – issue of Line of Defence.

In this Spring issue of Line of Defence, we cover recent developments in the New Zealand Information Domain. First discussed in Defence Capability Plan 2019, thinking on this new domain has undergone significant evolution in recent months.

We take a look at some of the key messages thus far.

With the NZDIA’s July member meeting and IDEAS 2020 (Part One) proving a massive hit among members and the broader Defence supply chain, we cover several speaker presentations from these events. Among these, COL Trevor Walker provides an update from DESC, the NZDF’s Richard Harrison talks opportunities for local suppliers, DIAC’s Greg Lowe ONZM explores sovereign capability and a trans-Tasman single market, and NZTE’s Graeme Solloway elaborates on new trade support for industry.

Also in Defence, with New Zealand in COVID-19 and election mode, we feature regular columnists Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark and Opposition Spokesperson for Defence Hon Mark Mitchell. , with a focus on the NZDF’s COVID-19 response role With the RNZN’s Seasprites due for replacement in 2027, Editor-at-Large Dr Peter Greener surveys the international market for maritime helicopter acquisition options. There’s many options out there, but very few capable of meeting the Ministry of Defence’s requirements. Matthew Medley of IFS explores how COVID-19 is accelerating digital change for defence organisations In International Security, we present expert perspectives on the ongoing debate over the place of China in New Zealand’s foreign policy, including coverage of recent addresses by twotime NZ ambassador to China John McKinnon CNZM QSO and Beijing-based New Zealand business leader David Mahon.

Former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO also weighs in, suggesting that Wellington can play an important role in diffusing great power tension in the region – if it chooses to.

In Homeland Security, Massey University’s Prof Rouben Azizian and Dr John Battersby introduce the second edition of the National Security Journal, and Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand H.E. Dr Itzhak Gerberg explores the spectre of bioterrorism. In Border Security we unpack the challenge of Managed Isolation Facility security, and I make the argument for a rethink on how to approach COVID-19 at the border.

I commend the above articles to you, along with the many fine contributions inside.

Nicholas Dynon Auckland

CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand

www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

CONTRIBUTORS & PRESENTERS Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Hon Ron Mark Dr Itzhak Gerberg Dr John Battersby COL Trevor Walker Richard Harrison Graeme Solloway Nicholas Dynon

Hon Mark Mitchell Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Peter Greener John McKinnon CNZM QSO Greg Lowe ONZM David Mahon Matthew Medley

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

SPONSORSHIP PARTNERS General Atomics Aeronautical Rheinmetall Defence

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UPCOMING ISSUE ASSOCIATION

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Summer - December Main themes: Air domain, space, cyber, new government priorities Events: IDEAS 2020 Copy Deadline: 1st December 2020 Publication: 10th December 2020

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ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

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BORDER SECURITY

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Opinion: Managed isolation missing intelligent border management

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NZDF capability needs matched by vast Rheinmetall product range

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How COVID-19 is accelerating digital change for defence organisations

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Rohde & Schwarz to outfit Cape class patrol boats with naval communications

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What is the New Zealand Information Domain?

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At speed and scale: NZDF steps up to support the COVID-19 response

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SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian: The Next Generation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft

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From Oslo to Wellington: A role in keeping the great power peace

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Update from the Defence Employer Support Council

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Does an increasingly powerful China present a dilemma for New Zealand?

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Beca selected to support Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel Project

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

HOMELAND SECURITY

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COVID-19, closed borders and local support for projects

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Massey University publishes latest National Security Journal

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COVID-19 response and National’s continued commitment to NZDF

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Bioterrorism as a National Security Threat: A suggested model

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New Zealand’s future maritime helicopter options

REVIEWS

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COVID-19, Sovereign capability and a trans-Tasman single market

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New NZTE support for industry

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Book Review: Crossing the Lines

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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DEFENCE NZDF capability needs matched by vast Rheinmetall product range Rheinmetall will draw on its significant product portfolio for future growth in New Zealand as the company expands its regional capability to meet the needs of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).

The company’s targeted approach to growing its business in New Zealand will stretch across vehicle platforms, electronic solutions and weapons & munitions. Though its brand is relatively low profile in New Zealand compared with other global Defence Primes, Rheinmetall has been an active partner to the New Zealand Defence Force and a member of the nation’s defence industry since 2013.

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In line with the establishment of a new regional hub at Rheinmetall’s new $AUD170 million Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence (MILVEHCOE) in Australia, the company will grow its presence in New Zealand from its offices at Upper Hutt.

This local growth mirrors the global activities of the parent company as an integrated technology group expanding into new regions

and markets in the areas of environmentally friendly mobility and threat-appropriate security technology. Rheinmetall Group’s operating activities are split in two corporate sectors - Rheinmetall Defence and Rheinmetall Automotive.

Its 23,000-strong staff generate annual sales of more than $NZD8 billion.

Under the leadership of Managing Director Gary Stewart and New

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Zealand Country Manager Marty Roelofs, Rheinmetall Defence Australia and New Zealand oversees the activities of all company entities and manages operations in Wellington.

“Rheinmetall has successfully built a successful export industry for defence products and services from its German base and we are now working towards the same ambition at our Asia Pacific hub in Australia,” Mr Stewart said.

Rheinmetall’s MILVEHCOE is an 11 hectare precinct for design, manufacture and support of military vehicles, turrets and medium calibre weapons, fire control and electrooptics, simulators, armour systems. It also includes combat vehicle system integration laboratories, a vehicle prototyping workshop, welding and painting facilities, EMC chamber to test up to a main battle tank, medium calibre indoor firing tunnel, and mobility test tracks.

“Our focus is on creating sustainable design, development and Line of Defence

manufacturing facilities that deliver world leading products and services to the NZDF, as well as partnering with local New Zealand SMEs to ensure their products and services are available globally through our company’s Global Supply Chain,” Mr Stewart said.

The New Zealand Government’s historic capital investment in the NZDF provides the foundation for Rheinmetall’s local focus. The company’s footprint in New Zealand has long been associated with its fleet of high mobility logistics vehicles currently in service with the NZDF. Today, the 130-year-old Dusseldorfbased company is growing its New Zealand footprint by delivering capability where the key requirements are mobility, lethality, reconnaissance, protection and sustainment.

Rheinmetall is creating solution concepts for the networked battlefield of the future. The company’s Electronic Solutions division offers an array of Soldier Systems with

key products including Laser Light Modules, Laser range finders for Sniper and Anti material weapons.

This delivers capability that meets the increasing digitalisation of the modern battlefield and the challenges it presents armed forces when it comes to the reliable networking of systems and actors at multiple command levels and the impact of information, command, and fire superiority.

Ammunition is core business for Rheinmetall and the company also offers a broad range of infantry ammunition including 40mm ammunition, grenades and pyrotechnical products for a wide variety of missions. The product portfolio includes a full array of 40mm low, medium and high velocity ammunition, accompanied by a wide selection of pyrotechnical devices for signalling and illumination.

Vehicle platforms, too, core business for Rheinmetall’s Vehicle Systems’ high-mobility logistic vehicles, known as the Rheinmetall 7

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MAN HX series, are in service in New Zealand, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and elsewhere.

Drawing on MAN‘s significant expertise in commercial truck development and manufacturing, Rheimetall MAN - a joint venture between Rheinmetall and MAN Trucks - also has the “Trucknology Generation” series of militarised trucks (or ‘TG-Mil’ for short). As a primary choice for logistics in both domestic and low-threat mission environments, and with a true family of vehicles from two to four axles, these vehicles offer scalable degrees of militarisation and are ideal for humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

The impetus to expand the Vehicle Systems business into New Zealand follows the appointment of Gary Stewart in the additional role of Chief Executive Officer, Vehicle Systems Asia Pacific, alongside his current role of Managing Director of Rheinmetall Defence Australia and New Zealand.

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“This business unit will improve Rheinmetall’s operational and program performance to ensure delivery of key programs to Australian and New Zealand customers while leveraging the establishment and operations of MILVEHCOE and enable regional growth and exports,” Mr Stewart said.

Rheinmetall MAN trucks have a long history in New Zealand. In March 2013, Rheinmetall MAN was awarded a contract to supply the New Zealand Defence Force with 194 new Logistic trucks as well as 6 training vehicles.

The order encompassed trucks based on HX chassis in three basic sizes: the 6-tonne 4x4, the 9-tonne 6x6 and the 15-tonne 8x8, in ten variants.

Some of the trucks were fitted with winches and cranes to allow completely independent operation. They include dump trucks for combat engineers, trucks fitted with specialized pallet and container handling equipment, and tractor/semi-trailer combinations to carry heavy vehicles and equipment.

The contract included vehicles, armour protection kits, weapons mounts, personnel modules and an extensive range of specialised military equipment. It also covers spares, logistic support arrangements, project management and extensive training packages, including six additional vehicles specifically for training purposes. All 200 trucks were successfully delivered between October 2013 and September 2014.

The NZDF deployed a fleet of the trucks to bring much-needed supplies to quake-damaged Kaikoura in the days immediately after the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake. A convoy of Rheinmetall MAN trucks ferried 7320 litres of diesel and 1540 litres of petrol to Kaikoura’s petrol stations and emergency services. It also brought 10,000 litres of potable water for distribution and nine Army chefs who were to cater for emergency workers and volunteers as well as about 250 patients at Kaikoura Hospital.

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TRUSTEDPARTNERS RHEINMETALL IS A PROUD INDUSTRY PARTNER TO THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE. Rheinmetall has been delivering and sustaining the most durable, reliable, versatile and cost-effective military vehicle in its class to men and women in service with the NZDF. This could not be possible without our growing network of industry partners, including: • TRT, Hamilton • Mobile Mechanical Solutions, Palmerston North • 360 Logistics, Wellington • Penske Commercial Vehicles, Auckland, Christchurch • Mills-Tui, Rotorua We acknowledge the work of our employees, partners and suppliers as we work together to sustain a high performance logistics backbone for the nation’s military. www.rheinmetall-defence.com

FORCE PROTECTION IS OUR MISSION.

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How COVID-19 is accelerating digital change for defence organisations For many, the pandemic has fast-forwarded digital transformation, with some organisations claiming to have completed years’ worth of transformations in a matter of weeks, explains Matt Medley, Senior Product Manager, IFS.

A Senior Product Manager at IFS, Matthew Medley is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy. He served as a Major in the US Air Force, compiling over 2,500 flight hours in C-130 aircraft. He holds the FAA Airline Transport Pilot and Certified Flight Instructor ratings.

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Despite having a reputation for being rigid and adhering to long-standing traditions, military organisations must be flexible in order to continue operations in a socially distant manner with thousands of personnel working from home, troops still deployed overseas, others building emergency hospitals, delivering PPE, and providing much needed emergency backup – and technology has been the key enabler.

In fact, they have been marching at the double. In a recent interview, senior figures in the UK military forces explained how the organisation had cut back heavily on bureaucratic processes, and in their words “hit the accelerate button” on programs to take advantage of emerging trends and technology.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) has expedited 3D Printing, rapidly making operations leaner. The Royal Navy sees the current environment as the springboard for digital transformation programs across the board: people, the estate, and the support systems for ships.

Global military organisations responded to the pandemic by looking to increase investments in digital infrastructure. The US Department of Defense is currently trialling 5G technology to optimise military operations using transformational technologies like augmented reality in MRO, and training and Australia has invested in research to develop new manufacturing technologies for the Hunter Class Frigate Program.

This initiative developed in collaboration between military, industry, and academia, is aimed at providing replacement frigates optimised for anti-submarine warfare. The work will underpin a dramatic change in the way shipyards are planned and managed by enabling valuable integrated data insights across the entire supply chain.

As the new goes on parade, the old gets serious inspection Militaries are not alone in their technology adoption. Recent IFS research highlighted the central role digital transformation is now playing within organisations despite – but more likely because of –the economic challenges that have accompanied the pandemic. Over 50 percent of respondents across multiple industries are looking to increase their spend on digital transformation going forward in response to the pandemic.

We can also see, for the defence industry, that the pandemic has not only accelerated the implementation of technology, but it has offered a chance to call outdated processes into question. COVID-19 has created the opportunity to step back and reevaluate operations, and there will be a number of advances in the defence industry in the wake of the pandemic.

For military organisations, I believe there are four key areas where we can see the current business and economic effects of the pandemic acting as a catalyst for technology change.

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1. Quarantine has forced businesses and governments to rethink traditional processes Before the pandemic, the idea of flexible and remote working options would have been an unlikely prospect.

As well as the commitment within the defence sector to rigid processes, in the past there has been a distinct reluctance from higher-ranking leaders to embrace remote working due to the deeply ingrained tradition of in-person, direct management and leadership.

But the coronavirus crisis has made a new working paradigm necessary for survival. Now that remote and flexible working has proved itself to be an efficient means of operating, it raises the question of whether traditional processes and policies within defence organisations have been hindering productivity in the past. In a postCOVID world where new efficiencies are being realised, processes that were once deemed necessary are revealing themselves to be merely a force of habit.

For example, the long-standing tradition of requiring physical signatures on formal documentation is being rapidly replaced with electronic signatures generated by automated workflows – drastically reducing the wait between approval steps and reducing total throughput time.

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As a natural extension to that, many organisations are finding that lengthy approval workflow processes don’t empower their employees to act, but rather do the opposite. By reducing the number of total approval steps and raising authority thresholds for lower-level managers, employees are empowered to act, while freeing up valuable executive time to focus on more pressing strategic matters.

The defence sector can learn valuable lessons from the pandemic.

If the defence industry continues to embrace change and realise the benefits on non-traditional working, it has the opportunity to further streamline processes and increase efficiencies across organisations—all while empowering the workforce to focus on results.

2. Remote working must go hybrid Connectivity and bandwidth issues come in two flavours: planned and unplanned. Most organisations, civilian or defence, experience planned or unplanned outages on occasion for system maintenance, natural disasters, physical damage, or hardware failure, and in the case of defence organisations, physical attack. On these occasions, organisations will have contingency response plans for these scenarios and can be quite efficient in restoring their networks afterward.

However, the common need to perform prolonged operations, often in unfriendly territory, with no connectivity due to the lack of forward infrastructure and a critical requirement to maintain secrecy is arguably unique to defence organisations. In this case, a robust Disconnected Operations solution – capable of distributing and reconsolidating data and technical records when connected and operating autonomously when not connected – is a critical feature of disaster-proofing the operation.

With remote work increasing across the globe, connectivity has become more complex. Military organisations will be joined by civilian companies now seeking remote data access and the ability to continue working while offline and later reconnect and resync.

As a formal risk mitigation technique, organisations need to harden their network solution with a true Disconnected Operations mode.

Robust Disconnected Operations capabilities can capture, store and resync asset and workforce data regardless of connectivity. It could be the difference in a company’s ability to not just recover from planned or unplanned outages, but rather to continue operating seamlessly throughout—even with workforce and assets globally distributed.

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3. Digital transformation can increase workforce efficiency without cutting personnel As with remote working, many leaders within military organisations have been hesitant to welcome digital transformation and automation within the military, as they thought it would mean having to cut back on personnel. This has been holding back the progress of administration and headquarter reform for years.

But in reality, digital transformation is more about optimising workforce efficiency rather than headcount reduction. This has two main benefits for organisations.

Firstly, the coronavirus crisis has added additional pressure to existing budget cuts, so companies want to retain the personnel they have so heavily invested in. This preserves capacity for business to ramp back up as the crisis resolves—while protecting the livelihoods of their workers and families. Secondly, removing waste through densification of value-added work results in real time and cost savings that can be reinvested into other activities.

Defence manufacturers face this challenge daily. Despite rapid advances in Industry 4.0 technologies, these companies must still maintain large human labour forces that cannot work from home and are often hired to support specific programs. When those programs get delayed – whether due to a crisis like COVID-19, budgetary shortfalls, or other severe disruptions – those skilled laborers must often be reassigned to other programs or let go to preserve cash.

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The companies best able to match their labourers to value-added work have the best chance of retaining them, preserving critical skillsets, and the right technology solutions can help highlight those opportunities for workforce realignment.

Before the pandemic, global militaries were under increasing pressure to reduce admin costs and decrease the size of headquarters. Organisations were unsure how to manage this without losing personnel. But the coronavirus crisis has demonstrated that this can be possible. The adoption of digital transformation and automation within an organisation streamlines administrative tasks and means more efficient back-office processes.

Consequently, more resources can be reassigned to the operations that matter: moving resources from non-value-added processes to core operations can increase efficiency with no net change in force size.

4. Change is necessary, but compliance is still on the frontline – to cloud or not to cloud?

Once seen as nuisance, regulations and red tape, compliance is rapidly emerging as a barrier to entry for large government contracts, which makes the aerospace and defence sector poised to best weather and recover from the current global crisis.

Compared to the rapid decline and slow recovery underway in commercial aviation, government defence spending has remained relatively stable, with large multi-year contracts still being awarded for major new programs.

Only those competitors with the right combination of demonstrated excellence across a variety of compliance areas such as ITAR, FedRamp, and CMMC are allowed to compete on certain contracts, and to the victor go the spoils.

With such importance attached to regulation, defence organisations must keep compliance top of mind if they are to transfer to remote operations on a more permanent basis. Therefore, remote operations require flexible software architecture and filing to adhere to regulations. And it is because of compliance that many A&D organisations are also hesitant to adopt cloud-only ERP deployments.

A recent IFS webinar attended by key decision makers within aerospace manufacturing, revealed that only 3 percent of respondents deploy their ERP software only using the cloud – whereas 64 percent said they use their software either on-prem only or a mixture of on-prem and cloud-based deployments.

For defence organisations to continue to embrace remote working and unlock further efficiencies while remaining compliant they need a tailored solution. With a managed cloud or secure hybrid enterprise software environment for critical compliance areas such as ITAR, organisations can explore remote capabilities knowing compliance is not an issue.

Changes made now will benefit the industry for years to come For defence organisations, COVID-19 has increased the pace in which organisations would have made changes that were formerly just blueprints. It has expedited transformations from considerations to realities in a matter of months.

For an industry that has many traditions and processes in need of updating, this fast forward will provide a huge advantage for the future. By embracing digital transformation and choosing a capable enterprise software solution to do so, military organisations can realise the benefits of increased flexibility, increased efficiencies and streamlined processes, not just during the pandemic but long into the future.

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Rohde & Schwarz to outfit Cape class patrol boats with naval communications Clear commitment by Austal and the Australian Government to strengthen the Cape class with class leading internal and external communication solutions by Rohde & Schwarz Rohde & Schwarz (Australia) has signed a contract with Austal Limited to deliver integrated communications systems for six Cape class patrol boats (CCPB) contracted by the Department of Defence for use by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). CCPBs are currently in production at Austal’s Henderson shipyard in Western Australia and are to be delivered from September 2021.

The new RAN CCPBs will include a number of enhancements that include Rohde & Schwarz communications equipment, including the company’s Naval Integrated Communications System (NAVICS) with multi-layer security and secure external line of sight (V/ UHF) and beyond line of sight communications (HF).

Managing Director of Rohde & Schwarz Australia, Gareth Evans, said that, “As a communications systems integrator, we have unique perspective and capability along with clear technical superiority of our solutions, particularly NAVICS. “One of the exciting aspects of this system is its true VoIP switching, it’s not a hybrid TDM solution. This makes it both future-proof and scalable. NAVICS also reduces the integration effort and risk associated with incorporating third party components using its versatile IP gateways.

“Rohde & Schwarz (Australia) established a very competent integration capability for Australian industry in Sydney to complement our existing maintenance and world-class calibration facilities. This opportunity ensures Australian jobs are created and supply chain opportunities continue for Australia’s shipbuilding industry. ” Ben Wardle, General Manager Australian Shipbuilding at Austal said the company was looking forward to working with Rohde & Schwarz Australia to deliver an effective integrated communications system for the Cape-class patrol boats.

“For the new Cape-class patrol boat contract with the Department of Defence, Austal conducted extensive market testing for a new, proven partner that would be able to meet or exceed the technical scope of the project whilst maintaining Australian Industry engagement.

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Rohde & Schwarz to deliver communications for six Cape class patrol boats by Austal for the Royal Australian Navy. (Image: Austal)

“We were very pleased to find Rhode and Schwarz could fulfil this scope and we look forward to working with both the Australian and German based teams to deliver the very best integrated communications system for the RAN’s new Capes,” Mr Wardle said.

“This contract represents a clear commitment by Austal and the Australian Government to strengthen the Cape class with Top-of-Class communication solutions by Rohde & Schwarz,” Hansjörg Herrbold, Vice President Market Segment Navy Rohde & Schwarz, says. “NAVICS is being deployed on numerous naval vessels, including the Royal Navy’s Type 26 frigates and was on display at the recent Pacific 2019 exhibition in Sydney.”

NAVICS uses state-of-the-art VoIP and Ethernet standards. Following market tendencies Rohde & Schwarz has decided to abandon outdated TDM technology, which required heavy proprietary hardware. Instead, NAVICS relays on widely spread industry standards and commercial-of-the-shelf hardware, thus eliminating the risk of expensive obsolete equipment. A multilevel security architecture allows secure, trusted and tamper-proof communications between multiple domains with different security classifications.

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DEFENCE What is the New Zealand Information Domain?

Information is fast becoming a key instrument of power wielded by states and non-state actors alike. The Ministry of Defence and NZDF have now provided insights into the nascent New Zealand information domain, writes Nicholas Dynon.

“States have become masters at exploiting the seams between peace and war,” wrote General Sir Nicholas Carter, British Army Chief of General Staff, in 2018.

“What constitutes a weapon in this grey area no longer has to go ‘bang’, bribes – corrupt business practices, cyber-attacks, assassination, fake news, propaganda and indeed military intimidation are all examples of the weapons used to gain advantage in this era of ‘constant competition’…

“The deduction we should draw from this, continued General Carter, “is that there is no longer two clear and distinct states of ‘peace’ and ‘war’; we now have several forms.

Echoing this, Brigadier Mark Ascough CSC, DSM, Commander of the Australian Army’s 6th Brigade, wrote in April that to fight and win in the information domain, “the military professional must form and lead teams of multi-discipline capabilities that advise and assure commanders and decision makers, and generate effects that impacts an adversary or supports a partner during times of cooperation, competition and conflict.”

The ‘information domain’ is not a new concept within military literature, however, it is one which has been given recent urgency in what is an emerging era of ‘weaponised information’, ‘smokeless battlefields’ and constant ‘soft conflict’ characterised by a wide array of new – and often inexpensive and readily accessible – non-kinetic capabilities.

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In the past year, New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force have given shape to what has been described as the ‘bespoke New Zealand information domain’.

A New Zealand Information Domain Introduced in the Defence Capability Plan 2019, the New Zealand information domain comprises a sub-portfolio of projects defined in four distinct pillars: (i) Cyber and Electronic Warfare; (ii) Intelligence; (iii) Information Activities; and (iv) C4. According to the DCP, investments in this domain will be informed by cross-agency work on how best to deliver and resource these capabilities, and by new thinking from Industry.

Major Defence-led information domain projects currently include the Joint Intelligence Project, Cyber Security and Support Capability, Joint Electronic Warfare Project, and Fixed High Frequency Radio Refresh, with more to come. In addition to these, the NZDF will undertake a large number of small scale projects totalling over $150 million out to 2030.

At both the recent NZDIA July Member Meeting and the IDEAS 2020 virtual event hosted by the NZDIA in collaboration with Defence, the Ministry of Defence and NZDF enunciated their understanding of the new domain and what it means for Defence and industry going forward.

According to Nick Gillard MNZM, who was up until recently the Ministry’s Information Domain

Director (now Director Land Domain), the last six months have been spent “defining and designing what we’re calling the Information Domain.”

Since DCP 2020, Defence has developed a strategy that defines the New Zealand Information Domain and lists the sub portfolio of projects it includes as well as a roadmap relating to the development of capabilities within the domain.

The information domains fits within the traditional five domain categorisation commonly articulated as: land, air, space, maritime and cyber.

What sets it apart is that it is an enabler in relation to the other domains but it should also be capable of generating its own strategic, operational and tactical military effects. A discrete number of capabilities can therefore be grouped under this domain.

“What we’re looking for with uplifting these capabilities are new ways of doing business, new people, new skills, new technology,” said Mr Gillard at the NZDIA’s July Member Meeting.

Depending on COVID-19 impacts, and the fact that a national election is coming up, Line of Defence understands that Information Domain work is being scheduled as follows: • February 2021: release of a new Defense Assessment, which will provide a first indicator on what the direction of travel is for the domain.

• March 2021: provision of an update of information domain timeline • May 2021: confirmation of budget for financial year 2021.

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• July 2021: opportunities will possibly start to arise for industry – with the possibility of opportunities for small-scale collaboration in the meantime.

Redesigning the operating model GPCAPT Pete Franken, Information Domain Director, NZDF Capability Branch, will be dealing with the smaller scale NZDF-led projects. He is also responsible for structuring the NZDF – or “offering opportunities for the organisation to change” – in order to best meet the requirements of the new information domain.

Importantly, the information domain is focused on offering options for the NZDF to best shape itself to meet the foreseeable future given the Line of Defence

rate at which information is changing the nature of international competition and conflict. For this reason, commented GPCAPT Franken, these options will need to be relevant to times of peace and competition, as well as times of conflict – a major shift in mindset.

The information domain focus is therefore part organisational design – about the shaping of the NZDF operating model. “The goal is to ensure that the Defence leaders of the future will have a broad array of military effects at their disposal,” he said. “They need to be better informed of the threats, options and constraints than our current cohort of military leaders.

The journey will involve enhanced integration of existing talent, skills

and capability from the strategic level through to the tactical level and across the Defence Force.

He noted that the NZDF’s workforce is not large enough to have its own personnel across all of the specialised fields within the information domain, and that it would therefore need to look to the private sector and security sector to work more on a system of integrated systems.

The NZDF will be partnering with industry, the security sector and academia to explore all the options, which – it is hoped – would lead to the presentation of a range of options to the executive before 2020 is out. That will lead to work on a detailed business case throughout 2021.

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At speed and scale: NZDF steps up to support the COVID-19 response Where security, wellbeing and logistic stresses change, writes Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark, the NZDF continues to maintain its unique capability to provide appropriate support at speed and on a large scale.

Hon Ron Mark is Minister of Defence.

He served as mayor of Carterton from 2010 to 2014, and previously served as an officer in the New Zealand Army and in the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces.

Over the past seven months the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has been providing support to New Zealand’s COVID-19 response through Operation PROTECT. During this period NZDF’s assistance to other government agencies has been varied; they’ve provided advice and assistance with Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) supply chain planning, completed P-3K2 aerial surveillance flights of recreational craft for New Zealand Police, manned check points, and our HMNZS Canterbury retrieved Department of Conservation staff from Raoul Island.

Defence Estate in Whangaparaoa has been utilised as a quarantine site, and our Defence Technology Agency scientists have sat on working groups with our security partners to further our understanding of COVID-19 and share scientific developments.

All this while maintaining additional personnel at a heightened state of readiness.

As I’ve continued to state throughout my term as Minister of Defence, it is the highly skilled women and men of our Defence Force that are our greatest asset. The discipline, rigour and operational expertise the NZDF provides has clearly been needed and they have proved their effectiveness. I have been highly supportive of the military’s strong role as part of the COVID-19 response, as have many of my colleagues.

Last month, the Coalition Government announced a significant increase in the number of NZDF personnel supporting the COVID-19 response. In total, there are now approximately 1,260 personnel supporting tasks as part of this operation.

Image courtesy New Zealand Defence Force

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Image courtesy New Zealand Defence Force

This represents the largest military contingent since the Timor-Leste deployment.

Through the provision of disciplined, well-trained and professional personnel, the NZDF is now making a difference through support of Managed Isolation and Quarantine Facilities (MIQF) and assisting at the maritime border.

The increase in Defence Force personnel deployed to the facilities will increase security of higher risk areas, such as entry and exit points and public areas, and reduces the reliance on private security guards. Air Commodore Darryn Webb continues in his role of Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine within the Government response.

Defence Force MIQF staff have duty lengths between seven days and four weeks, depending on their role, and are accommodated on site during this time. They do not return to their home or regular NZDF workplace each day as other Agency staff may.

This is an NZDF requirement for their people as an additional precaution to protect the force.

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In addition, 80 NZDF personnel are assisting New Zealand Customs at the maritime border by maintaining the security of entry and exit points in relation to ports and ships that have arrived in New Zealand; providing information and engaging with people to ensure they understand the relevant isolation and quarantine rules; monitoring and, if necessary, directing the movement of persons at ports and on ships; and monitoring compliance at ports and on ships in relation to people disembarking, physical distancing rules, and rules in relation to wearing PPE. The Director-General of Health has authorised members of the Armed Forces working in MIQFs and at the maritime border with specific enforcement officer powers under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020.

These enforcement officer powers are not a deputation of New Zealand Police powers, and are specific in scope. At the MIQFs, Defence Force personnel are able to give legally enforceable directions, and to request a person to provide identifying information. At the maritime border,

Defence Force personnel now have the authority to enter areas, buildings, vehicles, to give directions, and to request a person to provide identifying information.

While the NZDF continues to play a pivotal role in the response to COVID-19, they also continue to work alongside our partners and friends in our neighbourhood and further afield.

Throughout this period, the NZDF continued to assist our neighbours and friends in the Pacific in response to Tropical Cyclone Harold, with our C-130 Hercules delivering essential equipment and supplies. The Royal New Zealand Airforce was also called upon to repatriate New Zealand citizens from the Pacific as a result of the combined impact of COIVD-19 and Tropical Cyclone Harold.

New Zealanders can rightly be proud of how their Defence Force has stepped up to support our country in this challenging time. Where security, wellbeing and logistic stresses to the response change, the NZDF continues to maintain the unique capability to provide appropriate support at speed and on a large scale.

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SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian: The Next Generation of Remotely Piloted Aircraft The SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) possess a number of unique advantages not found in manned platforms. They have much longer endurance (40 hours or more based on payload), are more affordable, require a fraction of the footprint, effectively operate between low and high altitude (500 to 40,000 feet), are employable in high-risk environments without concern for loss of aircrew and, like manned platforms, they’re

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built to be certified to fly in civil airspace. These attributes, which have been exploited in over-land and largely permissible environments, are now being tested for high threat, multidomain missions, including maritime surveillance and undersea surveillance, as well as broad-spectrum, passive and active electronic warfare. These developments also network the RPA with other land, aerospace and maritime assets and enable role expansion, while highlighting the system as a true force multiplier.

In the New Zealand context, Sky/ SeaGuardian offers flexible and versatile capabilities to support whole-ofgovernment employment, with excellent potential to meet evolving military and civil Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) roles, including resource protection, support to security agencies, and responses to civil emergencies across New Zealand’s vast area of interest. No other single platform has the versatility, range and endurance to meet the broad requirements of the New Zealand Government.

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Operational roles for RPA are in transition, which is in conjunction with changes to customer security priorities. While support to land forces and security agencies in the overland environment will remain a core role for these systems, employment focused on multidomain, high-end conflict, ‘greyzone’ operations (operations below the threshold of armed conflict including asymmetric methods, and often involving militia and constabulary forces) in the maritime environment, and support to civilian authorities are shaping development priorities for GA-ASI and its customers. In the civil-focused roles, first responder and long endurance/ range ISR and communication missions are expanding.

The GA-ASI MQ-9 Mediumaltitude, Long-endurance (MALE) series of RPA had their genesis in the 1990s, with an early version of the RQ-1 RPA possessing ISR capability.

The RQ-1 Predator operated over Bosnia in 1995, with more capable, armed versions (MQ-1) commencing operations in the Middle East theatre Line of Defence

in 2001. The significantly more capable USAF MQ-9A ‘Reaper’ RPA variants followed, along with the U.S. Army’s MQ-1C ‘Gray Eagle’ Unmanned Aircraft System. Today the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain operate the aircraft with great success. The Netherlands have also procured the system with deliveries to commence soon.

Less well known is the MQ-9’s non-military utility. For example, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection force has effectively employed the MQ-9A Guardian for both overland and maritime surveillance activities since 2005. In the past two years, GA-ASI has conducted maritime and civil surveillance demonstrations in Japan and Europe, with a further comprehensive maritime validation trial for the Japan Coast Guard planned for later in 2020. Further, the California Air National Guard has used the MQ-9 with great success combating forest fires by identifying hot spots, and providing critical environmental intelligence to allow more targeted and safer deployment of firefighters and equipment.

Production has now commenced on GA-ASI’s most advanced RPA variant – the MQ-9B SkyGuardian/ SeaGuardian. The UK, Australia and Belgium intend to acquire this system, with customer interest increasing throughout the world.

With the focus of RPAS customers now turning to multi-domain, highend, grey-zone and civil security operations, the traditional roles for MQ-9 series RPA are transitioning to support these missions, including in the maritime domain. With this refocus comes an increased requirement for networking and synergies with other strategic, tactical, and front line operational platforms, including those from civil security agencies. The MQ-9 RPA systems are well suited to be networked and interoperable during coalition operations or for support to civil agencies through their open systems architecture and common communications protocols.

Capability development and the integration of systems for MQ-9 series platforms is proceeding at an unprecedented pace within GA-ASI 19

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to meet U.S. and Allied requirements.

The most prominent developments relate to Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Self-Protection systems, and advanced networking solutions, with flight trials on these configurations planned in 2020. Meanwhile, developments to the baseline MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian, including a Detect and Avoid System (DAAS) to aid in seamless operations in all classes of airspace, Portable Pre/PostFlight Equipment (P3E) to enable austere expeditionary operations, and a range of automation and Artificial Intelligence (AI) applications for operations and processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED), are either operational or nearing completion.

System testing of these new capabilities is ongoing in operational environments.

The MQ-9B is ideally suited to operate from a range of airfields throughout the world, including fields as short as 4,000 feet, by using an Automatic Takeoff and Landing Capability (ATLC). ATLC enhances the systems versatility and employment options due to its small footprint and it only requires a handful of essential 20

personnel for support. The capability to auto-land at un-surveyed airfields has now been developed and is being further tested by customers. With such capabilities, the MQ-9B could operate more flexibly and rapidly reposition between deployed operating sites, when compared to other more strategic ISREW assets. With expanding multirole capability options, the SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian offer impressive future employment potential.

Many of GA-ASI’s customers are acquiring a range of very capable ISREW weapon systems including P-8A Poseidon and the MQ-9B SkyGuardian. Operational roles for these systems overlap in some areas, with each providing an important contribution to the layered and networked Joint Force, while also supporting other whole-of-government agencies. This networked force creates a unique opportunity to maximize cross-domain capabilities. No longer can defence forces afford to operate platforms within a narrow set of roles. With the need to focus more fully on multi-domain operations spanning high-end, grey-zone warfare and civil support missions,

with reduced warning/response times and asymmetric challenges, the requirement for versatility and flexibility within ISREW systems has become more acute.

The SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian enables a net-centric capability of multi-domain, expeditionary operations in direct support of Land and Maritime Surveillance, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Strike and EW roles, whether in support of military forces or civil agencies. The MQ9B’s ability to seamlessly and securely network with other Air, Sea, Land and Space systems, both military and civilian, creates an exceptional opportunity to further expand force employment options.

In the New Zealand context, the expanding capability and versatility of the SeaGuardian across both civilian and military support roles can provide ISREW coverage across the vast geographic expanse from the Equator to the Southern Ocean, including lowfootprint expeditionary or deployed operations. No better or more costeffective, long-range/endurance capability is available through a single platform.

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Update from the Defence Employer Support Council At the NZDIA July Member Meeting, Defence Employer Support Council’s (DESC) COL Trevor Walker provides an update on DESC’s activities and what lies ahead for the annual Minister’s Awards for Excellence.

The Defence Employer Support Council advocates to employers on behalf of defence and its main role is to support cadet force officers and reservists who are also in civilian employment. According to DESC’s COL Trevor Walker, DESC is also looking at how to support NZDF personnel who are transitioning out of the New Zealand Defence Force into to civilian employment.

Another area is youth programs.

“One of those is the Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) courses that Defence is responsible for running on behalf of the MSD” involving training 1,600 unemployed youth per year and supporting their entry into the workforce.

A significant challenge of supporting people who are transitioning out of the Defence Force to find employment is that it requires data. “Who are those people?

Who do they work for? And what are the jobs out there in New Zealand and wider?

“At the moment we’re quite data poor,” observed COL Walker. “And that’s one of the pieces of work that we need to commission in the future to make sure we actually understand who our Cadet Forces officers are, who they work for and how you can help us better, and supporting those personnel who give up their time to either serve in the Reserve Forces or go out there and look after our youth in the Cadet Forces.”

Another area of recent DESC involvement has been in relation to the Volunteers Employment Protection Act 1973 (VEPA). It needs a bit of an Line of Defence

The Minister of Defence Awards for Excellence celebrate excellence in the NZDF and industry communities. Image: DESC website.

update. “It’s a actual employment act owned by the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE), but we’re looking at how we develop that and bring it into the modern day so it more or better suits looking after our reserve personnel, our volunteers.”

Another area in which DESC has been involved is the Kawenata.

The DESC had a part to play, said COL Walker, “and it has now gone back to the minister who will release some further information on it in the future.”

Minister’s Awards for Excellence Last year for the first time, the Defence Employment Support Council and the Defence Industry Advisory Council (DIAC) combined their annual Minister’s Awards that had in previous years been organised separately.

“It was in my mind, and certainly in the mind of the DESC, a very clumsily named 2019 Defence Industry Advisory Council and Defence Employer Support Council Awards,” he said.

“The DESC has set itself the challenge of renaming it into something more snappy and easily understood by the people we’re awarding.”

The awards are currently scheduled for 24 November this year in or around Wellington. COL Walker is hoping that the DESC part of it will be a day of events, including a Defence-based show-and-tell or display-type activity, followed by an award ceremony in the evening at Parliament.

COL Walker stated that DESC is looking to work more closely with the NZDIA and at facing its data challenges so that the organisation is better able to “support the people we’re advocating for”.

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Beca selected to support Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel Project

Beca Applied Technologies Ltd, with the support of specialist naval architecture company Vard Marine Inc, has been appointed by the Ministry of Defence as Technical Support Partner to the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project.

Beca and Vard Marine will join the Ministry’s Integrated Project Team providing systems engineering, concept design and technical logistics input for the early stages of the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel (SOPV) project as the capability is defined and specified.

The SOPV project is exploring options for a ship that is designed to operate in one of the harshest environments on the planet. An ice-strengthened offshore patrol vessel for Southern Ocean operations will be navigating the large distance between New Zealand and Antarctica, it will be traversing one of the roughest seas in the world, and must be able to operate safely in Ross Sea ice conditions.

Beca has been a long-standing strategic supplier to the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force with a successful track record of support to capability development projects and programmes. Recent examples include the Maritime Sustainment Capability and Dive Hydro Vessel projects that contributed to the delivery of HMNZS Aotearoa and HMNZS Manawanui.

“We are delighted to be supporting the development of another critical capability for the people and Government of New Zealand, stated Andrew Ford, Business Director - Defence & National Security at Beca. “The SOPV has the potential to provide much needed presence in the Southern Ocean to safeguard New Zealand’s interests there. We are excited to partner with the MoD 22

Integrated Project Team and to bring Vard’s significant polar class experience to this programme.”

New Zealand’s Otago Class patrol vessels, HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington, were designed by Vard Marine and delivered in 2010. These vessels have operated in heavy sea states and ice in the Southern Ocean, and the SOPV is intended to provide improved operability in similar conditions.

Vard Marine’s recent experience with the Antarctic Support Vessel for the Chilean Navy and the Southern Ocean research vessel for the South African Navy, along with similar projects for the United States Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Coast Guard, and the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, all translates directly to this program.

“Vard Marine is delighted to once again be supporting the Royal New Zealand Navy in developing another vitally important maritime capability,” stated Derek Buxton, VP Business Development at Vard Marine. “This time we very much look forward to combining our expertise in multirole ships designed for high-latitude operations with the regional defence knowledge and systems engineering expertise that Beca brings to the program.”

Beca and Vard Marine will combine their local systems engineering and specialist international polar class naval architecture expertise to work with the Ministry to define and design the SOPV capability requirements in preparation for going to market.

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COVID-19, closed borders and local support for projects Amid the disruption of COVID-19 there are plenty of potential good news stories, says NZDF External Relationship Manager Richard Harrison, including upcoming procurement projects and opportunities for local suppliers.

2020 has seen some big changes for the NZDF’s Capability Branch, according to External Relationship Manager Richard Harrison. Not least among these has been a major realignment of the branch to the Capability Management System and the Ministry’s four-domain structure that will provide for clearer visibility for project owners.

Another change is the secondment of Air Commodore Darryn Webb, Assistant Chief of Defence – Capability, to the COVID-19 Operational Command Centre and, more recently, his appointment to the high-profile role of Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine.

Although the pandemic may have resulted in some shuffling, says Harrison, there’s been no cancellation of capability projects. Among those coming up over the next 12 months or so include the procurement of night vision equipment, sighting equipment, body armour, helmets, fire emergency equipment, fire crash tenders for Air Force, Fire control systems, ground support systems for Air Force.

“There has been a bunch of recent construction fabrication tenders going out for protection for trucks,” he told a physical and online audience at the NZDIA’s July member meeting. “There’s further projects for bulk fuel, and bulk water… and then there’s also trailers and general procurement in the minor projects area.”

The key, he says, is to “get yourself on GETS” and watch out for early engagement alerts prior to projects going to tender. “If there’s any questions you’ve got in that period, certainly come and ask us yourself, or direct them to the project team.”

Among the challenges posed by COVID-19, says Harrison, there are also opportunities for local providers.

In particular, border closures mean that offshore-based providers no longer have the option of flying in to deliver services. “… in the past, training, sustainment, and providing specialist support to military equipment has often come via a prime and delivered by an offshore provider. With the borders being slammed shut on us, we’ve got to look at new ways of doing that.”

Capability Branch is reviewing projects to explore delivery alternatives, such as providers engaging more local employees to get the work done.

“But we also encourage domestic companies with the capability to engage with our current or potential OEMs Line of Defence

(overseas equipment suppliers) to look at ways that they can come to an agreement to be the expertise in the delivery of that service or training.”

According to Harrison, this has already started to happen, with local providers entering into authorised supplier relationships with specific OEMs or otherwise pairing up for an opportunity. He suggests that there’s more advice on this to come from Capability Branch as they look at new ways to deliver projects and access domestic support in the current environment.

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COVID-19 response and National’s continued commitment to NZDF As election time draws near, Opposition defence spokesperson Hon Mark Mitchell reiterates his party’s commitment to continuing Defence Capability Plan investment and developing relationships with strategic partners.

Hon Mark Mitchell is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence, the previous Minister of Defence, and a former Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee.

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The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) is multifaceted and a critical part of the crisis management network in New Zealand. When New Zealand faces a domestic crisis, we must be confident that our Defence Force will not shy away from its responsibilities.

As the former Minister of Defence, current Opposition spokesperson for Defence and a concerned Kiwi, I am proud of the work the NZDF has done, and the support it continues to provide by way of stepping in to fill the gaps of this leaky Government’s Covid-19 pandemic response.

Just as communities were getting their feet back under them, and businesses were assessing their ability to survive, we shouldered another strong blow as a result of the pandemic; when New Zealand moved to Alert Level 2, and Auckland to Alert Level 3. With high-risk zones and

Kiwis continuing to return home from overseas, we have also seen significant pressures on our border and managed isolation and quarantine facilities. It is reassuring to know our Defence Force are well trained and prepared to provide immediate support where required.

With Auckland now in Alert Level ‘2.5’, I have been able move throughout my electorate and the wider Auckland region, speaking to members of the community about their experiences during the second lockdown and reintegration into their ‘normal lives’.

The feeling out there is that the NZDF is well trusted and confidence in them and their efforts are at an all-time high.

Since Covid-19 reached our shores in March, New Zealand has committed considerable resources to ‘Operation Protect’, with more than 1,000 Defence

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Force personnel enlisted to aid the Covid-19 response efforts. Stationed at Managed Isolation and Quarantine Facilities, providing personnel to support Regional Isolation and Quarantine Coordination Centers across the country, and providing direct support to the central command and management centre in Wellington, our Defence Force has certainly been busy.

The hundreds of returning Kiwis, who are placed in managed isolation and quarantine facilities throughout the country, are being met by friendly, highly trained Defence Force personnel. It is not common that members of the public are in contact with Defence Force personnel on active duty so often, so it is wonderful to hear from those who have had interactions with staff that they are being treated with absolute compassion and care during this time of heightened anxiety.

Over the past few weeks these facilities have been receiving more support from the NZDF with increased numbers, which will in turn bolster security presence and show that security measures are being taken seriously. The Defence Force do an outstanding job at keeping us safe and while we know they are highly trained and prepared for the unexpected, these recent events certainly reinforce that.

Being frontline staff doesn’t come without risk, and I want to thank Line of Defence

all of the service men and women who are spending time away from their families and communities for serving and protecting our country and ensuring that our regional and domestic security is managed safely and with confidence.

We, as a nation, have a deep respect for our service personnel and must remember that while COVID-19 response efforts have seen large numbers of service men and women assigned to Operation Protect, the NZDF have continued training to be ready to respond to domestic and international aid, protect our national interests and promote regional security.

The Defence Force do an outstanding job and have a very good reputation both domestically and internationally. Recruits are always high quality and enlisted service personnel’s dedication to keeping our shores safe and providing support to our allies exceeds itself. I am not surprised to learn enrollment numbers are increasing significantly, with the training, education and job security that our NZDF offers. This is great to see.

This is my final contribution to Line of Defence Magazine before this year’s general election and I want to make sure our NZDF knows National will continue to support them by advancing necessary commitments that were outlined in our 2016 Defence White Paper.

Throughout the 52nd Parliament, we have continued to put pressure on the Government and hold them to account to ensure National’s 15-year modernisation plan, worth nearly $20 billion, was not scrapped. Because of this pressure we have seen some much-needed investment in defence capabilities.

National is committed to continuing investment towards the Defence Capability Plan, continuing to develop our mutual defence and security relationships with key strategic partners, investing in the capability to respond to regional issues and to assist humanitarian efforts, and committed to supporting and assisting partners, where required, to uphold a rulesbased international order.

Importantly, and as committed to during National’s last term in Government, we will start work immediately upon taking office to begin implementing the real work on upgrading defence estate, because we know that this is a much-needed investment to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the NZDF and so they are ready and able to respond to events.

We face an increasingly complex environment and we owe it to our Defence Force to ensure they have the right investment to continue doing their job and doing it well. Our commitments reflect our intentions and the value we place on our service men and women.

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New Zealand’s future maritime helicopter options With its Seasprites due for replacement in 2027, the Defence shopping list includes nine maritime helicopters. Editor-at-large Peter Greener surveys the market and considers the main contenders.

Dr Greener is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University Wellington, and an Honorary Professor – and previously Academic Dean – at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force. He is also an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences at AUT University

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In the interview with the Secretary of Defence in the Autumn issue of Line of Defence Magazine, it was noted that in the Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP 2019) the replacement of the maritime helicopters had been brought forward, and the current eight Kaman SH-2G(I) Seasprites were to be replaced by nine new aircraft in 2027.

In discussing this future capability, the Secretary observed that, “Ultimately it boils down to what the Government requires.

Undoubtedly the specification will require a range of capabilities in the new maritime helicopters; a combination of sealift, patrol and combat capabilities.” Whilst a Request for Tender is envisaged in 2024, industry engagement and planning will need to progress significantly during the tenure of the next government. This next government will therefore need to signal what is required.

This article discusses this crucial complementary capability for the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), exploring a range of aircraft with a wide range of capabilities.

The DCP 2019 indicates that there will ultimately be nine RNZN ships capable of embarking helicopters.

With the purpose and therefore the requirements of each class of ships varying significantly, the replacement maritime helicopter needs to be versatile and affordable. What all RNZN ships have in common is that they operate at times in some of the most hostile sea-states on the planet, a further challenge for maritime helicopter operations.

In reviewing the international aviation press it becomes readily apparent that the number of capable, available, contemporary maritime helicopters are few.

Whilst there are other maritime helicopters available, a number of commentators agree upon eight of the top performing helicopters globally, based on equipment, range and endurance.

These eight include the SH-2G Super Seasprite, the predecessor to the SH-2G(I) Seasprite. Also included are three machines manufactured in Russia or China; the Chinese Z-18F, an anti-submarine helicopter that can be deployed on smaller surface combatants of the People’s Liberation Army Navy; the Russian Ka-27 helicopter used by the naval forces of Russia, Ukraine, Vietnam, China, and India; and the Chinese manufactured Z-9EC, an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopter operated by Pakistan.

Excluding all four of these aircraft, this then leaves the Leonardo AW101(Military), the NH Industries NH90 NFH (Naval Frigate Helicopter), the Lockheed Martin Sikorsky MH-60R Romeo, and the Leonardo AW159 Wildcat.

In assessing these four remaining aircraft, whilst acknowledging that the new government will need to confirm what is required, it is perhaps helpful to review the specifications required at the time of the SH-2G(I) Seasprite purchase. In the Major Projects Report 2015, the Ministry of Defence noted six requirements: (a) Conduct military and civil surveillance; Line of Defence

The Leonardo AW159 Wildcat.

(b) Embark and operate from all RNZN aviation-capable units; (c) Detect threats in a hostile environment; (d) Conduct maritime search and rescue; (e) Prosecute surface and sub-surface targets; (f ) Utility lift.

How well might the four remaining aircraft meet these requirements?

Leonardo AW101 (Military) The Leonardo AW101 multi-role helicopter is capable of performing a wide range of missions in maritime and littoral environments. It has been widely used in a number of European navies and air forces, along with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

In Royal Navy service there are two variants, a dedicated anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the Merlin Mk.2 and a Commando battlefield helicopter, the Merlin Mk.3. In addition to its ASW capability the helicopter can also be armed with anti-ship missiles, air-toLine of Defence

air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, rockets and gun systems.

Whilst a very capable helicopter, it is rather more than is needed; it is also very large at 22.83 metres long. As such it would not meet requirement (b) – embark and operate from all RNZN aviation-capable units.

NH90 NFH (Naval Frigate Helicopter) The NH90 is a twin-engine, mediumsize helicopter programme managed by the joint venture NHIndustries.

The NH90 NFH is an advanced ASW helicopter and is operated by, amongst others, the Italian, French, Netherlands, Norwegian, Swedish, German, Qatari and Belgian navies (the Royal Australian Navy operates the MRH90, the troop transport (TTH) variant of this aircraft, at sea).

For the NFH role the NH-90 can be configured with a variety of sensors for Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and ASW including dipping sonar in the cabin. Similarly, a range of external weapons can be carried including two torpedoes, whilst the Italian NH90 NFH are equipped with Marte MK-2/S anti-ship missiles, and the

Qatari aircraft have Marte ER antiship missiles fitted. The helicopter is installed with dipping sonar/sonics systems to detect quiet submarines operating in the open ocean and in littoral waters.

In the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Major Projects Report 2015, the NH90 NFH was evaluated alongside the SH-2G(I) and the following observations were made: the capital cost was not well known but based on the NH90 they would be expensive compared to other options; the operating costs were not well known but would be higher than the Seasprite; and, again of some importance, they would be unable to operate from the OPVs. Whilst it was noted that there would be high commonality with the NH90 in training and maintenance, it has since become clear that in service the aircraft has not been without its problems.

The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) received the first two of its eight NH90 TTH helicopters on 6 December 2012 and since then has built up considerable operating 27

DEFENCE experience with the aircraft. In an interview with Flight Global in June of this year, Chief of Air Force Air Vice Marshal Andrew Clark noted that, “I think, like a number of NH90 customers, that we would prefer to have a higher availability rate out of them�.

Remaining Contenders This then leaves two aircraft that have in recent years been competing with each other in the international market: the Sikorsky MH-60R and the Leonardo AW159 Wildcat.

The Royal Danish Navy was the second export customer for the MH60R, following the Royal Australian Navy. The Danish government considered both the MH-60R and the AW159, as did the Republic of Korea.

Unlike Denmark, South Korea announced its decision to proceed with the AW159. These aircraft were delivered in 2016 and were reported to cost significantly less than the MH60R. Another call for tenders went out in 2018 to supply the ROK navy with

a further 12 helicopters and Lockheed Martin and Leonardo are competing once again, but no decision has been made as yet.

MH-60R Romeo The MH-60R is a next-generation ASW and ASuW helicopter produced

by Lockheed Martin. It is described as one of the most advanced naval helicopters available. The MH-60R was chosen by Australia to operate from the Anzac frigates and the new Air Warfare Destroyers.

The helicopters are equipped with a sonobuoy launcher, forwardlooking infrared radar (FLIR), multimode radar, dipping sonar, integrated self-defence suite and four weapon stations. The aircraft is equipped with combat systems designed to employ the Mark 54 anti-submarine torpedo and is undoubtedly a very capable ASW platform.

Fitted with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, this is perhaps the major disadvantage in an ASuW role, as the Hellfire has a limited range of 8

km (the SH-2G(I) is fitted with the Penguin Mk2 Mod7 with a range of 34 kms). It could therefore meet the requirement stated in 2015 to (e) prosecute surface and sub-surface targets, but with limitations.

The other consideration from a navy fleet perspective is that at 19.76 metres long it is larger than an NH90 NFH and therefore unable to embark and operate from all RNZN aviationcapable units.

AW159 Wildcat The AW159 Wildcat is an advanced multi-role, maritime and utility aircraft produced by Leonardo Helicopters. Based on the Lynx family of helicopters, the AW159 replaced the Lynx fleet in the British Army and Royal Navy, entering service in 2015.

Designed from the outset as a maritime helicopter, the airframe design of the Wildcat is built to operate off the smallest frigates and offshore patrol vessels, including in heavy sea states.

A Royal New Zealand Navy Seasprite. Image: NZDF.

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A United States Navy SH-60B Seahawk (MH-60). Image: US Navy.

The helicopter integrates AESA radar, active dipping sonar, an electrooptical device, ESM and a defence aids suite. Onboard sensors and mission systems enable the Wildcat to autonomously find and track surface and sub-surface targets.

Already capable of carrying a wide range of weapons, missiles, torpedoes, depth charges, rockets and guns, its newly designed weapon wing will be able to carry a maximum load of 20 Martlet Lightweight Multi-role Missiles (LMM) or four Sea Venom missiles, or a mixture of both. Whilst the LMM has a range of 8 km, the Sea Venom, jointly developed by France and the United Kingdom, has a range of 20 km, allowing the helicopter to remain beyond the reach of most modern air defence systems.

As a combat helicopter, its ISR and weapons capability over land as well as sea is notable. As a utility helicopter operating off the OPVs, the Wildcat can lift underslung loads up to one tonne.

In the MOD Major Projects Report Line of Defence

2015, the AW159 was also evaluated alongside the SH-2G(I). It was noted that the Wildcat met or exceeded all user and operational requirements, it benefitted from its fully integrated avionics system, and it was expected to be cheaper to maintain than the Seasprite.

Challenges for the future In considering options for the future maritime helicopter fleet, it is instructive to once again refer to the MOD Major Projects Report 2015 and the recommendations regarding the ultimate purchase of eight NH90 Medium Utility Helicopters (MUH).

Here seven options, 1- 5A, 5B and 5C, were considered to provide a mixed MUH and helicopter training capability. Option 5B was to purchase 9 medium utility aircraft and 8 training and light utility aircraft. Option 5C was to purchase 10 medium utility aircraft and 10 training and light utility aircraft.

In the assessment provided, whilst Option 5C was considered the

optimum solution because it met all key operational requirements, Option 5B was considered an acceptable solution because it also met all the operational requirements, but it was noted that readiness could be compromised if concurrent tasks were required. In the event, only eight NH90 MUN helicopters were purchased.

In previously raising the issue of the total number of operational helicopters needed for nine ships with the Commander of Joint Forces in the Spring 2019 issue of Line of Defence Magazine, Rear Admiral Gilmour noted that, “As an operational commander I am aware that quantity can have a quality of its own - it is not ideal to have the latest highest tech that is not available due to the small numbers of them that can be afforded.�

Nine new maritime helicopters are envisioned and therefore the cost/ capability trade-off of purchasing any fewer than this must be carefully weighed.

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DEFENCE

COVID-19, Sovereign capability and a trans-Tasman single market The Defence Industry Advisory Council’s Greg Lowe presented at the July NZDIA Member Meeting on supply chain resilience and linking NZ and Australian defence industries via the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum.

Greg Lowe ONZM is Group Chief Executive of Beca and New Zealand co-chair of the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum, having spent his early career in the Royal New Zealand Navy as a Commander and director of marine engineering.

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COVID-19 and Sovereign capability The Defence Industry Advisory Council (DIAC) has been focused on working with the Ministry of Defence post the review Optimising New Zealand Industry involvement in the New Zealand Defence Sector. A key conclusion of that report, says Mr Lowe “ was that maximising support that’s available in the country is likely to be a more cost-effective outcome provided that the value and the quality of services and products meets the standard.”

Changes to procurement policy flowing from the report’s recommendations include the requirement on overseas bidders to submit a New Zealand Industry Engagement Plan. “Recently, the Ministry has strengthened that requirement for international bidders to demonstrate how they are providing value to the New Zealand economy through their engagement with New Zealand industry,” he added.

During the COVID-19 crisis, the minister reached out to the DIAC to initiate a discussion on the impact of COVID on the New Zealand defence industry. According to Mr Lowe, understanding the impact of the COVID crisis on the defence industry is a multifaceted discussion.

“So to assist that, the Ministry recently commissioned a survey of a number of industries, which was conducted by Martin Jenkins,” he said.

“They’ve put their initial report back to the Ministry of Defence, resulting in recommendations to the Minister.”

“The salient point that comes through all of that is a discussion that’s happening in New Zealand and in Australia around what’s termed ‘sovereign capability’. Both countries are using the same language, and they’re essentially asking that as a result of this crisis, what has been the impact of the disruption of supply chains and how has that impacted the ability of defence to do its business.

“Given that defence is expected to operate in times of crisis, the disruption of supply chains to defense activity is not a new subject, of course. So the question that’s being asked is, is there enough sovereign capability in New Zealand and in Australia.”

“The question that the minister, the government, the ministry and the Defence Force is asking is what is the nature of the relationship between the local supply chain and the international supply chain, and is that strong enough?

I think the answer to that is going to be it needs to be stronger and so the recommendations that are going to go back to the minister are about how we might strengthen that supply chain.”

According to Mr Lowe, the Secretary of Defence is holding a workshop with DIAC in September to begin this conversation around a potential program of work that strengthens the relationships New Zealand organisations have with international suppliers.

“What we would expect is that in that procurement activity, as we go Line of Defence

A RAAF F-35A Lightning II A35-026 aircraft.

Image: Australian Government Department of Defence.

forward, there will be closer scrutiny in terms of what the post-supply support chain looks like and how that’s going to be sustained in times of supply chain disruption,” he said. “That’s an important national capability.

“It’s an important capability for the NZDF, and it’s an important capability for the ADF. Both countries are looking at how they optimise those supply chains, and there’s a ministerto-minister discussion going on around that as well, so that’ll be some activity which plays out into next year.”

A single defence market?

Mr Lowe, who is also Co-Chair of the Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum (ANZLF), believes that the Forum provides a potential vehicle for bringing the New Zealand and Australian defence industries together.

“Those of you that are old enough will know that the Single Economic Market (SEM) between Australia and New Zealand is defined by the NZAustralia Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement, which creates the Single Economic Market. There’s an Line of Defence

addendum to that called the Closer Defence Relations (CDR) Agreement [established 1991, and last updated 2018], which creates a single market for defence activity.”

Under these agreements, officials on both sides of the Tasman work to improve trans-Tasman access for New Zealand and Australian companies to New Zealand. The countries’ Prime Ministers meet annually and Foreign Ministers meet six-monthly. Political and business leaders also meet at the annual Australia New Zealand Leadership Forum.

According to Mr Lowe, ANZLF sector groups do much of the heavy lifting. The Forum’s Tourism Sector Group, for example, initiated the recent formation of the Trans-Tasman Safe Border Group, which is working with both governments on the mechanics of the Trans-Tasman nonquarantine travel bubble.

“Now that might seem a little further out given what’s happening in Victoria at the moment. But behind the scenes, the mechanics of that are being laid out and the rules and regulations

for airlines and airports are being laid out,” he added. “That work’s been done under the auspices of the ANZ Leadership Forum.”

According to Mr Lowe, there is an opportunity to set up a defence industry policy group that might connect defence industry in New Zealand to defence industry in Australia. “It’s quite common for these policy groups to be made up of competing organisations, but they work together on the things that are of common interest to them.

“What are the things that are of common interest to defence industry in New Zealand and Australia that some changes to regulation or government policy would improve in terms of access to marketplace?

“Areas of interest might include transportable security clearances, supporting big defence programs in Australia in a time when travel is constrained, and potential regulatory changes. “I’m talking with Andrew Ford [NZDIA Chair] about that and about seeing whether we can set that up.”

Minister’s Awards for Excellence The last thing I’d like to talk about is the Minister of Defence Awards for Excellence to Industry. You heard earlier today I think about the DESC awards for defense employers.

Last year, the Minister’s Awards for Excellence to Industry and the DESC awards were held in a combined event at Parliament House, and a number of you would have attended those.

Nominations close on 07 August, and the nomination process is online and straightforward. Categories include those around the provision of services, the provision of product, and also special awards for individual commitment and special awards for company commitment.

“Quite often, the nominations come from the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force, but there is nothing stopping industry participants nominating other industry participants. If you’ve got a good subcontractor or a good industry partner that you think has been doing a great job and deserves consideration for those awards, then please do get a nomination in.”

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DEFENCE

New NZTE support for industry Graeme Solloway, program lead for New Zealand Trade and Enterprise in the Australian defence market, talked at the NZDIA July Member Meeting on the implications of Budget 2020 and NZTE’s Australian Defence Program.

Graeme Solloway is Programme Leader Australia Defence at New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. He was previously Market Manager Australia Pacific (2014-19) and Trade Commissioner to South Korea (2008-12).

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How NZTE can help exporters NZTE’s purpose – to grow companies internationally – bigger, better, faster – for the good of New Zealand – is based on an understanding that New Zealand is a trading nation, and on a belief that New Zealand is good for the world.

“We’re all about adding value rather than volume,” Graeme Solloway told his physical and virtual NZDIA Member Meeting audience. “We’re in it for the long term, so we want to be involved. We want businesses who are committed to building long term markets.”

NZTE’s customers include New Zealand businesses exporting overseas, and overseas businesses looking to invest in New Zealand. In terms of exporters, the government agency has a big focus on what it refers to as the ‘Focus 700 customers’ cohort, which includes companies in the areas of technology, manufacturing, and food and beverage.

According to Mr Solloway, NZTE can “help you grow your capability, help boost your global reach, reach your customers and potential customers, understand what those markets look like… invest in your growth, and connect you into other businesses.”

“We [also] have a whole program around coalitions… these are shared opportunities where businesses come together to achieve a particular challenge in a market, and that’s something which I think there’s plenty of potential for within a defence market context.”

COVID-19 response According to Mr Solloway, NZTE pivoted quickly in response to COVID-19, including immediately standing up a website for exporters and investors with information on the effects and impact of COVID-19.

The agency ran cashflow clinics and contracted PWC, KPMG, and Deloitte to run workshops to over 400 of its customers on business continuity, which were eagerly taken up.

“We stood up a whole freight organisation, recognising that [our customers] faced tremendous air freight capacity constraints,” he added. “ And that’s now migrated over to being run out of the Ministry of Transport.”

“We made available our Beachhead Advisories Network around the world to provide support for customers that needed immediate assistance in understanding impacts in particular markets, and we pumped a whole lot more money into regional business partners that impacted on over 6,000 companies around New Zealand.”

Budget 2020 Budget 2020 saw a single investment of an additional $216 million over four years into NZTE to fuel the recovery process.

NZTE is now looking at increasing its Focus customer cohort. “We’re going through a process at the moment of analysing what that size will be, whether there’ll be 900 or 1200 or something like that,” said Mr Solloway.

“We haven’t made those decisions yet, but that support has been increased.”

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Defence Experimental Airborne Platform (DEAP) aircraft sensor system check. Image: Australian Government Department of Defence.

“We’re also focusing around digital commerce capability, recognising that one of the lessons learned from the pandemic and the response is the importance of having digital capability within your company, right through digitising your entire business process.” $40 million of the 216 million injection is being put into recruiting more people in NZTE’s international offices to better support New Zealand businesses, and also to provide those people with additional tools to enable them to directly represent their customers in the market.

Strengthening the New Zealand brand is important, he notes, with Tourism New Zealand recently launching a new brand positioning.

“We’ll be following on with a campaign that’s starting off with food and beverage and then through into technology.”

Australia Defence Program NZTE’s Australia Defence Program is based on, and recognises the importance of, the Australian defence market, and the role that New Zealand Line of Defence

businesses can play within Australian defence supply chains.

‘It’s about identification of committed customers,” Mr Solloway explained. “I have been talking with Jenny and the NZDIA team around identifying new businesses in the defence space, and we’re doing some work around capability mapping around that.”

Just recently, Mr Solloway hosted a new defence seminar with Audra McCarthy from the Defence Teaming Center in South Australia, speaking around the topic of how do you position yourself – how do you think about – the Australian defence market as a small-tomedium New Zealand business?

His team has also been engaging with Defence primes in Australia.

As a result of such engagement, representatives from the shipbuilding arm of BAE Systems Australia came over from Adelaide earlier this year to talk to over 70 New Zealand businesses. Online briefings are taking place with Hanwha Defence Australia and Lockheed Martin Australia New Zealand over coming weeks, which

present further opportunities for New Zealand companies to connect with primes.

“We continue to do work around amplifying, talking the New Zealand story within Australia, using our High Commission and our Defence Adviser team in Canberra, to reach into the defence infrastructure in Canberra and continue to raise that story,” he continued.

“To add to that, NZTE is recruiting two new people in Australia to work on the defence market as part of that new tranche of funding into ‘feet on the street’ internationally,” he added. “Those two people will work specifically on building our opportunities in the defence market and working with our customers, you guys, in that space.”

Mr Solloway noted that the website my.nzte.govt.nz has been launched as a new portal for New Zealand businesses. Anyone can register and doing so opens up a wealth of information and resources around particular markets, knowledge and connections.

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BORDER SECURITY

Pre-departure border controls may minimise post-arrival COVID risk The political focus on perceived security gaps in Managed Isolation Facilities, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon, distracts from the critical task of implementing more proactive border management measures.

Nicholas Dynon is Chief Editor of Defsec Media’s defence, security and safety publications, and a commentator on New Zealand security affairs.

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In a 19 August media release, Minister of Housing, Hon Dr Megan Wood, announced that the security of the Managed Isolation and Quarantine System and maritime border would be bolstered by an additional 500 NZDF personnel.

“We are reducing our reliance on private security guards by scaling up Defence Force personnel, especially in the highest risk facilities,” explained the Minister. “They will staff the higher risk security areas such as entry and exit points and public areas.”

On 26 August, the Director General of Health authorised members of the Armed Forces at MIQFs with enforcement officer powers under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 to be able to give legally enforceable directions, and to request a person to provide identifying information.

Under section 18 of the Act the Director-General may authorise “a suitably qualified and trained person who is employed or engaged by the Crown or a Crown entity” to carry out any functions and powers of an enforcement officer under the Act. Some legal experts have since questioned the legality of authorising military personnel under section 18 given that servicemen and women are not employed by the Crown or by a Crown entity, which is generally taken to refer to Executive Government, but rather by the Governor General on behalf of the sovereign in accordance with section 5 of the Defence Act 1990.

Beyond such legal arguments, some commentators have had more to say.

Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie, in a blog post titled “The NZDF Aren’t Handbag Checkers”, wrote “given that we know the ‘War on Covid-19’ is a long game, it would be madness to lock down our Defence Force into a cycle of running hotels, manning roadside barriers, ‘handbag checking’ and ‘drain-sniffing’.”

There are no doubt strong arguments to be made on either side of that debate. But, ultimately, no one is doubting the ability of NZDF personnel deployed at MIQFs to acquit themselves admirably in their unexpected role.

What’s concerning about the Housing Minister’s announcement is its implication that private security is to blame for gaps in the COVID border control regime. As part of her announcement, Dr Woods stated that the government would “be moving to a model of direct employment of security guards with the appropriate training and paying the living wage.”

Unsurprisingly, the private security industry’s peak body, the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), hit back.

“The announcement raises a number of concerns with regards to how the plans will be enacted and the resulting impact on security providers and their staff,” stated NZSA CEO Gary Morrison in a 20 August update to his members. “It also fails to recognise that many of the staff working on these sites are already being paid the living wage and are engaged in industry [NZQA Certificate] Level 3 training.”

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Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine Air Commodore Darryn Webb. Image: NZDF.

Morrison also acknowledged the controversies surrounding the highly criticised role of private security providers in securing Melbourne’s isolation facilities, but pointed out that the making of any trans-Tasman parallels is misleading.

To be sure, there have been disappointing lapses by private security personnel at the MIFs, but these have been overstated by a media that has allegedly been offering bounties for images of dozing isolation facility security guards.

“When things go wrong, the tendency is to blame operational mistakes,” Keith Woodford, Honorary Professor of Agri-Food Systems at Lincoln University wrote recently in relation to the issue. “The reality is that such mistakes always occur in large scale operations. The New Zealand border operation, with between 400 and 500 people entering on most days, is very large scale. Yes, mistakes will happen.”

Meanwhile, with hundreds of travellers entering New Zealand daily under a COVID airline quota, there nevertheless remains the continued risk of the virus infiltrating the border Line of Defence

undetected. As COVID cases continue to rise in the Northern Hemisphere, our air and sea ports are the virus’ most likely avenues of attack.

Prof Woodford recommends a nuanced risk-based approach to entry at the border. “It is very clear that the risks associated with people from some parts of the world are many times greater than those coming from some other regions such as Australia and most of the Pacific Islands,” he wrote. “Restrictions on people entering New Zealand have to be proportional to the specific risk.”

Immigration New Zealand (INZ) has long deployed risk-based policy and processing models to its assessment of visa applicants and persons seeking entry upon arrival. Via pre-flight processes and systems, such as offshore visa applications, Electronic Travel Authorities (NZeTA), the collection of biometric information and Advanced Passenger Processing (APP), INZ effectively pushes our border controls out beyond our shores and at least as far back as the last port of embarkation.

It’s a ‘security in depth’ approach that seeks to assess risk, flag issues and make decisions well before a passenger checks into a New Zealand-bound

plane – and well before they pass through the New Zealand border.

Apart from closing the border to all but ‘exempt’ persons, this ‘predeparture’ border control approach isn’t being used by our border authorities in relation to COVID. Rather, New Zealand has implemented a range of ‘post-arrival’ controls.

COVID border measures, for example, compel those entering the country to spend a minimum of 14 days in managed isolation or quarantine, and to be wearing a face mask from the airport to the facility. These measures make sense, but they all happen once an untested person is already here.

Requiring travellers overseas to produce a clear COVID test prior to departing for New Zealand is one example of a pre-departure border control. But New Zealand doesn’t require it.

Among FAQs on its website, in answer to the question “Why don’t we require exit testing for those coming into New Zealand?”, the Ministry of Health states that it “doesn’t believe pre-departure testing is effective on its own. You could still have COVID-19, even if you test negative for it.”

It’s an answer. But it doesn’t answer the question. Of course pre-departure testing is not effective on its own, but used in combination with the range of other controls already in place it would provide better security in depth.

Many airlines require their passengers to undertake temperature screening and/or produce a clear COVID test prior to their flight, and some even offer pre-flight testing services. Some countries require a clear test prior to a passenger departing their border to travel elsewhere.

Several other countries’ border authorities require travellers to provide extensive health and contact information prior to entry.

There are a range of pre-departure border control options available to Government that, if imposed, would deliver safer travel and reduce the risk of COVID entering the country in the first place.

Managed isolation and quarantine makes sense, but a blinkered focus on fixing holes in managed isolation security in the absence of robust predeparture border controls doesn’t.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY From Oslo to Wellington: A role in keeping the great power peace

Former Defence Minister Hon Wayne Mapp surveys the state of China-US rivalry in East Asia, suggesting that New Zealand can play an important role in diffusing tension in the region – if Wellington chooses to invest.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

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The tempo of the war of words between China and the United States keeps building. It is no longer uncommon to see speculation about a future great power military conflict in East Asia. How much attention should we be paying to this? To what extent is it a real threat?

I last wrote about the China challenge in the Summer 2019-20 issue of Line of Defence Magazine, nearly two years ago. The fundamental trajectory of China has not changed since then.

China remains on track to reaching economic parity with the United States within a few years, though per capita GDP will only be a quarter of that of the US. However, it is worth recollecting that when the US had similar real GDP per capita, it was building its first nuclear aircraft carrier and was about to embark on the Apollo programme.

China has the potential to hugely increase its military capability. Most informed estimates have China’s defence spending at about 2 percent of GDP, about double the official figure.

Taken as a percentage of population, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is about a quarter the size of that of the US defence force, though in absolute terms, the PLA has about the same number of people.

The percentage of people in uniform is actually similar to that of New Zealand but given the high level of investment in high end technology, China will be spending substantially more than New Zealand as a percentage of GDP.

During my time at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC in the summer of 2012, one of the researchers there argued that a combat aircraft would cost China the same in nominal terms as it would in the United States.

I said that took no account of the significantly lower costs in China.

At that time China was building as many Su 27 aircraft per year as the US was building F15E, F16 and F18E/F aircraft.

However, the cost per aircraft was clearly much less than in the United States, particularly given that in 2012 China was spending only 2 percent of GDP on defence and that China’s economy was only half the size of the United States’. The labour cost per aircraft was clearly much less in China than in the US. China’s defence force is still substantially less powerful than that of the United States, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, China has focused its investment on naval and air capabilities that will have greatest effect within China’s continental margin, specifically within 1,000 miles of the China’s coast. This includes both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It is clear that China intends to be the dominant power within this area. China’s reach within this area clearly will not go uncontested. The US has sovereign territory close to China’s continental margin, in Guam and the Northern Marianas. Japan, in particular, will contest China’s influence in the East China Sea, and Line of Defence

Taiwan is building up its military capability to resist the threat of invasion.

China could clearly increase its defence expenditure and build its naval and air capability at a faster rate than is already occurring. But whether that would actually increase China’s dominance within the region is questionable. It might simply spur an arms race both within the region, and with the US. The trajectory of great power competition within East Asia has been evident for a decade, particularly with the establishment of Chinese bases in the South China Sea. The establishment of these bases was the Line of Defence

first real indication that China would no longer be hiding its ambitions behind a veil.

Although he may use more direct language than his predecessors, the fact that the construction of these bases occurred before Xi Jinping became President shows that China has spent many decades working toward its long-held ambition to be the dominant power in East Asia, including within its littoral margins.

What do China’s power ambitions mean for the next decade or so?

It seems hard to imagine that China will forgo its ambitions, and it is much more likely they could intensify.

Similarly, it is unlikely that the US will simply accept this. Washington, along with its core allies, will seek to match or, more likely, overmatch Chinese capability.

We can expect, no matter the nature of the US administration, that there will be increased defence spending, particularly on naval and air capability. The new long-range bombers will be entering service in the late 2020s. The new frigates will also be coming into service. The United States Navy could easily get 100 such ships over the next decade.

If this is the outcome, tensions in East Asia will sharpen, rather than reduce. They will spill over 37

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY to the broader China-US bilateral relationship. Inevitably, the close allies of the United States will also be drawn into the conflict.

In practice, that means the likelihood of military confrontation will increase. This does not mean out right war. Instead, it is likely there will be military incidents, which could be as serious as the sinking of ships and the shooting down of aircraft. The situation would be similar to the most intense phase of the Cold War from 1950 to 1980.

It is worth recollecting that even during this period, and especially in the 1970s, the economic relationship between the West and the Soviet Bloc steadily increased, though of course there never was the level of economic integration as now exists between China and the US, and with the West generally.

It is this latter point that might be seen as providing the best hope to avoid a repeat of the Cold War. However, history is not a comforting guide in this respect. Prior to World War One, the countries of Western Europe had complex and comprehensive economic ties. These were not enough to thwart the slide into war.

Of course, the contemporary situation is different. Both China and the US are nuclear powers.

Nations still recall the disastrous miscalculations that led to war in the early twentieth century, not just once, but twice.

Nevertheless, there are powerful forces and voices on both sides that are likely to impel a more competitive, even confrontational, relationship between China and the US. It seems unlikely that Washington will stand by as China increases its military power and dominance within the littoral margins of East Asia. The US will be more proactive, and it is probable that this will be welcomed by its allies within the region, particularly Japan and Taiwan.

It seems that a new version of the Cold War is more likely than not.

There are too many fundamental factors that are driving toward this outcome.

It will take exceptional statecraft to avoid this prospect. This will 38

require more from Washington than it will from Beijing, since it is US primacy that is being challenged. The US will have to cede some level of power to China, something that will be very difficult for the US to do. It may require a new way of thinking about security within the East and South China Seas, with something akin to both nations acting as coguarantors of security within these waters.

Can New Zealand play a role in defusing potential tension?

It won’t be easy. As a member of Five Eyes and part of the broader Western grouping of nations, there will be an expectation that New Zealand will simply stand alongside its traditional partners. However, we add relatively little by being simply part of the chorus.

It would be better for New Zealand to find a way to act more creatively Line of Defence

to suggest alternative ways to reduce the tension. One of my roles is the Deputy Chair of the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC), established under the Nuclear Free legislation.

PACDAC has proposed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that New Zealand should fund an Aotearoa Peace Research Institute modelled on the Norwegian Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

Line of Defence

Norway has been able to manage the art of being a leading member of NATO while devoting significant public money to peacebuilding, both through peacekeeping missions with the UN and with building intellectual capacity to deal with the difficult art of resolving military conflict through negotiation and mediation. Norway has been prominent in many international peacebuilding initiatives, particularly in assisting parties to defuse regional conflicts.

PRIO is the principal reason why Norway is able to fulfil this role. PRIO provides the intellectual capital and skills to build a body of serious work to make a measurable difference in ameliorating and reducing conf lict.

Smaller nations, even when they are part of security alliances, are able to act more flexibly than the larger, more central nations. New Zealand needs to make more of this advantage than we currently do. The increased tension in East Asia, particularly among the great powers, means the imperative for New Zealand is to be more active than we currently are.

A small proportion of the investment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Defence could be directed to establishing an Aotearoa Peace Research Institute. We currently spend nearly $4 billion on defence and foreign affairs. An institute could be started for less than $1 million.

Such an institute would bring together scholars, diplomats and those with experience in international relations to work on initiatives that could lead to resolving regional competition other than by a show of arms. The work of the Institute would include symposia, dialogue and developing the architecture for a more co-operative Asia Pacific.

The Institute would have to show a realistic understanding of the forces that drive the current levels of tension if it is to make a meaningful contribution to regional dialogue.

The objective would be for the Institute to build a body of work that is respected by the political, foreign affairs and defence establishments within the region. If this is achieved, then New Zealand will be able to offer more than it is currently able to do.

Without alternative approaches, the risk that the Asia Pacific region will slide into a new cold war is all too likely. The proposed institute, costing less than 0.1 percent of the combined defence and foreign affairs budgets, would seem to be an appropriate step for New Zealand to take. The cost would be modest, but the gain could be very significant.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Does an increasingly powerful China present a dilemma for New Zealand?

New Zealand: Do we face a China dilemma? Former New Zealand Ambassador to China John McKinnon CNZM QSO and Beijing-based business leader David Mahon deliver sage perspectives at a recent public discussion, reports Nicholas Dynon.

John McKinnon CNZM QSO is a twotime New Zealand Ambassador to China, and a former Chief Executive of the Ministry of Defence.

David Mahon is the Executive Chairman of Beijing-based Mahon China Investment Management Limited 40

Against the background of a rising China, New Zealand’s relationship with the Middle Kingdom is often framed within media and politics in binary terms: trade versus security, friend versus foe, China versus the US. New Zealand’s choices over the future of this relationship thus tend to be talked about as a set of dilemmas.

And these apparent dilemmas are by no means trifling. Amid the increasingly hyperbolic alarmism of political debate and the cacophonic crassness of click-bait journalism our China dilemmas are presented as urgent, stark and – ultimately – personal.

But, does China indeed pose a dilemma to New Zealand, or – beyond the black-and-white presented to us by the pundits – does China pose something else entirely?

A high stakes question John McKinnon, who served twice as New Zealand Ambassador to China (2001-04 and 2015-18) and is a former Secretary of Defence, sees no China dilemma for New Zealand but rather a challenge. “I think that challenge is significant and I think for the future of our country it’s important that we face up to it,” he told a New Zealand China Friendship Society public discussion audience in July, “and it’s important that we actually get it right.”

“This is high stakes stuff. Getting it right is more than just important, I think it’s crucial for our national future” According to McKinnon, the challenge is that China is a country “with

whom we have to have a relationship” yet at the same time it’s a country “very different from New Zealand.”

“There are always going to be issues which we have different views on and different perspectives on, and the… challenge is how do you manage a relationship while respecting those differences at the same time as you continue to place value in the things that both bind you together and create common interests.”

David Mahon, who has lived in Beijing since 1984, is chairman of Mahon China Investments and a veteran advisor on China to business leaders, public servants, and politicians. He too rebukes the notion of a dilemma.

“I would say that there is a dilemma and the dilemma is that we think we have a dilemma. We think we have to choose,” posited Mahon. “The trouble is that New Zealand believes it has to make a choice. We don’t have to make a choice.”

Difficulties adjusting to new norm Although both McKinnon and Mahon both negate the idea of a China dilemma, they nevertheless share an understanding of the various factors that have given rise to it. Prominent amongst these is the West’s coming to terms with a China that within a mere five decades has transformed itself from the China with whom formal diplomatic relations were established in the 1970s.

“China became a wealthy country and quite a powerful Line of Defence

country influential in the region and influential in the world,” said McKinnon. “And in a sense we’re all coming to terms with what that actually means for us.”

Mahon puts it in more direct terms.

The China of the latter 20th century “was easy to deal with because it could be condescended to.” The problem now, as he sees it, “isn’t that China’s changed profoundly, but that China has become confident and China has become strong.”

According to both McKinnon and Mahon, the dilemma – if there is one – then becomes one of perspective.

Does one fear, accept, or seek to deny the idea of an emergent China? It’s a choice that perhaps has less to do with China and more to do with ourselves – and one with potentially profound implications.

“The dilemma,” argues Mahon, “is that we are increasingly going to be asked to be drawn into this very dangerous, pointless attempt to contain China or reduce China because we’re afraid we’re losing our mojo as the West.”

Line of Defence

Keeping channels for understanding open Whereas many international political figures and commentators have chosen to view a resurgent China through a negative lens, he believes that New Zealand can cut a different path.

“We’ve got to be careful because the rest of the world and the Western media is trying to make us believe that we have to choose between the West and China. We don’t. We [can] choose ourselves and [in doing so] choose to be true to ourselves.”

“New Zealanders are non-aligned country. We make our own decisions.

We went nuclear free. We [were the first to secure a] free trade agreement with China and were derided [at the time].”

“Now we may not always like things that are going on in China and China may not always like things that it sees here,” said McKinnon, “but regardless of that we have to find ways of connecting with one another.”

The key to this, he suggests, is ensuring that lines of communication lines remain open and that they remain channels for understanding.

“We need to keep talking even if we have disagreements and especially if we have disagreements. It’s important to keep those lines of communication open because otherwise we’re never going to know what is really animating people in China and equally they will not know why it is that our governments say and do certain things.”

The dangerous flip-side to this is a relationship based on mutual misunderstanding, and this, says McKinnon, is a grave risk. “I worry that we will get it wrong… in other words that New Zealand’s management of the China relationship somehow or other will take us into a place we shouldn’t probably be.”

More information: inspired by the work of Rewi Alley QSO MM, the New Zealand China Friendship Society was established in 1952 to promote peopleto-people links between China and New Zealand https://nzchinasociety.org. nz. A video of highlights from the public discussion can be viewed at https://youtu.be/ a6YhI80EYNM 41

HOMELAND SECURITY Massey University publishes latest National Security Journal In this abridged ‘Comment from the Editors’, Professor Rouben Azizian and Dr John Battersby provide a brief introduction to the just-published second instalment of the National Security Journal.

The successful launch of the National Security Journal last year was not without doubts about its sustainability in the highly competitive academic journal market and its relevance for the broad audience of security analysts, practitioners and students.

The feedback that we have received so far, from across the government sector in New Zealand and from around the globe, confirms that our readers see the benefit of this synergy of diverse and inclusive expertise and ideas.

This issue, like the one before, offers perspectives on a wide range of security issues. Reuben Steff’s article

Professor Rouben Azizian is Director of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

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provides an in-depth analysis of the North Korean problem, explaining the historical context to the current situation on the Korean peninsula and, importantly, the motives driving the North Korean position. This insight is useful and timely.

Carl Bradley’s article looks at New Zealand’s gangs from a broad cultural perspective. Gang numbers in this country have been increasing in recent times, boosted by deportations from Australia who arrive here with established Australian underworld connections. Bradley argues, that “increased economic inequality will see gang membership continue to rise” and moves by some groups to position themselves to further control illicit, and perhaps certain licit, commodities.

The socio-economic driver for gang membership is important for the New Zealand government to take note of, as COVID-19 leaves the country’s economy with high unemployment, high costs of living, a continuing housing crisis, and increasing gang recruitment in prisons.

Holly Vandenberg and Wil Hoverd discuss the use (and misuse) of the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, comparing the use of these terms before and after the 15 March 2019 attacks in Christchurch. The authors argue there is an inconsistency in the use of the terms which indicates confusion and directly influences government and security agencies, as well as the media and general population.

Olivia Cleaver and Germana Nicklin’s article on the use of ‘false

personas’ in social media intelligence collection discusses the ambiguity of private information on publicly available social media systems. There is social license to use these systems in intelligence collection, but the authors shed light on an area which has so far defied legislators’ abilities to clarify the public interest, the right to privacy, and appropriateness of covert use of this information.

John Battersby, Rhys Ball and Nick Nelson challenge New Zealand’s recently published “Countering terrorism and violent extremism national strategy” as not hitting the mark that it should. The authors take readers briefly over what a strategy should be, then review the practice of the Five Eyes partner nations and their CT strategy documents.

Overall, it is contended that New Zealand’s strategy is all too brief and compares unfavourably with more comprehensive and explained strategies of our security partners.

The broader formation, background research and compilation of strategy documents is an area where academics and practitioners could work much more closely together.

Finally, National Security Journal is privileged to have Yevgeny Zvedre’s article on space weaponisation – a Russian perspective. The implications of a space arms race are alarming, and the author’s call for increased diplomatic initiatives to keep space free of weapons is genuine, urgent and well made.

Read the Journal online at https://nationalsecurityjournal.nz Line of Defence

PACIFIC SECURITY DYNAMICS 16 – 19 November 2020 PACIFIC SECURITY DYNAMICS This four day course delivers an in-depth and interactive study of comprehensive security challenges and cooperation opportunities in the vast Pacific region which stretches from the Antarctic in the south to the Bering Strait in the north.

The course includes presentations by prominent experts from academia and the public/private sector, daily small group deliberations and a concluding tabletop exercise. Topics will also cover the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

KEY TOPICS INCLUDE: •

sources and factors undermining regional security and stability;

•

key regional actors, their policies and relationships;

•

regional flash points, such as the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea;

•

transnational crime, climate change and resource security;

•

security-trade-development nexus;

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implications of the New Zealand Government policy “reset” towards the Pacific Islands.

LEARNING OUTCOMES •

gain comprehensive knowledge of complex regional security challenges and strategic trends;

•

develop New Zealand responses to these challenges and trends.

To register visit: pacificsecuritydynamics.co.nz

LEAD ACADEMIC PRESENTERS AND FACILITATORS Professor Rouben Azizian Dr Anna Powles Dr Germana Nicklin Also presentations by senior diplomatic, New Zealand government, business and civil society representatives.

WHAT: WHEN: WHERE: PRICE: CONTACT:

4 day Short Course 16 – 19 November 2020 Executive Seminar Suite, Gate A, Massey University, Wellington Campus $2799 (inc gst) Earlybird - $2519 (inc gst) (until 16 October) Claire Grant c.grant@massey.ac.nz 04 801 5799 extn 63597

HOMELAND SECURITY Bioterrorism as a National Security Threat: A suggested model

COVID-19 has increased awareness of pandemics and biosecurity hazards as national security threats. Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand, Dr Itzhak Gerberg, suggests it’s also time to counter the spectre of bioterrorism.

Dr Itzhak Gerberg is Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand. He has held Ambassadorial positions to Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Georgia, with prior postings to the Philippines, India and China.

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The concept of national security changed after 11 September 2001, transforming into something more comprehensive. This broader ranging concept is reflected in the definition of national security adopted at this year’s Munich Security Conference “which encompasses not only traditional national or military security, but also takes into account the economic, environmental, and human dimensions of security.”

Possessing parallels with New Zealand’s “all hazards – all risks” approach to national security, such definitions include ‘non-traditional’ security issues, such as environmental and biological hazards.

Dr William Hoverd of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies refers to biosecurity as a current major concern that looms large as a future non-traditional issue. Just last July, New Zealand Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark was quoted by the New Zealand Herald as commenting “defence has been considering the changing impact of biological hazards and threats on New Zealand’s security.”

Despite the resemblance, there are definitional distinctions between ‘biosecurity’, ‘biosafety’ and ‘biocrime’.

In essence, biosecurity deals with bio-threats in general, including bioterrorism, whereas biosafety refers to pandemics, such as COVID-19.

Biocrime refers to criminal action conducted using biological agents.

COVID-19 has certainly increased awareness of bioterrorism as a potential national security threat. In terms of non-conventional security threats, however, bioterror gets less attention in comparison to other types of terror; due probably to the complexity of producing biological weapons as well as the difficulty in using them.

Bioterrorism is defined by William C. Shiel Jr. as: “terrorism using biological agents that are harmful to humans”. It is characterized by the tactical surprise, strong initial impact and imposition of anxiety and fear usually associated with terrorism, but achieved via a pandemic, which is evasive in nature and causes massive disruption.

For the purposes of this article, I define bioterrorism as the intentional release or dissemination of biological agents (such as bacteria, viruses, insects, fungi or toxins) that can sicken or kill people, livestock and crops and/or biologically pollute the environment.

It was Bill Gates who commented at the 2017 Munich Security Conference that “bioterrorism could kill more than nuclear war – but no one is ready to deal with it.”

Bioterrorism is indeed in need of special attention as a threat to national security, partly because it is different to other types of terror in the following ways: Line of Defence

• First and foremost, bioterror is multivariant in terms of biological agents and is diverse in terms of its contagious capabilities.

• Unlike other types of terror, the unpredictability of bioterror and its consequences makes resilience against it difficult.

• Bioterror has borderless effects.

• Bioterror can be used without leaving a trail to its source.

• Bioterror can impose irrational fear, anxiety and high degree of uncertainty.

• Bioterror has a negative impact not only on health but also on other domains such as economy, ecology, society and politics.

• Obstruction options are complex.

• Research concerning bioterror, detection and rapid response to biological threats is insufficient.

The core elements of international counterterrorism are prevention and preparation, containment and management, damage control and mitigation. But considering the complexity of bioterror and its alarming potential impact, I suggest the following as a theoretical model of operative biosecurity: 1. Awareness – considering the relatively low awareness of bioterror compared with other types of terrorism, it is essential to improve awareness of bioterror as a national security threat and to enhance academic research in relation to its multivariant aspects.

2. Prevention based on pre-incident detection (intelligence) and ethical considerations – there is a rule of thumb that prevention and risk reduction against bioterrorism are more effective than obstruction.

Detection is essential to early warning, and any information achieved by preincident intelligence can contribute to the reduction of uncertainty and fear.

It is manifestly clear that getting information about new types of biological agents and/or biological weapons is crucial to biosecurity, but it is difficult to achieve this.

New initiatives and ideas should be encouraged. Ethics approaches can be used to denounce bioterrorism, and – Line of Defence

for that purpose – bioterror should be presented as an extreme, immoral and illegitimate action.

3. Medical containment – the means, tools, functions and constituents used in terms of counter measures based on medical institutions, such as hospitals, and programs.

In practice, it refers to establishing a program using advanced technology, including robotics and automation, that can perform medical activities without direct contact; medical teams; reliable medical diagnostic kits; medical protocols on critical basic triage and immediate response; bio forensics capability with a focus on mass casualties; safe hospitalisation, including isolation (quarantine); medicines and vaccinations; personal protective equipment (PPE); and physical distancing.

4. Identification – initial hazard identification of bioterror is a key preliminary element. Equally important is classification of the various types of biological agent, its form, its source, and the identification of the geography affected.

5. Legislation / domestic law and order – the use and stockpiling of biological weapons must be legislated as a criminal offence based on the US Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act. 6. International Affairs / Diplomacy – implementation of conventions and treaties relating to bioterrorism, including the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which covers the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons, as well as the destruction of biological weapons. Although even when such conventions/treaties are established, there remains the challenge of how to apply them.

Active participation of relevant UN organisations is essential and can contribute to international compliance.

However, international politics makes it difficult to impose sanctions for violations of such agreements. The possibility of dual-use medical and/or

pharmaceutical materials must also be taken into account.

Diplomacy can be helpful in building medical cooperation, integration of international medical efforts, assurance of medical supply chains and financial support.

Diplomacy can also be very helpful in the prevention of leakage of biological weapons to terror organisations.

7. Medical treatment, containment and inspection based on the principles of integrated risk management – coordination and control in terms of roles, sources of authority, decision making process and responsibilities for administration and resource allocation, action planning and strategy (including exit strategy); and coordination between institutions and organisations with a focus on health and the economy.

8. Situation analysis based on damage control principles.

9. Political leadership, trust and psychological factors – public trust in government is a key element of success in the fight against bioterror. Relevant, transparent and reliable information provided in real time lends credibility and trustworthiness and is a counter measure to misinformation, fake news and rumors.

10. Obviation, research and recovery plan – studying of medical test results, indices, time range, expansion, infection spread circles, incubation period, and collateral damage. Development of future recommendations that include legal aspects, economic inducements for resilient and sustainable development aimed at a return to normality and reduction of future vulnerability.

This theoretical model of operative biosecurity is offered as a road map for combatting bioterrorism as a national security threat.

The views expressed are based on the author’s academic background and do not reflect that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel. This article is based on a presentation delivered at the Asia-Pacific Security Innovation Forum, Queenstown, 29-30 July 2020.

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REVIEWS & EVENTS

Book Review: Crossing the Lines Historian Brent Coutts brings to light the previously untold history of New Zealand homosexual soldiers in World War Two, relating the surprising story of three ordinary men living through extraordinary times.

Crossing the Lines is the first history of New Zealand homosexual soldiers in World War Two. Award-winning teacher and historian Brent Coutts brings their experiences to life through the extraordinary experiences of Harold Robinson, Ralph Dyer and Douglas Morison, three men who shared a queer identity and a love of performance.

As female impersonators in the Kiwi and Tui concert parties in the Pacific, they found a place to live as gay men within the military forces, boosting the morale of personnel in the Pacific Campaign and, along the way, falling in love with some of the men they met.

After 10 years of multiple first-hand interviews and painstaking archival research, Coutts discovered there was a surprising level of acceptance of homosexuality by the military, considering its illegal status. “We assume people had to keep their sexuality hidden and yes, discretion was necessary, but homosexual soldiers had a fairly open experience regarding being gay during the war,” says Coutts.

Harold Robinson, a ballet dancer, found a role as the batman (personal servant) of Major John Marshall, who later became New Zealand’s prime minister. “He’s gone down in history as being one of our conservative PMs, yet, during the war, he had a batman who crossed-dressed.”

Coutts discovered from court-martial files that very few prosecutions were carried out on grounds of homosexuality.

“Of thousands of court-martials, there were just eight prosecutions involving 10 gay men among the surviving records, “has said”.

Crossing the Lines reveals Harold’s friendship and later marriage to Auckland socialite and lesbian Freda Stark. “Harold met Freda in Auckland, just as he was about to leave for Egypt. Freda sent him food parcels. Later [following the war], Harold got a soldier’s bursary to attend

Author Brent Coutts.

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the Sadler’s Wells Ballet School in London where Freda joined him. They got married and tried for a few months to have a normal relationship.”

This richly illustrated account, which includes rarely seen photos, is principally a story of mateship. It follows the men from their formative pre-war lives to their experiences living in post war London, where they embraced the many new possibilities available. It is a story of the search for love and belonging, and the foundation of the queer community today.

Brent Coutts is a University of Otago graduate living in Auckland. He is the author of Protest in New Zealand (2013), Re-Reading the Rainbow (2017) and Pacific History (2018), which focus on themes of social justice, identity and decolonisation. In 2009 he was awarded a teaching fellowship from the Royal Society Te Apārangi, which allowed him to begin research into New Zealand soldiers’ experiences during WWII. Crossing the Lines was published on 03 August 2020 by Otago University Press.

Line of Defence

REACH

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