Hayden Okurowski ‘25

Bibliography: Abel, Theodore. “The Sociology of Concentration Camps.” Social Forces 30, no. 2 (December 1951): 15055.

Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. “The organizational structure of Auschwitz Concentration Camp.” Auschwitz-Birkenau. Accessed April 24, 2022. https:// www.auschwitz.org/en/history/the-ss-garrison/theorganizational-structure-of-auschwitz-concentrationcamp/.

Birkbeck University of London. “Camp System.” The Nazi Concentration Camps. Accessed May 12, 2022. http:// www.camps.bbk.ac.uk/themes/camp-system.html.

Evans, Richard J. “Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany.” The British Academy, 2007, 53-81. Accessed May 23, 2022. https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/ documents/2036/pba151p053.pdf.

Frankl, Viktor E. Man’s Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press, 2006.

“The Gas Chambers.” Education Institute of Scotland. Last modified February 3, 2012. Accessed May 23, 2022. https://www.eis.org.uk/Auschwitz/Holocaustpart12.

Glasner-Heled, Galia, and Dan Bar-On. “Displaced: The Memoir of Eliezer Gruenbaum, Kapo at Birkenau— Translation and Commentary.” Shofar 27, no. 2 (Winter 2009): 1-23.

Gwiazda, Henry J. II. “The Nazi Racial War: Concentration Camps in the New Order.” The Polish Review 61, no. 3 (2016): 59-84.

Megargee, Geoffrey P. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945: Early Camps, Youth Camps, and Concentration Camps and Subcamps under the SS-Business Administration Main Office (WVHA). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

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How China’s Over-Reliance on Coal Will Affect its Role in the 21st Century

Middle East and China

Hayden Okurowski ‘25

According to Kenneth Lieberthal, Senior director at the National Security Councils Asia desk under Pres. Bill Clinton, “The Chinese wouldn’t put it this way themselves, but in their hearts, I think they believe that the 21st century is China’s century.” This statement conveys President Xi’s strategic vision for China to surpass the United States and become the next great superpower of the 21st century. Specifically, China has the objectives to become the global leader in its economy, military, technology, and foreign policy. China has also pledged to be a world leader in climate change and renewable energy. On October 29, 2021, two days before the start of COP26, Xi and China confirmed their commitment to the terms of the Paris Agreement by promising to reach peak carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve net zero emissions before 2060.1 With China being the world leader in carbon emissions, China’s dependence on coal as its largest source of energy must be addressed as part of a new energy policy if China is to be successful in meeting its environmental goals. In this regard, China’s challenge is how to address its ongoing power shortages and maintain economic growth while continuing to meet its international obligations to lower carbon emissions. How China addresses this challenge will need to be solved at both national and provincial levels if China wishes to succeed in making the 21st century China’s century.

China’s most pressing energy and environmental challenge is that despite China’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions, its current energy infrastructure is still dependent on coal. China is dependent on coal primarily due to its enormous economic growth and the fact that coal is cheap and available in China.2 From 1990 to 2019, China’s coal consumption nearly quadrupled from 527 metric tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 1,951 Mtoe. In 2019, coal made up 57.7 percent of China’s energy use.

Since 2011, China has consumed more coal than the rest of the world combined. China’s industrial sector is by far the largest consumer of coal.3 Internally, China’s continued dependence on coal highlights the struggle between China’s need to grow its economy with cheap and readily available coal power and the country’s broad desire to lower CO2 emissions. This has put China’s stated national environmental objectives and policies in direct conflict with its provincial energy requirements.4 China has historically struggled with environmental enforcement at the local level when pressured; provincial governments have prioritized economic development over the environment.5 Economic development in China is governed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NRDC), while the Energy policies are governed by the National Energy Administration (NEA) and Environmental policies are led by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). The lack of integration between these three organizations and the policies they create have been demonstrated since 2015. In 2015, China passed the Environmental Protection Law, which was the nation’s first major environmental reform legislation of the last two decades. The law put stricter punishment and laws on polluters. As part of the Environmental Protection Law, China committed to a future Five-Year Plan that would directly address cuts to carbon emissions and showed a more dedicated commitment to environmental protection.6 However, since 2015, China has remained vague in how they will accomplish stated environmental goals and actions have been often contradictory to pledges made to protect the environment. For example, China has pledged to raise its power generation from solar and wind plants to 11 percent of total power consumption and cut coal production to below 56 percent of total energy consumption.7, 8 Nonetheless, in the post-pandemic economic surge, China’s energy demands have increased. Supply could not meet demand in the spring of 2021 and 11 provinces experienced significant power outages.9 China’s increased demands for power were met with demands for increased coal consumption by the China Electricity Council. On July 30, 2021, some within the Politburo even argued the crisis in the provinces was because many local governments were too aggressive with their attempts to reduce emissions and limit coal consumption.10 The reality is that China’s economy and energy sector currently remains dependent on coal. China is still growing its coal industry and is currently the world leader in building new coal power plants. In 2020, China brought close to 50 gigawatts of coal fired power plants online, which is over 3 times the total of the rest of the world combined. As of 2021, a total of 247 gigawatts of coal power is now in planning and development.11

Due to China’s massive continued increased investment in the use of fossil fuels, many internationally question the validity of China’s claims to reach peak emissions by 2030.12 China’s national solution to this problem is complex. In theory, the Chinese policy process should be able to develop a strategic balance between the economy, power production and the environment because the CCP is diffused throughout the local, provincial, and national government. In reality, China’s energy, economic, and environmental policies follow a pattern of “fragmented authoritarianism”

as outlined by Lieberthal.13 Fragmented authoritarianism maintains that despite the centralized power of the CCP, delegation of decision making and responsibility move downward to local levels of government; in addition, power also moves horizontally between state ministries that often have competing ideals and responsibilities. The issue of fragmented authoritarianism has plagued China’s interaction of environmental, economic, and energy policies. More specifically, China has historically struggled with environmental enforcement at the local level when pressured; provincial governments have prioritized economic development over the environment.14 Without reform, this problem is likely to continue. The solution may lie with Xi Jinping who leads with an emphasis on centralized authoritarianism and can increase the power of the central authority over provincial independence. Xi can accomplish this through a series of future Five Year Plans with a long-term strategic approach that focuses on unifying the balance of China’s national needs for development, energy, and the environment. The task of making the switch to carbon neutral energy sources will not be easy, but the place to start is in Northwest China, where wind and solar renewable energy are abundant. The Northwest also has a longstanding tradition of cooperation between provinces and the electrical sector. With success in the Northwest, Xi can bring a coordinated model of economic, energy, and environmental policies to the rest of China.15 In doing so, Xi can make a national commitment to coordinate coal retirement initiatives over time and not disrupt the economy and the availability of power. China’s motivation to pursue an immediate path to net-zero carbon emission extends beyond purely environmental issues. To mitigate the security risks of fossil fuels, China must quickly transition to carbon neutral resources. While China is the largest consumer of energy, each year only a fraction of its energy comes domestically. Over 70% of its oil and 40% of its gas usage are imported.16 Although China is self-reliant with its production of coal, it over relies on its number one environmental polluter. This puts China into a vulnerable position due to regional instability, political sanctions, and foreign disputes, which could cause China to drastically worsen an already ongoing energy crisis. So, if China can transition to a cleaner form of energy, they will become self-sufficient while helping the environment. China’s switch to renewable energy would also benefit its global geopolitics. China would be able to expand its military presence in regions for the purpose of energy security and protection of domestically produced renewable energy.17 And, with China being a large superpower on the global stage, the country would have the potential to influence smaller countries to become energy efficient. China also must use its environmental movement to create “soft power” and mitigate political tensions to improve its image and prove that China is truthful in its goals to become carbon neutral.18 As China has been viewed as an antagonist on the world stage in the past years, China must prove its willingness to collaborate with the rest of the world. China may do this by completing the promises set out by the 2021 Paris Agreement, which will set China as a world leader in environmental change. By taking a leadership role and committing

to addressing the challenges, it will create opportunities for China to build trust among nations and grow its political influence.

Despite China’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions, its most pressing energy and environmental challenge is that their current energy infrastructure is still dependent on coal. Internally, C h i n a’s continued dependence on coal highlights the struggle between China’s need to grow its economy with cheap and readily available coal power and the country’s broad desire to lower CO2 emissions. The lack of integration between China’s economic development, energy, and environmental policies have been demonstrated since the start of the 21st century. In 2015, China passed the Environmental Protection Law, which was the nation’s first major environmental reform legislation of the last two decades. However, since 2015, China has remained vague in how they will accomplish stated environmental goals and actions have been often contradictory to pledges made to protect the environment. This is highlighted by the fact that as of 2021, a total of 247 gigawatts of coal power has been used in planning and development. Due to China’s massive continued increased investment in the use of fossil fuels, many internationally question the validity of China’s claims to reach peak emissions by 2030. China’s inability to reconcile economic development, energy, and environmental policy is in part due to “fragmented authoritarianism.” Without reform, this problem is likely to continue. The solution may lie with Xi Jinping, who must now place new emphasis on increasing the power of central authority over provincial independence. This can only be achieved on a series of future Five Year Plans with a long-term strategic approach in which Xi can focus on unifying the balance of China’s national needs with the needs of the provinces. China’s motivation to pursue an immediate path to net-zero carbon emission goes beyond purely environmental issues and extends into security risks related to energy independence. Furthermore, China must also use its environmental movement to mitigate political tensions and improve its image to the international community by demonstrating it is truthful in its goals to become carbon neutral. By taking a leadership role and committing to addressing their environmental challenges, China creates an opportunity to build trust among nations and grow its political influence as a leader in the environmental movement. Doing so would be an important step in making the 21st century China’s century.

Endnotes

1 Chua, Amy. “China Ascendant.” In Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance--and Why They Fall, 287. New York: Doubleday, 2008. 2Jiang, Zemin. Research on Energy Issues in China. Amsterdam: Elsevier/Academic Press, 2010. 3Center for Strategic and International Studies. ChinaPower Project--How is China’s Energy Footprint Changing? 2019. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/. 4Standaert, Michael. “Despite Pledges to Cut Emissions, China Goes on a Coal Spree.” Yale Environment 360, March 24, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. 5Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Fang Zhang. “China is positioned to lead on climate change as the US rolls back its policies.” The Conversation, September 12, 2019. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// theconversation.com/china-is-positioned-tolead-on-climate-change-as-the-us-rolls-back-itspolicies-114897 6Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Xiaowei Xuan. “National Circumstances.” In Titans of the Climate: Explaining Policy Process in the United States and China. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2019. 7Xu, Muyu. “China to bring solar and wind power generation to 11% of total electricity use in 2021.” Reuters, April 18, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainablebusiness/china-bring-solar-wind-power-generation11-total-electricity-use-2021-2021-04-19/. 8Xu, Muyu A. “China to cut coal use share below 56% in 2021.” Reuters, April 22, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://www.reuters. com/world/china/china-cut-coal-use-share below-56-2021-2021-04-22/. 9Baiyu, Gao. “Will recent power shortages slow China’s progress to carbon neutrality?” China Dialogue, November 3, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// chinadialogue.net/en/energy/will-recent-powershortages-slow-chinas-progress-to-carbon-neutrality/. 10Cheng, Evelyn. “China has ‘no other choice’ but to rely on coal power for now, official says.” Sustainable Future, April 29, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/29/climate-china-hasno-other-choice-but-to-rely-on-coal-power-for-now. html. 11Standaert, Michael. “Despite Pledges to Cut Emissions, China Goes on a Coal Spree.” Yale Environment 360, March 24, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. 12Yao, Aidan. “China: Path to ‘Net-Zero.’” Research & Strategy Insights. Last modified March 18, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. file:///C:/Users/ Admin/Downloads/China%20-%20Path%20 to%20%E2%80%98Net-Zero%E2%80%99%20%20 20210318%20en.pdf. 13The College of Staten Island’s Modern China Studies Group. “China Rises Companion--Political Governance and Fragmented Authoritarianism.” New York Times. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://archive.nytimes. com/www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-about. html. 14Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Fang Zhang. “China is positioned to lead on climate change as the US rolls back its policies.” The Conversation, September 12, 2019. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// theconversation.com/china-is-positioned-tolead-on-climate-change-as-the-us-rolls-back-itspolicies-114897 15Road Map for Power Sector Transition and Coal Generation Retirement in Northwest China. N.P.: Regulatory Assistance Project, 2021.

16Center for Strategic and International Studies. ChinaPower Project--How is China’s Energy Footprint Changing? 2019. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// chinapower.csis.org/energy-footprint/. 17Yao, Aidan. “China: Path to ‘Net-Zero.’” Research & Strategy Insights. Last modified March 18, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. file:///C:/Users/ Admin/Downloads/China%20-%20Path%20 to%20%E2%80%98Net-Zero%E2%80%99%20%20 20210318%20en.pdf. 18Yao, Aidan. “China: Path to ‘Net-Zero.’” Research & Strategy Insights. Last modified March 18, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. file:///C:/Users/ Admin/Downloads/China%20-%20Path%20 to%20%E2%80%98Net-Zero%E2%80%99%20%20 20210318%20en.pdf.

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Center for Strategic and International Studies. ChinaPower Project--How is China’s Energy Footprint Changing? 2019. Accessed January 9,2022.https://chinapower.csis.org/energyfootprint/.

Cheng, Evelyn. “China has ‘no other choice’ but to rely on coal power for now, official says.” Sustainable Future, April 29, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://www. cnbc.com/2021/04/29/climate-china-has-noother-choice-but-to-rely-on-coal-power-fornow.html.

Chua, Amy. “China Ascendant.” In Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance--and Why They Fall, 287. New York: Doubleday, 2008.

The College of Staten Island’s Modern China Studies Group. “China Rises Companion--Political Governance and Fragmented Authoritarianism.” New York Times. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://archive.nytimes.com/ www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-chinaabout.html.

Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Xiaowei Xuan. “National Circumstances.” In Titans of the Climate: Explaining Policy Process in the United States and China. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2019.

Gallagher, Kelly Sims, and Fang Zhang. “China is positioned to lead on climate change as the US rolls back its policies.” The Conversation,September 12, 2019. Accessed January 9, 2022. https:// theconversation.com/china-is-positionedto-lead-on-climate-change-as-theus-rolls-back-its-policies-114897.

Gallagher, Kelly Sims, Fang Zhang, Robbie Orvis, Jeffrey Rissman, and Qiang Liu. “Assessing the Policy Gaps for Achieving China’s Climate Targets in the Paris Agreement.” Nature Communications 10, no. 1 (March 26, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1038s41467-019-09159-0.

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Xu, Muyu A. “China to cut coal use share below 56% in 2021.” Reuters, April 22, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. https://www. reuters.com/world/china/china-cut-coal-useshare-below-56-2021-2021-04-22/.

Yao, Aidan. “China: Path to ‘Net-Zero.’” Research & Strategy Insights. Last modified March 18, 2021. Accessed January 9, 2022. file:///C:/Users/Admin/Downloads/ China%20-%20Path%20to%20%E2%80%98NetZero%E2%80%99%20%2020210318%20en.pdf.

HISTORICAL FILM REIVEW