The Plane That Almost Ate Seattle Cooper Nelson ‘23

The Plane That Almost Ate Seattle:

The Motivations Behind America’s Failed Supersonic Transport Program Monaco Prize-winner 2022 | AP United States History

Cooper Nelson ‘23

Introduction On the crisp morning of October 14th, 1947, a Boeing B-29 bomber took off from a dry lakebed in the Mojave Desert in California. The bomber’s payload was US Air Force Captain Chuck Yeager and his Bell X-1 aircraft, nicknamed “Glamorous Glennis” for Yeager’s wife (Figure 1). The experimental X-1, with its bullet-like contours, was designed to be the first plane to transcend the speed of sound. Little more than a blood-orange aluminum can strapped to a rocket engine, the X-1 was the evolution of numerous failed military attempts to fly faster than sound. The risk of failure was severe, and multiple pilots had perished trying to do what Yeager would attempt. At an altitude of 23,000 feet, the B-29 dropped the X-1, which rapidly climbed, before beginning a slow descent during which history would be made.1

With a thunderous boom that startled onlookers, the X-1 reached a top speed of Mach 1.06, or around 700 miles per hour.2 In that moment, Yeager had become the fastest man alive, and safe supersonic flight, long thought impossible, was proven to be attainable. With this achievement, the first era of aviation came to a close, and the supersonic age began. In this discovery, a new realm of possibilities was unlocked, equivalent to the steam engine or the first Mesolithic canoe. As one sensationalist author described this advancement,

“Supersonic speed is the newest, fastest, most dramatic expression of an innate craving of men– to move quickly about the world.”3 Logically, people began to wonder how soon this remarkable innovation could be experienced by the common man.

The answer came in 1963, when John F. Kennedy announced at the Air Force Academy the US’s intention to develop and build a commercial supersonic transport (SST).4 Because this undertaking was too expensive for any aircraft manufacturer to finance alone, the federal government promised to pay the majority of the development and production costs.5 After a design competition, Boeing’s model 2707 was selected in 1964 to be built into two prototypes.6 The budget was set at $1 billion, and development commenced soon after. However, the program experienced several cost overruns and delays, as well as questions surrounding its environmental impact. Political opposition grew, and in March 1971, further funding for the program failed to make its way through Congress, and the supersonic transport never made it past the design phase.

The effects of the cancellation on Boeing

were disastrous. Already in a difficult spot due to massive borrowing to finance the development of its 747, Boeing was forced to lay off thousands of additional workers after the SST was canceled. Boeing’s commercial workforce decreased from around 80,000 in 1968 to as low as 20,000 in the months following the Congressional votes.7 The economic ruin and subsequent mass workforce exodus imposed on Seattle gave the SST the moniker “the plane that almost ate Seattle.”8

Figure 1:103 Bell X-1 “Glamorous Glennis”

The SST program failed because politicians, influenced by a national anti-SST movement and clear public opinion, voted against further funding due to the plane’s economic and technological infeasibility, as well as its environmental flaws. By the late 1960s, evidence started to pile up against the continuation of the program. Several reports and appraisals into the program’s feasibility came back negative, and dissent to the program’s continuation arose in Congress. Technological issues such as the sonic boom delayed the program and ballooned its budget. Questions emerged surrounding its economic viability, as airlines were hesitant to get involved and politicians feared the government would never recover its investment. Responding to these issues, a ubiquitous nationwide anti-SST movement began to take shape, ignited by a small group of scientists and economists. Gaining support from the environmentalist movement, the SST’s opponents grew in number and in influence, spawning a widespread and farreaching media smear campaign. Ultimately, the SST, created to compete with European and Russian equivalents, failed because its opponents were more vocal than its supporters, and by attacking the project’s imperfections, they were able to turn the tide of public and political opinion against the program.

Origins of the SST

The SST Program, first surmised by President Kennedy in 1962, was initiated primarily in response to the European Concorde and the Russian TU-144. The Concorde, a joint British-French endeavor, threatened American dominance in commercial aviation manufacturing. Furthermore, the project was justified as a means through which the economy as a whole and the ailing economic industry could be enhanced.

The Concorde In November 1962, the British and French governments formally announced their collaboration on the Concorde program, a jointly funded and developed commercial Supersonic Transport.9 The program was the first of its kind and hoped to leverage the research and manufacturing capabilities of both countries. Built by the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and French Sud Aviation (later Aerospatiale), the Concorde was designed to carry 100 passengers at up to twice the speed of sound.10

The motivations behind the Concorde program’s initiation were primarily political rather than technological. An inquiry report designed to assess the validity of the Concorde program was delivered to the British Parliament in 1965.11 Its author, an industrialist named Lord Edwin Plowden, defended the Concorde on the basis that it would boost the UK’s economy in several ways. These included defense, foreign policy, and trade balances.12 He concluded that it was necessary to fund the Concorde not because an SST was required, but to support the faltering European aircraft industry.13

After the end of World War 2 and the dawn of the jet age, Europe had fallen critically behind in the commercial aircraft industry. The British had surpassed the jet threshold first, unveiling the de Havilland Comet in 1952. However, the plane proved a commercial failure after a series of disastrous crashes caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by poorly engineered rectangular windows. Confidence in the plane’s safety plummeted, and it was grounded in 1954.14 In the years following, 80% of the commercial aircraft market went to American stalwarts such as the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8, leaving the European manufacturers to compete against superior aircraft.15 British aircraft exports in 1955, standing at a value of 55 million pounds, were dwarfed by American exports, totaling 260 million pounds the same year.16

The Plowden report stressed that it was necessary to support the air transport industry with SST funding that would both benefit the national economy and heal the weakened industry. It would improve poor trade balance statistics, increase employment and output in the aviation industry, and position the UK and France as world leaders in aerospace technology. By building the Concorde, Europe hoped to leapfrog American aviation domination by entering the supersonic market first, and, as French President Charles De Gaulle put it, challenge “America’s colonization of the skies.”17 Notably, very few Concorde proponents argued that supersonic travel was necessary; rather, it was a means to accomplish other ends. This theme is paralleled in the defense of the American SST, drawing harsh criticism from the program’s opponents.

The Concorde was perceived as a threat to the US aviation industry because it was intended to increase Europe’s share in the world market. The predicted implications of a successful, monopolistic Concorde program on the United States were catastrophic. FAA director Najeeb Halaby warned that it would force the US to “relinquish world civil transport leadership,” and cost as many as 50,000 jobs.18 In a report to President Kennedy, he even warned that the inconceivable could come to fruition: someday, the President could by flying on a foreign aircraft.19 Additionally, in 1962, the Soviet Union confirmed that it was commencing development on its own Supersonic Transport, the Tupolev TU-144, labeled “Concordski” by derisive Americans.20 This announcement factored into rising Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union and strengthened the case for an American SST. The entrance of the second world hegemon into the supersonic race caused the issue to transcend mere economics; America was now at war with its

diametric enemy for control of the industry.

Foreign competition became the primary factor influencing the American SST decision. The Project Horizon report, issued by the FAA Task Force on National Aviation goals in 1961, recommended that the US must “maintain its position as the world’s leading developer and builder of all categories of aircraft.” The authors argued that maintaining industry superiority would benefit national security, economic growth, and even promote world peace. It seemed to American politicians in the tense Cold War climate that strengthening the aviation industry was necessary. President Kennedy himself was reported to have an

“obsessive desire not to have America fall behind in any phase of aerospace technology.”21 The obvious and most pressing way to strengthen the industry came to be supersonic flight. Since no American manufacturer was financially capable of funding this project, it seemed a natural choice for federal support despite the technological shortcomings and inherent risk associated with the plane’s development. Avoiding European industry domination (and even the thought of Russian domination) proved reason enough for government sponsorship of the program.

After the Tupolev announcement, fears of Russian commercial aviation strength also factored into the decision to accelerate the SST program. The Soviet Union’s post-WW2 technological prowess astonished the world. In 1949, they tested an atomic bomb years earlier than thought possible, sending the western world into a frenzy.23 In 1957, they sent two satellites and a dog into space, brandishing their aerospace achievements to the west.24 These innovations scared the US, as the thought of relinquishing superiority in even one domain of the multifaceted Cold War brought shivers to nationalist American politicians. This fear is evident in the congressional passing of the National Defense Education Act in 1958, which was signed in the wake of the Sputnik launches. This law promoted and allocated funds toward research and education in STEM fields, and was intended to breed a new generation of engineers and scientific thinkers that could restore America’s extolled technological leadership. Evidence of Russia’s technological abilities led Halaby to state that “the Russians have the capability for fielding a Mach 2 transport anytime they want to.”25

Furthermore, confidence in the success of the Concorde program in America was declining. The UK’s newly formed Labour government planned a thorough appraisal of the practicality and economic prospects of the Concorde amid calls for its dissolution in 1964.26 The Concorde was plagued with design setbacks, hundreds of millions in budget hikes, and political opposition that placed doubts on its future.27 Additionally, an American study by Department of Defense economist Stephen Enke evaluated the Concorde’s economic prospects. Enke reported that the Concorde had little chance of success due to its narrow market niche resulting from its limited route potential and high seat-mile costs.28 These factors combined raised doubts about the successes of the Concorde amongst Americans. Thus, the unpalatable possibility that the Europeans could fail while the aerospace savants in

the Soviet Union might succeed began to pervade the politics behind the American SST decision. While many American economists found European domination of the supersonic niche unfathomable, Russian domination was unanimously agreed upon to be unacceptable. Doubts about the Concorde furthered arguments that an American SST was needed solely to prevent the Russians from monopolizing the commercial air industry.

On June 4th, 1963, leading American Airline Pan American, led by fervent SST supporter Juan Trippe, announced its intention to purchase six Concordes for its international fleet.29 The very next day, President Kennedy announced the inception of the American SST program.30 The proximity of these events suggests that the Concorde was the foremost impetus for the American program (Figure 2). World Bank Chairman Eugene Black summarized this motivation well, asserting: “It’s too bad we have to build the damn things. But the Concorde forced us to. We certainly can’t sit here and turn over the market to the British and the French – from the standpoint of prestige to our industry.”31

The threat of the Concorde and the Soviet TU-144 proved to be the defining factor in the American SST decision. While economic, social, and technological arguments factored into the initial SST debate, it was ultimately the threat of foreign industry dominance that compelled President Kennedy to fund the American SST. Economic Benefits In addition to the menace of foreign supersonics, the American project was also justified as a nationally productive means of economic intervention. In 1967, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the aviation manufacturing industry contributed 3.7% of the country’s non-agricultural workers and 3.8% of the GDP.32 In addition, aviation’s ties to the tourism and travel industries, as well as its prevalence in the raw materials market, mean that stimuli within the aviation industry have implications that reverberate throughout the economy.33 Before the SST was devised, the Kennedy administration identified the aviation industry as a potential route to instill federal dollars into the private sector to improve the national economy.34 Since the SST would have required thousands of workers, private subsidies, and a substantial amount of material resources, its existence would have had far-reaching benefits spanning multiple economic sectors.

The SST also would have energized an aviation industry that was struggling in the wake of waning peacetime military aircraft investment. Prior to the SST, nearly all commercial aircraft ventures were offshoots of federally funded military research. Typically, the defense department would fund research into technology with military applications, and then the manufacturers could use that knowledge, including airframe prototypes, to bring commercial products to market. An example was the prominent Boeing 707, which was built off the Dash-80 prototype for the Air Force KC-135 tanker.35 However, in peacetime after the Korean War, military spending in general and specifically in

aviation diminished, aggravated by President Eisenhower’s Policy of Boldness and military budget cuts.36 Cold War military spending also progressively favored missile development, leaving aircraft manufactures without funding for new initiatives. Aircraft corporations in the late ’50s and early ’60s were strapped for cash, and as one historian put it, cognizant of the danger “that the impetus for technological advance would be lost.”37 In response to this threat, the SST could have revitalized the

afflicted aircraft manufacturing industry.

Figure 2104: “Congress” by Etta Hulme, appearing in the Fort Worth Star Telegram in the early 1960s

The SST’s Demise

In the late 1960s, a growing movement amongst American politicians rose against the SST. It culminated in a March 1971 decision in the Senate to cancel funding for the program, after over a billion dollars and a decade of work had already been poured in. However, many of the motivations for the program’s inception persisted. The Concorde and Tupolev programs were nearing completion, and the economic implications of a foreigndominated industry remained strong. The SST was voted down despite its initial motivations because of a nationally potent opposition movement that objected to the SST’s technological, economic, and environmental flaws.

Technological Barriers SST scientists established early on that for the plane to be economically viable, the issue of a sonic boom would have to be solved. Sonic booms occur when an object is traveling faster than the speed of sound. Supersonic aircraft create a pressure shockwave that manifests in a deafening boom that anyone under the plane’s path can hear. In a report commissioned by President Kennedy into the SST’s feasibility, World Bank Chairman Eugene Black confessed that

“unless solutions to [the sonic boom] is found, the entire program could fail to become commercially feasible.”38 Included in the FAA’s initial design constraints of the aircraft were provisions requiring that the aircraft maintain reasonable noise levels around airports, and manage the issue of the sonic boom.39 However, when Boeing discovered that there was no simple or cost-effective solution to these issues, they successfully lobbied to have those constraints removed in their 1965 contract.40 This constituted an admission that Boeing would not address the issue, and in the design process, it was clear that they ignored it. This departure from Black’s warning represents

how design flaws, combined with failures to acknowledge early red flags, precipitated the demise of the program.

The magnitude of the disruptiveness of sonic booms was not fully understood until 1965, when the FAA conducted tests over Oklahoma City.41 The tests were conducted using Air Force fighter jets, which produced considerably weaker booms than a larger plane would be expected to create. Pilots flew the jets at regular intervals over the city, and the FAA warned residents beforehand as to when they could expect the booms to occur. They found that while most people found the booms acceptable, a growing fraction of people (27%) found the booms intolerable.42 Additionally, there were thousands of formal damage complaints filed by Oklahoma City residents, most of whom claimed that windows had been shattered by the disruptive thunderclaps.43 Since the magnitude of a sonic boom is directly proportional to the size

and speed of the moving object creating it, it stands to reason that the SST’s sonic booms would have been deafening. The FAA, looking for evidence to corroborate their view that the sonic boom would not be an issue, used the Oklahoma data to reinforce the idea that people would come to live with sonic booms.44 They determined that there was nothing in the data that precluded the design and testing of a Supersonic Transport. Because of these findings, little to no research was done into creating a quieter and more acceptable airplane. Those in charge of the program felt that the sonic boom would not prove to be an issue in the long run. In a world where supersonic flights were seen as the future, there was a pervading attitude amongst scientists and technocrats that these booms were unavoidable byproducts of advancement and would come to be accepted. When pressured on the sonic boom issue, newly appointed SST program head General Jewell Maxwell responded with, “I’ll bet you’ll find that babies are sleeping through them [sonic booms].”45 SST proponents advocated that the booms did not need to be eradicated, rather, they would have to be accepted. They felt that it was a necessary price to pay for progress; forward innovation inevitably had its drawbacks. However, this outlook did not account for the fact that a single supersonic transcontinental flight would boom upwards of 5 million people, and due to its forecasted size and speed, would be excruciatingly loud.46 By ignoring rather than addressing or even acknowledging the issue, Boeing and the FAA advanced a project with a known vulnerability, setting the stage for the program to fail.

Additionally, as the project progressed, it became clear that the restraints placed on the program to make the aircraft commercially competitive made it technologically infeasible. The 1963 Black and Osborne report recommended that the US pursue an aircraft superior to the Concorde in both speed and size.47 The Concorde program was already two to three years ahead in its development.

Black stated that

“a superior aircraft which is available within two to three years of the first ‘Concorde’ deliveries would still be able to capture the bulk of the world market.”48 Purely out of economic necessity, the United States was forced to pursue an aircraft that was both faster and of higher capacity (Figure 3) to account for the timetable difference between the SST and the Concorde. However, the assessment made in the report assumed that a superior aircraft would be developed in a similar timeframe to the Concorde – the Americans were behind by two years at the onset of the program – and did not consider the technological breakthroughs required to build a plane capable of flying at Mach 2.7 (2000+ mph).

Figure 3105: The Boeing 2707 in the background, with the Concorde and Tupolev TU-144 in the foreground

The myriad challenges resulting from the necessity of exceeding the design parameters for the Concorde resulted in delays, cost overruns, and ultimately an incomplete aircraft by the time the project was canceled. Unlike the Concorde, titanium needed to be used for the fuselage instead of aluminum, as aluminum couldn’t stand up to the immense heat generated at speed.49 Titanium was a comparatively expensive material and required new machinery and techniques to work with. The SST’s General Electric engines, which were the most powerful jet engines ever constructed, needed to survive the rigors of industry safety testing. The plane needed to be able to withstand meteorological forces resulting from high-altitude flying.50 Engine emissions needed to be studied to identify any adverse effects on the ozone layer, through which the SST would be flying.51 The SST would need to have tolerable airport noise levels and be able to operate without any tailor-made airport infrastructure such as gates or runways. Each of these constraints, many of which were contradictory in nature, resulted in an engineering mountain that became costly and time-consuming to overcome. One development that proved particularly damaging to the SST’s prospects was Boeing’s proposed swing-wing design. To be commercially viable, an SST would need to be aerodynamically efficient both at runway speeds and above Mach 2. Boeing, whose bid was chosen to build the SST, elected for a swing-wing mechanism to change the shape of the wing for optimal aerodynamic efficiency covering a wide range of speeds (Figure 4). It was intended to allow the plane to take off and land “like a conventional jet, yet still… cover three miles in five seconds.”52 However, this part of the design process proved especially difficult to master. Due to the intricacy of the swing mechanism, and the added weight of the bulky machinery, the design was scrapped late in the 1960s.53 This setback caused a yearlong delay and resulted in price increases and stagnation in popular support for the aircraft. In all, by the time the Concorde made its first

flight in 1969, Boeing was back at the drawing board after abandoning its design. Work had not even begun on a prototype, and America was insurmountably behind in the supersonic race. The failure to produce a technically viable design in a reasonable timeframe contributed to the uncertainty behind the program, leading to its demise.

Economic Challenges Perhaps even more challenging than the technological obstacles were the economic roadblocks to the SST’s completion, both for an industry that wasn’t ready for the plane and the government that had to foot an extremely risky bill. First, the federal government’s costs far exceeded initial estimations. In 1963, Congress determined that a total of $1 billion would be required to finance the development and construction of the first two companies.54 Due to the manufacturers’ inability to contribute, Congress originally agreed to a 75:25 financing ratio, in which the engine and airframe manufacturers would be responsible for a minority of their costs.55 However, it soon became clear that this arrangement was unsustainable for the manufacturers. Understanding the technological cliff that had to be climbed to ensure an eventual profit, the manufacturers shied away from the costsharing agreement.56 As historian and aviation researcher T.A. Heppenheimer put it,

“This was their way of declaring that the SST looked like a fine way to lose money.”57 There was no evidence that the sonic boom issue was solvable, and there were only educated guesses regarding the sales potential for this type of aircraft. Due to these concerns, the congressional funding bill was amended to a 90:10 ratio, putting nearly the entire burden of financing this gargantuan undertaking on the taxpayer.58 As the program progressed, experiencing setback after setback, cost estimations ballooned to $4.5 Billion.59 The magnitude of funding required was more than Congress could justify, and they rejected a further $134 million dollar appropriation in 1971, effectively killing the SST program.60

Figure 4106: Boeing 2707 swing wing design

The $4.5 billion cost estimate was viewed as a gamble that was unlikely to pay off. The hefty sum was originally justified through a royalty program that would recoup the taxpayers’ investment through a sales tax on the plane.61 Beginning with the 101st sale, a royalty would be attached to the sale price of each aircraft that would reimburse all or part of the initial investment.62 However, it was estimated that these revenues would not materialize until at least 1980, due to repeated manufacturing

and development delays.63 Furthermore, the success of the investment relied entirely on the success of the aircraft. By 1970, it was apparent that failure to address the sonic boom issue would severely limit the SST’s route potential due to worldwide bans on overland supersonic flying, which cut sales estimates by more than half.64 Despite these restrictions, hundreds of aircraft would still need to enter service for the principal sum to be recovered. In addition, mammoth fuel consumption and seat-mile costs further clouded the profitability prospects of the SST.

The financial risk of investing in the SST was real, and the potential for loss was immense. In hindsight, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent fuel price gouging would likely have

killed any American SST due to exorbitant operating costs resulting from fuel inefficiency.65 This is exactly what became of the Concorde: in the wake of rising fuel costs, not a single aircraft was every sold internationally (the Concorde’s only operators, British Air and Air France, were both partially state-owned as well), indicative of a far smaller market than initially speculated.66 Without any sales, the rest of the $2 billion dollar development cost had to be underwritten by the British and French treasuries.67 A similar fate would likely have befallen the Boeing SST had it moved forward to production. Given the magnitude of investment required and the considerable uncertainty of the program, the slim chances for success contributed to antiSST sentiment in Congress and the eventual rejection of funding in 1971.

The financial impact of the SST program on the commercial aviation industry also contributed to the cancellation of funding due to high prices and fears of monopolization. The SST was initially slated to be sold at $30 million, compared to $12 million for the Concorde and under $10 million for the subsonic jets of the era, such as the Boeing 707.68 These predictions are notable not just for their inaccuracy (each of the 14 Concordes that flew cost well over $100 million just to

develop), but also for the huge financial burden that they placed upon the airlines. During the 1960s, some American airlines were still paying for the transition to the jet age a decade earlier. Prior to the proliferation of jet travel, a DC-3 passenger liner cost $125,000. With the advent of the jet age, a spare jet engine would cost an airline twice that sum.69 This transition required drastically higher levels of capital from airlines, putting them in a difficult position where they needed more money than they had. By forcing the supersonic jets on airlines, some feared that they were rushing airlines into buying planes that they couldn’t afford. The airlines would have to stomach the debt and buy the jets out of necessity, and any that couldn’t afford them would be outcompeted as the industry

transitioned into the supersonic age. While some airlines, namely Pan American, were interested in purchasing SSTs, most did not want to make the financial commitment until the plane’s economics were proven, further adding to the uncertainty surrounding the program.

In addition, some worried that government involvement in the production of the SST would lead to monopolization amongst manufacturers. While the FAA accepted bids from multiple manufacturers in a design competition initiated by Lyndon Johnson in 1966, only Boeing and General Electric (GE) were contracted to develop the SST.70 This left other participating manufacturers, such as Lockheed, without the financial resources to stay competitive. Considering no company could fund SST development on its own, any manufacturer not involved in the federal program would soon become insolvent as the supersonics took over the majority of market demand. These fears were legitimate, as evidenced by the merger of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation and Douglas Aircraft Company into McDonnell Douglas in 1967, partially due to fears of Boeing and BAC/ Aerospatiale market domination.

The Anti-SST Movement In response to the economic and technological concerns, as well as political antagonism and environmentalist worries, a nationwide anti-SST campaign began to take shape in the late 1960s. At the helm of this movement in Congress was Senator William Proxmire (Figure 5). A witty and charismatic Democrat from Wisconsin, he was known for allowing public opinion to influence his actions and for staunchly opposing wasteful government spending.71 Well-known for his frugality, he legislated the same way he lived his life: with efficient spending and thrift. His principal argument against the SST was that it constituted wasteful spending on an extravagance without any tangible benefits. By 1971, barely half of the country had traveled on a plane of any kind, and supersonics seemed to most an unnecessary and far-reaching step that would benefit very few.72

Beyond that, the predicted high price of supersonic flight tickets meant that only the wealthy would ever experience faster travel, raising questions about who benefited from the SST. Proxmire also decried the potential 4-billion-dollar investment for accomplishing nothing aside from a two and a half hour travel time between New York and Europe for the top one percent.73 George Hilton, who served as chairman of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society task force on transportation, felt that the program existed so that the taxpayer could “subsidize the travel habits of the highincome classes.”74 Proxmire mirrored this idea in a Senate floor speech by stating that the only people who benefit from the program were

“the high-powered international businessmen, the impatient jet set playboys and the like.”75 Proxmire’s populist views gained traction amongst the voting public, the majority of whom were not part of that sky faring minority. Unsurprisingly, congressional constituent mail during this period was majority anti-SST, further shaping lawmakers’ views surrounding the SST.76

When viewed in the context of President Johnson’s Great Society reforms, which pledged similarly sized sums towards poverty alleviation, the SST was seen as a white elephant.77 Senator Robert Kennedy, an ally of Proxmire, summarized this point well in a 1968 speech during an appropriation vote:

“Three hours ago, the administration was in favor of cutting $198 million from the poverty program which would have provided jobs. Now it is supporting this kind of legislation…

We are faced with a $29 billion dollar deficit. We are spending approximately $30 billion a year in Vietnam. We have internal problems in our own country and they are not improving. We should not build a supersonic plane so that one percent of the population can get to Paris in four hours while so many of our people are in such desperate need.”78

It was impossible to justify hundreds of millions in spending on the shaky economics and premise of the SST when similar sums were being cut from poverty programs. The view of the SST as a wasteful institution devoted to the needs of the elite took hold, leading to increased allegiance to Proxmire’s camp.

Additionally, technical reports on the SST’s feasibility were publicized, and most did not assess the program’s prospects favorably. When President Nixon entered office, he commenced a number of these reviews to determine if he would continue the program. One report, conducted by a task force that Nixon put together, investigated the SST’s cost, environmental hazards, and effects on trade balance. The report’s conclusions were overwhelmingly negative and determined that the aircraft would not have nearly as great of a positive impact on society as previously thought. Nixon also commissioned a member of his Science Advisory Committee, Dr. Richard Garwin, to do an independent feasibility study. This report recommended that the President terminate the program and withdraw all federal dollars. To the dismay of several Senators, Nixon decided to move the

program forward despite these findings.79

Figure 4107: Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisconsin), an ardent SST adversary

As congressional opposition to the SST grew, a consortium of scientists and environmentalists contributed to the program’s demise through extensive lobbying and a widespread media presence. Leading the charge was an unlikely Harvard University physicist named Dr. William A. Shurcliff. Alarmed by reports of the effects of the sonic boom, he founded the Citizens’ League Against the Sonic Boom

(CLASB) in 1967.80 The CLASB aimed to flip Congress against the SST through lobbying and to change public opinion by exposing the program’s less favorable details. Prior to 1967, nearly all SST information, including the critical appraisals and reports, were kept hidden within the administration and the FAA.81 Suspecting that critical information was being suppressed, Shurcliff investigated and published his SST and Sonic Boom Handbook, which attempted to expose technical information on the SST, including the results of the sonic boom trials (which were not nearly as complimentary to the program as the FAA claimed them to be).82 The handbook sold over 100,000 copies to the public in the years leading up to 1971, demonstrating the influence Shucrliff’s efforts had on the American public.83

Shurcliff’s primary grievance was the disruptiveness of the sonic boom. He claimed in the New York Times in 1967 that a fleet of SSTs flying over land would cause $1 million in damages every day through soundrelated incidents, and that the government was pursuing sound pollution in an era of environmental awareness.84 He foresaw a future in which hourly disruptive booms were a regular and even accepted occurrence, and his activism struck a chord with others in the scientific community.85 His league grew to over a thousand members by late 1967, and about a quarter of them were members of the scientific community. Shurcliff’s organization was unsuccessful in fomenting legislative change in the late 1960s but did succeed in uniting a network of outspoken critics in opposition to the SST. Using the media as a tool, which was overwhelmingly supportive of the anti-SST movement, Shurcliff, Proxmire, and others slowly began to shift public opinion against the continuation of the program.86

After President Nixon’s election, the CLASB united with the strengthening environmentalist faction in American politics, resulting in an even more potent national anti-SST movement. During the 1960s, the environmental movement exploded in prevalence, commonly thought to begin with the 1962 release of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, a novel that denounced pesticide usage.87 A national bestseller, the novel prompted widespread outcry and nationwide recognition for the environmentalist cause. The Sierra Club, a conservation group originally founded in 1892 by John Muir, experienced successes during the ’50s and ’60s, preventing the construction of dams in the Grand Canyon and lobbying for the passage of the Wilderness Act, which protected public lands from commercial development.88 By 1970, polling organizations found that three-quarters of Americans found air and water pollution serious, up from one quarter five years earlier.89 Environmentalists then saw further successes during the Nixon administration with the celebration of the first Earth Day in 1970 and the founding of the Environmental Protection Agency.90 Environmentalist organizations and politicians, through use of the media, were able to influence public opinion to necessitate legislative progress towards conservation. During this time, the environmentalists not only grew in numbers, reach, and capability, but also became a large enough faction that politicians pandered to their sympathies, as evidenced by the Nixon Administration’s actions. The environmentalists became politically disadvantageous to ignore, and

their support became both sought-after and even essential for American legislators.

The SST program became swept up in the environmentalist movement due to intensifying anxiety surrounding the sonic boom and concerns about the aircraft’s impact on the ozone layer. Due to the SST’s relatively high flight ceiling of around 60,000 feet, an atmospheric scientist named Conway Leovy charged that the water vapor and nitrogen expelled by a fleet of SSTs could weaken the ozone layer over time, through a chemical process called Wet Photolysis.91 His assertion had some scientific merit and was welcomed in Congress by the anti-SST wing.92 In addition to the threat posed by a weakened ozone layer, environmentalists objected to the sonic boom’s adverse effects on people and ecosystems. An offshoot of the Sierra Club named Friends of the Earth joined with the CLASB to advocate against the SST.93 Uniting their efforts and resources, the groups furthered their cause through sponsored newspaper ads and editorials, as well as mass dissemination of Shurcliff’s Handbook. The movement grew, and by March 1970, a coalition was formed that added the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, the National Wildlife Federation, and several other organizations spanning multiple sectors and regions of American society.94 The Coalition, with its extensive power and influence, united the national environmental movement in opposition to the SST. Support for the program became difficult to justify in the face of national dissent.

The Coalition’s lobbying, based in its environmentalist roots, became a defining factor behind the cancellation of funding in March 1971. The media became the Coalition’s most effective tool in spreading their views. Throughout 1970 and ’71, the public was subjected to incessant newspaper editorials that viciously attacked the program for its many risks and deficiencies.95 An editorial in the New York Times, published two days before the ill-fated vote, summarized these arguments plainly: “There is no urgent human need to be met by the SST. Commercial airlines are in no financial position to purchase these planes. Construction of the planes is an extraordinarily wasteful way to ease unemployment.

Congress wishes to appropriate these large sums, there are many social needs that deserve priority. The cost of the SST in money, noise and environmental risk excessively high. Every argument points toward the Senate voting once again to refuse funds for this project.”96

In the face of an overwhelmingly pessimistic public, legislative support for the SST withered away in the months leading up to March 1971. Since public opinion favored cancellation, lawmakers risked their electability by advocating for the program, and ultimately, the appropriation failed to move through Congress twice, in March and again in May 1971. Without any public funding, Boeing’s leadership quickly terminated the program amidst speculation about the company’s future. Ultimately, the motivations that led to the project’s termination had existed all along. The difference between congressional appropriation votes taken a decade apart was the public voice. In 1961, the SST in the planning

stage was understood only by those at the highest level of government and industry; by 1970, the entire country felt that they were “entitled to challenge the technocrats.”97

In retrospect, the greatest weapon used against the SST was public opinion. The project certainly had its shortcomings, and they were well known amongst the SST’s leaders from the beginning. However, the SST was, from its onset, a bureaucratic initiative, endorsed only by Boeing and GE and a small group of select operatives within the executive branch. These actors made a very limited effort to appeal to the people, because their validation was not initially required for the program to take flight. On the other hand, SST opponents such as Shurcliff “generated enough scare stories to convince the public that the SST was the worst thing to afflict the world since the bubonic plague.”98 Their arguments struck a chord in the vacuum left by the SST supporters’ relative silence and the FAA’s lack of transparency. It appeared that most Americans didn’t seem to care about the national origin of the planes that they may or may not be flying on in the coming decades. In the end, the people, inspired by the countercultural mood in the air, challenged the establishment’s authority, and in doing so, struck down the most monumental undertaking in the history of the commercial aviation industry.

Conclusion The American SST program, initiated in response to the threat of foreign supersonics, failed due to its economic and technological infeasibilities being promulgated nationally by the anti-SST activists. The sonic boom issue had no apparent solution, and the commercial aviation industry was not prepared to adopt the costly aircraft. As the Citizen’s League and the Coalition spread disparaging information on the SST through the media, public opinion shifted against continuation. With a political incentive to vote down the project, Congress in 1971 elected not to provide further funding for the program, terminating hopes of an American SST once and for all.

In evaluating the failure of the American Supersonic Transport Program, it is vital to understand its purpose. Specifically, the program was not designed for the purpose of building a supersonic jet. There was never a necessity for faster travel, nor in many cases was there even a want for it. Historian David Lawrence believed that introducing an SST to the market was only the third most important goal of the program, behind boosting the economy by intervening in the private sector and supporting the aircraft industry in the presence of a foreign threat.99 The FAA’s Project Horizon Report, which outlined the US’s aviation goals for the 1960s, put building an SST at goal #14, behind maintaining world aviation leadership and supplementing foreign policy initiatives.100 The SST was, at its core, nothing more than an inefficient means to other ends. It was a vehicle that some reasonably argued

furthered American political and economic goals, but itself had little merit or need. SST opponents such as Proxmire were quick to point out how supporters never championed the speed of the plane, further diluting the aircraft’s justifications.

In pursuing its political goals, the government sank a billion dollars into a program that seemed “contrary to the perceived needs of the public in general and the airline industry in particular.”101 Its proponents ignored the risks, brushed aside early warning signs and unfavorable reports, and concealed disparaging information from the public. At no point in the program’s timeline, save perhaps the very beginning, did its funding make sense. As a French congressman stated about the Concorde (a comparatively reasonable project), “By all normal decision-making systems, it should have been

cancelled long ago.”102 The American SST, which was designed defensively to supersede the Concorde in capability (and price), proved to be even less desirable.

The SST can be viewed in multiple ways. When seen generously, it was a noble attempt to protect American industry, but it was blindsided by miscalculations regarding its market niche, the sonic boom, and the threat posed by the Concorde. It failed because circumstances changed, and new information was discovered in its decade-long lifespan.

When evaluated more pragmatically, the SST was a gamble. It was a calculated bet on the future of the industry; it was a necessary but risky plot to further American corporate and political interests. Catastrophic failure was understood as a possibility, but the threat against American manufacturing was grave.

When viewed critically, it was a project that was doomed from the start. It was pursued for political motivations, without the consent of the people, when almost every sign and technical appraisal pointed to its eventual demise. It is an example of the dangerous intersection between technology and politics, where nonsensical initiatives are taken, and market forces are ignored. It was a program that Wall Street was too scared to fund, pursued out of fear by public figures swept up in Cold War nationalist fervor.

The SST came to symbolize both progress a n d elitism, both interventionist socialism and corrupt

corporatocracy. It was marked both by initial unity and national conflict, by engineering triumphs and devastating setbacks. It was a project that some argue should never have taken place; the SST was a product of political hubris and a government blinded by international competition. After a decade, a billion taxpayer dollars had been thrown away, tens of thousands of aviation jobs had been lost, and the imaginations of enthusiasts and dreamers nationwide were shattered, all over a foreign threat that failed to materialize.

Endnotes

1 Smithsonian Institute, “Bell X-1 Glamorous Glennis,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, accessed May 18, 2022, https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/bell-x-1/nasm_A19510007000. 2 Ibid 3 A. Herron, Cobra in the Sky: The Supersonic Transport (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1968), 13. 4 Tom A. Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” in The Space Shuttle Decision, 1965-1972 (Washington: Smithsonian Inst. Press, 2002), 307, accessed December 24, 2021, https://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221.pdf. 5 Evert Clark, “U.S.- Backed Bonds for Jet Proposed,” The New York Times (New York City), May 24, 1965, late City edition accessed December 27, 2021, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/ timesmachine/1965/05/24/101549847.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0. 6 Clive Irving, Wide-body: The Triumph of the 747 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), 186. 7 Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 303 8Russ Banham, Higher: 100 Years of Boeing (San Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books, 2015), 197. 9David S. Lawrence, “The Initial Decision to Build the Supersonic Transport,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 30, no. 4 (October 1971): 405, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3485505. 10T. Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Concorde,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified September 15, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Concorde. 11Lawrence, “The Initial,” 407 12Ibid 13Ibid 14Lewis Johnman and Frances M.B. Lynch, “The Road to Concorde: Franco-British Relations and the Supersonic Project,” Contemporary European History 11, no. 2 (May 2002): 231, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20081830. 15Herron, Cobra in the Sky, 107 16Johnman and Lynch, “The Road,” 234 17Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,”306 Mel Horwitch, “The Role of the Concorde Threat in the U.S. SST Program” (working paper, MIT Alfred P. Sloane School of Management, Cambridge, MA, May 1982), 4 19Ibid 20Robert J. Serling, Legend and Legacy (New York, N.Y.:

St. Martin’s, 1992), 267-268 21United States Federal Aviation Agency, Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals (Project Horizon), 10, accessed December 31, 2021, https://edan. si.edu/transcription/pdf_files/32931.pdf. 22Serling, Legend and Legacy, 268 23David M. Kennedy and Lizabeth Cohen, The American Pageant, 17th ed. (Boston, MA: Cengage, 2020), 832 24Ibid, 868 25Paul Martin, “U.S. Air Chief Urges Supersonic Transport,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA), September 17, 1962, 20, https://www.proquest.com/ docview/168188025/FE7C7DDE75844D86PQ/4?accountid=35147. 26Horwitch, “The Role,” 9 27Ibid 28Ibid 29Lawrence, “The Initial,” 405 30Ibid 31George Lardner, Jr, “Supersonic Scandal,” New Republic 158, no. 11 (March 16, 1968): 17, PDF. 32U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1967 : Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, by W. Willard Wirtz and Arthur M. Ross, report no. 1555, 56, August 3, 1967, accessed May 21, 2022, https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/ handbook-labor-statistics-4025/handbook-labor-statistics-1967-498301. 33Lawrence, “The Initial,” 406 34Ibid 35Edward C. Wells, “The Boeing Jet Transport,” National Defense Transportation Journal 12, no. 2 (March/April 1956): 38, accessed February 27, 2022, https://www. jstor.org/stable/44098971. 36Lawrence, “The Initial,” 403-404, Kennedy and Cohen, The American, 865-866. 37Joshua Rosenbloom, “The Politics of the American SST Programme: Origin, Opposition and Termination,” Social Studies of Science 11, no. 4 (November 1981): 405, https://www.jstor.org/stable/284775. 38Eugene R. Black and Stanley J. Osborne, Report on the Supersonic Transport Program, December 1963, Naval War College Library, Newport, RI. 39Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,”15 40Ibid 41Rosenbloom, “The Politics,” 407 42Ibid 43Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 309 44Ibid 45Don Dwiggins, The SST: Here It Comes, Ready or Not (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 75-76. 46Why the SST Took a Nosedive,” The Washington Post (Washington, DC), July 21, 1982, accessed December 13, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ lifestyle/1982/07/21/why-the-sst-took-a-nosedive/eb2f66ec-d672-49ef-beb1-d125dd90c721/. 47Black and Osborne, Report on the Supersonic. 48Ibid 49R.L. Bisplinghoff, “The Supersonic Transport,” Scientific American 210, no. 6 (June 1964): 30, accessed February 27, 2022, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24931523. 50George A. Steiner, “Costs, Needs and Prospects of SST,” Challenge 12, no. 9 (June 1964) 28 https://www. jstor.org/stable/40718853. 51Ibid 52Serling, Legend and Legacy, 272-273 Richard Hallion, NASA’s Contributions to Aeronautics (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010), 592, accessed February 5, 2022, https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/482997main_53ContributionsVolume2.pdf. 54Steiner, “Costs, Needs,” 29 55Ibid 56Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 307 57Ibid 58“U.S. Reappraising Program for Supersonic Airliner,” The New York Times (New York City), March 12, 1964, late City edition, 28, accessed December 24, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/12/archives/us-reappraising-program-for-supersonic-airliner.html. 59Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,”13 60Lawrence, “The Initial,” 403 61Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,” 14 62Ibid 63Ibid 64Rosenbloom, “The Politics,” 406 65Serling, Legend and Legacy, 276 66Britannica, “Concorde.”

67Ibid 68Steiner, “Costs, Needs,” 29 69113 Cong. Rec. 5-12 (May 31, 1967). Accessed December 30, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bound-congressional-record/1967/05/31/senate-section?s=1&r=374. 70Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,” 13 71U.S. Congress, “William Proxmire: A Featured ,” United States Senate, accessed May 14, 2022, https://www. senate.gov/senators/FeaturedBios/Featured_Bio_ProxmireWilliam.htm. 72Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 317 73113 Cong. Rec. 5-12 (May 31, 1967) 74Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,” 16 75113 Cong. Rec. 5-12 (May 31, 1967). 76Serling, Legend and Legacy, 276. 77Geoffrey Thomas, “The Supersonic Airliner That Turned into a White Elephant,” Airline Ratings, last modified March 16, 2022, accessed May 20, 2022, https://www.airlineratings.com/news/supersonic-airliner-turned-white-elephant/. 78Lardner, “Supersonic Scandal,” 16. 79Rosenbloom, “The Politics,” 412. Serling, Legend and Legacy, 276 80Rosenbloom, “The Politics,” 408 81Ibid 82Ibid, 409 83Joel Primack and Frank Von Hippel, Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena (New York City: Basic Books, 1974), 16, PDF. 84“League against the Sonic Boom Works to Stop Building of High-Speed Jets,” The New York Times (New York City), June 18, 1967, 60, accessed May 15, 2022, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/06/18/issue.html. 85Ibid 86Linda J. Greenhouse, “Protest Blossoms as Sonic Booms,” The Harvard Crimson (Cambridge, MA), September 26, 1967, accessed May 18, 2022, https://www. thecrimson.com/article/1967/9/26/protest-blossomsas-sonic-booms-psix/. 87PBS, “The Modern Environmental Movement,” American Experience, accessed May 15, 2022, https:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/ earth-days-modern-environmental-movement/. 88Sierra Club, “Historical Accomplishments,” Sierra Club, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.sierraclub.org/accomplishments#:~:text=1890s%20The%20Sierra%20 Club%20is,boundaries%20of%20Yosemite%20National%20Park. 89Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 311 90Sierra Club, “Historical Accomplishments,” Sierra Club. 91Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 314. 92Ibid 93Rosenbloom, “The Politics,” 413. 94Heppenheimer, “Aerospace Recession,” 313. 95Serling, Legend and Legacy, 276. 96“The Cost of the SST,” The New York Times (New York City), May 18, 1971, Editorials, 38, accessed December 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/18/archives/the-cost-of-the-sst.html. 97“Why the SST Took,” Washington Post 98Serling, Legend and Legacy, 275. 99Lawrence, “The Initial,” 411. 100United States Federal Aviation Agency, Report of the Task Force, 57. 101Lawrence, “The Initial,” 411 102E.W. Kenworthy, “Frenchman Finds SST’S Costs Soar,” The New York Times (New York City), March 14, 1971, 21, accessed December 29, 2021, https://www.nytimes. com/1971/03/14/archives/frenchman-finds-ssts-costssoar-servan-schreiber-cables-views-to.html. 103Smithsonian Institute, “Bell X-1 Glamorous,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. 104Etta Hulme, “Congress,” cartoon, Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Fort Worth, TX), accessed May 14, 2022, https:// libraries.uta.edu/ettahulme/image/20114989. 105Thomas, “The Supersonic,” Airline Ratings. 106“Boeing 2707 Swing Wing: Clearance to Stabilizer,” Airliners.net, accessed May 21, 2022, https://www.airliners.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=774639. 107U.S. Congress, “William Proxmire,” United States Senate.

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