Indonesian Islam - TEXT PAGES 15/7/03 3:14 PM Page 112
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INDONESIAN ISLAM
reached. In 1986 the NU revisited371 the issue and returned to its original position: ‘social bodies’ cannot receive zakåt because they do not fall within the classes in S IX:58–60. No sources are cited. The NU collective memory appears to be somewhat limited in this case. Staying with the collecting agent (>åmil): what exactly is it, and what is a legitimate agent? As we have seen, Persis reject the idea of agent and the Muhammadiyah severely restrict it. The NU is as little enamoured; in 1960 it was prepared to say372 that a committee not appointed by an imåm for the purpose of distribution is not an acceptable board for distribution of funds. The authority cited, Fat˙ al-qar•b, appears to have little to do with the decision. It is appointment by the imåm which appears crucial for the NU. In 1986 a further fatwå373 reinforced this position: a committee appointed by the imåm may receive the zakåt. But this fatwå applied only at the village (desa) level, where the imåm is, of course, in charge of religious matters. There is deep suspicion of an intervening body in connection with zakåt. This is understandable given the high levels of corruption and inefficiency in Indonesian bureaucratic practice. The Indonesian government has, however, recently attempted to control zakåt by establishing the Badan Amil Zakat (Zakat Collection Board) under the control of the Ministry of Religion.374 It is a comprehensive attempt to organise all zakåt payments for all of Indonesia in detail on something like the Malaysian model.375 It is too early to know how, if at all, the system will work. It is worth noting that the main provision of the law appears in large-scale newspaper advertisements published just before the end of Puasa. Indonesia is rather late in this respect; all governments of Muslim-populated states have consistently attempted to control zakåt monies which, though perhaps inconsiderable on a state budget basis, are socially immensely important as showing the public face of a Muslim tax for charity. It is essential for a government to be able to demonstrate its credentials in this way. In contrast to the proposed state simplification, which is part of the simplification of Syariah in Indonesia (above), the fatåwå demonstrate just how complex the zakåt has become. The reason for complexity is not hard to find: zakåt is property being transferred from one person to another or to a named class of recipient. In such a transaction, the nature of the property involved is crucial. For peasant proprietors in Indonesia, the main form of property is land. Movables, cash and jewellery are secondary. For contemporary urban dwellers the main property is a house and salary, a pension and possibly investments. (The poor, by definition, do not own property and do not pay zakåt.376) These forms of property are not in Revelation or in a˙åd•th, nor are they in the fiqh texts. While the modern forms are not known in these sources, the individual Muslim still does possess property and must pay zakåt. The issue, therefore, is to convert one form to its equivalent in another so as to preserve the practicality of payment. Practicality of means of payment is the key to preserving liability to pay. If payment cannot in fact be made, then liability disappears; it is just impossible.