The Lutetian 2013

one. Cohen underlines that democracy necessitates equality between its members where all members are “entitled to participate in making fundamental judgments about society’s future course.” 14 He continues to say that democracy, in order for members to be equal, needs to be based in a liberal understanding of free and equal individuals.

Each individual pursues her own version of the good life and her own “sense of justice.” 15 Democracy is conceived as a deliberative process in which individuals make concessions in order to reach a political agreement. 16 Cohen argues that Confucian societies cannot be democratic for several reasons: communitarian values restrict the members’ individual freedoms, members see themselves as members of a group instead of “separate individuals deserving equal representation” 17 —both of which are features of Confucianism. Moreover, Confucianism sees the creation of “the authentic self through active preservation or retrieval of the moral mind,” which implies a singular conception of the good. 18 On the other hand, changes in value and society are based on pre-existing cultural values. “Ren” in Confucian theory advocates the relief of suffering and can be understood, alongside benevolence, as similar to the Western conception of human rights. 19 It is inscribed in a different logic, but still promotes values that accord with democracy: relief of suffering and benevolence are not too far away from protection of human rights.

The subordination of the subject to the sovereign should not preclude the possibility of equality in Confucianism. “Confucian persons are equals in their possession of the moral mind or their moral capacity to cultivate themselves to realize their authentic moral selves. This constitutes the Confucian idea of equality.” 20 As such, Confucianism sees all members of society as having the potential to arrive at “authentic moral selves.” Based on this principle, Herr underlines that people are not forced to accept their leaders, and can indeed reject them if the leaders do not follow moral principles. Moreover, “if Confucian persons equal in their moral capacities are conferred equal respect and thereby participate equally in ‘making fundamental judgments about their society future course,’ then Confucian participatory politics is democracy in Cohen’s sense.” 21 Interestingly, Albert H.Y. Chen takes us back to January 1958 and underlines that four modern Confucian thinkers advocated China’s undergoing a “genuine democratic reconstruction” in their manifesto to the world on the behalf of Chinese culture. 22 Democratic rulers can learn, from Confucian principles, to exert virtue and benevolence and to educate themselves in order to improve morally. The paternal and elitist vision of government is certainly harder to reconcile with democracy but it is not impossible to do so. Some Chinese thinkers call the shift from benevolence to the demand for complete submission and obedience the “fallacy of the misplaced Dao,” 23 suggesting that imperial powers in Ancient China might have debased the tradition. Chen underlines the need, advocated by some Chinese thinkers, to promote the former type of Confucianism and to allow for a transformation of Confucian tradition (with more focus on objective norms and institutions to guarantee a benevolent use of power) while keeping its most valuable notions. Confucianism can be compared with the West in its promotion of benevolence and restraint of power. The difference is that it puts forward intentionality while the West emphasizes “extentionality,” or the institutional framework. 24 As such the two can be seen as different faces of the same coin.

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