Who Am I?: On The Construction of Identity

Who am I?

Many have asked this question at some point or another. Their confusion comes as a form of inquiry; are they in control of their identity? Have their traumas so gravely shifted their sense of self that they become nothing more than a shadow of who they “should” be? Three distinct thinkers have probed this notion: JeanPaul Sartre constructed this notion of identity through three main concepts: The Being-in-Itself, the Being-for-Itself, and the Being-for-Others. These are simply the existence of the self, devoid of any consciousness, activity, or passivity, the self as experienced by the subject, and the self as it is seen by others. In order to understand how identity is constructed, in a melange between Being-for-Itself and Being-for-Others, it is important to examine the very structure of self experience as well. Maurice Merleau-Ponty examined this dynamic through the lens of Phenomenology, exploring the intricacies of sensory experience situated in their respective environments. Finally, in an evaluation and critique of the aforementioned two, Frantz Fanon considers the construction of the Black man’s identity under colonial rule in Martinique. The ultimate goal is thus to use the work of these three thinkers to develop an understanding of how the human identity is constructed, and how it can be maintained.

In his exploration of phenomenology in the context of racial oppression in Martinique, Frantz Fanon criticised Merleau-Ponty for his assumption of “historical freedom”; the notion that people are free to affect their lives and to impact history in a dialectical process. The individual affects their environment, is affected by their environment, and ultimately creates a synthesised imprint on history. While this may apply to a certain extent for the White man, the Black man under colonial rule is subjected to an entirely different situation. The Black man’s ability to construct his own socio-historical identity, through the identities of his descendents, is stifled by the overpowering nature of his “Being for Others”. The Others here, meaning the White people, construct a series of stereotypes, perceptions, and roles for the Black man to comply with, thereby shaping his entire identity around them. His Being for Itself is thus affected, and becomes distorted. As such, with the Black man being “battered down by tomtoms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects…”, the White man becomes associated with the exact opposite and is given a new identity as the superior figure—ultimately “better” than his non-White counterparts. This is an example of what Fanon calls “epidermalisation”, and results in the historical identity of the Black man, ultimately constructed by the White, being ingrained in the very blackness of their skin, overpowering their own perception of their own Black identity. The analysis of this process can be applied and extended to many other examples, including gender, sexuality, and perhaps even religion.

If gender is to be taken as an example, the construction of “man” and “woman” is key here. A simple example, which American philosopher Iris Marion Young posits, is the phrase: “throw like a girl”. In establishing negative connotations with the phrase, and with the culture’s collaborative enforcement of the stereotype, boys and men are taught to perceive their masculine body as strong, while girls and women are taught to perceive their bodies as frail and weak. Marion further corroborates this by citing a study where boys and girls did indeed develop these perceptions about their bodies through their sensory experiences within those bodies. This acts as a phenomenological example of the ways in which the experiences of masculinity and femininity are shaped. In their experiences of their skin, their bodies, and the identifying features of their bodies, men and women have their identities shaped almost entirely by their Being for Others; both men and women are pushed to adhere to societal expectations. For example, “throw like a girl” makes girls ashamed of their feminine bodies, and encourages the development of a Masculine mask on a Feminine body, to parallel Fanon’s White mask on Black skin, in order to be perceived as stronger. If they choose to embrace their femininity instead, they must also perceive themselves as weak. As such, their Being for Itself is rendered almost synonymous with their Being for Others. Their identity is not theirs to control, but rather belongs to the collective societies and institutions that construct the definitions forced upon them.

With two examples of the forced construction of identity, the road is paved for the most abstract level: Human identity. While it would be naïve to assume that all humans are fundamentally equal in all capacities and potentials, it would not be unsound to argue that the dynamics which govern the formation of our identities are similar. The human identity, if accepted as a result of the tension between the Being for Itself and the Being for Others, must be shaped in equal amounts by both forces. If the Being for Itself exists on its own, it constructs a person who does not interact in any way, shape, or form with their environment—a conceptual impossibility. This is primarily because it would arguably not exist unless it came into contact with the Other. If the Being for Others exists on its own, the individual is rendered a mere summation of the stereotypes and perceptions around them. As such, in order for the identity to exist in a balanced image, Fanon’s “new humanism” must be applied. The construction of individuals as “others” alienates them, making it nearly impossible for the “Being for Itself” to develop in its own domain.

As such, in disalienation, lies the freedom that Merleau-Ponty suggests and that Fanon strives for. Disalienation is Fanon’s notion of freeing the Black man from his role as The Other, or an object rather than a subject. Based on that, one could argue that disalienation from racism, sexism, or mental illness, grants the Self sufficient space to develop on its own as a Being for Itself, in tandem with the development of the identity in light of its role as a Being for Others. Here, differences can be celebrated and accommodated, while the interactions between people and environments also take their place in the human psyche.

Philosophical examinations mean little if they cannot be put to practise. Disalientation comes as an ongoing process, first and foremost through an awareness that one is alienated, and then the subsequent awareness that they may be alienating others as well. Once they are aware of this dynamic relationship, avoidance is the logical next step. Taking care to acknowledge others’ selfhood, without forcing any perceptions on it, limits the infliction of narratives that build the Being for Others at the significant expense of the Being for Itself. Lastly: resistance. While it may seem as though resisting these narratives and stereotypes is in fact a construction of the Being for Others, it nevertheless allows for a certain level of historical freedom. The individual paves the way for their descendants to live in a world with fewer stereotypes, and more room for their selfhood to flourish. The imprint of those who resist is thus maintained throughout history in the freedom of their descendents. Ultimately, in balance and freedom lies the true essence of who we truly are.