Partner Operations in Syria
TRAIN AND EQUIP: SEEKING TO CLOSE THE POCKET WITH ARAB FORCES
T
he United States’ Turkey-based Train and Equip program stems from this same debate: How do you cut ISIS off from the border without a Turkish ground force or a militia that would violate Turkey’s stated red line? The T&E program fell under the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Syria (CJSOTFS)47 in support of CJTF-OIR, and had to navigate host-country sensitivities.48 For example, Ankara’s preferred approach was to directly arm groups in the Manbij pocket with minimal training, according to Turkish officials;49 but this proposal apparently ran afoul of the legal authorities to train and equip the vetted opposition. Under CJSOTF-S, the T&E program appears to have had a reporting line that made it susceptible to micromanagement from the National Security Council and CENTCOM.
and constraints on their missions. YPG members were generally motivated to fight well beyond their villages and home countries of origin largely because the group is, at its core, an ethno-nationalist, political movement fighting for political autonomy.51 The Arab-majority forces, in contrast, fought for various reasons, ranging from the formation of a new government (divided by competing visions of how that government should be structured) to cash payments, resulting in limitations to their motivation. Moreover, as an ethnically homogenous force with an internal intelligence and command and control structure, the YPG could effectively screen out ISISor al-Qaeda-linked sympathizers.52 The various Arab groups did not have these capabilities, making the vetting process more challenging and the threat of ISIS infiltration more acute.
The authorities to train Arab and Turkmen forces in Turkey are the same as those that govern the provision of weapons and training to the SAC, and the funding comes from the same $500 million allocation. All authorities for special operations forces are overt, although many can be clandestine if units are placed under Title 50 authorities. As such, the SDF program, headed up by a specialized USSOF organization (sometimes referred to as the Task Force) composed of Syria-based “black special forces,” had more autonomy to conduct missions.50 Absent clear guidance from the commander in chief, the specialized USSOF organization could dictate policy outcomes, based on their own preferences, in ways that its CJSOTF cousin could not.
The CJSOTF-S and USSOF organization were, however, unequally prepared to manage characteristics of the forces they were training. The YPG were, according to multiple interviews, “ready to go” right out of the box as a capable force to fight ISIS,53 whereas the Arab-majority groups (both with SAC and in T&E) were less capable of fighting ISIS outside of their home villages, and therefore not ideally suited to help the United States achieve its objectives. While the USSOF organization and CJSOTF-S experienced similar challenges with the Arab-majority forces, the former operated incountry and the resulting rapport made it more able to address these challenges.54
Organizational Challenges for the T&E Program
The T&E and SDF programs faced challenges inherent to the composition of their partner forces
The limits of the Section 1209 authorities impacted the Train and Equip program more significantly than the SDF program given the structure of the former. The authorities required that partner forces pledge to fight ISIS, rather than only fighting the Syrian regime, which further undercut efforts to establish
47 The “S” in CJSOTF-S denotes the location as Syria, as compared with different Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces in other parts of the world. 48 See “Organization,” Operation Inherent Resolve, http://www.inherentresolve.mil/About-Us/Organization/. 49 Author Interview, Turkish Official, Ankara, March 2015. 50 Email Interview, US Military Official, February 2017. 51 International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria, Report No. 151, May 8, 2014, https://www. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/flight-icarus-pyd-s-precarious-rise-syria. 52 Author Interview, US Government Official, Washington, DC, January 2017. 53 Email interview, US Military Official, February 2017. 54 CJSOTFS, not initially based in-country and using Skype or other tools to connect with commanders in Syria, struggled to build rapport with militia leaders, further limiting the effectiveness of the initial training efforts. See Ibid.
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL