EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN THE CONTEXT OF CLAIMS FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS: HAS THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
GONE Too FAR? CLAYTON A. MORTON & TYLER G. DOYLE
249 IN TRODU CTION ........................................... 252 ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL .................. 252 A. Grigson v. CreativeArtists Agency, L.L.C. .......................... 256 B. MS Dealer Service Corp. v. Franklin ............................. 259 C. Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc ................... 261 EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN TEXAS ....................................... 262 A. In re V esta Group, Inc ....................................... 265 B. Meyer v. WM CO-GP,L.L.C. ................................... 267 C. In re M errill Lynch Trust Co ................................... 268 EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT ............................ A. Non-signatoryAttempts to Enforce an Arbitration Clause 269 Against a Signatory......................................... B. Signatory Attempts to Enforce an Arbitration Clause 271 A gainst a Non-signatory ..................................... 272 ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................ 277 C ON CLU SION ..........................................................
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that, under the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA), arbitration "is a matter of consent, not coercion,"' the FAA "does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so, '' 2 and its purpose is "to make arbitration agreements as '3 enforceable as other contracts, but not more so." Texas courts, however,
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Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478). Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 n. 12 (1967).
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