National Security
was replicated using other ‘pox viruses’, such as smallpox, the potential existed for the creation of a super virus which could infect millions of people with no known cure. However disturbing this may sound, undoubtedly more disturbing is that the findings, materials and methods of the experiment were published in Journal of Virology in 2001. Recreation of the 1918 Spanish Influenza The 1918 Spanish Influenza virus is thought to have killed up to 50 million people worldwide. In 2005, researchers in the US were able to extract the 1918 Spanish Influenza virus from samples of lung tissue from US Soldiers using reverse genetics. The sequenced 1918 virus code was then recreated by using an existing influenza virus and individually swapping each gene. As a result, the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu was successfully resurrected. The researchers published their report titled Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus in the October 7, 2005 issue of Science. These are only two examples of DURC which caused concern – if not some outrage – that the experiments and their subsequent publication were not only irresponsible, but downright dangerous and potentially unethical. Notably, the above research was conducted in 2001 and 2005 respectively, but the DURC issue remains and if anything – has intensified. A recent article in Science (published July 6, 2017) describes how Canadian researcher Dr David Evans led a research team which synthesized the Horsepox Virus by ordering DNA over the internet from a synthetic genomics company in Germany. Once again, synthetic re-creation of any of the ‘Pox Viruses’ are alarming not only with respect to human health, but for the potential risk posed to animal health. The fallout from the Mousepox experiment among other DURC has obviously had little effect. Although the details of the Horsepox experiment have not been released to date, research and publication of other technological ‘blue-prints’ of biological information has had an almost polarising effect on scientific discourse seeing the creation of groups such as the Cambridge Working Group. However any attempt to ‘contain’ or ‘suppress’ the publication of scientific research has been met with harsh opposition and will likely continue to be. Censorship would not be seen to be in the public interest, and restrictive regulation of scientific knowledge is arguably beyond social and political reach. In an effort to address widespread concerns relating to DURC, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) published a report in May of 2016 providing recommendations for dealing with proposed GainOf-Function (GOF) Research and GOF research of concern (GOFROC). GOF Research is research which enhances the ability of a pathogen to cause disease, or generates highly transmissible and highly virulent pathogens with pandemic potential. The NSABB developed a framework to guide funding for GOF research in influenza viruses that are transmissible between mammals. However, the recommendations of the report are limited to controlling GOFROC by restrictive funding, and the included pathogens are limited to influenza viruses, SARS-CoV and MERSCoV. The report does not include recommendations for the application of restrictive measures to privately funded
research, nor places of potential research such as privatelyoperated community labs or DIY-Bio groups. Modifications to viruses other than influenza-type as well as other pathogens including bacterium seem to have been overlooked. In Australia, the Gene Technology Act 2000 is administered by the Gene Technology Regulator, and is responsible for identifying and managing risks associated with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). DURC involving modification of pathogens falls under this legislation, and with proper regulation and compliance, DURC risks may be mitigated or at least reduced, particularly in accredited facilities. The Australian National Regulatory System for Gene Technology extends to Do-It-Yourself Biological Research (DIY-Bio), however the effectiveness of administration and enforcement of legislation beyond registered and accredited facilities or individuals remains to be seen. While the legislation may be challenging to administer on a widespread basis, particularly in relation to individuals, it signals the acknowledgment of a significant biosecurity issue at a policy level. Similarly, the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Bill 2015 was introduced under the Defence Trade Control Act 2012 to regulate export of technology and knowledge derived from the scientific and research industries as well as Dual-use industries. The Bill now includes restriction of publications of technology or technologies which may be used for military purposes (as per the DSGL), and specifies that a permit be required for publication where the document or data will be in the public domain. Essentially, the amendment includes the export or publication of knowledge and not just the physical export of materials, goods or technology. A permit is required to supply both controlled military technology as well as controlled dual-use technology, however publication of technology requires approval from the Minister for Defence only for controlled military technology, not for the publication of controlled dual-use technology. Therefore, publication of dual-use research of biological agents or toxins would not currently require authorisation by the Department of Defence. Even if publication or ‘export’ of Dual-Use knowledge was restricted, the mechanics of monitoring, investigation and enforcement would be almost impossible. In a perfect world, all DURC and associated publications would be compliant with relevant legislation and fit within a moral, ethical and risk-free model of scientific conduct however this is simply unrealistic as legislative frameworks cannot possibly regulate free thought – scientific or not. By no means is this a criticism of the Government in its attempt to reign in and mitigate potential adverse outcomes of DURC, rather acknowledgement that scientific advancement is beyond the control of not only the Australian Government, but governments world-wide. The horse has bolted. Global biosecurity issues resulting from scientific research and development of all disciplines under the biological sciences umbrella are well understood within the Life Sciences domain, however it may be time to thrust the issue under the spotlight for consultation with a wider audience. The potential adverse effects of DURC may reach into every corner of the globe. As such, the responsibility of addressing Dual-Use issues rests with all of humanity, not just policy makers and scientists alike.
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