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2007 Editorial Advisory Board

ACFEI Executive Advisory Board Chair of the Executive Board of Advisors: David E. Rosengard, RPh, MD, PhD, MPH, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, FACA (apoth.), Chair, American Board of Forensic Medicine Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Advisors: Michael Fitting Karagiozis, DO, MBA, CMI-V, Chair, American Board of Forensic Examiners Members of the Executive Board of Advisors: John H. Bridges III, DSc (Hon.), CHS-V, DABCHS, FACFEI, Chair, American Board for Certification in Homeland Security Doug E. Fountain, PhD, DABFSW, Chair, American Board of Forensic Social Workers Raymond F. Hanbury, PhD, ABPP, FACFEI, DABFE, CHS-III Lee Heath, CHS-V, DABCHS, Chair, American Board of Law Enforcement Experts Brian L. Karasic, DMD, DABFD, DABFM, DABFE, Chair, American Board of Forensic Dentistry Marilyn J. Nolan, MS, DABFC, Chair, American Board of Forensic Counselors Thomas J. Owen, BA, FACFEI, DABRE, DABFE, Chair, American Board of Recorded Evidence Russell R. Rooms, MSN, RN, CMI-III, CFN, Chair, American Board of Forensic Nursing J. Bradley Sargent, CPA, CFS, Cr.FA, Chair, American Board of Forensic Accounting Gregory Vecchi, PhD, DABECI, DABLEE, CFC, CHS-V, Chair, American Board of Examiners in Crisis Intervention Ben Venktash, MS, DABFET, DABFE, Chair, American Board of Forensic Engineering and Technology

Editor in Chief Associate Editor Assistant Editor Art Director Director of Publications & Multimedia

Leann Long (editor@acfei.com) Kristin Crowe (kristin@acfei.com) Charlyn Ingwerson (charlyn@acfei.com) Brandon Alms (brandon@acfei.com) John Lechliter (john@acfei.com)

Publisher

Robert L. O’Block, MDiv, PhD, PsyD, DMin (rloblock@aol.com)

Louay Al-Alousi, MB, ChB, PhD, FRCPath, FRCP(Glasg), FACFEI, DMJPath, DABFM, FFFFLM Nicholas G. Apostolou, DBA, DABFA, CPA Larry Barksdale, BS, MA E. Robert Bertolli, OD, FACFEI, CHS-V, CMI-V Kenneth E. Blackstone, BA, MS, CFC David T. Boyd, DBA, CPA, CMA, CFM, Cr.FA Jules Brayman, CPA, CVA, CFD, DABFA John Brick, PhD, MA, DABFE, DABFM Richard C. Brooks, PhD, CGFM, DABFE Steve Cain, MFS, MF--SQD, DABFE, DABRE, FACFEI Dennis L. Caputo, MS, DABFET, REM, CEP, CHMM, QEP Donald Geoffrey Carter, PE, DABFET David F. Ciampi, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS Leanne Courtney, BSN, DABFN, DABFE Larry Crumbley, PhD, CPA, DABFE Jean L. Curtit, BS, DC Andrew Neal Dentino, MD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Francisco J. Diaz, MD James A. DiGabriele, DPS, CPA, CFSA, DABFA, Cr.FA, CVA John Shelby DuPont Jr., DDS, DABFD Scott Fairgrieve, Hons. BSc, MPhil, PhD, FAAFS Edmund Fenton, DBA, CPA, CMA, Cr.FA Per Freitag, PhD, MD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Nicholas Giardino, ScD, DABFE David H. Glusman, CPA, DABFA, CFS, Cr.FA Karen L. Gold, PysD, FACFEI, DABPS Ron Grassi, DC, MS, FACFEI, DABFM James Greenstone, EdD, JD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS, DABECI Roy C. Grzesiak, PhD, PC Raymond F. Hanbury, PhD, ABPP, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, CHS-III James Hanley III, MD, DABFM Nelson Hendler, MD, DABFM David L. Holmes, EdD, BCFE, BCAP, BCPS, BCBS, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS Leo L. Holzenthal, Jr., PE, DACFE, MSE, BSEE Linda Hopkins, PhD, CFC John R. Hummel, PhD, CHS-III Edward J. Hyman, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Zafar M. Iqbal, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Nursine S. Jackson, MSN, RN, DABFN Paul Jerry, MA, C.Psych., PhD, DAPA, DABFC Scott A. Johnson, MA, DABPS, DAACCE Philip Kaushall, PhD, DABFE, DABPS Eric Kreuter, PhD, CPA, CMA, CFM, DABFA, FACFEI, SPHR

Ronald G. Lanfranchi, DC, PhD, DABFE, DABFM, DABLEE, CMI-IV Richard Levenson, Jr., PsyD, DABFE, DABPS Monique Levermore, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS Jonathon Lipman, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, DABFM Judith Logue, PhD, FACFEI, DABFSW, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM Jennie Martin-Gall, CMT, CMI-I Mike Meacham, PhD, LCSW, DCSW, DABFSW David Miller, DDS, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABFD John V. Nyfeler, FAIA, LEED-AP Jacques Ama Okonji, PhD, FACFEI Norva Elaine Osborne, OD, FAAO, CMI-III Terrence O’Shaughnessy, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD George Palermo, MD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Ronald J. Panunto, PE, CFEI, BSEE Larry H. Pastor, MD, FAPA, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Theodore G. Phelps, CPA, DABFA Marc Rabinoff, EdD, FACFEI, DABFE Harold F. Risk, PhD, DABPS Susan P. Robbins, PhD, LCSW, DCSW, BCD, LCDC, DFSW, DABFSW Jane R. Rosen-Grandon, PhD, DABFC Douglas Ruben, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS J. Bradley Sargent, CPA, CFS, Cr.FA, DABFA William Sawyer, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Victoria Schiffler, RN, DABFN John V. Scialli, MD, FAACAP, DFAPA, DABFE, DABFM Howard A. Shaw, MD, DABFM Henry A. Spiller, MS, DABFE, DABA Marylin Stagno, PsyD, RN, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Richard I. Sternberg, PhD, DABFE, DABPS, FABVE, FFAPP James R. Stone, MD, MBA, CHS-III, DABFE, DABFM Johann F. Szautner, PE, PLS William A. Tobin, MA, DABFET, DABLEE Robert Tovar, BS, MA, DABFE, DABPS, CHS-III Brett C. Trowbirdge, PhD, JD, DABPS Jeff Victoroff, MA, MD, DABFE, DABFM Patricia Ann Wallace, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Raymond Webster, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Dean A. Wideman, MSc, MBA, CFC, CMI-III

The Forensic Examiner® (ISSN 1084-5569) is published quarterly by The American College of Forensic Examiners International, Inc. (ACFEI). Annual membership for a year in the American College of Forensic Examiners International is $145. Abstracts of articles published in The Forensic Examiner® appear in National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Cambridge Scientific Abstracts, Criminal Justice Abstracts, Gale Group Publishing’s InfoTrac Database, e-psyche database, and psycINFO database. Periodicals Postage Paid at Springfield, Missouri, and additional mailing offices. ©Copyright 2007 by the American College of Forensic Examiners International. All rights reserved. No part of this work can be distributed or otherwise used without the express permission of the American College of Forensic Examiners International. The views expressed in The Forensic Examiner® are those of the authors and may not reflect the official policies of the American College of Forensic Examiners International.

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THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

The American College of Forensic Examiners Executive Advisory Boards

AMERICAN BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN CRISIS INTERVENTION Chair of the Executive Board of Crisis Intervention Advisors: Gregory Vecchi, PhD, DABECI, DABLEE, CFC, CHS-V Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Crisis Intervention Advisors: Sharon C. Leviton, PhD, DABECI Second Vice Chair: Kent Rensin, PhD, DABECI Honorary: Edward S. Rosenbluh, PhD, DABECI (1937-2000) Members of the Executive Board of Crisis Intervention Advisors: Sam D. Bernard, PhD, DABECI John H. Bridges, III, CHS-V Marie Geron, DABECI Major Stephen B. Ijames, BS, FACFEI, DABECI, DABLEE Marilyn Nolan, MS, DABFC David E. Rosengard, RPh, MD, PhD, MPH, FACFEI, DABECI, DABFE, DABFM, FACA AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING Chair of the Executive Board of Accounting Advisors: J. Bradley Sargent, CPA, CFS, Cr.FA Members of the Executive Board of Accounting Advisors: Stewart L. Appelrouth, CPA, Cr.FA, CFLM, CVA, DABFA Gary Bloome, CPA Jules J. Brayman, CPA, FACFEI, DABFA Stephen E. Cohen, CPA, ABV, FACFEI, DABFA, Cr.FA D. Larry Crumbley, PhD, CPA, DABFA, Cr.FA James A. DiGabriele, CPA, Cr.FA, DABFA June Dively, CPA, DABFA, Cr.FA David Firestone, CPA David H. Glusman, CPA, FACFEI, DABFA, Cr.FA Michael G. Kessler, FACFEI, Cr.FA, DABFA, DABFE Eric A. Kreuter, PhD, CPA, CMA, CFM, FACFEI, DABFA, SPHR Dennis S. Neier, CPA, DABFA Sandi Peters, CPA, Cr.FA Raimundo Lopez Lima Levi, CPA, DABFA Jay J. Shapiro, CPA, DABFA AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC COUNSELORS Chair of the Executive Board of Counseling Advisors: Marilyn J. Nolan, MS, DABFC Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Counseling Advisors: Steven M. Crimando, MA, CHS-III Chair Emeritus: Dow R. Pursley, EdD, DABFC Members of the Executive Board of Counseling Advisors: George Bishop, LPC, LAT, LAC, FACFEI, DABFE Laura Kelley, PhD, DABFC Robert E. Longo, FACFEI, DABFC Kathleen Joy Walsh Moore, DABFC, CHS-II DeeAnna Merz Nagel, MEd, LPC Irene Abrego Nicolet, MA, DABFC Hirsch L. Silverman, PhD, FACFEI, DABFC, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS William M. Sloane, LLM, PhD, FACFEI, DABFC Gary Smith, MEd, FACFEI, DABFE Ava Gay Taylor, MS, LPC, DABFC AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC DENTISTRY Chair of the Executive Board of Forensic Dentistry: Brian L. Karasic, DMD, DABFD, DABFM, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Dental Advisors: Ira J. Adler, DDS, DABFD Bill B. Akpinar, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD, DABFE Stephanie L. Anton-Bettey, DDS, CMI-V Jeff D. Aronsohn, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD, CMI-V Susan A. Bollinger, DDS, CMI-IV, CHS-III Michael H. Chema, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD, DABFE James H. Hutson, DDS, CMI-V, DABFD John P. Irey, DDS, CMI-V Chester B. Kulak, DMD, CMI-V, CHS-III, CFC Morley M. Lem, DDS, FACFEI, DABFD, DABFM, DABFE John P. LeMaster, DMD, DABFD, CMI-V, CHS-III Jeannine L. Weiss, DDS AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC ENGINEERING & TECHNOLOGY Chair of the Executive Board of Engineering & Technological Advisors: Ben Venktash, MS, DABFET, DABFE Vice Chair: Cam Cope, BS, DABFET, DABFE 2nd Vice Chair: Ronald Schenk, MSc, CHS-III, CMI-I Chair Emeritus: David Hoeltzel, PhD Members of the Executive Board of Engineering & Technological Advisors: Nicholas Albergo, DABFET Kyle J. Clark, DABFET George C. Frank, DABFE Robert K. Kochan, BS, DABFET, DABFE John W. Petrelli Jr., AIA, NCABB, TAID, DABFET Max L. Porter, PhD, DABFET, DABFE Peter H. Rast, PhD, DABFET, DABFE, DABLEE Oliver W. Siebert, PE, DABFET, FACFEI Kandiah Sivakumaran, MS, PE, DABFET James W. St.Ville, MD, FACFEI, DABFET, DABFM Malcolm H. Skolnick, PhD, JD, FACFEI, DABFET, DABFE

AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC EXAMINERS Chair of the Executive Board of Forensic Examiners: Michael Fitting Karagiozis, DO, MBA, CMI-V Chair Emeritus: Zug G. Standing Bear, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM Members of the Executive Board of Forensic Examiners: Jess P. Armine, DC, DABFE, DABFM Phillip F. Asencio-Lane, FACFEI, DABFE John H. Bridges, III, CHS-V, DABCHS Ronna F. Dillon, PhD, DABFE, DABPS, CMI-V, CHS-III Nicholas J. Giardino, ScD, DABFE Bruce H. Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, DABFE, DABFM, FACFEI, DAPA Kenneth M. Gross, DC, DABFE, CMI-I Darrell C. Hawkins, JD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABLEE, CMI-IV, CHS-III Michael W. Homick, PhD, DABCHS, CHS-V John L. Laseter, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, CMI-IV, CHS-III Jonathan J. Lipman, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Leonard K. Lucenko, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE Edward M. Perreault, PhD, DABFE Marc A. Rabinoff, EdD, FACFEI, DABFE David E. Rosengard, RPh, MD, PhD, MPH, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, FACA Janet M. Schwartz, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Richard Sgaglio, PhD, CMI-IV AMERICAN BOARD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS Chair of the Executive Board of Law Enforcement: Lee Heath, CHS-V, DABLEE Advisor: Vice Chair of the American Board of Law Enforcement Experts: Darrell C. Hawkins, JD, DABLEE, DABFE, CHS-III, CMI-IV, Chair Emeritus: Members of the Executive Board of Law Enforcement Advisors: Michael W. Homick, PhD, DABCHS, CHS-V Dickson S. Diamond, MD, DABLEE, DABFE James L. Greenstone, EdD, JD, FACFEI, DABLEE, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS, DABECI, CHS-V, CMI-I Les M. Landau, DO, FACFEI, DABLEE, DABFE, DABFM Ronald Lanfranchi, PhD, DABLEE, DABFE, CMHV, DABFM John Muldown, JD, FACFEI, DABLEE, CHS-V Henry A. Paine, III, PhD, DABFC John T. Pompi, BA, DABLEE, DABFE David E. Zeldin, MA, FACFEI, DABFE, CHS-III AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC MEDICINE Chair of the Executive Board of Medical Advisors: David E. Rosengard, RPh, MD, PhD, MPH, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, FACA (apoth.) Members of the Executive Board of Medical Advisors: Terrance L. Baker, MD, FACFEI, DABFM John Steve Bohannon, MD, CMI-IV Edgar L. Cortes, MD, DABFM, DABFE, CMI-V Albert B. DeFranco, MD, FACFEI, DABFM, DABPS, CMI-V James B. Falterman Sr., MD, DABFM, DABFE, DABPS, CMI-IV Malcolm N. Goodwin Jr., MD, FACFEI, DABFM, FABFE Vijay P. Gupta, PhD, DABFM Richard Hall, MD, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFE Louis W. Irmisch, III, MD, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFE, CMI-V E. Rackley Ivey, MD, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFE, CMI-V Kenneth A. Levin, MD, DABFM, DABFE E. Franklin Livingstone, MD, FAAPM&R, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFE, DAAPM John C. Lyons, MD, BSE, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFET, DABFE, CMI-IV Manijeh K. Nikakhtar, MD, MPH, DABFE, DABPS, CMI-IV, CHS-III John R. Parker, MD, FACFEI, DABFM Anna Vertkin, MD, CMI-V Maryann M. Walthier, MD, FACFEI, DABFM, DABFE Cyril Wecht, MD, JD, FACFEI, CMI-V AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC NURSING Chair of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Russell R. Rooms, MSN, RN, CMI-III, CFN, DABFN Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Jamie J. Ferrell, RN, BSN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE, CFN Members of the Executive Board of Nursing Advisors: Marilyn Bello, RNC, MS, CMI-V, CFC, CFN, SAFE, DABFN, DABFE Rose Eva Bana Constantino, PhD, JD, RN, FACFEI, DABFN, DABFE, CFN Renae M. Diegel, RN, SANE, CMI-III, CFC, CFN Dianne T. Ditmer, MS, RN, DABFN, CMI-III, CFN Lo M. Lumsden, ANP, EdD, RN, DABFN Yvonne D. McKoy, PhD, RN, DABFN Suzette Rush-Drake, RN, BSN, PsyD, DABFN, DABFE Elizabeth N. Russell, RN, BSN, CCM, DABFN LeAnn Schlamb, RN-BC, MSN, CFN Sharon L. Walker, MPH, PhD, RN, CFN

AMERICAN BOARD PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECIALTIES Chair of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Raymond F. Hanbury, PhD, DABPS, DABFE Vice Chair of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Raymond H. Hamden, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABECI, CMI-V, CHS-V Chair Emeritus: Carl N. Edwards, PhD, JD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Psychological Advisors: Carol J. Armstrong, LPC, DABPS Robert J. Barth, PhD, DABPS Alan E. Brooker, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-III Brian R. Costello, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Ronna F. Dillon, PhD, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-V, CHS-III Brent Van Dorsten, PhD, FACFEI, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Douglas P. Gibson, PsyD, DABPS, CMI-V, CHS-III Thomas L. Hustak, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Richard Lewis Levenson, Jr., PsyD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE Stephen P. McCary, PhD, JD, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Helen D. Pratt, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS Douglas H. Ruben, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABFE, DABFM Richard M. Skaff, PsyD, DABPS Charles R. Stern, PhD, DABPS, DABFE, CMI-V Joseph C. Yeager, PhD, DABFE, DABLEE, DABPS Donna M. Zook, PhD, DABPS, CFC AMERICAN BOARD OF RECORDED EVIDENCE Chair of the Executive Board of Recorded Evidence Advisors: Thomas J. Owen, BA, FACFEI, DABRE, DABFE Committee of the American Board of Recorded Evidence Forensic Audio: Ryan Johnson, BA Forensic Voice Identification: Ernst F. W. Alexanderson, BA, MBA, DABRE, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Recorded Evidence Advisors: Eddy B. Brixen, DABFET Charles K. Deak, BS, DABLEE Michael C. McDermott, JD, DABRE, DABFE Jennifer E. Owen, BA, DABRE, DABFE Lonnie L. Smrkovski, BS, DABRE, DABFE AMERICAN BOARD OF FORENSIC SOCIAL WORKERS Chair of the Executive Board of Social Work Advisors: Douglas E. Fountain, PhD, DABFSW Chair Emeritus: Karen M. Zimmerman, MSW, DABFSW, DABFE Members of the Executive Board of Social Work Advisors: Susan L. Burton, MA, MSW, CSW, DABFSW, DABLEE Judith V. Caprez, MSW, DABFSW Peter W. Choate, BS, MSW, DABFSW, DABFE Judith Felton Logue, PhD, FACFEI, DABFSW, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Michael G. Meacham, PhD, LCSW, DABFSW Kathleen Monahan, DSW, MSW, CFC, DABFE Susan P. Robbins, PhD, DABFSW Steven J. Sprengelmeyer, MSW, MA, DABFSW, DABFE AMERICAN BOARD FOR CERTIFICATION IN HOMELAND SECURITY Chair of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: John H. Bridges, III, D.Sc. (Hon.) CHS-V, CHMM, CSHM, DABCHS, FACFEI Vice Chair of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: LZ Johnson, Col., Special Forces, U.S. Army (Ret.), CHS-V, DABCHS Members of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: Chair Emeritus of the Executive Board for Certification in Homeland Security: Nick Bacon, CHS-V, DABCHS David N. Appleby, CHS-V, BS, JD Thomas Baines, MA, MPA, JD, CHS-V, CFC Donna Barbisch, CHS-V, MPH, DHA E. Robert Bertolli, OD, CHS-V, CMI-V, DABCHS, DABFE Brigadier General Robert C. G. Disney, U.S. Army (Ret.), CHS-V, CFSSP Paul P. Donahue, CHS-V, MBA, Cr.FA, CMA, CPP, CBM Ernest R. Frazier, Sr., Esq., CHS-V, DABLEE James L. Greenstone, CHS-V, EdD, JD, FACFEI, DABLEE, DABPS, CMI-I Brigadier General John J. Harty, CHS-V Keith Holtermann, Dr. PH, CHS-V Billy Ray Jackson, ATS, CSC, CHS-V Robert R. Silver, CHS-V, PhD, MS, DABCHS Lt. Colonel Herman C. Statum, United States Army (Ret.), CHS-V, CPP, MS, PI, DABCHS Edward W. Wallace, CHS-V, Detective 1st Grade (Ret.), MA, SCSA, LPI, CFI I & II, CLEI, CTO, CDHSI

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

THE

FORENSIC

EXAMINER

The Official Peer-Reviewed Journal of The American College of Forensic Examiners

VOLUME 16 • NUMBER 3 • FALL 2007

Write about a fascinating forensic case. Case studies exploring forensic investigations on any topic, case, or crime—including fraud, theft, murder, historical cases, and any others—are welcome. These case studies could discuss serial killers, famous fraudsters, cold cases, or any other type of case. Case studies should focus on how forensic techniques, tools, and investigations were used to break the case or solve a mystery. These could be cases you’ve worked on or simply cases that fascinate you. Submit an article for peer review. The Forensic Examiner® is always looking for articles on research and new techniques and findings in the various fields of forensics. To submit an article for peer review, or for complete submission guidelines, please visit www.acfei.com or write to editor@acfei.com. How to Submit Whether you wish to submit an article for peer review, a fascinating case or forensic case profile, or an article on a current issue in the field of forensics, send your writing electronically (either in the body of an email or as an attachment) to editor@acfei.com. Or, send in your writing on a disc or CD to Editor, Association Headquarters, 2750 E. Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804.

Feature Articles

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p. 16

p. 20

p. 28

p. 34

p. 50

07 Detecting Deception in Neuropsychological Cases: Toward an Applied Model

By Harold V. Hall, PhD; Jane S. Thompson, PhD; and Joseph G. Poirier, PhD, ABPP

Prevention of Traumatic Stress in Law Enforcement Personnel: A Cursory Look at the Role of Peer Support and Critical Incident Stress Management

By Richard L. Levenson Jr., PsyD, CTS

20 Eyewitness Memory In Context: Toward a Systematic Understanding of Eyewitness Evidence

By Matthew S. Sharps, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI; Adam B. Hess, MA; Bethany Ranes, BA; Jenna Jones, BA

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

By John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, DABFE, DABFET, DNAFE

Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as a Marker for Genocide

By Alen J. Salerian, MD; Pars Tuglaci; Gregory Salerian, LGSW; Janice Berry Edwards, PhD; Antonia Baum, MD; and Barry Mendelsohn, MD

Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation

By Henry A. Spiller, MS, DABAT, FACFEI, DABFE, and Tama Sawyer, PharmD, DSPI

The American College of Forensic Examiners International (ACFEI) does not endorse, guarantee, or warrant the credentials, work, or opinions of any individual member. Membership in ACFEI does not constitute the grant of a license or other licensing authority by or on behalf of the organization as to a member’s qualifications, abilities, or expertise. The publications and activities of ACFEI are solely for informative and educational purposes with respect to its members. The opinions and views expressed by the authors, publishers, or presenters are their sole and separate views and opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of ACFEI, nor does ACFEI adopt such opinions or views as its own. The American College of Forensic Examiners International disclaims and does not assume any responsibility or liability with respect to the opinions, views, and factual statements of such authors, publishers, or presenters, nor with respect to any actions, qualifications, or representations of its members or subscriber’s efforts in connection with the application or utilization of any information, suggestions, or recommendations made by ACFEI, or any of its boards, committees, or publications, resources, or activities thereof.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Case Studies/Current Issues

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p. 82

p. 74

56 Gray Matter: Redefining Metal Retardation in Capital Murder

By Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, DAPA

He Made Mute Evidence Speak: Edward O. Heinrich

By Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V

66 The Dangerous Flame of Childhood: A Means of Investigating Fire in the Wrong Hands

By Shelly Ruben-King

Violent Criminal Apprehension Program

By Greg Cooper, MPA

Cracked Cold Case: The Justice Department’s 2007 Conviction of the 1964 Murders of Charles Eddie Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee

By Charlyn Ingwerson, Assistant Editor

Falsely Accused: Profiles of Individuals Wrongfully Convicted of Crimes

Also in This Issue

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42 45 76 79 80

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79 p. xx

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2007 National Conference Information Successful Member Profile: An Interview with 2007 National Conference Presenter Terry Litchenwald CE Test Pages: Six Continuing Education Credits in This Issue Book Review: Al-Qaeda’s Goal to Nuke 7 American Cities ACFEI and The Forensic Examiner® Logo Products

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Welcome New ACFEI Members! Due to space limitations, members’ academic degrees and professional designations are not listed.

Benjamin J. Adam Cindi Agge Ahmed Ibrahim Alyahya John J. Anderson Jr. John A. Anderson Jr. Glenn L. Astey Bill Atwood Donna Garbacz Bader Mark Lawrence Bailey Peter A. Barone Esq Journey Basic Darshan S. Bath Douglas Wayne Beal Teresa L. Beebe Heidi Berner Chame Curtis Blackburn Jennifer Blind Susan R. Borgaro Gary Brown Terry Lynn Burks Alva W. Busch Heather Busta Mike Butera Chris S. Carpenter Idania Carpio Robert C. Cesternino Sherie Chaney Roosevelt B. Chisolm Damiana Cohen Judith A. Common William B. Connors Jr. R. Coppi

John J. Coughlin Jr. Kara Crass Robin M. Dalgleish Joann David-Parrilla Michael P. Dell Samuel J. DeSalvo Sara Villanueva Dixon Joseph M. Dolan Lauren Douglas Esq. Connie D. Draehn William Dube Vern A. Dubendorf Michael C. Duell Tiffani Dusang David G. Dwinell James M. Dye Sam O. Ebomwonyi Pete Eisert Gregory M. Eliasen Elizabeth C. Engels Todd Eversmeyer Lydia P. Fellner Theresa Joe Ferrara Michael J. Ferullo Harold Aaron Finkleman Michael Fisher Mary Fitzpatrick Keith A. Fixel Jamie Flaherty Dale E. Fox III Harlan Frankel Timothy Franklin

Kristen Fraser Leslie R. Freedman Cathleen M. Fulfer Lolita Geenie Gabehart Candice Gabriels Carla L. Garrett Kay F. Gordon Robert Gralla Bernard J. Grotewiel Lorenza Guerrero Tammy Harpster John Tonner Harris IV Michael J. Hazel William Robert Hedger Matt Hicks Karla M. Holguin Marion M. Howard Seana L. Howard Michelle Lee Hubbard Tasha Hubbard Jeffrey K. Humphrey Carol Jimenez Susan Jones Calvin Kam Hang Li Donald A. Kelley James T. Kennedy George Kerstetter Jr. David H. Kervin Kim Khor Darrell L. Kingore Stephen D. Kirkland Calantha R. Klusmann

Russell D. Koch Maria Lasker James A. Lawrence Peter R. Leffe Susan L. Leonard Gina M. Lesoski Matthew Liotine Elizabeth M. Maish Cindy Maning-Starr Timothy P. Manley Givona R. Marquez Jorge Armando G. Martinez Mohammad Mashiatulla Stacy K. McCrory Steven A. McDade Nathan Scott McElrath Mary K. McGee Katie Medlock Bernadine Mellinger Patricia Hanes Meyer Deborah K. Miller Virginia Miranda Elizabeth B. Monty Patrick Moug Melanie T. Murrell Annette Nader Marybeth O’Duggan Toochukwu Michael Okorie Norma M. Owen O’dell M. Owens David Parson

Richard W. Patrick Roger A. Patz Robert J. Pazdro Stephen M. Pelletier Christopher A. Peltier Hank A. Phillips Meredith Harvey Pierce Linda E. Pilcher Jeffrey E. Pollard Frederick G. Pooser Martin L. Price Edward John Primeau Kathryn Pursley Portia D. Rawles Marguerita Reczycki Marilyn F. Reed Reid C. Renicker Jacqueline F. Rich Luis O. Rivera Nancy E. Ross David A. Rossi Joseph V. Russo Wendy A. Salinas-Frazier Tammy L. Schmidt Erich J. Schwab Maria Sette Brian Sharkey Steven B. Shaw Omana C. Simon Joseph T. Simpson John Skoglund III Pamela S. Slease

David A. Smith Kim Smith Jennifer Smyers Ross A. Spurlock Robert W. Stafford Annette M. Stalker Nicole P. Story Lisa Stott Catherine Strain Christina Swain Teresa M. Szlosek William T. Tackett Lauren L. Thompson Lori Thompson Stacy Anne Townsend Grace Tramm Jeffrey Wayne Turner Victor Uribe Ronald J. Verrochio Jennie Vershvovsky Tammie S. Waddle Timothy K. Weeks Karen Weinberg John P. White Lance R. Wiles James Aaron Williams Teresa R. Williams Paul W. Wilson Elise Woltersdorf

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Detecting Deception in Neuropsychological Cases: Toward an Applied Model

By Harold V. Hall, PhD; Jane S. Thompson, PhD; and Joseph G. Poirier, PhD, ABPP Key Words: deception analysis, neuropsychological malingering, faking good, faking bad, applied model This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates. (CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants. (NBCC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an NBCC Approved Continuing Education Provider (ACEP) and may offer NBCC approved clock hours for events that meet NBCC requirements. The ACEP solely is responsible for all aspects of the program. Provider #5812.

Abstract The neuropsychological literature and clinical-forensic experience in both criminal and civil contexts suggest an applied model of deception analysis. This article presents such a model in terms of a faker’s (1) target/symptoms, (2) response styles, and (3) detection strategies. The deceiver’s targets/symptoms can be broken down into distorted behavioral, affective, cognitive, psychophysiological, and somatic problems. Response styles include honest responding (from the perception of the assessee), faking bad (malingering), faking good (defensiveness), attempts at invalidation, mixed responding (faking good and bad), and a fluctuating, changing style that occurs within one evaluation session. Detection strategies involve the use of neurometric and psychometric testing, observation, clinical and structured interviews, and comparison to values such as base rates for the deceptive group to which the faker holds membership. Expert testimony that meets Daubert standards, based on such an applied model of deception analysis and report writing, clearly communicates the decision path and findings of the forensic evaluator.

(APA) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

Introduction Faking cerebral dysfunction has an extensive and infamous history. Malingering brain damage has long been recognized in forensic settings despite an unwarranted belief that neuropsychological tests could not be malingered (Hart, 1995; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978; Miller & Cartlidge, 1972; Ziskin & Faust, 1988). The assessment of malingered traumatic brain injury (TBI) is difficult for several reasons. To begin, in spite of considerable research, there is little support for any type of “malingering profile” on neuropsychological tests (Franzen, Iverson, & McCracken, 1990; Heubrock & Peterman, 1998; van Gorp et al., 1999). Actual malingerers rarely acknowledge their deception and, therefore, it is difficult to distinguish malingerers from honest responders for empirical comparison (Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Vrij, 2005; Kassin, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, 2002; Vrij, 2000).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

Table 1: Faking Bad Response Styles

Style

Behavioral Strategy

Examples

1. Verbal fabrication

Claiming a nonexistent problem

“I have ringing in my ear.”

2. Verbal exaggeration

Amplifying real problem

“I’m more forgetful than usual.”

3. Verbal denial

Disclaiming an ability

“I can’t smell anything.”

4. Verbal minimizing

Downplaying an ability

“I can walk only one block.”

5. Misattribution

Stating deficit due to false cause

Claiming developmental learning diability

rather than true etiology

caused by a vehicular accident

6. Behavioral fractionalizing

Shows crudely estimated fraction of ability

Hand grip scores only 1/2 of ability

7. Behavioral approximating

Gets a close, but not exact, answer

“6+6=13; 7x3=22”

8. Behavioral infrequency

Sprinkles errors throughout

Errors on WAIS-R Comp. and

performance on graduated scale

Vocab. on initial items

Shows confusion and frustration—may give up

Claims total inability during

9. Behavioral disengagement

blindfolded period of TPT testing 10. Impusivity

Answering quickly, presents first thing on mind

Poor on Arith. and Block Design compared to untimed performance

11. Perseveration

12. Randomizing

Persists with one response mode

Alternates errors on WCST or

regardless of feedback

Explicit Alternative Testing

No consistent pattern of errors

Speech Perception Test errors due to deliberate inattention

Few applied models of feigning cerebral dysfunctions have been offered in the forensic neuropsychological literature. This article incorporates Hall & Poirier’s (2001) model, which scrutinizes targets of the faker, response styles employed, and the detection strategies used to uncover feigned neuropsychological dysfunctions (see Table 1).

Targets For the first part of the model involving targets and goals of the faker, the basic questions concern whether the individual has a motive for faking and the most likely targets of deception. Keep in mind that in deliberate deception, of which malingering is an example, DSM-IV-TR states that the individual is externally motivated and is aware of the motivation behind the deception. According to DSM-IV-TR, a factitious disorder is shown by an individual who is usually not aware of his or her own motivation behind the distorted behavior and who lacks external incentives. However, this ar THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

ticle considers deceptive behavior to include factitious disorders because the symptoms of both are deliberately faked. Targets can be broken down into the building blocks of personality—behavioral, somatic, sensory, affective, cognitive, and interpersonal—as discussed by Lazarus (1976, 2002, 2006). For example, a faker may display a deficiency in behavior such as mutism, or pretending to have lost the ability to speak. The selection of targets by the deceiver is limited only by the deceiver’s imagination, and targets have been found to take myriad forms within those categories listed above (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Rogers, 1997). One faker may wish to present an exaggerated pain response in an attempt to feign difficulty in ambulation, whereas another may show slowness of response or a festinating gait to convey the same problem. The evaluator should keep in mind that targets of the faker may change, but the long-range objective of the deception (for example, increased compensation) usually

does not (Hall & Poirier; Hall & Pritchard, 1996). The evaluator is urged to take into account that fear of getting caught may affect the selection of faking criteria. As described by Freedland (1982), this occurs for two reasons: First, mild deficits are easier to fake than severe ones; therefore a mild faking criterion is less likely to be questioned by an examiner. Second, choices of criteria may be influenced by the effects they will have on the patient’s lifestyle. For example, fake unilateral deafness is seen more often than fake bilateral deafness. Bilateral deafness might merit a larger compensatory settlement, but the patient wishing to avoid later charges of fraud might have to feign total deafness indefinitely. Unilateral deafness is worth less money, but the patient is able to engage in most of his or her favorite activities without arousing suspicion.

Response Styles Response styles are behaviors exhibited by the faker to achieve some outcome. The assessment of response styles lies at the crux of a deception analysis using the applied model. The response styles themselves provide the basis of the detection strategies employed by the evaluator presented in the next section. With regard to the applied model, six primary response styles should be considered. The first is honest responding, where the examinee, from his or her perspective, presents non-deceptive behavior. Honest responding is not equivalent to a good performance in that some examinees may consistently err on testing tasks because of genuine deficiencies (e.g., mental retardation, florid psychosis, dementia; Rogers & Bender, 2003). The second response style is faking bad, or malingering. This is the category in which most of the examples in this article fall, where the assessee deliberately attempts to exaggerate or fabricate a problem or denies or minimizes his or her strengths. There are many behaviors that fakers may employ in attempts to feign believable deficits on neuropsychological evaluations (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989; Craine, 1981, 1990; Drummond, 2004; Hall, 1985, 1990; Hall & Pritchard, 1996; Hall & Poirier, 2001): • Present realistic symptoms—A deceiver will employ a common sense or popular schema of what persons with brain damage are like and will select symptoms that accord with that naive view (Aubrey et al., 1989). • Distribute errors—To cover their targets, fakers tend to make deliberate mistakes throughout their evaluations rather than miss only difficult items. A balance is sought between appearing fully functional (missing too few items) and appearing too impaired (missing too many items). Fakers attempt to control their errors as much as possible, but, in practice, they fail to maintain a realistic percentage of errors. • Protest that tasks are too difficult and/ or feign confusion and frustration— The faker may feign confusion, anger, or other emotions superimposed upon adequate cooperation and task compliance.

• Perform at a crudely estimated fraction of actual ability—Speed may be deliberately decreased. The faker is generally knowledgeable of his or her true rate of responding but may decide to show a partial performance. Table 1 presents 12 types of faking bad, the associated behavior strategy, and an example of each. A third response style is faking good, which involves denial or downplaying real problems and/or fabricating or exaggerating existing strengths and abilities. Fourth is invalidation, which is the deliberate attempt to sabotage or render useless evaluation efforts (e.g., missing appointments, incorrect marking on computer-scored measures). A fifth response style is mixed responding, such as faking both bad and good during one evaluation session (e.g., denial of sexual problems with exaggeration of depression on the MMPI). Finally, the last response style is a fluctuating style, which is, within one session, changing how one responds to test questions or the examiner (e.g., from honesty to malingering in accordance with a plan to do so; from faking good to attempts to invalidate testing as the examinee becomes fatigued).

Detection Strategies Detection strategies employed by the evaluator have been investigated for their effectiveness at detecting particular response patterns of the faker as well as for characteristics of standardized tests used to assess deception. As a measure of response set, most neuropsychologists employ personality tests in addition to specific tests of malingering. The most widely used personality test is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) (Butcher, 2006). The original MMPI has been a mainstay component of neuropsychological test batteries (Lezak, 1995), and the MMPI-2 has been demonstrated to have comparable utility to the MMPI with neurological populations (Miller & Paniak, 1995; Mittenberg, Tremont, & Rayls, 1996). The MMPI-2 provides the neuropsychologist with valuable information about the patient’s noncognitive functioning to include behavioral, emotional, and psychiatric issues. Also particularly useful in forensic circumstances are the MMPI-2 scales designed to indicate response bias. Lamb, Berry, Wetter, and Baer

(1994) noted that the MMPI-2 is vulnerable to simulated closed head injury; MMPI-2 findings alone, however, should not be relied upon as the sole indicator of malingering of a head injury. Detection strategies to measure specific areas of neuropsychological faking outside the domain of personality fall into several categories (Craine, 1990; Freedland & Craine, personal communication, 1981; Hall, Shooter, Craine, & Paulsen, 1991). These include assessing lack of neurological fit, retesting or comparison strategies, assessing certain test characteristics, and searching for departures from expected levels of accuracy on forced-choice tests. Lack of Neurological Fit Reported history, presenting symptoms, or responses on neuropsychological tests or on individual test items must make sense compared to what is known about the functional neurological systems involved. Otherwise, a lack of neurological fit exists. For single items or symptoms, does the assessee present signs that do not make sense neurologically to a supposedly involved hemisphere (such as glove amnesia or hemiparesis ipsilateral)? On multidimensional tests, does the assessee produce a pattern of scores (profile) that is consistent with known neuropsychological syndromes? Retesting or Comparison Strategies There are three types of resting or comparison strategies. Easy versus difficult versions of similar tests. The faker may not understand that a second testing may be easier or more difficult than the first. Thus, fakers may perform similarly on the two versions whereas nonfakers would perform differently. The Dot Counting Test (DCT) illustrates this method. Cards A, B, and C (consisting of massed dots) are more difficult than their counterparts, Cards, D, E, and F (consisting of clusters of dots), even though the two sets have the same number of dots to count. Administration of the two sets of the Dot Counting Test may yield such inconsistent results that only a conscious attempt to control performance can explain them. In a meta-analytic review of selected malingering detection procedures, Vickery, Berry, Inman, Harris, and Orey (2001) found that on the DCT, malingerers scored .75 standard deFall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

viations below honest responders. In analyzing 32 studies of commonly researched neuropsychological malingering tests, Vickery et al. found that the Digit Memory Test (DMT) and the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT) could effectively discriminate honest responders from fakers, separating the two groups by approximately 2 standard deviations. Another test with built-in easy-versus-difficult items is the Auditory Discrimination Test (ADT) (Language Research Association, 1958). Initial administration of the ADT involves informing the assessee that words will be read, two at a time, and that the task is to say whether the two words are the same or different (e.g., tub - tub, lack - lack, web - wed, leg - led, chap - chap). A second form presents same or different word pairs of similar difficulty and number (N = 40) as the first form (e.g., gear - beer, cad - cab, bug - bud). In terms of threshold values, the faker may not realize that normals can miss many of the “same” items (< 15), but should miss only a few of the “different” items (> 4) before the performance appears suspicious. Comparison of the hit rates for same versus different items may detect a suspicious asymmetry in the types of items missed. Caution should be exercised, however, in deciding that failures of easy items within a test are more characteristic of deliberate distortion than of genuine responding. Mittenberg, Hammeke, and Rao (1989) 10 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

examined the distribution of intratest scatter among brain-damaged and normal subjects on the vocabulary, comprehension, and similarities subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAISR). Their results suggested high cut-off scores (e.g., more than six failed items interpolated among passed items) for distinguishing brain-damaged subjects from normal subjects. If intratest scatter is to be used as an index of faking bad as well as an index of brain damage, then the cut-off scores for distinguishing actual brain damage from malingered brain damage would have to be even higher than those for distinguishing brain damaged from normal subjects. In another study, Mittenberg, TherouxFichera, Zielinski, and Heilbronner (1995) compared selected WAIS-R subtest score differences between a group of recruited simulators and a mild head injury group. A significant discriminant function was identified, and the cutoffs differentiated the two groups. The TBI group showed negligible differences between vocabulary and digit span subtest performance. The simulators performed better on vocabulary compared to digit span. The authors acknowledged the limitation of their experimental cutoff scores being used with actual clinical populations. In a third study, from a survey of the members of the American Board of Clinical Neuropsychology (ABCN), Mittenberg,

Patton, Canyock, and Condit (2002) determined the base rate for faking bad based on more than 33,500 cases involving personal injury, disability, criminal, and medical matters. Base rates for malingering did not change for geographic location or type of setting but were affected by type of referral (plaintiff vs. defense). The following rates for probable malingering were reported: personal injury, 29%; disability, 30%; criminal, 19%; medical cases, 8%; mild head injury, 39%; fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue, 35%; chronic pain, 31%; neurotoxic, 27%; and electrical injury, 22%. Mittenberg et al. (2002) stated the following: Diagnosis was supported by multiple sources of evidence, including severity (65% of cases) or pattern (64% of cases) of cognitive impairment that was inconsistent with the condition, scores below empirical cutoffs on forced choice tests (57% of cases); discrepancies among records, self-report, and observed behavior (56%); implausible self-reported symptoms in interview (46%); implausible changes in test scores across repeated examinations (45%); and validity scales on objective personality tests (38% of cases). Parallel testing. Repeatedly administrating the same test or a parallel form of a test should yield similar performances. The faker may not understand that a repeat of the test will be given and, therefore, may have difficulty replicating the previous performance. Faked scores in general are less stable than genuine scores. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) as a test of receptive vocabulary is an example. Faking or malingering clients often have difficulty obtaining the same score on a parallel form even when the test is administered a short time later. Deviations from predicted scores. The evaluator can compare predicted scores on a test with actual performance on that test. For example, regression equations have been developed to predict WAIS-R scores from scores on the Shipley-Hartford Institute of Living Scale (Weiss & Schell, 1991; Zachry, 1986), Ravens Progressive Matrices (O’Leary, Rusch, & Gudstello, 1991), and the National Adult Reading Test (Willshire, Kinsella, & Pryor, 1991). A faker’s obtained score on the WAIS-R may fall outside the confidence interval predicted from one of these three other tests.

The Shipley-Hartford and Ravens Progressive Matrices in particular are useful screening measures of intelligence because they take only a short time to administer. In addition, the Shipley-Hartford provides alternate forms that will yield information on retest performance as well as gives an estimated WAIS-R IQ. Impaired non-faking subjects should obtain WAISR IQ scores similar to those predicted by these two tests. Certain Test Characteristics Some tests expose fakers by measuring inconsistencies between similar tasks or gauging a assessee’s failure to exhibit that he or she has learned. Inconsistencies across similar items or tasks. Within the same test, the faker may not pay attention to item similarity and, therefore, not perform in an identical fashion. A less stable performance on similar items is frequently seen in fakers, just as with parallel tests. On tests with repeated trials of the same task (e.g., finger tapping, dynamometer), intertrial variability also increases with faking. However, it should be remembered that the reliability of item-level scores is much lower than the reliability of scale-level scores. Therefore, less confidence should be placed in item-level or trial-level inconsistencies than in scale-level inconsistencies. Failure to show learning. Fakers often do not show expected learning curves (or may perhaps even show deterioration) across repeated trials of a task. The Mirror Tracing Test (Andreas, 1960; Millard, 1985) illustrates this expectation. The subject is told to trace the path between the two solid lines of a maze while viewing the maze in a mirror. An error is counted each time the subject’s pencil touches a guideline. If the subject crosses the line, he or she must re-enter at the same point; otherwise, a re-entry counts as a second error. Faking may be suspected if the expected bilateral transfer of training (improved performance with the opposite hand after training with one hand) does not occur, if the expected improvement over trials (learning curve) is not apparent, or if the total time exceeds 5 minutes. Departures from Expected Accuracy Forced-choice testing and forced-choice reaction-time testing provide powerful meth-

ods of assessing deception of deficits. These tasks are all so easy that even severely impaired persons should perform satisfactorily. Departures from expected levels of performance provide a measure of a conscious attempt to manipulate performance. Symptom Validity Testing (SVT) and Explicit Alternative Testing (EAT) both attempt to measure faked sensory and recall deficits (Grosz & Zimmerman, 1965; Hall & Shooter, 1989; Hall & Thompson, 2007; Pankratz, 1979, 1983, 1988; Pankratz, Fausti, & Peed, 1975; Theodor & Mandelcorn, 1973). EAT involves the presentation of stimuli whose perception or recognition is either affirmed or denied by the assessee. An interference period may be added if recall, rather than sensory perception, is the target of evaluation. Almost no one should miss the presented items unless a genuine impairment exists. In the case of total impairment (e.g., total blindness or deafness), one’s performance should approximate chance responding (50% accuracy with two-choice tasks). A significant deviation from chance responding is defined as an accuracy score with a probability less than some specified level (e.g., p < .05 or p < .01) as determined by the binomial distribution; for example, the one-tailed probability of obtaining fewer than 40 correct responses in 100 trials of a two-choice task is less than 2% (p = .0176). Achieving fewer than 36 correct answers would occur by chance less than twice in a thousand tests (p = .0018). Fakers usually assume that impaired performance requires less than 50% accuracy (Haughton, Lewsley, Wilson, & Williams, 1979; Pankratz, 1988). Persons genuinely impaired will usually guess randomly on EAT testing. Fakers do worse than chance because they intentionally suppress the correct answers on items to which they know the answers. The Smell Identification Test (SIT) provides an illustration of forced-choice testing of faked sensory deficits. Developed by Doty and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania (Doty, Shaman, & Dann, 1984; Doty, Shaman, & Kimmelman, 1984), the 40-item SIT provides a quantitative measure of olfactory dysfunction in less than 15 minutes. The authors note that problems with the sense of smell are frequently associated with head trauma, with

anosmia found in between 7% and 8% of cases. The SIT may be useful when the assessee is suspected of malingering with regard to his or her sense of smell such as when insurance/accident claims are filed and there appears to be no basis for the claim. Four choices of smells are presented upon release of an odorant, yielding a 25% chance of accuracy in correctly identifying the designated smell, given total anosmia (10 out of 40). Most non-faking patients will correctly identify 35 or more of the 40 odorants, with females generally outscoring males at all age levels. Zero was the modal number of correct guesses for 158 men and women instructed to fake bad in the Doty, Shaman, & Kimmelman (1984) study. Doty (personal communication, 1991) notes that under the assumption that p = 0.25, the probability of obtaining a score of zero by chance is one in 100,000; the chance of obtaining five or fewer correct on the SIT is less than 5 in 100. Those with genuine problems reflecting total loss of smell (i.e., anosmia) generally score around 10 at chance level because of essentially random responding. Patients with partial dysfunction have intermediate SIT scores. Patients with multiple sclerosis yield scores slightly above average; Parkinson’s or Alzheimer’s patients produce scores that are significantly lower than average, but that are still substantially above the expected range for random responding. Frederick (1997) described the Validity Indicator Profile (VIP), a two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) procedure designed to identify when the results of cognitive and neuropsychological testing may be invalid because of malingering or other problematic response styles. The instrument is comprised of 100 problems that assess nonverbal abstraction capacity and 78 word-definition problems. The VIP attempts to establish a subject’s performance as representative of the subject’s overall capacity (i.e., valid or invalid). A valid performance is classified as compliant, and an invalid performance is sub-classified as careless (low effort to respond correctly), irrelevant (low effort to respond incorrectly), or malingering (high effort to respond incorrectly). Frederick & Crosby (2000) reported a cross-validation study with 152 non-clinical subjects, 61 brain-injured subjects, 49 subjects considered to be at risk for malingering, and 100 randomly generated Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 11

There have been forensic cases in which the adversarial attorneys made available to their clients books and journal articles on deception and distortion . . . . ironically, the clients were detected in their faking by a battery of tests, suggesting a testible hypothesis that even with knowledge of the literature on faking, deceptive persons can nevertheless be identified. VIP protocols. The nonverbal and verbal subtests of the VIP demonstrated overall classification rates of 79.8% (73.5% sensitivity and 85.7% specificity) and 75.5% (67.3% sensitivity and 83.1% specificity) respectively. The VIP is another promising instrument for the detection of malingering. Its author suggested that the instrument’s fourfold classification scheme (i.e., cross classification of high to low motivation and high to low effort) reduces problems with false-positive classifications. The Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT) (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Thompson, 1997) is a forced-choice instrument. The VSVT was designed to address the validity of reported cognitive impairments. The VSVT is computer-administered and consists of five-digit numbers of varying difficulty. One feature of the VSVT is an administration time of 10–15 minutes, while another is its production of probability values (scores for valid, questionable, and invalid profiles). The test manual has a table of binomial probability values that is used to estimate the probability of obtaining the number of correct items out of the total number of items completed. The VSVT was found to be effective in detecting feigned memory impairment (Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006; Loring, Lee, & Meador, 2005; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Spellacy, 1996; Slick et al., 2003). Overall, validity and reliability data are encouraging (see review by Lees-Haley, Dunn, & Betz, 1999). Another instrument is the widely used Rey 15-Item Memory Test (FIT) (Liff, 2004; Rey, 1964). The FIT is a screening instrument designed to identify malingered memory complaints. To the examinee, the FIT initially appears to be more difficult than it actually is. The redundancy of simple character sets makes the memory task relatively simple, such that significant memory problems are necessary to generate actual 12 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

deficit performance. Twenty years of studies (for a review, see Hart, 1995), mostly consisting of cutoff score refinements and adjustments, have indicated the FIT to be vulnerable to false positive findings. The FIT is unique in its simplicity and brevity, but these same attributes render it not able to yield meaningful discriminant functions. In Vickery et al.’s (2001) study, they found that the FIT separated the two groups by .75 of a standard deviation. Importantly, the evaluator should note that empirically designed tests of deception are likely to meet the Daubert standards for admission of scientific evidence (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Hall & Thompson, 2007).

Caveats Neuropsychologists, firstly, should understand that their training, especially in clinical settings, poorly prepares them for deception analysis. The emerging literature discussed in this article has the typical neuropsychological practice-incorporated deception analysis. Likewise, in actual clinical practice, a multidimensional view is necessary in that genuine symptoms may be distorted and/or exaggerated in intensity, frequency, and duration (Zielinski, 1995). Secondly, the evaluator should be wary of the traditionally accepted signs of hysteria and malingering, which actually may reflect cerebral dysfunction. One study, Gould, Miller, Goldberg, & Benson (1986), surveyed the literature and found that the majority of clients (60% to 80%) thought to be hysteric or presenting neurological problems because of secondary gain, actually suffered brain damage. A third caveat concerns the need for multiple measures of distortion. When evaluating neuropsychological patients for forensic purposes, the authors use specific devices for detecting deception in addition to a com-

posite neuropsychological battery and as much historical and premorbid information available. A fourth caveat involves the array of factors that are reviewed in assessing neuropsychological symptoms. In a study of base-rate data regarding postconcussive syndrome (PCS) with a large sample (N = 1,116), neurological, psychological, and environmental variables were found to affect symptom presentation (Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 1995). The authors observed that neuropsychological test data must be reviewed in the context of a broad range of factors before PCS complaints are used as a basis for brain damage. A fifth caveat notes that the effects of coaching or priming others should be carefully scrutinized. There have been forensic cases in which the adversarial attorneys made available to their clients books and journal articles on deception and distortion. The implicit aspects of coaching in these situations were impossible to demonstrate but were suspected. In these cases, ironically, the clients were detected in their faking by a battery of tests, suggesting as a testable hypothesis that even with knowledge of the literature on faking, deceptive persons can nevertheless be identified. But this may not be true. Despite widespread use of malingering instruments, few, if any, empirical studies have been published determining the vulnerability of malingering measures to explicit coaching. Dunn, Shear, Howe, and Ris (2003) studied two commonly used measures of deception—The Computerized Assessment of Response Bias-97 and The Word Memory Test—with participants aged 18–30 years, and found that both tests could detect malingering, but neither test differentiated between naïve and coached participants. They also found that

Summary of Suggestive Signs of Faking Neuropsychological testing lends itself well to deception analysis. Fruitful areas of inquiry are plentiful within a composite battery consistent with an applied model. Tests for cerebral functioning can be combined with personality tests, clinical observation, and cross-validating sources to provide conclusions regarding faking. The following list presents cross-validated signs suggestive of deception: • Failure on specific measures adapted to assess faking of cerebral impairment (e.g., illusorily difficult tests) • Inconsistency between clinical/test behaviors and known neuropsychological syndromes (i.e., goodness of neurological fit) • Failure to exhibit impaired function outside the context of evaluation • Skill performance changes on parallel testing • Anterograde memory that is better than retrograde memory • Approximate answers in interviews when concurrent testing reveals adequate skills • Neuropsychological test results consistent with statistical rules for detecting malingering • Similar or better performance on easy compared to difficult versions of the same test • Less than accurate performance on forced-choice sensory, recall, and reaction-time tests • No improvement where expected (e.g., absence of learning curve) • Test scores outside of predicted confidence intervals (e.g., actual WAIS-R Full Scale IQ outside the confidence interval predicted by the score on the Shipley) While not definitive in themselves, these factors are suggestive enough of distorted performance to justify a more intensive investigation of the possibility of deliberate deception. Clinically-based empirical research in this area is strongly encouraged. Much is unknown concerning the dimensions of faking, under what conditions it most likely will occur, its magnitude and direction, the role of motivation and vested interest in given outcomes by the faker and, importantly, interventions that could reduce deliberate deception while simultaneously offering a reliable and valid evaluation of the forensic client. Practically, a deception analysis could be applied to every forensic examination by integrating measures of faking good and faking bad into the battery of tests employed. Thus, all forensic professionals, not only neuropsychologists and psychologists, who use evaluation findings corrected for deception would benefit from its application. Finally, the proposed model lends itself well to research that will ultimately lead to an empirically-based theory of human deception. response times and items correct were the two best indicators of participants not giving their full effort. Borckardt et al. (2003) found similar results on the Cognitive Behavioral Driver’s Inventory for 98 student subjects. The students were divided into a coached group and an un-coached group; the coached students performed indistinguishably from the un-coached students on the measure. In an attempt to detect malingering on the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices, McKinzey, Prieler, and Raven (2003), found that all but 2 of 44 subjects (ages 7–17 years) could produce lower scores when asked to malinger on the test. Yet a simple rule involving missing any of three easy items (i.e., A3, A4, or B1) yielded 5% true positives and negatives and an overall hit rate of 95%.

A sixth caveat rests on the necessity of the examiner’s attempting to reconstruct the malingering experience from the perspective of the suspected faker. Alban (2003) found that subjects who were asked to malinger were unable to maintain faked responses under cognitive overload for reaction-time measures, but this finding did not hold true for other neuropsychological domains. It can be speculated that for timed tasks, fakers would have difficulty determining which temporal limitation was associated with impairment. As a last concern, the evaluator who provides expert testimony in court should be cognizant of Daubert standards for admissibility of evidence. Relevant questions for a deception analysis may include those designed to reveal the sensitivity and specificity of the measures employed, as well as the degree of error associated with the dif-

ferent procedure’s steps employed (e.g., order of administration). Findings that stem from empirical studies on deception may be more helpful to the trier of fact (as well as less painful to the expert who is cross examined) than subjectively based findings or clinical judgment. The expert who opines on deception in a particular case should be prepared to share with the courts his or her own accuracy level in attempting to detect deception in forensic cases.

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About the Authors Harold V. Hall, PhD, ABPS, is a forensic neuropsychologist and director of The Pacific Institute for the Study of Conflict and Aggression. He is board certified in forensic neuropsychology. He has written 10 books including Detecting Malingering and Deception, Second Edition, which was nominated for the Manfried Guttmacher Award of the American Psychiatric Association. Jane Thompson, PhD, received her doctoral degree in quantitative psychology from the University of California at Davis in 2004. She is now on the faculty at the University of Hawaii at Hilo, specializing in teaching courses in statistics and methodology. Joseph G. Poirier, PhD, ABPP, is a clinical psychologist with a specialty in forensic psychology. He is currently in private practice in Maryland, having worked decades for several Maryland agencies that oversee forensic assessments of criminal, juvenile, civil, and domestic matters.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 76 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 15

Prevention of Traumatic Stress in Law Enforcement Personnel: A Cursory Look at the Roles of Peer Support and Critical Incident Stress Management

Abstract Law enforcement is considered to be one of the most stressful careers. Constant exposure to horrific scenes of death, tragedy, and human suffering may result in debilitating and, ultimately, life-threatening psychological illnesses. Because law enforcement communities are typically resistant to outside interventions, training mental-health paraprofessionals (peer support officers) to work with police officers has been a successful alternative. By using critical incident stress management (CISM), a technique of emotional first aid, peer-support officers can achieve results equal to, or better than, many mental-health professionals. This article outlines the seven-stage model of CISM, a comprehensive, integrated, and multi-component continuum approach to crisis intervention. 16 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By Richard L. Levenson Jr., PsyD, CTS Key Words: peer support officers, critical incident stress management, mental-health critical care, emotional first aid This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates. (CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants. (APA) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

Law enforcement ranks as one of the most stressful careers. Yet, traditionally, law enforcement officers (LEOs) dealing with significant and debilitating job-related stress have avoided reaching out for help, especially within their own departments. These officers fear being labeled troubled and are concerned that they will be seen as ineffective, unable to undertake normal work responsibilities, unworthy of promotion, and unable to carry firearms. The fact that LEOs think they must maintain image-armor further exacerbates their stress levels and is another obstacle to obtaining help. In terms of the costs of not seeking help, Mitchell states, “for many law enforcement personnel, the results of severe or prolonged stress can be seen in poor job performance, disrupted relationships, declining health, changes in personality, the development of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and, in extreme cases, even suicides” (p. 215). Another factor playing into the decision not to seek help is a mistrust of the mental health profession—a fear that the disclosure of how the LEO feels will be used against him or her and adversely impact his or her career. Despite assurances of confidentiality, most LEOs remain suspicious and mistrustful of the mental-health professionals who are there to help the officers return to pre-crisis levels of functioning. The failure to address critical incidents and stressful events, sometimes over the course of their entire professional careers, creates a cumulative effect that places many LEOs at risk for stress-related disorders (e.g., poor mental health, alcohol and substance Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 17

Table 1

Elements of CISM (Everly & Mitchell, 2003)

• Pre-incident education, preparation • Demobilizations (large groups of public safety)

• Crisis Management Briefings (large

• • • • • • •

groups of primary, secondary emergency personnel, and tertiary–family, co-workers, etc., and victims) Defusings (small groups) Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) (small groups) One-on-one crisis intervention Family CISM Organizational/Community Intervention, consultation Pastoral crisis intervention Follow-up and referral for continued care

*Note: Table reproduced by permission of the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc.

abuse, cardiologic, vascular, and gastrointestinal illnesses). Internalizing both traumatic scenes they have witnessed and life-threatening situations in which they have been involved settles into a foundation that cannot support healthy functioning. As a result, the LEO’s energy is invested in holding him or herself together in order to make it through each day. Law enforcement communities typically are resistant to outside interventions, so training mental-health paraprofessionals has been one successful way of treating stressaffected LEOs. The use of paraprofessionals in many fields has been well-established for over 40 years (Carkhuff & Truax, 1965; Durlak, 1979). In law enforcement, these paraprofessionals are called peer support officers (PSOs) (Levenson & Dwyer, 2003). These active-duty (and sometimes retired) LEOs around the country serve on their own departmental teams and are on call to provide “mental-health critical care” (Levenson, 2005) to officers who reach out to their fellow specially-trained officers. According to George S. Everly, PSOs are specifically trained in crisis intervention assessment and techniques and are under the supervision of a licensed clinician (as cited in Levenson & Dwyer). Research has shown that paraprofessionals “frequently achieve clinical outcomes equal to or better than those obtained by professionals” (Levenson & Dwyer, p. 148). Appropriately training paraprofessionals is essential; the use of standardized treatments 18 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

(Durlak), a careful and meticulous selection procedure (Sheehan, 1999), all-encompassing primary training (Hattie, Sharpley, & Rogers, 1984), and ongoing supervision from licensed mental health professionals and more experienced PSOs (Clifford, 1999) are all key elements in PSO training. Having PSOs conduct preliminary assessments and provide peer-counseling support to LEOs serves a number of functions. First, LEOs are comfortable speaking to peers who know the job intimately and, thus, understand their traumatic experiences. The issues of suspiciousness and mistrust with respect to confidentiality are virtually non-existent. LEOs who are seen as needing more intensive clinical intervention and support are more likely to accept a referral to an outside-the-department mental-health professional who has been identified through prior screening as having had specialized training working with members of the law enforcement community. Peer support officers are an interesting group, and the mixture of law enforcement knowledge with an interest in, and acceptance of, the mental health profession makes for a more fully functioning department. There is little doubt that the support PSOs provide helps reduce sick days and job-related disability claims, keeps families intact, and lowers the rate of officers’ suicides. After noting the positive effects on personnel, some departments have made regular debriefings mandatory, as providing emotional support and stress management is important in these highly emotionally charged environments. The beneficial effects of peer counseling have been shown in numerous research investigations with federal agents (Sheehan, 1999) and police officers (Chamberlin, 2000; Freeman, 2002; Greenstone, 2000).

The Role of Critical Incident Stress Management Human reactions to man-made disasters (i.e., terrorism) are more psychologically debilitating than reactions to natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes. It seems likely that terrorism is more stressful psychologically due to its unpredictability in terms of occurrence and scope of destruction. According to Everly and Mitchell (1999), a psychological crisis results from feelings of distress associated with a critical incident. In a psychological crisis, there is a

marked stress increase, where coping mechanisms stop working, and there is “evidence of significant distress, impairment, and dysfunction” (p.10). The goal of crisis intervention techniques is to stabilize the individual by reducing symptoms and facilitating return to pre-crisis levels of functioning or to provide access to more specialized mental-health critical care. Critical incident stress management (CISM) is now in world-wide use by many law enforcement organizations as well as emergency services, hospitals, schools, business, industrial, and banking institutions. CISM is also a service that is funded—or reimbursed—by mental-health insurance policies and plans of most major health insurance companies. In concurrence with earlier definitions developed by Mitchell (1983; 1996), Everly and Mitchell (1999) denote CISM as a “comprehensive, integrated, multi-component continuum approach to crisis intervention” (p. 15). CISM is designed to mitigate the severe psychological distress brought on by involvement in some traumatic event or situation, and techniques associated with CISM also may serve to reduce the impact of PTSD should it evolve. CISM is part of a multi-faceted program of crisis intervention techniques, which include, but are not limited to, both one-on-one and group debriefings. A rich cascade of services, beginning at pre-incident training and ending with post-incident response, is available (See Table 1). Despite a controversy initiated by Bisson, McFarland, and Rose (2000) suggesting that debriefings were neither efficacious nor helpful (Everly & Mitchell, 2003), empirically sound research has provided strong support for shortterm, CISM group and individual services to a wide variety of populations (e.g., Boscarino, Adams, & Figley, 2005; Everly & Piacentini,1999). CISM is considered to be emotional first-aid and is not psychotherapy, nor are psychotherapeutic services part of the CISM continuum. The CISM team is peer-driven, but a CISM-trained mental-health professional is a member in order to provide supervision and support, as well as specific educational information during a debriefing. Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) for adults is a seven-phase process, consisting of Introduction, Fact, Thoughts, Reactions, Symptoms, Teaching, and Re-Entry. A debriefing is neither a critique nor an investigation (Mitchell, 2001), and the phases are led by a PSO, with the exception of the

Teaching Phase, which is conducted by a mental-health professional who is a regular member on CISM teams. During the Introduction Phase, the team is introduced, a brief explanation and rationale are given, and confidentiality is assured as notes or recordings are not made, nor are officers’ ranks considered. In the Fact Phase, participants are asked about themselves, their roles in or exposure to the event, and their perspectives. In the Thought Phase, first impressions or prominent thoughts are elicited. During the Reactions Phase, participants are encouraged to share their emotional responses including what they viewed as the most disturbing or worst part of the event. In the Symptoms Phase, the goal is to acknowledge any bodily changes noted on scene, both during and later (such symptoms might be increased heart rate, upset stomache, headache, nausea, and others too numerous to mention). The Teaching Phase is vital to help those involved realize that they have experienced normal feelings during and after an abnormal event, which serves to help normalize the entire experience for the LEO. In that regard, the need for re-establishing normal routines, which includes the individual’s usual amount of sleep, exercise, food, self-care, and talks with trusted friends, is stressed. Expectations and any concerns are also discussed in this phase. Lastly, there is the Re-Entry Phase, during which questions may be asked and are answered, the CISD is summarized and any loose ends are tied up, and participants are reminded about confidentiality. If the mental-health professional believes that one or more of the participants might benefit from a referral for personal counseling services, that discussion occurs after the CISD is concluded. Typically, PSOs and trained mental-health professionals who work together in CISM agree on which LEO-CISD participants need more intensive clinical services. It is not the role of CISM teams in law enforcement to cure those with whom they interact. No single team can alleviate all symptoms or return every single individual to healthy functioning, as each person reacts to stressful events in different ways. As Mitchell (1996) states, “CISM teams work to mitigate the impact of the event and to accelerate the recovery of personnel from traumatic stress reactions” (p. 217).

Conclusion There is great need for quality stress management programs in law enforcement, and perhaps the most important aspect of any program is an endorsement by a director, chief, or other administrative commander. Therefore, LEOs should be able to see that their superiors acknowledge their repeated exposure to job-related stressors and provide LEOs with a climate of acceptance. The situations in which LEOs are involved can severely impact common and healthy people and lead to “normal (but painful) reactions to abnormal or unusual circumstances” (Mitchell, 1996, p. 216). Because officers exposed to traumatic events need to be aware of the types of psychological reactions one might experience as a result of involvement in domestic terrorism, mass disaster, or horrific crime scenes, pre-incident training is one of the most crucial aspects of any law enforcement critical incident response team. References Bisson, J. I., McFarlane, A., & Rose, S. (2000). Psychological debriefing. In E. Foa, A. McFarlane, & M. Friedman (Eds.), Effective treatments for PTSD (pp. 39–59). New York: Guilford. Boscarino, J. A., Adams, R. E., & Figley, C. R. (2005). A prospective cohort study of the effectiveness of employer-sponsored crisis interventions after a major disaster. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 7(1), 9–22. Carkhuff, R. R., & Truax, C. B. (1965). Lay mental health counseling: The effects of lay group counseling. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 29(5), 426–431. Chamberlain, J. (2000). Cops trust cops, even one with a Ph.D. APA Monitor, 31, 1. Clifford, B. (1999). The New South Wales Fire Brigades’ critical incident stress management response to the Thredbo landslide. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 1(2), 127–133. Durlak, J. A. (1979). Comparative effectiveness of paraprofessional and professional helpers. Psychological Bulletin, 86(1), 80–92. Everly, G. S., Jr., & Mitchell, J. T. (1999). Critical incident stress management (CISM): A new era and standard of care in crisis intervention (2nd Ed.). Ellicott City, MD: Chevron Publishing Co. Everly, G. S., Jr., & Mitchell, J. T. (2003). Critical incident stress management CISM: Individual crisis intervention and peer support. Ellicott City, MD: International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc. Everly, G. S., Jr., & Piacentini, A. (1999, March). The effects of CISD on trauma symptoms: A metaanalysis. Paper presented at the APA-NIOSH Work, Stress and Health ’99: Organization of Work in a

Global Economy Conference, Baltimore, MD. Freeman, G. (2002). 9/11 one year later, ACFE members reflect: What have we learned? The Forensic Examiner, 11(9–10), 10–15. Greenstone, J. L. (2000). Peer support in a municipal police department. The Forensic Examiner, 9(3–4), 33–36. Hattie, J. A., Sharpley, C. F., & Rogers, H. J. (1984). Comparative effectiveness of professional and nonprofessional helpers. Psychological Bulletin, 95(3), 534–541. Levenson, R. L., Jr. (2005). On the cutting edge of mental health critical care. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 7(1), 59. Levenson, R. L., Jr., & Dwyer, L. A. (2003). Peer support in law enforcement: Past, present, and future. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 5(3), 147–152. Mitchell, J. T. (1983). When disaster strikes . . . The critical incident stress debriefing process. Journal of Emergency Medical Services, 8(1), 36–39. Mitchell, J. T. (1996). Systematic approach to critical incident stress management in law enforcement organizations. In J. T. Reese, & R. M. Solomon (Eds.), Organizational Issues. Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mitchell, J. T. (2001). QuickCards. Ellicott City, MD: Chevron Publishing Co. Sheehan, D. C. (1999). Stress management in the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Principles for program development. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 1(1), 39–42.

About the Author Richard L. Levenson Jr., PsyD, CTS, is a New York State licensed psychologist and certified trauma specialist in private clinical practice in New York City. He specializes in the psychology and psychotherapy of law enforcement personnel and their families, post traumatic stress disorder, and crisis intervention in the aftermath of terrorism and mass disasters. Dr. Levenson is department police surgeon with the Ulster County Sheriff ’s Office in Kingston, New York, and is the editor of the International Journal of Emergency Mental Health. He can be reached at drlevenson@att.net. Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 76 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 19

Eyewitness Memory in Context: Toward a Systematic Understanding of Eyewitness Evidence

Abstract Eyewitness identification research has typically been focused either on isolated specific factors or on more broadly defined and more ecologically valid contexts that occur in more realistic but less-controlled crime simulations. However, a paucity of studies have addressed both controlled and realistic contexts, investigating specific factors systematically in context. In the present study, researchers have addressed the effects of the following circumstances on memory: stimulus complexity, gender of assailant, gender of respondent, presence of weapons, clothing and physical characteristics of assailants, peripheral sources of hazard, and seeing perpetrators in lineups. Standardized contexts were used to strengthen experimental controls. Results indicated that eyewitness memory, even under idealized conditions, was highly unreliable, both for perpetrator characteristics and for other aspects of the crime scene, including weapons and peripheral sources of hazard. These results provide important information about the elements of eyewitness testimony that are most likely to yield difficulties in both investigative and courtroom settings.

20 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By Matthew J. Sharps, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI; Adam B. Hess, MA; Hilary Casner; Bethany Ranes, BA; and Jenna Jones, BA Key Words: eyewitness memory, recognition memory

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates. (CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants. (APA) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is approved by the American Psychological Association to sponsor continuing education for psychologists. ACFEI maintains responsibility for this program and its content.

Over the past century, numerous studies have addressed eyewitness identification. Many sophisticated studies have addressed individual factors of importance, such as exposure time, suspect race, witness gender, or weapon presence (e.g., Narby, Cutler, & Penrod, 1996), typically in isolation. Such studies of isolated variables have been designed to improve experimental control. However, isolating such critical factors from their contexts, while increasing experimental control, has typically reduced ecological validity (for review, see Sporer, Malpass, & Koehnken, 1996; also, see Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Other research has been directed at field studies, video, or live simulations of crime events. However, these studies, which improve on ecological validity, are necessarily less controlled (Morgan et al., 2004) and, consequently, are more difficult to interpret. There is a lack of systematic research on eyewitness testimony that bridges the gaps between isolated variables with better experimental controls and more realistic ecological variables with better validity. Additionally, whether an isolated-variable focus or a more ecological approach, there has been little research on eyewitness memory for forensically important elements other than identification of persons (elements such as recall of weapons and peripheral sources of hazard) (e.g., Sharps, Barber, Stahl, & Villegas, 2003; Villegas, Sharps, Satterthwaite, & Chisholm, 2005). Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 21

The integration of experimental control with more realistic environmental validity formed the foundation for the studies reported in this research. The experiments described in this research were designed to enhance the development of a systematic contextual understanding of eyewitness memory, which would help bridge the gap between isolated variables in experimentally controlled designs and environmental variables that are more realistic, but less controlled. Also, the present research was designed to address the broader context of eyewitness memory to include important inanimate elements of crime scenes while identifying the narrower specifics for each individual to get the highest degree of experimental precision possible. In previous studies, Sharps et al. (2003) and Villegas et al. (2005) utilized this integrated tradition of addressing relatively ecologically valid contexts in experimentally controlled environments—in the important, but hitherto neglected, areas of weapon and vehicle identification. These studies were conducted under conditions of ideal lighting, exposure time, and freedom from contextual distraction. Even under these ideal conditions, which would be considerably diminished under the real-world conditions of a typical crimescene, eyewitness memory was shockingly poor. In our study of weapon identification (Sharps et al., 2003), response rates for semiautomatic pistol identification were correct in fewer than half the cases. More familiar handgun types were better recognized than less familiar types, but even familiar revolvers were recognized correctly only 43% of the time. Even assault weapons, which are used less frequently in crimes but are larger in size and have greater complexity of features and, consequently, are subject to a higher level of feature-intensive processing (Sharps, 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002), were correctly recognized less than threequarters of the time. These data strongly suggest appreciable reconfiguration of memory for weapons after initial encoding at the given crime scene. A similar study of vehicle identification (Villegas et al., 2005) yielded even poorer results. Again under idealized conditions, vehicles were identified correctly, on average, only one quarter of the time. 22 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

In Villegas et al.’s study (2005), vehicle color was more important in the generation of errors than vehicle model. This result was consistent with the Gestalt/Feature-Intensive Processing (G/FI) theory of visual cognition, which has proven useful in several areas of eyewitness memory research (Sharps, 2003; Sharps et al., 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002). Color, an identifiable feature of an object that may readily be processed linguistically, was more important in the generation of errors than was the vehicle model, which depends on the less linguistically-accessible shapes of the various structural elements of the given vehicle body type (see Sharps & Nunes). The results of this research may be helpful in explaining such apparent anomalies as occurred in the Washington sniper case, in which the suspect vehicle, a dark-blue Chevrolet Caprice, was apparently misidentified by multiple witnesses as a white or cream-colored van (Blades, 2005). In this case, of course, neither color nor vehicle model were particularly helpful to witness memory. The repetition of the error is explicable in view of the relatively poor performance of witnesses in our laboratory situation, in which factors of darkness, brief exposure, occlusion, movement, and perceived danger had not been present. In these studies, memory for vehicles and for weapons was reconfigured in young, healthy witnesses to an extent that reliable eyewitness identification was unlikely. The fact that such reconfiguration of memory occurs has been known for more than 70 years. Bartlett (1932) showed that memory is not the static, videotape-like system of popular imagination. Rather, memories become reconfigured in three primary ways. First, memories become shorter and more abbreviated. Second, details are lost, leaving a general representation upon which information obtained after the fact may act to alter elements of initial memory that may or may not have been correct in the first place. Finally, personal belief can alter memory significantly in both the visual and verbal realms. Bartlett showed that custom and cultural beliefs significantly reconfigured British subjects’ memories of Native American stories and that relatively abstract figures were recalled by respondents as specific, meaningful pictures of everyday objects if suggested to be such by the experimenter. Modern work in several venues has

confirmed the major points originally described by Bartlett (e.g., Ahlberg & Sharps, 2002; Bergman & Roediger, 1999). Research in G/FI theory has shown that these various phenomena may be encapsulated along a single processing dimension (Sharps, 2003; Sharps & Nunes, 2002). People in eyewitness situations typically encode a given original memory in a gestalt manner, with little attention to details that might assist in making a correct identification. However, as the witness reviews the given memories over time, especially under circumstances in which others such as attorneys and investigators are directing and framing the viewpoint from which the events are considered, reviewed, and reported, the resultant feature-intensive analysis will process both actual/true details as well as details that have been derived from a reconfigurative process or from post-event suggestions. As Bartlett demonstrated, such details may readily be fabricated wholly unconsciously on the part of the witness from vague impressions, post-event information, or other sources. Thus, researchers can now explain the respondents’ tendencies to focus on featureintensive factors such as vehicle color or on the greater number of identifiable features presented by a large assault weapon than by a small, simple handgun. Witnesses may search their memories for veridical features of the given crime situation, but then focus instead on inconsequential, inaccurate, or even accidentally fabricated elements that alter their memories further from the underlying genuine memory stimuli. What happens to eyewitness memory in a context where features and details must be sorted and separated from visual situations with differing elements such as weapon presence and complexity? The experiments reported herein are initial attempts to cohere variable-by-variable studies of the variable components of eyewitness memory typically addressed solely in isolation, with more ecologically valid but less controlled studies employing simulated live or video-based crime scenes. In this initial effort, researchers employed high-quality digital photographs of ecologically valid crime scenes developed under the advice and supervision of expert senior field-training officers of the Fresno, California, Police Department. These offi-

cers were highly experienced in tactical realities and in the sorts of situations encountered by witnesses and officers on the street. The photographs employed in these studies depicted a potentially violent crime scene in which either a male or a female perpetrator appeared armed with a Beretta handgun. The scene was either simple, sparse in terms of potentially distracting objects, or complex, including a victim being threatened by an armed perpetrator and typical street clutter. Peripheral sources of hazard were also included in the complex scenes. Researchers included in the complex scene an explicit explosive device (i.e., a disarmed and hollowedout surplus hand grenade, which, from outward appearance, could not be distinguished from a live weapon) and a potentially implicit explosive device (i.e., a military-surplus ammunition box which may or may not have contained live explosives, but which was clearly out of place in the street scene and was placed next to the hand grenade, near the perpetrator). These crime elements were included because such weapons and ambush tactics have become increasingly important in real-world criminal and terrorist operations (Gelles, 2006). For the sake of control in the case of weapon identification, in one full set of conditions (either a simple or complex context, and each with either male or female perpetrator), the Beretta was replaced by a power screwdriver, which the perpetrator might have been pointing or waving for emphasis in a non-lethal argument with the victim. The conditions for all scenes involved uniformly excellent lighting (strong sunlight), extended exposure time, and the relative comfort of witnesses being seated 10–20 feet from a standard white movie screen, which they faced and on which the given scene was projected. There was no movement or occlusion of important elements of the scene, and of course, there was an absence of personal danger. As in our previous work (Sharps et al., 2003; Villegas et al., 2005), these idealized conditions were selected with the knowledge that an actual crime scene might well involve uncertain lighting and potentially occluded conditions and would typically result in poorer performance of eyewitnesses because of established dynamics of human visual cognition (e.g., Narby et al., 1996; Spoehr & Lehmkule, 1982).

Method The participants in this study were 149 women (mean age 19.86 years, SD = 2.48) and 49 men (mean age = 21.10 years, SD = 4.59) recruited from freshman psychology classes at California State University, Fresno. Gender proportions reflect the proportions of the classes. Also, this population was generally younger and probably in better health than the population at large. A Snellen test of visual acuity was performed, and all respondents possessed at least 20/40 eyesight corrected or uncorrected. Each respondent viewed only one scene (simple or complex, with a male or female perpetrator either armed or holding the power tool). In real-world eyewitness identification situations in general, exposures to critical stimuli are frequently brief and fragmented. Witnesses may be under stress and may be operating under elevated levels of arousal. Also, elements that might be important for later identification may actually be obscured in real crime situations by vehicles, buildings, curbs, or other contextual features. Further research should address eyewitness memory under systematically varied conditions of these critical parameters, and efforts along these lines are currently in progress in this laboratory. However, in this preliminary research, researchers sought to evaluate identification under ideal conditions and to establish baseline data as outlined above. Therefore, the condition of an extended exposure time was imposed—a full 5 seconds. Law enforcement experts suggest that, generally, a firearm assault situation, such as the one depicted in this study, tends to develop rapidly and may result in a violent conclusion in literally less than a second (e.g., Moore, 2006; Montejano, 2005; Tietjen, 2005). Therefore, respondents in this research had substantially more than the typical period of observation and processing time. In order to evaluate witness performance, the aid of senior, experienced Fresno Police field training officers were enlisted to produce a realistic police interview focused on the scenes viewed by respondents. The interview administered requested information on the perpetrator’s dress, physical characteristics (as both general verbal descriptions and as specific numerical estimates of height, weight, and age), weapon type

if any, and the presence of other sources of hazard in the scene. This information was collected via multiple methods for each topic. Respondents were scored on each item in an objective scoring system from 1 to 3: 3 reflected a correct answer, 1 reflected an incorrect answer, and 2 reflected uncertainty or an answer too vague to be of use. These scores were combined and summed into specific indices: a clothing index (composed of 3-point scales for hat, coat, shirt, and shoes), and a physical characteristics index (composed of 3-point scales for complexion, facial hair, marks or tattoos, height, weight, and age). Numerical estimates for the latter three elements of this index were also obtained, although these were not entered into the combined score to avoid potential redundancy. Finally, there was an index of weapon characteristics (3-point scales on whether the respondent was armed, with what type of weapon generally, and then requesting a specific description of the firearm in question). These combined indices were subjected to analysis of variance against four independent variables: the complexity of the scene; the gender of the perpetrator; whether or not the perpetrator was actually armed or carried the power screwdriver; and the gender of the witness. A second study employing a sample of 47 college students (thirty-one females, mean age 25.68, years, SD = 7.44, and sixteen males, mean age 23.38 years, SD =3.14), was conducted to investigate standard lineup identification under the conditions provided by the same scenes described above. To replicate typical and realistic crime scenes, only the scenes involving the armed male perpetrator were employed in the second study. Witnesses were exposed to the given scene for the usual 5-second exposure, followed by administration of a “six-pack” photographic lineup recognition test, to which the sample responded between 10 and 15 minutes after termination of the exposure. The lineup was administered according to Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines (1999). In the lineups, the perpetrator was placed at either position 3 or 5. A simultaneous lineup procedure was chosen because this remains the most commonly employed technique in actual criminal investigations (Wogalter, Malpass, & Burger, Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 23

1.Factors

Leading to Wrongful Convictions

The most common factors leading to wrongful convictions that were found in the first 130 DNA exonerations.

Mistaken I.D. (101) False Confessions (35) Microscopic Hair Comparison Matches (21) Informants/Snitches (21) DNA Inclusions at Time of Trial (3)

1993), despite research that indicates sequential lineups are typically more accurate (e.g., MacLin, Zimmerman, & Malpass, 2005; Wells, 1993; Wogalther, Malpass, & McQuiston, 2004). Finally, all respondents in both experiments completed the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (CAARS) (Conners, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1999) and the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) (Carlson et al., 1991). These scales were included to explore the possibility that symptoms of attention deficit and dissociation at levels found in a general, non-diagnosed population and falling below the threshold of identifiable clinical significance might influence performance in eyewitness identification. These specific factors were analyzed, as they have been shown in previous research to influence performance in other areas of G/FI processing (e.g., Sharps, Matthews, & Asten, 2006; Sharps, Price-Sharps, Day, Villegas, & Nunes, 2005).

Results and Discussion Neither DES scores nor scores on any subscales of the CAARS were significantly predictive of performance on any index or measurement in either of these experiments. Within the present research framework, and with symptomatology at clinically non-significant levels, eyewitness abilities were in24 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Source: Innocence Project (www.innocenceproject.com)

fluenced minimally, if at all, by attention deficit or dissociative anomalies. These results do not, of course, speak to clinically significant disorders or syndromes or to other possible frameworks of research. Specific memory results for each index described above are as follows: Memory for Clothing The average combined score for witness recall of perpetrator clothing was a respectable 9.64 out of 12 (SD = 1.67), an accuracy of 80.3%. The effect of scene complexity was significant, F (1,182) = 4.60, p = .033, but modest; complex scenes resulted in only 3.3% less accuracy than did simple (sparse) scenes. The effect of perpetrator gender was also significant, F (1,182) = 12.55, p < .001, with the female perpetratorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s clothing being described 12.6% better than that of the male on average. This effect interacted significantly with the effect of scene complexity, F (1,182) = 3.93, p = .049. The presence or absence of a weapon was not significant on clothing description, but the gender of the witness was, F (1,182) = 4.08, p = .045. This effect should be interpreted with caution because of the disparity in numbers of the two sexes, but within this research framework, women were 7.46% better than men on average at describing perpetrator clothing.

Memory for Physical Characteristics The average combined score for witness recall of perpetrator physical appearance was less impressive than that for clothingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;only 12.71 out of a possible 18 points (SD = 1.81), an accuracy of 70.6%. For this index, the effects of scene complexity, witness gender, and weapon were non-significant; the only significant variable was gender of perpetrator, F (1,182) = 12.64, p < .001, with the appearance description scores for the female perpetrator 11.97% higher on average than those of the male. As noted above, in addition to the questions requesting verbal descriptions of height, weight, and age, numerical estimates were sought from witnesses as well. There was no identifiable correlation, significant or otherwise, between numerical or verbal estimates. In other words, a descriptive term like heavy, thin, or tall had no identifiable relationship with numerical estimates of the same quantities. Further research will be needed to understand the mechanisms by which witnesses arrived at these apparently unrelated qualitative and quantitative descriptions. However, if confirmed in other research, this finding may have important implications for police interview techniques. For example, respondents may be better at making general, qualitative descriptions of persons than they are at attempting to convert their observations into realistic quantitative estimates. How law enforcement officers elicit such information (qualitatively or quantitatively) may result in differences in the utility of such information in searches, investigations, and courtroom proceedings. Memory for Weapons and for Peripheral Sources of Hazard In contrast to the data concerning the physical description of the perpetrator, the independent variables of scene complexity, perpetrator gender, and gun-versus-screwdriver all resulted in significant effects on identification of the weapon carried by the perpetrator. Also significant were the interaction of complexity and perpetrator gender and the interaction of these factors with the gun/ screwdriver variable [F values, respectively, were F (1,182) = 4.18, p = .042; F (1,182) = 4.053, p = .046; F (1,182) = 242.69, p < .001; F (1,182) = 7.50, p = .007; and F (1,182) = 8.17, p = .005].

The effect of witness gender was not significant. Average performance across conditions was not impressive, with a mean score of 6.20 (SD = 2.63) out of a possible 9 points, producing an average witness accuracy of 68.9%. The simple scene yielded better performance than the complex scene by 4.12%. The male perpetrator resulted in better performance than the female by 22.28%. Further, the gun condition was massively superior to the screwdriver condition, by 211%. This gun condition results warranted further investigation. In the screwdriver condition, out of 103 respondents, 92 were in error, believing the screwdriver to have been, in fact, a firearm. Only five witnesses had been uncertain as to what they had seen, and a mere six correctly identified the power tool. It should be reiterated that this result was obtained under conditions of ideal lighting and exposure, as well as an exposure period several times longer than typical for real-world criminal activity. Even with enhanced light and time, most witnesses identified the tool as a gun. This result may prove useful in explaining the large numbers of cases in which civilians and police mistake an innocuous object for a firearm. Rather than having anything to do with witness or law enforcement duplicity, such errors may frequently derive from typical characteristics of human visual cognition when witnesses are faced with this type of situation (see Sharps et al., 2003). It is important to develop a better empirical understanding of the types of conditions under which such errors are most prevalent. Identification of peripheral sources of hazard was also unexpectedly poor. Only a single respondent, out of 94, identified the hand grenade, even though the grenade was in plain sight and viewed under the optimized observation conditions described above. Not a single individual identified the ammunition box as a potential source of hazard, even though it was placed close to the hand grenade and was clearly an anomalous object in a normal street scene. In view of the terrorist threats currently confronting law enforcement and military authorities in much of the world and the relative reliance of terrorists on ambush tactics and pre-placed improvised explosive devices (e.g., Gelles, 2006), the failure to detect a grenade hazard clearly highlights the

need for a better understanding of witness, bystander, and professional perceptual and cognitive responses to such devices. This is especially important in view of the fact that such devices are not normally placed in plain sight, as they were in the present study. On a train or in a crowded street, observation of such peripheral sources of explosive hazard prior to their detonation and the recognition of an anomaly—something that simply should not be there—is likely to come from a law enforcement officer, a security officer, or a particularly alert civilian. Given the poor performance of respondents in this study to such hazards placed in plain sight and under optimal viewing conditions, more research on the topic of observation, detection, and interpretation of anomalous threatening devices is clearly needed. Lineup Performance This experiment required witnesses to respond to a typical police lineup, only 10 to 15 minutes after viewing the simple or the complex scene of the armed male perpetrator under ideal conditions. The sole visual transformation required of the respondents involved viewing the perpetrator in profile in the crime scenes and viewing the perpetrator and foils full-face in the lineup photographs. Though there appear to be no current statistics on this subject, it seems that in a typical, actual crime situation, witnesses rarely have the opportunity to gaze full-face on a suspect. Actual perpetrators are typically in motion, frequently with their faces occluded by a partial disguise, such as a hood, cap, or even stocking mask, and conditions are seldom optimal (e.g., Narby et al., 1996). Thus, this simple transformation of the view of the alleged perpetrator under optimized laboratory conditions would seem to pose little challenge compared to the use of lineups in real-world forensic practice (e.g., DOJ, 1999). However, the results of this experiment led to little cause for optimism in the realm of alleged perpetrator identification. Out of 47 respondents, only 5 were able to identify the perpetrator correctly from a standard simultaneous lineup. Position 5 (central, bottom row) was slightly more likely to result in a correct identification than Position 3 (more visually peripheral). However, the level of identification observed here was

sufficiently poor as to render miniscule the position effect, and, essentially, render moot this picture-placement finding. Of the five correct identifications, four of the five came from the simple condition. Only one individual in the complex and more realistic condition was able to make the identification correctly. These results are sufficiently close to the statistical “floor” as to defy inferential statistical testing. The data clearly indicate that, at least within the conditions of this research, at best, only about 10% of witnesses can be anticipated to be correct in their identifications. Furthermore, accuracy is probably likely to be lower in more complex, and hence more realistic, visual situations. These results may at first seem to fly in the face of some schools of conventional wisdom on this subject. For example, human visual recognition memory was shown to be quite efficient in a series of classic studies, especially for detailed pictures (e.g., Nelson, Metzler, & Reed, 1974), but performance declined with shorter exposure times (e.g., Loftus & Bell, 1975). However, these studies required recognition of pictures in their entirety, rather than the recognition of abstracted elements of original encoding situations involving visual transformations, which is typical of lineup procedures. Other studies have, of course, found recall or recognition-enhancing effects of, for example, instructional manipulations (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987), which may enhance lineup memory (in the case of the Cutler et al. study, to 44% accuracy). However, in the absence of such manipulations, and with only a single visual change in the aspect of the individual to be identified, the present results add to the growing body of information suggesting that person identification, even when obtained from properly conducted police lineups (DOJ, 1999), must be viewed with extreme caution by law enforcement and judicial personnel.

Summary and Conclusions As anticipated from previous research (e.g., Narby et al., 1996; Sporer, Malpass, & Koehnken, 1996; Sharps et al.; Villegas et al., 2005), levels of eyewitness performance in person description, weapon description, and person identification were generally low. When a contextual systematic assessment of specific factors involved in these effects was Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 25

conducted, more complex (and hence more realistic) scenes resulted in diminished performance compared to simpler situations. Witnesses generally reported an innocuous object (i.e., the screwdriver) to have been a handgun, even under the ideal viewing conditions employed here. Under typical, approved lineup conditions, recognition of a perpetrator seen in context was effectively at a statistical floor. Peripheral sources of hazard, even when placed in plain view, generally went unnoticed and unreported. Finally, the viewing of a female perpetrator, as opposed to a male, improved person description significantly but reduced weapon recognition. An immediate limitation on the present research is noted. The use of a single male and female perpetrator in these studies obviously does not allow broad general conclusions about perpetrator gender and identification. A more exhaustive accounting of this effect would require depictions of a large number of individuals of both sexes, systematically varied according to race, physique, perceived attractiveness, and other characteristics. Such an effort would require a substantial long-term research project devoted to this question alone, well beyond the scope of this preliminary research. There must be, however, limitations to the generalized results of such a broad effort, as any given real-world perpetrator might possess characteristics that differed significantly from those evaluated. For the present, there is a reasonable, parsimonious working explanation for the significant effects of perpetrator gender observed here. Although women do commit violent crimes, the vast majority are committed by men. Confronting a female perpetrator may reduce processing and performance, even in seasoned combatants and law-enforcement officers (e.g., Grossman, 1996; Kessler, 2002). The authors suggest that the witnesses’ patterns of attention and cognitive resources may have been altered by the surprise or the violation of expectations, engendered by the depiction of the female perpetrator. The higher average reportage of the female perpetrator’s clothing and physical characteristics than those of the male may speak to this effect. Attention and processing resources were drawn to her as an unexpected stimulus, resulting in the superior description of her clothing and body per se. 26 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

However, with better identification of the female perpetrator, resources were reciprocally drawn away from other elements of the scene, such as the gun, which might have been more expected in the hands of a male. As a result, the study suggests that weapon identification was superior with the male perpetrator. The role of expectations may also help explain the tendency of witnesses to report the innocuous power screwdriver as a firearm. There may have been a tacit expectation that a given object, pointed by one individual at another, was in fact a weapon. This expectation-based reconfiguration (see Bartlett, 1932; Ahlberg & Sharps, 2002) could have resulted in the potentially vast witness misperception observed in this research. However, these impressions are conjectural at present. A significant body of future research will be needed to elucidate the mechanisms of these effects. The gender of the witness had a significant effect on clothing description. Women’s performance exceeded that of men on average. However, and perhaps contrary to expectations, no gender differences were observed in weapon identification, physical description, or lineup recognition of persons. Because of the extremely poor performance of witnesses of both sexes, lineup recognition could not even be analyzed statistically. Also, there was also no evidence of an effect, in this civilian witness population, of familiarity with weapons on witnesses’ ability to identify them. One might, however, expect such an effect with trained law-enforcement or military personnel, who are familiar with the idiosyncratic features of many weapons, including the standard police Beretta used in these studies. Finally, tendencies toward attention deficit and dissociation at subclinical levels did not influence eyewitness performance. In aggregate, these studies attest to the importance of the empirical evaluation of eyewitness memory in systematically-varied context. The combined effects observed here further add to the growing body of evidence indicating the necessity of viewing eyewitness evidence with extreme caution. Contrary to beliefs often observed to prevail in courtroom proceedings, eyewitness identifications of persons, weapons,

and peripheral sources of hazard in crime scenes are unlikely to be highly accurate, especially under the relatively brief conditions of exposure, the high levels of arousal, and the poor viewing conditions typical of real-world crime scenes.

References Ahlberg, S. W., & Sharps, M. J. (2002). Bartlett revisited: Reconfiguration of long-term memory in young and older adults. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163, 211–218. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bergman, E. T., & Roediger, H.L. (1999). Can Bartlett’s repeated reproduction experiments be replicated? Memory and Cognition, 27, 937–947. Blades, H. B. (2005). The Washington, D.C. sniper case: A case study in how eyewitness identification of vehicles can go wrong. The Forensic Examiner, 14(3), 26. Carlson, E. B., Putnam, F. W., Ross, C. A., Torem, M., Coons, P., Dill, D., et al. (1991). Factor analysis of the Dissociative Experiences Scale: A multicenter study. In B. G. Braun & E. B. Carlson (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Multiple Personality and Dissociative States. Chicago: Rush. Conners, C. K., Erhardt, D., & Sparrow, M. A. (1999). Conners’ CAARS adult ADHD rating scales. North Tonawanda, NY: Multi-Health Systems. Cutler, B. L., Penrod, S. D., & Martens, T. K. (1987). The reliability of eyewitness identifications: The role of system and estimator variables. Law and Human Behavior, 11(3), 23–258, Department of Justice (1999). Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law enforcement. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Gelles, M. (2006, October). Behavioral threat assessment: Law enforcement considerations. Washington DC: Society for Police and Criminal Psychology. Grossman, D. (1996). On killing. Boston: Little, Brown. Kassin, S. M., Tubb, V. A., Hosch, H. M., & Memon, A. (2001). On the “general acceptance” of eyewitness testimony research: A new survey of the experts. American Psychologist, 56(3), 405–416. Kessler, R. (2002). The bureau. New York: St. Martin’s. Loftus, G. R., & Bell, S. M. (1975). Two types of information in picture memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 104(2), 103–113.

MacLin, O. H., Zimmerman, L. A., & Malpass, R. S. (2005). PC_Eyewitness and the Sequential Superiority Effect: Computer Based lineup administration. Law and Human Behavior, 29(3), 303–321. Morgan, C. A., Hazlett, G., Doran, A., Gattett, S., Hoyt, G., Thomas, P., et al. (2004). Accuracy of eyewitness memory for persons encountered during exposure to highly intense stress. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27(3), 265–279. Montejano, D. (2005). The impact of job related stress on individuals in law enforcement. Frenso, CA: Fresno Police Department, Sierra Education and Research Institute, and Alliant International University. Moore, L. (2006, November). Conference on the use of force in law enforcement. Office of the United States Marshal, Fresno, CA. Narby, D. J., Cutler, B. L., & Penrod, S. D. (1996). The effects of witness, target, and situational factors on eyewitness identifications. In S. L. Sporer, R. S. Malpass, & G. Koehnken (Eds.), Psychological issues in eyewitness identification (pp. 23–52). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Nelson, T. O., Metzler, J., & Reed, D. A. (1974). Role of details in the long-term recognition of pictures and verbal descriptions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102(1), 184–186. Sharps, M. J. (2003). Aging, representation, and thought: Gestalt and feature-intensive processing. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction. Sharps, M. J., Barber, T. L., Stahl, H., & Villegas, A. B. (2003). Eyewitness memory for weapons. The Forensic Examiner, 12(5), 34–37. Sharps, M. J., Matthews, J., & Asten, J. (2006). Cognition, affect, and beliefs in paranormal phenomena: Gestalt/Feature Intensive Processing Theory and tendencies toward ADHD, depression, and dissociation. Journal of Psychology, 140(6), 579–590. Sharps, M. J., & Nunes, M. A. (2002). Gestalt and feature-intensive processing: Toward a unified model of human information processing. Current Psychology, 21(1), 68–84. Sharps, M. J., Price-Sharps, J. L., Day, S. S., Villegas, A. B., & Nunes, M. A. (2005). Cognitive predisposition to substance abuse in adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Addictive Behaviors, 30(2), 355–359. Spoehr, K. T., & Lehmkule, S. W. (1982). Visual information processing. San Francisco: Freeman. Sporer, S. L., Malpass, R. S., & Koehnken, G. (1996). Psychological issues in eyewitness identification. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Tietjen, T. (2005, January). The impact of job related stress on individuals in law enforcement. Fresno Police Department, Sierra Education and Research

Institute, and Alliant International University, Fresno, CA. Villegas, A. B., Sharps, M. J., Satterthwaite, B., & Chisholm, S. (2005). Eyewitness memory for vehicles. The Forensic Examiner, 14(3), 24–28. Wells, G. L. (1993). What do we know about eyewitness identification? American Psychologist, 48(5), 553–571. Wogalter, M. S., Malpass, R. S., & Burger, M. A. (1993). How police officers construct lineups: A national survey. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 640–644). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Wogalter, M. S., Malpass, R. S., & McQuiston, D. E. (2004). A national survey of police on preparation and conduct of identification lineups. Psychology, Crime and Law, 10(1), 69–82.

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank Chief of Police Jerry Dyer of the Fresno Police Department and the staff and field training officers of the Fresno Police Department for giving of their time and expertise and for their continued and very generous assistance, advice, and support of this research. They would also like to thank Officer Scott Larson, Los Angeles Police Department and Amy Neff, Morgan Goodwin, and Randy VaughnDotta for their excellent help in the preparation of the materials for this research. The research, views, and opinions presented in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Fresno or Los Angeles Police Departments or their chiefs, staffs, officers, or employees. About the Authors Matthew J. Sharps, PhD, DABPS, FACFEI, is professor of psychology at California State University, Fresno, and adjunct faculty member at Alliant International University. He received his MA (clinical psychology) from UCLA and MA and PhD (psychology) from the University of Colorado. He is the author of numerous articles and papers on visual cognition and related topics as well as the book Aging, Representation, and Thought: Gestalt and Feature-Intensive

Processing (2003, Transaction Publishers). He has consulted on issues of eyewitness identification in more than 160 criminal cases. Adam B. Hess, MA, is a lecturer in Criminology at California State University, Fresno, and a doctoral candidate in forensic clincical psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno. Bethany Ranes, BA, is a doctoral candidate in Forensic Clinical Psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno.

Jenna Jones, BA, is a doctoral candidate in Forensic Clinical Psychology at Alliant International University, Fresno.

Hilary Casner, BA, is a graduate student in psychology at the University of Arkansas.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 77 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 27

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance Abstract A premises (building and its site) consists of components to form a safe, usable facility. The components must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Forensic engineers are often asked to render their opinions concerning a componentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s performance and the maintenance it has received. Because the results are to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions. One method of making such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach. When a component and its maintenance are treated as a system, the engineer considers its various aspects and the interaction between those aspects. Furthermore, the examiner can test â&#x20AC;&#x153;what ifâ&#x20AC;? hypotheses using the same method. This article discusses a method to achieve that end while giving the forensic engineer a strong foundation for his or her opinion.

28 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, DABFE, DABFET, DNAFE Key Words: buildings, premises, maintenance, systems evaluation This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

Introduction A premises (buildings and its site) consists of a group of systems working together to form a facility. The components of these systems must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Following an accident or system failure, a forensic engineer is often asked to make an examination and render an opinion concerning a component’s performance and the maintenance it received. Such requests are most common in civil litigation, but may be required in a criminal case as well. Because of the complexity of a premises (both the building and its site), such services may be requested from engineers in many disciplines and some examinations may require an interdisciplinary team. Because the result is to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions. One method to make such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach. System analysis, as defined in this article, is the critical examination of the technical and managerial skills used to maintain the premises. This approach recognizes that continued, acceptable operation of a component is dependent upon a system consisting of the component itself and the maintenance it receives. Systems, whether including human activity or not, are subject to limitations whose effects can best be understood through system analysis. Furthermore, the examiner can test “what if” hypotheses by assuming changes in the system and analyzing the results. The result of an analysis is a simple statement of opinion; however, time, work, and data are needed to posit an opinion with a strong foundation. The remainder of this article discusses a method to achieve that end. Many of the principles discussed have their origin in health and safety engineering. Often, premises maintenance evaluations are required when an accident or injury has occurred. Therefore, the method described here is closely related to safety engineering practice. Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 29

The Flow Chart (Figure 1) By applying the evaulation flow chart, the examiner covers a wide range of pertinent topics. Not only does this provide a guideline to the examination, but it also provides an excellent foundation for the engineer’s opinions. The flow chart has two flow paths, Component and Maintenance. Each path consists of decision points where the engineer finds the aspect under consideration either acceptable (yes) or unacceptable (no). A “no” evaluation leads to an Inadequate System rating. A series of “yes” evaluations leads to the And gate toward the bottom of the flow chart. Both paths of the flowchart must be evaluated and lead to the And gate in order for the system to receive a Good rating. If the first path leads to the And gate, then the second path must be evaluated to complete the process. Once an Inadequate System rating is reached, theoretically, there is no need for further evaluation. However, an Inadequate System rating is often the beginning of the next phase of the investigation, an explanation of cause. Because a system may be inadequate for numerous causes, the engineer alone must decide whether he or she should continue the evaluation further. An Example The following example follows Figure 1 and includes a discussion of the evaluation process. The example is a request to evaluate the floor of a small mercantile establishment where a patron slipped and fell on a rainy day. There is an allegation that water was present on the floor at the time of this fall. The component to be evaluated is the flooring. The maintenance program is that which the proprietor uses for safety during inclement weather. Operating Conditions The first step in the evaluation process is to determine the operating conditions. These are the conditions under which the system is expected to operate and give the engineer insight to the system when working the evaluation paths. The operating conditions are best determined by site inspection, document review, and testimony of various parties. A document review may include but is not limited to: • Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer 30 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

• Lease documents that may specify permitted activities within the building • Building and maintenance codes • Zoning ordinances and other regulatory documents • Indoor environmental standards common to the industry In this example, the site inspection revealed that the space was being used as a haberdashery. Flooring was a commercial grade vinyl tile. The slip location was approximately 7 feet from the entry. The document review has determined that, at the time of the fall, the building was approximately 25 years old. The architect’s plans indicate the space to be used for retail use. The use of the space for mercantile purposes is consistent with the permitted uses in the zoning ordinance. The lease between the owner and tenant indicates that the space is to be used for the legal, retail sale of goods, not to include food or personal services. Based on the site inspection and document review the engineer can reasonably conclude that the use of the space is “anticipated.” Note from Figure 1 that the evaluation process does not depend upon the operating conditions; however, if unanticipated conditions are involved, the examiner must decide and note if the evaluation is made for the actual conditions encountered, the

anticipated conditions, or both. The examiner must also recognize that a component may be exposed to an unanticipated condition and continue to function well. Component Component evaluation follows the right side of Figure 1. Here, the specific component under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions. Component Specifications. The next step in component evaluation is to determine if it meets specification. This step implies that the engineer has determined the component’s specification and an appropriate test for compliance. The component specification may be either specific (specified by size, make, and model) or performance (i.e. 100 cfm fan, 230VA) oriented. Oftentimes, component specifications are not specific and must be derived from document review. These include, but are not limited to: • Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer • Manufacturer’s specifications • Building codes • Typical architectural and engineering details (graphic standards) • Engineering organization standards • Authoritative consensus standards

In the example, the architectural plans were silent on the flooring material. According to testimony, the vinyl tile was selected by the owner and was in place when the tenant moved in. The manufacturer is unknown at this time. The tenant space was inspected by the construction official before opening to the public and received a certificate of occupancy. The local building code requires that all walking surfaces be slip-resistant. A literature search revealed an ASTM standard that relates slip resistance to the floor’s static coefficient of friction with a shoe-leather test surface and a threshold level. On-site testing of the floor material was conducted and determined it to be slip-resistant. Based on the site inspection, document review, and testing, the engineer can reasonably conclude that the material used to construct the floor surface meets specification. Component Installation. The next step in Figure 1 is to examine the component installation. Poor workmanship should be noted and described. The manufacturer’s installation guide for the component should be consulted, if possible, whenever installation is drawn into question. In the example, the vinyl tile was examined and found to be tight, stable, and planar. Based on the site inspection, the engineer was able to reasonably conclude that the installation was not an issue and probably followed the manufacturer’s specification. Maintenance The maintenance flow path follows the left side of Figure 1. Here, the maintenance program under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions. This flow path incorporates work on safety done in the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. recommendations were developed and promulgated for workplace safety. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), publishes a document entitled Keeping Your Workplace Safe (1999). This document describes four elements that every effective program should have: • Management, leadership, and employee involvement • Workplace analysis • Hazard prevention and control • Training and education Similarly, the Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom publishes a document

entitled Managing Health and Safety – Five Steps to Success (1998). The document states: “This leaflet contains notes on good practice which are not compulsory, but which you may find helpful in considering what you need to do.” The five steps are • set up your policy; • organize your staff; • plan and set standards; • measure your performance; • learn from experience. Figure 1 incorporates these into the four aspects of the maintenance procedure flow path. Maintenance Procedure. Maintenance procedures may be written and formalized. This is commonly found at locations that have a maintenance department or are part of a nationally operated or franchised establishment. Managers responsible for large buildings or multiple premises may have routine and preventative maintenance scheduled and noted by computer. On the other side of the spectrum, other business or industrial locations may not have a written plan, and the examiner must determine the maintenance procedure through investigation, interview, or testimony. The second aspect of the maintenance procedure is to determine if it conforms to or follows a standard. The examiner must keep an open mind and not judge the book by its cover. Policies and procedures that are extensive, written, and neatly bound are not necessarily more compliant with standards than those that are less organized. A lack of organization and record-keeping may be a regulatory violation, but is insufficient by itself to consider the system inadequate. However, policies and procedures that are unclear may be considered outside the standards because of ambiguity. Further, loosely stated maintenance procedures can have an effect on other aspects of the maintenance program. The engineer must determine the appropriate standard by which to measure the subject procedure. The manufacturer’s specification on how to maintain the component should be investigated and may specify a performance standard for maintenance. For example, certain filters may need to be checked at a maximum time interval and cleaned following a specified process. Property maintenance regulation may specify the maximum time that snow or ice may be allowed to remain untreated or the length of

time that rainwater may accumulate before it is considered stagnant. In cases where the standard is not straightforward, the engineer must be prepared to ascertain industry standards for maintenance based on authoritative and circulated industry publications. Standards organizations such as the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) publish a wealth of information. The insurance industry has a long history of underwriting standards for buildings and sites. They pioneered sprinkler system standards for fire control, and many insurance companies sponsor safety research to this day. Over time, these findings become industry standards and find their way into loss-control and underwriting literature. The National Safety Council (NSC) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASEE) are another source of information. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force have extensive procedures for maintaining buildings and sites with a wealth of information available on their websites (Secretary, 2004; U.S. Army, 2003). When deciding on an appropriate standard, the examiner must be sure that the standard is widely circulated and does not conflict with jurisdictional building codes, maintenance regulations, or site improvement standards. The challenge is to determine reasonable industry standards for a given situation, especially in view of critics that are always present around any issue. Cutting-edge academic and scientific papers should be used with caution. They may be useful to explain or substantiate a principle, but most are not widely circulated amongst maintenance practitioners, and the author’s view may not be widely accepted or adopted as a standard. When researching standards, remember that a maintenance procedure in practice must include a method of discovering conditions that need to be maintained. Discovery of a condition that has developed relative to a component is an essential part of maintenance. The time required to correct such conditions (correction time) includes both the amount of time the condition exists before it is discovered (discovery time) and the amount of time required to do the work using reasonable dispatch (work time). Hence, there will always be a time interval between the instant a component develops a condition requirFall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 31

ing work and when the work is completed. Often a condition that develops will not be obvious and the maintenance procedure must be proactive to minimize the discovery time. For example, mechanical equipment should be checked on a periodic basis to assure it is either functioning properly or exhibiting telltale signs of impending failure. Published standards must also be read with this principle in mind. They will often indicate that certain actions must be taken “immediately.” This should be interpreted as acting “without delay upon discovery” because instantaneous discovery (zero discovery time) and correction (zero work time) is, in most cases, impossible. The procedure and standard examination may require some iteration. The examiner should have the standard in mind when examining the procedure and the procedure in mind when examining the standard. After interviewing the various parties or reviewing their deposition testimony, review both the procedure and the standard for modifications afterward. This will help assure that nothing out of the ordinary is missed. In the example, the engineer researched Best’s Loss Control Manual (2000), a losscontrol engineering guide and authoritative publication for insurance underwriting. After selecting the appropriate use, he reviewed the various items of concern and selected those that were appropriate to floor maintenance and the conditions at hand. This subset of conditions became the performance standard for the evaluation. Also, it was determined that local building and maintenance codes provided no performance standard for floor maintenance. Further review of a NSC publication concerning falls on floors revealed similar recommendations therein. The engineer felt confident that the items selected represented good practice and industry standard. The maintenance procedures for floor maintenance were written and posted on the bulletin board in the employee area of the store along with emergency phone numbers. While not detailed, they covered the items in the standard and were straightforward and easy to understand. They included employee assignments and response measures to inclement weather conditions. The engineer determined that the maintenance procedure did follow standard. 32 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Education. Education refers to the training that maintenance personnel receive. Depending upon the maintenance tasks, the education may require specialized training or schooling. Most commonly, however, maintenance personnel receive on-thejob training, especially if the maintenance tasks are more janitorial than repair in nature. Management must be involved to assure that education is not a one-time experience. New equipment or changes in business operations may require re-training of maintenance personnel. Further, it must also be determined that the specific personnel responsible for the maintenance had received the training and understood their duty. Maintenance personnel must be taught and encouraged to trust their judgment and report their opinions concerning the component or the maintenance procedure to management without fear of reprisal. In the example, it was determined that all employees are instructed as to the safety procedures for inclement weather. The maintenance was basically a janitorial function. Safety posters were on the employee bulletin board, and the owner discussed safety at all employee meetings, instructing them to place mats on the floors and warning cones at the entrance when it starts to rain. Employees were instructed how to properly clean water and spills from the floor and to watch for such conditions as they move about the store. The specific employee at the store when the incident occurred had 3 years of experience with the company and was thoroughly familiar with the procedures. The engineer concluded that the personnel were sufficiently trained to properly maintain the floor. Management. Management works hand-in-hand with education and is a critical component in resources. Management must consider maintenance a priority aspect of their business and be committed to keeping the system working. The attitude of management influences the personnel; if the boss does not care, neither will the staff. Management should • have a system of reporting and tracking maintenance functions. This data can point to problems and the need for improvement in the system; • check to assure that adequate resources in the form of manpower and equipment are available to keep the system running; • reinforce education amongst the workers;

• create a climate where maintenance is a priority. Sometimes an evaluation of management can be simple and straightforward. In other situations, it can be complex and difficult. A proprietor of a space that ships and receives merchandise from one or two loading docks may have no problem both scheduling and managing his truck traffic. The traffic manager for an industrial or warehouse operation may have traffic engineering and safety problems to be solved while, at the same time, keeping the system running. It is important that the examiner keep his own house in order and recognize when a consultant or team approach is required. The proprietor of the establishment in the example had two locations to manage. He visited both of them more than five times a week and had constant cell-phone contact whenever the stores were open for business. He met with employees and conversed with each one every 2 weeks. Premises maintenance was always discussed. Furthermore, he rotated and replaced the signs, posters, and instructions posted in the employee areas. Based on this testimony, the engineer concluded that the management of the system is adequate. Resources. Resources are the manpower, equipment, and material required to keep the maintenance program working. It is tied to management because management allocates the funds, hires the people, and sets the work schedules. Management also determines how and when the resources are allocated. Personnel view resources as a management statement, equating adequate allocation of resources to a top management priority. Conversely, management that is perceived as “doing-it-on-the-cheap” is considered to have maintenance as a low priority. Although budgets are an important factor in any business, resources are best measured by what takes place at the premises. It is one thing to budget for an adequate number of filters and another thing to have them in the supply room when they are needed. It is one thing to budget for a snow removal contractor and another thing to have sufficient manpower to do the job properly. Therefore, resources are a topic of investigation with both management and the personnel at the site.

At many small premises, maintenance responsibilities are shared amongst the general staff. Workers in a machine shop may also do regular maintenance on the machines and pitch in for janitorial work. At large premises, there will be a maintenance department. Each can be satisfactory, and each presents challenges to the examiner. Staffing levels will vary from place to place, and the examiner will often rely on management testimony concerning overall staffing levels. However, the examiner needs to assure him or herself that there is adequate manpower to maintain the component under consideration. In any examination, testimony from the personnel specifically assigned to the component’s maintenance will be valuable. This is another area where the examiner may need input from a consultant. Communication is another resource. At small premises, a few employees can respond quickly when a condition arises based on verbal communications. Larger premises may require radio or telephone communication systems to report a condition when it is discovered and to dispatch personnel to do the work. The engineer must keep in mind that a maintenance evaluation of a particular building component is not an examination of the entire building. If the examiner fails to properly limit his investigation, he runs the risk of following many irrelevant paths at a cost of much time and effort. He also exposes himself to irrelevant information that clouds his judgment. This leaves the engineer open to charges of bias or “witch-hunting.” In the example, the proprietor scheduled a minimum of two employees on each shift, one for general operations and one at the cash register. The retail space is not large and the operations employee were easily able to make half-hour inspection rounds. Furthermore, he observed the store while moving about and assisting customers and responded to instructions from the cash register station by a hand-held radio. Floor mats, warning signs, mops, and buckets were kept in the maintenance closet. Floor mats were serviced by an outside contractor every 2 months. Three mops and buckets were available—one for each employee and a spare. Based on the site inspection and testimony from the various parties, the engineer concluded that the system was supported by sufficient resources to properly maintain

the floor during wet weather. This results in a “yes” for resources. However, during his examination the engineer discovered that one employee was sick the day of the incident, leaving only one person to man both the cash register station and cover general operations. There was no one else available to cover the shift. When the rain started he placed the mats and warning signs at the entrance. However, he was unable to make regular rounds of the store looking for water and spills on the floor. The water on the floor was brought to his attention when the patron fell.

Opinions and Conclusions According to the flow chart, when there are two “yes” results at the And gate, the engineer can feel confident that the component is adequate and the maintenance system can keep it functioning properly under the expected operating conditions. Therefore, a Good System rating is in order. The fact that a component has failed does not affect this rating; it is the system being evaluated and not a single event. Components and maintenance can fail, even in a good system, because all systems have limitations; they are subject to randomly occurring and unpredictable events. In the floor accident example, the system recieved a Good rating. However, insight into the event under consideration was gained by analyzing the conditions at the time of the failure. A re-analysis using the staffing conditions on the day of the component failure resulted in a “no” (not adequate) classification for resources because staffing fell below management’s recommended levels, and proper inspections were not taking place because of the short-staffing condition. Under these conditions, the flow chart leads to an Inadequate System rating for that particular circumstance. The forensic engineer must clearly make the distinction between the system’s rating overall and its rating as operating at a particular time. This distinction can be important in a forensic forum. The use of systems analysis, as presented here, offers the forensic engineer a methodology of evaluation that is both comprehensive and flexible. The example presented shows that the method has application to simple as well as complex systems. The engineer must remember that the analysis is only as good as the input data, the end result

is the opinion of an engineer who may have to defend it, and this analysis and opinion are seldom the end of the questions to be answered.

References A. M. Best Company, Inc. (2000). Best’s loss control manual (version 2006). Oldwick, NJ: Author. Brauer, R. L. (1990). Safety and health for engineers. New York: VanNostrand Reinhold. Health and Safety Executive Books. (1998). Managing health and safety—Five steps to success. United Kingdom: Author. Secretary of the Air Force. (2004). Safety and health standards. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2003). Safety and health requirements manual. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Department of Labor. (1999). Keeping your workplace safe. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Wausau Insurance Company. (1990). Hazard survey guide. Wausea, MN: Author.

About the Author John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, is a professional engineer in private practice with more than 30 years experience in the engineering design and forensic evaluation of buildings and premises. He holds a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in civil engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology. D’Onofrio is a licensed professional engineer in New York, New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and has been recognized as an expert in federal court and in the courts of all three states. He has taught at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and at the Community College of Morris in Randolph, New Jersey. He has been a guest lecturer before the New Jersey Municipal Engineer’s Foundation and the New Jersey Society of Professional Land Surveyors.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 77 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 33

Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia as a Marker for Genocide Abstract This article reviews the mass homicide of 140 Turkish intellectuals of Armenian heritage to determine whether their mass execution was consistent with the selective mass extermination of intelligentsia observed in other genocides during the twentieth century. All the victims were arrested on April 24, 1915, in Istanbul and subsequently killed. Review of data demonstrates a robust correlation between certain markers, social profiles, and the death rate of the 140 Turkish men. The data suggests that their religious and ethnic identity (all men were of Armenian heritage) was a preeminent factor in their demise. The authorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; review suggests that the selective persecution and homicides of intelligentsia, which this article defines as cerebrogenocide, was similar to genocidal killings and selective persecution and extermination of distinct subgroups in the genocides of Jewish and Serbian citizens in 1940, Jewish intellectuals in Nazi Europe, Jewish doctors in the Soviet Union in 1953, the homicides of Nuba in Sudan from 1960â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1972, and western-friendly or eyeglass-wearing Cambodians in the Cambodian Killings Fields from 1975â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1978. This article suggests recognition of early signs may help prevent genocide and that health-care professionals may play a key role in combating future genocides.

34 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

By Alen J. Salerian, MD; Pars Tuglaci; Gregory Salerian, LGSW; Janice Berry Edwards, PhD; Antonia Baum, MD; and Barry Mendelsohn, MD Key Words: genocide, United Nations, Armenian, Turkish, Ottoman

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates. (CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants. (CBBS) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is an approved provider of the California Board of Behavioral Sciences, approval PCE 1896. Course meets the qualifications for 1 hour of continuing education credit for MFTs and/or LCSWs as required by the California Board of Behavioral Sciences.

Background According to United Nations Resolution 96, genocide is a crime with intent to destroy either in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group (Charny, 1999). In the twentieth century, genocide has been a common phenomenon, and scholarly descriptions of many crucial aspects of this uniquely human invention of menace have been described (Charny) (Table 1). It has been suggested that genocide is a premeditated set of actions to eradicate partially or totally a particular group and to silence opponents (Lieberman, 2006). A common trait of genocide is the precise targeting of people with a particular shared group identity (i.e., professional or social status) or appearance, distinct from their religious, ethnic, racial, or political identity, for persecution and/or execution (Lieberman, 2006). Examples of such selective targeting include the following: In 1933, special legislation enacted by the Nazi regime barred all German-Jewish physicians from government jobs and excluded German-Jewish students from medical school (Morse, 1967). The evidence of Nazi persecution of German Jewish professionals affecting 42% of lawyers, 50% of doctors, and 83% of government employees shows this persecution preceded the main extermination of Jews (Morse, 1967) (Table 2).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 35

Table 1: Genocides During the Twentieth Century (According to UN-96, each case met the definition of genocide.) Victims

Time

Ruling Power

Location

Deaths (millions)

Armenians

1915–1918 Ottoman Turkey

Young Turks Triumvirate, Talaat, Enver, Djemal

Don Cossacks

1919

Soviet Union

Lenin

Soviet citizens

1930–1937 Soviet Union

Stalin

4.2

Ukrainians

1932–1933 Soviet Union

Stalin

Estonians

1932–1933 Estonia

Stalin

.05

Kulaks

1932–1933 Soviet Union

Stalin

6.5

Hitler, Ustasha, Pavelik

Jews, Gypsies, Muslims 1941–1945 Serbia Jews, Roma, Polish

1941–1945 Nazi held territories Hitler

Chinese, American, 1937 Australian, British POW’s Polish POW’s 1941

China

Unit 731, Dr. Ishi, Hirohito

Katyn, Poland

Stalin

.01

Germans

1944

Germany, Dresden, Bremen

Churchill, Roosevelt

.04

Japanese

1944

Tokyo

Churchill, Roosevelt

.87

Japanese

1945

Japan, Nagasaki, Hiroshima

Truman

Chinese

1950

China

Mao

Tibetans

1960

Tibet

Mao

.87

Indonesians

1965–1966 Indonesia

Suharto, Muslim militias

Sudanese Christians, 1960–1972 Sudan Nuba, Dinka Cambodians 1975–1978 Cambodia

Sudanese government

Pol Pot

Kurds

1988–1991 Iraq

Saddam Hussein

Ethiopians

1989–1991 Ethiopia

Mengistu Haile Mariam

Bosnians

1991–1995 Bosnia

Slobodan Milosevic

.05

Tutsi

1972

Burundi

Hutu

.02

Hutu

1972

Burundi

Tutsi

1993

Burundi

Hutu

.03

Hutu

1993

Burundi

Tutsi

.03

Tutsi/Hutu

1994

Rwanda

Hutu

1994

Rwanda

Tutsi

.05

Hutu refugees from Rwanda & Barundi

1996–1997 Congo

Tutsi army from Rwanda

.05

36 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

.06 1

In 1942, the Ustasha pursued national purity by identifying Serbian, Gypsy, and Jewish individuals as national enemies of Croatia and then killing them systematically. The persecution of Serbs and Jews began before their mass homicides when they were excluded from work in the press, radio, theater, and other professions of cultural life (Lieberman, 2006). In 1953, Soviet Jewish doctors and other professionals were targeted for persecution and death (Lieberman, 2006). In 1962, during the genocide of Nuba, the Sudanese government took special measures to persecute and exterminate the educated Nuba (Charny, 1999). In 1975, to cleanse Cambodia of the “impure,” the Khmer Rouge first persecuted, then liquidated, Cambodians with higher education and Western ties, those who were bilingual in English and French, and those who wore eyeglasses (Charny, 1999). In 1915, during the first genocide of the 20th century, Armenian intellectuals became the early victims (Charny, 1999) (Figure 1 & Table 3). Despite documentation that verifies the targeting of intellectuals or community leaders of a victimized minority, the genocide literature—with the exception of The Holocaust—lacks adequate statistical data of the selective mass persecutions and homicides of intelligentsia. The purpose of this article is to determine whether the mass

Table 2: Nazi Persecution of German Jewish Professionals Profession

Total Population

Number

Percentage

out of 500,000

Persecuted

Lawyers

2,800

1,200

42%

Doctors

7,000

3,500

50%

Government Workers

6,000

5,000

83%

Reference: Morse, 1967 Figure 1: Relative Risk of Genocide for Turkish-Armenians in Istanbul in 1915 by Gender, Age, and Occupation 100% 100% 100%

100

homicides of the 140 Turkish intellectuals of Armenian heritage arrested in 1915 were a marker consistent with targeting intelligentsia before genocide or in the early phases of genocide and the implications such a discovery should have on today’s health-care professionals. This article defines the mass and premeditated extermination of intelligentsia as cerebrogenocide.

History For almost 700 years, Armenians, as Christian subjects, lived under the Ottoman rule as a conquered people. As a minority, they were one of the millets (minority nationalities) and were given limited authority for selfgovernment. But like other minorities, Turkish-Armenians had almost no legal rights in the Ottoman Empire. A Turkish-Armenian had no recourse in the Islamic court system, for in the religious court, non-Muslim testimony was either disallowed or accorded significantly less value. At least 1 million, and possibly more than half of the TurkishArmenian population, was killed or deathmarched by the orders of the ruling triumvirate of the Ottoman government between 1915 and 1918 (Balakian, 2003). The ruling powers, Talat Pacha, Enver Pacha, and Djemal Pacha, viewed the Turkish-Armenian minority of approximately 2 million people as a potential threat to the survival of the empire and forced the

91%

80 P E R 60 C E N T A 40 G E

45%

25% 30 3% 0

0% CH

0% H

0% W

10%

Cerebrogenocide index as a function of genocidal acts with death risk showing steady increase with gender and profession or vocation A - All Turkish-Armenians in Istanbul, D - Doctors, P - Poets, C - Congressman, NR - Newspaper Reporters, W - Women, M - Men, B - Bankers, H - Hospital Executives, CL - Clergy, PH - Pharmacists, CH - Girls & Boys underage 17, CO - Comedian

“cleansing” of the republic of the TurkishArmenian population. Several strategies were used to cleanse the empire of the Turkish-Armenians: • Massive deportations of civilian population via death marches without any regard for the safety or the survival of the deported • Disarmament and execution of all Armenian males serving in the Turkish army

• Early arrests and executions of intelligentsia (cerebrogenocide) • Voluntary or involuntary assimilation of a large number of Armenian survivors into the Turkish society with a new cultural religious identity (Muslim Turk) and the absolute severance of any cultural or ethnic bonds to their Armenian heritage (see the story of Sabiha Gokcen in Discussion section) (Akyol, 2004; Alpay, 2004)

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 37

Table 3: The Selective Homicides of Turkish-Armenian Intellectuals in Istanbul in 1915 Population

Number of

Percentage of

Genocidal Deaths Genocidal Deaths All Turkish-Armenian Residents

162,000

2,345

1.3%

Men

77,760

2,345

2.6%

Women

84,240

Children (under age 17)

Unknown

None

Congressman

100%

Newspaper Reporters

100%

Comedians

100%

Poets

91%

Physicians

135

45%

Bankers

25%

Clergy

10%

Pharmacists

120

Hospital Executives

Reference: Balakian, 1977; Boghosian, 2005; Kansu, 2000; Tuglaci, 2004; Yarman, 2001

Method The authors of this article studied data from numerous sources including the official records of the U.S., British, German, and Ottoman-Turkish national archives. In addition, the Google Internet search engine (www.google.com) provided links to websites with articles and statistics about genocide such as www.genocidewatch.com and www.isg-iags.org (Institute for the Study of Genocide & International Association of Genocide Scholars). There were four publications of paramount significance in gathering statistical data: The History of Western Armenians, The Encyclopedia of Genocide, While Six Million Died, and Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics.

Their mass homicides occurred between April 24, 1915, and September 30, 1915, in the early phase of the genocide that lasted until the end of 1918 (Charny, 1999). None of the victims had a criminal history. All the victims were better educated than the average Turkish-Armenian of his community, with activities consistent with higher-than-average participation in civic and community affairs. Further, their psychosocial status crowned them as leaders of their subgroup. Methods of homicides included death by hanging, gunshot, stabbing, and blunt trauma (Tuglaci, 2004). Of those 140, 62 were physicians, 10 poets, 16 congressmen, 7 pharmacists, 4 clergymen, 1 comedian, and 36 newspaper reporters.

Review of the Killings On April 24, 1915, in Istanbul, 140 men were taken into custody. Subsequently, without a trial or any other formal charges brought against them, they were killed.

Results The review suggests that the homicides of the 140 men were premeditated. There seems to be a correlation between the death rate for a Turkish-Armenian in Istanbul and

38 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

his or her occupation, gender, and age, with women and individuals younger than 17 having full immunity against death by homicide. Among the health-care professionals who were victimized, there was a striking difference of risk of homicide among physicians (45%), pharmacists (6%), and hospital executives (0%). It appeared that the risk of being a victim of homicide for any Turkish-Armenian in Istanbul in 1915 was 1.3%, whereas it was greater for TurkishArmenian men (2.6%). The death rate from homicide increased to 100% for congressmen, newspaper reporters, poets, and comedians. Collectively, the data suggest that the victimsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; potential leadership profile was of significance and indeed made them the preeminent targets for genocide. The ethnic cleansing of Turkish-Armenians was nearly perfect. In 1915, the Turkish-Armenian population in Ottoman Turkey was estimated to be between 1,161,169 and 2,133,190, with a total population of 25 million people (Karpat, 1985; Balakian, 2003). In 2004, Turkey had a population of more than 70 million with a TurkishArmenian population of 65,000 (Tuglaci, 2004). Before 1915, there were 2339 Armenian churches in Turkey. After the genocide, most had been destroyed or deserted. The most recent statistics suggest the presence of only 40 churches serving the Turkish-Armenian minority in Turkey (Tuglaci, 2005). In 1915, Turkish-Armenians represented 16% of the Ottoman population. After 1916, the percentage of Turkish-Armenians in Turkey dropped to 0.4%. The latest official census indicates the Turkish-Armenian population in Turkey is 65,000, or less than 0.01% of the overall population (Tuglaci, 2004).

Discussion The Turkish-Armenian genocide, as the first genocide of the 20th century, is the template for most of the genocides that followed. Prevention of genocide poses a challenge, yet it is preventable. Passionate and unconditional commitment to defend and reinforce U.N. Resolution 96 and educational efforts to teach the history and effects of genocide are essential.

Table 4: Early Signs of an Impending Genocide: Intellectual, Social, and Cultural Persecution and Liquidation of a Subgroup Ethnic Group

Country

Year

Armenians

Ottoman Turkey

1915

Ruling Power

Did it Precede or Occur in the First Half of the Genocidal Period

Doctors, poets &

Ruling triumvirate

Yes

newspaper reporters

of Talat, Enver,

Who

& Jamal Pasha Jews, Serbs,

Croatia

1941

& Gypsies

Jews, Serbs barred from

Ustasha

Yes

Hitler

Yes

Stalin

Persecution and execution

Sudanese

Yes

of Nuba intellectuals

Government

Western-friendly Cambodians,

Khmer Rouge,

Cambodians wearing eyeglasses,

Pol Pot

professions of cultural life, the press and radio

German Jews

Germany

1945

Jewish doctors barred from government jobs, Jewish students barred from German medical schools

Soviet Jews

Soviet Union

1953

Jews barred from practicing medicine in the Soviet Union

Nuba

Cambodians

Sudan

Cambodia

1966

1975

Yes

and Cambodians bilingual in English and French Reference: Encyclopedia of Genocide, Charny, 1999.

Physicians and other health-care professionals may play a key role in preventing or combating genocide with the knowledge gained from the past genocides. Four general observations can be made about genocides of the twentieth century: • Genocide requires secret, premeditated, methodical mass homicides of a victimized group, often followed by the premeditated destruction or alteration of evidence to cover-up the genocide. • Genocidal killings are contrary to the Hippocratic Oath and the common ethical principles of the American Medical Association (AMA), American Psychological Association (APA), and American Psychiatric Association (APA). • Cerebrogenocide is a common marker,

not a defining one, identifiable by alert and well-informed health-care professionals. • Many physicians, health-care professionals, and other scientists played crucial roles in the design and execution of genocides during the twentieth century.

Physicians and Genocide in the Twentieth Century In the first genocide of the twentieth century, many physicians played key roles in exterminating Armenians. Dr. Mehmed Reshid, the governor of the Ottoman province of Diyarbekir, once raised a rhetorical question about Armenians: “Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy microbes?” After the genocide, Dr. Reshid proclaimed, “My Turkishness prevailed over my medical calling.” Drs. Behaeddin Sha-

kir and Mehmed Nazim, both Committee of Unity and Progress (CUP) party leaders, condemned Armenians as infidels (gavurs), like tubercular microbes infecting the state. During the official trials of the Armenian genocide from February 5 until April 7, 1919, a Turkish physician, Dr. Ziya Fuad, testified in writing that Dr. Ali Saib had caused the deaths of untold numbers of Armenian children with injections of morphine (Balakian, 2003). The summer of 1915 witnessed the homicides of two Turkish-Armenian physicians by two of their Turkish colleagues. The homicide of Dr. Nerses Shabagliyan by Dr. Asaf and the homocide of Dr. Ormayan by Dr. Sani Yaver were the first documented homicides of physicians by physicians in the 20th century (Tuglaci, 2004).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 39

In 1946 and 1947, 23 Nazi doctors stood trial in Nuremberg for crimes against humanity and were found guilty. Among them were the dean of faculty at Berlin University, Dr. Franz Six, responsible for the murder of more than 50,000 Jews; Dr. Josef Mengele, the director of the Institute of Hereditary Biology and Racial Hygiene; and Dr. August Hirt, director of the Strasburg Anatomical Institute in France, who in 1941 gassed 86 Auschwitz concentration camp victims to study their bones to prove Aryan superiority. The euthanasia program (code name T4 Unit) was the brainchild of Dr. Karl Brandt in his relentless drive to design the perfect machine for the mass extermination of the mentally ill and physically handicapped (Hogan, 2003). From 1932 until 1945, in a quest to develop germ warfare capability, some 20,000 scientists, including doctors and nurses, participated in one of history’s most gruesome medical experiments on prisoners. Some 580,000 Chinese civilians and American, British, and Australian prisoners of war were killed under the medical leadership of Dr. Shiro Ishii, Japanese microbiologist and Lieutenant General of Unit 731, a biological warefare unit of the Imperial Japanese Amry during the Sino-Japanese War (Miller, Engelberg, & Broad, 2002).

Barriers to Education of the Public and Prevention of Genocide For many complex psychological, social, economic, and political reasons, scholarly research and teaching of genocide have been difficult. Understandably, collective guilt or national shame may inhibit open discussion of tragic events even in the most advanced societies. After all, what American or British citizen would consider the hypothetical possibility that the terror bombings of German and Japanese civilians during the Second World War was a form of genocidal killing, particularly if financial compensation and demands may emerge as a result of such a discussion? Perhaps similar dynamics also inhibit a country like China from studying the genocidal deaths of millions who perished under the rule of Mao in the 1950s. Politics may also influence educational efforts. If it is

40 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

not for strict national interests, it is hard to explain why Israel today does not allow the education of young Israelis to include the history of Armenian genocide. Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom officially acknowledges the Armenian genocide. The Japanese government denies the atrocities of Unit 731. The recent political storm prompted by media reports about Sabiha Gokcen, the adopted daughter of modern Turkey’s founder and first president, Kemal Ataturk, may illustrate the political obstacles that hinder educational and preventive efforts in combating genocide (Millyet, 2004; Alpay, 2004). Hatun Sebilciyan spent several years at an orphanage before her adoption at the age of 12 by Kemal Ataturk. The reality remains that her adoption helped her become an accomplished leader of the young Turkish republic, as she became the first female pilot of the country. Yet, the death of her parents and her adoption were genocidal acts according to United Nations Resolution of 96. However, public expression of this point is a crime punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years according to current Turkish law, Article 301. In essence, the challenges associated with any inquiry of Sabiha Gokcen’s life may represent the core challenges faced by all genocide scholars around the world. It is simply a sad reality that today the politics of power and national interests make scholarly discussions or dissemination of historically accurate information very difficult, if not impossible. In summary, it appears that today the biggest obstacle both to educating the world about genocide and to preventing genocide is the political climate, which makes it very difficult for evidence-based teaching to investigate past genocidal acts.

Conclusion Although genocide seems to be only a nightmare of the past, the unthinkable act has occurred in several countries throughout the twentieth century, and, considering the situation in Darfur, has extended into the present. In order to prevent future acts of genocide, it is imperative to let go of the belief

that genocide is not a threat to or a concern for this era or “our” country. During the period in which genocides are born and grow, they never seem as heinous and barbaric to the people committing them as they do to other countries when remembered years later as distant historical events—if remembered by other countries at all. Genocide, with its history being such a stranger to today’s younger Western generations, could pose quite a future threat, as an unsuspected enemy is doubly dangerous. Along with specific measures to prevent genocide described by Charny (1999), including the creation of an International Peace Army (IPA), teaching evidence-based history and promoting accurate dissemination of historical facts of all genocides may be the best weapon against genocide. Educating all future generations about the past genocides would be one logical first step. Another initial measure to be taken is to incorporate the genocide literature into the standard curriculum for all health-care professionals. As this article has demonstrated, in the event of a future genocide, healthcare professionals would likely be targeted as either victims or perpetrators because of the valuable knowledge they possess. Given their influence, scientists and all healthcare professionals may also play a key role in educating political forces. Health-care professionals can lead educational efforts to influence legislative initiatives to create and defend genocide research and scholars. By informing the public and the media and by actively resisting the presumed governmental authority to override the ethical obligations of health-care professionals defined by the American Medical Association, American Psychological Association, and American Psychiatric Association, healthcare professionals can play an active role in combating genocide.

References Akyol, T. (2004, March 2). Sabiha Gokcen tartismasi [Debate about Sabika Gokcen]. Milliyet, 15. Alpay, S. (2004, February 28). Sabiha Gokcen 80 yillik sirri [The 80-year-old secret of Sabiha Gokcen]. Zaman, 121.

Balakian, K. (1977). Hai golgotha [Armenian golgotha]. Beirut, Lebanon: Plenetta Printing. Balakian, P. (2003). The burning tigris: The Armenian genocide and America’s response. New York: Harper Collins. Boghosian, K. (n.d.). My arrest and exile on April 24, 1915: An eyewitness account of the start of the Armenian genocide. Retrieved October 12, 2005, from http://www.armenianreporteronline.com/ old/21042001/c-hachig.htm. Charny, I. (Ed.). (1999). Encyclopedia of genocide (vol. 1). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc. Hogan, D. (2003). The holocaust chronicle: A history in words and pictures. Lincolnwood, IL: Publications International Ltd. Kansu, A. (2000). Politics in post-revolutionary Turkey, 1908–1913. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers. Karpat, K. (2002). Ottoman population 18301914: Demographic and social characteristics. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Lieberman, B. (2006). Terrible Fate: Ethnic cleansing in the making of modern Europe. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher. Miller, J., Engelberg, S., & Broad, W. (2002). Germs: Biological weapons and America’s secret war. New York: Simon & Schuster. Tuglaci, P. (2004). Bati ermenileri [Western Armenians]. Istanbul, Turkey: Pars Yayin Tc Ltd Sti. Yarman, A. (2001). Osmanli saglik hizmetterinde ermeniler-ana-basime [Ottoman Health Professionals of Armenian Heritage]. Istanbul, Turkey: Sanayever.

Acknowledgement The authors would like to acknowledge and thank Mr. Ara Guler for his magical photos of old Istanbul. About the Author Alen J. Salerian, MD, is a psychiatrist and the medical director of Washington Center for Psychiatry in Washington, DC. He is also a former chief consultant for the FBI and a frequent contributor to national newspapers such as, the Los Angeles Times and USA Today. Dr. Salerian has co-authored several psychiatric

articles in peer-reviewed journals. He has made more than 100 appearances on various news shows including CBS’s 60 Minutes and 48 Hours and the BBC’s Panorama. He is a regular analyst and commentator on the Washington, DC CBS television affiliate WUSA-TV. Dr. Salerian is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Medicine and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1997. Pars Tuglaci is an accomplished historian, linguist, and author of more than 20 scholarly books, who lives in Istanbul, Turkey. A graduate of Malconian Educational Institute in Cypress (1951) and Michigan University (1955), Professor Tuglaci published the first modern Turkish medical dictionary. Professor Tuglaci’s most recent work, The History of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, has been the product of his lifetime research at numerous museums, libraries, and state archives in more than 30 countries dating back to the early 70’s. Gregory H. Salerian, MSW, LGSW, holds a master’s degree in clinical social work from the Catholic University of America and a bachelor’s degree in psychology from the University of Delaware. He is in full-time private practice at Washington Center for Psychiatry in Washington, DC. He is a member of the National Association of Social Workers as well as the Greater Washington Society of Clinical Social Workers. Janice Berry Edwards, PhD, is an assistant professor in the School of Social Work at Virginia Commonwealth University’s Northern Virginia campus in Alexandria. She maintains a private practice with the Washing-

ton Center or Psychiatry, in Washington, DC. She holds a doctorate in social work from Catholic University School of Social Work. Her teaching areas include micro practice (advanced clinical social work practice), social justice, and psychopharmacology. Her research and scholarship interests include African American women, multiple intelligences and social work education, relational/cultural theory applied to teaching social work education and field instruction, psychopharmacology and the elderly, as well as domestic violence in law enforcement. Antonia L. Baum, MD, is on the clinical faculty at the George Washington University School of Medicine’s Department of Psychiatry. She is in private practice in Chevy Chase, Maryland, and specializes in the treatment of athletes and eating disorders. She is a graduate of the Brown University program in medicine (BA and MD). Barry Mendelsohn, MD, a Board Certified Psychiatrist, currently serves as the medical director of an Assertive Community Treatment Team in Prince Georges County, MD. The program has as its charge the care and treatment of a segment of the population often overlooked or underserved. Dr. Mendelsohn maintains a private practice as well, focusing on the mental health needs of deaf children and their families. He is known in the musical community through his years of involvement in opera and musical theatre. Dr. Mendelsohn completed his medical school training at Stanford University. His internship was at UCLA in pediatrics, and his psychiatric residency was completed at the University of San Francisco.

Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 78 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 41

ACFEI’s 2007 National Conference October 4–6 • Kansas City, Missouri

ACFEI’s 2007 National Conference at the luxurious Hyatt Regency in Kansas City, Missouri, is just around the corner, but it is not too late to register and save. The early-bird registration extends until August 20! With all of the cutting-edge presentations and workshops offered at this year’s conference, including special day-long presentations by legendary criminal profiler John Douglas and former FBI agent and chief of police Greg Cooper, this conference promises to be an educational experience you will not want to miss!

42 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Also, back by popular demand, this year’s conference will feature another mock trial. In addition, the banquet reunion will give you the opportunity to reunite with your friends and colleagues from previous conferences and meet many more fascinating people who share your passion for forensics. Do not miss your opportunity to save big on this exciting conference. Continue reading through page 46 for more information about the 2007 National conference, and register on pages 47 and 48. Register by August 20 and save $100!

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Continental Breakfast Greg Cooper Workshops Workshops Lunch On Your Own Workshops Mock Trial

For more information or to view a detailed presentation schedule, visit www.acfei.com or call (800) 423-9737.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 43

Conference Workshops Workshops planned for the conference will include, but are not limited to, the following. Presentations offered are subject to change. Violence Through the Eyes of a Child Instructor: Dianne Ditmer, PhD, RN, CFN, DABFN, CMI-III, CHS-III

Treatments of Selected Forensic Accounting Cases Instructor: Janet Reynolds, BA

Demystifying Forensic Accounting Instructor: Collin Greenland, MBA, FJIM, CFC

A Dysfunctional Nation and Its People Instructor: Raymond Hamden, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABECI, CMI-V, CHS-V

IME Part 3—IME Injury & Fraud Instructors: John Haberstroh, DC and Robert Fielden, MD

Poison, Powder, & Putrefaction Instructor: Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V

Determining Projected Cost Impact Due To Owner-Caused Delay on a Construction Contract for a Municipal Water Treatment Plant Instructor: Eric A. Kreuter, PhD, CPA, CMA, CFM, FACFEI, DABFA, SPHR

Ethics: the Fickle Reocurring Nonce Instructor: Karen Gold, PsyD

Biological Incidents—Terrorism and Infectious Diseases Instructor: Howard Levinson, DC

The Many Faces of Pedophilia Instructor: Nancy Ansevics, EdD

What Constitutes a Proper Forensic Neuropsychiatric Evaluation? Instructor: John Henderson, MD Marketing the Medical Expert Instructors: Michael Karagiozis, DO, MBA, CMI-V and Richard Sgaglio, PhD, CMI-IV

Forensic Digital Recovery Instructor: Thomas Owen, BA, FACFEI, DABRE, DABFE

Working Papers That Work: Effectively Documenting Issues and Evidence Instructor: Constance Pinney, CPA Fraud Detection Homcide: A Proposed FBI Criminal Classification Instructors: Terry Lichtenwald, PhD, and Frank Perri, JD

Explaining Evidence—Reporting & Testifying Instructors: Michael Karagiozis, DO, MBA, CMI-V, and Richard Sgaglio, PhD, CMI-IV Criminal Profiling and Ethical Issues in Criminal Forensic Psychology Instructor: Stephen McCary, PhD, JD, DABFE, DABFM, DABPS Psychology of Terrorists—Four Types Instructor: Raymond Hamden, PhD, FACFEI, DABPS, DABECI, CMI-V, CHS-V White Collar Criminals: You Can Run but You Can’t Hide Instructor: Michael Kessler, FACFEI, Cr.FA, DABFA, DABFE

*Attend the John Douglas Profiling Workshop at the 2007 National Conference to receive your exclusive free autographed copy of this book. 44 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Successful Member Profile:

An Interview with 2007 National Conference Presenter Terrance G. Lichtenwald, PhD

You have a thriving career as a forensic psychologist. Please describe your journey to success. I received a BS in broad field social studies (anthropology, sociology, geology) and a minor in psychology. As part of my undergraduate employment, I ran statistical analysis using the university’s mainframe computer. This experience led to a research position developing mainframe computer-scoring programs for intelligence tests while I sought my graduate degree in school psychology. After graduating with my masters, I worked as a school psychologist and consulted with Happ Electronics, assisting them in developing software programs psychologists could use with their personal computers. Government agencies and other notable institutions purchased these software programs. Subsequently, I enrolled in a clinical psychology program and received a second masters and doctorate in clinical psychology. My doctorate dissertation involved enabling the hardware and software of a personal computer to “speak” (English was the chosen language) to an examinee and to administer and interpret the psychological test without a human examiner. The computer system was evaluated for validity.

During my clinical psychology internship, I developed an interest in health psychology and combat trauma. In conjunction with my internship, I participated in an artificial intelligence software research project. For my post-doctorate, I worked general clinical psychology in an internal medicine program and consulted on several software development projects. Then I worked with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where one of my assignments was assisting in the development of the computer system and software used by BOP psychologists. I trained to work with myriad inmates and detainees ranging from low security (federal prison camp white-collar criminals) to maximum security (U.S. penitentiary gang leaders, traitors, drug dealers, smugglers, and different types of trans-national criminals). My BOP training and experiences with these criminals led to additional opportunities. Subsequently, two employment offers were presented: one for the Department of Defense, the other at the University of Illinois-Chicago Family Practice Residency in Rockford (UIC-R). I chose the position of director of behavioral science at UIC-R. Shortly after taking the directorship, I was required to finance my position and department. I did evaluations for the courts, other government agencies, and private businesses as well as clinical, health, and school evaluations for the local hospitals, clinics, and private practices. After several years, I was spending the majority of my time completing evaluations with minimal teaching or research; therefore, I left the UIC-R and went into private practice. For the last 18 years, through my private practice, I have completed thousands of evaluations. These evaluations are very intensive, laborious, and specific. It is common for me to work 12–15 hours a day for weeks or months in a row depending on the type of evaluation required. I occasionally travel to the location where the evaluations are conducted. My research activities stem from the type of referrals I have received. For example, about 10 years ago, I completed a court-ordered

evaluation on an individual who was a known trans-national smuggling criminal. The Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM) theory, which was published in The Forensic Examiner, was the end result of the study of smugglers and smuggling organizations. Since the publication of the DSM, I have explored various predictions of the theory. Recently, I had the opportunity and privilege to supervise Paula MacKenzie as she completed her doctorate thesis on a courtordered fitness-to-stand-trial evaluation that she completed during her assessment practicum involving a death row inmate who was granted an appeal and was undergoing another trial for multiple murders. You will be presenting at this year’s conference on “Fraud Detection Homicide: A Proposed FBI Criminal Classification.” Please tell readers a little about your presentation and what piqued your interested in this area? Several years ago, Attorney Frank Perri asked me to complete a behavioral science study of a defendant accused of murdering his business partner. Since then, I have collaborated with him in his research of white-collar criminals who murder or order the murder of the individual(s) who detects or is in the process of detecting the criminal’s fraud. Given your accomplishments, what advice do you have for other psychologists interested in the field of criminology? The downside of being a forensic psychologist is that the work requires a major commitment of time and energy. The upside is that I have traveled and completed evaluations on the types of characters on which novels and movies are based. I have also associated with individuals of immense integrity and patriotism. Also, time is very important; therefore, I attend continuing education programs like ACFEI conferences and specialized training services and advise others to do the same. I prefer and recommend learning from individuals who have spent their career in the field, many of whom have written a book on the topic they are teaching. Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 45

2007 National Conference Exhibitors Be sure to check out the exhibitor area!

• Visit vendors and receive information •

• •

on the latest forensic products and services. Mock Crime Scene: Using the crime scene, solve the crime and be entered to win a voucher good for $100 in ACFEI logo wear (must be a member to win). Network with other professionals who share your expertise. Participate in the “Ask the Expert” forum, which allows you to ask questions to experts in various forensic fields including nursing, forensic medicine, and law enforcement. Attend hands-on martial arts seminars with top martial arts instructors. See products and services showcased on the vendor stage.

There are still exhibitor spaces available! Register to become an exhibitor by September 14, 2007, and receive $250 off the normal exhibitor price. Exhibitor fee includes the following:

• 8’ x 10’ booth • One 6’ table topped in white vinyl and skirted on three sided • Two folding chairs • One wastebasket • One 7” x 44” one-line, black-on-white identification sign including booth number Price: $100 For more information or to sign-up, contact Samantha Cloud, conference coordinator, by phone at 800-423-9737, ext. 168 or by email at conference@acfei.com. We look forward to seeing you in Kansas City!

CHS National Conference By attending the ACFEI National Conference, you will save 30% on your registration for the CHS National Conference. Do not miss your change to save big and attend the following presentations: • Identity Theft • NIMS Train the Trainer/FEMA Incident Command System (ICS) • How to Develop an Elections Regional Response Plan • Harmful Intent: Organized Crime and International Terrorism • Snow Rescue Task Force • Developing a Business Continuity Plan • Seven Signs of Terrorism • Basic and Advanced IED’s • Rapid Project Planning, Seven Steps to Rapid Planning • Information Security • Business Continuity or Disaster Recovery: What is it Really? • Choosing an Explosive Detections Canine Team • Social Engineering Used to Exploit Security Violations

• • • • • • • • • •

Defense Against Anti-Vehicle Explosive Attacks Communications Interoperability Mock Disaster Tabletop Exercise Understanding Islamist Terrorism: Why the Hate How Money Fuels the Terrorist Flame: An Overview of Terrorist Financing Creating a Business Continuity Plan and Program: BCP101 Achieving Emergency Preparedness: A Presentation for Health-care Executives Detection k-9s and Their Increasing Deployment in Transportation Security Pandemic: Biology and the State of Preparedness and Response A Dysfunctional Nation and It’s People

For a more information about the CHS National Conference or for a detailed schedule of events, visit www.chs.acfei.com or call (800) 423-9737. 46 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

** SAVE 30% when you register for the CHS Conference and the ACFEI, APA, or AAIM Conference **

2007 NATIONAL CONFERENCE/AWARDS BANQUET Kansas City, Missouri • Hyatt Regency • October 2007

JOHN DOUGLAS

October 1–2, 2007

Acclaimed Behavioral Profiler FRIDAY, OCTOBER 5TH.

CHS CERTIFICATION CONFERENCE REGISTRATION The Certified in Homeland Security (CHS) Levels IV & V Certification Conference

❑ CHS-IV: Incident Awareness, Response, and Terrorism (Monday, October 1, 2007)

$425

Note: You must be Certified in Homeland Security at Level III and have completed the IS 700 and IS 800A prerequisites to take the CHS-IV Course and Exam.

❑ CHS-V: CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives) Preparedness (Tuesday, October 2, 2007) You may enroll in both the CHS-IV and CHS-V courses, but you must successfully complete BOTH the CHS-IV and CHS-V courses to earn CHS-V status.

$495

If you are not currently Certified in Homeland Security or need further information, please call (800) 423-9737 or email marianne@acfei.com.

*You may also choose to audit either course. No certification will be awarded for auditing courses.

October 2–4, 2007 CHS NATIONAL CONFERENCE REGISTRATION

❑ The Certified in Homeland Security (CHS) National Conference Early Early Bird

CHS Certification Conference Attendee Date

Member

has

Non-Member

passed

Life Member (save 10%) Honor Awards Banquet & Reunion Tickets: $50 *no on-site tickets available

Regular (before 9/30)

Onsite/Late (10/1 or after)

$245

$345

$395

$445

$490

$540

$590

$320

$370

$420

Early Bird (before 8/21)

(must be purchased in advance by Friday, Sept. 28th)

# of tickets:

x $50 =

Totals

October 4–6, 2007

❑ The American College of Forensic Examiners (ACFEI) 2007 National Conference ❑ The American Psychotherapy Association (APA) 2007 National Conference ❑ The American Association of Integrative Medicine (AAIM) 2007 National Conference

Please check which of the above three associations’ conferences you wish to attend. (Check only one.) Registration with ACFEI, APA, or AAIM grants you full access to the sessions of ALL three associations. However, you will only receive the complimentary conference merchandise for the association with which you register. Early-Early Bird

CHS Conference Attendee Member Non-Member Life Member (save 10%) Awards Banquet & Reunion Tickets: $50 *no on-site tickets available

Date has passed

Regular (before 9/30)

Onsite/Late (10/1 or after)

$245

$345

$395

$445

$490

$540

$590

$320

$370

$420

Early Bird (before 8/21)

(must be purchased in advance by Friday, Sept. 28th)

# of tickets:

Members who wish to stay at the Hyatt Regency Hotel will receive a special group rate of $139/night. For room reservations call (800) 215-2167. Mention the discount code ACFEI.

x $50 =

Totals

SUBTOTAL $

** SAVE 30% when you register for the CHS Conference and the ACFEI, APA, or AAIM Conference **

2007 NATIONAL CONFERENCE/AWARDS BANQUET Kansas City, Missouri • Hyatt Regency • October 2007

PAYMENT INFORMATION (Please print)

Name

__________

Address Phone (

Designation

City )

Fax (

__ _________________

Member ID #

State

)

Zip

John Douglas Profiling Workshop

Friday, October 5th (10 a.m. to 5 p.m.) Price includes an autographed copy of his latest book $110

Inside the Mind of BTK: The True Story Behind 30 Years of Hunting for the Wichita Serial Killer

Greg Cooper Profiling Workshop

Saturday, October 6th (8 a.m. to 2 p.m.) Free with Conference Registration!

SUBTOTAL page 1 $ SUBTOTAL page 2 $ TOTAL $ PAYMENT PROCESSING ❑ Check enclosed (payable to ACFEI, APA, or AAIM)

Total Amount Due: $

Card Number

Exp

❑ Purchase Order ❑ MasterCard/Visa ❑ Am. Express

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All requests for cancellation of conference registration must be made to Association Headquarters in writing by fax, mail, or email. Phone cancellations will not be accepted. All cancelled/refunded registrations will be assessed a $50 administrative fee. All refunds will be issued in the form of credit vouchers and are pro-rated as follows: cancellations received 4 or more weeks prior to the conference=100% refund (less $50 administrative fee); cancellations received less than 4 weeks but more than 1 week prior to the conference=50% refund (less $50 administrative fee); cancellations received 1 week or less prior to the conference=no refund. For more information on administrative policies, such as grievances, call (800) 423-9737. The performance of this conference is subject to the acts of God, war, government regulation, disaster, strikes, civil disorder, curtailment of transportation facilities, or any other emergency making it impossible to hold the conference. In the event of such occurrences, credit vouchers will be issued in lieu of cash. Conference schedule is subject to change. Please be prepared to show photo identification upon arrival at the conference. Special Services: ❑ Please check here if you require special accommodations to participate in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Attach a written description of your needs.

You may register online at www.mgmtexec.com FAX YOUR REGISTRATION FORM TO (417) 881-4702 MAIL TO Association Headquarters, 2750 E. Sunshine Springfield, MO 65804 PHONE toll free (800) 423-9737 EMAIL TO conference@mgmtexec.com

Attention Forensic Educators The Commission on Forensic Education The Commission on Forensic Education, developed by The American College of Forensic Examiners, emphasizes the importance of forensic science programs in education and is committed to their expansion. The Commission, which has no fees or dues to join, offers guidance on instruction, provides help to those who teach or study forensic science, and reviews professional certification programs. The Commission is an effective and essential network that helps educators and students stay informed of the latest innovations, breakthroughs, and important research in the field. Commissioner membership is open to college and university administrators and full time, part-time, and adjunct professors, and Associate Commissioner membership is open to high school teachers. The commission helps educators advance the field and inspire future forensic professionals through providing supportive services: • Helping educators network with fellow teaching professionals and top experts in the field. • Teaching potential students about the importance and the benefits of studying forensic science. • Giving members a highly visible forum to publish and distribute their research. • Helping members stay current in a constantly evolving field by providing quality continuing education. • Providing certification programs that recognize achievement.

To join The Commission, apply online. Go to www.acfei.com/pcfe.php.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 49

Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation By Henry Spiller, MS, DABAT, FACFEI, DABFE, and Tama S. Sawyer, PharmD, CSPI Key Words: withdrawal syndrome, DUI, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit: (ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates. (CFC) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Certified Forensic Consultants. (ACCME) The American College of Forensic Examiners International is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education to provide continuing medical education for physicians. This activity has been planned and implemented in accordance with the Essential Areas and Policies of the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). The American College of Forensic Examiners International designates this educational activity for a maximum of 1 hour AMA PRA Category 1 Creditsâ&#x201E;˘.. Physicians should only claim credit commensurate with the extent of their participation in the activity.

Abstract Millions of Americans annually receive selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressants and dual-action antidepressants for their symptoms of depression. These patients are at risk for a well-documented withdrawal syndrome if they abruptly stop their medication. This withdrawal syndrome may produce significant effects that may impair a personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ability to drive, putting at risk both the driver and others on the road. In a situation of the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the impairment is due to the absence of drugs in the patient, producing the paradox of a potentially impaired driver because of an absence of the influence of a drug. This article reviews the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome and describes the effects on cognition, memory, vision, and motor performance and reviews how these clinical effects might be misinterpreted using standardized field sobriety tests suggesting the patient is intoxicated in the absence of other drugs or alcohol. 50 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Introduction Worldwide use of antidepressants has increased dramatically in the past decade (Berndt, Bhattacharjya, Mishol, Arcelus, & Lasky, 2002; Ciuna et al., 2004; Helgason, Tomasson, & Zoega, 2004; Hemels, Koren, & Einarson, 2002). Use of antidepressants may range from 26 to 72 defined daily doses per 1000 people, depending on the country (Ciuna et al.; Helgason et al.; Hemels et al.). The estimated range of Americans using antidepressants is from 7 to 18 million patients annually. Of the various classes of antidepressants available, the Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) and Dual Action Antidepressants (DAA), involving serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibition, make up more than 75% of the prescriptions filled for antidepressants (Berndt et al.; Hemels et al.). Additionally, use of SSRIs and DAAs has increased more than 600% in the last 10 years (Ciuna et al.). While the drugs in these two classes have proven to be generally safe and effective, studies have documented a problem with the effects of withdrawal (Stahl et al., 1997). Though symptoms from withdrawal are diverse, all include effects on cognition (impaired concentration and/or confusion) and motor performance (impaired coordination, loss of balance). (See Table 2 for a complete list of the clinical effects reported with withdrawal syndrome associated with the SSRI and DAA drugs.) These withdrawal effects may put patients at risk of impaired driving in the absence of other drugs or alcohol. While this is a potentially serious problem for both the patient/driver and others on the road, it has not been previously explored in the literature. This article describes the withdrawal syndrome associated with the SSRI and DAA drugs including clinical effects, with a focus on the potential effects these drugs may have on driving. Additionally, this article includes a discussion on the impact antidepressant withdrawal syndrome might have on field evaluation of a driver with tests such as the standard field sobriety test. Antidepressant Withdrawal syndrome Several groups of antidepressants, including the tricyclic antidepressants, the tetracyclic antidepressants, the SSRIs, the DAAs, and newer antidepressants such as mirtazapine (Remeron), may produce a withdrawal syndrome (Benazzi, 1998a; Coupland, Bell, &

Potokar, 1996; Dilsaver, Kronfol, Sackellares, & Greden, 1983; Hindmarch, Kimber, & Cockle, 2000; Rosenbaum, Fava, Hoog, Ascroft, & Krebs, 1998). However, the withdrawal syndrome produced by the SSRIs and the DAAs is clinically different from that produced by the classic tricyclic antidepressants (Lejoyeux, Ades, Mourad, Solomon, & Dilsaver, 1996; Stahl et al., 1997). The withdrawal syndrome from the tricyclic and tetracyclic antidepressants is primarily a cholinergic syndrome with symptoms such as nausea, vomiting, anorexia, diarrhea, rhinorrhea (runny nose), diaphoresis (excessive sweating), myalgias (muscle pain), increased anxiety, agitation, and sleep disturbances (Dilsaver, 1994; Dilsaver et al.). In contrast, the withdrawal syndrome from the SSRIs and DAAs is primarily a serotonergic syndrome, with symptoms such as dizziness, lethargy, impaired concentration, electric-like shock sensations, impaired coordination, blurred vision, and sleep disturbances (see Table 2). This article discusses the impact of the serotonin-related antidepressants. The SSRI and DAA drugs that may produce a withdrawal syndrome are listed in Table 1. The syndrome may be seen in a substantial minority of patients taking these drugsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;up to 25% (Coupland et al.; Michelson et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 1998). A brief understanding of the mechanism(s) of action of these drugs will improve the understanding of the withdrawal syndrome. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor class includes 6 drugs that are widely available. (See Table 1 for a list of drugs in this class with associated pharmacokinetic information.) These drugs inhibit the human serotonin transporter, inhibiting reuptake of serotonin into presynaptic neurons (Schmidt, Fuller, & Wond, 1988). This allows for persistence of serotonin in the neuronal synapse and increased serotonergic neuron transmission. In effect, it increases activity on the pathways of the brain that use serotonin as the neurotransmitter. Chronic use has been shown to cause reduced serotonin transporter density, maintenance of normal cell-firing rates, and increased activation of post-synaptic firing. The SSRIs produce little or no clinically significant activity on dopamine, norepinephrine, histamine, or acetylcholine receptors, or re-uptake transporters. The DAAs inhibit both the human serotonin transporter and the huFall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 51

Table 1: SSRI and DAA Medications Generic Drug Name

Brand Name

Drug Class

Elimination Half-life

Starting Dose

Dosing Range

Escitalopram

Lexapro

SSRI

22–32 hours

10mg

10–20mg

Citalopram

Celexa

SSRI

33–37 hours

20mg

20–60mg

Fluoxetine

Prozac

SSRI

70 hours

20mg

20–60mg

Fluvoxamine

Luvox

SSRI

17–23 hours

50mg

50–300mg

Paroxetine

Paxil

SSRI

15–22 hours

10mg

10–50mg

Sertraline

Zoloft

SSRI

24–27 hours

50mg

50–200mg

Duloxetine

Cymbalta

DAA

11–16 hours

20mg

20–60mg

Venalfaxine

Effexor

DAA

5 hours

75mg

75–375mg

man norepinephrine transporter, inhibiting reuptake of both serotonin and norepinephrine. The end result of the actions of both these classes of drugs is increased nerve transmission in select areas of the brain because of prolonged duration of neurotransmitters in the synapse. The sudden withdrawal of these drugs produces a sudden decrease in serotonin transmission due to reduced persistence of the neurotransmitter in the synaptic cleft (Zajecka, Tracey, & Mitchell, 1997). In effect, it produces a reduction of activity in some areas of the brain controlled by serotonin in the case of SSRIs and by serotonin and norepinephrine in the case of the DAAs. It is this sudden decrease in activity that is responsible for the effects seen in these patients. If the decrease is of sufficient magnitude, an antidepressant withdrawal syndrome will occur. The dosage range of these drugs varies, with as much as a five-fold difference in some of the drugs between the lower and upper range of the therapeutic dose. (See table 1.) Any decrease that significantly effects serotonin transmission may produce a withdrawal syndrome. The withdrawal syndrome is transitory but may persist for days to weeks as the brain adjusts to new levels of activity on these neuronal pathways. Additionally, the syndrome may be reversed by restarting the antidepressant therapy. The true incidence of the withdrawal syndrome is unclear, with reports suggesting that 3%– 30% of patients experience some form of the syndrome (Coupland et al., 1996; Oehrberg et al., 1995; Stahl et al., 1997). The most frequently reported symptoms from the serotonin antidepressant withdrawal syndrome are dizziness, altered bal52 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

ance, lethargy, parathesias (numbness, tingling feeling, electric shock-like sensations), nausea, behavioral changes, and sleep disturbances. The clinical effects that can occur with the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome are diverse, and a broader list is provided in Table 2. It should be noted that the syndrome is varied from patient to patient—from mild to severe—and not all symptoms will be seen in every patient. Criteria for diagnosis of antidepressant withdrawal syndrome vary, but generally include sudden discontinuance or reduction of dosage of an SSRI or DAA after a period of at least 1 month of use, two or more symptoms from Table 2, and symptoms not triggered by a general medical condition or other recognized cause (Black, Shea, Dursun, & Kutcher, 2000; Ditto, 2003). The onset of symptoms may be interpreted as a return of psychiatric symptoms (Benazzi, 1998b). Additionally, it may be interpreted by the patient as the onset of a flu-like syndrome (nausea, fatigue/lethargy, dizziness) along with return of depression (behavioral changes and sleep disturbances). The symptoms may be sufficiently severe to interrupt activities of daily living, such as going to work or driving a car, and patients should be warned about the dangers of operating a motor vehicle if they begin experiencing moderate to severe withdrawal symptoms. In some cases, the symptoms may be severe enough for the patients to recognize they should not drive (Campagne, 2005). However, in other cases, the patients may not recognize the degree of impairment and attempt to continue with their daily lives including commitments to work, school, or other outside commitments.

Patients may have an interruption in their medication for a number of reasons. They might miss one or several days of therapy due to non-compliance (“drug holiday”) (Hylan, Dunn, Tepner, & Meurgey, 1998) or there may be an interruption in the patients’ medication supply due to travel, lack of access to a pharmacy, or inability to pay (Campagne, 2005). In some cases, the patient will suddenly stop taking the medication due to perceived problems with the side effects of the medication itself (Leiter, Nierenberg, Sanders, & Stern, 1995). Symptoms of the SSRI and DDA withdrawal syndrome may occur from as early as 12 hours after a missed dose and up to 3 weeks after discontinuance, although the average time of onset of symptoms is 1 to 3 days (Campagne, 2005; Zajecka et al., 1997). One factor impacting the onset of symptoms is the half-life of the drug involved, which can vary significantly depending on the drug involved (Michelson et al., 2000) (See Table 1).

Withdrawal Syndrome and Driving Generally speaking, impaired driving (driving while intoxicated) is considered secondary to the effects of drugs or alcohol while these substances are in the patient and producing a direct effect on cognition, attention, motor control, and reaction time. However, in the situation of the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the impairment is due to the absence of drugs in the patient. This produces the paradox of a potentially impaired driver that is not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. While there may be significant impairment, the term driving under

Table 2: Clinical Effects Reported with Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome

Cognitive Impairment Effects

• • • • • • • •

Agitation Anxiety Confusion Depersonalization/detachment Electric shock-like sensations Impaired concentration Irritability Short-term memory impairment

Motor Impairment Effects

• • • • • • • •

Blurred vision Dizziness/lightheaded/vertigo Gait instability Incoordination or impaired coordination Jerking eye movements Loss of balance Tremor Visual disturbances

Other Effects

• • • • • • • • • • • •

Diarrhea Chills Headache Insomnia Myalgia Nausea/vomiting Parathesias Sleep disturbances Suicide thoughts or behavior Sweating Tinnitus (ringing in the ears) Vivid dreams or nightmares

(Table complied from references: Black, Shea, Durson, & Kutcher, 2000; Campagne, 2005; Coupland, Bell, & Potokar, 1996; Leiter, Nierenberg, Sanders, & Stern, 1995; Michelson et al., 2000; Rosenbaum, Fava, Hoog, Ascroft, & Krebs, 1998; Stahl et al., 1997; Young & Haddad, 2000; Zajecka, Tracey, & Mitchell, 1997)

the influence may be an inappropriate term for these cases. There are a number of symptoms of the withdrawal syndrome that could potentially cause a patient to operate a motor vehicle in a manner that might be interpreted as operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs. These symptoms include visual disturbances, dizziness/vertigo, impaired coordination, tremors, confusion, impaired concentration, and jerking eye movements that cause difficulty with tracking and memory impairment. These clinical effects might produce an altered driving pattern, including weaving, erratic speed and erratic lane changes, which might be interpreted as driving while intoxicated. Additionally, if the vehicle were stopped for possible impaired driving and the patient evaluated, there are a number of symptoms that might be interpreted as the patient being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. These symptoms include confusion, agitated behavior, distracted affect if the patient is experiencing repeated sensations of electric shocks, an unsteady gait, and inattention to questions because of inability to hear on account of tinnitus.

Withdrawal Syndrome and the Standard Field Sobriety Test When a police officer stops a driver for suspicion of impaired driving, the most common procedure is to have the driver perform a field sobriety test. The National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) has validated three tests that have become generally recognized as the Standardized

Field Sobriety Test (Tharp, Burns, & Moskowitz, 1981). These three tests are the Walk and Turn (WAT), Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), and One Leg Stand (OLS). However, other tests may be performed at the discretion of the police officer or local jurisdiction such as asking the driver to count backwards from a certain number and to stop at a certain number (e.g. count down from 55 to 18) or to recite the alphabet beginning at a particular letter and ending at a particular letter (e.g., beginning at F and ending at R). These latter tests have not been validated by NHTSA. In the course of administering the WAT, the subject is given oral instructions to take nine steps heel-to-toe along a straight line. After taking nine steps the subject must execute a one-foot turn and return in the same manner in the opposite direction. There are 7 indicators of impairment for which the police officer is instructed to watch to indicate successful completion or failure of the test: 1) subject cannot maintain balance while listening to instructions, 2) subject begins test before instructions are complete, 3) subject stops to regain balance while walking, 4) subject does not touch heel-to-toe, 5) subject uses arms to maintain balance, 6) subject loses balance during turn, and 7) subject takes incorrect number of steps. In a patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, there are a number of symptoms that would cause them to fail the WAT test, even in the absence of intoxicants. The most important of these are gait instability, dizziness/vertigo, lack of coordination, and loss of balance. Additionally,

such symptoms as confusion, impaired concentration, and short-term memory impairment might cause the patient to fail by beginning too soon, failing to take the correct number of steps, or failing to walk heel-totoe on the return walk. In the course of administering the HGN, the subject is instructed to focus on an object 12 to 15 inches in front of his or her face as the object is moved horizontally to the left and right. The police officer is instructed to watch for smooth pursuit, nystagmus before onset of 45 degrees, distinct nystagmus at maximal deviation, and head movements and/or jerks. A patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome might fail the HGN because of misinterpretation of already existing jerking eye movements and blurred vision. In the course of administering the OLS, the subject is instructed to stand with one foot held approximately 6 inches off the ground and to count by thousands (e.g. one thousand one, one thousand two, etc.) until told to put the foot down. The subject is timed for 30 seconds. There are 4 indicators of impairment that the police officer is instructed to watch for to indicate successful completion or failure of the test: 1) swaying while balancing; 2) using arms to balance; 3) hopping to maintain balance; and 4) putting the raised foot down. There are numerous symptoms that could cause a patient experiencing antidepressant withdrawal syndrome to fail the OLS test, even in the absence of intoxicants. The most important of these are dizziness/vertigo, lack of coordination, and loss of balance. Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 53

Finally, the patient may be agitated and experiencing significant anxiety. The patient’s behavior may initially be interpreted by the police officer as a refusal to obey commands during the initial evaluation or during one of the SFSTs. In either case, refusal may be interpreted as reason to suspect intoxication. It should be noted that the primary role of field sobriety tests is to give the police officer a reasonably accurate tool to determine if intoxication might be suspected and if further verifiable documentation such as an alcohol breathalyzer test or blood alcohol test should be administered. The tests themselves should not be sufficient evidence of intoxication without clinical evidence such as a breathalyzer test or blood alcohol test. In the case of drug intoxication, field sobriety tests again are not sufficient evidence of intoxication without supporting evidence of a blood concentration of the suspected drug. Because of situations such as the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome, the field sobriety tests may provide misleading indications of intoxication when no intoxication has occurred.

Conclusion Millions of Americans annually receive SSRIs and DAAs for their symptoms of depression. These patients are at risk for a well-documented withdrawal syndrome if they abruptly stop their medication. The antidepressant withdrawal syndrome may produce significant effects on cognition and motor performance. Further, these effects might be misinterpreted in the use of standardized field sobriety tests to suggest the patient is intoxicated in the absence of other drugs or alcohol. References Benazzi, F. (1998a). Mirtazapine withdrawal symptoms. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 43(5), 525. Benazzi, F. (1998b). Sertraline discontinuation syndrome presenting with severe depression and compulsions. Biological Psychiatry, 43(12), 929–930. Berndt, E. R., Bhattacharjya, A., Mishol, D. N., Arcelus, A., & Lasky, T. (2002). An analysis of the diffusion of new antidepressants: Variety, quality, and marketing efforts. Journal of Mental Health Policy and Economics, 5(1), 3–19. Black, K., Shea, C., Dursun, S., & Kutcher, S. (2000). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor discontinuation syndrome: proposed diagnostic criteria. Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 25(3), 255–261. Campagne, D. M. (2005). Venlafaxine and serious withdrawal symptoms: Warning to drivers. 54 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Medscape General Medicine, 7(3), 22. Ciuna, A., Andretta, M., Corbari, L., Levi, D., Mirandola, M., Sorio, A., et al. (2004). Are we going to increase the use of antidepressants up to that of benzodiazepines? European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 60(9), 629–634. Coupland, N. J., Bell, C. J., & Potokar, J. P. (1996). Serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 16(5), 356–62. Dilsaver, S. C. (1994). Withdrawal phenomena associated with antidepressant and antipsychotic agents. Drug Safety, 10(2), 103–114. Dilsaver, S. C., Kronfol, Z., Sackellares, J. C., & Greden, J. F. (1983). Antidepressant withdrawal syndromes: Evidence supporting the cholinergic overdrive hypothesis. Journal of Clinical Psychopharmacology, 3(3), 157–164. Ditto, K .E. (2003). SSRI discontinuance syndrome: Awareness as an approach to prevention. Postgrad Medicine, 114(2), 79–84. Helgason, T., Tomasson, H., & Zoega, T. (2004). Antidepressants and public health in Iceland. Time series analysis of national data. British Journal of Psychiatry, 184(2), 157–162. Hemels, M. E., Koren, G., & Einarson, T. R. (2002). Increased use of antidepressants in Canada 1991–2000. Annals of Pharmacotherapy, 36(9), 1375–1379. Hindmarch, I., Kimber, S., & Cockle, S. M. (2000). Abrupt and brief discontinuation of antidepressant treatment: Effects on cognitive function and psychomotor performance. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 15(6), 305–318. Hylan, T. R., Dunn, R. L., Tepner, R. G., & Meurgey, F. (1998). Gaps in antidepressant prescribing in primary care in the United Kingdom. International Clinical Psychopharmacology, 13(6), 235–243. Leiter, F. L., Nierenberg, A. A., Sanders, K. M., & Stern, T. A. (1995). Discontinuation reactions following sertraline. Biological Psychiatry, 38(10), 694–695. Lejoyeux, M., Ades, J., Mourad, I., Solomon, J., & Dilsaver, S. (1996). Antidepressant withdrawal syndrome. Recognition, prevention and management. CNS Drugs, 5(4), 278–292. Michelson, D., Fava, M., Amsterdam, J., Apter, J., Londborg, P., Tamura, R., et al. (2000). Interruption of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor treatment: Double-blind placebo-controlled trial. British Journal of Psychiatry, 176(4), 363–368. Oehrberg, S., Christiansen, P. E., Behnke, K., Borup, A. L., Severin, B., Soegaard, J., et al. (1995). Paroxetine in the treatment of panic disorder. British Journal of Psychiatry, 167(3), 374–397. Rosenbaum, J. F., Fava, M., Hoog, S. L., Ascroft, R. C., & Krebs, W. B. (1998). Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor discontinuation syndrome: A randomized clinical trial. Biological Psychiatry, 44(2), 77–87.

Schmidt, M. J., Fuller, R. W., & Wond, D. T. (1988). Fluoxetine, a highly selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor: A review of preclinical studies. British Journal of Psychiatry, 153(3), 40–46. Stahl, M. M. S., Lindquist, M., Pettersson, M., Edwards, I. R., Sanderson, J. H., Taylor, N. F. A., et al. (1997). Withdrawal reactions with selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors as reported to the WHO system. European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 53(3–4), 163–169. Tharp, V., Burns, M., & Moskowitz, H. (1981). Development and field test of psychophysical tests for DWI arrest. (DOT HS 805–864). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA. Young, A., & Haddad, P. (2000). Discontinuation symptoms and psychotropic drugs. Lancet, 355(9210), 1184. Zajecka, J., Tracey, K. A., & Mitchell, S. (1997). Discontinuation symptoms after treatment with serotonin reuptake inhibitors: a literature review. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 58(7), 291–297.

Henry A. Spiller, MS, DABAT, DABFE, FACFEI, is board certified in Toxicology and the Director of a certified regional poison center, with more than 20 years clinical experience. He has authored more than 180 toxicology related publications, including peer-reviewed medical/scientific journals, comprehensive toxicology textbooks, and scientific abstracts. He has more than a decade of experience in training toxicologists and specialists in poison information and has directed, as principal investigator, more than 35 multicenter national studies in toxicology. He has made toxicology-related presentations at scientific meetings in North America, South America, and Europe and has presented evidence as an expert in numerous state and federal courts on toxicology related subjects. Tama Sawyer, PharmD, is a Certified Specialist in Poison Information with more than 20 years clinical experience at a regional poison center. Earn CE Credit To earn CE credit, complete the exam for this article on page 78 or complete the exam online at www.acfei.com (select “Online CE”).

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56 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

GRAY MATTER: Redefining Mental Retardation in Capital Murder

By Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, FACFEI, DABFE, DABPS, DABFM, DAPA

n two separate but related decisions, in 1989 and 2001, the United States Supreme Court held that mental retardation is a mitigating factor to be considered by capital juries during sentencing, that the class of individuals diagnosed as “mentally retarded” is not homogeneous in terms of their capacity for legal and moral culpability, and that capital punishment of mentally retarded persons is not a universal or per se violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual punishment” (Penry I, 1989; Penry II, 2001). One year later, in deciding the 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the Court noted the shift in social thought and practice regarding the execution of mentally retarded defendants, reversed its position in Penry, and made the mentally retarded a class exempt from the death penalty. In April 2007, a ruling by the California Supreme Court gave trial court judges broader discretion in determining if a defendant is mentally retarded and, therefore, exempt from the death penalty. Not only in California, but throughout the United States, this ruling has the potential to affect those persons on death row and currently facing capital charges whose intellectual functioning borders on the classification of mentally retarded. Of Unsound Mind According to court records, Jorge Junior Vidal was born in Delano, California, on October 23, 1969 [See: People v. Superior Court (Vidal), 07 S.O.S. 1781; People v. Superior Court (Vidal), Ct. App. 5 F045226 (2004); People v. Vidal, Tulare County Super. Ct. No. 69782-C]. On January 24, 2001, Vidal was one of seven men who invited Eric Jones to enter a private garage to join them in “getting high.” Once inside the garage, instead of partying, Jones was bound, hands and feet, with an extension cord and beaten severely. Vidal reportedly stripped an electrical cord, attached the exposed ends to Jones’ fingers, poured water on the garage floor where Jones lay, repeatedly inserted and removed the plug from a wall outlet, and as Jones was being shocked, asked, “Are you feeling energized?” At some point, Jones’ clothes were cut off, and while he was being brutally sodomized, stabbed

with a screwdriver, and jolted with a stun gun, music blasting from a car radio was used to drown out his screams. Eventually, Jones was thrown into the trunk of a car and driven to a field in southern Tulare County, where he was shot nine times at close range in the back and through his cheek. Left naked in the field, Eric Sean Jones, who was 17 years old at the time, bled to death within a few minutes, after having been tortured for nearly 2 hours. All this was apparently done in response to or in retribution for Jones’ earlier alleged attempt to steal Vidal’s car. Three days after Jones was killed, Vidal and two others were arrested and charged with Jones’ “torture killing.” Of the seven men involved in the crime, two, Juan Dedios Soto and his younger brother Gerardo Soto, have yet to be apprehended and are believed to have fled to Mexico. Gerardo Zavala was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 16 years to life. Keith John Seriales

and Daniel Portugal were each convicted and sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of parole. Tyrone Ebaniz’s conviction (for 1st degree murder, torture, and kidnapping) and sentence (36 years to life) has been overturned twice on appeal (because of error in jury instructions), with his third trial pending. Ebaniz was 16 years old at the time and, reportedly, Jones’ best friend. Vidal was charged with murder (with special circumstances and enhancement), torture, forcible sexual penetration, sexual assault in concert, unlawful sexual penetration of person under age 18, kidnapping, false imprisonment, multiple counts of unlawful weapon possession, and other lesser charges. The prosecution filed the case as a capital offense; the defense responded by filing a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty under Atkins, as implemented in California law [See: Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and California Penal Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 57

Code Section 1376]. California law allows defendants a choice in this matter: to have the issue decided by a judge in a pretrial hearing or by a jury after the guilt phase of trial. Opting for the former, in October 2003 and March 2004, Vidal’s motion was heard during an evidentiary hearing.

Proving Mental Retardation As might be expected, psychological experts for the defense (who has the burden of proof ) and the prosecution disagreed as to whether Vidal met the legal standard for mental retardation. Consistent with the clinical diagnosis of mental retardation or intellectual disability of both the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities [AAIDD; known as the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) prior to 01/01/07] and the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the legal definition of mental retardation set forth in both Atkins and the California Penal Code involves a three-pronged test: significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, which must exist concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior, and which must have a manifest onset before the age of 18 (AAMR, 2002; West, 2007; APA, 2000; Atkins v. Virginia, 2002). In assessing the first prong of mental retardation—Vidal’s general intellectual functioning—the psychologists were able to review several standardized intelligence tests administered to Vidal through the public school system as early as 1980 (when he was 11), as well as one administered by a defense expert in 2003. Across administrations, Vidal consistently scored in the mentally retarded range in terms of his Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ), while his Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ) ranged from average to high average (See Table 1). Vidal’s Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) ranged from borderline mental retardation to average intelligence. With each administration, there was a strikingly significant split between his VIQ and PIQ. In addition to administering the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence to Vidal in 2003, the defense expert, psychologist Eugene Couture, also administered the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, which is designed to assess the respondent’s ability to understand spoken language. As Vidal’s first 58 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

language was Spanish, the Peabody was given in both English and Spanish, with Vidal scoring in the lowest percentile on both versions (as he had on prior administrations in 1980 and 1989). According to family members, it was clear early on that Vidal was “not very smart.” His older sister noted his ability to read and write was not the same as his peers and that, even with help, he was unable to understand and complete homework assignments. As early as kindergarten, Vidal’s academic records identified him as having language problems. He was held back in the 4th grade, and while his communication skills had improved somewhat by the 9th grade, Vidal was never completely fluent in Spanish or English (he was never able to read or write anything beyond the simplest of words) and had difficulty understanding both languages. Throughout his school years, Vidal took approximately seven achievement tests, never performing at grade level (with the exception of scoring at the 12th-grade level on a letter identification subtest when in 8th grade) and never showing improvement between administrations. Several individualized educational plans were constructed (and unsuccessfully implemented) for Vidal and he received the support of special education services or a resource specialist throughout his education. While he reached the 12th grade, Vidal did not graduate and never functioned beyond a 2nd- or 3rd-grade level academically. To address the second prong of mental retardation, “deficits in adaptive functioning,” Couture administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, using Vidal’s sisters and exwife as informants. Vidal’s scores were below 70 on “daily living,” “communication,” and “social” across informants, while Vidal rated himself as below 70 on only two of the three subscales. In addition to standardized test results, lay witnesses described Vidal’s historical difficulties with routine tasks and with remembering chores and household rules. Thirty-two years old at the time of Jones’ murder, Vidal never lived independently, only leaving his mother’s home when he married. The father of several children, Vidal was described as a loving father who occasionally provided his children with a degree of care. Over the years, Vidal had worked as a seasonal field laborer.

After hearing all the evidence, in midMarch 2004, the Superior Court judge ruled that Vidal had met his burden of proof. The judge reasoned that Vidal’s VIQ (combined with clear deficits in adaptive functioning) was sufficient to establish a severe lack of verbal ability that went to the issues of “premeditation, deliberation, appreciation of concepts of wrongful conduct, ability to think and weigh reasons for and not for doing things and logic [and] foresight,” as proscribed by Atkins. A finding that Vidal was, in fact, mentally retarded was issued, thereby blocking the prosecution from seeking the death penalty. The prosecution appealed the decision in the 5th District Court of Appeals on several grounds. Most relevant to this discussion was the People’s contention that the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by basing its decision on the defendant’s VIQ score—rather then the FSIQ score—combined with adaptive behavior scores. The People argued that Vidal’s behavior in the instant offense calls into question the nature and degree of any manifest adaptive deficits and that while his VIQ had been consistently low, his PIQ and FSIQ argued against mental retardation. In May 2005, the lower court’s ruling was reversed when, in a split decision, the Appeals Court held that the FSIQ is (or should be) the primary determinant of intellectual functioning and mental retardation.

Intellectual Error Since 1976, when the death penalty was reinstated, approximately 44 persons with mental retardation have been executed, with others pending (Keyes, Edwards, & Perske, 2002). In Virginia, a mentally retarded man sat on death row for 10 years before being exonerated by DNA evidence (Elgie, 2001). In Texas, a man is awaiting execution whose IQ scores (on three different administrations), as entered into evidence, were 65, 68, and 74 (Clark v. Dretke, 2004). Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins in 2002, 18 states and the federal government had existing laws that banned the execution of persons identified as mentally retarded. Of those 19 jurisdictions, nine specified a FSIQ score of 70 or below (on a standardized assessment procedure) as the cut-off for classification. However, when the Supreme Court published its opinion in Atkins, it did not operationally define, delimit, or quantify

“subaverage general intellectual functioning” or “deficits in adaptive functioning.” The Court intentionally did not provide a specific cut-off score for mental retardation or identify a particular measure (or measures) to be employed in that determination. The Court’s intention was that the best measure of intellectual functioning remains a matter of fact to be resolved on the trial court level, based on the evidence unique to each given case. Despite this, of the eight states that passed new legislation to be in compliance with Atkins, two opted to institute a cut-off FSIQ of 70 and one, a FSIQ of 75. Like Atkins, the remaining states’ statutes had no fixed IQ score, thereby allowing trial courts greater flexibility in determining the degree of weight given to different categories of evidence. In those states, which include California, the trier of fact is bound to treat each defendant individually when determining whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentencing option. Given this, on April 2007, the California Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Fifth District Court of Appeals ruling in Vidal. In writing the opinion, Justice Werdegar noted that the District Court erred in presuming that the best measure of intellectual functioning is a matter of law when in actuality, it is a factual question to be determined or decided in each case by the trier of fact. In turn, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court judge did not exceed his authority or use an incorrect standard when finding Vidal was mentally retarded. In other words, although Vidal’s FSIQ scores were generally within the standard average range of intellectual functioning, as a matter of law that fact alone does not preclude a finding of mental retardation. Because Atkins does not incorporate the set requirement of a specific test score, the Supreme Court did not find error in the trial court giving greater weight to one piece of evidence (Vidal’s VIQ) over another (his FSIQ), even when the evidence comes from the same source or test.

Between Black and White There are issues in the domain of forensic psychology where clinical definitions are not a clean match to legal definitions, nor do they directly inform the factual question

at hand. The definition and determination of mental retardation appears to be one such issue. In terms of clinical diagnosis, the purported purpose of which is to direct treatment interventions, the APA has established three criteria for a diagnosis of mental retardation: “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning”; concurrent “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning”; and onset of these indicators before age 18 (APA, 2000). To be diagnosed with “mild mental retardation,” the APA requires an approximate IQ score of 70 or below (on an individually administered test). The more impaired subcategories of mental retardation (i.e., moderate, profound, and severe) do not have a set range of scores, but allows for a “give-or-take” of 5 to 10 points. The APA’s adaptive functioning criterion is defined as “the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural group.” To meet this criteria, the individual must demonstrate deficits or impairments in at least two areas specified by the APA. These include communication, social/interpersonal skills, self-care, health, safety, home living, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, and leisure.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) uses comparatively flexible eligibility requirements (in terms of qualifying criteria, domains, cut-off scores, and age) when classifying individuals as mentally retarded for the purpose of assigning financial benefits (SSA, 2003). The AAIDD, which influences the definition of mental retardation used by other agencies and service providers (such as the Department of Education), is expected to issue a new definition of mental retardation or intellectual disability in 2009 or 2010. As with the APA, the AAIDD’s existing definition requires “subaverage intellectual functioning,” “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning,” and onset/manifestation by the age of 18 years (this is to rule out brain/neurological damage in a previously non-retarded adult) (AAMR, 2002). In order to account for measurement error, the AAIDD’s ceiling for “subaverage intellectual functioning” is an IQ score of 75, or a score representing at least two standard deviations above the mean on a standardized test. The AAIDD currently defines adaptive behavior as “the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that people have learned so they can function in their everyday lives.” According to the AAIDD, significant limitations in adaptive functioning “impact a perFall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 59

sons’ daily life and affect the [individual’s] ability to respond to a particular situation or to the environment.” When standardized tests are used to assess “deficits or impairments in adaptive functioning,” the AAIDD requires a score of at least two standard deviations below the mean on a measure of one or more of the three domains. While adaptive functioning can be assessed by standardized measures, it is often determined by subjective impressions, reported observations, integrated documentation, and/or clinical assessment. How mental retardation is defined has bearing on several legal issues, such as determining juvenile fitness and adult competence, proving certain elements of murder, and whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence in a given case. In the context of capital murder by defendants who are mentally retarded, the Atkins Court found that, “Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded defendants.”

Redefining Mental Retardation In 2005, the California Supreme Court chose not to adopt an IQ score of 70 as the upper limit for making a “prima facie” showing of mental retardation (Hawthorne, 2005). Rather than base the finding on a single test score (measuring either intellectual or adaptive functioning), the Court concluded that making a finding of mental retardation requires “an assessment of the individual’s overall capacity, based on a consideration of all the relevant evidence.” In 2007, with Vidal, the Court went further, holding that even with a FSIQ score that would preclude clinical diagnosis, a defendant may be found mentally retarded based on subscores of the same test (provided the other two prongs of mental retardation have been proved). Many states (and expert witnesses) have held to a definitive IQ score cut-off despite the clear intention of Atkins. Using a cutoff score obviously makes the decision of whether a defendant is mentally retarded a simple one; it is not, however, sufficient to make the decision one that is definitively accurate or just. Our understanding of intelligence is constantly evolving, with no 60 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

universally accepted definition of the construct itself. Likewise, our understanding of how to best measure “intelligence” is evolving. While re-norming standardized intelligence tests may help offset the Flynn Effect, defendants tested at either end are at risk of being misdiagnosed, especially if experts do not determine exactly when each test was administered in the given test’s life-cycle. To ensure that neither proceedings nor the punishment of a capital crime of those with mental retardation is cruel, unusual, or excessive, the trier of fact must be given more information than is necessary for making a clinical diagnosis. As was the case for Vidal, a defendant may have a FSIQ that precludes a diagnosis of mental retardation, but may manifest significant deficits in components of intelligence that have great legal relevance, such as in the ability to process information. Another defendant may have IQ scores that indicate retardation, yet possess the capacity to create intent and to kill with premeditation by “lying in wait.” As noted in Atkins, “there are many persons who have been diagnosed as mentally retarded who know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial, but, by definition, they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others’ reactions. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability.” A thorough forensic evaluation of intellectual and adaptive functioning must address each and every aspect of intelligence as provided in the legal definition of mental retardation. For example, beyond the initial question of whether the defendant knows right from wrong in both a social and cultural context, comes the matter of how complex a moral question the defendant can answer. Beyond that, how capable is the defendant of controlling his or her impulses, and in the context of what degree and nature of internal and external pressures? Ultimately, the expert witness must provide information for the trier of fact to use in deciding whether the defendant meets the legal definition of mental retardation, a definition that determines moral culpability.

References American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR). (2002). Mental retardation: Definition, classification, and systems of supports (10th ed.) Annapolis, MD: Author. American Psychiatric Association (APA). (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th edition – test revision (DSM IV-TR). Arlington, VA: Author. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Clark v. Dretke, No. 5:04-cv-00124-DF (2004). Elgie T. (2001, July 10). The death penalty in Virginia: Attempts at legislative reform. The Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest. Retrieved June 18, 2007, from http://law.richmond.edu/rjolpi/ Issues_Archived/2001_Spring_Issue/Elgie.html Keyes, D., Edwards, W., & Perske, R. (2002). People with mental retardation are dying—legally: At least 44 have been executed. Mental Retardation, 3, 243–244. Penry I (Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry II (Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). People v. Hawthorne, 35 Cal.4th 40 (2005). People v. Superior Court (Vidal), 07 S.O.S. 1781. People v. Superior Court (Vidal), Ct.App. 5 F045226 (2004). People v. Vidal, Tulare County Super. Ct. No. 69782-C. Social Security Administration (SSA), Office of Disability Programs. (2003). Disability evaluation under social security. [SSA Pub. No. 64-039]. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. West. (2007). California penal code section 1376. Retreived June 18, 2007, from http://www. leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=pen&g roup=01001-02000&file=1367-1376

About the Author Bruce Gross, PhD, JD, MBA, is a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners and is an Executive Advisory Board member of the American Board of Forensic Examiners. Dr. Gross is also a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners and the American Board Psychological Specialties. He has been an ACFEI member since 1996 and is also a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association.

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phone: (800) 423-9737 | fax: (417) 881-4702 | web: www.acfei.com Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 61

By Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V

He Made Mute Evidence Speak: Edward O. Heinrich he crowded Number 13 train was on its usual route as it headed into Tunnel 13 through the Siskiyou Mountains in Oregon, just north of the California border. It was October 11, 1923, and the train was bound for San Francisco. Nothing that day appeared to be out of the ordinary, so engineer Sidney Bates was oblivious to what awaited him on the other side of the half-mile tunnel. As the train emerged from the dark into daylight again, two masked men with guns jumped out and demanded that Bates stop the train. When he complied, a third man appeared, shoved a bundle through the door of the mail car, and ran. A second later, a blast shook the train, triggering a fire. Shots were fired in the ensuing confusion that left three trainmen, including Bates, dead. The clerk trapped in the mail car burned to death and the three bandits-turned-killers fled without the money they had come to grab. Some of the horrified passengers managed to alert authorities. 62 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Daniel O’Connell, chief of the Southern Pacific police force, was the first investigating officer to arrive. Near the damaged train he found a battery linked to a detonating device, a pair of gunny-sack shoe covers, a revolver, and a pair of greasy denim overalls. Although teams equipped with dogs had caught the killers’ trail, they did not track them down. The discovered battery led officials to a mechanic in a nearby town and, noticing that his overalls were greasy, arrested him. He claimed he had never seen the battery before, but when the overalls taken from the scene fit him, he was detained. Authorities were unable to connect him to the crime, but, having no other leads, they were not about to let go of this rather sensational investigation. Someone had heard of a chemist down in Berkeley, California, with a reputation for tackling tough cases. His name was Edward O. Heinrich, and, reportedly, he used science to solve crime. While not everyone trusted his techniques in an era when science was not yet common practice for investigators, he had often surprised people with solutions that stood up in court. Using objects such as hair, threads, dust particles, and bullet fragments, he could coax otherwise mute evidence into telling a story. Some people called him the “Edison of crime detection.” Although the Oregon investigators saw nothing on the overalls that could possibly offer any leads, they sent them on to Heinrich, along with the shoe covers, the revolver, a summary of the facts, and a description of their jailed suspect. He accepted the case, and thanks to a chemical analysis, a microscope, and careful observation, he spotted a lot. “You have the wrong man,” he told them, adding that the overalls had been worn by a left-handed, twenty-something-year-old Caucasian lumberjack who worked in the Pacific Northwest. The wearer of the overalls, according to Heinrich, stood no taller than 5’10 and weighed about 165 pounds. He also had small feet for his size, light brown hair, and a fastidious habit. The mechanic, who did not resemble this description, was freed. Heinrich pointed out that stains on the overalls were not car grease, but pitch from fir trees; their size, with the shoe covers, had provided the suspect’s height and approximate weight. Tiny wood chips in the right pocket indicated the position the man took

when cutting a tree, and because the overalls buttoned on the left and there was more wear on the left-hand pocket than the right, it stood to reason that the person who wore them was left-handed. Hair shafts caught on an overall button indicated his race, age, and hair color, while fingernail clippings in one pocket affirmed his tendency toward neatness. More interesting was a receipt for registered mail overlooked by other investigators: it was burrowed deep inside the narrow bib pocket, and magnification had offered a number. This evidence led to the three D’Autremont brothers, missing since the incident, one of whom was a left-handed lumberjack of the right size and age. Evidence from the brothers’ personal effects matched evidence on the overalls, and strands of hair and fibers from items in their homes were consistent with evidence from the scene. A knapsack found days later near the train tunnel yielded minute grains of dust like that on pine needles taken from the overall pocket. In fact, the knapsack had been mended in the same manner and with the same type of thread as a worn area on the overalls. Heinrich also turned his skill to the revolver, which the investigators had deemed worthless for clues because only part of the serial number was legible. He found a hidden serial number that led to a sales slip that had been signed with an alias; however, the handwriting, according to his expert analysis, was that of Roy D’Autremont. After a tedious manhunt that spanned several years, the youngest brother was finally caught, creating press coverage that led to the apprehension of the other two. They all confessed and were given life in prison (Thorwald, 1966). This case earned Heinrich another nickname: the American Sherlock Holmes, which he disliked. He claimed that Holmes acted on hunches rather than calculating methodically with solid science. “Hunches play no part in my crime laboratory,” Heinrich told reporter Eugene Block, explaining further that all criminals left clues that decreased the pool of suspect possibilities. His procedure was to reconstruct the crime “by visualizing the habits and actions of the criminal.” He started with the manner in which the crime had been committed and applied the relevant area of science to the debris left behind (Block, 1958). Hunches had no place. The forensic arena during the 1920s was in a state of chaos, as charlatans touted them-

selves as “experts” and no one held them accountable. Heinrich was aware of this and wanted to improve the situation, at least in his corner of the world, so he went to work learning everything he could about forensic chemistry, handwriting analysis, ballistics, and trace evidence investigation. He excelled in all of these areas. He was among the first investigators to use strings to compute bullet trajectories. Despite having a wife and two sons, Heinrich despised vacations and was most happy when he could immerse fully in a project that exercised his intellectual skills. He became one of the greatest forensic scientists of the early twentieth century, a living encyclopedia of the natural sciences, and his reputation spread across the country and abroad. His formula relied on answering five questions: what, when, where, why, and who, and his specialty lay in ferreting out more key minutiae at a crime scene than anyone else—including the bad guys. “The smaller the detail,” he would say, “the more likely it is that the criminal has overlooked it” (Block, 1958). In the course of one case, Heinrich actually learned several Hindu dialects. It was during World War I in 1916, and British military intelligence sought information about a conspiracy of revolutionaries who threatened to weaken the country’s resources. The authorities had papers in different dialects, which they could translate, but they were unable to identify the authorship. When Heinrich consulted, the only solution he could see was to translate the papers himself, so that he could discern between analogous styles; this would mean learning all the dialects. Tutors were employed and the task took months. The process that eventually solved the puzzle included a chemical analysis of the inks used and a complete examination of several confiscated typewriters. Finally, however, Heinrich provided the information necessary to connect the papers with specific people. The conspiracy was larger and more complex than anyone had realized, and, ultimately, 31 participants were arrested and convicted. For Heinrich, the triumph belonged to science. As a teenager growing up in Tacoma, Washington, he had acquired part-time employment in a pharmacy. He used the opportunity to learn everything he could about the trade, and he would later comment, “A drugstore is a veritable laboratory

in behavioristic psychology. I learned what people do in secret” (Block, 1958). Without the benefit of formal schooling in the subject, at only 18 years of age, he passed the state pharmacy exam. A pharmaceutical career was not to be his destiny, but was just one step along the way. Heinrich received a chemistry degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He went to work for the city of Tacoma, but his knack for solving crimes put him in demand as an investigative consultant. By 1916, he had become the chief of police in Alameda, California, where he trained his investigators in scientific procedures; 3 years later, he accepted a post in San Francisco as a handwriting expert. He also taught courses at his alma mater. Journalist Eugene Block collected Heinrich’s most “insoluble” cases into a book and called Heinrich the “Wizard of Berkeley” to convey a sense of his extraordinary intuitive powers, though Heinrich himself believed his deductions were merely a matter of the proper application of scientific methods. In Heinrich’s mind, science was never wrong. On the night of August 2, 1921, a man arrived at the home of Father Patrick Heslin in Colma, California, in urgent need of a priest: a friend of his was dying. Father Heslin accompanied this stranger, but failed to return. Soon, an anonymous and disjointed letter arrived from San Francisco demanding a ransom of $6,500 for the priest. The correspondent indicated that Heslin had been beaten unconscious and described an elaborate arrangement that involved releasing chemicals to kill him. The kidnapper promised another letter, but it failed to arrive. Unable to develop leads and fearing the worst, local police contacted Heinrich. Heinrich had worked, by this time, with August Vollmer, the police chief in Berkeley who had encouraged Sergeant John Larson to devise a machine that could measure deception via elevated heart rhythms and systolic blood pressure. Now, they would have cause to put the device to the test. Heinrich arrived in Colma and studied the ransom letter. He could not tell them much, but of one thing he was certain: the correspondent was a baker. The police were skeptical, but Heinrich was firm that the lettering was the style taught to cake bakers. How he knew this he did not say, but after the manner of Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, he trained Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 63

himself daily in gathering information about a diverse range of subjects. Still, this identification did not offer much in the way of leads, so authorities offered a reward. A week passed and a Texan named William Hightower entered the Archbishop’s office. He told an elaborate yarn that included how he had heard that Father Heslin was dead and buried. In fact, while digging for bootleg liquor he had found what he believed must be the spot, because the dirt was loose. He had seen the offer of a reward and he wanted to claim it. So Hightower led detectives to the suspected burial spot, indicating the location of the grave’s foot end, and some digging soon unearthed the corpse; Heslin had been beaten over the head and shot twice. The police then took Hightower, who was a baker, in for further questioning. They thought he knew the burial site just a little too well, but he stuck by his original story. Larson brought in his lie detector, and as Hightower answered questions, it was clear from changes in his blood pressure that he was lying. Larson concluded that Hightower had murdered the priest, but it remained for the evidence analysis to prove it (Wilson, 2003). Further searching of the burial place produced a tent peg wrapped with white cord. In Hightower’s room they found a canvas tent imprinted with the word Tuberculosis. Heinrich’s inspection of a jackknife removed from Hightower’s pocket showed microscopic shreds of white cotton like that of the cord on both the tent peg and the tent. Sand in the knife’s hilt was identical to that at both the burial site and in the tent seams. Heinrich also compared the handwriting on the tent to that in the ransom note and in poems penned by Hightower, affirming that they all originated from the same source. Also, a typed section of the note had been produced on a typewriter traced to Hightower. From this stack of evidence, Heinrich surmised that Hightower had slain the priest at the burial site, wrapped the body in the tent to await burial the following night, and used the disease label to prevent the curious from looking inside. Hightower was convicted of murder and given a life sentence. In another case, Heinrich introduced a new type of evidence into the courtroom. John McCarthy, foreman for the Vallejo Street Department, entered his home on December 19, 1925, and was shot in the 64 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

chest. As he was dying, McCarthy stated again and again, “I fired Colwell.” The police believed he was referring to Martin Colwell, 59, a local ruffian with a criminal record for assault. McCarthy had dismissed Colwell from a street labor gang and Colwell had, on drunken binges, threatened revenge. A .38-caliber bullet was recovered from McCarthy’s body, and when police arrested Colwell, they found a .38 revolver in his pocket with one chamber empty. He had three more bullets on his person, and a box of ammunition from his home showed four bullets gone. Colwell could not account for the missing bullet, protesting he had been drunk at the time of the incident. He remembered nothing. The gun and bullets went right to Heinrich. Having versed himself in the emerging science of ballistics, he used the gun to test-fire one bullet retrieved from Colwell’s pocket, several from his ammunition box, and others from an unrelated batch similar in caliber. Examining the bullets under a stereoscopic microscope, along with the recovered bullet that had killed McCarthy, Heinrich found convincing similarities that led him to believe that Colwell’s revolver had fired the fatal bullet. However, as the January trial approached, the prosecutor was concerned that the ballistics analysis would prove insufficient, so Heinrich strove to produce photographs that would show the tiny rifling scratches on the bullets in a side-by-side comparison, as a single three-dimensional image. He experimented over and over until he was able to successfully click his two cameras simultaneously over the dual microscope lenses. No court officer had ever before seen such an image, where the photographs of two different bullets seemed to perfectly merge, and they thought it was impressive. As Heinrich made his presentation to the jury, with photographs, he called the marks the weapon left on the spent bullets a “bullet fingerprint,” setting a precedent in an American court. Another ballistics expert confirmed Heinrich’s work, but the defense had a witness as well who contradicted them both, so the jury hung. The case went back to trial. This time jury members asked to look into the microscope to see for themselves what Heinrich had observed. Heinrich took advantage of the unique opportunity to teach laypeople the methods of science and arranged for a

demonstration, allowing each jury member to look through the lenses. But they wanted more. They asked Heinrich to re-shoot the photographs in front of them. He accepted the challenge and then took the negatives to a nearby darkroom, accompanied by the bailiff. Under these difficult conditions, he replicated his laboratory feat and the jury was finally convinced. Despite the defense’s attempt to introduce new alibi witnesses, after only an hour of deliberation, the jury sent Colwell to prison. Heinrich’s approach inspired refinement of the equipment so that future scientists could more efficiently offer results. Throughout his long career, Heinrich continued to expand his knowledge into other fields, including even the authentication of works of art and the restoration of burned papers to the point of legibility. He kept working past the typical retirement age, but on September 28, 1953, the world lost a brilliant forensic scientist when the Wizard of Berkeley, at age 72, suffered a stroke and died. He would have enjoyed seeing the procedures he developed or refined nearly a century ago still being used today to make mute evidence speak.

Works Consulted Block, E. The wizard of Berkeley. New York: Coward-McCann, 1958. Evans, C. The second casebook of forensic detection. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004. Thorwald, J. Crime and science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. Wilson, C., & Wilson, D. Written in blood: A history of forensic detection. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003.

About the Author Katherine Ramsland, PhD, CMI-V, has published 29 books, including The CSI Effect and Beating the Devil’s Game: A History of Forensic Science and Criminal Investigation. Dr. Ramsland is an assistant professor of forensic psychology at DeSales University in Pennsylvania, is a Certified Medical Investigator (CMI-V), and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1998.

Book Description Medical malpractice has become a hot issue in our litigious society. The trial lawyers are locked in battle with the doctors, while the politicians and the patients look on. This is about one skirmish in that battle, told by one of the casualties. Donald Austin, M.D., was a well-respected neurosurgeon, operating at the cutting edge of medical technology. He was justly regarded as an expert in the field, and as such gave testimony for the defense in many malpractice lawsuits. However, he was shocked by some instances of malpractice, and when he decided to testify for plaintiffs as well, he did not bargain for what ensued. As his testifying became known, both his professional colleagues and the medical societies carried out a smear campaign that ended his professional career.

To purchase this book, please go to Amazon.com

About the Author Donald Austin, M.D., is a third-generation doctor. A native of Indiana, he now lives in Michigan. He was chief of the neurosurgery section of the Hutzel Hospital in Detroit for many years and associate professor of neurosurgery at Wayne State University. He is married, with four grown children, and is now, reluctantly, retired. Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 65

By Shelly Reuben King

The Dangerous Flame of Childhood: A Means of Investigating Fire in the Wrong Hands

There is no such thing as a small fire. Fire knows no boundaries and adheres to no restrictions. It is limited only by its supply of oxygen and the availability of a fuel source. Someone can set a small and insignificant fire, but fires only start small. They can fizzle out and die, but all too often they grow, vast and terrible. They destroy property. They take lives. Sadly, the most persistent and dangerous incendiary fire-setters are the weakest and least responsible of us all: children. According to the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, juveniles in the United States annually set 41,900 fires that result in 165 deaths, 1,900 injuries, and $272 million in property damage. Fifty-five percent of all arson arrests in the United States are children under the age 66 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

of 18, nearly half of whom are under the age of 15, and 6.8% of whom are younger than 10 years old. Who are these children, and why do they set fires? A 3-year-old innocently playing with a cigarette lighter left out by a careless parent might cause a conflagration in which his entire family dies. A 10-year-old might ignite his mattress in a desperate attempt to draw attention to an intolerable home situation. A high school student might throw a match into a wastebasket so that an alarm will go off and disrupt a dreaded test. One teenager might set fire to a car. Another might set fire to a rival’s home. Some have even been known to toss flammable liquids on derelicts because it amused them to watch the wretched souls flailing fran-

tically at flames and screaming in pain. A successful actress I once knew told me that as a child, she had set fires for emotional relief. Children set fires out of boredom, anger, and rage. The motivations of youthful fire-setters run the gamut from curiosity to pathology, from innocence to evil. Recently, I received a letter from a special education teacher, whom I will call Sarah Nelson, who works for the New York City school system. Her letter began: Dear Shelly, Gerald, who is repeating third grade, did so well that I was wondering WHY he had been placed in my class until, following a real fire evacuation at about 11 o’clock that morning (after someone had set the paper towel dispenser in the boys’ bathroom ablaze), I was called into the principal’s office. There sat Gerald, two other boys, and his teacher. “Mrs. Nelson,” asked the principal. “Was Gerald with you between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m. today?” “Yes. He was taking the assessment test.” “Did Gerald leave you at any time to use the bathroom?” In the 47 seconds or so that Gerald had taken “to relieve himself,” he had pulled out a purloined lighter from his pocket and lit up the paper towels. And this was not his first fire of the day! A few hours before, Gerald, in the presence of the other two boys sitting in the principal’s office, had used matches to light up a toilet paper roll! In the case of the paper towels, one of the male teachers had happened by, saw flames coming from the dispenser, rushed to the science room where there were two buckets filled with water, and attacked the fire. It was then that smoke had come pouring out of the bathroom and the alarm had been sounded. Dismayed as I was to hear about these fires, it was not until I had read the next

paragraph that I changed my mind about how I was going to approach this subject: Of course, we did not DARE disturb the fire department to check our suppression efforts and/or “light” into the student body about fire safety. And our principal refuses to let us cover the incident in our student newspaper. It is for this reason I thought of you and wondered if you could give me some tips about juvenile fire-setters. Needless to say, the small, unreported fires in Sarah’s school did not loom in my mind as small. I saw them as the deadly conflagrations that they might so easily have become. To alert my friend to the seriousness of her situation, I related some frightening statistics accumulated in the spring of 2004 by the Massachusetts Coalition for Kids in Danger. The Coalition’s purpose was to track media coverage of children who set fires or set off bombs. In the first 201 days of the project, children burned over 57 vehicles, set fires that destroyed over 48,594 acres of forest, set 218 houses on fire, and destroyed 228 apartments, 30 businesses, and 13 churches. Additionally, they killed 80 people (26 of whom were children who perished in fires that they, themselves, had set) and injured 346 people, including 63 firefighters, police officers, and bomb technicians. Relative to institutions of learning, in its first 7 months of information gathering, the study found that 301 or 31% of the 901 fires set by children had targeted schools. These statistics, however, reflect only fires that were reported in the media. If we could add in fires like those described to me by Sarah Nelson— ones left unreported because principals do not want their schools to look bad—the statistics would become ominous indeed. My involvement with juvenile fire-setters began when a polygraph expert contacted my late husband and me. He had been hired by a drug rehabilitation facility that I will

call Kid City (my version of Boys Town) to determine which of the young people on the premises was responsible for setting a series of fires. Because there were hundreds of suspects and the polygraphist could not possibly test them all, he suggested that Kid City hire us. Our company, Charles G. King Associates, investigates the origin and cause of fires (origin: where a fire started; cause: what or who initiated the blaze). At that time, most of the high schoolaged children in Kid City had either been remanded there by the courts or had been placed there by family members or guardians for drug rehabilitation. The greatest percentage of those in the facility were criminals, and some were hardened criminals. All were underage. Their ages were relevant because Kid City was mandated by law to maintain the absolute confidentiality of their juvenile population. This meant that, although the local fire department could be called in to fight a fire, after extinguishment, they were required to leave. Nor would a city, county, or state fire marshal be permitted to enter the building to analyze the fire scene, search for hidden stashes of matches, or interview the residents. This left Kid City in a terrible bind because at least one of their residents had set a series of fires, but, unlike the public school system situation related to me by Sarah Nelson, Kid City was completely committed to the continued safety of the young people in its charge. This is why they brought us in to investigate the fires. First, Charlie and I were asked to sign documents protecting the confidentiality of the residents (all of the names and places in this article have been changed); then we were briefed. Kid City was located about 2 hours north of a big eastern city. The four-story structure was slightly larger than a county hospital, and it was surrounded by acres of beautiful farmland where residents were encouraged

to grow crops and take nature walks. Other than some pleasant administrative offices on the ground floor and an elegant wood-paneled religious sanctuary, the building itself was institutional and utilitarian: cinderblock classrooms, cinderblock dormitory, communal dining rooms, and so on. During our briefing by the director of Kid City, we were told that over the past seven months, three fires had occurred: 1. February 28 –Someone had taken a bunch of papers, piled them in a bin in the basement of Kid City, and ignited them. The fire was set at 8:20 a.m. 2. July 13 –Someone had shoved a wad of toilet paper between the arm and cushion of a sofa and set it on fire. This fire had not occurred at Kid City proper, but at its induction facility over 50 miles south. The fire had been discovered a little after midnight. 3. August 14 – This fire was set between two mattresses stored in the cinderblock closet of an empty room on the fourth floor of Kid City where the kids used to “coop,” or hang out. The fire occurred at 6:57 p.m. We were called in after the third fire. Initially, the task of discovering who had set these fires was daunting, in no small part because our pool of suspects was upward of 150 residents. We then had to multiply this pool by three (once for each fire). In order to cut the list down to a manageable size, we asked the administrators to go through their files and give us only the names of those residents who had been at Kid City for at least the last two and optimally for all three of the fires. This reduced our pool to a little over one hundred suspects. To whittle the list down further, we drafted an affidavit and had copies distributed to the 100 plus residents on the list, as well as to all of the counselors, teachers, and administrators in Kid City. Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 67

The affidavit asked the individual to write his or her name and to answer four questions about each of the three fires. The questions were carefully worded to make the respondents feel that they were only reporting their observations, and not being tattletales or informants. It was not their job to identify the fire setter, it was ours. The four questions were 1. Where were you at the time of the fire? 2. What were you doing? 3. Who did you see? 4. Who saw you? After the forms had been filled out, they were returned to us. Once we had a chance to look them over, we realized, somewhat to our surprise, that not only had the residents been willing to answer our questions, they had done so eagerly. We also noticed that fear of injury or death superseded peer group loyalty. The teenagers in the facility had a firm grasp of how dangerous a fire could be. Most of the students had been in residence only for the fires that had occurred in Kid City and made no mention of the fire at the induction facility. Many gave detailed observations that specified locations, recalled times, and named names. What follows is a sampling of typical responses: Richard C. During the first fire I was with my clan leader Evelyn V. talking about my problems. Then I went to seminar at 1:00 o’clock. During the second fire I was in the rec room relating with Margaret C. Rene D., Dave H., Todd M., Marty E., and Jerome L. Ken B. First Fire – I was eating lunch until approx. 12:45. Then I went down to the auditori68 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

um for seminar. I do not remember who I was with at the time. Evelyn V. was going to give the seminar. I was reading until the fire began. At approx. 1:05 the alarm went off and I went outside. Second Fire – I was in the recreation room, listening to music with Donald A., Joe Z., Joe B., and one other person. At approx. 9:30 I went upstairs to my room, and was still there when the alarm went off. When I was leaving the floor during the alarm, Bill D., saw me on the floor. From these responses, we extrapolated where people were, when they were there, what they were doing, whom they saw, and who saw them. Then we tediously cross-referenced times, places, and residents. If Donna wrote that she had seen Thomas, Iris, and Edwin in the basement, we wanted to know if Thomas, Iris, and Edwin had also seen Donna. Our ultimate goal was to identify who had been in the area of the various fire scenes at the times of the fire and who had not. The work was time-consuming and required meticulous attention to detail, but it produced results. Once we had completed and studied our charts, we were able to eliminate all but four suspects: Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, Tyrell Washington, and Randy Scarp. Chris Ramiriz • Chris Ramirez had been seen on the fourth floor immediately before the fire. • When the alarm went off, he was overheard saying that there were mattresses in room 411 that would be easy to set on fire. • He was seen smoking a cigarette on the fourth floor immediately prior to the fire. • He had set two fires before he was 6

years old. One in his grandfather’s garbage and one in his father’s grocery store. Coincidentally, the pizza store next door to his father’s grocery store had also burned down. Fred Pozniak • Fred Pozniak was seen on the fourth floor shortly before the fire. • He was moody, quiet, and used to hang out on the mattresses in the “fire room.” • He was a bed wetter and claimed to have been an abused child. • He was a loner and was picked on and teased for being unattractive. • He was very grim and depressed on the day of the fire. Tyrell Washington • Tyrell Washington had told two other boys at Kid City that he had a prior arrest for arson that was not in his records. • He was present for all three fires. • He had a hostile attitude and was overheard threatening to blow up the building. Randy Scarp • Randy Scarp wanted to leave Kid City and hated the place. • He was reported to have a sadistic streak and laughed when other people were in pain. • He seemed to have no control over his emotions. • He was heard stating that “people are going to start dropping” at Kid City. • Many of the other residents thought that he was not really a drug addict, but that he was crazy. Once our list had become manageable, we moved to the next phase of our investigation. This was to interview each sus-

pect individually and ask him what he had seen, when and where he had seen it, and who he thought had set the fires. Our interview strategy was low-key. Each youngster would be brought into a private room, asked questions, and invited to respond at length. None of the interviews were tape-recorded. Nobody from the staff was present. Charlie and I took turns asking questions, and I took all the notes. After we had finished our interviews, we created four final charts, one for each suspect. Each consisted of three columns. The first column was headed “Witness” and listed the names of the residents who had seen one of the four main suspects at the time of a fire. The Second column was headed “What clears him” and delineated what the witness had seen that seemed to exculpate the suspect. The third column, headed “What makes him look suspicious,” did the same for what made him look guilty. The following might be a typical entry for Tyrell Washington: • Witness—Bill Hix • What clears him— Bill saw Tyrell in the courtyard after dinner. • What makes him look suspicious— Tyrell was present for all three fires and is known to have a hostile attitude. He told Bill and at least two other kids that he had been arrested for arson prior to coming to Kid City. Bill also overheard Tyrell threatening to blow up a building. Our analysis of the entries on these four charts made it evident that only Randy Scarp had been sighted by multiple witnesses in the areas of all three fires. The “conclusion” column on his chart read: Randy Scarp is the only suspect who was confirmed to be on the fourth floor at the time of the fire and who admits to being there. He denies setting the fire, but cannot explain why

he did not see who did, because he was in the hall at the time the fire was set. There is also a problem with his disposal of a cigarette he was smoking at the time, as he said that he tossed it out a window, but that window is covered with a screen. At the interview, he presented himself as compassionate and good-natured. He said he did not resent being accused of setting the fire, that he was not angry, and that he had not been out to get anybody lately. The most suspicious thing about Randy, other than his proximity to both fires, is the benign way in which he presented himself. This benevolence is in complete contrast to the way others describe him. Also, unlike the others who were interviewed, at the end of his interview, we felt that Randy gave an audible sigh of relief that it was over. After we had finished our interviews, our charts, and our analyses, we told the Kid City director that we had eliminated three of our four prime suspects and that we believed Randy Scarp, alone, had set all three fires. He responded that they were going to polygraph all four boys. Subsequently, the polygraphist told us that Randy Scarp was, and I quote from my notes, “heavy duty guilty.” Nevertheless, all four boys were kicked out. Charlie and I may have cleared Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, and Tyrell Washington of involvement in those specific incendiary incidents, but Kid City was not going to take any chances. Fire is too dangerous, and too many lives were at stake. They knew, as we do, that children who set fires are a fact of reality, an unfortunate fact brought home to me when my friend, Sarah Nelson, contacted me again—this time on a cell phone from her classroom. After a minute or two, I had calmed her down enough to learn that two more fires had been set that morning in her school. As before, school officials had

themselves extinguished the fires and had not contacted the fire department. Unlike the administrators at Kid City, they had not learned the most important lesson about fire, one I believe should be engraved in giant letters for all to see: THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A SMALL FIRE. THERE ARE ONLY FIRES THAT HAVE NOT GOTTEN BIG— YET. Shelly Reuben King is the author of Tabula Rasa, Origin & Cause, Spent Matches, the Edgar-nominated Julian Solo, and Weeping. She is a licensed private detective and a certified fire investigator who has been investigating fires and arson for more than 20 years. King is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1996.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 69

The Certified Testify The American College of Forensic Examiners (ACFEI’s) 2007 Certification Conference held in Dallas, Texas, on June 1–2 was a tremendous success. Attendees praised the classes and instructors and enjoyed the additional opportunity to meet and network with other members. Here is what just a few of the 2007 Certification Conference attendees are saying about the conference: Certified Forensic Nurse, CFNTM “The field of forensics is ever changing. I found the information covered in this conference to be an excellent representation of the most up-to-date material, not only in SANE, but also in general forensic knowledge. Instructor Jamie Ferrell has been at the forefront in forensic nursing. I enjoyed this conference and would recommend it to any of my SANE team.” - Donna Doyle, BSN, RN, BC, SANE-A, CA/CP SANE, CFN “The 2007 Certification Conference in Dallas was a wonderful experience. My job involves abuse and wrongful death investigations, and by attending the conference, I gained knowledge about a much larger scope of forensic nursing. I was unaware of how many careers and avenues of practice there were under the umbrella of forensic nursing. I now have a wider knowledge base in my chosen career. I also networked with members from other states and learned what they were doing in comparison to what I do in my area. It was great!” - Lydia Fellner, RN CFN Certified Medical Investigator®, CMI “What truly impressed me was how Instructor Dr. Michael Karagiozis and the ACFEI staff members repeatedly went out of their way to make sure each attendee felt ready to take the certification exam. Dr. Karagiozis was extremely knowledgeable regarding the material and made every attempt possible to assure that each attendee understood the materials. He continually asked for feedback and responded in a genuinely caring manner. The case scenarios used for teaching purposes were fantastic. There were attendees from several fields of law enforcement, and I learned so much just 70 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

having an opportunity to mingle. I would encourage anyone thinking of taking the certification exam to attend a future conference. ACFEI staff members are great to work with!” - Jeannie Autry, BS, RN, LNCC, CMI-I “ACFEI certification conferences are of the highest standards and professional quality. Sitting for my third ACFEI certification exam was again a positive and educational experience. Dr. Karagiozis and Dr. Sgaglio, with their infinite knowledge and expertise, are dynamic speakers and educators!” - Angela Pons-Sepsis, BSN, RN, SANE-A, CFN, CMI-III Certified Forensic Consultant, CFC “The 2007 certification conference was one of the most practical and content-packed conferences I have ever attended! Dr. Mark Rabinoff brings experience, depth, humor, and heart to the CFC educational experience. The CFC course was right on the mark in preparing me not only for the exam, but to deliver expert testimony effectively.” - Darrell Barr, CFC ®

“I have over 19 years of federal law enforcement experience, and I have consulted and testified in many cases; however, I was surprised to discover through the Certified Forensic Consultant course that what I knew as a testifier of fact is worlds apart from consulting and testifying as an expert witness, which is what this course was all about. I was also impressed with the fact that there was a challenging 90-question test that had to be passed in order to get the certification; in other words, this is not a vanity credential that given to just anyone who shows up. Keep up the good work ACFEI!” - Gregory M. Vecchi, PhD, DABECI, DABLEE, CFC, CHS-V Certified Forensic Accountant, Cr.FA® “The conference was efficiently run by helpful and patient staff members. I was especially impressed by Instructor Bradley Sargent, as his knowledge, exceptional presentation skills, good humor, and stamina kept the class entertained and painlessly focused on

the subject matter. Sharing a classroom with 30 or so other CPAs of such varied experience and expertise was a bonus. In 20-plus years of accounting, this was definitely my best CPE experience. I’m looking forward to future conferences. Thank you.” - Linda Thaler, CPA “The Cr.FA course provided me with the information about forensic accounting for which I was looking. Instructor Bradley Sargent was a subject-matter expert and understood how to effectively present material to students.” - J. Dan Lavergne, CPA Many members were also able to meet and talk with Dr. Robert O’Block, founder of ACFEI, who was also extremely pleased with the conference: “The success of the Dallas Certification Conference was unparalleled and can only be surpassed by next year’s certification conference in San Diego. Both ACFEI staff and course instructors are constantly striving to enhance these exceptional certification courses every year, and they never cease to amaze me. I was thrilled to be able to sit in on all four of the courses and be a part of the invaluable learning experiences offered. I can say without a doubt that our instructors are the top authorities in the field and are teaching courses that are truly unrivaled.” - Robert O’Block, PhD, DMin, PsyD, MDiv ACFEI is continually working to better accommodate the needs of members who want to participate in future conferences. The 2008 Certification Conference and the 2008 National Conference will be held back-toback in beautiful San Diego, California. The Certification Conference will be September 3–4, and the National Conference will be September 5–6. Members can make one trip and attend both conferences! New certifications will be coming in the future! Look for more information about new certifications in future issues of The Forensic Examiner, at www.acfei.com, or in your inbox.

By Greg Cooper, MPA, FBI (retired), Chief of Poice (retired)

here are literally thousands of separate and independent federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Although each of the agencies share common goals in their distinct jurisdictions of “keeping the peace,” “protecting the public,” and “maintaining law and order,” they do not generally share common databases or records management systems. Amazingly, each agency maintains separate and independent systems aligned with their own geographical or legal jurisdiction. This condition exists in spite of their common goals and the common sense of sharing and maintaining inter-dependent systems that could otherwise effectively facilitate coordination and cooperation between agencies. Inter-dependent systems would also improve relations and the mutual best interest of both law enforcement and the public at large. Some authorities list several reasons for preserving the status quo. Their arguments are understandable and justifiable under certain circumstances; however, they do not pass muster when measuried up against the benefits derived from merging their collective efforts or the expectation of the public. The primary prohibitive factors against combining criminal and information management systems between agencies are issues of privacy and finance. There are other obstacles that must be overcome as well, including organizational politics, pride, and ego. Unfortunately, the legitimate objections are often presented as a blanket excuse when, in some cases, the root or heart of the matter 72 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

lies in the personality of the organization, either in its leadership or historical policies. Regardless, most public safety executives concede that sharing and coordinating information is the “best-case scenario” and publicly support the concept while bemoaning the realities of financial restrictions and potential legalities. Recognizing the valid rationale for either resisting, delaying, or preventing attempts to merge separate data and independent systems, authorities have incorporated creative and resourceful alternative approaches. In support of law enforcement’s efforts to overcome such obstacles, specialized autonomous databases have been created. These databases are separate from the individual agencies, allowing access to outside agency information while still protecting privacy restrictions and reducing financial considerations. Several databases have been created, monitored, and administered by official federal, state, and even private institutions. Legitimate law enforcement entities are allowed full access through compliance with strict standards, rules, and guidelines. The existing databases are examples of excellent resources made available to law enforcement agencies in their collective efforts to share, coordinate, and cooperate while supporting each other in identifying, investigating, and apprehending offenders. A representation of various databases and informational resources are summarized in chapters 5 and 10 of a book I authored with Mike King, Cold Case Methodology (Law Tech Custom Publishing, 2005). Among the resources listed and described in that work is

the FBI’s Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP). It is the only national database that exists for the purpose of assisting law enforcement agencies in determining if cases from separate jurisdictions may have been committed by the same offender.

Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP) In 1985, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced the birth of VICAP. The purpose of VICAP is to provide a national clearinghouse for law enforcement agencies to coordinate information on missing persons, unidentified bodies, and homicides. Participation in the program is voluntary and is available to all law enforcement agencies in the country. It was determined that a significant number of cases bearing common characteristics could be identified by collating these categories together. In 1997, I was promoted to the VICAP National Program Manager. As a criminal profiler, I re-engineered the program to work more closely and in alignment with the Criminal Investigative Analysis Program (FBI’s Criminal Profilers). Additionally, the stated mission and focus of the program was streamlined to “facilitate cooperation, communication, and coordination between law enforcement agencies in their efforts to investigate, identify, track, apprehend, and prosecute violent serial offenders.” VICAP is a nationwide data information center designed to collect, collate, and analyze crimes of violence, specifically murder. Cases examined by VICAP include

• solved or unsolved homicides or attempts, especially those that involve an abduction; are apparently random, motiveless, or sexually oriented; or are known or suspected to be part of a series; • missing persons, where the circumstances indicate a strong possibility of foul play and the victim is still missing; • unidentified dead bodies where the manner of death is known or suspected to be homicide; • abductions of children or attempts; • solved or unsolved sexual assaults or attempts. Currently, VICAP is working toward implementing a sexual assault component for the VICAP tracking system. For VICAP to work effectively, it needs an invitation from local law enforcement to participate in an investigation. The FBI provides, free of charge, the software to set up the VICAP database. Cases with an arrested individual or identified offender can be submitted to the VICAP system by local law enforcement investigators for comparison and possible matching with unsolved cases. Once the case is entered into the database, it is compared continually against all other entries on the basis of certain aspects of the case. The purpose of this is to detect signature aspects of a crime and similar patterns of modus operandi (MO), which will, in turn, allow VICAP personnel to pinpoint those crimes that may have been committed by the same offender in other areas of the country. If patterns are found, the VICAP coordinators will then work with all of the law enforcement agencies involved to solve the crime. When a pattern of criminal activity is discovered; (for example, a serial murder suspect has been identified), VICAP can then assist law enforcement agencies by coordinating a multi-agency investigative conference. These conferences can be very beneficial, especially if it has been determined that the suspects have traveled throughout the country. A pivotal product of prior conferences has been the coordination of activities such as search warrants, interview matters, and laboratory testing. The VICAP database is effective in solving crimes from the past to the present. Current cases may be entered as well as cases as far back as the 1950s; or any case that law enforcement thinks VICAP can assist in may be offered (Cold Case Methodology).

Current VICAP Services The Second Edition of the FBI’s Crime Classification Manual (Jossey-Bass, 2006), of which I was a contributing author, reports that VICAPs services provided to local law enforcement include the following: • Analytical support for cold case investigation, to include homicide and sexual assault matters that may potentially involve transient or serial offenders • Mapping, trend analysis, training, and case coordination support and analysis • A full range of analytical services for all member agencies on submitted cases, as well as limited analysis for nonmember agencies which submit criteria cases • Written products prepared and disseminated in the Criminal Intelligence Assessment Report (CIAR) format • Offender timelines, matrices, and mapping products • NCIC interface for off-line searches of suspects or vehicles • National Law Enforcement Telecommunication Systems (NLETS) searches of messages dating back to 1986 • National crime analyst training inservices to include crime analysis, behavioral analysis, and case management • VICAP Alerts published in the FBI’s Law Enforcement Bulletin and other publications (VICAP Alerts feature crime information notices of general interest to law enforcement) Revised Form In the early-to-mid 1990s during my tenure as the National Program Manager, the VICAP crime analysts began a detailed examination of the submission report. Their efforts resulted in a reduction of the questions from 190 to only 95. The current format is in an “intelligent layout and design and it looks less imposing and more like an attractive, easy-touse reporting instrument.” It has always been my opinion that the VICAP form also serves as an excellent reference guide while conducting a thorough and well thought-out investigation of homicide, missing persons, unidentified bodies, and sexual assaults. If the questions posed by the VICAP form are completed, it can be presumed that the investigation is complete and thorough.

In conclusion, it is critical that American law enforcement agencies foster a stronger will toward a more interdependent network of their respective resources in order to optimize a strong and safe society. This is particularly applicable in resolving difficult cases. Individual agencies, regardless of their size, that work exclusively and independently, will never have sufficient resources alone to complete their mission. However, those agencies that apply the three-pronged approach of cooperating, communicating, and coordinating their efforts and resources will reap an abundance of success while being extolled by the citizens that they have taken an oath to protect and serve. In the next issue of The Forensic Examiner, I will provide an example that demonstrates the type and nature of cases for which VICAP’s services can provide critical assistance and support: the case of Robert Ben Rhoades. Greg Cooper, MPA, FBI (retired), Chief of Police (retired), started his law enforcement career as a police officer in Provo Utah in 1977. He began his criminal profiling career in 1986 with the FBI, Seattle Division. Just a couple of years later, he was soon promoted to field coordinator for the Criminal Profiling Unit at the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA, and then in Los Angeles, CA. In 1990 he was again promoted to profiler with the Quantico unit, where he was also able to teach several classes at the FBI’s prestigious National Academy and supervise VICAP. In 1995, Cooper left the FBI to serve as the chief of police in Provo, Utah. Currently, Cooper enjoys instructing psychological profiling and anatomy of homicide courses and serving as an expert witness in the legal arena. He is a coauthor of the Crime Classification Manual and, the recently released, Predators: Who Are They and How to Avoid Them. Do not miss Greg Cooper’s criminal profiling workshop at the 2007 ACFEI National Conference in Kansas City, Missouri. He will be speaking from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 6, and attendance at his workshop is free with conference registration! For more information about the National Conference, see pages 42–48.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 73

By Charlyn Ingwerson, Assistant Editor

Cracked Cold Case: The Justice Department’s 2007 Conviction of the 1964 Murders of Charles Eddie Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee

agical thinking is a component of folklore, certainly of Southern folklore, and the most pervasive of magical notions is that a secret can be kept. In spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the persistence of this belief is evidenced in retrospect by the behavior of those in white hoods who imagined that their identities were secret, that disappearances would go unquestioned, and that real events do not leave a trail. On May 2, 1964, two 19-year-old black men disappeared from Meadville, Mississippi. A month later, three civil rights workers also disappeared in Mississippi; but this disappearance was actually investigated (Godoy and Lohr, 2007). Federal agents who came down to Mississippi to look for the three missing civil rights workers found what remained of the bodies of Charles Eddie Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee, the two black men who had disappeared. They arrested two white men for their murders: James Ford Seale, 29, and Charles Marcus Edwards, 31. 74 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Edwards admitted to the FBI that he and Seale picked up Moore and Dee, took them to the forest, and beat them; however, he says the two were alive when he and Seale left. Edwards later denied his statements (Godoy and Lohr, 2007). The FBI questioned Seale, claiming knowledge of his guilt. Seale, without denying his responsibility, told the agents they would have to prove he was to blame for the deaths (Lohr). It took 43 years, but on June 14, 2007, a federal jury in Jackson convicted Seale of kidnapping and conspiracy in connection with a murder. He now faces life in prison at the age of 71.

Seale, who pleaded not guilty to the charges, still is not talking, but at long last, other people are. Here is the story, as it has been patched together, of that sad day: The two young hitchhiking victims had stopped for ice cream at a roadside stand on a hot May afternoon in rural Mississippi (Bates, 2007). Federal prosecutors charge that Seale stopped to pick up the two men (Lohr, 2007); Jerry Mitchell of The ClarionLedger says the Klan suspected gunrunning in the county [Franklin County, MS] and thought Moore and Dee might know something about it (Inskeep, 2007). FBI documents indicate that Klansmen picked up the men in Meadville and took them into the Homochitto National Forest, where they were brutally beaten, taken across the state line to Louisiana in the trunk of a car, tied to an engine block, and dumped in the Mississippi River so that they would drown (Lohr, 2007; “Recent Discoveries,” 2007). Mitchell spoke with Seale in 2000, and Seale denied having been a member of the Klan or knowing anyone in the Klan. However, Seale’s brother had been a confirmed member of the Klan, and his dad was widely assumed to be a member as well (Inskeep, 2007). On July 12, 1964, the lower half of a black man’s body was discovered near Tallulah, Louisiana, and the body of another black man was found the next day. The remains were later identified as Moore and Dee (Godoy and Lohr, 2007). The following November, the FBI arrested Seale and Edwards for the murders, but Goodwyn writes that the agency was “consumed with the case of the three civil-rights workers,” (2007). So, the case was turned over to local authorities for prosecution, and they dropped all charges. How is it that 43 years later, this case was brought to trial? According to Mitchell, in 2000 federal authorities reopened another Klan case from 1966 that took place on federal property in Mississippi—the Homochitto National Forest (Inskeep, 2007). With the forest name sounding familiar, Mitchell and The Clarion-Ledger picked up the investigation of the cold case murders of Dee and Moore and discovered FBI documents revealing that the beatings occurred in the Homochitto National Forest, which made the case subject to federal jurisdiction (Godoy and Lohr, 2007). Though

the newspaper’s investigation certainly contributed to the Justice Department’s reopening of the case, Mitchell says Thomas Moore, the brother of Charles Moore, traveled to Mississippi with Canadian documentary filmmaker David Ridgen and contacted the U.S. Attorney in 2005. Acquaintances of Seale assisted Mitchell as he searched for the suspect (Inskeep, 2007). During his 2000 interview, Mitchell asked Seale if he was concerned about federal agents reinvestigating the case. Seale’s reply was, “they don’t have any more than you’ve got—and that’s nothing” (Lohr, 2007). But maybe he was a little worried; in 2002, Seale’s son, James Jr., told The Los Angeles Times that his father was dead. But when Thomas Moore discovered that Seale was alive and residing in Roxie, Mississippi, he asked authorities to reinvestigate the case (Godoy and Lohr, 2007). Thomas Moore reported to NPR that although his family spent years digging for details and facts about the murders, “we didn’t have money to solicit help from attorneys, so the old saying is, we just had to eat it up” (Lohr, 2007). Fortunately for the Moore family, justice has finally been served. Lohr (2007) cites other recently reopened civil rights cases that have resulted in the convictions of former Klansmen: • Byron De La Beckwith for the assassination of Medgar Evers • Edgar Ray Killen for his role in ordering the murders of the three civil rights workers in the Mississippi Burning Case • Tommy Blanton and Bobby Frank Cherry for the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham Witnessing Seale’s trial enabled Lohr to understand the difficulties in bringing such long-standing cold cases to trial: one retired FBI agent struggled to recall the investigation, constantly consulting his decades-old notes, and a former game warden could barely hear (2007). Dr. Michael Baden, chief forensic pathologist for the NY State Police; Mark Vukelich, chief of the FBI’s Civil Rights Unit; and Mark Kappelhoff, chief of the Criminal section of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, joined in an audio round table discussion on NPR, January 29, 2007, that addressed the question of how authorities solve a 40-year-old crime. Baden was called in by

the prosecutor who reopened the cold civil rights case of voting rights activist Medgar Evers, who was 33 years old the day he was shot in the back. Three decades after the murder, Baden conducted an autopsy that resulted in the reconstruction of the gunshot wound: trajectory, entrance, and exit of the bullet. Further, he was able to extract fragments of the bullet, which, in the absence of the rifle as evidence, were helpful in establishing the prosecution’s case. Baden notes that the exhumed body was in excellent condition and that this had a profound effect upon the jury: the case became real and relevant to them—this was no abstract historical death. Though evidence in cold cases can be difficult to assemble, Baden says that often people who did not know the case was still open or did not realize that what they knew was important come forward. They speak up when they hear about a case and realize they were witnesses. Kappelhoff observes that old evidence often goes missing or records are not kept but says that time can be a benefit, as well. Twenty-five years after the murder of Medgar Evers, the governor’s papers were made available to the public and it was discovered that the governor’s office had been guilty of jury tampering in the case. Unbeknownst to the prosecutor who was trying to do his job and who had arrested one of the heads of the local KKK for the murder, the governor was tipping off the defense so they could stack the jury with people sympathetic to the Klan. Not surprisingly, the case resulted in a hung jury— twice. (“Recent Discoveries,” 2007). Mark Vukelich asserts that solving cold cases is a high priority for the FBI (“Recent Discoveries,” 2007). He agrees that there is immense value in creating new witness lists and in the meticulous re-gathering of every shred of evidence in a cold case. Often, an investigator will run across people who were never initially interviewed or who, for one reason or another, had been afraid to talk. Though a skeptic may conclude that a preponderance of evidence must not exist or a conviction would have occurred years ago, Vukelich says that changes in attitudes have made a big difference in the evaluation of evidence. Time and social change have helped people overcome barriers like fear of law enforcement and fear of retaliation. Overcoming those stereotypes and

barriers and getting the courage to stand up and say what really happened outweigh the other difficulties of cold case prosecution (“Recent Discoveries,” 2007). Vukelich is right, it is important to close the loop. It is a matter of our collective ethical identity to right wrongs, no matter how long it takes to do so, no matter how cold the case. There is a sense of shared relief when justice is finally done and we all affirm to ourselves and to our neighbors that there is neither secret vice nor secret virtue and that one story always leads to another.

References Bates, K. G. (2007, January 25). On the trail of a civil rights-era cold case. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 13, 2007, from www.npr. org/tempates/story/story.php?storyld=7017780. Godoy, M., & Lohr, K. (2007, June 14). Timeline: The decades-old case against James Ford Seale. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 15, 2007, from www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyld=11097952. Goodwyn, Wade. (2007, January 25). Former deputy charged in civil-rights murders. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 13, 2007, from www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyld=7022278. Inskeep, S. (2007, January 25). Kidnap charges set in 1964 race killings. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 13, 2007, from www.npr. org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=7017780. Lohr, K. (2007, June 5). Seale civil rights murder trial begins, 43 years on. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 13, 2007, from www.npr. org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10741271. “Recent discoveries put spotlight on cold cases.” (2007, January 29). National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 13, 2007, from www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=7064845.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 75

CE TEST PAGE: SIX TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 6 CE TESTS)

In order to receive one CE credit, each participant is required to 1. Read the continuing education article. 2. Complete the exam by circling the chosen answer for each question. Complete the evaluation form. 3. Mail or fax the completed form, along with the $15.00 payment for each CE exam taken to: ACFEI, 2750 East Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. O Fax to: 417-881-4702

For each exam passed with a grade of 70% or above, a certificate of completion for 1.0 continuing education credit will be mailed. The participants that do not pass the exam are notified as such and will have a second opportunity to complete the exam. Any questions, grievances or comments can be directed to the CE Department at telephone (417) 881-3818, fax (417) 881-4702, or email: cedept@acfei.com. Continuing education credits for participation in this activity may not apply toward license renewal in all states. It is the responsibility of each participant to verify the requirements of his/her state licensing board(s).

ARTIcLE 1 (PAGE 07) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

ARTICLE 2 (PAGE 16) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Detecting Deception in Neuropsychological Cases:

Prevention of Traumatic Stress in Law Enforcement PersonNel

Toward an Applied Model

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Explain the role of peer support officers 2. Distinguish between the functions of peer support officers and professional mental health specialists 3. Discuss critical incident stress management 4. Identify and explain the different phases of critical incident stress debriefing

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Discuss the difficulties involved with assesssing neuropsychological malingering. 2. Explain the three dimensions in a model of deception. 3. Apply the model to clinical-forensic situations.

1. Deception analysis is not useful in which of the following contexts: a. Criminal b. Civil c. Clinical and forensic d. Rapport building with forensic clients

1. Peer support officers are a. Active duty or retired law enforcement officers. b. Licensed professionals specializing in law enforcement. c. Allowed legal confidentiality with their clients. d. Always assigned to employee assistance plans.

2. A malingerer is most likely to a. Fake the most extreme deficits possible for maximum compensation. b. Perform at better than actual ability. c. Perform at chance. d. Fake a milder deficit as opposed to an extreme one because the faking will be easier to maintain.

2. The term Image Armor refers to a. The officer’s ego. b. Thinking about how to conduct oneself when answering a call. c. Maintaining the idea that an officer is superhuman and not affected by regular human emotions. d. Making sure that a bullet proof vest is worn under the patrol uniform.

3. Which of the following is not true about the MMPI-2? a. The MMPI-2 has scales that are designed to detect response bias. b. The MMPI-2 has good utility with neurological populations. c. The MMPI-2 can be relied upon to detect malingered head injury. d. The MMPI-2 provides information about non-cognitive functioning such as behavioral and emotional information.

3. Studies show that peer support officers a. Are mainly officers of rank. b. Have virtually no knowledge of mental health training and procedures. c. Are assigned to specialized units. d. Frequently achieve outcomes equal to or better than those obtained by professionals.

4. Which of the following tests employ easy and difficult versions of similar tests? a. The Dot Counting Test (DCT) and the Auditory Discrimination Test (ADT) b. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) c. The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) d. The Shipley-Hartford and Raven’s Progressive Matrices

4. Critical incident stress management was developed to a. Keep officers from feeling unappreciated. b. Help civilians overcome man-made and natural disasters. c. Encompass pre-incident training to post-incident response. d. Determine the individuals who have debilitating, job-related stress.

5. In assessing neuropsychological malingering, which of the following is not a valid consideration? a. The evaluator should be sure to employ multiple measures of distortion. b. Clients may be malingering, but they may also actually suffer from brain damage. c. The accurate evaluation of neuropsychological malingering necessitates a multidimensional view. d. The arrangement with the referring attorney may not be in writing.

5. The original stages of a critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) are a. Introduction, Fact, Thought, Reaction, Symptoms, Teaching, and Re-Entry. b. Introduction, Fact, Thought, Method, Results, Questions, and Conclusion. c. Introduction, Thought, Fact, Reaction, Symptoms, Re-Entry, and Teaching. d. Introduction, Thought, Fact, Reaction, Teaching, Symptoms, and Re-Entry.

6. The link between empirical research and an examiner’s methods of deception analysis is characterized by the following: a. No link need be established as applied methods over time may be highly consistent for individual examiners. b. Empirical research should provide the foundation for virtually all applied methods. c. Empirical research is overrated; clinical judgment will suffice and, therefore, there is little reason to use the research literature in deception analysis. d. The link with applied methods can be demonstrated in other ways such as later writing a book or article about one’s deception methodology.

6. Critical incident stress management teams a. Administer stress tests to law enforcement officers. b. Mitigate the impact of a traumatic event and to accelerate the recovery of personnel from traumatic stress reactions. c. Reduce traumatic stress by normalizing feelings and helping restore coping skills. d. Help law enforcement personnel return to active duty.

Article 1 Evaluation: (1-3 rating section) Circle one (1=Poor 2=Satisfactory 3= Excellent) 1. The author presented material clearly. 1 2 3 2. Learning objective 1 was met. 1 2 3 3. Learning objective 2 was met. 1 2 3 4. Learning objective 3 was met. 1 2 3

5. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 6. Comments:

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5. Learning objective 4 was met. 1 2 3 6. New knowledge or technique was gained. 1 2 3 7. Comments:

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CE TEST PAGE: SIX TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 6 CE TESTS)

ARTIcLE 3 (PAGE 20) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

ARTICLE 4 (PAGE 28) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

EyeWitness memory in context

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Explain the reconfiguration of memory in terms of gist, brevity, and personal belief and the ramifications of these aspects for eyewitness identification. 2. Discuss the influence of scene complexity, witness gender, perpetrator gender, and weapon on eyewitness performance in the systematically-varied research framework employed in this study. 3. Discuss the reliability of eyewitness performance as demonstrated by controlled experiments.

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Identify premises maintenance as a system. 2. Understand the relationship between a premises system component and the maintenance effecting it. 3. Develop an appreciation for a systems approach to evaluation. 4. Implement a methodology of evaluating premises maintenance.

1. Bartlett showed that memory a. Remains static, but is a nearly perfect record of the past. b. Remains static, but may exhibit diminished accuracy. c. Is significantly reconfigured and changed with time. d. May improve with repeated rehearsal.

1. A premises consists of

2. Which of the following is not typical of memory reconfiguration: a. Memories become briefer. b. Memories become less detailed, retaining gist. c. Memories become altered by personal beliefs. d. Memories of peripheral details become sharper with time.

2. A maintenance program consists of a. Janitorial staff with materials and equipment to keep the premises sanitary. b. Maintenance procedures and the supporting activities to keep a component functioning. c. Skilled repairmen monitoring the site components. d. A written manual of maintenance procedures and schedules.

a. A place where people work and do business. b. A building of any use. c. The site on which a building sits and any other supporting lands. d. A building and its site.

3. In a controlled experiment, under idealized circumstances, college-student respondents on average were able to describe weapons and physical characteristics of perpetrators a. Virtually perfectly. b. Less than 25% of the time. c. Less than 70% of the time. d. Virtually never.

3. A purpose of using a flow chart for maintenance system evaluations is a. To narrow the field of pertinent topics and their relationship. b. To direct the engineer to the proper conclusion. c. To provide a foundation for the engineer’s opinions. 4. The purpose of a maintenance system evaluation is a. To classify the system as “Good” or “Inadequate.” b. To determine why a particular component failed. c. To make a case for negligence in civil court.

4. Peripheral sources of hazard were identified and reported a. Effectively at statistical ceiling. b. Effectively at statistical floor. c. About half the time. d. About one quarter of the time. 5. What circumstances of actual crime situations would not be expected to reduce eyewitness performance still further? a. Obscuring of important features by landscape features or vehicles b. Bad or variable lighting c. Very brief exposures d. Excessively long exposures 6. The viewing of a female perpetrator, as opposed to a male a. Improved person description significantly but reduced weapon recognition. b. Diminished person description significantly and reduced weapon recognition. c. Improved both person description and weapon recognition significantly. d. Improved respondents’ abilities to detect peripheral sources of hazard.

5. The flow chart method of system evaluation a. Can be used to determine the cause of an accident. b. Should only be used to evaluate the system under expected operating conditions. c. Is flexible and can be used to evaluate “what if” scenarios. d. Should be used to schedule maintenance activities. 6. True or false: A systems approach to maintenance evaluation is only useful during forensic examination and has no application to ongoing maintenance procedures. a. True b. False 7. True or False: Once an “Inadequate System” rating is reached, theoretically, there is no need for further evaluation. a. True b. False

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Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 77

CE TEST PAGE: SIX TOTAL CREDITS AVAILABLE (WITH THE COMPLETION OF ALL 6 CE TESTS) In order to receive one CE credit, each participant is required to 1. Read the continuing education article. 2. Complete the exam by circling the chosen answer for each question. Complete the evaluation form. 3. Mail or fax the completed form, along with the $15.00 payment for each CE exam taken to: ACFEI, 2750 East Sunshine, Springfield, MO 65804. O Fax to: 417-881-4702

ARTIcLE 5 (PAGE 34) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

ARTICLE 6 (PAGE 50) LEARNING OBJECTIVES

Review of Mass Homicides of Intelligentsia As a maker for Genocide

Antidepressant Withdrawal Syndrome and DUI Evaluation

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Identify variables that protected certain people against the genocide of Turkish-Armenians in 1915. 2. Explain cerebrogenocide. 3. Discuss the steps that health professionals can take to prevent future genocide.

After studying this article, particpants should be better able to do the following: 1. Explain the pharmacology of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) and Dual Action Antidepressants (DAA). 2. Identify the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome associated with the SSRI and DDA drug class. 3. Discuss the impact antidepressant withdrawal syndrome may have on a driver undergoing standard sobriety tests.

1. According to the United Nations Resolution 96, genocide is a. A crime with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. b. A crime with intent to destroy a whole nation. c. A solution to poverty around the world.

1. The serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal syndrome occurs because of a. A reduction of serotonergic neuronal transmission. b. A depletion of serotonin transporters. c. An increase in serotonin availability. d. A blockage of serotonin receptors.

2. Which variable did not protect certain individuals from the Turkish-Armenian genocide in 1915? a. Being a physician b. Being a woman c. Being under the age of 17

2. The serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal syndrome a. Is irreversible. b. Occurs in the majority of patients that stop using antidepressants. c. Generally occurs 1–3 days after sudden removal from the antidepressants. d. Only occurs in patients that have been on the medication for more than 1 year.

3. Cerebrogenocide is defined by the authors as a. The mass killings of intelligentsia. b. The removal of brain tissue from victims of genocide. c. The destruction of properties such as libraries and schools.

3. Drugs that might be involved in the withdrawal syndrome include all of the following except: a. Escitalopram (Lexapro). b. Fluoxetine (Prozac). c. Sertraline (Zoloft). d. Tiagabine (Gabatril). 4. True or false: Restarting the medication at the previous dose should resolve symptoms from the antidepressant withdrawal syndrome. a. True b. False

4. Which of the following is not a distinct marker closely associated with cerebrogenocide? a. Its relatively early occurrence during the course of genocide b. A period of violence and destruction lasting more than 5 years c. The victims’ high intellectual social leadership profile 5. What percentage of Turkish-Armenians fell victim to genocide from 1915–1918? a. 25% b. 75% c. 58% 6. What percentage of German government employees of Jewish heritage were fired from their government jobs prior to The Holocaust? a. 14% b. 83% c. 100%

5. Clinical effects reported with the serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal syndrome include all of the following except: a. Loss of balance. b. Chest palpitations. c. Jerking eye movements. d. Electric shock-like sensations. 6. Clinical effects reported with the serotonin reuptake inhibitor withdrawal syndrome might cause failure in all of the following except: a. Walk and turn. b. Horizontal gaze nystagmus. c. One-leg stand. d. Reciting name and address.

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Book Review

Nuclear Detonation In Seven U.S. Cities: A Review of The Day of Islam by Paul L. Williams

Al-Qaeda’s goal, says Williams, is “American Hiroshima:” simultaneous detonation of nuclear devices in seven American cities—New York, Boston, Las Vegas, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington DC (163). The author’s implicit claim is that the inattention of Americans will accommodate this plan. The Day of Islam is not the research of covert intelligence reports or classified intelligence documents; it a collection of news reports. The book draws from the best of the popular press, the accessible reports of various think tanks, as well as several popularly published documentaries on national security and terror. If it is Williams’s intent to demonstrate, then, that it is possible to be informed about the pervasiveness of terrorist activity, specifically al-Qaeda, then he has succeeded. But his sub-point appears to be that Americans do not wish to be informed and that Americans neither take seriously who al-Qaeda is nor what al-Qaeda intends to do. And so he assembles this impossible-to-ignore album of “nightmares.” We believe the author’s thesis, stated explicitly, is that al-Qaeda is capable of perpetrating the destruction it threatens and that it’s leaders are not merely grand standing, which he infers is the American prevailing assumption. “Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri,” he writes, “are devout and earnest Muslims. They mainly speak without guile or duplicity . . . but there remains a pervasive belief that the statements of these men should not be taken seriously; that they are backward Bedouins” (72). We recommend reading the epilogue first for a description of “The Day of Islam,” (defined in the Qu’ran as the return of Jesus to earth with the Prophet), then reading chapter 2 for a brief history of al-Qaeda’s origins, followed by chapter 1, the testimony of an al-Qaeda defector. For believers, The Day of Islam will result in the universal submission of all nations to Islam; the radical view [a la bin Laden] is to force universal submission now.

Williams details the al-Qaeda acquisition of nuclear devices formerly in possession of the KGB and purchased through the Chechens (ch. 3–6). Chapters 7 and 8 detail the nuclearization of Pakistan, an event Williams says has contributed to the nuclear aspirations of Iran, North Korea, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Nigeria, and others (121). Chapters 9 through 11 catalogue the thriving al-Qaeda cells throughout South America, Latin America, and Mexico, linking both the drug trade and illegal immigration to the proliferation of terror. Chapters 12 and 13 discuss al-Qaeda activity in Canada, where Williams says the national attitude is “lax.” But what is problematic for Canada is the British and American dilemma as well: terrorists who are citizens. Clearly, it would be easier if terrorist identification were merely ‘them’ and ‘us.’ The man Williams denotes as “the most dangerous person in the Western world” is, in fact, an American citizen (157). Jose Padilla [who Williams notes, pp. 43, 103, and 161], on trial in Miami at this writing, is an American—a former Chicago gang member who converted to Islam, learned Arabic, and told his teacher “that he hoped it [Islam] would help him straighten out his life” (TempleRaston, 2007). Michael Scheuer writes that “the third most important spokesman among al-Qaeda leaders, following Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri [is] the American Adam Gadahn— now known as Azzam al-Amriki (Azzam the American)” (Scheuer, 2007). Of course, of the millions of American Muslims in the United States, almost all shot fireworks on the 4th, and almost none are moving to Islamberg, New York (chapter 14). In a phone interview, Williams claims that there are now over 72 para-military boot camps similar to the one in Islamburg to train American converts to miltant jihad and 50% of these converts are recruited from the prison system. Williams does more than imply that U.S. intelligence is not paying attention, and while it is worth observing that the collective mess we are in may be attributed to past inattention/hubris, it does not follow that not all collective intelligence agents are bumbling Clouseaus. If Williams is making a case that Americans are not paying attention, this is a case the pop/pulp press will help him make.

References Scheuer, M. (2007, June 5). Al-Qaeda’s American recruit releases something entirely new. Terrorism Focus, 4(17). Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article. php?articleid=2373449. Temple-Raston, D. (2007, June 27). Mosques reflect on Padilla’s Islamic education. National Public Radio (NPR). Retrieved June 27, 2007, from http://npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyld=11443212.

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 79

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Summer 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 81

Falsely Accused On June 20, 1996, Kevin Lee Green left the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald’s courtroom—after 17 years confined in a California prison— finally a free man. On September 30, 1979, Kevin Lee Green went out to get a hamburger, leaving his pregnant wife Dianna at home. When he returned around 20 minutes later, he found his wife had been attacked and beaten. Dianna was left in a coma for 1 month following the attack due to a blow to the middle of her forehead. She was 9 months pregnant with Kevin’s child, and their unborn daughter died in the womb. When Dianna awoke from the coma, she suffered from substantial memory loss and had “considerable brain damage” (Assembly Bill, 1999). Kevin Green told police he left the apartment where the two lived to get a hamburger, and the employee at the hamburger stand testified that Green had been there. Police found that the food Green had in his possession was still warm when they arrived. These statements and evidence, however, did not prevent them from charging Green for the murder of his unborn child and the attempted murder of his wife. On October 2, 1980, an Orange County Superior Court jury convicted Kevin Lee Green of one count of second degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. 82 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

The prosecution’s main witness was Dianna Green herself. In fact, because there was a complete lack of corroborative evidence, the entire case rested on Dianna’s testimony. Although she had lost much of her memory and suffered incredible brain damage, Dianna testified that her husband had struck her in the head that night, serving as the only witness against Kevin Green. Psychiatrist Dr. Martin Brenner found Dianna a reliable witness, enabling her to take the stand. The defense’s request to have an independent psychiatrist evaluate her mental state was denied. While on the stand, Dianna found it difficult to spell her own last name. Never did Kevin Green admit guilt, maintaining his innocence throughout the trial and the years he would spend in jail. He testified that upon his return home from the hamburger stand, he saw a man in a dark van quickly leaving the crime scene, but police did not consider this important enough to investigate. On November 7, 1980, for allegedly attacking his wife and killing his unborn child, a judge sentenced Green to 15 years to life in prison. Although he knew that his chances for parole were higher if he expressed regret for his “crimes,” Green held to his assertion of innocence throughout the entire time he was in prison. His refusal to lie led to his being denied parole four separate times. When Dianna was attacked, Kevin was a corporal in the United States Marine Corps, and he intended to make military service his career, as his father had done. The Marine Corps gave Green a less than honorable discharge, which further penalized him as it prevented him from serving in the military again or from receiving retirement and other military benefits. Vaginal slides taken from Dianna Green after the attack showed the presence of spermatozoa. Kevin Green tried, while in prison, to raise enough money to take a DNA test to prove the evidence left in Dianna did not match his DNA. This would allow the case to be reopened. He was never able to afford the test, and although he had passed at least one polygraph test before the trial, investigators refused to reopen the case. In 1982, an appeal in district court affirmed the conviction, so Green petitioned the State of California Supreme Court for a hearing.

When the DNA offender database was created in California, examiners discovered that the DNA profile in the spermatozoa found in Dianna Green was a match to another felon. Gerald Parker gave a full confession and admitted guilt to five other murders. Parker, also known as the serial killer called the “Bedroom Basher,” was responsible for the attack on Dianna Green and the death of the Greens’ unborn daughter. Kevin Lee Green was granted habeas corpus and immediately released from prison on June 20, 1996, by the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald, Judge of the Superior Court for the County of Orange. The same day, “the Honorable Robert Fitzgerald further found and ordered that Kevin Lee Green was factually innocent of all charges and that all allegations against him relating to the September 30, 1979, attack on Dianna Green were untrue” (Assembly Bill, 1999). Green had spent approximately 17 years in prison for crimes he did not commit. Kevin Lee Green entered prison at age 21, and was exonerated when he was 37. He was unable to attend the funerals of both his grandmothers and his grandfather because he was incarcerated at the times of their deaths. His sister and brother both married while Green was in prison. In October 1999, California Governor Gray Davis awarded Green $620,000 as compensation for his time spent wrongfully imprisoned. Currently, Green lives in Jefferson City, Missouri, and is trying to rebuild his life.

References California State Legislature. (1995, October 5). Assembly Bill No. 110. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://info.sen.ca.gov Innocence Project. (n.d.) Kevin Green. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/162.php Williams, M. (2001, February 22). Following other states’ lead, Missouri lawmakers consider funding post-conviction DNA testing. Retrieved March 21, 2007, from http://www.mdn.org/2001/STORIES/DNA.htm

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