KHI 20-02-2012_Layout 1 2/20/2012 3:16 AM Page 13
Monday, 20 February, 2012
comment 13
the persian-arab divide
Unfettered existence
Murky waters, careful treading
The idealism is dead
PoliTact By Arif Ansar
P
oliTact has been writing consistently on the evolving Persian-Arab tussles, and the theme was also a prominent focus of the forecast for 2012. Meanwhile, the centre of attention of the West has remained fixated on Pakistan’s role in the context of its ties with Afghanistan, India and China. This is turn has also influenced Pakistan’s foreign policy thinking. However, it is increasingly clear that the matters related to the Middle east, more specifically the Iran crisis, will determine the future of not only the Afghan reconciliation but also Pakistan’s relations with other countries. For the most part, western scholars have not tried to understand how the Iran crisis could impact the Afghan reconciliation. The first reference in this regards seems to have been made by the former national security advisor of US and renowned geopolitical strategist, Zbigniew Brzezinski. In a recent talk, he specifically mentioned that if Iran crisis develops into a full-blown conflict, Afghan reconciliation would be seriously dented. PoliTact recently interviewed two other scholars of the region, Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation and Dr Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle east Institute. Lisa affirmed that Afghan reconciliation would be impacted by the Iranian crisis but was not sure about the magnitude; however, Dr Weinbaum backed Brzezinski’s assertion, while also admiring his genius. To make matter worse, Iran also appears to be missing from the fluid Afghan settlement. Most of the discussion in this
regard has focused on Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The missing Iranian component may have been due to the focus of American strategy for the region. The US would ideally like to deal with Afghan reconciliation first, and then to shift focus to Iran. And letting sanctions and efforts towards regime change in Syria pile up the pressure on the Iranians. However, from the Israeli perspective, this approach has not been convincing enough and the country is fast running out of patience. The reality is that the events related to both Iran and Afghan crises have been occurring simultaneously, not sequentially, and Iran appears to be taking over the Afghan crisis. The escalating Iran situation has caught India and Pakistan by surprise. Both countries are now balancing their ties between the US and european backed Gulf monarchs on the one hand, and the Iranian regime on the other. The US-eU sanctions on Iranian oil export and the recent UN Security Council resolution on Syria lays out this divide more prominently. India and Pakistan voted in favour of the Arab League supported resolution on Syria; however, both countries have pledged to continue their energy and trade dealings with Iran despite western sanctions. The dilemma for India is even greater than Pakistan as it has strategic relations with Israel, eU and the US. In a recent the Indian Express article, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi C Raja Mohan addresses India’s problematic approach to Middle eastern politics: “The problems for India’s Middle east policy emerged when the regional and internal contradictions began to acquire a salience all their own. If India was flummoxed by the shifting regional coalitions, it was utterly unprepared for internal strife in the Arab states and its external consequences.” The same can be said for Pakistan. Any question related
to its foreign policy is being ducked under one standard comment that the policy review the country had initiated after the November NATO Mohmand attack will provide the needed direction. Though, in recent days, comments made by Pakistan’s civilian leadership have provided clues on Pakistan’s implied policy on Iran. In an interview to The Sun, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to Britain stated that if Israel attacks Iran, Pakistan would be left with no option but to support Iran. Wajid Shamsul Hasan commented, “We wouldn’t like to be seen as part of Israel’s campaign against any country. If Israel attacks Iran, it will have an impact on Pakistan as well.” Pakistan faces a much more serious challenge, as these tensions between Iran and Gulf countries have the tendency to take on Shiite versus Sunni colour. “We will have to safeguard our own interests. We also have a Shia population in Pakistan who will not take it lying down,” the High Commissioner added. Moreover, during the recently held tripartite meeting in Islamabad, President Zardari has commented that Pakistan and Iran “need each other and no foreign pressure should hinder their ties.” He also added that in case the US attacks Iran, Pakistan would not be providing any support to the US. While Afghan conflict has consumed people’s attentions for more than a decade, the scope of Iran and Syrian crisis is much wider. Any realistic assessment of the situation in South Asia would have to envision what happens in Afghanistan, and the region, once the Middle east comes to a boil. Not doing so will only lead to more surprises. The writer is the chief analyst for PoliTact (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at aansar@politact.com
H
ello. My name is Sajjad. I’m just over 40, and I’ve been working in the NGO sector for the last 10 years. every evening, I go back home, and I try not to think about the suit I was wearing, the two useless reports I approved, or the fancy hotel lunch meeting I had with a naïve white man (who picked up the tab). every evening, however, despite my best efforts, I go to sleep thinking about the colour of tomorrow’s tie, the three reports I still need to read through, and the planned lunch meeting with another white man. This time, I’d have to pay the bill. It wasn’t always like this, you know. Things were different 24 years ago. Things were unstructured, unregimented, unconstrained. Things were free. At the age of 16, I passed the matriculation exam from Government Higher Secondary School (for boys) in my hometown, Muridke. By the grace of God, my father thought I was smart enough to be sent to Lahore for further education. As I packed for the hour-long bus ride, abbaji stepped into my room and told me his plans for my future: Plan A was admission to engineering University (formally known as UeT), and then a job in the gulf through Uncle Farooq’s younger brother (who knew some people there). If Uncle Farooq’s younger brother bailed, then it By Umair Javed was probably best I sit for the CSS exam. Failing that, I will apply for a grade 16, entrylevel post in the Communication and Works department, Government of Punjab. Plan B was admission to Hailey College of Commerce for a B Com, because, apparently, there are new banks recruiting young graduates and sending them to the gulf. Takes Uncle Farooq’s younger brother out of the equation all-together. Plan C would kick in if I failed to make the merit list after the intermediate examination results. If so, I would move back to Muridke and start work with abbaji at the shop. Deference to paternal authority, it turned out, is inversely proportional to distance. After 5 months in college, a friend of mine convinced me to switch from pre-engineering to arts and humanities. I ditched Physics, Math, and Chemistry, and ended up taking Sociology, Political Science, and economics. I decided I wanted to take up Plan D, which was becoming a col-
lege lecturer. Unfortunately for me, abbaji wasn’t willing to finance a Plan D, and I had no option but to turn to my eldest brother for college related expenses. Luckily, he was less fussy about my choice of subjects. I was arrested for the first time in my life at the age of 17. One of our instructors took a bunch of us to a pro-democracy public gathering on the Mall Road. We were baton charged, tear-gassed, and then finally pushed into a large police van, which took us to the police station. It was a frightening, yet oddly exhilarating experience, and I wanted more of it. An Inter, BA, MA later, I found myself working as a journalist for the Lahore bureau of a major newspaper. Plan D, sadly enough, fell through when the Public Services Commission interviewer, after three questions on political theory, asked me to recite Dua-eQunoot. The idea that the attainment of a political science lectureship hinged on my ability to repeat a certain amount of words in a foreign language seemed ludicrous. I voiced my thoughts, they didn’t like them, and I ended up working as a journalist. As it turned out, it really wasn’t such a bad thing. Four of us had taken up a small apartment in the old city and spent most of our time dabbling in plenty of radical ideas, and even more radical substances. Good times. This is how I lived life for 12 years. The cities changed, the apartments changed, the substances changed, but life was spontaneous, and existence remained unfettered. That Sajjad is dead now. Bogged down by a changing society, and eventually killed by the barrenness of growing old. The worst part is that there’s no new Sajjad either. No 17-year-olds getting arrested, nobody making spontaneous life-style choices, nobody bothering themselves by the added weight of utopian ideals. People want straight, predictable lines, and lives they can see 10 years into the future. They want stability, fancy toys, and gated communities. The only ‘ism’ that they cherish is careerism, (Islamism too, but only as long as it doesn’t interfere with the former). There’s a 24-year-old LUMS graduate working in my NGO. He’s doing well for himself, and he knows it. He sees a promotion at the end of this year, and a fat pay-raise too. After a while, he’ll move to some hi-fi UN type international organisation, get married, rent a bigger place, and buy a bigger car. His ambition, he told me, is to become a Washingtonbased public policy specialist. And he tells me all of this with an earnest, sincere expression on his face. Yep, that Sajjad is definitely dead. The writer blogs at http://recycledthought.blogspot.com. Email him at umairjaved87@gmail.com, or send a tweet @umairjav