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McGill Journal of Political Studies | Winter 2020
political program. The factors that led to Hamas’ shifting trajectory will then be assessed, and these include mounting pressures from the worsening conditions in Gaza, the need to better relations with Egypt, and a desire to improve its international standing. Finally, this paper will discuss prospects for the future of Hamas. Overall, this paper seeks to demonstrate that through Hamas’ decision to become a formal political actor in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections and renewal of its charter in 2017, adaptation has become one of the defining characteristics of Hamas as a movement. Furthermore, this paper argues that Hamas’ actions demonstrate that the group has evolved into a rational political actor who adapts to the changing demands of the Palestinian people and the regional status quo.
THE MILESTONE 2006 ELECTIONS: HAMAS’ TRIUMPH On January 25, 2006, Hamas shocked the world with its landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections. In an election with 77 percent voter turnout, Hamas won 42.9 percent of the vote, giving it a parliamentary majority with 74 of the 132 seats.2 The rival party, Fatah, received only 41.43 percent of the vote. Consequently, the results of the 2006 parliamentary elections overturned forty years of Fatah’s domination.3 The election was judged by international observers to be “competitive and genuinely democratic.”4 By virtue of its victory, Hamas formed a government and became the leading force in Palestine for the first time since its founding.5 The 2006 elections were for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the legislature of the Palestinian National Authority which embodied Palestinian political legitimacy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.6 Fatah, a secular political party, was the preferred ruling government by Israel, the United States, Europe, many Arab regimes, the United Nations, and various other regional and international players. Governments across the globe were stunned: a “terrorist organization” (as it had been labeled in the West) could emerge as a victorious popular political power.7 Between 2000 to 2005, Hamas was responsible for more than 40 percent of Israeli fatalities through its repeated violent attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers.8 The Islamist militant group emphasized that its participation in the 2006 elections was part of its broader strategic goal of resistance to Israel and expressed its standing commitment to the liberation of Palestine and rejection of the Oslo agreements.9 In spite of the group’s claims of consistency in its goals, however, Hamas’s decision to participate in the 2006 legislative elections signaled a significant shift in its approach to the political status quo.10 Up until 2005, Hamas had refused to participate in national elections because it would have been an endorsement of the Oslo agreements.11 The provisions of the 1993 Oslo Accords stipulated that the Palestinian leadership recognized Israel’s right to exist and were willing to commit to finding a peaceful solution. Hamas rejected participation in the 1996 legislative elections, because it perceived the elections as an outcome of the accords.12 Hamas’ entrance into the political process hence raised questions about the group’s fundamental stance.13 In the lead-up to 2006, Hamas justified its decision to participate in the elections by claiming the Oslo Accords, for all
