McGill Journal of Political Studies - Winter 2020

Page 110

The Failure of the Second Reconstruction

102

black poverty at an alarming rate, heightening relative deprivation. White resentment towards African American enrichment was also a critical influence in the changing face of American politics since the civil rights movement. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968, who won by appealing to disgruntled members of the white working-class, marked a change in the American social fabric that impaired the possibility of concerted efforts to address institutionalized inequality in the future.26 Once Nixon became president, black activists were largely shut out of national politics, exacerbating the decline of the movement as African Americans lost their voice in policymaking.27 The rhetoric of white activists relies solely on the sentiment of threat based on the American culture of inequality, but it has been a dangerously effective tool in the interference of black advancement. For example, proponents of this point of view have been instrumental in the contraction of affirmative action policy in the last few decades. However, King and Smith indicate that “affirmative action programs in employment and admissions often cause very little harm even to poorer whites,”28 illustrating the power of exploiting white fears even when the fear is based on fabricated threats.

ELECTORAL INCENTIVES AND POLICY DECISIONS As white backlash spread throughout the 1970s, political leaders adjusted their platforms and policymaking decisions to appeal to this sentiment. Frymer’s analysis of electoral incentives helps explain this process. Scholars such as Anthony Downs have argued that political parties have an incentive to appeal to the policy interests of marginalized groups to create broader electoral coalitions and win elections.29 Frymer argues that this is not the case; instead, party leaders often overlook and neglect potential black voters to be elected into office.30 Notably, Frymer states that “parties do not seek election to promote policies; they promote policies to win elections.”31 This proposition encompasses the policy decisions of political leaders in the post-civil rights movement era. This mechanism has been demonstrated by almost every American president since the 1968 elections, resulting in the systematic erosion of the successes of the movement. To win the presidency and retain support for a second presidential term in 1972, Nixon employed a tactic often referred to as the ‘Southern Strategy.’ This term refers to Nixon’s ability to appeal to the racial fears of working-class whites in the South. According to Chafe, Nixon “denounced busing, sought judicial appointments that would please conservative white southerners, and mobilized an electoral constituency based upon loyalty to traditional values of law and order”32 to do this, implicitly scapegoating black Americans for the loss of these ideals. Despite this, Nixon was a supporter of the Philadelphia Plan, an affirmative action program that would establish quotas of minority workers in federally funded construction projects.33 That said, throughout Nixon’s presidency, it was clear that white hostility towards black advancement was on the rise. The most pervasive effect of the Southern Strategy was its ability to bring about a reactionary shift in politics and society. Ronald Reagan employed the Southern Strategy to win two presidential elections in the 1980s, making policy


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