5 ConneCts And disConneCts BetWeen sMAllsCAle FArMers And PoliCies
goal for decades, but erratic efforts to bring this about have produced an array of often conflicting policy documents and institutions. there is no central policy framework for small farms, and major initiatives have arisen from several different unlinked government bodies.
some government officials, who have the necessary skills in legislative advocacy, research and economic analysis. these cases reinforce the view that pro-farmer policies are more effectively shaped by knowledge-based advocacy, with good evidence and detailed proposals, rather than by ideological arguments, rent-seeking or blocking change. expanding political agency may mean building farmers’ capacity to take on this advocacy themselves; the nicaraguan study’s respondents noted that farmers’ groups are usually represented by professional staff of their own or their partners’ organisations, rather than by farmer leaders. Politically active producers also need the capacity to push the government for adequate implementation and monitoring of programmes. in nicaragua, some milestone laws in small farmers’ interest have not been carried out at local levels (see Box 5.4).
this picture is common across the learning network. government departments in charge of agriculture, trade, food, water and other relevant sectors fail to coordinate their activities on behalf of small farmers — or to harmonise the bureaucratic requirements that may stand in the way of new markets. if small-scale producers are to shape the policies that determine fair market access, their organisations have to be heard by a plethora of institutions. in india, for example, Arya and Asthana pointed out a range of departments at both the federal and state level regulating trade policy, subsidies, and the sale of produce at new farmers’ markets instituted by recent legislation. small-scale producers’ organisations do not have the resources or expertise to engage with all these bodies.
learning network studies beyond nicaragua add to this picture. in Bolivia, some producers’ organisations are able to interact directly with national and state leaders, but galleguillos argued strongly that the Bolivian groups are not developing coherent proposals to improve small farmers’ bottom line. the most politically powerful organisations representing farmers are the traditional rural unions, who are vigorously opposed to neoliberalism and globalisation; these groups also lack the technical capacity to steer policy implementation in favour of their grassroots members. some other farmers’ economic associations are interested in reaching more markets, galleguillos added, but these are not engaged in political advocacy.
5.1.5 Policymaking driven by large numbers, political opportunities and short-termism Ultimately, policymakers may not give much weight to the business interests of small producers because of how these farmers are seen within the larger policy landscape. national priorities are usually based on large numbers — in the case of economic policy, on the contributions of different sectors to gdP. in developing countries, agriculture as a whole usually contributes a much smaller fraction to gdP than to employment — the learning network reflected this pattern in Uganda (rwakakamba) and indonesia (natawidjaja), for example — and farmers are thus seen as surplus labour, an economic inefficiency.
Monterroso, a sociologist and vegetable exporter in guatemala, echoed the observation that producers lack capacity to make policy proposals towards their goals. he offered a basic example at a learning network meeting, explaining that one group he worked with succeeded in gaining a political voice in the central government, but instead of trying to change their competitive playing field, they simply demanded a new government handout of 42 to 84 kilograms of fertiliser per farmer.
While some governments use cash transfers to low-income farmers to try to ensure food security or fight poverty, states may also have political goals in offering such lump-sum payments. this also makes farming look more relevant to social policy rather than to economic policy that improves marketing options and tools.
5.1.4 Lack of coherence and coordination in policymaking effective advocacy is made more difficult when small-farmer representatives must affect an array of uncoordinated and sometimes competing institutions and programmes. in Uganda, for example, the learning network’s rwakakamba reports that strengthening smallholder agriculture has been a
government views of smallholders can change, however, in response to different metrics — like food supply — that reframe farmers’ economic role. in nicaragua, the learning network’s guharay noted that officials committed to
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