Conclusions

Sinai. Except for Damietta, all these governorates had exhibited high rates of live births. This finding suggests a need to prioritize policies that will keep children, particularly girls, in school. Qena and Matrouh also had an increased likelihood and/or concentration of marriage contracts. But surprisingly, the remaining governorates with high levels of school dropouts had low levels of contract marriages. These data should be interpreted cautiously, however, as they may mask the phenomenon of unregistered marriages in some governorates, notably among those below the legal age for marriage. Also, except for Menoufia, Sohag, and South Sinai, all these governorates had high unemployment rates, particularly among females.

Unemployment The potential for higher fertility increases when unemployment, particularly female unemployment, lowers the cost of childbearing, as data seem to indicate for several governorates in Egypt. There was an increased likelihood and/or concentration of male and/or female unemployment in 10 governorates—Cairo, Damietta, Dakahlia, Qalyoubia, Gharbia, Beheira, Giza, Assiut, Aswan, and north Sinai—with an associated increase in one or more rates of live births in 7 of the 10 governorates: Dakahlia, Gharbia, Beheira, Giza, Assiut, Aswan, and north Sinai. An increased likelihood of unemployment, particularly among females, was evident in seven governorates: Suez, Alexandria, Ismailia, Qena, luxor, Red Sea, and Matrouh, several of which also had increased rates of live births: Alexandria, Ismailia, Qena, luxor, and Matrouh. Out of these, 17 governorates also exhibited high rates of school dropouts.

Illiteracy Illiteracy, particularly female illiteracy, can be associated with early marriage and childbearing, and may have played a role in increased live births in Egypt. The illiteracy rate was high in nine governorates: Kafr El-Sheikh, Beheira, Beni Suef, Fayoum, Menia, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, and Matrouh. Other than Fayoum, all these governorates also exhibit an increased likelihood and/or concentration of live births.

CONCLUSIONS

During the implementation of EPIP 2015–2020, there was a decline in the overall rate of population growth, GFR, and CBR. Despite these positive trends at the national level, considerable challenges persist. First, paucity of data, especially at subnational levels, is a major obstacle for monitoring progress. Although the use of proxy indicators may reveal some insights, it has limitations, especially as overall national averages do not allow for a full understanding of the varied contexts within the country. Their use can also then make it difficult to assess the true impact of Egypt national Population Strategy (EnPS) 2015–2030 and EPIP 2015–2020.

Second, where data are available, evidence points to large variations between and within governorates. In 10 governorates, in both rural and urban areas, current efforts to reduce childbearing appear to have low effectiveness and need to be revisited. In an additional 10 urban areas, the interventions seem to be ineffective.