and Thailand

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Political, Constitutional, and Legislative Contexts for Participation All the countries in the sample are democracies.Two (Bangladesh and India) were founded as a result ofsecession and independence movements;three (Indonesia,the Philippines,and Thailand) recently underwent constitutional change after civil society uprisings against authoritarian rule.All have legal provisions for direct democracy,although they are not always embodied in governance practice (table 5.1).In all five countries,traditional social structures coexist with liberal democracy and provisions for participation

TABLE 5.1 Constitutional and Legal Provisions for Decentralization and Participation in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand

Political and constitutional Constitutional and legal provisions Country context for decentralization and participation

Bangladesh Democracy since 1971, A recent government review following secession ofEast recommended a four-tier system of Pakistan from West Pakistan. local government, including The constitution includes a village-level councils, but the bill ofrights and “pledges recommendation has not been ownership ofthe republic implemented. The legal framework to the people.” for assigning roles and responsibilities across levels of government is weak, as is the fiscal capacity oflocal governments. India Federal democratic republic The constitution assigns clear roles since 1947, born out ofthe and responsibilities to local Gandhian independence government. Local governments are movement. The constitution has largely dependent on transfers from a strong focus on fundamental national government: their own rights. The 73rd and 74th revenue sources are limited to amendments introduced property and professional taxes and village-level autonomy to a limited set oflicense fees. Transfer promote democracy at the criteria for recurrent spending are grassroots level. determined by the Finance Commission; the national Planning Commission allocates funds to major capital investment projects. The financial autonomy oflocal governments to initiate new programs and projects remains limited.

(continued)

Participatory Budgeting in Asia 161

TABLE 5.1 (continued)

Political and constitutional Constitutional and legal provisions Country context for decentralization and participation

Indonesia Demonstrations and riots in Indonesia has passed two 1998 led to the resignation of decentralization laws since 1999. In Suharto after 32 years of 2001 it passed implementation dictatorship. The constitution legislation. Bureaucratic opposition was enacted in 1945. Since has succeeded in rolling back many then piecemeal change has ofthe gains made in the legislation. been made toward making it more progressive. Philippines The Marcos regime fell in 1987, The Local Government Code of following mass demonstrations. 1991 embodies a comprehensive The constitution is progressive, decentralization program. containing a strong bill ofrights In accordance with the and recognition ofcivil society. constitutional provisions, the code institutionalizes the participation ofcivil society at the local level, envisaging a partnership between NGOs and local administrations, in terms ofboth joint planning and partnering in service provision. The code creates local development councils, with guaranteed seats for NGOs. Thailand Demonstrations in 1992 ended The constitution provides for 60 years ofmilitary rule. The decentralization. The Local constitution is progressive, Government Code places strong containing a strong bill ofrights, emphasis on participation. enacted with support from a broad civil society coalition.

Sources: Brillantes 2005; McGee 2003; Paul 2005b; Rahman, Kabir, and Razzaque 2004; Suwanmala 2004.

and accountability to the larger population.In practice this means that meaningful participation is not the norm;access to political power and the organs ofstate is still largely elitist.

Experience around the world suggests that legal provisions for decentralization and participation are necessary to create an enabling environment for these institutions.Legal frameworks regulate the terms of actors’engagement and their scope for influencing behavior in the arenas of other actors (McGee 2003).This holds both for how subnational governments influence national governments and how civil society influences government. Experience also suggests that legal frameworks are not sufficient to ensure

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that effective decentralization and participation mechanisms develop. Despite numerous constitutional and legal provisions for direct democracy and accountability,restrictions to democracy are in place in the case studycountries,where undemocratic traditional social norms underpin the political systems (McGee 2003).Decentralization will be effective only ifit is supported by a clear assignment ofroles and responsibilities in a legal framework,but such a framework alone is not enough.

This mismatch between the legal framework and practice plays out in various ways in the case study countries.In Bangladesh local government elections are hotly contested and draw high voter turnout,but the roles and responsibilities oflocal governments are not well defined and implementation capacity is very weak.Fiscal capacity is also limited,with local governments largely dependent on transfers from the center.A weak framework for local government,coupled with a strong national nexus between politicians, bureaucrats,and business,results in a government that remains highly centralized (Rahman,Kabir,and Razzaque 2004).As a result,local government institutions are ill equipped to provide basic services.At the national level,vulnerable groups are largely excluded from access to budget decision makers.The state is not entirely closed to participation,however.Organized and well-resourced interest groups have direct access to political power and bureaucracy,and they lobby for their interests.In contrast,the poor have virtually no control over policy changes,with profound implications for their livelihoods (Rahman,Kabir,and Razzaque 2004).The Bangladesh case study describes an instance in which development partners are joining forces with other stakeholders to create demand from citizens for better local government.

In India the assignment ofroles and responsibilities to local government is clear,but local governments have only limited financial autonomy to initiate new programs and projects.The financial (and therefore policy) autonomy oflocal governments is nominal rather than real (Paul 2005b).In addition,traditional social norms hinder effective broad-based participation. It is therefore interesting that in the case studies from India,all initiatives except one were initiated by civil society,with at least two cases involving groups representing the lowest tiers ofsociety.

In Indonesia implementation ofthe decentralization legislation is slow and has met with bureaucratic resistance,rolling back many ofthe gains made in the legislation (McGee 2003).In the Indonesian case study ofparticipatory decision making at the local level,government is a key partner.According to Edstrom (2002),choosing to work with local rather than national government reflects the recognition that radical interventions are needed to improve state effectiveness in an environment ofsevere corruption.