Is the End of Multilateralism Nigh?

Is the End of Multilateralism Near?

Stephen Browne • Aug 06, 2024

Diplomats huddling in the Security Council before it voted on a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza war, which never happened. Vassily Nebenzia, Russia’s envoy, center, and Zhang Jun of China, left, March 25, 2024. The essayist writes that to restore the United Nations to its “full functions,” the biggest powers must show “a greater willingness to collaborate” and a revised Charter would need to better reflect today’s multipolar geopolitics.

The UN secretary-general would also need to flex more “muscular leadership.” EVAN SCHNEIDER/UN PHOTO Multilateralism is retreating and the United Nations is no longer effective in any of its major functions. The fault is with both the First UN of member states — and particularly the veto wielding P3 of Russia, China and the United States — and the Second UN of secretariats. More ominously, it is not clear how the UN could regain its usefulness. In a month, a summit will declare on its future, but rather than a UN 2.0, the result is more likely to confirm a UN 0.5, perhaps a “mere footnote” of history.

Many declarations have come and gone. The latest pact, devised for the upcoming Summit of the Future, contains nearly 60 actions. Apart from authorizing the UN secretary-general to take a few minor organizational initiatives, nearly all the “actions” — like so many previous resolutions over decades — will fall short. The continuing pursuit of perfection in an organization that is still pretending to adhere to an 80 year-old Charter, originally developed by and for the prevailing postwar Western interests, is futile. If there were ever a good definition of “brain dead,” we are encountering it in the UN. Attempts in September to reset, revamp and revisit the organization through yet another pious declaration will only distract us from global realities. They are not going away.

The latest draft of the Pact for the Future has 17 actions on peace and security. Most of them will depend on the Security Council to carry out, but the P3 powers will continue to veto any decisions that impinge on their national interests. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine called out the Security Council in 2022 when it became obvious that through its full invasion of his country, Russia was ready to trample over every core principle of the Charter with impunity (and have the ultimate hypocrisy to chair a Security Council discussion on its bombing of civilian infrastructure).

Action 24 will pursue a “future free from terrorism,” but in the UN secretariat the responsibility falls on a department headed by a representative of that same member state that perpetrates terrorist acts. Meanwhile, the US has urged the Security Council to call for a ceasefire in Gaza while giving Israel the weapons it needs to destroy the lives and livelihoods of the Palestinians there. China has ignored and virulently opposed discussions on the findings of a UN report on crimes against humanity in Xinjiang Province. More examples are scarcely needed.

Action 1 of the pact will “achieve” the Sustainable Development Goals. But this is a waste of words since, according to the UN secretariat, a mere 15 percent of the targets are on track to be achieved by 2030. From the beginning, the path toward the 2030 agenda was poorly managed, and the blueprint was far too complex and ambiguous.

One goal, SDG 16, stands out as a precondition for development but is one of the least likely to be met.

As International IDEA recently concluded, “the evidence reveals that peace, justice and strong institutions are not merely complementary but foundational to sustainable development.”

As for climate change and the environment, Actions 9 and 10 will “enhance the ambition to address climate change and accelerate efforts to protect, conserve and sustainably use the environment.” After decades of trying, it is not obvious that solutions will be found through the UN. Quite the contrary. While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has played a role in raising the alarm, the UN has relied on the Conference of the Parties (COP) process to achieve results.

But the COPs have been singularly ineffective for several reasons. One is the UN secretariat’s timidity. It has been far too indulgent to member states in allowing voluntary national targets to reduce carbon emissions. It has permitted petro-states to host COP meetings, like the United Arab Emirates last year and Azerbaijan this year, and it has failed to counter the advocacy by oil and gas interests. Progress is measured by slight adjustments of language in its outcome statements while downplaying actual outcomes in CO2 emissions.

Consensus on COP results inevitably leads to conservative solutions that pander to the positions of the member states, which are the most resistant to change. The conclusion of each COP is applauded by the participants, but it can be argued that the process has faltered and hindered progress. Funding acts as a further brake. Without exception, every major debate in the UN ends up with confrontations concerning finance. The COPs are no exception. Financial targets are always missed, providing further excuses for inaction.

Progress on the climate is made elsewhere, albeit too slowly. Civil society and other nongovernmental interests are helping to force change, shaming governments into acting. Shareholders have prevailed on oil companies to invest in renewable energy. The mayors of 9,000 cities around the world (C40 Cities) have agreed on a global covenant to address climate change. In the US, the euphemistically named Inflation Reduction Act will help, but it is more a response to commercial rivalry with China than a reaction to the 2015 Paris Agreement.

Trade provides another example of the failure of multilateral negotiations (Action 5). The WTO (which has replaced UN Trade and Development, or UNCTAD, in this function) has rules that are being willfully ignored. The US has knee-capped the dispute mechanism by refusing to allow the appointment of judges; the world’s largest exporter, China, continues to claim developing-country status and hides information on its trade policies. Global trade

negotiations began in 2001 in Doha and died in 2015. Determined multilateralists are calling for WTO reform but there is no sign that the changes will happen. There are echoes here of the ill-fated efforts to change the Security Council.

Trade is being weaponized through targeted tariffs, and countries are pursuing industrial policies that subsidize domestic production. Yet, trade negotiations are as active as ever, just not global in scope. With average global tariff levels now below 10 percent, free trade agreements are becoming rarer. The emphasis is on nontariff barriers of various kinds, including trade facilitation, which is more resistant to uniform rules and norms. Today, trade relations are developing bilaterally and regionally at a rapid rate, with growing numbers of so-called minideals in which pairs or groups of countries agree on specific mutually advantageous conditions.

The evidence of governance in peace and security, the SDGs, climate change and trade would suggest that global multilateralism is now failing, prompting questions about whether it is even necessary. It is true that global forums such as those of the UN and WTO give vent to the voices of the smaller powers that would otherwise not be heard.

There are still some technical areas where the UN can help to establish global norms and standards, such as cybersecurity. But the second UN, of secretariats, needs to up its game in steering discussions backed by sound evidence and effective advocacy, and to be ready to shout down the naysayers.

As for restoring the UN to its full functions, there is little likelihood that can occur with the current leadership of the bigger powers. Even if a greater willingness to collaborate returns to the UN, a revised Charter — or a stricter interpretation of its articles — would need to better reflect today’s multipolar geopolitics. In the second UN, more muscular leadership would be required from the very top, including a readiness by the secretary-general to invoke the Charter to sanction and circumvent the most egregious detractors from the UN ideal.

Q U E S T I O N S: 1. You make a compelling case that “multilateralism is now failing”: was it ever necessary?

2. If it was, what will it take to re-invent the UN to make “multilateralism” a success?

3. What – if anything – gives you hope for the future of the human family?

4. You do not even mention the UN’s “Liquidity Crisis”: do you think that’s terminal?

5. The P3 member states have yet to pay their assessed contributions: could not the General Assembly suspend their right of veto until they do?

6. The powers of the WTO are now so eviscerated, should not its staff voluntarily wind the organisation up?

7. You say that “Civil society and NGOs, mayors and shareholders have prevailed” on climate issues where governments have signally failed: do you see any hope of a “We the Peoples…” movement for the UN?