The Threshold of Humanitarian Intervention for Religious Persecution

In the 1900s, more than 240 million civilians were killed by their governments for horrifying reasons including their religion, economic status, and race (Bandow 1995). Two of the most gruesome incidents included the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide, which were acts of religious persecution and a blatant disregard for basic human rights. Despite this startling number, so far the 2000s show no clear signs of stopping this trend. From the ongoing Uyghur crisis in China to the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, it is clear that our current society does not stray far from the dark history of the past. In fact, as violence becomes normalized, citizens and governments all over the world become numb to persecution and genocide which further perpetrate a cycle of violence. The role of the government within these killings lies foremost in recognizing the inalienable rights of the victims. Within the International Bill of Human Rights, the freedom of religion is one of the clearest. Article II of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities proclaims that “persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities… have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion… without interference or any form of discrimination” (OHCHR 1948). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as the “crime of destruction of minorities”, with religious groups being one of the main categories for discrimination (OHCHR 1952). While the right for freedom of religion is clearly stated, its legitimacy is directly challenged each time a government uses religion as a means of bias. The ICISS Report of “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) specifies that the international community must intervene if there is any “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’” (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, sec. 4.19). All of the countries that sign the International Bill of Human Rights agree to the R2P and to intervene if any of the rights are not upheld. Humanitarian intervention has long been viewed as a controversial political move. While humanitarian aid is normally more peaceful of an approach, humanitarian intervention is specifically defined as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (Barsa, 6). The defense behind humanitarian intervention is that in looking at genocides and religious persecution, specific force often has to be applied once the crisis has hit “no point of return” without outside help. While humanitarian intervention is often debated among scholars, this paper operates under the assumption that when necessary, governments should prioritize force in order to save lives. As Joseph Stalin famously wrote, “one death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic” (Washington Post 1947). Because of the drastic nature of government-sanctioned killings as a

whole, this paper aims to uncover the nuances surrounding religious persecution and the role of the international community in intervening. The research question motivating this paper is: When and how do states decide to intervene against religious persecution? What is their motivation for doing so? In order to tackle this question, this paper looks at four main case studies (the Greek War, the Holocaust, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Uyghur Persecution) to examine the cause for a lack of intervention in the first place and the overall trends of why intervention eventually occurred. These case studies were chosen over a variety of variables including regions, time period, and scale in order to allow for generalization when answering the question fully. Through this question, I hope to clarify the perspective of governments in order to offer conclusions to the international community on methods to intervene. The first perspective in considering when governments should intervene is realism. Realists would contend that the threshold of intervention lies within unitary states or leaders. Specifically, intervention itself would depend on the self-interest of the state getting involved, and the threshold would be based on the state rather than on the type of violence surrounding the victims. Realists would also contend that when the actor is getting involved, they have just cause for war (just war theory). Among the notable research surrounding this issue is done by Kuperman (2020) who examined the threshold of intervention during the Rwandan Genocide and concluded that governments have become normalized to violence of massive proportions and therefore are raising their thresholds for intervention (Kuperman, 104). Additionally, Huag (2020) underscores the realist perspective of just war theory in reference to intervention. In other words, when a country decides to intervene (through self-interest), aggression and the “means to an end” are properly constituted. This implies that in deciding whether humanitarian intervention does more harm than good, arguing that if it is in a state’s (and presumably, the victims’) best interest, then the state should intervene. Overall, however, realists would contend that governments intervene according to their country’s agenda, rather than simply for the sake of protecting the people being persecuted. Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, would look towards the laws that already exist that allow for intervention, including the human rights norms of doing so. They argue that international organizations should increase their role in intervention against religious persecution, which would consequently increase government participation in ending it. The threshold for intervention would then depend on the pre-existing precedent for intervention and the ethical laws that the perpetrator is breaking. Among existing literature for the school of thought, Harff (2003) tries to predict the “risk factors” for a genocide in a country. He finds that countries with previous political upheaval, the authorities’ articulation of an exclusionary ideology, autocratic regimes, and trade isolation were key indicators of these “risk factors” (Harff 61-63). By indicating these risk factors, many of which require an international institution to correct at an early stage, Harff hopes to encourage international organizations in promoting democracy, freedom of religion, and trade openness. Identifying risk factors is an important step, but Harff argues that international institutions should intervene much earlier, especially considering the precedents that already exist. Finally, constructivists would argue that actors are more likely to intervene when religious persecution has some tie to the government’s identity, whether that be race, ethnicity, religion, or

government type. Therefore, the threshold of intervention would depend on the victims, the reason for the persecution, and whether the intervening actor has a collective identity with the victims. In a study examining why countries intervene in genocides from psychological and social angles, Mazur and Vollhardt (2015) find that intervention is most likely to occur when there are published “central features” of a genocide (the generalizable characteristics of power struggle, discrimination, etc.), rather than peripheral features (features specific to one country’s genocide). Additionally, the means of intervention depends on the violence of the genocide, not the severity of it. In other words, a country might be more likely to intervene depending on the discrimination of the victims, suggesting that the decision to intervene is subjective based on its collective identity. In looking at the four case studies, the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) documents the first case of armed humanitarian intervention to occur by outside forces. The Greek War occurred because Greek Orthodox Christians were being discriminated against by Greek Muslims and the Ottoman Empire (Heraclides and Dialla 2015). While the international community was aware of this persecution, the war lasted for almost eight years due to little intervention. The lack of intervention stems from the fact that France and Germany had no interest or precedent in intervening in the region or in crises that weren’t wars. Because humanitarian intervention was so unprecedented, the British, French, and Russian governments had to be explicitly convinced why intervention was so necessary, which delayed action. This points to the liberal institutionalist argument that intervention is needed through humanitarian organizations so that the cost of transaction is significantly reduced (Heraclides and Dialla 2015). Finally, through mediation attempts, naval fleets, and interventions by these three additional powers, the war ended. This war highlights the fact that intervention did not occur through a mix of reasons. Broadly, the other powers felt no need to intervene which jointly stemmed from a lack of precedent, a lack of collective identity towards the Orthodox Christian community and Mediterranean, and a lack of motivation for achieving some political agenda in their country. The focus was on what was best for the countries intervening, rather than the Greek victims. The Holocaust, one of the most well-known acts of blatant religious persecution, is a chilling reminder of what happens when countries raise their threshold of intervention. To begin, the United States initially only entered the war because of the bombing of Pearl Harbor (1941) due to government fears of over-involvement. Self-interest, or the realist agenda, drove the United States to avoid intervention in the first place, and their decision to intervene stemmed from their own political agenda and fear of being disregarded as a global superpower (The Holocaust: World Response, 2020). The lack of intervention occurred in threefold. First, the Allied Powers were too concerned with winning the war, rather than the victims being harmed by the war, which led to tunnel vision in prioritizing battle over direct intervention. Additionally, there was general disbelief and denial from the Allied Powers in that the astronomical numbers must have been fabricated. Finally, while the world had an inclination of what was happening in the region, citizens (specifically Americans) failed to pressure their governments to take collective action, due to the fact that they felt little allegiance to Jews in Europe. Unfortunately, the religion of the victims dissuaded the governments from intervening, directly supporting the constructivist argument. The

end of the war was demarcated by military, navy, and air force intervention that involved atomic bombs. One of the deadliest events in all of history, the Holocaust, is unique in that it spurred the creation of what many people consider to be the popularization of international institutions. The international community adopted a liberal institutionalist approach when it realized that specific standards for human rights, which were implied before, could no longer operate under the honor rule. Now, international institutions would be put in place to spell out these rights, as well as enforce them. The lack of efficacy in the Allied Powers, too, showed that even when countries share the same ideals surrounding rights, global governance needs to ensure that the focus lies on intervening to protect the victims, rather than to win a war. This underscores the importance of an international institution and proves that without one, countries might be tempted to pursue their realist goals. The Rwandan Genocide (1994) was short, but one of the most fatal in all of Africa’s history. This genocide is included in this research as religious persecution because when Belgium colonized Rwanda, they ruled through the church. Only through this colonization were the Hutu, the crow-growing majority, and the Tutsi, the livestock minority, separated into classes (Kuperman 2020). These classes, which were demarcated by profession and dedication to the church, sparked the initial Hutu violence against the Tutsi. However, the international community struggled to intervene, despite more international institutions being founded. While the international community had ample resources to intervene, one of the main reasons for the lack of intervention was the “shadow of Somalia”. In other words, because other regional actors wanted to keep amicable policy relations with military-powerful Somalia, they refused to intervene for fear of retaliation. Notably, the United States never tried to intervene, specifically due to a lack of stakes and identity (through internalized racism) with the African nation. Finally, a lack of internal pressure in Rwanda itself slowed the action. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) tried to intervene but was widely criticized for giving too little, providing inadequate aid, and not listening to the needs of the local community (Maritz 2014). The war only finally ended because of an uprising from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was backed by the sole actor of Uganda. This case has often been studied as a time in which international institutions and constructivist identity directly harmed Tutsi lives. Through this case analysis, not only were international institutions exposed to their flaws, but what once could have been beneficial action by these institutions was undermined by powerful countries like the United States not stepping in and providing additional support. This offers nuance to the liberal institutions’ hypothesis in that while the threshold for intervention often does rely on past precedent, governments also cannot intervene reasonably and effectively if they don’t have enough global support and resources. The final case study is the current persecution of the Uyghur People, a group of Muslims that reside in the region of Xinjiang, China. While there has been military occupation in the region since 1949, an official campaign by China’s Communist Party has started since May 2014 (Maizland, 3). This campaign, which China frames as a way of ridding their country of terrorism, is truly systemic discrimination and persecution. A current lack of intervention is a result of Chinese information suppression about the extent of the persecution and support from other

countries about the “eradication of terrorism”. Notably, this “support” stems from 45 countries, which is appallingly high (Putz 2020). In addition, most of this support stems from Muslim countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Yemen, among others), which in theory have a bond of identity that should lead to intervention, as the constructivist hypothesis proposes. Instead, however, the realist ideals of these countries in wanting China’s global power on their side have hindered their ability to properly intervene and protect the Uyghur people. While there has been a signatory of 22 countries condemning the persecution, there are notably more countries supporting the persecution, which not only shows the need for international institutions to spearhead the effort in stopping acts of religious violence, but also serves as a warning for the international community that inaction truly costs lives. The realist ideals of these Muslim countries were put ahead of a potential means to intervene through shared identity, which point to how international institutions need to step in further to ensure intervention at all. The following chart summarizes the four case studies and helps to show trends among the reasons for a lack of intervention, showing which parts of the hypotheses ring true.

Greek War 18211829

Holocaust 19391945 Greeks pushed from native land and killed by Ottomans

Persecution of Jewish people by German government Lack of threat to immediate security or essential interest

Focus on winning war, disbelief, lack of common identity Mediation attempts, naval fleets, & assistance by Britain, France, and Russia Military, public verbal support, monetary aid

Rwandan Genocide 1994 Hutu violence against Tutsi because of ethnic differences Somali politics, lack of media coverage, low $ incentive to interfere UNAMIR, Ugandan military aid

Uyghur Persecution 2014 Violence towards and occupation of Turkic people by CCP Chinese information suppression; outside support Letter-writing; proposed sanctions

As shown by the chart and the summaries of the case study, there is no clear-cut way in looking at the threshold for intervention in religious persecution. Constructivists would argue that the threshold for intervention depends on some collective identity with the victims. While the inaction in the Greek War, Holocaust, and Rwandan Genocide all directly correlate to a lack of empathetic connection with the victims, the Uyghur Persecution shows that even in the eye of a collective religion, countries often prioritize their realist ideals. Furthermore, when the

constructivist argument does hold true in the case of the first three case studies, it is often masked by countries as a matter of self-interest or the realist approach to not intervene, in an attempt to seem less discriminatory. Due to the inherent nature of this research in religious intervention, the majority of intervention and the lack thereof stems from collective identity, echoing the sentiment of the constructivist ideals. However, as the complete picture of these case studies reveals, a lack of identity might prevent a country from helping the victims of a genocide, but even when a collective identity exists, intervention is not guaranteed if there are no underlying benefits for the countries involved. Realists hypothesize that the threshold of intervention lies within unitary states or leaders and is dependent on self-interest. These case studies show how intrinsically linked realism and constructivism are to one another–– intervening in persecution stemming from a country with a different identity could turn the domestic political climate against the government, which would then make intervening against their self-interest. Cases like these, which were echoed in the Holocaust and the lack of intervention in the Rwandan Genocide, underscore the importance of governments putting their needs aside. Unfortunately, however, as these cases show time and time again through cycles of violence, governments rarely do so. In these studies, both the constructivist and realist perspectives of intervention seem to hold true, and with caveats, are dependent both on the case and the level of intervention needed. However, embedded in all of the constructivist reasons to not intervene, are realist reasons as well. These interwoven ideas are seen through the Holocaust, in which the United States did not intervene because of a lack of shared religion with the persecuted Jews but also for self-interest of remaining neutral. All of the cases, as well as the explanation for the realist and constructivist hypotheses, show why liberal institutionalism is important. Liberal institutionalists look towards the laws that already exist that allow for intervention, including the human rights norms of doing so. After the Greek War and the Holocaust, the international community scrambled to create laws and norms for intervention in the first place, like the International Bill of Rights and the R2P. Once these existing laws were established, the international community tried to increase their role in intervention against religious persecution. While this falls in line with the liberal institutionalist claim, the examples of both failed attempts of intervention in the Rwandan Genocide and the failure of the United Nations to get more than 22 countries to condemn Uyghur persecution show that while the international community might have taken a larger role, it was not necessarily effective nor beneficial. This was seen in the Rwandan Genocide. Yet again, too much trust was placed in international institutions rather than individual governments intervening as aggressively as possible. Additionally, while countries might lean on liberal institutionalism as a way of dictating their threshold, too much stagnation in definition and bureaucracy limits their effectiveness, especially as unprecedented forms of persecution are cropping up each day. In many ways, this research serves as a starting point in educating the general public and government about the holes and fallacies within religious persecution. Governments are left to their own devices to figure out whether to intervene, but often turn to realist or constructivist reasons as a way to justify inaction. When the international community does step in and

governments use existing precedent however, like the liberal institutional hypothesis, more harm is often done. The goal of this research was to pinpoint a threshold of when governments decide to intervene so that the international community may work on lowering this threshold to be more proactive in situations of wrongful killings. While the thresholds certainly vary and cannot be pinpointed, being acutely aware of possible outcomes in which a government may shirk the R2P allows citizens to hold their governments responsible. Regardless of the justification for lack of intervention, governments all over the world must work to uniformly lower the threshold of intervention. Only then will we be able to break out of the cycle of religious persecution and unjust genocide.

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The Tinker et al. v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (DMICSD) case is about a student’s right to “‘political expression’ asserted [via the] right to wear black armbands during school hours and at classes in order to demonstrate to other students that petitioners were mourning because of the death of United States soldiers in Vietnam and to protest that war [itself]” (Tinker v. Des Moine 516). Tinker’s side argued that the school officials’ ban on protesting the Vietnam War with armbands was encroaching on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. DMICSD claimed that they were acting in good faith; they were concerned the protest would disrupt the school day. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit Court’s decision. Tinker et al. had the right to protest while on school grounds and that the DMICSD’s decision to ban armbands violated the 1st and 14th Amendment rights. Although this case was decided over 50 years ago, the sentiments expressed by Tinker and the majority opinion still apply to protest limitations enforced in high schools today. Now more than ever, schools should abide by the Tinker et al. v. DMICSD decision. Justice Fortas states in the case’s majority opinion that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des Moine 506). This belief has been established and upheld in many cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska. Within the last five to ten years, young adults have just begun to tackle –or at least acknowledge– some of the deeply rooted injustices that have plagued our country since it’s foundation. The liberties formed in Tinker et. al v. DMICSD allow children to appropriately express their opinion while in school. The Tinker case also drew strong congruities between Tinker et. al.’s, “… symbolic act, [which] is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,” and how “closely akin [it is] to 'pure speech' which, we [the Supreme Court] have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment,” (505-506). Even though the meaning of symbolic and pure speech has evolved over the last five decades, Tinker et. al v. DMICSD defined that both are to be protected by the First Amendment, even during class. Lastly, the Tinker case is monumental because it clearly defines whether a student protest would be suitable on school grounds. If the protest “…would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’” then students cannot host such disruption(s) to the school day (Tinker et. al 509). This is one of the most crucial aspects of the case because this statement eliminates ostentatious scholars who, as Justice Black so eloquently describes, are the “… loudest-mouthed, but maybe not [the] brightest” (Tinker v. Des Moine 525). Because of the clear specifications outlined in Tinker et. al v. DMICSD, student protests since the 1960’s have been early identified and permitted on school grounds. Despite the stunning arguments in favor of Tinker et. al., Justice Black and Justice Harlow offer opposing opinions on this case. J. Black alleges that the majority’s main argument utilizes what he calls the “‘reasonableness-due-process-McReynolds’ constitutional test” (521). This is a

false claim for many reasons. The main reason is that the mere use of the word ‘reasonable’ does not constitute the resurrection of an era. J. Black offers no true explanation or evidence to support this outrageous claim other than one quote from Justice Fortas’ majority opinion. Justice Black also bases the bulk of his argument on non-sequiturs, irrelevant cases, and digressions. For example, he begins with a self-evident statement, but quickly switches to a case that barely connects to Tinker et. al v. DMICSD. From there, J. Black hurriedly transitions to a platitude with a lack of purpose, just to finish on another bromide that fails to tie in the aforementioned case or enlighten the reader since before the deviation occurred. While J. Black fumbled for a valid stance, Justice Harlow vehemently disagreed with the core issue of the Tinker case; he believed that school officials had complete jurisdiction in whether students can host protests. While J. Harlow makes a sound point, it is simply not feasible. Students are often protesting a view that school officials oppose. There is also the possibility of students protesting against officials themselves, which would cause an obvious conflict of interest. While Justice Harlow and Black make wellintentioned objections to the majority opinion of Tinker et. al v. DMICSD, many of their objections fell flat compared to the facts and reasoning of the majority opinion. In conclusion, notwithstanding protests, Tinker et. al v. DMICSD created a solid foundation on which students have the freedom to protest with limitations. As long as their protests do not interrupt the school day, students can express their opinions within the classroom. Young adults are permitted to support the environment, protest police brutality, or discourage sexual harassment among one another. While some may object to this right, they must recognize the situation of most students. These are children who are unable to vote but are expected to be politically active in the future. While the amount of civic engagement varies for each person, everyone is expected to vote. Allowing students to protest maintains their passion to shape our democracy while keeping them in a safe, controlled environment rather than a potentially dangerous setting. Schools were made for learning. Although a significant amount of learning comes from a textbook, one of the best ways to learn is by shaping history yourself.

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)