THE CHOICE OF CIVILIZATION IS AT STAKE

Professor Andrzej Rychard , director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences, talks to Witold Żygulski .

How would you describe the Polish political scene today?

I think it is even more difficult to define than it might seem. Seemingly, there is a strong polarization; we have two opposing camps, but the nature of this conflict is no longer easy to read. This is because the division is already far wider than pure politics, it goes deeper. In my view, it has turned into a civilizational, or at least a systemic, dispute. It boils down to a debate and argument over whether Poland should move even further toward the West or, with all its anti-Russianism that is fully justified and understandable, it should move a bit more toward Eastern solutions. I think of what German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf once aptly observed, that in Western democracies there are clear procedures, while the outcome is unclear. A lack of democracy, on the other hand, is when it is the other way around: the result is clear, but the procedures are not. These are Eastern solutions. This happens when democratic institutions are treated only as a constraint and not as a means of stabilizing the social order, when political will is placed above the law.

This is the essential nature of the dispute in Poland today, regardless of how the various parties would like to define it. They call the two civilizations in different ways: politicians close to the [opposition] Civic Platform (PO) talk about their Western liberalism, the parties associated with the ruling United Right by no means claim that they want to push the country to the East in a mental and institutional sense, but only that they want to build a civilization grounded in values, tradition and history, based on what is particularly good for Poland and strengthens its sovereignty.

I do not believe that the group affiliated with the ruling camp centered around Law and Justice (PiS) today is acting against the Polish national interest. I assume that the vast majority of these politicians, especially the PiS leadership, think in terms of this interest, but they completely misdefine it. The steps that PiS is supposedly taking to increase Poland’s sovereignty are in fact weakening it. After all, Polish sovereignty is linked to being in the center of Europe, not to European peripherality.

Will this civilizational dispute become an essential axis of the election campaign in the current election year?

It certainly will, regardless of how the participants in the pre-election struggle portray it. The essence of this dispute comes down to a civilizational choice precisely.

It is important for the other participants in the electoral process - voters - to be aware of the choice they are making, to be able to read the nature of the political struggle. PiS would certainly completely disagree that we are faced with a choice between East and West, because it believes that it, too, wants to go West, but a West that it has defined itself.

An additional feature of the current debate is that both sides are unable to fully manage their own political camps. The opposition is still unable to speak with a reasonably unified voice, the ruling side is being torn apart by internal conflicts that are causing the so-called United Right to increasingly erode.

What will be the other crucial points of the election campaign?

The main focus of the upcoming, or, rather, already ongoing campaign lies both inside and outside the political field. First of all, it is difficult not to take into account the extremely important non-political context of inflation, still at very high levels and causing extreme anxiety in society. Until recently, the ruling team was very effective in reducing such public fears, which, by the way, it sometimes generated itself. But it has severely lost this ability in recent months.

Second, there are still smoldering fears about the COVID-19 pandemic.

Third and last, one cannot overlook the impact of the war in Ukraine on the elections, since it is unfolding directly across the Polish border. But this particular issue should not antagonize politicians or voters. I have to say that, for all my criticism - which I do not hide - of issues such as the way the ruling group has been diminishing the role of liberal democracy’s institutions, I have practically no remarks to make about the policy toward the Ukrainian crisis. It is a very good policy. And, there is also a certain, if only tacit, level of agreement across political divides. While Ukraine will certainly be an element of the election campaign in Poland, it does not look like it will be a source of any major dispute; all the significant groupings seem to agree on government policy on the matter.

On the other hand, political rivals will certainly argue about the methods of fighting inflation or the state’s preparedness for earlier and potential epidemic threats.

You spoke of a split in the United Right, visible for all to see, for instance in the way some votes go in the Sejm; will the ruling camp therefore be able to function as a monolith in the election campaign?

[Junior coalitionist] Solidarna Polska (United Poland) politicians led by Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro will certainly make some noticeable attempts to take a jab at PiS and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki himself. But when the time comes, the self-preservation instinct of politicians will turn out to be stronger than the desire of groups like Ziobro’s people to break away into political independence. I therefore predict that there is a greater likelihood that the entire ruling side will go forth together. Surely Ziobro can see that he has no chance to exist in the Polish parliament as an independent political force, as the results of polls [Solidarna Polska gets about 1-percent support in them] clearly prove.

opposition politicians. If this does not succeed, it will not be because of a lack of intellectual capacity, but a lack of political will. And this, in turn, will be interpreted by voters as an embarrassment, resulting in a demobilizing effect on the opposition’s potential electorate. To sum up: it will increase the likelihood of the ruling camp winning again.

PiS is pushing through a draft of amendments to the electoral law; do these stand a chance of gaining parliamentary support, and if so, what impact might they have on the outcome of the fall vote?

I think that, contrary to the prevailing critical opinion, these changes may come into effect. PiS is trying to convince people that the amendments are needed to increase electoral participation and ensure transparency in the election process; its opponents argue that the right wing wants

What is the situation among the opposition? Are these groups able to go to the elections together?

The opposition has so far given no signal that it is capable of going together to the fall elections, which weakens its political position immeasurably. This “together” might, of course, take various forms, starting with the strongest option of a single, joint electoral list. According to various analyses, which in my opinion are reliable, such an arrangement offers the best chance of gaining the largest representation in the parliament. The more lists, the fewer parliamentary seats will be won. Weaker variants of running together are also possible. By this I mean demonstrating that in practice, a vote for individual opposition parties will be a vote for a common program, not just a vote to remove the current rulers from power. If such a message sent continuously reached the voters effectively, then even regardless whether a single common list is put forward, this alone would already show that a vote cast for the opposition would not be a wasted vote. But this is not happening either, as the opposition is not sending such a message. This is its biggest problem today.

Given the low likelihood of an agreement being reached on a single joint list, the opposition must now find an intelligent way out to show that even without a single formal list, the opposition parties are somehow together. This is not an insurmountable task; after all, there are people with a lot of political experience and a lot of class among to reach a larger portion of the electorate in this way. However, sociological analyses show that these changes are not particularly productive for the ruling party’s interests. The Batory Foundation’s experts even believe that they could harm PiS, and if they have any positive effects, these will be minimal. Meanwhile, the costs, both financial and organizational, would be very high. Besides, if the aim is to increase voter participation by encouraging more elderly people to go to the polls, the interpretation that PiS wants to increase its holdings inevitably comes to mind, since all analyses show that the older electorate votes for the ruling group. One might ask why the ruling camp is not turning to young people. This is a group with a low voter turnout; it has been a little better recently, but it is still low. The answer is obvious: there is growing dissatisfaction among young Poles with the direction in which those in power are steering the country. PiS therefore wants election commissions to be located closer to churches, rather than, for example, closer to universities. This clearly shows the intentions behind the draft amendments to the election law.

Will the current fierce conflict, including within the ruling camp, over the European Union funds due to Poland under the National Recovery Plan (KPO) also be visible in the election campaign?

Of course it will. The opposition must not let itself fall into the trap of saying that if the legislative changes neces- sary for KPO implementation are adopted and the money flows in, this will be a great success. I would say, although I know it sounds a bit utopian, that what is needed is to reduce the level of the opposition’s emotionality and involvement regarding this problem. Opposition politicians should treat money from EU programs as a normal thing, and a situation in which this money does not reach Polish recipients as a pathology. Therefore, there should not be any debate on whether the opposition should support the government’s proposed legal changes necessary for Poland to meet the EU “milestones” that condition the disbursement of money from the KPO. Of course it should support them, and in supporting them constantly point out that if the fate of the money for Poland depends on the opposi- tion’s position, it shows the weakness of a government that is unable to obtain for Poland what the country is absolutely entitled to. This would be a blow to the fundamental element of the image PiS builds for itself, that of a party that is effective in defending Poland’s interests.

At the same time, I am not at all convinced that there is a 100-percent guarantee that the changes to the Supreme Court [passed by the Sejm in January] will eventually be adopted in Poland, and that the money will start flowing immediately. This is only the first step, the first milestone. There is still a long road ahead.

Another thing is that once the EU money reaches Poland, those in power will use it, first and foremost, to patch holes in the budget and rescue the state’s crisis-ridden finances. The funds will therefore make political life easier for the current ruling camp. The opposition must be prepared for this.

But is the issue of relations with the EU at all important to the PiS electorate?

Of course, there is a certain “core electorate” that will vote for their party whatever happens. This PiS core is actually more committed than the opposing side’s supporter group. But we never fully know how numerous this group is and how strong their political beliefs are. Undoubtedly, Poland’s attitude toward Europe will be an important element in the electoral struggle. However, I think that the messages sent out by those in power to appeal to their most faithful electorate, persuading them that the EU is dominated by Germany and that historical Polish-German relations make us fear and distrust it, that Europe wants to limit Polish sovereignty, do not really convince even right-wing voters. I have the impression that PiS politicians have a rather outdated image of their electorate, which in reality is somewhat different by now. After all, this electorate also derives unquestionable and tangible benefits from Poland’s EU membership, and anti-European rhetoric does not quite convince it.

Some polls show that the PiS electorate is visibly eroding; in 2019, 45 percent of PiS voters believed that their party would win the parliamentary elections but would not be able to govern on its own; by 2022, that percentage had risen to 80 percent. This is a clear sign of a lack of PiS supporters’ confidence in the party’s fitness. I would therefore be cautious about claiming that the dependability of the PiS electorate is unquestionable. We thus don’t know what might happen in a few months. Above all, we have to take into account that the current number of supporters is not enough for PiS to continue its independent rule. Some added value is needed, and that is what is at stake. And, a policy of attacking sexual minorities or the EU’s alleged Germanness is not a message that those who are hesitant about how to vote will buy. Rather, let’s face it, this electorate can effectively be bought literally - with a sizable sum of money, and not with ideological messages about German domination in Brussels or homosexuals lurking to destroy our sovereignty.

Where can PiS look for the “added value” you mentioned, i.e. new votes to support it?

It can delve even deeper into its traditional circles: the elderly, the less educated, residents of small towns or rural areas, but these are groups with significant voter participation. I don’t think the ruling party will be able to radically increase its hold in big cities or among the better educated. The opposition groups would have to make some kind of huge mistake. I therefore believe that PiS will continue to try to activate the residents of its traditional bastions.

Speaking of the opposition, is its electoral strategy clear to the Poles?

No, it is not. Voters are receiving signals from which one thing can be deduced: the most important thing to the opposition parties is their interests, position and future, rather than any desire to assume power in Poland and take responsibility for the country’s further development. This can be maliciously explained: after all, it is better to be a strong opposition group, receive funds from the state coffers and not be responsible for anything, than to have to deal with a whole host of problems left by the previous ruling team, for example, with regaining the development momentum of the Polish economy. A recent analysis by a Swiss research institute showed how dramatically Poland’s standing in the competitiveness ranking list has deteriorated. Among the 60 countries studied, we fell from 38th place to 50th. Without a competitive edge, Poland is doomed to development problems, that’s the most important thing. Meanwhile, there is no clear message from the opposition about what needs to be done to change this dire situation. Nor do we hear anything about problems that cannot be solved during one [four-year] parliamentary term. The opposition would lose nothing if it started talking to those in power about precisely such issues, concerning climate change, energy policy, and environmental, military, epidemic or educational challenges - tasks that need to be solved together, regardless of who happens to be at the helm of state power today. Debates on issues to be solved in the perspective of 10, 15 or 20 years are consistently lacking in Polish political life. And it is precisely such discussions that could attract new supporters to individual parties, as well as motivating those who are inactive voters. Instead, we only see thinking about terms in office on both sides of the political stage, and thinking about one’s own party.

PiS can be accused of having chosen the wrong direction for Poland, but it cannot be accused of not having defined that direction. In the case of the opposition, on the other hand, this direction is still vague. Besides being “anti-PiS,” something positive needs to be presented. The opposition is not offering any clear picture of what the future Poland should be like.

Polls unanimously indicate that PiS might win the fall elections but has little chance of gaining the parliamentary majority needed to govern alone; will we be doomed to a minority government and permanent chaos? After a possible electoral success, PiS will do everything to prevent a minority government scenario. It will enter into some strange alliance with, for example, the radical-nationalist Confederation, which there is every indication will enter parliament again. Or, it will skillfully - and it has already done this effectively in the current term - pluck some small number of deputies from other groups. Again, much depends on the opposition’s unified attitude. Consistently acting together is not only in its own interest, but is needed above all to get Poland on the appropriate side in that civilizational choice of which I have spoken.