Refugees Must Keep All Options Open

Professor Paweł Kaczmarczyk, director of the Center for Migration Research, University of Warsaw, talks to Witold Żygulski.

In recent weeks we have been dealing with an

There is, of course, one thing in common: we are dealing with a massive influx of people who are, directly or indirectly, victims of warfare. But that is where the similarities end. The first fundamental difference is the temporal framework. The influx of refugees from North Africa, first to Turkey and then to the countries of southern Europe, was a process spread over months or even years. Now, however, we are dealing with an extremely rapid process. In Poland alone, more than 2.2 million refugees have arrived in a month, while the total number of people who have fled Ukraine already exceeds 4 million.

Another difference is that the current movement of people threatened by war into the European Union is happening extremely easily. Even before the Russian invasion, Ukrainian citizens were able to enter Poland freely under very liberal regulations. The Polish labor market was wide open to them. The EU also launched protection procedures that allowed Ukrainian citizens not only to enter its territory, but also to move freely between member states, without activating the refugee status application process, which is formally complicated and takes a very long time.

The third and most striking difference is the demographic structure of the current wave of refugees. Data from the registration of Ukrainian citizens in the Polish PESEL system, with a total of over 800,000 applications as of the beginning of April, shows that 49.5 percent of them are children, while among adults 44.5 percent are women. The share of men and elderly people does not exceed a single-digit number. This is because men have stayed to fight the Russian invaders, and even those who would have liked to leave have been unable to do so due to exit restrictions imposed by the authorities in Kiev.

During the 2015 migration wave, the opposite was true. At the time, we were frightened by images of numerous groups of young men from North Africa and a few other countries such as Afghanistan making their way into Europe, but research and analysis shows that this was primarily an offshoot of cultural conditioning and the migration strategies of men trying to be the first to get to Europe, hoping to someday bring their families over. All the data from refugee camps at the time suggests that the demographic structure of that migration was radically different from that of today.

Let me start from the fourth difference between the 2015 migration and the current one, which I have not yet mentioned. It is no coincidence that most of the Ukrainian refugees, about 60 percent, end up in Poland. It is not just a matter of a long-shared border; even before the war broke out, we had a large group of Ukrainians in Poland who had been connected to the Polish labor market for what was often a long time. Their number was estimated at 1.5-2 million people. We can therefore safely say that we had a large Ukrainian diaspora, incomparably larger than in any other European country. It is capable of absorbing a new large group of compatriots. It was evident that the Ukrainians already in Poland immediately, in the first days of the war, joined in helping the refugees by organizing their stay. Moreover, they will continue to assist the new refugees, helping them not only to find a place to live, but also to obtain temporary employment in Poland.

As for the future, we continually analyze the phenomenon of Ukrainians returning home and the directions of their departure to other countries. We estimate the number of those who remain in Poland today at about 1.5 million. However, we can already observe a small but visible wave of returns to Ukraine. How it will develop depends, above all, on how the war situation will develop and, in the event that the fighting ends, what the new reality of the Ukrainian state will be like, what the political, economic and social situation will be.

Today we can only speculate on this. In my opinion, three scenarios are possible. The first one sees us dealing with a prolongation of the war and a kind of stabilization. Then we can expect that the population of refugees will not increase dynamically, and probably about 1.5 million people, mostly women, will stay in Poland. In practice, this would be economic emigration, combining employment with various forms of assistance from the host country. After 2014, i.e. after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the armed conflict in the Donbass, we already had to deal with this. Few of the Ukrainians who came to Poland then chose the refugee path with all the relevant procedures; the vast majority chose economic emigration.

The second scenario assumes an end to the war and a quick, efficient and decisive reconstruction of Ukraine. In that case, in my opinion, there would be a massive wave of returns, obvious in view of the fact that Ukrainian families are separated. It would also probably be fostered by a massive movement to rebuild the country.

The third scenario is if the war ended but the reconstruction process was slow and difficult. Then a significant proportion of those who have come to Poland would probably decide to extend their stay. Migration could turn into something long-term, perhaps even taking the form of settlement.

Regardless of the development of events, the stock of immigrants in Poland will be much higher than before the out- break of the war. The question is whether we will be talking about a few hundred thousand people or a few million. Unfortunately, we cannot exclude the latter option.

Of course, I don’t know about all of the government’s actions or their complexity, but I assume that they are ongoing, comprehensive and based on the best possible knowledge. I also think that they must be of a long-term nature. I fear, however, that on the one hand, they are somewhat overdue; on the other, they are not as deep as might have been hoped. What I find most lacking is something that was crucial in the first weeks of the war, namely an efficient response to the crisis situation. It is not even a question of creating new state institutions, but simply of making good use of those that already exist, at various levels of administration, both central and regional, of an active stance of the crisis management center. Meanwhile, what was happening in Poland was a spontaneously organized grassroots help operation launched by ordinary people: Poles, but also - as I’d like to underline - Ukrainians already living in Poland. It involved citizens, NGOs, international organizations and private business, which was also heavily involved in helping the refugees from the first days of the war. Ukrainians were provided with food, a place to sleep, their basic needs were satisfied, their relocation within Poland and further travel to third countries facilitated and, finally, they received help with the formal procedures for the legalization of temporary residence. Local governments, especially in large cities, were well prepared to act on behalf of migrants; they had dealt with them before, although obviously not on such a large scale.

By comparison, the actions of the authorities can be considered insufficient, they appeared relatively late, there was - and probably still is - a lack of coordination of assistance.

First of all, the authorities should have acted effectively to provide the refugees with a place to live, not just for a few days after they had fled the war zone, but for a longer period of time. Meanwhile, a bizarre situation has arisen: most of the refugees from Ukraine have found a place to live with private individuals. This was especially the case in the first phase of the crisis. This solution gave the government and local governments some time to organize themselves, to create a housing base for refugees. But more weeks have passed and no solution to the problem is in sight. We are reaching a point where both the refugees themselves and their Polish or Ukrainian “temporary hosts” are on the verge of endurance, mentally or physically as well as financially. Aid has a cost; it is not only time and a place, but also very real spending to buy not only food, clothing or personal hygiene products, but also all those goods that the refugees did not manage to take with them when fleeing Ukraine. It is therefore necessary to create opportunities for them to leave their temporary homes and find a place for longer.

The housing market in Poland was not working well before the war, the rental system was far from efficient, which was especially experienced by young people starting their careers outside their place of residence; now, not only have prices skyrocketed, but there is simply no housing. This means that the spontaneous help which the Ukrainians and their hosts imagined would last a few days has lasted several weeks and may last much longer.

The second issue is education. This is an extremely controversial topic today and there is a lot of discussion about the ideas of the Ministry of Education and Science. There seems to be an attempt to deal with the problem at the lowest possible cost or to shift the cost to local governments. Especially the intention to force Ukrainian children into the Polish education system and Polish curricula seems dangerous and senseless. For the vast majority of the refugees, their stay in Poland was supposed to be temporary; some of them are already returning, even though there are still military operations around their places of residence. I hope that there is close cooperation between the two countries’ ministries of education today, so that schooling in Poland makes sense for the young refugees’ continued education in their homeland.

Healthcare is another issue. There are people coming to Poland who have not been vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 at all, or if they have, it was without booster shots. We do not know the scale of this, but we do know that the vaccination level in Ukraine was much lower than in Poland. We also know that since the beginning of the immigration wave, there have been numerous cases of infection. As for vaccinations, it is not just about those related to the COVID-19 pandemic, but also other kinds, and this concerns children in particular.

There are problems related to general access to medical care, but also much more specific issues; from the information we are getting, there is a serious over-representation of people with disabilities among the refugees. Specific, sometimes 24-hour care is often needed. There are wounded people as well, who also require specialized care. Finally, a significant number of refugees need psychological help after the tremendous stress they have endured. It seems to me that we are still unable to fully cope with all of this.

In last place - completely deliberately - I would mention the labor market. First of all, it is absorptive, there is still a shortage of workers, and secondly, the experience of the last decade shows that Ukrainian workers find their way around it very well. They have been a significant and valued group in at least several sectors of the economy (construction, transport, trade, etc.). This does not mean, however, that one should not quickly and efficiently act for even better involvement of Ukrainians in work in Poland. We should also try to make sure that working at Polish companies gives them an opportunity to gain additional professional competencies which they will be able to use after returning home to Ukraine.

The final thing that is necessary is a clear message about how the government intends to deal with the crisis. In my opinion, it is very important to explain to Poles what we are dealing with and why we are doing it, what the prospects are, as well as to make it clear that coping with the current crisis will require costs and sacrifices. Poles need to be informed about what help they can count on from the authorities. This is extremely important also to help avoid giving ground to populist parties and movements that undoubtedly might try to use the current crisis for their political goals and short-term gains.

As I said, everything depends on how the war situation develops and what happens after the war ends. If more refugees from Ukraine stay in Poland permanently, it will obviously mean a drastic demographic change in both countries. In Poland, an aging population would become less of a problem, while the bigger problem would be ensuring that the new members of the community have access to public services and that they enter the labor market in the best possible way. However, I would be very far from sketching any such scenarios today; the fundamental issue is what to do here and now, how to provide support and assistance to these people. As migration researchers, we always try to emphasize the need to avoid situations in which we try to bind Ukrainian immigrants to Poland by force, whether through the education system, teaching them Polish and Polish culture, or simply by encouraging them to stay. We should create conditions that leave them with various options open, so that these people can return to Ukraine at any time, but also - if they wish - stay in Poland for longer.