The Warsaw Institute Review Issue 3 2020

qr. 3. 2020 no. 14 ISSN 2543-9839

Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area

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Editorial

Dear Readers,

T

he current issue of the quarterly includes articles by leading Polish experts on current world events, bilateral relations between countries as well as the historical and cultural contexts. I especially recommend the article by Grzegorz Kuczyński on the background and significance of the growing pro-democracy protests in Belarus, which began after the rigged presidential election in August this year. The subject of the Belarusian protests against Alexander Lukashenko’s regime is also approached

by Jakub Lachert in his article “Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area.”

We also report on the so-called silent war of the 21st century.

In the interview “Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century,” Kamil Basaj tells us about the threats which can nowadays be observed on the Internet.

The article addresses the issues of manipulation, information warfare, and extensive disinformation operations.

Furthermore, the review includes two texts on the current situation in the Middle East. Marcin Krzyżanowski describes in detail the situation in Iran, which, as a result of numerous internal disturbances, may now be forced to adopt a new strategy based on talks with the West. Karolina Olszowska analyzes the Turkish-Russian alliances which continue to face problems such as the clash of interests in the Black Sea region

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Editorial

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and the Caucasus in addition to the wars in Syria and Libya, where two countries support the opposite sides of the conflict. The author attempts to investigate the existing situation and forecast future actions of Russia and Turkey in the context of their bilateral relations.

I strongly encourage you to read all the articles!

Izabela Wojtyczka

Editor-in-Chief The Warsaw Institute Review

Editor-in-Chief Izabela Wojtyczka

izabela.wojtyczka@warsawinstitute.review

Editing Łukasz Biernacki Michał Kopański Translations Paweł Andrejczuk Aleksandra Iskra Aleksandra Tomaszewska Cover and Layout Katarzyna Dinwebel Jacek Kotela DTP and Printing www.sindruk.pl

Publisher

The Warsaw Institute Review Sp. z o.o.

Świętokrzyska 18/410, 00-052 Warsaw, Poland

www.warsawinstitute.review editor@warsawinstitute.review President Berenika Grabowska The opinions given and the positions held in the materials published in the Warsaw Institute Review solely reflect the views of the authors and cannot be equated with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland.

ISSN 2543-9839

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Public purpose co-financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic od Poland in the competition "Cooperation in the Field of Public Diplomacy 2020".

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Poland

Co-financed by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage from the Promotion of Culture Fund.

Partners: Foundation based in Warsaw, Poland

Foundation based in United States

www.warsawinstitute.org

www.warsaw.institute

The Warsaw Institute Review

Contents

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49

86

Belarus

Disinformation

culture

Grzegorz Kuczyński:

Kamil Basaj:

Izabela Wojtyczka Maja Borowicz:

Belarus: the war for the Russian world

Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century

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International Relations Daniel Kawczyński The Importance of Future BritishPolish Relations

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International Relations Julia Grzybowska Alexander Ben Zvi Building Peace in the Persian Gulf

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Belarus Grzegorz Kuczyński Belarus: the war for the Russian world

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Belarus Jakub Lachert Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area

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Baltic region Krzysztof Kamiński The Baltic Fund – A New Idea for the Region

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Middle East Marcin Krzyżanowski Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US?

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Disinformation (INTERVIEW) Izabela Wojtyczka, Kamil Basaj Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century

Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism

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Geopolitics Paweł Paszak China – USA. The Cold War 2.0?

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Geopolitics Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD Stealth War

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Geopolitics Paweł Pawłowski A Difficult Transatlantic Cooperation

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Middle East Karolina Wanda Olszowska The intricacies of (un)lasting Turkish-Russian alliances

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Culture (INTERVIEW) Izabela Wojtyczka Maja Borowicz Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism

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History Rev. Sylwester Suchoń The “silent” pearl of Southern Poland

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International Relations

The Importance of Future British-Polish Relations

Daniel Kawczyński

Global Britain is a new era for British-Polish relations, and an opportunity for Warsaw to capitalize on a strategic – and sovereign – relationship.

L

ast year Poles and Brits celebrated the 250th anniversary of the first Polish diplomatic presence in the United Kingdom. Since 1769, our two nations have had multitude of challenges and opportunities. Looking merely at the last century – we had to collectively face and defeat the German Nazi aggression, and 50 years later we conquered communism which

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presented the prospectus of uniting under the then European Economic Community. In the 21st century, Poland and the UK are facing new pathways and roadblocks. London is on a course of departing from a flawed European project dominated by a Franco-German alliance, whilst Warsaw looks to regain its historical leadership in Central and Eastern Europe. These opportunities and challenges can be mapped out by

The Importance of Future British-Polish Relations

A LONDON BUS DRIVES PAST NEAR THE BANK OF ENGLAND IN THE CITY OF LONDON, UK, OCTOBER 16, 2020.

examining contemporary British-Polish relations through the political, defense, and economic lenses.

Political

Britain is leaving the European Union, not Europe. Global Britain is here to seek influence globally, including in the Central and Eastern Europe region within and outside the EU. Poland has successfully showcased its ability to be a leader and seek influence in this area. The Visegrad Group’s influence in EU policymaking or the Three Seas Initiative’s ability to make Atlanticism attractive again throughout the region, are emblematic of this. Closer British-Polish ties in this region are thus crucial. British presence in CEE and its projects such as the Three Seas Initiative can strengthen the prospects of a “Transatlantic Triangle” cooperation

© Facundo Arrizabalaga (PAP/EPA)

Britain is leaving the European Union, not Europe. format emerging between WarsawLondon-Washington, in which mutual benefits can be easily identified. Firstly, closer cooperation with Washington on specific foreign policy areas (in this case approach to CEE) could contribute to a future favorable US-UK trade deal.

Secondly, Poland could use the V4 (which declared its willingness to take leadership in the currently lifeless EU-US trade negotiations) as a tool to shape a favorable common EU approach to both the US and the UK. Finally, the Transatlantic Triangle could collectively curb the domination of 3/2020

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© Jason Alden POOL (PAP/EPA)

International Relations

BRITISH PRIME MINISTER BORIS JOHNSON GESTURES AS HE DELIVERS A SPEECH ON “UNLEASHING BRITAIN’S POTENTIAL” AT THE OLD ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE IN LONDON, UK, FEBRUARY 3, 2020.

the Franco-German machine in Europe.

Consequently, it could challenge projects, which threaten the national security of its members.

Additionally, there are a number of projects aiming to strengthen the NorthSouth infrastructure and the trade link between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, which were previously neglected, but now, thanks to projects such as the Three Seas Fund, may become an attractive opportunity for British investors.

Establishing a new cooperation format through closer Polish-British ties may also curtail perilous Chinese trade power, especially in CEE. The success of the Three Seas, with joint British-American support, could be a key factor to convincing CEE countries to be wary of Chinese-led projects like the 17+1 Cooperation and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, and primarily focus on enhancing transatlantic ties.

Defense

Britain is well-versed in its understanding of the Russian threat at NATO’s Eastern flank. In intra-EU diplomacy, London 8

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lobbied together with Warsaw to ensure continued EU sanctions against Russia.

Now, as a sovereign diplomatic player, Britain remains persistent in pursuing a balanced policy towards Russia.

This was demonstrated recently by the Prime Minister’s call for a transparent investigation into the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. Global Britain’s hard line on Russian interference could be supported by an increased British presence at the Eastern flank. There are over 150 British soldiers stationed on Polish soil and a discussion to strenuously lobby for more British troops could therefore be considered in the Polish defense discourse.

Equally, hybrid warfare is another area in which Poland and Britain find common interest. The hacking and foreign interference in elections as well as misinformation and fake news have become some of the main tools of modern warfare and must be treated with upmost importance. The collective response to hybrid threats is widely dispersed across different international and regional organizations such as the EU, NATO, and the UN, providing groundwork to

The Importance of Future British-Polish Relations facilitate closer bilateral cooperation between the Poles and the Brits.

In a coordinated approach, Poland could continue to raise awareness of cyberattacks on EU platforms i.e. PESCO. Warsaw has shown the ability to effectively lobby for PESCO not to duplicate NATO’s competencies, thus it successfully uses its membership in the EU to align the bloc with broader transatlantic security interests. Whereas, the UK could lobby for the common cause in the UN Security Council, which Poland recently departed after its two-year elected tenure.

Lastly, during NATO summits, both Warsaw and London could speak in a united and coordinated voice on this topic.

Trade

Last but certainly not least – trade. Poland has been named the most businessfriendly country in the Central European region, and Britain has successfully recognized that. According to a 2019 report from Deloitte, three out of four companies owned or co-owned by British investors planned to increase their investment outlays in Poland. Moreover, UK investors perceive Poland positively due to the “size of its economy and its growing integration with the global economy.” UK companies invested PLN 48 billion in Poland between 1995 and 2017, growing Poland’s GDP by 15 billion in 2017. BP, AVIVA, Imperial Brands , Rolls-Royce, Prudential and Primark are just few among the many British companies that have seized on the opportunities that lie in Polish-British trade relations.

From a superficial perspective, Brexit in its early stages may be perceived by some as a challenge to future trade relations, as businesses may have to slightly recalibrate their activities. However, every new change brings room for new opportunities – Global Britain will be able to trade with the whole world and not suffer from

Poland has been named the most business-friendly country in the Central European region, and Britain has successfully recognized that.

Brussels’ interventions whilst Poland could tap into the Commonwealth’s network to boost its global trade, while inviting British companies to continue to invest their capital over the Vistula river.

Shaping post-Brexit trade relations should also be facilitated by regional agencies and trade bodies that highlight investment opportunities not only in Warsaw, Kraków or Łódź, but also in cities like Piotrków Trybunalski where FDI could drastically improve the lives of hard-working Poles.

Global Britain has the chance to create thousands of jobs and boost infrastructure without having to pay billions to a regional organization dominated by foreign interests, hindering the true potential of Polish-British relations.

Conclusion

As outlined, there is tremendous space for closer cooperation in the political, defense and trade realms. The latter in particular is a policy sphere in which this potential is most evident and provides a model for strengthening British-Polish relations. It is imperative that Polish policymakers examine the opportunities afforded by Brexit, which have been wrongfully labelled as setbacks to London’s ties with Warsaw.

Daniel Kawczyński October 2020 3/2020

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International Relations

Building Peace in the Persian Gulf

Julia Grzybowska's interview with Ambassador Alexander Ben Zvi

On August 13, 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a very special peace agreement. As per the document, the UAE will officially become the third Arab country to normalize its relations with Israel. In an interview with The Warsaw Institute Review, H.E. Mr. Alexander Ben Zvi – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel to the Republic of Poland, explained the importance of this step and talked about recent developments and threats in the Middle East.

Julia Grzybowska: “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People”, proposed by the White House and President Trump’s administration, states that “It creates a path to prosperity, security, and dignity for all involved.

If the parties can agree on this framework as a basis for future negotiations, the potential for both the Israelis

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and the Palestinians and the region is unlimited.” What are the opinions of Israel, and, if we may ask, what is your opinion on the plan concerning both Israeli and Palestinian interests?

Alexander Ben Zvi: Israel perceives President Trump’s initiative as a starting point for further bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Any action requires a starting point, and the “Peace to Prosperity” plan certainly is one.

© Israeli Embassy in Poland

ALEXANDER BEN ZVI

Security is crucial for Israelis, consequently, the plan was adopted. Palestine did not acknowledge it and refused to normalize ties. The “1967 borders” are too dangerous to be established today, due to hostile neighborhoods. As per the “game theory,” there are three possible outcomes: win-win, win-lose, and lose-lose. In my opinion, the optimal solution is the latter one. Both sides need to give up something in order to end the conflict. Israel already said what it is willing to surrender on two occasions – in 2000 and 2008. The Palestinians never did.

Some US presidential election forecasts suggest that Joe Biden can win the Electoral College. In case of his victory –

what is the future of “Peace to Prosperity” plan, proposed by Donald Trump?

Israel will work with any US administration. The USA is our strategic partner and one of the few states that can offer a real solution.

Referring to that, could you please present your opinion on the role of the USA in the region?

The USA is a major player in the Middle East and a major donor of economic aid – you can observe this in Jordan or Egypt, for example. Furthermore, the Americans are present in Syria, but in a different capacity.

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International Relations Without any doubt, they are our primary strategic partner and a vital intermediary in the Middle East. Our first agreement in this region was concluded with Egypt and later with Jordan. I am certain that they would not be possible without the American assistance and so is the case with the recent Israel-UAE peace deal, announced on August 13, 2020.

I am happy to confirm that even Poland had an indirect role in this particular agreement. Some useful contacts were established during the February 2019 Warsaw Conference (the Warsaw Process).

Our Prime Minister was there in addition to prominent individuals from the UAE, allowing them to discuss multiple significant matters. This is why I can now say that Poland has indeed contributed to peacebuilding in the Middle East.

How important is this agreement for Israel and the whole Middle East?

Extremally important. This is the third agreement on diplomatic relations between Israel and an Arab State. We had relations with other Arab countries in the past, but they were not full diplomatic relations.

Moreover, we had some agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania, but they were limited in scope and due to some political reasons we were forced to amend them later in time.

This specific agreement is not only significant because the UAE is a strong player in the Persian Gulf but also because it proves an important point that peace between Israel and Arab countries or even Israel and the Muslim world is possible.

Unfortunately, most Muslims countries perceive us as an enemy. We do not have a good explanation for this situation.

The UAE is a central player in region and thanks to the agreement with Israel, other Arab countries can notice that we are 12

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not the enemy nor are we are the biggest threat to them. Instead, we think that they should note that it is Iran that poses a real threat to the whole Arab world. Combing efforts instead of fighting is not a new idea of ours. For instance, our former president Shimon Peres, in the book entitled “The New Middle East,” explained how fruitful could combining financial possibilities of all Arab states with the technological capabilities of Israel could possibly be.

In the spirit of this idea, the Israel-UAE treaty broadens the medical cooperation between our states in the face of COVID-19 crisis.

How are other neighbors of Israel likely to react to the aforementioned agreement?

I am sure that neither Iran, Qatar nor Palestinians will like it. Nowadays less and less people think that having good relations with Israel is a real problem for Arab states. However, we are now observing that modern countries of the Middle East are focusing on their own interests and not Arab interests in general.

They are beginning to take interest in Israel.

How are Hamas and Hezbollah likely to respond to the agreement?

With regards to Hamas, shortly after the Israel-UAE peace agreement was announced, we had some rocket attacks and incendiary balloons being sent against Israel in order to burn the fields close to the border. Hamas tried to escalate the situation in the southern border to provoke Israel’s reaction to later communicate to the rest of world that Israel is the aggressor. This was also done to request further financial and political support from other Arab countries.

For now, Hezbollah is not our main concern – they currently have their own problems including issues in Syria and the explosion in Beirut, which put them in

Building Peace in the Persian Gulf a very uncomfortable position. Certainly, they will come back and attack again, just like when they had tried to infiltrate the territory of Israel before the Israel-UAE peace deal was announced.

Will the agreement change the balance of power in the region?

Yes, to some extent. After Egypt and Jordan and now the UAE, we hope that more countries will follow these steps and eventually we will wake up in a completely new Middle East.

Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the most important one in the Middle East right now. The disputed territory is relatively small, the victims on both sides are small in numbers – it is, however, a big PR issue both domestically and globally. Palestinians are spending so much on the conflict with Israel that they do not have enough funds for their own citizens, schools and hospitals. Fighting Israel is nothing more than just a political move to create a false external enemy and then blame it for everything bad that happens, thus also keeping own citizens under control.

For us, Iran is a strategic threat. Any country which is ready to peacefully coexist with Israel would experience a mutually beneficial cooperation. We are one of the leading countries in terms of start-ups, technology and agriculture, which all happen to be areas in which Arab countries could use a hand – we are to contribute if only they would be interested . We do so in Africa, in Latin America, why not in the Middle East?

Before the announcement of the Israel-UAE agreement, the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UAE met with officials from Iran. Why do you think

Modern countries of the Middle East are focusing on their own interests and not Arab interests in general. They are beginning to take interest in Israel. this happened? Is the UAE likely to become a regional intermediary?

Not really. I presume that this meeting was just one of the previously scheduled consultations. For us, Iran is a strategic threat. If they would eventually like to speak with us, they need to stop stating that Israel should cease to exist as a state over and over again. Secondly, they need to discontinue funding people and organizations which use rockets against Israel.

Can you predict the development of other agreements in the region?

“Prophecy has been taken from prophets and given to fools,” says the Talmud I am not a prophet nor a fool that is why I do not want to guess – it is simply not possible to predict. It has been mentioned several times in the media that other Gulf countries could be next and I hope that this is true – Oman, , Sudan – it is a controversial yet an important matter. If we work discretely on such agreements and do not announce them to a broader public, we will have a better chance to achieve positive results – that is why we all need to wait and observe.

If someone wants to talk to us, they know how to find us. I hope that this agreement is just a first step towards a permanent peace in the Middle East.

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Belarus

Belarus: the war for the Russian world

Grzegorz Kuczyński

The presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, was officially won by incumbent President Alexander Lukashenko.

However, there is no doubt that this election was rigged – which triggered protests on a scale previously unseen in an independent Belarus.

For two weeks, there was a high chance that Lukashenko would be overthrown.

These hopes were put on hold because the Kremlin finally supported the Belarusian dictator, who then successfully managed to control the protests. Despite this, Alexander Lukashenko has lost the support of the majority of the country’s citizens and can only remain in power by using force.

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Belarus: the war for the Russian world

PEOPLE ATTEND A RALLY IN SUPPORT OF THE BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION TO PROTEST AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS IN MINSK, BELARUS, AUGUST 18, 2020.

T

he developments of the crisis in Belarus are of key importance for all postSoviet states. Overthrowing Moscow’s autocratic ally would represent a disaster for Russia and a bad example for others. As of today, Belarus is a fundamental element of the so-called ‘Russkiy mir’ (‘Русский мир’, lit. ‘the Russian world’) – a civilization area centered around Moscow and united not only by political, military, and economic ties, but also by autocratic methods of governing and lack of freedoms characteristic for developed democracies.

An outburst of dissatisfaction with Lukashenko in Belarus should not come

© Yauhen Yerchak (PAP/EPA)

as a surprise after the rigged presidential elections in August this year. Already during the campaign, unprecedented signs of large-scale social mobilization began to appear. President Lukashenko, just like other rulers, underestimated the influence of the coronavirus pandemic on the attitudes of Belarusians. It was COVID-19, or more precisely, the methods of the Belarusian regime to respond to the pandemic, that changed the mindset of a large part of Belarusian citizens towards the authorities and towards Lukashenko himself. It seems that the dictator has neglected the potential of the protest.

First of all, he rigged the election results on a scale that even many of his supporters were unable to accept. The official results were like a blow to the Belarusian society.

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Belarus

Belarus is of great strategic importance to Russia, particularly because it serves as a buffer separating Russia from NATO's eastern flank.

Secondly, the regime believed that the scenario would be repeated, as in many previous elections, and that in one day or two, at most, it will be possible to brutally suppress the spontaneous social protests in Minsk. However, this time, the situation turned out to be different, since the attacks of the police forces caused even greater outrage and resulted in hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets. Never in the history of independent Belarus has there been so many demonstrators taking to the streets of the country’s cities.

For several days, it seemed that Lukashenko’s power was actually at stake, especially because Russia has been very cautious in its reaction to the crisis.

After a change of tactics, Lukashenko finally managed to control the situation.

He chose to avoid brutality and violent repressions until the scale of the protests finally began to decrease. The regime then cautiously (but systematically) tightened its policy towards the protesters – especially towards the leadership of the opposition. Lukashenko was already much more self-confident at this point – after all, he already had Moscow’s support.

Out of all countries in the region, Russia is the main external player in this crisis; it is also a country that is most interested in the developments in Belarus.

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Why is Belarus so important to Russia?

Russia’s stance on the events in Belarus is influenced by a number of interrelated, sometimes contradictory geopolitical and internal issues. Yet what is most striking (and what makes the current situation different from, for example, two revolutions in Ukraine) is a whole range of similarities between Russia and Belarus’ regimes, making it impossible for the Kremlin to ignore the crisis of the Lukashenko regime. Vladimir Putin, just like the Belarusian dictator, has been ruling the country for many years (Lukashenko for twenty-six years and Vladimir Putin for twenty years). The models of government in both countries are based on a strong centralization of power and constitutional powers of the president and, importantly, on Lukashenko and Putin’s personal political powers. In both cases, the informal relations between the leaders and their subordinates, as well as within the governments, are more important than formal dependencies. That is why Putin can draw conclusions from the Belarusian crisis also for himself. Based on Lukashenko’s mistakes, he can take steps to avoid problems similar to the ones faced by the Belarusian leader. However, it is not only the ideological and political similarities between the two regimes that are at issue.

Belarus is of great strategic importance to Russia, particularly because it serves as a buffer separating Russia from NATO’s eastern flank, therefore pushing the potential threat away from Moscow.

Belarus is geographically the bridge through which the Polish, French, or German armies headed for Russia. But it was also through this area that the Russians marched to conquer Europe – both in the Tsarist and Soviet times.

Belarus is a key ally of Russia in its western direction. It is a loyal member of Moscow-dominated post-Soviet military,

Belarus: the war for the Russian world

WARSAW, SEPTEMBER 10, 2020. THE LEADER OF THE BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION, SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA, DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER THE MEETING WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIC PLATFORM.

political, and economic structures such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In military terms, Belarus is, in fact, part of the strategic area of Russia. The Belarusian army is de facto subordinated to the Russian Western Military District.

The Belarusian army is trained in Russia, while the Russians have strategic military facilities in Belarus.

Keeping Belarus in the Russian sphere of influence is also vital for Moscow because of the Kaliningrad region. Should the forces striving for integration with the West or even advocating a neutral status of Belarus come to power in Minsk, it would significantly deepen the isolation of the westernmost region of the Russian Federation. Moreover, it would also seriously complicate Moscow’s military plans, thus making it lose its advantage

© Piotr Nowak (PAP)

of threatening NATO with occupying the Suwałki Gap, a narrow stretch of land connecting Poland and Lithuania and dividing Belarus and the Russian exclave.

In the event of a war with NATO, such as the Baltic States invasion, this would be the only land-based connection between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the rest of the Alliance. Thus, if Belarus ceased to be a military ally of Russia and part of Russia’s military territory, Moscow would lose part of its strategic advantage over the Baltic States. This means that the weakening of Russian influence in Belarus would strengthen the security of Estonia, and especially Latvia and Lithuania, and reduce the risk of the military conflict started by the Russians in this part of Europe. Not only Western, but also Russian and Chinese analysts agree that in case of war without the involvement of Belarus, the Russians would manage to keep Kaliningrad for a maximum of two weeks, and probably even shorter.

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Belarus

Moscow considers Belarus to be a part of its natural sphere of influence.

The Russian plan for Belarus probably predicted that Lukashenko would win the election. However, he would be very weakened by the good result of the opposition – and thus more likely to make concessions concerning the integration process (a matter envisaged in the documents establishing the Union State).

This integration is to be multidimensional and aimed at the real incorporation of Belarus by Russia.

The scale of the protests surprised the Kremlin – just like it surprised Lukashenko. What is important, Russia decided not to rush with declarations of support for the regime in Minsk.

Moreover, Putin was not the first leader who congratulated Lukashenko after the election. China, Kazakhstan, and even Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, came ahead of him.

Some Russian politicians, on the other hand, were then openly attacking the Belarusian regime. Vladimir Zhirinovsky directly accused Lukashenko of rigging the election. What is more, the Russian state media reported the results of the elections in Belarus with caution. While the threatened Lukashenko was strongly advocating for a clear declaration of the Kremlin, Putin held back for a long time, choosing first to observe the course of events. It was not until the last days of August (August 27, to be precise) that Russia declared the preparation of the “reserve of the Ministry of Interior officers,” which could help Lukashenko, if necessary. Later, during the fifth phone 18

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call since the beginning of the crisis, Putin invited Lukashenko to visit Moscow.

The visit finally took place on September 14 in Sochi, where the Belarusian dictator received confirmation of a 1.5-billiondollar loan. The decision to provide clear support was motivated by the Kremlin’s concerns about the weakening of influence in Belarus and the impact of the peaceful revolution on Russia’s internal situation.

The fear of the “Belarusian plague” became even greater as another source of the “democratic epidemic” threatening the Kremlin had emerged in Khabarovsk Krai. In the Russian Far East, thousands of people took to the streets throughout several weeks to protest against removing a popular local governor from office and pressing charges against him.

Two phenomena, so characteristic of the later events in Belarus, first appeared in Khabarovsk. The first one was the peaceful demonstrations and the effective avoidance of yielding to the provocations of the authorities. The second was the mass scale of the manifestations, and the demonstrations so large that it was impossible to suppress them by force.

Putin understood that he should stall with such large street rallies and that he is powerless when it comes to the desire to crack down on the demonstrators quickly.

Lukashenko had to face the same problem.

Moscow considers Belarus to be a part of its natural sphere of influence; a key element of the so-called Russian mir (world), an area of civilization concentrated around Russia. Belarus is of great importance to the Kremlin, especially after Ukraine fell out of the Russian world. However, the protests in Belarus should not be compared with the Ukrainian revolutions of 2004–2005 and 2014. For many different reasons, including the degree of escalation of the conflict between society and the regime (the bloody nature of the Ukrainian

Belarus: the war for the Russian world Maidan) and the extent to which geopolitics took part in the crisis (the revolutions in Ukraine were generally anti-Russian and pro-Western).

Apparently, it would be more appropriate to compare the protests in Belarus with the events in Armenia in 2018.

Russia cannot afford another revolution within “the Russian world” – what happened in Ukraine was enough.

If Lukashenko was overthrown in Belarus, a country considered to be the calmest part of the post-Soviet space; inhabited by a population deemed to be politically passive and reluctant to act in violation of the regime’s law – it would be a huge blow to Putin’s political agenda and an incentive for his opponents in Russia.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that both sides of the conflict in Belarus are competing in declaring close ties with Russia. “Russia has always been, is and will always be our closest ally, regardless of who is in power in Belarus or Russia.

This is an invariable factor, and it is deeply rooted in our nations.

Even though the fraternal relations between us have only become a partnership,” said Lukashenko on August 4. As we know, the President of Belarus is fighting for his own future, but also the oppositional Coordination Council and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenko’s challenger in the August election, have been saying from the beginning that in case of a change of power in Belarus, no deterioration of relations with Russia should be expected.

This is a reaction to Lukashenko’s narrative that the goal of the opposition is to separate Belarus from Russia. From the beginning, the dictator used this argument to get help from the Kremlin. It was Tsikhanouskaya who, speaking to the members of the European Parliament on August 25, emphasized the geopolitically neutral nature of the protests: “(...) it is neither pro-Russian nor anti-Russian,

not pro-EU nor anti-EU.” Anyway, it seems that the current opposition also counted on the support of the Kremlin.

Valery Tsepkalo, who tried to compete with Lukashenko in the election and fled to Moscow when his candidacy was rejected, told Kommersant that the opposition was surprised by Putin’s quick congratulations to Lukashenko.

“We were hoping that Moscow would be more neutral.” – said a former Belarusian official. This disappointment may indicate that Tsepkalo and other people from the opposition had previously been receiving signals from Russian sources that Moscow would like Lukashenko to fall.

Neighbors vis-à-vis the crisis in Belarus

Russia has had a traditionally strong influence in Belarus, and this country is of key importance for Moscow. For these reasons, the actions of other countries, whether from the region or from outside, regarding the events in Minsk, can be considered limited and with smaller influence on the course of events in Belarus – when compared to the Kremlin’s activity. However, what is decisive in this situation is the Lukashenko-Putin relations. Naturally, this does not mean that other countries are not particularly interested in the developments in Belarus.

The situation in Minsk is particularly important for Ukraine. Kyiv regards the Belarusian crisis as a threat of the increase of Russian influence in this country and, consequently, an increased threat to the Ukrainian state – both politically (Lukashenko has so far tried to be neutral in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict) and militarily, if Russian military units appear north of Ukraine.

On August 13, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, said that the reaction to the results of the elections in Belarus would be decided after their 3/2020

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Belarus

BELARUSIAN POLICEMEN TRANSFER A DETAINED PARTICIPANT TO ANOTHER POLICE VAN DURING A RALLY TO PROTEST AGAINST THE INAUGURATION OF ALEXANDER LUKASHENKO AND AGAINST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS IN MINSK, BELARUS, SEPTEMBER 23, 2020.

formal announcement. The President of Ukraine was also very cautious at first.

Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the events in Belarus as late as five days after the election, evading criticism of the authorities and calling for dialogue (“Belarusians must find only a peaceful and democratic solution to the sociopolitical conflict”).

The assessment of the events in Belarus differed significantly among the different forces in the Ukrainian Parliament.

Some of the MPs of the President’s Servant of the People (Sluga Naroda) congratulated Lukashenko on his victory and leadership, suggesting that Ukraine should maintain “neutrality.” The openly pro-Russian opposition supported Lukashenko more actively – Viktor Medvedchuk even appeared in the Belarusian Parliament. The party of the former president Petro Poroshenko acted in 20

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© EPA/STR (PAP/EPA)

a very different way. On August 10, European Solidarity condemned the aggression against the protesters and brought a bill on not recognizing the elections.

In the last days of August, Ukraine finally decided to stop all contacts with Belarus.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine also announced that Kyiv would join the European Union’s declaration of August 11 that Belarus’s elections were unfair – not excluding the imposition of sanctions.

The event that caused Ukraine’s policy towards its northern neighbor to become much stricter was the release of Russian mercenaries detained by Lukashenko’s regime before the elections. Kyiv wanted Belarus to release most of them to Ukraine because they once fought on the side of pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, and some have Ukrainian citizenship.

Belarus: the war for the Russian world Meanwhile, not only did Lukashenko hand over the mercenaries to Moscow, but he also adopted the Russian narrative that the case of the Wagner Group mercenaries was a provocation staged by Ukraine.

The Belarusian president also began to attack Ukraine in a fierce way. In response, Kyiv called off its ambassador in Minsk (for consultations), and Volodymyr Zelensky changed the attitude in his statements about the Belarusian authorities. Social moods in Ukraine also influenced the adoption of a tough stance towards Lukashenko – most Ukrainians support the protests of Belarusians.

However, other neighbors of Belarus, especially Poland and Lithuania, are much more active in this context. It is these two countries that have become a refuge for the leaders of the anti-Lukashenko opposition.

They are also actively working on the EU forum to take decisive steps – for example, in the form of sanctions – against the Belarusian regime.

It was not easy to count on quick decisions on the part of Brussels. During the discussion on the list of people subject to sanctions, Germany, Italy, and France turned out to be against Lukashenko’s inclusion on the “blacklist.” Meanwhile, on August 31, the three Baltic States introduced their measures against 30 Belarusian officials. For example, Lukashenko and his son Viktor are on the list. All of them have an indefinite ban on entering Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

In late August, Lukashenko threatened to redirect “all trade flows from Lithuanian ports elsewhere,” claiming that transport of Belarusian goods makes up one-third of Lithuania’s budget. In fact, the Baltic States, especially Lithuania, would not lose anything from Minsk’s economic retaliation. Profits from Belarusian transit account for only 0.03% of the state budget. However, one should remember that Belarusian companies have shares in

Lithuanian infrastructure – for example, Belaruskali owns a 30% stake in a terminal in the Klaipeda port. Finally, Lukashenko himself admits that redirecting the trade flows to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea would be much more costly for Belarus.

Lukashenko refuses to contact the western leaders and maintains contacts only with Russia. Why is he not answering the calls incoming from Berlin or Paris? Probably, he does not want Putin to speculate that the Belarusian leader is making deals with EU countries. The President of Belarus has adopted strong and aggressive anti-Western rhetoric. Meanwhile, politicians in Berlin or Paris have already had to deal with the issue of Ukraine, and another ‘problem’ in the East is something they are not comfortable with. Hence consultations of Western leaders with Putin from the beginning of the crisis and their intention to obtain a guarantee ensuring that there will be no bloodshed and no Russian invasion of Belarus. It seems that this is the only thing the western leaders would want – especially because, from their perspective, the pro-democratic claims of the Belarusians seem irrelevant today, all the more so because the Ukrainian crisis has increased the tolerance of the West for Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule. There are opinions that Lukashenko’s regime is a safer option than a radical change and the collapse of power, which could trigger Russia’s intervention.

Kremlin’s scenarios

Putin is afraid of democracy and freedom – even if a democratic and a free state were to remain Russia’s closest ally. To have the Kremlin’s trust, being pro-Russian is not enough. Even being anti-Western will not suffice. It is also necessary to be an autocrat, not a democrat. However, the Kremlin also sees that Lukashenko no longer has the support of Belarusians.

Moscow gave Lukashenko an ultimatum.

Until November – when his current term 3/2020

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of office ends – he has time to start a dialogue with the opposition and make attempts at “reforms” to end the conflict.

But even if Lukashenko does not do so, the Kremlin will not abandon him – at least for now. Putin has no interest in quickly absorbing Belarus, both for political reasons (negative reaction of the West but also Kazakhstan’s reaction, for instance) and economic reasons (Russia would have to take on the burden of the anachronistic Belarusian economy). In fact, it is more profitable for Moscow to keep Belarus a buffer between Russia and NATO.

changes, they may be questioned by the successors of the current leader of Belarus.

Mostly since Lukashenko, even weakened, remains a problematic partner when it comes to addressing these issues. As the Belarusian analyst Artiom Shraibman notes, “forcing the now weak Lukashenko to deepen integration is no less risky than persuading the strong one. After all, if it was announced that Lukashenko would agree to the Russian military bases in Belarus or selling out the best companies to the Russians, protests against him could become anti-Russian.

The optimal scenario for Russia would be a bloodless stabilization of the situation through Lukashenko, and then a safe and coordinated transfer of power – agreed with the Kremlin. Weakened, isolated, with strong internal opposition, aware that there is no longer any support from the majority of his compatriots, Lukashenko will be forced to accept the Kremlin’s further demands ranging from the sale of Belarusian strategic companies to Russian oligarchs associated with Putin, to the installation of Russian military bases and large numbers of troops in Belarus. Of great importance in this context is the personal attitude of Putin and his Chekists to all social protests, ‘color revolutions,’ and ‘Maidans.’ Ideologically, Putin does not feel comfortable in a situation where the people impose a change of power.

Especially when they overthrow an authoritarian government because it gives rise to an eternal fear of his own position.

That is why even the bottom-up change in Armenia, when Nikol Pashinyan took over the government, made Moscow furious and very anxious (even though it did not affect Armenia’s close alliance with Russia) since it was not agreed upon and forced by public discontent.

The Kremlin may be currently not pressing for Lukashenko’s spectacular concessions and new agreements to deepen integration because it knows that if the regime

Lukashenko’s weak position provokes the Russians to take advantage of the situation and deepen the “integration process” between Belarus and Russia – which, in reality, means making their Western neighbor even more subordinate.

The Belarusian leader’s weakness in negotiations with Russia results not so much from the protests that have been going on since August, nor, as it seems, from the final turning away of most Belarusians from the regime, but from the dramatic economic situation of Belarus.

Lukashenko can only count on Moscow’s financial support (the Chinese alternative turned out to be illusory), especially since recent political events in the country have again drastically worsened relations with the West (and, consequently, Minsk cannot count on cooperation with the IMF or the World Bank). The question is at what point the Kremlin will attempt to ‘replace’ Lukashenko – which will certainly happen. If Lukashenko does not agree to the Russian scenario of a slow transformation, he will be repressing the opposition (largely pro-Russian) to eliminate potential rivals. Contrary to what it seems, Moscow is not in such a strong position and is far from making Lukashenko agree to all its demands.

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Grzegorz Kuczyński October 2020

Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area

Jakub Lachert

In recent years, Belarus has remained the only country in the region that maintained its stability within the authoritarian political system of Alexander Lukashenko. The leader of Belarus retained power by building a narrative in which the fear of the oligarchization of political life, war, and destabilization in neighboring Ukraine overshadowed the need to build a democratic state. This agreement between the authorities and society came to an end with the rigged presidential election in August this year whilst the protests of the Belarusian society against the regime are a clear sign of a change.

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Belarus

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA (C), VERANIKA TSAPKALA (L), WIFE AND REPRESENTATIVE OF NON-REGISTERED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VALERY TSAPKALA, AND MARIA KALESNIKAVA (R) A REPRESENTATIVE OF NON-REGISTERED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VIKTAR BABARYKA, ATTEND A CAMPAIGN RALLY IN MINSK, BELARUS, JULY 30, 2020.

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he current events in Belarus, where Alexander Lukashenko declared himself the winner in the fight for the office of President after 26 years of authoritarian rule, after the fraudulent presidential election, lead to the analysis of the socalled “color revolutions” in the postSoviet area. It seems difficult to compare the democratic changes in this area with their sustainability because of the political and economic diversity in the countries that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, there are some common points in the struggle against the existing political regimes.

The first two decades of the 21st century saw multiple changes in the states that had 24

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© Tatyana Zenkovich (PAP/EPA)

emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specific apathy of the 1990s, which helped to create more or less authoritarian systems of governance, ended with the “Revolution of Roses” in Georgia in 2003.

This social unrest brought to power the pro-Western leader Mikheil Saakashvili, who effectively used certain slogans in his political campaign. They were related to the democratization of the political system, the fight against corruption and rapprochement with the West. Similar slogans were used during the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, which broke out after the second round of the presidential election was rigged. The next stage of transformation in the post-Soviet area was the “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova, which began with speeches against the

Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area falsified parliamentary election results in April 2009 and the announcement of the victory of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, which has ruled the country continuously since 2001.

What these successful „revolutions” had in common were slogans calling for rapprochement with the European Union (EU), demonstrations with fluttering EU flags, and politicians who declared an intensification of dialogue with Brussels at the expense of relations with the Russian Federation.

Since the “revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, the events in Armenia proceeded differently, leading to the overthrow of President Serzh Sargsyan in 2018. However, this time pro-European and anti-Russian slogans were absent during opposition’s protests.

Due to its economic dependence and in particular because of Russian military aid, Armenia cannot free itself from Moscow’s influence as did neighboring Georgia.

The Russian troops stationed in Armenia ensure military balance in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh1.

The Russian factor, which is a significant element conditioning the course of political transformation, is identical for both Armenia and Belarus, but it is also worth emphasizing the fact that the degree of Belarus’ political dependence on Moscow is much greater than that of Armenia. From the beginning, Belarus has been building the structures of the Eurasian Economic Union (the Russian alternative to the European Union) with Russia, while Armenia joined this organization conditionally, after declining to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. Yerevan, still under Sargsyan’s rule, signed a Comprehensive The territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is an Armenian enclave on the territory of Azerbaijan, is a bone of contention between the two countries for the last three decades.

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and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU, which, although not as ambitious as the Association Agreement, regulates economic cooperation with the community and enables EU support for some projects, such as the decommissioning of the obsolete Metsamor nuclear power plant2. It can be assumed, however, that a new agreement with the EU is only a gesture towards the pro-European part of the Armenian society, and not an attempt to modify the main assumptions in Armenia’s foreign policy, aimed at close cooperation with Moscow.

Azerbaijan is the only country, apart from Belarus, where new political elites did not emerge. Russia would like to include Azerbaijan in its geopolitical projects.

Likewise, the EU is trying to influence the democratization of the political system in this country through the Eastern Partnership. However, the authoritarian regime of President Aliyev is independent of financial pressure from both Russia and the EU. This is due to the wealth acquired from oil extraction. In terms of the political system, Azerbaijan and Belarus were similar to each other.

Specific conditions of Belarus

Each of the above-mentioned countries has some characteristics which can be shared with the ones of Belarus. It is a result of common heritage in the USSR and obtaining independence under similar conditions. What seems the core element that shaped these countries was the formation of new political elites with the fall of the Soviet Union. Countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine still had active political circles in the 1980s, which, along with the political changes under Gorbachev, began to build their national structures, serving to shape new https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ analizy/2017-11-29/umowa-armenii-z-ue-pozorywielowektorowej-polityki-erywania

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In the case of Belarus, both the protests and the leading oppositionists in the country come from outside the establishment. independent states based on the national language and common identity. Due to the multi-ethnic character of the republics in the Soviet Union, the creation of new national identities was a difficult process that required a great deal of determination from the political elites and societies of these countries.

The issues of national identity and language were a particularly important element in the creation of a new political system. After gaining independence in 1991, Belarus symbolically referred to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, using Pahonia as its national emblem and a white-red-white flag. The Belarusian language, although it had the status of the state language, was not widely used by the political and cultural elites of the country. Alexander Lukashenko’s victory in 1994 halted the process of rebirth of the Belarusian national identity and marked the return to Soviet symbolism.

This development also meant that a centrally planned economy and security forces originating from the USSR, such as the KGB as the basic institution of the security apparatus, will remain.

In other states of the former Soviet Union, there were also attempts to rebuild the foundations of the former Soviet system, but such centralization of power as observed in Belarus did not happen there.

In Moldova, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova ruled for almost 26

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a decade (2001-2009), but there was strong parliamentary opposition in the country, which enjoyed the strong support of a part of the society. In Ukraine (when Kuchma and Yanukovych were in power) or Russia, the authoritarian system was based on an oligarchic system, while Lukashenko’s 26-year rule in Belarus was a period of full economic and political control over the country. No interest groups that were not controlled by the state came to existence in Belarus. This was due to the frequent change of people who held top positions in state administration and enterprises.

Those against Lukashenko’s regime could not count on business support, as was the case in Ukraine, where, for example, Yulia Tymoshenko – the leader of the events of the “Orange Revolution” in 2004 – represented Ukrainian entrepreneurs demanding changes in the country’s ossified economic system. A similar situation took place in Moldova, where the post-revolutionary European coalition was formed by two leading oligarchs of the country: Vladimir Plahotniuc and Vlad Filat. Although the revolution in Ukraine and Moldova had a grassroots character as well as involved various social groups, the power passed into the hands of the former economic or political elites in these countries.

In the case of Belarus, both the protests and the leading oppositionists in the country come from outside the establishment, with only a few exceptions, including the would-be presidential candidate of Belarus – Viktar Babaryka, originating from the banking system (he managed Belgazprombank, among others) and Pavel Latushko – a former Belarusian diplomat.

The main actors on the political scene on the side of the opposition in Belarus are people who have not been involved in the political life of the country so far – both Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (Lukashenko’s opponent in the presidential election) and

Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) is talking to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (L) at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Maria Kalesnikava – a member of the presidium of the Coordination Council, formed after the fraudulent presidential election in Belarus in August 2020.

It can be stated that the leadership of the opposition in Belarus is dispersed, which distinguishes this situation from the ones that took place in other post-Soviet states.

The success of the political changes in the post-Soviet states was to connect them with political leaders: Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine, and the strong support of the opposition parties in Moldova were the successes of the “color revolutions.” Belarus seems to be following a different path, building strong grassroots structures to have an impact on Lukashenko. These actions are

© Dmitry Astakhov (PAP/EPA)

supposed to lead to a re-run of the election, but they are deprived of political slogans.

The protesters in Minsk, Grodno, and Brest do not demand rapprochement with the EU or leaving the geopolitical sphere of Russian influence. This is due to two reasons. First, some politicians, even the opposition, insist on maintaining the alliance with Russia, e.g. Viktar Babaryka, who claims that economic organisms of Belarus and Russia should not be separated3. Secondly, the Belarusian opposition wants to maintain its unity to remove Lukashenko from power.

Building a pro-Russian or pro-European narrative in the current political situation would lead to strong divisions within the 3

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Belarus opposition. Additionally, the pro-European slogans of the opposition could lead to the intervention of Russia, which is afraid that the scenario from Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova may also occur in Belarus.

Russia’s stance on the Belarus events

Current events in Belarus are a geopolitical challenge for Moscow. From Russia’s perspective, the loss of influence in Belarus would be connected with the disintegration of the geopolitical project, the Eurasian Economic Union, created as an alternative to the European Union.

The buffer zone between the European Union and Russia, Belarus may, in case of political destabilization, constitute a zone of conflict between the two parties.

The fall of Alexander Lukashenko’s regime may also affect the internal political scene in Russia. The actions of the democratic opposition in Belarus may serve as a model for the opponents of Putin’s regime in Russia, for whom the collapse of Lukashenko’s regime could inspire an attempt to overthrow the authoritarian rule in their country. Consequently, further intensification of actions by the Russian forces against the Russian opposition can be expected. The events in Belarus coincided with an attempt to poison the Russian oppositionist Alexey Navalny, a move that can be interpreted as a kind of warning against opposition movements in Russia. The Kremlin, similarly to Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova, wants to prevent a repeat of these scenarios in Russia. In the case of Belarus, which has a similar model of power to that of Russia as well as given the cultural ties between the Belarusian and Russian nations, it can be assumed that the changes that will take place in one of these countries will have an impact on the system of another one.

“The competences and powers of the Russian and Belarusian presidents 28

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are broad and there are more political similarities than differences.

When Alexander Lukashenko took office, he stated that the constitution grants him ‘tsarist rights’ and in the following years he significantly expanded the scope of presidential power.”4 Twenty-six years of Lukashenko’s rule was a period of numerous crises between Minsk and Moscow. While maintaining his alliance with Russia, the Belarusian president tried to declare a revival of contacts with the West, especially at the time of a crisis with Russia. Furthermore, Alexander Lukashenko never took his rapprochement with the West seriously and his participation in various EU initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership, was merely a façade. From this perspective, should Lukashenko continue to be the president, Belarus will remain in the Russian sphere of influence.

Given the fact that the opposition leaders mostly come from outside the establishment, the possibility for Russia to exert direct influence on them seems limited. However, maintaining political support for Lukashenko may also change moods within Belarusian society, whose members will directly associate the maintenance of the regime with Russian support. The backing for the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych during the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004 led to a change of direction in Kyiv’s foreign policy to a pro-Western course.

Conclusions

The scenario of events in Belarus seems difficult to predict both in the short- and the long-term. It seems that there is no room for dialogue between Alexander Lukashenko’s regime and the opposition.

Consequently, continuing suppression E. Kużelewska, Porównanie pozycji ustrojowej prezydenta Federacji Rosyjskiej i Republiki Białoruś, Studia Politologiczne, 2014

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© Wojciech Pacewicz (PAP)

Belarusian protests in the context of transformations in the post-Soviet area

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko and his son Nikolai at a polling station in Minsk during the election to the lower house of the Belarusian Parliament – House of Representatives

would be necessary. This will result in considerable expenses on the apparatus of repression. Simultaneously, the opposition’s persistence in its peaceful way of manifesting the opposition to Lukashenko’s regime may lead to some erosion of the apparatus of repression, although, so far, the cases of desertion from the army or dismissal in the militia and security forces are sporadic. The main issue will be the attitude of Russia whose officials are now waiting how the events unfold.

From Moscow’s perspective, suppression of the protests by Lukashenko seems to be the most optimal solution – in such case he would be completely dependent on Russia as he would lose credibility in the West and could not blackmail Russia with any “pivots to the West.”

However, if the more pro-European circles in the Belarusian opposition were to be heard, or if the pro-democratic opposition threatened to take full power, a strong

Russian reaction can be expected, starting with the hybrid war and ending with a regular conflict, as is the case of eastern Ukraine.

The conflict has escalated significantly and it would be difficult to image a scenario in which Lukashenko and the opposition would come to an agreement. Moreover, the Belarusian authorities believe that the opposition is externally controlled.

Such conditions of dispute make it problematic to present any credible negotiation scenario.

The establishment of the “Euromaidan” in Belarus can be ruled out given all these variables Both geopolitical and internal conditions in Belarus eliminate the possibility of a violent political pivot towards rapprochement with the West.

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Baltic region

The Baltic Fund – A New Idea for the Region Krzysztof Kamiński

The establishment of the Baltic Fund is a proposal for a strategic move of the Polish state northwards – initially towards the Baltic States and then towards the Nordic countries. A new institution, modeled on the International Visegrad Fund, will allow increasing cooperation between Poland and the region in the domains of security, economy, energy and civil society. The initiator and originator of this geopolitical project is the Polish think tank – the Warsaw Institute – whilst the idea is supported by four other Baltic think tanks.

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© Baltic Fund website - balticfund.org

The idea

Poland’s policy in the Baltic and northern regions is currently implemented mainly through joint political, economic and military initiatives. However, there are no soft power projects, which could support cooperation of the countries of the region in a organic way. Building the best possible relations with the Baltic and Nordic states serves two strategic objectives of Poland’s foreign and security policy. Firstly, this cooperation strengthens the security of Poland and the entire region in the face of the threat of Russian aggression. Secondly, it enables the creation of a group of countries acting together on various issues in international organizations, such as the European Union (EU).

The development of Poland’s regional cooperation northwards (Baltic and Nordic countries) should complement such cooperation in the south (mainly the Visegrad Group) because only then can one talk about a full implementation of the Three Seas Initiative and the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO. For this purpose, the political, economic and military potential of Poland should be used, but also its geographical location to connect the northern part of united Europe with its central and southern parts like a bridge.

Strengthening cooperation with Lithuania,

Building the best possible relations with the Baltic and Nordic states serves two strategic objectives of Poland’s foreign and security policy.

Latvia and Estonia will naturally open up greater opportunities for cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. The policy implementation in the Baltic and Northern directions should go beyond the traditional framework of cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. What should be taken into account is that some Nordic countries do not simultaneously belong to two of the abovementioned international organizations.

Therefore, a greater emphasis should be placed on bilateral relations and within existing regional dialogue forums and organizations. Due to its position and location, Poland can successfully combine Central European regional initiatives with new ones in the north. The effective implementation of Poland’s “northern 3/2020

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Baltic region dimension” policy will make Warsaw the central link of the regional security system and North-South economic cooperation, going beyond the EU and NATO framework to stretch from Scandinavia to the Western Balkans, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.

Consequently, in its own interest and in the interest of the countries in the region, Poland should take the strategic initiative in the north. The first step is to build an appropriate political format on the basis of which further institutionalized cooperation could be established. It is worth noting that this process should be conducted gradually, the first phase being orbital around the Baltic States and the second one the Nordic countries. This is primarily due to the proximity of Poland and the Baltic States and the increasingly intensive cooperation of these countries in the immediate vicinity. This will enable the effective implementation of the new format of cooperation between fewer countries before being extended to other states. Hence it is reasonable to present the context of relations between the countries included in the first phase of the proposed project.

geopolitical situation and the countries forming this initiative, this format is not an effective field for cooperation between Poland and the Baltic or Nordic States, notably with the aggressive policy of Russia, another member of the initiative.

In addition to being part of regional organizations, Poland cooperates on a bilateral basis with individual Baltic States in the areas such as economy, culture and defense. What stands out is that there is no geopolitical cooperation scheme where Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia would directly and exclusively cooperate with themselves.. This cooperation is dominated by common membership in international organizations or in wider geopolitical formats mentioned above.

Economic cooperation between Poland and the Baltic States is constantly developing, however, it is much more modest when compared to Poland’s other neighbors.

This is a result of large disparities between their economic potentials. The total share of the Baltic States in Poland’s exports is 2.6% and that of imports stands at 1.1% (Central Statistical Office, Poland, 2019). Poland’s trade with individual countries is as follows:

Background

Poland and the Baltic States have been cooperating on the international forum for years amid their converging interests and common threats. Geopolitically, they are all members of the European Union and NATO. The most recent initiatives in the field of geopolitical cooperation formats include the development of the Three Sea Initiative (since 2015), cooperation within the framework of the Bucharest Nine, as countries of the eastern flank of NATO (since 2014), or the recently initiated Lublin Triangle format, aimed at strengthening partnership between Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine (since 2020). Within the regional formats, Poland and the Baltic States are also part of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), however, with the current 32

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•

Lithuania – export PLN 15,379.0 million (1.5%), import PLN 8,313.2 million (0.8%), balance of trade PLN +7,065.8 million;

•

Latvia – export PLN 6,121.0 million PLN (0.6%), import PLN 1,722.3 million (0.2%), balance of trade PLN +4,398.7 million;

•

Estonia – export PLN 4,857.8 million PLN (0.5%), import PLN 1,229.2 million (0.1%), balance of trade PLN +3,628.6 million.

Despite its lower economic potential, Poland, together with the Baltic States, is implementing a number of economic

The Baltic Fund – A New Idea for the Region projects in order to build up regional and EU integration. The projects of strategic economic cooperation include: Via Baltica (road connection between Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), Rail Baltica (high-speed railroad line connecting Helsinki with Berlin), LitPol Link (onshore electricity interconnection between Poland and Lithuania), HARMONY Link (subsea electricity interconnection between Poland and Lithuania) as well as GIPL (cross-border natural gas pipeline between Poland and Lithuania). These projects aim at strengthening economic cooperation by improving transport and energy connections.

The defense cooperation between Poland and the Baltic States materializes mainly within the two’s NATO membership as well as through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia believe that what poses the greatest military threat to the region are Russia’s aggressive actions, especially after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the armed conflict with Ukraine, lasting from 2014. Poland and the Baltic States, along with their allies, have taken a number of initiatives to deepen military ties in recent years. Such measures include: Baltic Air Policing – defense of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian airspace (since 2004), LITPOLUKRBRIG – multinational Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade of 4,500 soldiers (it reached full operational readiness in 2016), Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) – four battalion-sized battle groups stationed in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, each consisting of 1,000-1,500 troops (since 2017 being deployed on a persistent rotational basis every six months). Another important project strengthening regional security is the increased US military presence in Poland, which is supported by the Baltic States. It is worth noting that Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia meet the

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia believe that what poses the greatest military threat to the region are Russia’s aggressive actions, especially after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the armed conflict with Ukraine, lasting from 2014.

NATO’s goal of spending 2% of their GDP on defense each year.

At the heart of regional cooperation lie also social and cultural issues, including matters of national minorities. This is especially true for relations between Poland and Lithuania that have improved significantly over the last few years. In the light of deepening economic, military and political cooperation, it is possible to resolve many disputed social issues.

Referring to regional cooperation, it is worth noting the excellent relations between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The three states, referred to as the Baltic States, do not form an official union, but are actively involved in parliamentary and intergovernmental cooperation.

These countries cooperate closely, especially in areas such as foreign and security policy, defense, energy as well as transportation. That way, one of the region’s smallest states can consistently and effectively pursue their common interests in the international arena 3/2020

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Baltic region

In 2019 the Polish think tank – the Warsaw Institute, began working on a concept for a new international institution – the Baltic Fund. along with implementing ambitious economic projects. Moreover, the Baltic States cooperate closely with the Nordic countries, as demonstrated by their participation in the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) initiative.

A significant factor in relations between Poland and the Baltic States are also affairs with Belarus, especially in the aftermath of the August 2020 presidential election.

The democratic states of the region support the pro-democratic reforms and the right of Belarusian society to self-determination.

Belarusian turmoil is undoubtedly one of the greatest challenges in the foreign and security policy of Poland and the Baltic States. A new regional and political format could serve as a platform to coordinate activities in the neighborhood policy while its institutionalized form could result in proactive actions for the sake of Belarusian civil society.

All the aforementioned issues indicate that today the Baltic region requires an institutionalized framework for cooperation. Effective deepening of relations between Poland and the Baltic States cannot take place only on political, military or economic levels. It should also encompass civil society, expertise and soft power tools. At present, Poland does not have tools for direct cooperation with the Baltic States at this level. The proposed project of the Baltic Fund will certainly 34

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support the efforts of Poland and the Baltic States to enhance regional integration in addition to pursuing mutual interests or fighting against common threats.

The solution

In response to the aforesaid needs as well as in the context of the cooperation between Poland and the Baltic States to date, in 2019 the Polish think tank – the Warsaw Institute, began working on a concept for a new international institution – the Baltic Fund. The idea of creating such an institution primarily relies upon the untapped potential for cooperation between Poland and the Baltic States.

At issue was also the positive experience of the International Visegrad Fund, a complementary body for the efficient political format of the Visegrad Group.

In 2019, four think tanks joined forces with the Warsaw Institute to establish a new institution, giving it an international character. The following organizations became partners of the Baltic Fund project: International Centre for Defence and Security (Estonia), Baltic Security Foundation (Latvia), Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Lithuania) and Memel Institute (Lithuania). Thanks to the partners and their invaluable contribution to the work on the concept, especially in the context of the Baltic States internal conditions, it was possible to draft a common document. During the conference NATO Eastern Flank Security.

Baltic States and Poland on November 28, 2019 in Warsaw, representatives of five think tanks signed a declaration on increasing the efforts of expert organizations to promote the idea of establishing the Baltic Fund. Thus, the Baltic Fund project and its concept became a joint proposal of five institutions.

In February 2020 the signatories of the declaration put forward the official concept of the Baltic Fund to the authorities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

© Baltic Fund website - balticfund.org

The Baltic Fund – A New Idea for the Region

WARSAW, POLAND, NOVEMBER 29, 2019. THE SIGNATORIES OF THE JOINT DECLARATION OF THINK TANKS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BALTIC FUND. FROM LEFT: OLEVS NIKERS (PRESIDENT, BALTIC SECURITY FOUNDATION, LATVIA), SVEN SAKKOV (DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY, ESTONIA), KRZYSZTOF KAMIŃSKI (PRESIDENT, WARSAW INSTITUTE, POLAND), MANTAS MACIKAS (PRESIDENT, MEMEL INSTITUTE, LITHUANIA), LINAS KOJALA (DIRECTOR, EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE, LITHUANIA).

and Poland: presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers.

in the field of political, economic and military cooperation.

In line with the proposed concept, the Baltic Fund is supposed to support all valuable initiatives in the field of security, economy, energy and civil society in what will strengthen the sense of regional community and intensify expert cooperation. The new institution is modeled on the experiences and mechanisms of the International Visegrad Fund, while its assumptions take into account the specificity of the region and the key challenges it faces.

Four main themes were distinguished within the concept as the most important areas of cooperation between Poland and the Baltic States: security, energy, economy and civil society. Within the framework of the projects, the Baltic Fund will support networking in the region, research activities, expert and analytical events as well as civil initiatives. The target groups include: research and analytical centers, think tanks, local government branches, scientific and academic centers, students and doctoral students (with a special emphasis on students of security-related disciplines), secondary schools, NGOs, watchdogs and other foundations or associations. The Baltic Fund will support the projects of the enlisted organizations through various mechanisms. The first one will be the permanent Baltic Security Studies program, or an annual program consisting of four multi-day sessions in at least three Baltic Fund countries.

Its mission is to create a network of experts, analysts, ministry officials, etc., and to broaden their knowledge whilst ensuring direct contact between

Thanks to the Baltic Fund, the social capital in the form of knowledge alongside structural and interpersonal links will grow whilst the image and importance of the Baltic region will improve in Europe and worldwide. This plays a fundamental role in strengthening the sense of regional community and increasing security in the Baltic Sea area. The Baltic Fund initiative may be of significant importance in the current geopolitical situation in the region.

The Baltic Fund, through its soft power activities, may be a real tool for supporting the efforts of Poland and the Baltic States

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Baltic region representatives of government and civic institutions in member countries.

The second mechanism will comprise grants, which will be used to finance projects or replace own contribution in large international projects (small grants up to EUR 6,000, large grants up to EUR 50,000).

The third mechanism will consist of dedicated grants with one of the expected results being to release a publication in the form of an analysis, article or research bulletin, along with its translation into English. The fourth mechanism, addressed directly to the citizens of the Baltic Fund member states, will include scholarships financing the stay in another member state within the framework of a scientific trip or an internship in a government unit or a non-government organization (one grant holder will be entitled to EUR 600 per month for the total duration of one quarter of a year).

Within the framework of the presented concept of the Baltic Fund, four countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – will participate in the first stage of the project. The initial budget of the institution will be EUR 1 million, of which EUR 0.5 million will come from Poland and the remaining amount paid

by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the second stage, each subsequent state will have to provide a contribution equal to EUR 0.5 million. Furthermore, the concept assumes the implementation of projects with partners from third countries. This includes projects carried out with donor countries (e.g. the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea) as well as providing support through programs dedicated for organizations in Belarus, Ukraine or Georgia. The list of cooperating countries is open and its shape will result from the political decision of member states.

The concept of the Baltic Fund assumes the establishment of a new international 36

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institution, with a diplomatic status, based in one of the member states’ cities.

Its official language will be English. In order to operate efficiently, it will be necessary to appoint local coordinators in the member states (associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a given country).

The proposed model of management and supervision of the new institution assumes the appointment of the Council of Ambassadors of the Baltic Fund (the highest decision-making body of the Fund, consisting of the Ambassadors of the member states in the country where the headquarters will be located) and the Executive Director of the Baltic Fund (responsible for the operational activities of the Fund), selected on the basis of the recommendations of the member states for a period of two or three years.

It is recommended that all decisionmaking processes on day-to-day and strategic issues be based on unanimity.

Summary

During several months of collaboration of experts from five think tanks and four countries, a concept of a new international institution was developed. The Baltic Fund is an answer to the challenges of the region and takes into account its specificity.

This project is an example that ambitious international initiatives can be proposed in a bottom-up way by the expert community and non-governmental organizations.

The project has been backed by a number of institutions and public figures.

Currently the concept of the Baltic Fund is being debated in the decision-making circles in Poland and the Baltic States.

We encourage you to join the group of people who publicly support the establishment of the Baltic Fund and to contact us directly through the website: balticfund.org.

Krzysztof Kamiński October 2020

Will the “maximum pressure� campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US?

Marcin KrzyĹźanowski

The combination of the effects of American sanctions, the oil market crash, and the COVID-19 pandemic, has put the Iranian economy in a challenging situation. The country's economic situation is now under the government's control.

However, it may deteriorate further if the plans of the authorities to finance the state budget fail.

The forecasts indicate that the budget deficit will be greater than initially assumed. Although the economy is not the only factor influencing the attitude of the Iranian people, the worsening economic conditions, according to many experts, are increasing the chances for talks with the West in the medium-term perspective. But is this enough to convince or, de facto, force Tehran to take a seat at the negotiating table?

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Middle East

IRANIAN WOMEN WEARING FACE MASKS WALK NEXT TO A WALL PAINTING OF IRAN’S NATIONAL FLAG ON STREET IN TEHRAN, IRAN, OCTOBER 4, 2020.

Introduction

The official goal of the US sanctions is to force Tehran to discuss Iran’s regional policy, ballistic missile development program, and nuclear program. The sanctions are intended to lead to an economic crisis that will force Iran, which is threatened with bankruptcy, to negotiate. Another vision, in which the fatigue of the crisis and the poverty of the Iranian people lead to “regime change” is also popular among commentators from across the ocean. Did two years of sanctions soften the Iranian authorities 38

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or radicalize society? The strategy of the United States has limited Iran’s access to the global banking system almost to zero and has severely limited Iranian oil exports. Iran plunged into recession, inflation rose to about 30% in 20191, the currency market trembled, and the rial recorded a record fall in value.

The economic pressure exacerbated the negative effects of the uncontrolled social programs, errors in investment project Data published by AMAR (The Statistical Centre of Iran).

1

Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US? countries, rightly stating that crossborder trade with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Turkey will be very difficult for the US to control and block. The economy did not emerge from stagflation, but, by the end of 2019, Iranian leaders had real reasons to believe that they had a serious chance of resisting US pressure and getting the country out of the crisis.

However, this optimism did not last long.

The coronavirus pandemic that erupted at the beginning of 2020 struck a serious blow against the regime, and its effects are felt more in Iran than the consequences of American sanctions2. The US had been unable to force Iran’s neighbors to close their borders to goods imported from Iran, but this turned out to be a side effect of the pandemic. When Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, and other Iranian neighbors took drastic public health precautions and closed borders, Iranian companies stopped delivering convertible currency to the domestic market overnight.

This limited the government’s access to foreign exchange and caused a shock in the domestic currency market. It also resulted in significant funds being spent on aid packages for companies and individuals affected by the pandemic’s economic consequences. © Abedin Taherkenareh (PAP/EPA)

management, corruption, and shortsighted budget planning.

However, one year after the reinstatement of sanctions, the Iranian economy began to show signs of stabilization.

The consistent and well-coordinated monetary policy of the government and the central bank, Bank-e Markazi-ye Iran (BMI), has brought the value of the rial under control, and oil exports have stabilized at around 300,000–500,000 BPD. Iranian politicians and traders focused their attention on neighboring

At the beginning of the Iranian fiscal year (March 2020), the Rouhani administration implemented an aid package worth about 6% of GDP3.

Importantly, the value of the Iranian aid program in relation to GDP is slightly higher than the average for developing countries (5.4%), but lower than the programs implemented, e.g. in Thailand, India, or even Poland (about 10%). However, it does not differ from the average for the Middle 2

Author’s own research.

Azour, J. (2020). IMF press conference 13.07.2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/07/15/ tr071320-transcript-press-conference-reo-updatemiddle-east-and-central-asia, DOA: 15.09.2020.

3

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Middle East East (6.1%)4. In financial terms, the government was not able and did not want to do more. Among other things, the adoption of such a policy consisted of the limited possibilities of a sanctioned economy, as well as the priority for other expenditures. At the height of the pandemic, Tehran increased military spending by 9% year-on-year, inflation included. A large part of the additional funds was transferred to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah)5.

Iran has also not reduced its support for its allies in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen6. This, together with the general rhetoric of Iranian politicians headed by the rahbar (‘supreme leader’ – translator’s note) Khamenei, is definitely not a signal of a softening of Iran’s position on potential negotiations. On the contrary, it is a sign of a willingness to maintain the current regional and domestic policy course.

“Resistance Budget”

This year’s budget was the first one since the start of the “maximum pressure” campaign in May 2019. It was preceded by a year of sanctions, which brought oil exports – Iran’s most important source of revenue – down to less than 500,000 BPD, an 80% decrease on the previous year7. The big challenge for President Rouhani was to present a draft budget with significantly reduced revenues from oil sales while maintaining the social spending expected by the poorer Wheatly, J. (2020). Developing nations squeezed as virus fuels public spending, “Financial Times,” 20.07.2020, https://www.ft.com/content/c16f83c53444-4c78-afea-fa72c4b9c09c, DOA: 15.09.2020.

4

Author’s own research based on the analysis of Iran’s budget law of the year 1399.

Iranians, and the defense spending required by the military and the rahbar.

Despite the crisis, the budget was not adopted easily. On February 24, Parliament rejected the budget law by 67 votes in support and 114 against (in the absence of nearly one hundred MPs)8. In response, the President of the Parliament Ali Larijani asked for the intervention of Ayatollah Khamenei.

On March 3, the supreme leader issued a decree allowing for the adoption of the budget without parliamentary approval.

The budget (after quite significant number of amendments introduced under pressure from Sepah) was officially adopted on March 19. The supreme leader’s formal intervention was something quite unusual, which emphasized both the erosion of the role of the Parliament in the Islamic Republic and the extraordinary conditions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The budget originally assumed government spending of 5,638 quadrillion9 IRR (5,638,000,000,000,000) or about 43 billion USD – according to the free market rate. This meant an increase of 8% compared to the previous budget. However, after taking inflation into account, expenses were to decrease by about 17%. The updated budget increases planned expenses by 15% to 6,498 quadrillion IRR. This includes a planned increase in civil servants’ salaries (inflation not included), as well as a 25% increase in expenses on development projects and investments.

Moreover, the revised budget increases spending on defense and police.

5

Eventhal, U. (2020) How to fix the “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran, “Atlantic Council,” 02.06.2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ iransource/how-to-fix-the-maximum-pressurecampaign-on-iran/, DOA: 15.09.2020.

6

Author’s own research based on the analysis of Iran’s budget law of the year 1399.

7

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“Iran Press, “ 24.02.2020, www.iranpress.com/irani144223-iran’s_parliament_rejects_budget_bill_of_ upcoming_year

8

Iran uses a mixed scale of the numbers referring to the powers of a thousand. According to BMI, a quadrillion is a thousand trillion. For the sake of simplicity and order, this article adopts the Iranian nomenclature.

9

© Abedin Taherkenareh (PAP/EPA)

Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US?

AN IRANIAN WOMAN WALKS PAST A CURRENCY EXCHANGE SERVICE IN TEHRAN, IRAN, OCTOBER 14, 2020.

With oil revenues limited by sanctions and reluctance/impossibility to raise taxes, Tehran focuses on raising money from its privatization program, bond issue, and capital market, the main center of which is the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). The state still dominates the Iranian economy, so the potential resources for privatization

are substantial. As a result, TSE became10 the world’s most successful stock exchange in 2019. Given the possibility of overheating the stock market (TSE) and the creation of a speculative bubble, the 10 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/business/ iran-stock-market.html

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Middle East government, on the one hand, is reaping huge profits from the privatization and, on the other hand, is carrying it out carefully and in stages.

Furthermore, the government tries to cover the deficit by issuing bonds, burdening itself with long-term debt.

Given the drastic decline in public confidence in the state and the excellent TSE results, it is not surprising that there are relatively few individual bond buyers.

The main group of clients is banks – usually state-owned. BMI supports the purchase of bonds through loans to banks by creating additional money. This, in turn, strengthens the inflationary pressure but, at the same time, does not translate into the need to print the rial. Therefore, inflation does not get out of BMI’s control, but its amount gives cause for moderate concern.

The budget assumptions concerning tax revenues are also problematic. The government plans to increase the annual tax revenue by 13%, to the level of 1,950 quadrillion IRR (about 11 billion or 45 billion USD, depending on the conversion rate). The plan will be implemented in a situation of an almost certain decline in corporate turnover and personal income without introducing new taxes or increasing the ones already in place.

In addition, the budget continues to grant tax exemptions to religious foundations and organizations, so-called bonyads, which, depending on their sources, control from 15 to 50% of the economy. In October 2019, the national tax authority announced that nearly half of the highest-earning individuals as well as organizations are exempt from taxes11. The government will try to limit tax exemptions and control the tax collection system, but it may encounter strong resistance from Sepah-related and influential circles around the rahbar.

11

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https://www.irna.ir/news/83532018

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A similar situation occurred with respect to the planned social spending reform. In this case, however, the president managed to enforce changes in the social welfare system and reduce the number of its beneficiaries.

As presented above, Tehran finances its expenditures from three main sources: exports (primarily oil and petrochemicals), tax revenues, and privatization/bond issues. Each of these three pillars rests on shaky ground. However, the ambitious budget plan has so far been implemented to such an extent that it can be said that Iran will manage to end the Iranian year 1399 (March 2020–February 2021) with a large but controlled deficit.

Social impact of sanctions and the crisis

The Iranian authorities fully control the situation and social tensions, although the number of people dissatisfied with the situation in the country is steadily increasing. However, the idea of an Islamic republic, embodied by the rahbar Ayatollah Khamenei, enjoys significant social support, usually motivated by religion. Iranian society is strongly and profoundly divided. The Islamic Republic has both its sworn enemies and fanatical supporters. However, the fall in GDP, high inflation, rising prices, the decline in the purchasing power of the rial, and especially the human tragedies hidden behind the term ‘increased poverty rate’ have put a strain on relations between the state and its citizens, as reflected, for example, in the so-called fuel protests of November 2019. More and more Iranians regard their country’s economic situation as bad and with a tendency to deteriorate.

Ordinary people are not interested in complex economic analyses, which show that the economy is not in such a bad condition on a macroscale. They focus on issues that are observable and directly affect them, especially rising food prices

Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US? and high youth unemployment.

The majority (about 50–60%) of Iranians claim that bad governance and corruption have a greater negative impact on the economy than foreign sanctions. A large part (30–35%) of the population considers the so-called nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) a failure and blames both the government and the US for the worsening economic situation. Disappointment with the economy is one of the main reasons, apart from the veto of many prominent nonradical candidates, for the low turnout in the February parliamentary elections and the defeat of the camp of centrists/ modernists. The majority of Iranians see no point in possible negotiations with the USA, justifying this by the Washington’s violation of the nuclear agreement.

In turn, support for the concept of economic self-sufficiency and the so-called economy of resistance is growing12.

Iranian clergy, including the rahbar, systematically uses an important quotation of the founder of the Islamic Republic. In his speech during a meeting with Iranian students in November 1980, Khomeini said: “We did not shed our blood [in the struggle against the Shah regime] for the cheaper watermelons.”13 From mid-2018 onwards, government propaganda relatively often evoked this quotation, pointing to the spiritual values of the revolution and the futility of worldly life. A large part of the population fully supports the actions of the regime and is openly attached to the idea of an Islamic republic. This is particularly true of the Iranian province and the rural population, who, thanks to government subsidies, have not experienced a deterioration of economic situation as severely as the urban middle class.

The great support the republic enjoys has 12

Author’s own research.

https://enghelab57.wordpress.com/2008/02/01, DOA: 20.09.2020.

13

its roots in the religious legitimacy of the state and the social reforms carried out after the revolution. Access to transport infrastructure, electricity, hot water, and medical care in the rural areas is incomparably greater than during the times of the empire. In the 1970s, for example, resources flowed much faster to more privileged urban districts. Between 1973 and 1975, when Iran made huge profits from oil exports, access to water supply in urban areas increased from 65 to 80%, while growth in rural areas amounted to less than 1%, from 7.6 to 8.5%14.

The crisis is most challenging for the middle class and metropolitan areas.

This is reflected in the regularity of protests, which take place almost every month15.

They are hardly visible outside Iran, as they are usually local (communal or provincial) and led by different professions (e.g. demonstrations by teachers in Tehran, protests by farmers in Isfahan, and a strike by drivers in Tabriz, which took place in August, September, and October 2019, respectively). Importantly, the demonstrations have so far been about economic issues. The national protests have been erupting almost every year. However, back then they concerned only economic issues (which was visible, for instance, in the 2018 protests or the 2019 fuel protests).

Only after some time, and only when the level of frustration of the protesters correlated with the increase in the brutality of law enforcement, some shouts hostile to the rahbar and the republic started to be heard. What is important, however, is that the shouts are not postulates but only slogans. The opposition does not exist in an organized form, and there is a lack of notable leaders of the parts of 14 Salehi-Isfahani, D. Iran’s economy 40 years after the Islamic Revolution, https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/14/irans-economy40-years-after-the-islamic-revolution/, DOA: 20.09.2020.

15

https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard

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Middle East society opposing the republic. The regime is perfectly capable of suppressing the foundations of the organized opposition and skillfully isolating prospective leaders of any potential civil movements.

The regime took steps to improve the capabilities of police and other security forces in the aftermath of the 2009 protests. Protesters from that period were, for example, able to use social media to communicate, organize themselves, and criticize the regime. After the suppression of the so-called Green Movement, the Iranian government thoroughly examined the protesters’ methods. In 2011, it established the Cyber Police, Polis-e Faza-ye Towlid va Tabadol-e Ettelaat (FATA).

The new unit aims to monitor internet content, investigate cybercrimes such as fraud and privacy violations, as well as monitor internet activists. The effectiveness of its operation became apparent during the fuel protests when it turned out that by invading instant messengers, the security forces were able to isolate the most active citizens and imprison them. What turned out to be a big surprise and an issue of crucial importance was the information that the authorities have the ability to quickly and completely cut the country off from the global Internet.

While the protesters after the 2009 elections came mainly from the city’s middle class, the foundation of the recent fuel protests, as well as the December 2017 protests, were mainly low-income lower classes and unemployed youth living on the outskirts of cities. This is very dangerous for the Iranian establishment, as these groups have little to lose and see no chance to improve their lives in terms of employment and prosperity. However, the lack of solid leadership among the protesters, no potential alternative to the current system, or a strategic goal, as well as the fear of civil war, complete collapse of the infrastructure, the use of extreme force, and the range of methods used by the establishment to 44

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suppress the protests, do not currently give any prospects for regime change.

Military expenditure

Iran’s military spending between 1994 and 2018 peaked in 2006, after which it fell by 30% between 2006 and 2014. The fall was the greatest in 2012 and 2013, after the European Union, together with the UN and the US, imposed economic and financial sanctions on Iran. Sanctions were lifted in 2015 as a result of the signing of the JCPOA, which introduced a breath of fresh air into the Iranian economy. Iran’s military spending between 2015 and 2017 therefore increased by 25%. However, as the Iranian economy entered into recession and inflation rose from 10% in 2017 to 30% in 2018, the military budget fell again by 9.5% to 13.2 billion USD. In 2018, military spending amounted to 2.7% of GDP, the twenty-fifth highest expenditure in the world. Additionally, 96% of Iran’s arms imports in 2014-2018 came from Russia and the rest from China. Average military spending in Iran, as a share of total government spending in 2008–2016, reached 15%. This is the highest average share compared to regional averages of the Middle East and North Africa (12.5%), East Asia and Pacific (9%), Europe and Central Asia (5%), Latin America and the Caribbean (5%), Sub-Saharan Africa (7%), and the world as a whole (9%). In terms of average military spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), in Iran it amounted to 2.7% between 2008 and 2017, which is slightly higher than the global average (2.3%)16.

The graphs17 below show Iran’s military spending over the past 20 years and its correlation with inflation and GDP. 16 Dizaji, S., Farznegan, M. Do sanctions reduce the military spending in Iran?, MPS 2018/11, https:// www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/ magkspapers/paper_2018/31-2018_dizaji.pdf, DOA: 17.09.2020.

17 Own study based on data published by BMI, WB, IMF, and SIPRI.

Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US? 50

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Iran’s military expenditure is welldocumented in the budget law. However, while there is some transparency in the case of the army, this does not apply to Sepah. It is common knowledge that the corps has access to extra-budgetary sources of financing, i.e. the profits of its owned or co-owned companies, but their number and revenues, profits, or surpluses are unknown18.

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Wezeman, P., Kuimova, A. Military Spending and

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The first draft budget for Iran in 1399 assumed an increase in spending on all types of armed forces and the police.

Iran’s army, Sepah, and intelligence were to receive a total of about 20% more funds compared to last year, while the Basij militia funding was to decrease. The additional funds, despite Arms Imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE, Sipri Fact Sheet, May 2019, https://www.sipri. org/sites/default/files/2019-05/fs_1905_gulf_milex_ and_arms_transfers.pdf, DOA: 18.09.2020.

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Middle East 600 B

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nominal increases in real terms, would be somewhat reduced year-over-year.

Sepah’s budget increased by 60% yearon-year to 243 trillion IRR (about 1.6 billion USD). Taking into account extrabudgetary revenues, it can be assumed that the full budget of the corps reaches 2-2.2 billion USD. The budget of Basij, a paramilitary militia affiliated with Sepah, increased by 30% – to 22 trillion IRR (150 million USD). The army and the police have increased their budgets by 30%. Taking inflation into account, the budgets of all the armed and police forces remained unchanged from Iran’s year 1398. Only Sepah saw a significant increase. Given the political bargain concerning the adoption of the budget, it is believed that by increasing spending on Sepah, President Rouhani bought himself the rahbar’s support. If the government’s plans for privatization are also taken into account, it could turn out that Sepah will further increase its capital base by buying shares in privatized companies, and so-called ‘fair shares’19.

19 Author’s own research based on the analysis of Iran’s budget law of the year 1399.

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10

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Summary and forecasts

The Iranian economy has been coping with serious crises and foreign sanctions over the past two decades. Despite pressure from the US, Iran remains a strong and stable player in the region. Sanctions are painful for the Iranian economy, but their main goal has not been achieved – their victims are now primarily middle-class representatives from urban areas and hired workers.

With negative economic growth and high inflation, compounded by higher gasoline prices, the level of poverty may increase.

This rise will, however, be restricted via direct aids to the lowest-paid employees.

The increase in fuel prices and the reform of the subsidy system mean that additional transfers will not be a significant burden on the budget.

The Iranian economy was pushed back to its pre-JCPOA state but started to recover from stagflation. From a more pessimistic point of view, it remained in a state of a low-level economic equilibrium. This trend was halted by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, but in two years’ time, the economy should enter a slight growth path again.

Will the “maximum pressure” campaign force Iran to negotiate with the US?

AN IRANIAN MAN WALK PAST AN ANTI-US WALL PAINTING ON THE WALL OF FORMER US EMBASSY IN TEHRAN, IRAN, OCTOBER 14, 2020.

Despite the coronavirus pandemic crisis and US sanctions, the government has maintained repression in the country and its military capabilities as well as network of influence in neighboring countries. Political events in the region and budgetary trends show that Iran’s long-term and fundamental policies are not influenced by the economic pressure of the introduced sanctions.

The fiscal deficit will widen over the next two years due to the increasing government spending (including social protection programs), the need to stimulate the economy, and anti-crisis aid packages combined with a significant drop in oil export revenues and a temporary drop in tax revenues associated with the pandemic. Thanks to effective monetary

© Abedin Taherkenareh (PAP/EPA)

policy and the use of the capital market, the deficit will remain under control.

Assuming that the American economic pressure on Iran is not an end in itself but is part of the plan to force Tehran to negotiate and make concessions, the administration of President Donald Trump has so far failed to translate the sanctions-induced economic problems of Iran into strategic achievements.

In fact, it seems that the pressure has had the opposite effect – it made the Iranian position more rigid and strengthened the radical wing of the Iranian political scene.

Marcin Krzyżanowski October 2020

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Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century Izabela Wojtyczka's interview with Kamil Basaj

In the twenty-first century, the concept of war and fight between states has changed.

Nowadays, threats to state security can be observed primarily on the Internet.

Kamil Basaj, founder and president of the INFO OPS Poland Foundation, talked to Izabela Wojtyczka, editor-in-chief of The Warsaw Institute Review, about manipulation, information warfare and extensive disinformation operations.

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Turkey: In Search of Energy to Fulfil Geopolitical Ambitions

THE MASCOT OF A TROJAN HORSE MADE FROM ELECTRONIC PARTS STANDS GUARD OUTSIDE THE ENTRANCE TO THE CYBER WEEK SECURITY CONFERENCE OPENING AT THE TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY CAMPUS, ISRAEL, JUNE 24, 2019.

Izabela Wojtyczka: In your opinion, how right are the emerging diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare? How many directions and what specific features are we able to indicate?

Kamil Basaj: Currently, the Polishlanguage information ecosystems, but not only, are under permanent manipulative influence. Among such activities one can find disinformation and propaganda operations, as well as, more widely – psychological and informational ones. This subject has a wide range and

© Jim Hollander (PAP/EPA)

The Polish-language information ecosystems, but not only, are under permanent manipulative influence. cannot be limited solely to an operation using only correct, false or mixed information.

The processes of influence are carried out by more or less specialized action units, generally state-controlled ones.

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A DIGITAL SCREEN DISPLAYS A LIVE CYBER HACK ATTACK DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL POLICE OFFICE (BKA) IN WIESBADEN, GERMANY, NOVEMBER 11, 2019.

non-governmental organizations and society all have distinct capabilities to identify such threats. Manipulative operations are very often complex and are not limited to overt, propaganda and/or manipulative actions. An active information operation, conducted by professionals, often features a multivector transmission, activities (in multiple dimensions, e.g. physical and virtual), use of active means, e.g. provocation, simulation, mystification, or inspiration (made either consciously or not by the actor) and a planning process based on cognitive models, including subjectivity models. To make the whole action more effective and gain influence over the decision-making process of an individual and/or a social group in a wider context. The existing research shows that the basic parameter, which becomes the target of the attacker, are the cognitive processes of the recipients and they should be given special attention in the first place. This 50

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© Ronald Wittek (PAP/EPA)

is also important from the perspective of developing models for the recognition of such operations, because skillfully created queries/surveys taking into account the recognition of elements of an information opponent’s actions enable to detect an information operation at its early stage.

More broadly – in some cases this takes place already during the preparation of the background information by the attacker, which is supposed to constitute the foundation for future manipulative actions.

When wondering how correct the emerging diagnoses of the global disinformation warfare are, one can only point out that the information ecosystem, the processes of shaping views and decisions (including the abandonment of decisions), are the space for conducting information warfare and are coming from several basic directions in Poland.

The centers conducting offensive actions

Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century through open or overt channels are undoubtedly China, Russia, Germany and other actors, whose actions can be omitted for the purpose of this statement.

It should be remembered, however, that propaganda processes and activities, as those of the Russian Federation undertakes through open channels of communication the Kremlin-controlled media, vary from influencing public opinion through lobbying and paying off selected publicists and editorial boards for propaganda activities, related to, for example, masking, or otherwise – information cloaking, provided for e.g. Huawei products. Unfortunately, in both cases such activities are constantly present in the Polish information space.

Other threats, such as the distribution of terrorist materials or manuals (e.g. how to construct a bomb or transform a vehicle into a weapon, etc.), have a completely different structure and origin, but there are cases where materials of the so-called Islamic State are hidden in domains involved in manipulative operations of the Russian Federation.

From this perspective, the answer to the question on the accuracy of the aforementioned diagnosis is not obvious, as the very nature of the threats makes special services in individual states be responsible for recognition and prevention. There is no doubt that Polish special services have already developed capabilities both to recognize and counteract these threats within the framework of the applicable law in Poland, which often narrows down their possibilities of active performance.

Disinformation, even if it resembles true information, is intended to effectively interfere with the recipient’s decision-making process, i.e. in accordance with their preferences. One of the

techniques commonly used by the planners is to build models of reflection, based on models of subjectivity.

Could you please tell us about the mechanism of this process?

Reflexive management (control) has become a popular theme, used in the discourse on the use of active measures, deception and psychological operations, no less it has a very broad definition and can be used differently. The area of research, which I am currently focusing on in my professional activity at the INFO OPS Poland Foundation, concerns tactical level of control (low level), i.e. multidimensional method of influencing an individual’s decision-making process.

By definition, it takes place through the development of reflection on the collected resources of data, stimuli, memory, knowledge, decisions and the so far produced outlooks, accumulated unconsciously in human mind. Focusing on the tactical level of control in the research allowed to recognize processes classified as the group of models of subjectivity, i.e. individual patterns of perception of a stimulus – any information – by an affected entity.

This research has a long history.

In the Foundation we have also conducted research on volunteers to confirm the effectiveness of the applied solutions of conducting manipulative actions in an unconscious but effective way. The results of the research allowed us to determine the special features of this type of operations, i.e. a manipulative operation conducted with the use of models of subjectivity.

They can be applied to defensive actions and the recognition of the occurrence of events that may suggest the use of specialized tools by the attacker, which we qualify under models of subjectivity. From this perspective, the reflexive management has a very precise nature, because it is 3/2020

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Disinformation based on the understanding how the attacker seeks to permanently impair the decision-making process of the attacked, which from the perspective of the domain of reconnaissance is a significant element, as it enables an early identification of threats, often before they reach the right phase of action.

Going further, it is, of course, necessary to distinguish between operational areas in which it may apply. In simple terms, we should distinguish other models used, e.g. in reconnaissance conducted by APT teams, conducting intelligence operations in cyberspace, where the element of target profiling plays an important role through the operation against a single decision maker (e.g. commander, director of the department responsible for security), up to widely understood psychological operations, where elements of models of subjectivity can also be found by examining semantics and rhetorical clues or through applied social engineering.

All these areas as well as subsets of reflexive control (models of subjectivity, pre-reflexive patterns, individual thinking patterns), have a different potential to cause harm and in general their recognition process has a diversified form.

Can we trace this pattern on a specific example? Are there only public or private entities among the clients?

Employing models of subjectivity in conducting information attacks and more broadly – the use of active measures –– requires professional preparation, and I have not yet encountered a study that would reveal that the attacker using models of subjectivity was not a part of the security apparatus of the attacking state. However, it cannot be ruled out that such specialized abilities of nonstate actors will appear in the future, for instance, through the progressive 52

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A PERSON SITS IN FRONT OF A COMPUTER SCREEN IN MOERS, GERMANY, JANUARY 4, 2019.

commercialization of manipulative services.

Do we have any data on the financing and organization of disinformers’ work? Are these secret units operating at specific organizations with a hierarchy of orders?

The answer to this question requires determining which sector of the state apparatus is responsible for conducting the information operation. Typically, such

Mechanisms of disinformation of the 21st century

Š Sascha Steinbach (PAP/EPA)

an operation requires several different data sets, which can be obtained through the following processes: reconnaissance, analysis (including profiling of an object or a group of objects) and planning (also the use of manipulative matrices, models of subjectivity).The very scope of activities preceding the information operation indicates that the responsible centers, for instance in the case of the Russian Federation, are the Russian state apparatus as well as special and security sectors. A good example of such a complex

action was the process of cloaking the use of chemical weapon in Syria, where the information operation involved the Russian state administration apparatus, the military and media sectors as well as diplomacy and a number of cover-up activities carried out by Russian services in the form of inspiration and mystification, performed for the purposes of the socalled “media� activities.

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The Russian Federation permanently uses cyberspace as an operational environment in information, intelligence and penetration operations. such as Sputnik, RT or other documents that disseminate content, which is convergent with the actions of Russian propaganda, are somewhat different.

In this case, recognizing and defining actors is simplified, rather similar to information or media operations.

However, please be careful about the socalled Russian troll factories, because these centers would not be able to effectively perform their activities without the substantive support of reconnaissance, analysis and planning carried out by special centers, controlled by the security system of the Russian Federation.

Since the closure of national borders due to the coronavirus pandemic we have been receiving reports on intensified Russian cyberattacks. What are the main threats to Poland and the European Union? What defense mechanisms do we have?

The Russian Federation permanently uses cyberspace as an operational environment in information, intelligence and penetration operations. The threats are permanent and concern all state sectors being of interest for a country conducting hostile politics. From the security sector, the army, diplomacy, state administration, to the economic sphere, state-owned 54

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enterprises and non-governmental organizations, which from the perspective of the attacker have the potential to obtain the desired information from the organization’s resources.

This threat should be defined as permanent and important, also due to the low visibility of this type of operation, especially for the public. In the European Union, the infrastructure of the European Commission or the European Parliament is an equally sensitive target due to the potential gain of information that can present the background of many international events. Hostile actions of the Russian Federation cannot be underestimated and compared to other criminal activities because this runs greater risk to state security. There are various possibilities of prevention.

Poland and other EU or NATO members are constantly developing the potential to ensure the security of telecommunication systems and this process will continue. The human factor still plays a vital role in this system and often this aspect determines whether an attack is successful or not, for instance phishing. In recent years, Poland has reached many milestones, from the bill on the national cybersecurity system to the achievement of operational capabilities by specialized agencies, such as CERT Poland (CERT Polska) – a Computer Emergency Response Team operating within the structures of Research and Academic Computer Network (NASK), CSIRT GOV – a Computer Security Incident Response Team operated by the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and CSIRT MON – operated by the Ministry of National Defense (MON), which continuously monitor and counteract threats in cyberspace, including attacks by the Russian Federation, China or North Korea.

Kamil Basaj October 2020

China – USA. The Cold War 2.0?

Paweł Paszak

The escalation of tensions between the PRC and the USA during Donald Trump’s four-year presidency has prompted some commentators and scholars to identify the new strategic conditions as the Cold War 2.0. Despite the rising popularity of the term in the public discourse, it has many opponents who argue that it is unjustified and oversimplifies the actual nature of the process.

Is this really the case?

The spectacular growth of China’s economic and military power in the 21st century has made the United States – for the first time since the collapse of the USSR – face a rival that has a potential to achieve a superpower status and replace it as the global hegemon. Since Xi Jinping took power in China in 2012, this country has rejected Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic

24-Character Strategy, embarking on a more confrontational and ambitious foreign policy course. Xi’s rule is also a process of unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of an individual since Mao, with a gradual departure from the model of collective leadership and a return to Maoist symbolism.

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Geopolitics If one understands the Cold War 2.0 as a simple return of mechanisms and strategies of rivalry with the USSR, then this claim is not valid. Globalization, the internationalization of production processes and the weakening of the domination of the West have made the world far from the divisions distinctive for the previous era. China has become an integral part of the world economy, international institutions and political relations. Effective and efficient rivalry with this country requires a different approach than the Cold War-era containment.

If, however, we consider the Cold War 2.0 as a notion that reflects not a return, but an evolution of the great power struggle in a globalized world, then such a term is justified. The way the concept of industry 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 or 4.0 marks new eras in terms of technology, the Cold War 2.0 is a further manifestation of the structural struggle of the superpowers for material and normative world domination. The current confrontation with China in many ways resembles the relationship between the US and the USSR between 1945 and 1991, but concurrently these phenomena are fundamentally different.

In order to properly assess what remained the same and what changed as well as to identify the specific characteristics of this phenomenon, it is necessary to closely examine the military, economic, and ideological levels that set the framework for the new Cold War rivalry.

The military dimension of China-US rivalry

The Soviet Union was primarily a military threat due to the size of its army and nuclear arsenal as well as combat readiness. In this respect, contemporary China is still distinctly inferior to the US Army, but it is consistently bridging the gap through extensive modernization programs. In recent years, the Chinese 56

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© Yuri Kochetkov (PAP/EPA)

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has significantly increased the potential of its conventional and nuclear missile forces.

The development and deployment of DF-17, DF-26D, DF-41 missiles and their various carriers has greatly increased the threat to US troops and bases in the Western Pacific. The Chinese Navy is also growing rapidly, already being the world’s largest fleet (350 units), with its arsenal further increasing in the coming decades.

Despite numerous issues, a program of aircraft carriers and a fifth-generation multirole aircraft, capable of challenging the American F-22 and F-35, is still under

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MILITARY SERVICEPEOPLE OF CHINA TAKE PART IN A MILITARY PARADE, MARKING THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NAZI DEFEAT, MOSCOW, RUSSIA, JUNE 24, 2020.

development. What also deserves attention are efforts to expand the Strategic Support Force (SSF), responsible for cyberspace and information sphere in addition to providing an advantage in the C4ISR area (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). New type of troops, set in the PRC’s military strategy, are poised to achieve the goal of “winning local conflicts in the conditions of computerization,” in which situational awareness plays a primary role. According to the strategic documents, by 2049, thus the centenary of the establishment of the

Contemporary China is still distinctly inferior to the US Army.

PRC, the Chinese Armed Forces are to achieve “world class” and the ability to defeat any opponent. But does the progress accomplished by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army put it in line with the military potential of the USSR? 3/2020

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Geopolitics In the vast majority of sectors, the US Army has not only a qualitative but also a quantitative advantage, as evidenced by its military budget (USD 700 billion vs. USD 180 billion), the number of aircraft carrier strike groups (11 vs. 2) and fifth-generation aircraft (300+ vs. 50).

However, the forces of the United States remain dispersed in different regions of the world, such as Europe, the Middle East and Indo-Pacific. On the one hand, this increases Washington’s ability to shape the political situation and project the force in these areas, yet on the other hand, it limits the resources that can be used by the Indo-Pacific Command. PLA, although still significantly weaker, has concentrated its activity in the Western Pacific region and has subordinated modernization programs to acquire anti-access/areadenial (A2/AD) capacity and minimize the risk of foreign intervention in the region.

In case of a conflict, the US Army would have to operate from the bases in allied countries (Japan, South Korea, Australia) and in the area of the so-called “Second Island Chain” (Guam, Mariana Islands and Palau). The “Tyranny of Distance” and the related extension of logistical routes are described in the documents of the Department of Defense as one of the main problems associated with the power projection.

In recent years, further reports of influential US institutions (RAND, National Defense Strategy Commission) have shown that in a potential conflict over Taiwan, China has a growing chance to win. The dynamics of the events, unfavorable for the USA, requires firm actions to counterbalance the growing threat from the PLA. The authorities in Washington will strive to form a coalition of states in the Indo-Pacific region, which, following the example of NATO in the Cold War period, would constitute the foundation of the US strategy. The activities of both countries and their 58

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partners will result in an increasing security dilemma in East Asia, consistently increasing the risk of a conflict. China is still not match up to the level of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, but as its potential increases and the US position erodes, it will seek to disintegrate the American alliance system and achieve domination in East Asia.

The economic dimension: from the trap of interdependence to decoupling?

The most significant difference in comparison to the period of rivalry with the USSR is the high level of interdependence between China and the leading economies of the former “Free World” (USA, EU, Japan, South Korea).

The PRC as the world’s second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP (USD 14.14 trillion) is also the country with the biggest global trade balance (about USD 4.6 trillion) and export rate (USD 2.5 trillion). Such a huge success was possible because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western states recognized that the economic opening of China to the world not only creates great opportunities for optimizing production, but also provides a natural way to make political and social reforms effective. The concept of “change through trade” proved to be founded on erroneous assumptions, because, despite stronger economic ties, China had not liberalized its political system. The policies of the previous US and European governments came under heavy criticism from President Trump and his key associates. Donald Trump accused China of “the greatest theft in world history” whilst Vice President Mike Pence spoke at the Hudson Institute in October 2018 about the “economic aggression” which China had chosen instead of liberalization.

The USSR, despite its significant share of world GDP (the second largest economy in the world up until the 1980s), was

China – USA. The Cold War 2.0?

CHINESE AND USA FLAG ARE SEEN AMONG OTHERS IN SMIC FACTORY IN SHANGHAI, CHINA, SEPTEMBER 7, 2020.

a relatively isolated economic system.

The access of Western companies and investors to the markets of socialist countries remained severely restricted and, as a result, the USSR did not have any strong instruments of pressure on its rivals.

China is an integral part of global production networks, which is particularly evident in terms of the electronics sector. The scale of the dependence was demonstrated by, among others, the COVID-19 pandemic and the sharp rise in demand for medical supplies, which in many cases could be imported almost exclusively from China.

This is what the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo pointed out during his visit to the Czech Republic in August.

“The CCP is already enmeshed in our economies, in our politics, in our societies in ways the Soviet Union never was,” he then warned. Such a significant scale of economic interdependence makes any attempts to isolate China extremely costly for leading American companies and their counterparts in the allied countries.

© Alex Plavevski (PAP/EPA)

The resistance of key transnational companies constitute one the most profound barriers to employ more hawkish foreign policy toward China as exemplified by internal debate within the US and the European Union.

Nowadays, China is also the world’s largest market of semiconductors/ microprocessors (60%), industrial robots (36%) and one of the main sources of income for the US companies, such as Apple (17-25%) Boeing (22%) and Intel (28%). The situation is similar in the case of the leading German and European global corporations. In 2019, the Volkswagen Group sold more than three million vehicles in China, which is almost six times more than in the domestic market and nearly twice as many as in Europe. The Chinese market is equally important for the Mercedes/Daimler Group, which in 2019 sold 693,000 vehicles there – more than the combined sales in the USA (316,000) and Germany (318,000).

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Between 2000 and 2017, China’s gross expenditure on research and development (R&D) increased from USD 33.08 billion to USD 496 billion.

Sales results of the BMW Group also largely depend on the market situation in China, which accounted for 28.6% of the number of vehicles sold in 2019. According to the OECD data, the value of FDI stock in 2019 came close to USD 3 trillion, which also shows the scale of financial involvement of Western investors in this country.

The scope and depth of interdependencies led the US authorities to promote the concept of economic decoupling with China on the international stage. It would involve the diversification of production chains by moving some factories back to their home country or to other Asian countries, such as India, Vietnam, Thailand or Bangladesh. Poland, which has developed an important role in the European division of labor as well as has a qualified and still relatively cheap workforce, could also potentially benefit from such a solution. However, this concept is encountering serious problems.

Since the initiation of the opening reforms, the Chinese economy has achieved a number of comparative advantages, which make the whole process, should it go ahead, costly and time-consuming.

Furthermore, in order to attain this goal, it would be necessary to coordinate the actions of virtually all US allies and 60

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partners, many of whom maintain a lively economic cooperation with the PRC and fear potential retaliation. Under current conditions, the United States is not able to stop China’s economic growth on its own, and its impact on former allies has noticeably weakened in recent decades.

What illustrates potential trouble is the stance adopted by leading European politicians, expressed on the occasion of the visit of Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, to Europe in late August 2020. A number of prominent politicians, including the head of EU diplomacy Josep Borell, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, expressed skepticism about the concept of decoupling.

The problem for the United States is not only the fact of economic ties, but also the growing scientific and technological potential of the PRC, resulting in increased competition in the area of advanced technologies. Between 2000 and 2017, China’s gross expenditure on research and development (R&D) increased from USD 33.08 billion to USD 496 billion, which is higher than the funds allocated by EU countries for this purpose.

For comparison, in the USA it increased from USD 269 billion to USD 543 billion within the same period of time.

The inflow of funds allowed, among others, for dynamic development of the ICT sector (Information and Communication Technologies), artificial intelligence, electric cars, solar panels and high-speed rail (HSR). China has made progress particularly in the first of them, as evidenced by the global expansion of companies, such as Huawei, ZTE, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. Since 2014 in the ranking of WIPO and Cornell University, China has lifted its rating of the ICT sector from 36.1 in 2014 to 74.5 in 2019. For comparison, in the same period, the US index rose from 83 to 89 on a hundredpoint scale.

China – USA. The Cold War 2.0?

China’s advancement in the international division of labor is in serious competition with core industrial centers in the European Union, the USA, Japan and South Korea, which so far have maintained a distinct advantage. In the coming years, Chinese authorities will make significant effort to restructure its economy, advance in global value chains and create and indigenous high-tech sector. Shall these efforts succeed, the United States and the West will face a formidable opponent capable of undermining its technological advantage.

Ideological dimension: A return to the rhetoric of the “Free World” and the “Evil Empire?”

An important aspect of the Cold War was the ideological rivalry between the United States, representing the so-called “Free World,” and the Soviet Union, described by President Reagan as the “Evil Empire.” The model of modernization based on socialist and communist ideology was often adopted by the postcolonial countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, which were looking for ways to develop in opposition to Western countries. The influence of Moscow and Beijing as ideological centers supporting “fraternal” socialist states had a real dimension at the time, giving the rivalry between the USA and the USSR also a normative character. Contemporary China does not offer such an alternative to the Western development model; economically, it essentially accepted the superiority of capitalism, yet introducing far-reaching state interventionism. Despite the impressive GDP growth dynamics, the soft power of the PRC remains very modest. The hybrid economic and social system in the PRC is a specific construct and cannot be treated as a role model for other countries of the world, unless the oppressive nature of the state security apparatus can be considered exemplary.

However, the absence of an ideological alternative to the West does not imply that this aspect is absent in the Cold War 2.0.

Communist China remains an authoritarian state – since 2012 when Xi Jinping took power, the tendency towards further tightening of control over political and social life has also become apparent, which may result in totalitarianizing the system on the basis of the Maoist China.

The forced Sinicization of East Turkestan (Xinjiang), combined with the sterilization of the population and the detention of about one million inhabitants in “reeducation camps,” evokes analogies to the worst practices of the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”. Similarly, the de facto eliminating of Hong Kong’s autonomy through the introduction of the national security law in June 2020, conducted against the will of the majority of the population, confirmed the authorities’ lack of respect for fundamental civil rights and international obligations.

In addition come abusive practices of the PRC security apparatus against Christians and secular human rights activists.

The process of concentrating power in the hands of Xi Jinping and his cricle, which has been in place since 2012, is another element that evokes analogies with the Cold War China. Xi Jinping is often referred to as “the most powerful leader since Mao,” due to the domination of people from his milieu in the Political Bureau of the CCP as well as the purges of opponents carried out on the occasion of the reform of the army in 2015 and the anti-corruption campaign. Currently, Xi also serves as the General Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), a body with key influence over the army and security apparatus.

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THE LOGO OF CHINA’S HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. IS DISPLAYED NEAR THE US EMBASSY IN KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, JUNE 17, 2019.

© Fazry Ismail (PAP/EPA)

and “flies” were to eradicate corruption, both among leading political figures and low-ranking officials. Additionally, they served to eliminate political opponents in administrative and military structures as well as gave a clear signal that resistance to Xi would result in marginalization.

dating back to his childhood, studies or earlier career in Shaanxi and Shanghai.

The decision to include Xi Jinping’s thought into the Party’s constitution, reached at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in 2017, was also an expression of Xi’s strengthening position.

This decision made it one of the ideological compasses, on a par with MarxismLeninism, Mao Zedong’s thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the principles of the “three representations” and “scientific development.” No less important was the recommendation to abolish the current limit of two terms for the offices of President and Vice President, which

According to the findings of MacroPolo China, during the 2012-2017 term, there were only four people directly related to Xi who were the members of the Political Bureau, which is the key body in the PRC. In the new term of the Politburo, totaling 25 members, as many as 14 of them are people with ties to the General Secretary, 62

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China – USA. The Cold War 2.0? opened the way for the Xi administration after 2023, when his second tenure ends.

So far, there have been both formal and informal term limits, which were the Chinese version of the “checks and balances” principle, aiming to prevent a return to Mao’s dictatorship. The actions taken by Xi Jinping in institutional and symbolic dimensions indicate a partial return to the Mao era and the cult of personality. These processes herald the emergence of China, which is not only economically powerful, but also guided by an anti-Western sentiment, chauvinism and revisionism.

The outlined features of the Chinese system make the country strikingly opposite to Western culture, shaped by Christian and Enlightenment traditions.

In this sense, the rivalry with the PRC also gradually assumes a civilizational conflict. The Cold War 2.0 in its symbolic dimension will increasingly be based on a dichotomy of the humanist West and the oppressive Communist regime. On the one hand, this is due to the real dimension of persecutions, on the other hand, because of to the convergence of such a narrative with the interests of the United States.

Mike Pompeo clearly outlined the leading narrative of American policy towards China in his speech from July 23, 2020, titled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future.” Due to the democratic nature of the vast majority of the allies, arguments based on axiological elements have a chance to reach Western societies, dissuading them from further cooperation with China. Although the rivalry with the PRC has primarily a structural dimension and involves a competition for power, simultaneously, the moral issues play a significant role in the process of legitimizing politics. The hegemonic rivalry for the position in the international system will also have serious implications for the value system and law enforcing capabilities. On the basis of all the factors

The outlined features of the Chinese system make the country strikingly opposite to Western culture, shaped by Christian and Enlightenment traditions. presented above, it could be expected that the language of political discourse will be tougher while axiological arguments more frequent.

Summary

All three analyzed dimensions of rivalry (military, economic, ideological) have several elements in common with the Cold War period. Certainly, the Cold War 2.0 is not a simple continuation of its predecessor, due to the diametrically different role of China and the USSR in world economy and politics.

The possibilities of economic isolation of China remain severely limited and even an attempt to become partly independent of the country will require years-long efforts and generate additional costs. A probable scenario is the application of a hybrid doctrine of containment, involving the mobilization of the US Armed Forces and their allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Parallelly specific limitations of technological and investment progress of the PRC could be introduced. The realistic goal is not to completely isolate Chinese economy, but to cause a sectoral halt to its technological progress in order to secure an advantage in global production networks.

Paweł Paszak October 2020 3/2020

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Stealth War

Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD

While the free market economy and democracy pose the biggest threats to the Communist Party of China (CPC), Western capital flows allow the People's Republic of China, or PRC to finance its economic, military, and technological advancement.

A

poll published in December 2019 by the Pew Research Center1 found that 47% of Poles showed favorable views of the People’s Republic of China, which places Poland among European countries having an exceptionally positive opinion of China. Russians stand out for having the best view of China across all countries surveyed (71% favorable), while in Japan, 85% say they have an unfavorable opinion of China – International opinions of China divided, https:// www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinaseconomic-growth-mostly-welcomed-in-emergingmarkets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-influence/ pg_2019-12-05_balance-of-power_2-01/, December 4, 2019.

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the most negative among all countries in the poll. It is worth noting that in Poland’s neighboring Czech Republic, China received favorable marks from roughly 27%, which is similar as in the United States where this figure stood at 26%. Negative views of China predominate in both Japan (85%) and Sweden (70%).

Although the data was compiled before the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China, as the pandemic undoubtedly changed how China is perceived across the globe, the results come as somewhat worrying.

They demonstrate both general

Stealth War

AAM AADMI PARTY (AAP) MEMBERS BURN POSTERS OF CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING DURING A PROTEST AGAINST CHINA IN MUMBAI, INDIA, JUNE 20, 2020.

and desired favorable opinions of Chinese nationals in other countries and insufficient knowledge of the People’s Republic of China, its origins, accomplishments, goals, as well as what communist China is today. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand this state of affairs in the time of ubiquitous internet access, a medium where one can also find independent and objective information.

This happens even if we assume that people having some influence on what to think about contemporary communist China are guests of popular media outlets where they pose as experts and promote various forms of rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China. The presented data indicates the need to undertake wide-ranging information activities to gain a better understanding of some mechanisms of modern communist China

© Divyakant Solanki (PAP/EPA)

or long-term risks and consequences the country might pose to the West, its culture, economy, and geopolitics.

There is just one solution to some information hitches that affect the assessment of contemporary communist China: to get information from reliable sources and have a critical view on their content. This shows a particularly vital attitude in the time of omnipresent information warfare. To gain a better understanding of contemporary communist China, it is worth reading the following two publications: Bob Fu’s God’s Double Agent (published in 2015 in Poland),2 and Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept — God’s Double Agent: The True Story of a Chines Christian’s Fight For Freedom.

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Geopolitics authored by Robert Spalding and printed in 20193.

The former, authored by Bob Fu, is an autobiography of the icon of the fight for freedom in the People’s Republic of China, a Chinese underground church leader, imprisoned for running a Christian training center, a founder and chairman of ChinaAid, a non-profit religious freedom and human rights organization.

The author of the second book, Robert Spalding, retired from the U.S. Air Force as a brigadier general. He is a former China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, as well as a senior defense official and defense attaché to China.

These two works give an insight into what communist China was in the past and is now.

Bob Fu

Bob Fu and his wife fled the People’s Republic of China: back then, when China’s one-child policy was still in force, they would have been forced to kill their unborn baby. Born and raised in a small village in communist China’s southeastern Shandong province along the lower reaches of the Yellow River, Fu describes his story of living in a rural community formed following China’s property law in 1958 when private ownership was entirely abolished, and households were organized into state-operated communes.

Also, large communal kitchens were a characteristic feature of that time.

Bob’s very first experience was starvation, which forced people to eat mud, tanned and softened leather, or dead children and elderly, often killed beforehand.

The son of a poor rural accountant, Fu, struggled with poverty and overwhelming fear from the first years of his life while his only joy — and that of the whole Stealth War: How China Took Over When America’s Elites Slept.

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community — were propaganda movies screened once every few months. Despite these hardships, pain, and suffering, Bob graduated from both elementary and high school and then received an undergraduate degree. In 1991, he entered the university and then started working.

During the day, he was a teacher at a party school of the Chinese Communist Party, yet in the evenings and at night, he would read the Gospel or conducted religious activity. He was arrested many times and experienced religious persecution, but he refused to accept the reality he had to live in. Fu opposed pervasive corruption, trying to encourage others to adopt a different lifestyle. In 1989, he was also at Tiananmen Square, where many students died in the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on June 4 when demanding state political reforms and fight against corruption. Fu himself did not take part in the events that China’s authorities were never held accountable for. “We wanted to believe in the ideas of democracy, we wanted to believe in China. We wanted to believe that our government would protect students who only wanted to strive for a better future,” he wrote many years later.

Bob’s life took on real meaning due to both Heidi, his future wife, and his discovery of God. However, the Communist Party of China was against the faith, considering Christianity a threat to national security.

However, Bob Fu was not discouraged by the adversity of fate, conducting intense religious activity and becoming one of China’s underground church leaders.

Fu’s diary is extremely interesting and contains a set of information about the life of ordinary people in the People’s Republic of China.

Robert Spalding

Robert Spalding’s Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept blends the author’s personal experience with a set of interviews about the Communist Party of China. China’s

© Alex Plavevski (PAP/EPA)

Stealth War

A PRIEST SERVES EASTER HOLY MASS TROUGH THE FENCE OF OUR LADY OF LOURDES CHAPEL CHURCH IN GUANGZHOU, GUANGDONG PROVINCE, CHINA, APRIL 12, 2020.

goals, as Spalding writes in this book, are obvious: gaining control and influence across the planet without resorting to military aggression — yet by carefully taking control of the world’s shipping businesses, infiltrating corporations and science laboratories, and using American and Western investor money to float the cost of its own companies.

As Robert Spalding writes in his book, “war between nation-states in the twentyfirst century looks much different than war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Instead of bombs and bullets, it’s about ones and zeros and dollars and cents: economics, finance, data information, manufacturing, infrastructure, and communications. Control those fronts today, and you can win a war without firing a shot.” According to Spalding, what comes as the biggest threat to China’s authoritarian rule is core American values like freedom of speech. As the author of Stealth War argues in his publication, the People’s Republic of China remains

Instead of bombs and bullets, it's about ones and zeros and dollars and cents: economics, finance, data information, manufacturing, infrastructure, and communications. Control those fronts today, and you can win a war without firing a shot. focused on the six spheres of influence — economy, military, diplomacy, technology, education, and infrastructure — while using “our [U.S] capital against our 3/2020

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© Wu Hong (PAP/EPA)

Geopolitics

CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING WAVES AFTER DELIVERING A SPEECH DURING THE JOINT OPENING CEREMONY OF THE EIGHTH ROUND OF THE US-CHINA STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC DIALOGUE AND US-CHINA CONSULTATION ON PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGE AT DIAOYUTAI STATE GUESTHOUSE IN BEIJING, CHINA, JUNE 6, 2016.

interests.” Xi Jinping is pursuing to become a global tech leader to take over the telecoms market and export the totalitarian social control system to other countries.

According to Spalding, the United States and all democratic countries “now face our biggest challenge since World War II — one with dire implications for the United States and the world at large.”

The more Chinese-made goods flood the local market, the more negative impact this exerts on domestic economies.

The author also claims that the increase in the production of Chinese-made goods deepens chasms in local business communities, a phenomenon that fosters the interests of the People’s Republic of China. Gen. Spalding also gives an insight into how difficult it was to write his book in the United States, where some 68

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experts and businesses enjoy profits from ties with China. Between 2016 and 2017, the general called on a prominent U.S. think tank to analyze the impact that the Communist Party of China had exerted on the U.S. corporate sector. But the institution turned down the offer amid its supervisory board’s close link to Chinese business circles. As a member of the White House National Security Council, in 2017, Spalding tried to draw the attention of many institutions to risks arising from China’s aggressive policies, which some balked at, fearful of cutting off donations or breaking business ties. Among them were also institutions whose mission was to promote democracy, freedom, and human rights. “I was determined to educate America about how China uses the money to influence governments and institutions around the world to shape political and economic benefits,” Spalding

Stealth War explained further in this book. Many U.S. officials, as well as representatives of think tanks and business circles who occupy a leading role on Wall Street, remain, to a large extent, dependent on China.

Spalding points to an effective strategy that involves Chinese specialists who understand business data and technology, allowing the country to make strategic acquisitions and obtain key technologies.

In his book, the U.S. Army General quotes an interesting survey The China Toll Deepens by the Economic Policy Institute, or EPI. The U.S.-China trade model cost 3.4 million U.S. jobs between 2001 and 2017, of which 2.5 million were in manufacturing (data available after subtracting the number of jobs lost created in the export). Between 2001 and 2011 alone, growing trade deficits with China reduced the incomes of directly impacted workers by $37 billion per year, the EDI wrote in the report. It is worth noting that the People’s Republic of China solves oversupply problems by using dumping prices and flooding other countries with its goods. “The political leaders and financial elite I’ve mentioned here all share one thing in common: they have been operating under a false assumption that our interactions with China are part of normal free-market competition.”

But while the free market economy and democracy are both what poses the biggest threat to the Communist Party of China (CPC), Western capital flows allow the People’s Republic of China to finance its economic, military, and technological advancement. As Spalding points out, China relies upon a doctrine outlined in a 1999 work called Unrestricted Warfare written by two senior colonels in China’s People’s Liberation Army, Qiao Liang, and Wang Xiangsui. The book combines strategy with social theory and remarks on technology. The state no longer needs a mighty army to conquer others; it is economic power that strengthens

all areas of a possible attack. “China’s strategic culture,” Robert Spalding writes “is intertwined with Confucius societal notions of hierarchy and harmony and mixed with pragmatic views on how to gain power, wealth, and influence.”

The United States is wrong when assuming that building ties with China will bring a political shift in Beijing, Spalding writes.

Communist China is open to foreign projects and the global market yet on its own terms. In doing so, the country strategically defeats the United States that — since President Nixon’s term in office and notably in light of Henry Kissinger’s strategy — has seen cooperation with the PRC as a way to further destabilize and isolate the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR. Although the Soviet Union collapsed, the People’s Republic of China ruthlessly took advantage of the naivety of the American political and business elite while the strength of Western capital and free trade made Beijing grow richer.

On the other hand, the business serves political purposes, and a cheap labor force ensures the high product competitiveness on global markets. Today, the People’s Republic of China is building railroads and ports to control the world’s shipping routes, while, as Robert Spalding argues, it all starts with building the state economy, or the basis of national security. According to the General, the PRC will try to attract more foreign projects to sustain economic growth but will grab profits since Beijing needs money. Spalding also believes that it is reckless that Western corporations start investing in the People’s Republic of China, where there are violations of accounting practices, while analysts are unable to calculate the value of Chinese companies. In his book, the author paints a whole array of Chinese activities the country has used for unlawful enrichment: corporate espionage, intellectual theft, bribery, placing Chinese students in 3/2020

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China is making efforts to take control of critical infrastructure and exert pressure on other market areas. research institutes, putting bogus offers on Amazon, subsidizing illegal goods, and illegal fishing activities. Citing data from the Journal of Commerce, Robert Spalding notes that in 2017, roughly a total of 200 million containers were transhipped in Chinese ports. Of them, 12 million are shipped each year to the United States, a process that involves four American inspectors who yet have no right to check what is inside the containers. Spalding also writes that the U.S. post office loses $170 million per year as it costs far more to send a 1.4-kilogram package from the White House to the Capitol — both in Washington yet one being 3.2 kilometers away from another — than from the White House to Beijing, some 10,502 kilometers away. It is a consequence of the provision set by the Universal Postal Union that sets mail delivery fees for national carriers in 192 countries. Under a 1969 provision to help struggling economies, the U.S. Postal Service agreed to offer a huge discount for packages shipping out of China that weigh less than 2 kilograms.

According to Gen. Spalding, with its One Belt, One Road initiative, China seeks to dominate cargo shipping across the globe. The People’s Republic of China is now pursuing a $1.3 trillion plan with the mission to control the economy, and the world’s most important railways, motorways, and seaports. Spalding provides an overview of how the People’s Republic of China builds its dominant 70

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economic position and plans new takeovers. One famous example is the Hambantota Port project in Sri Lanka, where China Harbour Engineering Company inked cash and credit deals during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidential tenure. After he lost the election in 2015, China swamped Sri Lanka in debt, refusing to relax loan conditions.

In consequence, in 2017, Sri Lanka’s government Sri Lanka signed a deal with China for the control and a 99-year lease on the port and about 6,070 hectares nearby. In 2018, Xi Jinping offered between $60 and 80 billion in financing for Africa. With its activities, China is making efforts to take control of critical infrastructure and exert pressure on other market areas: just to add here that China’s Transsion Holdings overtook Samsung to become Africa’s number one mobile phone supplier. As Spalding aptly points out, the People’s Republic of China has an extremely strong position here: since 2019, it has exported between 90 and 95% of rare-earth metals like dysprosium, neodymium, gadolinium, or ytterbium, and can halt electronics manufacturing anywhere around the globe. China is also the world’s leading manufacturer of chemical fertilizers, cement, and steel.

The country used more cement between 2011 and 2013 than the U.S. did in the entire twentieth century. Further in his book, Spalding cites data from The Economist, saying that as of 2015, China produced about 80% of the world’s air conditioners, 70% of its mobile phones, and 60% of shoes. What is particularly worrying is that the U.S. Army is dependent on Chinese-made telecommunications gear.

According to Spalding, the United States is unable to conduct long-term military operations without China, from where it imports goods and materials in bulk for military purposes: missile propulsion, a metal called lanthanum to produce night-vision goggles, computers, or even video game consoles used by soldiers.

Stealth War There are other worthwhile issues that Robert Spalding discusses in his publication. For instance, China employs millions of its citizens as internet monitors. In 2013, China’s official state news outlets reported that the Communist Party of China had hired some 2 million “public opinion analysts,” with an extra 10 million of college student volunteers tasked with disseminating Chinese narrative across the globe, also through Twitter — although officially blocked in China — and Twitter-like WeChat.

There is no higher stake than 5G wireless technology, Spalding writes, “if a Chinese telecom builds and controls a nation’s 5G network, there will be no checks and balances to keep the Chinese company from stealing and mining all the data on that network. Creating a network is a matter of national security, not that of business or technology.” Spading adds that since 2004 the Chinese government has placed Confucius Institutes that served to spread communist propaganda. In 2017, 90 facilities were operating in the United States and more than 500 around the world. Nearly 45 million Chinese immigrants live now in the United States, Spalding writes in the book. In 2017, U.S. colleges admitted 350,000 Chinese students, making up for 32.5% of a total of over 1,000,000 international college students in the United States.

As Spalding notes in this work, the Communist Party of China passed on June 28, 2017, the National Intelligence Law giving authorities sweeping powers to monitor and investigate all individuals and companies in the People’s Republic of China and offering intelligence agencies legal ground to carry out their work also outside China. According to the author, the People’s Republic of China is investing mostly in cutting-edge technologies: high-end numerically controlled machines and robots, aerospace equipment, ocean engineering equipment, high-end vessels, high-end rail, energy-efficient,

China employs millions of its citizens as internet monitors. and new-generation vehicles, electrical gear, agricultural machines, biomedical materials, polymers, and leading-edge medical equipment. He also believes that the United States can and should still place in a spotlight values like freedom of speech and religion, free-market principles, and democratic norms while seeking to rebuild national infrastructure, strengthening the military and border security, and increasing competitiveness. In doing so, the United States protects information and digital technologies, focusing on the need to restore control of the budget and the international order.

Conclusions

The cited and discussed publications are a good example of reliable studies on the PRC and will serve as an introduction to an in-depth analysis of the model of the People’s Republic of China. They can also help readers build their opinions on the political system, economic strategy, and geopolitics of the People’s Republic of China.

Rafał Zgorzelski October 2020

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A Difficult Transatlantic Cooperation

Paweł Pawłowski

In the face of the growing economic and structural crisis as well as the global rise of China’s power, Europe and the United States should overcome reciprocal grievances and prejudices, revisiting the spirit of transatlantic cooperation that has been mutually beneficial in the past.

T

he decades spent under Soviet domination have accustomed Poles to perceive the West as a relatively uniform block of the “world of freedom,” but this was not true during the Cold War, nor is it today. Although transatlantic cooperation has borne great fruit and saved the nations to the west of the Elbe from the tyranny of totalitarianism at least twice, cooperation between the European countries and the USA is still going through further difficulties.

There is no doubt that the state of relations

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between the European Union (EU) and America is also strongly influenced by the structural problems that exist on both sides of the Atlantic and intensify tensions. In the context of transatlantic cooperation, there is a clear difference in approach between the western part of the continent and the countries of the Three Seas Initiative. The situation is further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected numerous aspects of the functioning of states and nations in both internal and external relations.

A Difficult Transatlantic Cooperation

LEFT TO RIGHT: US PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER SCOTT MORRISON, FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON, UN SECRETARY GENERAL ANTONIO GUTERRES, AND GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL SHARE A LIGHT MOMENT AS THEY POSE FOR THE FAMILY PHOTO DURING THE G7 SUMMIT AT CASINO IN BIARRITZ, FRANCE, AUGUST 25, 2019.

The European Union is going through an identity and structural crisis. On the one hand, it witnesses numerous protests, actions of dissatisfied social groups, and increasing support for Eurosceptic parties.

On the other hand, ideologists are calling for even closer economic and political integration. Financial problems are also observable. Even before the pandemic, economic growth was very modest, generated mainly by Germany and the countries of Central Europe. The current scale of unemployment and shrinking economies of, for instance, Spain and Italy are highly worrying. The scope of internal tensions in the Union is well illustrated by

© Andrew Parsons (PAP/EPA)

The European Union is going through an identity and structural crisis. the language used in the arguments held on the European forum. Such as example is the recent statement by Katarina Barley, Vice President of the European Parliament from the German SPD party, who said on the radio that Poland and Hungary should be “financially starved.” Such outrageous statements are proof of the heated disputes within the Community. At the same 3/2020

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US PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP (R) AND CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY ANGELA MERKEL (L) SHAKE HANDS WHILE HOLDING A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE IN THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., USA, APRIL 27, 2018.

time, the United Kingdom, whose AngloSaxon perspective allowed supporting transatlantic cooperation, has already left the EU. Recent months in the United States have seen a massive outbreak of the Wuhan coronavirus and numerous riots related to the Black Lives Matter movement. There is only a vague memory of economic success, which seemed to be the main theme of Donald Trump’s term. Deep divisions in American society became apparent again in the election year. Moreover, there is a growing gap between the supporters of social and political revolutions, who want to “sweep the past away,” and the conservative part of society. It must be borne in mind that the intensification of tensions is in the interest of all US enemies.

Racial conflict is the most observable, but only one of many problems. The result of the presidential election will show what 74

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© Michael Reynolds (PAP/EPA)

vision of the United States is supported by the majority of Americans.

However, it will be much less important for foreign policy than for domestic affairs. While many European leaders will be happy if there is a new tenant in the White House, in fact, not so much will change beyond rhetoric. As Michał Kuź, PhD, rightly quoted during one of the discussions organized by The Warsaw Institute Review, European audiences were dismayed when during the Munich Security Conference Mike Pompeo and Nancy Pelosi shared nearly identical opinions on matters of US foreign policy in one of the discussions after regular disputes. It seems that America’s most important interests will remain unchanged.

The processes triggered by the pandemic intensified the global US-China rivalry.

A Difficult Transatlantic Cooperation Although the first Wuhan coronavirus outbreak hit the Middle Kingdom, the country started to make up for losses relatively quickly. At the same time, on the example of medical products, the whole world could realize how much they depended on Chinese production lines.

Despite numerous Chinese operations in the information domain, the world’s problematic reliance on the Middle Kingdom was the key issue throughout the pandemic. Moreover, the subject of medical supplies was visible in relations between the EU countries as well as in EU-US relations. The cross-border transport of essential goods was halted in critical moments whilst the EU was the second biggest supplier of these products to the United States after China. The supply cut off was not received well in the US, which is struggling with a rapidly increasing number of cases.

The decisions of Germany

The quality of bonds between Washington and Berlin, which is the most significant member of the EU, are crucial to the state of transatlantic relations. One of the most significant points of contention in this arrangement is the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction. The RussianGerman agreement over the heads of the nations of Central Europe brings back the worst memories of the past. Given the numerous examples when Russia used the “energy weapon” to achieve its political goals, the pipeline poses a real threat to Poland and the Baltic States. Despite this, numerous protests and objections of other EU member states, Germany is collaborating with Moscow on the second string of the gas pipeline. Nord Stream 2 is a tool that strengthens Germany’s position on the European energy map and at the same time serves as a key geopolitical project for Russia. So far, Berlin has been able to continue its plans without major problems. Recently, however, the situation has changed – Washington supported

the states located between Russia and Germany by raising an objection.

Donald Trump made it clear that he does not understand why a member of NATO is involved in a project that is financing Russia’s military potential. At the same time, it should be noted that the US perceives a business opportunity in the region for its own gas. However, the declarations were not meaningless – sanctions that could directly hit the German companies associated with the project have become a real threat.

The poisoning of the Russian oppositionist Alexei Navalny, which fortunately did not end with his death, triggered a broad discussion in Germany about whether to abandon the Nord Stream 2 project. By doing so, the increasingly likely American sanctions could be avoided whilst German efforts to promote liberal and democratic standards would be highlighted.

Nevertheless, the final outcome of this case is not certain.

Nord Stream 2 is just one of the elements of the dispute between Germany and the USA. In the year of the US presidential election, Donald Trump wants to particularly emphasize his position regarding the shared responsibility for security and fulfilling the pledge of NATO members in terms of military expenditure. In 2019, only 9 out of 29 allied countries allocated the required 2% of GDP for this purpose. Apart from the USA, these countries included: Bulgaria (3.25%), Greece (2.28%), Great Britain (2.14%), Estonia (2.14%), Romania (2.04%), Lithuania (2.03%), Latvia (2.01%) and Poland (2.0%). The United States, which allocated $730 billion (3.24%) for this purpose, covered more than two thirds of NATO’s total spending.

The fact that Germany, which is the world’s fourth-largest economy, has only spent $49.3 billion (1.38%) on its armed forces may cause outrage in Washington.

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Geopolitics This is why the White House has also identified this issue as the main reason for the announced reduction in the number of American troops in Germany.

The decision was met with considerable opposition among the Democrats and the Republicans. It also caused anxiety among the European allies, who rightly saw that the NATO forces on the continent would be weakened as a result of such solution. On the other hand, the discussion about the withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons, deployed in Germany as part of the nuclear sharing program, had already begun. Prominent figures of the SPD pointed out that the funds spent by Germany on this program could be used for other purposes, such as fighting social inequality. The country’s head of diplomacy Heiko Maas and the CDU/CSU coalition presented a different position.

Technology – the dispute over the future

Aforementioned China is not only a global manufacturing powerhouse, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, a dynamically developing technological tycoon. It realistically threatens American domination in this sphere, and consequently the US position in general.

A crucial factor for the outcome of this rivalry is the European market. On the one hand, it is about the figures that are vital for the prospects of artificial intelligence (AI) development.

On the other hand, what is far more often emphasized in the public domain is the strategic importance of control over the 5G infrastructure, thanks to which data will be transmitted on an unprecedented scale. Additionally, it should be noted that the subjects are technologies that will revolutionize not only people’s lives but also production. The Industrial Internet of Things will make China’s current advantages in this area no longer valid.

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The 5G competition and the efforts made by the United States to exclude Huawei from other markets have also been met with a mixed response from allies.

Countries with close ties to the US – such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand – have already blocked the Chinese mogul in their market while Canada is doing so as well by delaying its decision. In Europe, however, opinions vary. Despite the initial resistance of many countries, they are gradually introducing regulations that effectively exclude Chinese participation in the rollout of 5G infrastructure. The Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, has opted for choosing more trusted suppliers, making it clear that Poland can take the position expected by the US. Nevertheless, the stance of Germany will be crucial. Berlin was long outraged over the “brutal” pressure from the US on this issue. The Financial Times recently announced that Germany might introduce new restrictions that may exclude Huawei from the German 5G network. The situation is similar in the case of France.

If these reports are confirmed, it will be a significant blow to the Chinese tycoon and an important step towards a relatively consistent position of the West on this major issue.

The Three Seas Initiative – the other face of Europe

In the review of the US relations with Europe, the subject of the Three Seas Initiative cannot be overlooked. In four years, this format has become a significant platform of cooperation in Central Europe – the involvement of Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Croatia is particularly visible. However, the Initiative gained significance due to the serious involvement of the US, a country outside the region. The perspective of the nations in the close vicinity of Russia is different from that of the western part of the continent – America is perceived as a guarantor of security

A Difficult Transatlantic Cooperation

© Philipp Guelland (PAP/EPA)

CH-47 CHINOOK HELICOPTERS STAND BEHIND BARRACKS AT THE US ARMY’S JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER IN HOHENFELS, GERMANY, AUGUST 10, 2020.

here. However, collaboration that goes beyond military aspects is much needed.

Hence the Three Seas Initiative focuses on economic cooperation. This area still suffers from the effects of communism and has infrastructure gaps estimated at about €600 billion. At the same time, the existing connections do not serve regional exchange, which impedes the development of economic cooperation. There is a great potential for change and “catching up.”

Initially, the United States saw profits primarily in the energy sector of Central Europe, but with the development of the Three Seas Initiative, it wishes to engage in other areas as well. Apart from road and rail connections, it is important to remember about the digital infrastructure in the region. The goals of the Initiative are to be served by the Three Seas Fund established by Poland and Romania.

Other countries are gradually joining the project – the upcoming summit in Tallinn might bring a few new ones.

The Fund operates on a commercial basis and after raising funds from the market it allocates them in investments related to the development of regional infrastructure.

The United States has announced its commitment of $1 billion. However, there is considerable hope that private investors from across the ocean will contribute to the Initiative.

Destined to cooperate

Despite many differences and conflicting interests, cooperation between Europe and the United States in terms of strategic issues is in the best interest of both parties.

In view of the dynamic international situation, China’s growth in addition to technological and structural changes, transatlantic cooperation is a secure foothold and a driver of development.

The lack of agreement drastically reduces the effectiveness of actions, a good example of which is the case of Belarus.

No cooperation and common position made it impossible to quickly introduce adequate measures that would allow influencing the developments in this country. The West cannot make similar mistakes in the future because their consequences may turn out to be devastating.

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Middle East

The intricacies of (un)lasting Turkish-Russian alliances

Karolina Wanda Olszowska

The Turkish-Russian alliance was supposed to be temporary. It seemed that the clash of interests of Ankara and Moscow in the Black Sea–Caucasus region would permanently prevent their long-term cooperation. This was accompanied by the wars in Syria and Libya, in both of which Russia and Turkey supported the opposing parties. Given these factors, the alliance of the "Bear" with the "Wolf" appeared almost impossible, and yet it continues. It is likely that neither side can now afford to put an end to it – unless NATO decides to lend a hand to Turkey. However, historical analogies show that Ankara and Moscow are far too divided to form long-term relationships.

Would history repeat itself this time?

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The intricacies of (un)lasting Turkish-Russian alliances

HUNGARIAN HISTORY ENTHUSIASTS REENACT THE SIEGE OF EGER, BATTLE OF THE HUNGARIAN CHRISTIAN DEFENDERS AND THE BESIEGING OTTOMAN TURKISH SOLDIERS FOR THE CASTLE OF EGER WHICH ENDED IN THE VICTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN FORCES IN 1552 DURING A FESTIVAL IN EGER, HUNGARY, AUGUST 10, 2019.

A room with a view of the war

Turkish (Ottoman) – Russian (Soviet) relations can be described briefly: a quarter of a millennium of wars. Over the course of 250 years, Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought eleven wars against each other, seven of which were won by the Tsarist armies.

In addition to its armed territorial expansion, the growing Grand Duchy of Moscow made use of propaganda – the duty to take Constantinople back from the hands of the Muslims. The tsars considered themselves heirs of the Eastern Roman Empire, by virtue of the wedding of Ivan III of Russia with Sophia (Zoe) Palaiologina, the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. In the future, this was

© Peter Komka (PAP/EPA)

used as one of the excuses for standing for the dominion over Christian places of worship. The struggle began in the 16th century, when, after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan by Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, the Black Sea became an Ottoman-Russian conflict area.

The common border was established at the end of the 17th century and then extended after the Second Partition of the Republic of Poland, running from the coasts of the Black Sea, along the Dniester, up to the borders of Galicia. This border shaped the course of relations between Moscow and the Sublime Porte for the following years.

For centuries, the Black Sea has been an area of clashing influences and hegemony struggles. As early as in the 17th century, 3/2020

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The war with Russia, won at the beginning of the 18th century, ensured the Ottoman Empire’s dominance over the Black Sea until 1774. After losing the Polish–Russian War, the Russian Empire was granted access to the sea. From that time on, the tsars sought to expand their influence and create an “internal lake.” Catherine II conquered more Black Sea fortresses and confirmed the claims to Crimea and Kuban. When, at the beginning of the 19th century, the successive Ottoman provinces began to fight for independence, the Sultan was in need of an alliance with the Tsar.

In exchange for not supporting Porte’s enemies, he pledged to keep the Black Sea closed to other war fleets at the request of Russia. This agreement was only revoked when, with British and French help, the Ottoman Empire won the Crimean War. Russia used internal divisions to weaken its opponent, for instance by supporting the national liberation efforts of minorities living in the Ottoman Empire. A perfect example of this was the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829, sparked by the Greek War of Independence. Without support from Russia, the Greeks’ uprising would have been quickly suppressed.

The war resulted in autonomy being granted to Greece. It was also confirmed with respect to Serbia, Moldova, and Wallachia. Half a century later, the Tsar supported the Slavic insurgents in the Balkans, and the Ottoman Empire lost further territories to the principalities of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.

The end justifies the means

Pragmatism was a feature shared by the Tsar and Sultan. Despite numerous difficulties, they were able to unite forces in case of a common enemy. After the arrival of Napoleon’s troops in Egypt, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire sent a common fleet against him. A year later, 80

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the two countries formed an alliance that allowed the Russian fleet to pass freely through the straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. The alliance lasted only a year, Russia left the anti-French coalition, and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty with France.

The situation was very different when the Bolsheviks came to power “on the ruins” of Tsarist Russia, and the Ottoman Empire was in decline. The Russian-Turkish alliance was then re-established.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish National Movement fighting the Allies trying to dismantle the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I, needed supporters. Lenin sought international recognition. At the beginning of June 1920, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Georgy Chicherin exchanged letters. In the same year, the Kemalists received supplies of weapons and other necessities, as well as financial assistance. What is more, with the help of the Bolsheviks, they escaped diplomatic isolation. On March 16, 1921, the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Brotherhood1 was signed, to which now the presidents of Russia Vladimir Putin and Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sometimes refer, emphasizing nearly a hundred years of Russian-Turkish friendship.

The Republic of Turkey is a country founded on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and proclaimed on October 29, 1923. Its first leader and president was Mustafa Kemal, who took the name Atatürk. Until his death in 1938, he was also the most important person in the country. Good relations with the Soviet Union lasted until the mid-1930s, when, again, there were too many conflicting points between the two allies. Atatürk did not want to agree to the introduction of communism in Turkey. What began Tanty, M. (1982). Bosfor i Dardanele w polityce mocarstw, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, p. 338.

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AN AERIAL PICTURE TAKEN WITH DRONE SHOWS A GENERAL VIEW OF HAGIA SOPHIA MUSEUM AT OTTOMAN ERA, WITH EMPTY ROADS, AS TURKISH GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED A TWO-DAY CURFEW TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID-19, IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY, APRIL 11, 2020.

overtime was also competition for border territories and the Black Sea straits.

After strengthening his power and Turkey’s position in the international arena, Mustafa Kemal, a supporter of Turkey’s Westernization, sought allies in Western Europe. It was the BritishTurkish rapprochement that contributed to the breaking of the then Turkish-Soviet cooperation.

The changeability of Turkish-Soviet relations can be demonstrated on the example of the years 1939–2003. During World War II, Turkey tried to maintain balance and neutrality, and Stalin wanted to take advantage of this attitude. Already at the end of the war, he demanded a revision of the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits and the transfer of the Kars, Ardahan, and Thrace provinces (for communist Bulgaria)2. At that time, President İsmet Shaw, S. J., Shaw, E. K. (2012). Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i Republiki Tureckiej (vol. 2, 1808– 1975), Warsaw, p. 604 [Available in English: Shaw, S.

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İnönü wanted to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. However, Stalin, whose position strengthened after his victory in World War II, hoped for territorial gains at the expense of Turkey – rather than an alliance. At that time, Turkey had no significant allies because Western European countries were disappointed by its lack of decisiveness during World War II, while the United States did not yet appreciate Turkey’s important geostrategic position. Without the division of the world into two spheres of influence and the outbreak of the Cold War, Turkey would have lost control of the Black Sea straits and part of its territory. At that time, the country was too weak to stand up to Moscow. The virtual suspension of mutual relations lasted from 1950 to 1962.

Ankara had been a faithful member of NATO for ten years – until the Turkish J., Shaw, E. K. (2016). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 18081975, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press].

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Middle East government felt “betrayed” by an American ally. On the one hand, without consulting Turkey, Washington withdrew Jupiter nuclear missiles from its territory; on the other, it supported Greece in the dispute over Cyprus, which was a direct cause of an attempt to unfreeze relations with the Soviet Union. However, the government in Ankara continued to hope for an improvement in relations with Washington, which gradually happened and lasted until 2003, when Turkey refused to allow an American attack on Iraq from its territory.3 The Tsar and the Sultan – searching for an agreement

It is very easy to offend Turkey. It is a loyal ally when it feels like an important and respected player. But if one treats this country like a less valuable party, it moves away and seeks support on the opposite side. Such a situation took place during the Cyprus crisis. President Lyndon B. Johnson threatened that if the Cyprus problem led to an attack by the USSR on Turkey, the latter could not count on its NATO allies. In response, Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü made a diplomatic visit to Moscow.4 This situation was deceptive, and yet resembling the present one. When during the war in Syria, the Americans began to support the Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD, Yekîtiya Democrat Party) and its military unit, the General Security Units (YPG, Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), which are linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a party considered terrorist in Turkey, President Erdoğan once again began looking for an ally in Russia. On June 27, 2016, President Erdoğan sent a letter to President Putin in which he expressed regret about the shooting down of a Russian plane a few months earlier. President Putin claimed

that in this letter, Turkey had apologized for the incident. Irrespective of what the letter said, the attitude of the heads of state showed how much they wanted to re-establish proper relations. In his letter, Erdoğan referred to Russia as Turkey’s friend and strategic partner and stressed that the Turkish authorities aimed to ensure that mutual relations did not deteriorate5. Both leaders were so keen on preserving the alliance that relations did not weaken even after the assassination of Russian ambassador Andrei Karlov in Ankara. The perpetrator was then arrested, and the case was closed.

Economic issues are another factor conducive to good ties between Turkey and Russia, regardless of partly conflicting interests in Syria and the Black Sea region.

Before the 2003 crisis in relations with the United States, trade between Turkey and Russia increased6. The shooting down of the Russian SU-24 aircraft by the Turkish F-16 fighter jet led to a significant deterioration in mutual diplomatic relations. The Russian administration imposed an embargo on Turkish food products, cooperation in the economic and military spheres was suspended, and the number of Russian tourists to Turkey decreased by 90 percent7. As soon as relations resumed, the embargo was lifted, and Russian Gazprom declared its immediate readiness to resume talks with the Turkish BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline President of Russia (2016). Vladimir Putin received a letter from President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan June 27, 2016, available at: http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52282, accessed on: 05.09.2020.

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Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010). Relations Between Turkey and the Russian Federation, available at: http://www.mfa.gov. tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-russianfederation.en.mfa, accessed on: 10.09.2020.

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Olszowska, K. (2017). Przyjaciel Ameryki, sojusznik Rosji? Zawiłości tureckiej polityki zagranicznej, [in:] Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Nauki Społeczne 18 (3), p. 32.

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Bogusławska, J. (2003). Interwencja w Iraku – stanowisko Turcji, Biuletyn PISM 20 (124).

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The intricacies of (un)lasting Turkish-Russian alliances Corporation on the construction of the undersea gas pipeline Turkish Stream.

Both parties are very committed to its construction. The contract for the Türk Stream (then Turkish Stream) was signed on November 10, 2016. Construction of the first line in the offshore section started on May 7, 20178. The earliest offshore line was completed on November 19, 2017. The offshore section was completed on November 19, 2018. More lines are currently under construction.

Furthermore, another idea has appeared to build additional lines of the pipeline (Turkish Stream 2). According to experts, if the idea becomes a reality, it will become another tool of Russia’s political influence, potentially leading to further dependence of the European Union on Russian gas9.

The most puzzling issue is the conflicting interests of Ankara and Moscow in Syria and Libya. It would seem that with such different aspirations in these two conflicts, a common alliance has no raison d’être, but in this case, Presidents Erdoğan and Putin have more reasons to agree above political divisions than to terminate their friendship. In the war in Syria, Russia supports Bashar al-Assad, whereas Turkey is against him and backs the opposition. After so many years of war (the conflict has lasted since the Arab Spring), the engagement has become very problematic and exhausting for Ankara.

Turkish soldiers are still being killed in the fighting, and more than 3 million refugees have already arrived in the country.

Turkish society is increasingly dissatisfied and loudly stresses that Syrians should

The most puzzling issue is the conflicting interests of Ankara and Moscow in Syria and Libya. return to their own country10. Erdoğan is forced to take this situation into account.

Despite seemingly conflicting interests, it should be noted that if relations with Russia had not improved, Turkey would not have been able to carry out a military operation against the Islamic State (and the forces of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party) under the code name “Euphrates Shield”11. Its goal was to create a buffer zone near the Turkish border.

It was successfully completed, but this would not have been possible if it had not been for the „friendly” Russian neutrality, thanks to which Russian troops did not block Turkish air raids.

When American forces withdrew from Syria, Turkey conducted a military operation called „The Fountain of Peace,” the official goal of which was to create a 30 km wide and 480 km long security zone along the Turkish-Syrian border12.

With time, it became increasingly difficult to find a consensus when competing for the same area. Since 2019, both sides have 10 Wasilewski. K. (2019). Turecka operacja w północnej Syrii, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), https://www.pism.pl/file/5ef06d82b1e1-4bd3-ba19-89faa6f07573, accessed on: 02.09.2020.

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«Gazprom» has started construction of the offshore section of Turkish Stream (2015). Russia News Today [online], May 7, 2015, available at: https://chelorg. com/2017/05/07/gazprom-has-started-constructionof-the-offshore-section-ofturkish-stream/, accessed on: 19.09.2020.

11 Strachota, K., Lang, J. (2016). Turecka inwazja w Syrii pod parasolem rosyjskim [online], Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, available at: https://www.osw. waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-08-24/tureckainterwencja-wsyrii-pod-parasolem-rosyjskim, accessed on: 09.09.2020.

Jakóbik, W. (2019). Turkish Stream 2, czyli pomysł Gazpromu na bezkrólewie w Europie [online], Biznes Alert, https://biznesalert.pl/turkish-stream-2analiza/, accessed on: 08.09.2020.

TRT Haber, Türkiye’nin güvenli bölge planı, available at: https: //www.trthaber.com/haber/ gundem/turkiyenin-guvenli-bolge-p lani-434404. html, accessed on 12.09.2020.

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Belarus met regularly to discuss matters related to Syria and Libya, especially the deescalation zone in Idlib. Regular dialogue is needed because military clashes between Russian and Turkish troops on Syrian territory still happen. However, the official narrative is that of Turkish troops fighting Syrian (governmental) ones, and of accidental skirmishes.

It seemed that the Russian-Turkish alliance would finally end in February 2020. Relations between the two presidents were becoming tenser and tenser, with both accusing each other of violating their previous decisions. Finally, in February 2020, Assad’s (or de facto Russian) troops attacked Turkish forces. Thirty-six Turkish soldiers were killed in the fighting13.

At that time, it seemed that the “Tsar’s friendship with the Sultan” would end and that such an imminent decline with so many conflicting interests would have to happen quickly.

President Erdoğan was ready to change his allies, albeit counting on the United States and NATO’s support. However, the West did not live up to his expectations, and the only support that the president of Turkey could count on was the words of support from the western leaders14, which alone were not enough to deal with the conflict with Russia. Turkey still tried to push the EU for help, threatening to send out another wave of refugees. Buses with Syrians were even transported to the border with Greece, but the COVID-19 epidemic closed the EU’s internal borders and made this plan impossible.

President Erdoğan further attempted to „scare” Russia militarily. He launched “Operation Shield Spring,” still hoping 13 BBC (2020). Syria war: Alarm after 33 Turkish soldiers killed in attack in Idlib, February 28, 2020, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-51667717, accessed on: 5.09.2020 14

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for the involvement of the North Atlantic Alliance Organization. After six days, however, he was forced to negotiate a ceasefire with Russia15. During his visit to the Kremlin, President Putin set up a meeting in such a way as to leave no doubt as to who was on a dominant position in this arrangement. First, he was two minutes late. Second, there was a clock on the fireplace behind the presidents, which represented one of the wars lost by the Ottoman Empire.

The pandemic temporarily put a stop to the situation, and, despite the ongoing conflicts, each side had to focus on its internal problems, especially involving economic challenges. Meanwhile, some importance was shifted to the conflict in Libya. Turkey engaged on the side of the Government of the National Accord of Libya of Fayez al-Sarraj, while Russia on the opposite side of the Libyan National Army headed by Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

In this conflict, however, the aspirations of both countries do not interfere so much.

Moscow wants to influence the division of territories in the country, while Turkey only wants to divide areas in the Mediterranean.

The opponents of the expansion of Turkish influence in the Mediterranean include Greece and France, which propose to the EU to impose sanctions on Turkey.

Such situations push Ankara towards an alliance with Moscow because if the former wants to negotiate concessions for itself in the international arena, it needs strong allies. At this point, only the Russians unambiguously stand on its side.

The alliance between Russia and Turkey, expected to last just several months, has 15 Roth, A. Russia and Turkey agree ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib province, The Guardian, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/05/ russia-and-turkey-agree-ceasefire-in-syriasidlibprovince, accessed on: 05.09.2020

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PEOPLE ARRIVE WITH A BOSPORUS STRAIT FERRY ON A SUNNY DAY AT THE OTTOMAN ERA QUARTER IN ISTANBUL, TURKEY, MARCH 3, 2019.

developed into a long-term cooperation involving multiple areas. This friendship is unpredictable as well as highly dangerous for both NATO and the EU. After all, one should not forget that the Turkish army is the second-largest army in NATO and is located in a key geostrategic position16. It also seems that the West is skeptical of the attitude of President Erdoğan, who, when dissatisfied with negotiations (whether they concern refugees or support for Turkish interests in Syria), leaves the negotiating table. President Putin is doing the same, which is why both leaders are not giving up on each other’s positions and are setting tough conditions for different interests without fear of using force. As historical analogies show, Turkey and Russia were able to communicate whenever they had an Turkey Military Strength (2020), available at: https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-militarystrength-detail.asp?country_id=turkey, accessed on: 30.08.2020 16

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important convergent interest. However, each time, NATO members represented a more significant partner for Ankara, and, whenever they showed support for Turkey, it demonstrated its loyalty in return. What is lacking in this situation is an unequivocal declaration of the Alliance of supporting Turkey to convince this country to solidarity and loyalty. It seems crucial to have such a partner on its side today. This is all the more true from the perspective of securing the Eastern Flank of NATO. Observing the Russian-Turkish relationship’s proximity, it is increasingly difficult to imagine the two presidents standing apart. It seems that only a change of power in either country could lead to this. After all, the partners are very much needed in today’s geopolitical reality.

Karolina Wanda Olszowska October 2020

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Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism

Izabela Wojtyczka's interview with Maja Borowicz

Polish art, which astonishes the world’s exhibitions, has been called emotional realism – a new form of surrealism – by the painter Maja Borowicz. The editor-in-chief of The Warsaw Institute Review, Izabela Wojtyczka, interviewed the artist with a remarkable talent and great humbleness who stands behind this notion.

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Maja Borowicz Š Maja Borowicz's private archive

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© Maja Borowicz's private archive

Izabela Wojtyczka (L) and Maja Borowicz (R)

Izabela Wojtyczka: We meet surrounded by your beautiful works, which delighted me personally because they carry a deeper message and “something more.” First of all, could you please tell us what is the style of your art and what could be hidden behind the words “something more?”

Maja Borowicz: Starting with the basics – what I do is described as surrealism.

Some people call it neosurrealism, but I do not quite like these terms. Surrealism is a very broad concept. To narrow it down, we can talk about magical realism, which is like a fairy tale, reminiscent of dreams, but it does not correspond to what I do in my works. Since there is currently no better definition to define it, I describe it as emotional realism. What I paint is mainly the relationship between reality and emotions we experience, so the term “emotional realism” fits me best. Although this phrase is not in the dictionary at the moment, I hope it will soon be.

Can we therefore say that you are a Polish pioneer of a new trend in art – emotional

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realism?

Perhaps so, but I am simply going in such a direction to carve out a place for myself that I have not found anywhere so far. History will show whether this trend will reinforce, or perhaps it is only distinctive for my works. I think, however, that many artists create what is related to their emotions, but do not quite know how to name it. Time will tell whether this term comes into general use.

You have already revealed that you use oil painting as the main technique of your works. Are there any other methods that you use?

Oil painting is the most classic technique used by artists in history. This method was used to create the world’s most famous paintings. I must admit that I have been drawing and painting since childhood.

I have painted with everything I could: acrylic paints, airbrush, inks, I have drawn with pencils, pastels – basically everything that I found. But now I dedicate mainly to oil painting. I have never attempted sculpting because it is necessary to have a completely different way of thinking.

Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism Moreover, it is simply a job that requires more physical strength.

You have mentioned your childhood – I wanted to ask you how such a talent develops when someone discovers that they are meant for painting?

I do not really know when someone discovers that they are meant for painting, but when I was a child, drawing and painting were the activities I performed better than some other ones. I could not find myself among my peers, yet I had always found my refuge in painting.

I remember, for example, playing in a sandbox and that I very much enjoyed building cities and obstacle courses to play with “matchbox cars” with other children.

And when they started to play with what I built for them, the fun ended for me. At primary and secondary school, teachers often approached me when they needed help with decorations for events, school newspapers, drawings in yearbooks, etc.

In elementary school I won almost all art contests, and I attended extracurricular drawing classes. However, this proved to be insufficient. When I was choosing high school and taking the entry exams to an art school, I was not accepted due to my poor score from the art history exam.

It proved to be a decisive factor. On the other hand, as a child, I preferred paying much more attention to painting and practicing to learning dates, places and names, especially since at that time I was already developing my oil painting skills, which back then were difficult to achieve for most of my peers.

If not art high school, what was next?

After this event, I decided not to paint ever again in my life and I graduated from a regular high school. Later on, when I had to choose a field of study, it was hard for me to pick something

unrelated to art. Unfortunately, history repeated itself again and despite the excellent drawing skills, I was not admitted into college (architecture), so I did not even try my luck at the Academy of Fine Arts (ASP). The failures at the exams confirmed my beliefs that I was not good enough for art schools. Eventually, I graduated in landscape architecture at the Warsaw University of Life Sciences (WULSSGGW), where during classes I mainly worked on project concepts and made visualizations. You could say – these “pretty” things, so that the project would charm with its originality, the maps would be legible and the visualizations would simply be beautiful images.

However, when I graduated from WULS-SGGW, I did not know that not being an alumnus of an art university excluded me from participating in national art contests.

A breakthrough came in the last year of my studies when I met a professor of painting, a graduate of the Academy of Fine Arts.

After examining my works, he noticed that what I really like to do is to draw, paint and create. He then suggested working on and defending a master’s thesis in landscape architecture from the works that I would make. His attitude changed me a lot – he showed me that I could go back to painting.

While writing the thesis, I had to think about what was really interesting for me.

What I paint, why and in what style. Then the history of art, my eternal problem, became interesting. Simultaneously to this thesis, I designed a series of fantastic art paintings, which I defended as my MA thesis. Thanks to this, I organized my thesis defense in the form of an exhibition, similar to the diploma exhibitions at the Academy of Fine Arts, which was the first of this kind at the WULS-SGGW. Even the Dean of the Faculty of Landscape Architecture, who came to the vernissage, was particularly impressed.

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Culture I must admit that at that time, after seven years of studying landscape architecture, I understood that I would never practice this profession.

Why?

Because of two things. First of all, while completing my thesis, I realized that I felt best at creating and painting, and I am not at all interested in issues related to plants, growing, fertilizing, nursing or road building.

Secondly, I have never been the picture of health. The troubles I have had since childhood, related to an undiagnosed chronic disease, made me finish my studies in 2007 in such a bad shape that I did not even have the energy to stand by an easel, let alone work on plants, an absolute requirement for any landscape architect.

Then, after graduation, my life was limited to my house. While trying to find myself I decided to learn how to use computer programs and draw on a graphic tablet.

Learning to use a stylus was a terrible experience – it drew so badly that it led me to tears. But the most important thing was that I could work at home, virtually lying in bed. And I drew. I was employed in advertising agencies for a long time, and after work I developed my own projects and ideas – everything was stored for later use.

Did anyone know that you were still drawing then?

Until 2013, I had not shown these works to anyone. I was convinced that I was not meant to be an artist because I never managed to get into an art school.

But once, while working on advertising projects of a certain art gallery, I was asked to present my works. They were so good and intriguing that they were shown at its opening. There I had contact with other artists of the Polish surrealist movement for the first time and discovered that there are people who paint like me. These acquaintances 90

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“ostatnia iskra nadziei”

resulted in the next step – submitting paintings for an art competition in Taiwan. There nobody asked about my art college diploma, which I did not have.

All that mattered were skills and ideas.

It turned out that the painting that I had executed a few years earlier and finished after years of break got to the final.

And then it won the contest.

Was this the turning point that made you believe in yourself?

Not quite yet. I am this type of person who has to think everything through and it takes a lot of time. It was not a dazzle, I could not

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© Maja Borowicz's private archive

abandon everything and become an artist.

The prize in this contest was an exhibition in downtown Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. I had less than a year to do about ten paintings.

At that time, I worked as an ordinary graphic designer in an advertising agency. Having a regular job forced me to work on the paintings at nights. It seemed to me that I achieved that success by chance and people would not like my ideas. Nonetheless it turned out that all ten paintings charmed the organizers and art lovers in Taiwan.

Then something hit me again, I started to think about it. I thought I had to change

my life. Combining a full-time job with art activity was impossible for me. With more and more competitions won, I increasingly felt that it is a waste of time and energy not to focus on painting. That way I gradually accepted the belief that I became an artist.

Today you are already a “fulltime” artist. What message would you like to convey to the audience through your paintings?

I actually devoted one chapter of my thesis to this issue. In culture, we have general associations and symbols that appear 3/2020

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Expo Spectrum, Miami, USA, 2018

on different levels. There are ideas that work worldwide, some only in Poland, other are understandable to people from a specific region or even characteristic and comprehensible only to the artist and its audience. For example, a “bird” means freedom, and a “white bird” (a white dove) means peace. I develop my own code, my own symbols which, as it seems to me, people understand subconsciously.

Let me give an example: multiple times in my life I felt that I was falling apart, that the situation overwhelmed me. I have conveyed this in my paintings.

Later people found their own, similar feelings in them. I have come across several comments that my painting perfectly captures the feeling of disintegration that the given person is experiencing. Some of my works are very literal, but others remain imbued with symbols. They touch the emotions that we come across in real life, but tell about that in a symbolic way.

This is why I call it emotional realism.

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© Maja Borowicz's private archive

How to understand exactly your works? Do these symbols only represent events that are emotionally difficult?

In my paintings I always depict what I have encountered and the emotions I have felt. But everyone experiences emotions and feelings. They concern every person. My works are my way of telling and expressing what I face. It is extraordinary when the audience discovers their own way of telling what they feel. It is often difficult to find words, speak about emotions in order to be understood. My paintings give space and form to do this. It is incomparably challenging to talk about sad and unpleasant emotions that often feature in my paintings. But careful viewers often find other, not so obvious, hidden, and in my opinion beautiful feelings, such as love, devotion, tenderness, hope, longing, responsibility, empathy, etc. I believe that finding individual, personal feelings in my paintings is exceptional. After all, we will remember only those events from life that evoked emotions.

Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism Is there any particular emotion that is significant for you?

One of the positive emotions that often appear in my works is hope. I want people to feel that there is something to fight for, something to strive for. I authored a series of such paintings in which I have expressed hope and responsibility. In these canvases, a stone face, a hand, and an animal are juxtaposed in a postapocalyptic space. The animal usually protects itself in the hand from the surrounding reality. With this symbolism, quite a simple one, I try to convey that it is a great positive value to take responsibility for protecting those weaker and dependent on us. There is also a certain hope that nature will manage, regardless of the destructive power of humans. But I do not want this to be a chance. I believe that everything is in our hands and we take responsibility for it.

Are you guided by any “mission” when creating?

It is a difficult question because I feel a strong personal need to paint and it is basically my whole world. It would be hard not to look for any goal, sense in it. It is not that I feel some kind of a “mission” inside me and I look for a way to achieve it. Since painting is my whole life, I only make it with the things that I consider the most important, valuable and beautiful.

For me these are things that have a positive value to our human nature such as responsibility, empathy, hope, support, love, or friendship.

I have to admit, although it may cause controversy, that I am very critical of art.

Not only my own, but also others’. Of course, I have a lot of respect for the creators, but I notice that often, and maybe even most of the paintings have very schematic content.

Personally, I do not like art produced under pressure. I associate it with making paintings on a given topic during art classes in elementary school. I require something more

from the artist – individual thoughts and reflections, often acquired with experience.

It is difficult for me to point out a group of artists who create high art – these are rather a few outstanding individuals. I believe that real art is created when you go beyond the framework of thinking because it is only when you are really free.

When I organize exhibitions, collectors often put a lot of effort into understanding a certain painting because it speaks to them, and they feel its value. And this is the way it should be. Art should be so good that people do not forget the painting and the feelings it evokes.

You travel the world with your paintings. Do you notice any cultural differences in terms of emotions felt by people from different parts of the world?

At exhibitions abroad, I see a variety of reactions to my works. Random people and artists who approach me “experience” my paintings very much. I have to admit that never in Poland have I witnessed such strong responses as abroad where people were clearly expressing how shocked they were by my paintings. I guess it is a kind of cultural difference. Poles simply do not show their emotions so openly, which obviously does not mean that they do not experience them. They do albeit more discreetly – and this is distinctive.

Moreover, there is a tendency to include popular themes in paintings, e.g. political subjects. Currently, a lot of works refer to sexual minorities or the virus.

In my opinion, this is a cliché, which, as I mentioned, I do not like. Possibly that is why my audience all over the world often experiences a shock because they see completely different things in my paintings, they understand that you can look at the world in an entirely distinct way.

Nevertheless, in the case of my paintings, people from different countries whom I have 3/2020

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ART EXHIBITION, VITKAC, WARSAW, POLAND, OCTOBER 2020.

encountered reacted in a similar way – they were shocked, emotional, sometimes cried.

They always similarly experienced feelings which I painted. This makes me think that deep down, beyond the divisions, people are very similar to each other. Regardless of the continent or nationality, there are people who are sensitive, loving, caring for others, and fighting for a better tomorrow. This gives me hope and always fills me with optimism.

Can we distinguish any specific cultural differences?

I think so. I have not been everywhere yet, but I already have some observations.

For example, a lot of art lovers from the United States are used to easy, colorful, pleasant, and light themes. In the Far East, where the nations have similar war experiences to Poland, people have a better understanding of my creations. They are looking for less obvious meanings in them.

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© Maja Borowicz's private archive

On the other hand, it is worth noting that in the Arab countries the paintings often do not depict naked figures or humans in general due to cultural differences. I guess that there are even more such differences, for example, related to the symbolism of specific elements, colors, and characters.

Do foreign audiences associate you with Polish culture?

Good question. Sometimes I have an impression that foreign audiences see Polish culture only through the prism of my work.

This is especially positive if my painting is awarded at an international exhibition.

Along with other active Polish artists, we are constantly working to make sure that Polish culture is well received abroad. So much has already changed in terms of the perception of the value of Polish art, and thus the Polish state. However, it cannot be denied that there is still much to be done

Cultural Diplomacy: Polish Surrealism in the Form of Emotional Realism and support from state institutions would be helpful. Organizing foreign exhibitions in Poland is very expensive. I think that the image of our country is largely influenced by people like me, who attend world exhibitions, meet other people and talk about who they are, what they create, where they live and how they live. At international exhibitions you can meet people from very different backgrounds, for instance children on school trips, entrepreneurs, politicians. Then various questions are asked, not necessarily about art, sometimes also about the so-called ordinary life, what the country looks like, what people are like, how to study in Poland, what Polish autumn or Christmas are like. Sometimes the topics come down to history and we are able to find common themes. Another time there are attempts to teach Polish or to show typical traditions. When I am abroad at an exhibition, I always have the opportunity to attend countless meetings and exchange experiences.

What do you think should be done to help Polish artists to organize international competitions or vernissages in embassies?

I once approached this topic by sending emails to Polish embassies around the world although I had no contacts. However, this way of reaching out often does not give any results. Artists can join various associations and count on someone to provide them with such contact, but from my experience I know that it is best to organize something directly. Communication with embassies would certainly be helpful. We, the artists, are very eager to show our paintings outside Poland. The embassy could be one of the ways to present our works abroad. Exhibitions of Polish paintings, at a high level, could add splendor to various occasional embassy events of cultural, business and political nature, also raising their prestige. Moreover, the embassy may also have relations and acquaintances that could be valuable for artists. I have personally encountered multiple difficulties associated

with international competitions or exhibitions on numerous occasions. Not knowing the place and language rules out the possibility of submitting documents and applying for a contest, exhibition or festival. Perhaps I, or another Polish artist, could impress the jury of the given country and win an international competition?

It reminds me sports a little bit – members of the art community often remember the artist’s name and country. It would be nice to share such events with all Poles. The embassy could help Polish artists by providing information about international exhibitions and contests in the given country. This would be highly valuable as artists could participate in them.

From my own experience I can also say that the involvement of the embassy, even in seemingly simple tasks, such as transporting paintings, translating, coordinating, providing an address for correspondence, supplying tickets, showing the city, and dealing with a whole lot of similar matters when organizing an exhibition – it is a great help for the artist. Especially when attending an art exhibition in a completely different part of the world, which is often a reward for winning a competition.

I also believe that the Polish diaspora could play a similar role here. I have a lot of positive experiences connected to the Polish Honorary Consulate and the Polish community in Miami, FL (USA).

I also had a good experience with the Polish community in Australia. However, the financial support that would enable us to act from the bottom up – by us I mean artists and people living in the given country, the Polish diaspora or the employees of the embassy – organizing exhibitions, meetings, residencies, lectures, or even workshops would, in my opinion, contribute substantially to promoting Polish art and culture in other countries.

Thanks to the fact that you exhibit your paintings abroad,

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History

ART EXHIBITION AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, DECEMBER 2017

they are becoming more and more popular across the world. Has it ever occurred to you that you will become a famous Polish woman?

I try not to think about it because it would overwhelm me. Just like in the case of my first competition – if I had treated it as a great challenge, knowing that it would transform my life, I would have not even taken part in it. Being famous only for the sake of fame, without any value behind, is meaningless and is an empty word. But if fame goes with specific principles that can be passed on and make people better, then this is worth the effort. I believe that being an artist is, above all, everyday work.

It teaches how to be humble and patient.

That is why I do not think too far into the future, I do not treat my work as anything special. I just keep trying to create the best possible paintings. It is the people, my audience, who will evaluate my work and give it the final value.

NOTABLE EXHIBITIONS AND AWARDS: • 10.2020 - Solo Exhibition, Vitkac, Warsaw, Poland • 02-05.2020 - Group Exhibition “Wheel perception,” Gdańsk, Kołobrzeg, Szczecinek, Poland • 03.2019 - Group Exhibition, Visionary Art, Moscow, Russia • 12.2018 - “The Best of the Show” award, Spectrum Miami, USA • 12.2018 - Group exhibition, international Expo Spectrum Miami, USA • 05.2018 - Group exhibition, Malczewski Museum, Radom, Poland

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© Maja Borowicz's private archive

• 04.2018 - 1st place, international competition “Artavita,” USA • 12.2017 - Certificate of Excellence, Palm Art Award 2017, Germany • 12.2017 - Solo Exhibition, “Studio Galeria” art gallery, Warsaw, Poland • 12.2017 - Group Exhibition, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium • 07.2017 - 3rd place, international art competition “Femininity,” Toronto, Canada • 01 - 07.2017 - Group Exhibition “Metamorphosis”, Kołobrzeg, Radom, Włocławek Gdańsk, Poland • 09.2016 - Solo Exhibition, “Twierdza” Festival of Fantasy, Giżycko, Poland • 08.2016 - Group Exhibition, POLCON Festival of Fantasy, Wrocław, Poland • 06.2016 - 2nd place, international art competition “Momma Juried Art Competition” • 06.2016 - Solo Exhibition, International Festival of Fantasy, Nidzica, Poland • 05.2016 - 1st place, international art competition “All scapes,” Toronto, Canada • 04.2016 - Group Exhibition, Expo Art New York, USA • 05.2015 - Group Exhibition, Expo Art Revolution Taipei, Taiwan • 12.2014 - Group Exhibition of Polish surrealists, “Quantum” art gallery, Warsaw, Poland • 04.2014 - 1st place, international art competition Art Revolution Taipei, Taiwan • 01.2013 - Solo Exhibition, “Stylo” art gallery, Oslo, Norway • 10.2013 - Solo Exhibition, Olsztyn Planetarium, Scenography and Special Effects Festival, Olsztyn, Poland • 09.2012 - Solo Exhibition, Olsztyn Planetarium, Scenography and Special Effects Festival, Olsztyn, Poland • 10.2012 - Solo Exhibition, “Kino Kultura,” Digital World of Film symposium, Warsaw, Poland • 12.2008 - Solo Exhibition, Municipal Cultural Center, Olsztyn, Poland

The “silent” pearl of Southern Poland

Rev. Sylwester Suchoń

Ćwiklice, a village located within Pszczyna County in Upper Silesia, Poland, is home to a wooden, Gothic church of St. Martin of Tours. The church was built between 1464 and 1466, and its provenance was confirmed by dendrochronological analyses and the study of post-visitation decrees. It was also later rebuilt.

The church has a log frame structure; and its main parts are Baroque altars, a 17th century polychrome, and a particularly valuable Gothic triptych located in the side chapel. The building is part of the Wooden Architecture Trail in Silesia, Poland.

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History Pszczyna Castle, the European bison farm, and, recently, the beautiful Kapias’ Gardens in Goczałkowice.

S

© Sylwester Suchoń's private archive

ilesia is split into two main subregions. The first one is Lower Silesia, with the capital city of Wroclaw. There, after World War II, Poles from the then Eastern Borderlands were imprisoned. The second one is Upper Silesia, which, 100 years ago, was the center of uprisings fought by the Silesian people.

Upper Silesia appears to many Polish residents as a land of heavy industry – steel mills, power plants, and mines – entities polluting the atmosphere as well as exposing cities and villages to the harmful effects of mining. As of today, all this is true, but incomplete. Much has changed in this respect already in the 1930s, at the beginning of the rebirth of a free Poland.

At that time, a modern metropolis, comprising multiple organically interconnected towns, was created in the center of Upper Silesia.

Today’s Silesia is also a green area – the examples of this are Cieszyn Silesia, the Opole region, the Lubliniec land, and the Silesian Beskids with the green Pszczyna region. The former Duchy of Pszczyna, which reached as far as Katowice (back then just an ordinary village), was part of the Archdiocese of Cracow until 1822. Tourists who come to Silesia visit the

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Furthermore, the Pszczyna Region offers a chance to explore the institutions of the Wooden Architecture Trail, for example, the Open Air Village Museum and wooden churches. Among the latter, the 16th century Church of St. James in Wisła Mała, the Church of St. Catherine’s in Pielgrzymowice, dating back to the end of the 17th century, as well as the church of St. Nicholas in Pszczyna-Łąka, built in 1690, are definitely worth visiting. When going from Pszczyna to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum in Oświęcim, tourists should visit the largest Silesian church of St. Clement the Pope in Miedźna. This building, erected in the 17th century, served as a parish church for all the surrounding villages, including Grzawa and Góra – in both of which there are also small wooden churches. In Góra, the visitors can pray to St. Matthew and St. Barbara, and in Grzawa, they can admire the interior of a small parish church of the Martyrdom of St. John the Baptist.

There is yet another monument in the region, which is undoubtedly worth visiting.

Dating from 1466 and named the Silent Pearl of the South of Poland, the Gothic church of St. Martin in Ćwiklice is the oldest wooden church in this part of the country.

The church in Ćwiklice is a genuine symbol of medieval Christianity in Central Europe.

The only movable historical object from the Gothic times is the altar – a triptych from 1475 located in the side chapel. The central part of the triptych depicts the Virgin Mary with the Infant Jesus conversing with St. Martin of Tours and St. Stanislaus of Cracow (La Conversione). In the left wing of the triptych, St. Apostles Peter and Paul, St. Barbara, and St. Catherine of Siena listen to this exchange, while in the right wing of the triptych, it is St. John the Baptist, St. James, St. Dorothy and St. Margaret who listen.

The “silent” pearl of Southern Poland

© Sylwester Suchoń's private archive

At the beginning of the 18th century, the interior of this Gothic church had been transformed to Baroque by the owners of Ćwiklice and Rudołtowice – Andrzej Zborowski and his father-in-law, Judge Marcin Kozłowski, both of whom were buried in the crypt. As a result of another reconstruction at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, the back wall was removed from the church, and it was enlarged by the space under the tower.

The oriented building has a log frame structure. The nave was designed on a quadrilateral plan, with the more recent chapel built on its southern side.

The porch and a sacristy were built near the presbytery. The double-pitched roofs over the nave and the presbytery are covered with roof shingles. Incorporated into the building’s main body in its lower part, the tower with a pillar structure, finished with a bulbous finial, adjoins the church from the west.

At the entrance, there are plaques commemorating parishioners killed in World War I and Silesian uprisings.

In 2020, it will be 10 years since the beginning of a thorough renovation of the church under my supervision.

The restoration included first of all laying

reinforced concrete foundations to a depth of two meters, replacing ground sills, partially replacing the tower pillars, reinforcing walls from the exterior with double studs, repairing the roof framework, and the tower, replacing the boarding and roof shingles, as well as drying. What is more, it involved the renovation of crypts, replacement of the floor, and no longer usable benches and choir. This stage took five years. The next five years were spent on renovating the interior. It was carried out by a team of conservators – graduates of the Academy of Fine Arts in Cracow led

by Bożena Halska.

Polychrome panels that decorated the ceiling until 1980 were found on the floors of the tower during the renovation.

After their conservation and filling in the missing elements, the paintings returned to their original place. At the entrance, under the tower, there is the “Veil of St. Veronica” with the Savior’s reflected face and the “Arma Christi,” the instruments of torture.

The recollection of the Passion of Jesus in this part of the church is completed by the restored Way of the Cross and the Pieta sculpture from the 18th century.

On the presbytery ceiling, we can admire the fresco “Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” and, above the main nave, 3/2020

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History

“Crowning of the Mother of God by the Holy Trinity.” It took a long time for the conservators to renovate the Baroque altars, the main and the side ones. The main altar features a beautiful painting of St. Martin of Tours and figures of saint bishops Adalbert and Stanislaus, Charles Borromeo, and martyr St. John of Nepomuk, also a priest.

The altar on the left side of the main nave depicts the Sistine Madonna, St. Joachim and St. Joseph. In the center of the altar on the right side of the church, there is a painting of the Crucifixion of Jesus, with St. Wenceslas and Christopher looking at the Savior. The conservators put a lot of effort to restore the figures of the apostles, the five scenes of the Passion of Jesus (the Garden of Gethsemane, the scourging, the crowning with thorns, the taking up of the cross, and the crucifixion), and the five scenes of the life of St. Martin (the meeting with the beggar, the appearance of Jesus in a given robe, the resurrection of the dead, the almsgiving, and death of St. Martin).

The renovation and return of the Baroque pulpit were a great success. Beforehand, it had been perishing in the «historic» barn.

In addition, the Baroque baptismal font, where many generations of the inhabitants of this beautiful land began their lives 100

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in faith, returned to the temple. In 2016, St. Martin›s Church celebrated its 550th anniversary, presided over by Rev. Wiktor Skworc, Archbishop of Katowice. In a few years’ time, another jubilee is to be celebrated – the 700th anniversary of the parish (its first mention is from 1326).

The chances are that the monuments mentioned in the article will one day obtain the title of «monument of history» and be enrolled on the UNESCO list, while I, as the parish priest of this extraordinary community, trust that the church will be given the title of «sanctuary,» so that even more pilgrims will visit this place and learn to «love their neighbor» from St. Martin.

Upper Silesia, the Pszczyna Land, and especially the «pearl» of Ćwiklice are areas and monuments worth visiting. They tell stories about the hardships of Polish history, the roots of generations of Poles living in the borderland, and the identity of Polish culture. The Polishness, which manifests itself in hospitality, care for the other person, and history, is present in today›s Silesians, all of which one can experience it in person when visiting the South of Poland.

Rev. Sylwester Suchoń October 2020

Author Biographies Daniel Kawczyński Polish-born Member of Parliament for Shrewsbury & Atcham. He has recently been appointed Prime Minister’s Special Trade Envoy to Mongolia, and has also been the Chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Poland for the past six years. Daniel’s main interests are British relations with Central and Eastern Europe through projects such as the Three Seas Initiative. His expertise on the region was recognised by the former Prime Minister David Cameron, who appointed Daniel as his Special Adviser on Central and Eastern European Affairs. p. 6

Grzegorz Kuczyński graduate of history at the University of Białystok and specialized Eastern studies at the University of Warsaw. Expert on Eastern affairs. For many years a journalist and analyst. Author of many books and publications on Russian politics. p. 14

Jakub Lachert PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include: European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Eastern policy, Eastern Partnership, EU integration of Western Balkans.

p. 23

Krzysztof Kamiński graduate of Management (MA) and Internal Security (BA) at the University of Warsaw. He completed the specialized course at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC. He built his professional experience in the energy industry and TSL sector. In 2017-2020 President of the Warsaw Institute think tank.

Marcin Krzyżanowski Polish consul in Kabul between 2008 and 2011. Orientalist, Eastern affairs specialist and Afghanologist. Entrepreneur, traveler, university lecturer at the Jagiellonian University, lives in Tehran. p. 37

Kamil Basaj President of the INFO OPS Poland Foundation, expert on information environment security. Founder and editor of the Disinfo Digest – a project promoting knowledge about the phenomena of impact of foreign information, disinformation and propaganda.

p. 48

Paweł Paszak graduate of International Relations (East Asia Studies) at the University of Warsaw, former grant holder at the University of Kent (United Kingdom) and Hainan University (PRC). PhD candidate at the University of Warsaw and the War Studies University, researcher of the Poland’s Ministry of National Defense projects. Expert at the Institute of New Europe (INE), author of analyses and articles concerning US-China trade war, China’s economic transformation as well as technological rivalry. p. 55

Rafał Zgorzelski, PhD historian, publicist, manager. PhD in the field of history – a graduate of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń.

He gained professional experience in the regulated sectors. His research interests include modern political thought and contemporary geopolitical systems.

Promoter of economic patriotism.

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p. 30

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Author Biographies Paweł Pawłowski graduate of law at the University of Warsaw, where he is currently a PhD student at the Institute of Sciences of the State and the Law. A graduate of a scientific internship at The Institute of World Politics and Babson Entrepreneurship Program at Babson College.

p. 72

Karolina Wanda Olszowska historian, turkologist. PhD candidate at the Faculties of History and Philology at the Jagiellonian University. Coordinator of the Regional Center for International Debate in Kraków.

p. 78

ALEXANDER BEN ZVI graduate of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and national security at the National Security College in Buenos Aires. For many years holding the position of secretary for Eastern Europe, a longtime director for South America and the Caribbean.

Ambassador to multiple countries, including Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Slovakia, currently based in Poland. p. 10

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Maja Borowicz Polish painter, born in January 1980, in Pruszków, Poland, graduated in landscape architecture at the Warsaw School of Life Sciences. Originating from surrealism, defining her paintings as “emotional realism,” using mainly oil painting techniques. Since 2013 regularly presents her paintings at individual and group exhibitions. She won, among others, the International Art Competition Art Revolution Taipei (2014) and “The Best of the Show” award at the Spectrum Miami (2018). p. 86 rev. Sylwester Suchoń graduate of the Higher Silesian Seminary, vicar of many Silesian parishes, since 2001 rector of St. Martin’s parish in Ćwiklice, guardian of „Salem” community in Ćwiklice. p. 97

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