The Response of The Three Seas Initiative Countries to the War in Ukraine by Warsaw Institute

— SPECIAL REPORT —

2023/11/16

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE BENJAMIN BARDOS

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Introduction The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) aims to tie together 12 countries within the EU through cooperation on several topics, such as security, energy, and cyber security to name a few. Moreover, plans from before the start of Russia’s war in Ukraine have been shaken up as the 3SI countries represent the overwhelming majority of both the EU’s and NATO’s eastern flank, consequently sharing collectively the largest border with Russian Federation (RF). This has naturally altered the vision of member states and their current priorities and focuses in many ways both in terms of economic and security models. Additionally, with the war in Ukraine and its subsequent reconstruction effort will greatly influence the goals and objectives of the 3SI and its member states. The war has highlighted the need for a revitalized approach towards military spending and security investment, something that before the war had a tainted reputation and was politically ill advised. However, a misconception needs clarification before anything, when talking about military spending or security investment it does

not always mean tangible offensive platforms like tanks, artillery, and fighter jets. Instead, investment in such a field extends to cyber security, a topic that will be later separately examined, and also energy, border, disinformation, resource security. All of these fields are a nexus between economic development and military/ security investments. Understandably the outbreak of war and its now near two yearlong continuation has caused many member states to reconsider existing security polices in light of the return of war to Europe. The approaches taken by various member states differ radically in strategy and position. Throughout this report member states, on the eastern flank bordering Russia or Ukraine, will be examined in groups or individually on developments in the fields of energy security, cyber security, military investments and developments. Additionally, it will be looked at how a given member states current policy priorities have changed their vision and priorities within the 3SI.

Poland Amongst the 3SI member states Poland has taken the most proactive approach in every domain within the scope of this report’s questions. Poland has undergone a massive campaign to bolster its military forces while also investing heavily in energy security and redundance in energy

supplies, moreover, Poland has taken a forefront position in developing cyber security responses towards digital domain threats. To begin with, last year Poland passed legislation 1called the ‘Homeland Defense Act’ (HDA) to allow for 3% GDP spending on military expen-

1. https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/polands-defense-spending#:~:text=Poland’s%20President%20signed%20into%20law,including%20 50%2C000%20in%20territorial%20forces.

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

PAP, WOJTEK JARGIŁO

diture, while also raising the number of service members in the military to 300,000. This decision alone has brought Poland to one of the highest military spenders by percentage in the NATO alliance, meanwhile, its planned personnel number would encroach on the numbers Germany and France have combined2. Moreover, the newly available funds under the HDA have caused for Poland to embark on a splurge of various military procurement programs3 internationally and domestically, this is reflected by the jump in the percentage on defense spending spent on procurement which increased from 20.4% to 35.9% in 2022. These procurement contracts include Korean K2 Main Battle Tank (MBT), K9 Self Propelled Howitzers (SPH) artillery systems, K239 Multiple Launch

Rocket Systems (MLRS), and FA-50 fighters. All of these crucially are a cooperation between Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) and their Korean counterpart corporations that will start production in Poland, with the exception of the fighter planes. These procurements are just a few, Poland has planned to build new frigates 4 with the help of British defense company Babock on a PGZ led consortium. Additionally, 96 Apache helicopters 5 and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) 6 to complement its HIMARS systems purchased in 2019, furthermore, previously Poland has already agreed7 to buy 32 F-35’s, 250 Abrams MBT’s, and Patriot missile defense systems8 from the United States.

2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_military_and_paramilitary_personnel 3. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-military-superpower-poland-army/ 4. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2023/impact-war-ukraine-polish-arms-industrial-policy 5. https://www.gov.pl/web/national-defence/first-offset-agreement-for-apache-attack-helicopters-signed 6. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2023/09/11/poland-to-buy-486-himars-launchers-from-lockheed-martin/ 7. https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-military-superpower-poland-army/ 8. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-approves-possible-sale-defense-system-poland-15-bln-2023-06-28/

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

The common denominator between this massive procurement spree can be explained by the 2020 National Security Strategy (NSS) of Poland. In 2020 their NSS had already outlined “the most serious threat is the neo-imperial policy of the authorities of the Russian Federation, pursued also by means of military force.” These fearful and worrisome sentiments have only been exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and their actions in Belarus through both nuclear brinksmanship9 and conventional posturing around the Suwałki Gap and Kaliningrad. However, another crucial aspect of the 2020 NSS was identifying threats “of hybrid nature…including: cyber-attacks and disinformation”. This is notable as a significant part of Poland’s participation in 3SI programs are of digital nature, meaning that there’s an increasing amount of the digitalized economy that requires adequate protection from such external threats.

Protecting the digital economy, especially Banking, Financial Services, and Insurance (BFSI) sectors is of particular importance as they are a prime target for cyber-attacks, especially now from Russia10. Therefore, Poland’s reaction to the war in Ukraine has been heavily focused on the creation of a capable domestic arms industry in conjunction with digitalizing the economy through various 3SI programs, this means that for Poland the priority is currently revolving around creating the supporting infrastructure and capabilities to ensure security in both digital and physical domains through bolstering security expenditure.

Romania Unlike Poland, Romania has taken a much more silent position compared to Poland with regard to Ukraine, albeit no less significant. Romania likewise to Poland shares a border with Ukraine, however, that border is significantly closer to the desired military objectives and targets of Russia in Ukraine, as witnessed during Russia’s bombing 11 of Ukraine’s Danube port infrastructure with Geran-2 drones. The proximity of Romania, and Romanians, to the war is at sometimes a couple hundred meters away on the opposing banks of the Danube. Subsequently, every step Romania takes is with extreme caution12 due to the complex security situation.

Romania relies on a two-prong strategy, firstly is to continue Black-sea gas exploration and production combined with the complimenting export infrastructure mainly under the 3SI. Secondly, Romania has been adamantly and persistently been an advocate for strengthening NATO presence to create a credible deterrence, in addition to bolstering its own defense forces, this is especially crucial in terms of protecting black sea strategic interests and the geographical area of the Focşani Gate13. Romania has extensively its military prepared in the years leading up to the war, and is still

9. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/belarus-has-started-taking-delivery-russian-tactical-nuclear-weapons-president-2023-06-14/ 10. https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/poland-cybersecurity-market 11. https://apnews.com/article/romania-ukraine-russia-attacks-danube-ports-4b1b0e2b9aab3893063352e8f3a85bf8 12. https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-natos-future.html 13. https://newstrategycenter.ro/project/policy-paper-focsani-gate-a-key-terrain-for-european-security/

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

SAMUEL RAJKUMAR, REUTERS

continuing its procurement spree with plans to purchase 32 F-35’s 14, a modernization for all its existing 32 F-16’s15, 54 M1A2 MBT’s16, an unspecified amount of Assault Amphibious Vehicles17 (AAV), and Naval Strike Missiles ‘NSM’. Together with its pre-war military buildup of a total of 7 Patriot batteries 18 and a naval buildup of two submarines and 4 corvettes.19 Romania seeks to establish a capapble defense with anti-access/area denial (A2/D2) platforms in the face of Russian black sea aggression. Black sea energy extraction, exploration, and subsequent export is a key strategic interest of Romania, which due to the war in Ukraine is of paramount strategic significance, both in terms of energy security and national security. Currently,

Romania produces 1 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) of gas from Ana platform 20, however, plans are in the works with OMV to start production an extraction from the Neptun Deep offshore gas field which aims to produce 8 BCM annually. For Romania this generally is less significant as 80% of national gas consumption21 is met by domestic production already so Russia, and by extension Gazprom, does not have too influence over energy security. However, regionally the impacts of this extra gas surplus is immense an could help wain regional countries off of Russian gas dependance in an affordable and feasible way.

14. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/08/16/romania-buy-32-f-35s/ 15. https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-modernization-tpt-f-16s 16. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/05/17/romanian-lawmakers-vote-to-approve-11-billion-abrams-acquisition/ 17. https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-assault-amphibious-vehicles 18. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/08/the-dawn-of-deterrence-listing-romanias.html 19. https://www.defenseromania.ro/romania-intends-to-buy-two-french-scorpene-submarines-for-2-billion-euros_622746.html#google_vignette 20. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/black-sea-gas-platform-launched-off-romania-despite-war-risks-2022-06-28/ 21. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/a-new-black-sea-natural-gas-project-could-be-a-game-changer-for-the-region-and-achallenge-for-putin/

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

However, this surplus gas can be sold to countries like Serbia 2.4 BCM 22, Moldova 1.5 BCM (not including gas consumption in Transnistria), Bulgaria 3BCM. It could even be sold to Hungary to improve strained relations an aid in reducing dependence on Russia for gas. This would fit in line with currently registered 3SI projects for Romania which aim to develop the gas network, such as the BRUA23 program. Although, as great as it all sounds an as feasible as all these plans are, the strategic interests of Romania in regards to energy extraction from the black sea are directly endangered24 by the Russian war effort. This has led to constant and consistent calls to secure the southeastern flank of NATO. The unescapable consequences of Russia’s war acutely affect Romania physically, Black-sea gas extraction operations and operation expansions are endangered 25 by drifting sea mines, naval and air patrols as well. Moreover, during Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine’s Danube port infra-

structure 26, namely the ports of Izmail an Reni there have been various reports of alleged Russian suicide drones aiming for Ukrainian port facilities impacting on Romanian soil. Therefore, Romania has significantly bolstered defenses in the region with the addition of 4 additional US F-16 fighters27 to patrol the airspace, along with 100 additional US soldiers forward deployed to the region. Overall, Romania’s reaction to the war in Ukraine has been significantly curtailed in both publicity and boldness due to its geographic disposition. Meaning, it needs to proceed with upmost caution and vigilance, however, in the backdrop of the complex security situation arising from Russian war activities it is Romania’s priority focus to leverage 3SI programs aimed at improving gas network interconnectivity to be able to export from new Black-sea exploration, both for economic benefit and to lessen Russian influence on regional energy security.

Baltics The Baltics represent the northern border of the 3SI member states with Russia, with a generally geographically unfavorable position that has a relatively small population and economy compared to that of Russia. Therefore, the responses of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are catered towards the security requirements necessitated by the Russia.

Estonia in their most recent NSS has taken the most proactive position among the Baltic countries by raising military spending to 3% of GDP28. This has allowed for Estonia to embrace, similarly to Poland, and arms purchasing spree which translates into 54% 29 of the 2023-2026 military budget being spent on arms procurement. Among its shopping spree are a couple

22. Here The numerical BCM value illustrates each listed countries national gas consumption in BCM, the data is sourced from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/a-new-black-sea-natural-gas-project-could-be-a-game-changer-for-the-region-and-a-challenge-for-putin/ 23. https://projects.3seas.eu/ 24. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/black-sea-gas-platform-launched-off-romania-despite-war-risks-2022-06-28/ 25. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/black-sea-gas-platform-launched-off-romania-despite-war-risks-2022-06-28/ 26. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-bolsters-defences-stop-ukraine-war-crossing-nato-threshold-2023-09-29/ 27. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-bolsters-defences-stop-ukraine-war-crossing-nato-threshold-2023-09-29/ 28. https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/government-updated-national-security-concept-estonia 29. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/06/13/estonias-global-arms-buying-spree-seeks-drastic-combat-gains/

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

big ticket items, such as 30, 6 HIMARS systems from the US, IRIS-T missile defense systems from Germany, K-9 SPH systems from Korea, Harpy long-range loitering munitions from Israel. These form a very observable policy focus in Tallin, that is to develop a potent deterrent force. In the meantime, while Estonia is raising and army against the east, it looks to further its economic and energy integration with the west. This is most apparent in projects registered by Estonia and ones which it is participating in within the framework of the 3SI 31. A significant priority is given towards LNG capacity, as planned with the LNG terminal in Paldiski 32 . However, it is crucial to underline that Estonian security strategy relies on a Baltic strategy, which in larger terms translates into a credible deterrence strategy for NATO. Latvia plans to go down the same economic approach as Estonia with regards to constructing infrastructure towards a more western facing economy, however, the Latvian change of strategy in reaction to the war in Ukraine has been more focused, as highlighted in their most recent NSS33, was to counter Russian influence whether it be through hybrid means or direct foreign special service operations and intelligence gathering efforts aimed at undermining national interests. The counterintelligence focus of Latvia stems from the large Russian foreign special service presence that operates in Latvia. 34 The Constitutional protection Bureau SAB published in its annual 2022 report35 that cyber-attacks have increased 40% since the start of the invasion,

moreover, in addition to Russia “actively developing informational influence operations” there is also a significant effort by Russia to spread disinformation. This means that whether its economic, military, or political focuses Latvia intends to embark on general security in all sectors is of the highest degree of importance. Lastly, Lithuania shares commonalities with the Polish approach, as after all Lithuania sits on the other side of the Suwałki Gap and Kaliningrad while also jointly dealing with Poland on the hybrid threats emanating from Belarus. The 2017 NSS36 still in effect, but amended, puts forward the security challenges posed by China, Russia, and Belarus reflecting this in its economic agenda’s where it aims to trade and cooperate only with “democratic states”. Therefore, due to the policy position of Lithuania with regards to economic cooperation the 3SI fits the policy directive of Lithuania perfectly, while also addressing security concerns through depended infrastructure integration with western countries and the Baltics. Meanwhile, militarily Lithuania has embarked on a smaller extent rearming program with the procurement 37 of 6 HIMARS systems and NASAMS air defense systems, in addition to bolstering ammunition reserves. The reason for this is because Lithuania’s NSS promulgates the approach of total defense38 when concerning military threats, as Belarus and Kaliningrad pose the biggest national security risk to Lithuania. Overall, the Baltics states response to the war in Ukraine has been aimed at ousting Russia

30. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/06/13/estonias-global-arms-buying-spree-seeks-drastic-combat-gains/ 31. https://projects.3seas.eu/projects/commissioning-of-the-regional-lng-terminal-in-paldiski-estonia 32. https://eng.lsm.lv/article/economy/economy/12.04.2023-latvia-plans-joint-use-of-estonias-paldiski-lng-terminal.a504511/ 33. https://www.mod.gov.lv/sites/mod/files/document/NDK_ENG_final.pdf 34. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/summer-reads/article/2023/08/23/latvia-a-baltic-playground-for-moscow-spies_6104433_183.html 35. https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/defense/constitution-protection-bureau-2022-brought-most-intense-cyber-attacks-so-far.a498514/ 36. https://kam.lt/en/the-seimas-approved-the-reviewed-national-security-strategy/ 37. https://www.defensenews.com/global/2023/05/04/lithuania-readies-ammunition-buys-worth-34-billion/ 38. https://kam.lt/en/the-seimas-approved-the-reviewed-national-security-strategy/

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

influence and consolidating abilities and capabilities in terms of military strength to form a credible complement to the forward elements of NATO, together forming the credible deterrence against both hybrid and physical threats in both the physical and digital domain. A cohesive Baltic policy with regards to the Russian threat

is visible as these countries aim to address forms of Russian influence left behind from the Soviet Union, additionally, Russian propaganda and disinformation presents a collective challenge in the Baltics due to the prominence of the Russian language39 40 in the region.

Bulgaria Bulgaria’s reaction to the war in Ukraine is one that has been, and still is, deeply troubled by clashing domestic sentiments surrounding Russia’s invasion. Compounding this issue is the significant pressure exerted on Bulgarian society through the extensively present Russian foreign special service41 carrying out disinformation and even sabotage operations42. A brief note has to be made of the political landscape in Bulgaria, currently President Rumen Radev 43 does not align in a ‘pro-Ukrainian’ manner but rather a ‘pro-Russian’, in that weapon shipments are a big taboo and only work through intermediaries, even that goes hesitantly. Therefore, the economic model of Bulgaria hasn’t changed, as the current government does not view Russian gas as a threat, and seeks to continue importing it44. Pro-western elements in the Bulgarian political sphere might be eagerly looking forward for the Romanian Neptun deep

Black-sea gas exploration to wain enough Russian energy influence. The security situation is where in spite of opposing sentiments about Russia’s war in Ukraine there is a semblance of a united understanding that the Black-sea is a very real place for a Russia-NATO confrontation, with the Bulgarian Defense minister saying “We cannot rule out such an option”45. The situation is such that now amidst tensions rising in the Black-sea Bulgaria is urgently pushing through a modernization bill which would include purchasing 183 Stryker Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) 46 from the US, and even more urgently refitting its outdated anti-ship missiles for its navy which are planned to be RBS-15’s47 made by a German and Swedish led consortium. Additionally, Bulgaria has also asked for and increased NATO presence, beyond the already recently deployed NATO multinational bat-

39. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwi4m6iZ6tmBAxXD-6QKHXs3C1kQF noECBUQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Feurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu%2Fnews%2Festonia-action-plan-approved-transition-estonian-language-edu cation&usg=AOvVaw1NewHQ3c3_bZqnEKaA-0DL&opi=89978449 40. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/latvia-is-going-on-offense-against-russian-culture/ 41. https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-must-rid-its-spy-services-of-russia-backed-agents-says-head-of-leading-party/ 42. https://www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-economy-minister-bogdan-bogdanov-nikolay-denkov-hints-at-russian-attack-on-ammunition-factory/ 43. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/31/bulgaria-election-parliament-president-radev-putin-russia-ukraine-polarization/ 44. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/bulgarians-protest-against-government-accuse-it-of-being-pro-russian/2658775 45. https://kyivindependent.com/bulgarian-minister/ 46. https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-stryker-vehicles 47. https://kinsights.capital.bg/politics_and_society/2023/09/11/4527203_govt_rushes_through_long-delayed_modernization_projects/

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

tlegroup 48, but specifically Sofia would like to have allied anti-ship missile systems 49 based in Bulgaria to remedy the current security risks in the black sea, brought about by Russian naval operations. Overall, Bulgarian policy focus has had limited drastic adaptations to the circumstances brought about by the war, that is until recently after the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Deal (BSGD)

which brought with it and increasingly aggressive Russian naval presence to a point where even despite the relatively friendly relationship between the two respective presidents, Bulgaria has had to look west for the ability to guarantee its security. Additionally, dependent on political change the 3SI programs for energy connectivity throughout the region may facilitate the decrease of Russian political influence in energy security.

Hungary Hungary currently does not send military equipment to Ukraine due to national policy orientation towards and immediate peace resolution through ceasefire 50. Hungarian policy towards Ukraine and subsequent threat perception regarding the war is overwhelmingly dominated by this line of thought. However, from before the war Hungarian military industrial investments, identified in the National Military Strategy of 2021 51, are now accruing a positive political capital return on investment with the country also embarking on a military procurement spree. Hungary has invested in mainly procurement of German military hardware and partnerships in the defense industry, namely the Lynx IFV factory 52 , the Leopard 2A7HU MBT’s 53, PzH

2000 (SPH) 54, and H225 M helicopters 55. These represent the fruition of the Hungarian modernization effort starting from 2018 where German platforms were chosen to replace the aging Soviet tanks. Regarding the security situation, as these military procurement contracts were from before the war, therefore, as a policy decision they cannot be attributed to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. However, Hungary energy security wise is in a similar position to that of Austria, in the sense that currently there’s a large dependency on Russian energy 56, as it one of the deepest structural dependency on Russian energy and energy infrastructure, namely due to the Russian built nuclear reactor and even currently being expanded by the Russians 57, although in a slow but gradual policy pivot western economic infra-

48. https://kyivindependent.com/bulgarian-minister/ 49. https://kinsights.capital.bg/politics_and_society/2023/09/11/4527203_govt_rushes_through_long-delayed_modernization_projects/ 50. https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fm-the-world-is-waiting-for-peace-in-ukraine 51. https://defence.hu/news/national-military-strategy-of-hungary.html 52. https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2023/8/2023-08-18-rheinmetall-opens-lynx-infantry-fighting-vehicle-factory-in-zalaegerszeg,-hungary 53. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-defense-forces-first-leopard-2a7hu-tank-arrives/ 54. https://euro-sd.com/2023/05/articles/31349/hungarys-modernisation-plans/ 55. https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2023-07-first-two-h225m-helicopters-delivered-to-hungary 56. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/20509.pdf 57. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-gets-eus-ok-amend-russian-nuclear-plant-contract-2023-05-25/

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

structure France is a partner58 in this expansion of the nuclear reactor at Paks as well. Hungary also aims to utilize the 3SI to develop energy infrastructure projects to decrease gas dependency, this is done through participation in the BRUA 59 program and also a 3SI program around unconventional gas extraction 60 in Hungary.

Therefore, the current policy focus of Hungary in response to the war in Ukraine is to develop the economic infrastructure to lessen its Russian monopoly like energy dependance through various channels of bilateral agreements and also through the 3SI. Hungarian rearement and military industrial investment currently benefits from positive political perception61 and is therefore likely continue with more partnerships aiming to produce arms in Hungary.

Slovakia Following the elections Slovakia is facing a similar prospect as Hungary and Bulgaria with a changing threat perception regarding Russia due to the election 62 of a ‘pro-Russian’ Prime Minister Robert Fico, which will be a considerable policy change from the previous ‘pro-Ukraine’ focus under former Prime Minister Zuzana Čaputová63. However, Slovakia similarly to Hungary and Bulgaria again, also has a significant energy dependence on Russian energy64 and is also subjected to significant Russian led disinformation campaigns65 and cyber-attacks66.

ling and enforcing security in the digital domain, both for civilians, BFSI sectors which are particularly vulnerable to cybercrime, and for general national security. The issue of disinformation while intertwined with cyber due to the dissemination of information predominantly taking place in the digital domain, does not fall within the ambit of the NCS as will require a political solution, one which currently due to diverging opinions about Russia and its war in Ukraine is a complicated, rather messy, and deeply political topic in Slovakia68.

To combat the issue of cybercrimes Slovakia has adhered to a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS)67 to address and solve the issues of patrol-

Meanwhile the Slovakian NSS69 does not go as far to outline any geopolitical adversaries, however, the digital domain is emphasized heavily with the

58. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/04/28/in-hungary-paris-is-willing-to-help-build-russian-led-nuclear-reactor_6024637_4. html 59. https://projects.3seas.eu/ 60. https://projects.3seas.eu/ 61. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/01/27/defense-firms-flock-to-hungary-amid-eu-isolation/ 62. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovaks-choose-between-pro-russian-ex-pm-fico-pro-western-liberals-2023-09-29/ 63. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-slovachchina-dosyagli-takogo-rivnya-spivpraci-ya-84157 64. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-05/SK_SWD_2023_625_en.pdf 65. https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20230928-disinformation-swamps-slovakia-ahead-of-parliamentary-elections 66. https://therecord.media/votes-in-slovakias-parliament-suspended-after-alleged-cybersecurity-incident 67. https://www.nbu.gov.sk/wp-content/uploads/cyber-security/National_cybersecurity_strategy_2021.pdf 68. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/world/europe/slovakia-election-fico-ukraine.html 69. https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MO/Dokumenti/ReSNV2.pdf

Special Report

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

addition of hybrid threats. What can be observed is a hybrid non-conventional threat perception in spite of the war in Ukraine having a profound physical domain. However, this does underscore the manner in which the cyber threat is perceived in Slovakia, a non-political subject unlike physical arms procurement and the question of disinformation. Energy security wise Slovakia is not a part of the BRUA 3SI program which would bring Black-sea gas from Romania, instead Slovakia is a part of another 3SI program which is the North-South Gas Corridor that aims to bring gas from the Baltic pipe via the Baltic Energy Market Inter-

connection Plan. This would be a paradigm shift for Slovakia’s energy supply as it would mean and alternative pipeline with a larger capacity than the proposed Bratislava LNG terminal70. Overall, it goes to say Slovakia’s response in threat perception is a doubling of efforts in the digital domain for both civilian and military sectors in and effort to curtail state and non-state actors malignin influence. Additionally, through the 3SI program it is and observable current Slovak policy focus to change its energy mix, that is in terms of suppliers not sources of energy.

Austria Austria, even though it does not border Ukraine or Russia it’s position is domestically extremely complicated and nuanced due to its permanent neutrality 71 following WW2, raising many questions within society about the extent of support towards Ukraine. Although, the 3SI programs is something Austria has significant regional geopolitical interests in, especially with regards to the western Balkans but could also influence Austrian energy dependance on Russia72.

Austria due its permanent neutrality is one of two countries in the EU who does not send weapons to Ukraine 73, with the second being Hungary, what’s more is the security question for Austria is a relatively simple one due to its neutrality and duality in foreign policy. However, with Ukraine’s associated member state 74 status in the 3SI, Austria has begun to explore the possibilities of replacing Russian energy from Ukraine, furthermore, Austria is also a partner in the Romanian led BRUA75 natural gas network connectivity improvement projects under the 3SI.

70. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/slovakias-decision-to-build-first-lng-terminal-in-bratislava-port-faces-criticism/ 71. https://www.ankasam.org/the-impact-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-on-austrias-foreign-policy/?lang=en 72. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-12/AT%202022%20Energy%20Snapshot_rev.pdf 73. https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/war-in-ukraine-tests-austria-s-status-as-gateway-to-the-east-1.1966426 74. https://3seas.eu/about/objectives 75. https://projects.3seas.eu/

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

INSPET.RO

Summary Currently the Eastern flank, which is where most 3SI member states are located, represent the frontier in revived geopolitical rivalry in which Ukraine has found itself in the midst of as a victim of blatant Russian aggression. However, the security policies and interests of this region represent the forefront of NATO’s credible deterrent policy, this deterrent is not credible only due to the number of tanks, helicopters, and warships but is acutely influenced and determined by the economic health of those

Special Report

nations. The 3SI initiative has transformed into a finance vehicle for accelerating eastern European gas network development with the objective of replacing Russian energy, both in the interest of dismantling the Russian war economy by removing gas revenues, and also by addressing national security concerns of potential leverage points Russia might have would it continue to be trusted to be a European energy provider.

www.warsawinstitute.org

THE RESPONSE OF THE THREE SEAS INITIATIVE COUNTRIES TO THE WAR IN UKRAINE

author: Benjamin Bardos Benjamin Bardos is a core writer in the Transatlantic Perspectives journal at European Horizons, focusing on transatlantic security and defense issues. Furthermore, he is currently doing an L.L.M degree of Global law at Tilburg University. He is also apart of the Hungarian Youth Atlantic Association, focusing on NATO military policy and European security architecture.

www.warsawinstitute.org

Special Report

Warsaw Institute Wilcza St. 9, 00-538 Warsaw, Poland +48 22 417 63 15 office@warsawinstitute.org

THE TASK IS FINANCED BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FREEDOM - CENTER FOR CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS FOR 2018-2030, PRIORITY 4. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC THINK TANKS, EDITION 2022.